GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU AND ANR.versusA. RAJAPANDIAN

           GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU AND ANR.                                A
                                   v.
                          A. RAJAPANDIAN

                          OCTOBER 24, 1994
                                                                            B
         [KULDIP SINGH AND B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, JJ.]

     Service Law-Disciplinary Proceedings-Administrative Tribunal not
empowered to re-appreciate evidence recorded by inquiring authority.

       Respondent joined service as Sub Inspector Police. Disciplinary      C
proceedings were held against him on three charges. The charges were
found proved against the respondent and as a consequence he was dis·
missed from service. The order was challenged. The Administrative
Tribunal set aside the dismissal order solely on re-appreciation of the
evi!lence recorded by the inquiring authority and reaching the conclusion   D
that the evidence was not sufficient to prove the charges against the
respondent. This appeal by Special leave challenged the order of the
Administrative Tribunal.

     Allowing the appeal, this Court
                                                                            E
       HELD : The Administrative Tribunal fell into patent error in re-ap·
predating and going into the sufficiency of evidence. It has been authorita·
lively settled that the Administrative Tribunal cannot sit as a Court of
Appeal over a decision based on the findings of the inquiring authority in
disciplinary proceedings. Where there is some relevant material which the F
disciplinary authority has accepted and which material reasonably sup·
port the conclusions reached by the disciplinary authority, it is not the
function of the Administrative Tribunal to review the same and reach a
different finding than that of the disciplinary authority. The Administra·
live Tribunal, in this case, has found no fault with the proceedings held by G
the inquiring authority. It has quashed the dismissal order by re-ap-
preciating the evidence and reaching a finding different than that of the
inquiring authority. The Tribunal fell into patent error and acted wholly
beyond its jurisdiction. The impugned order of the Administrative
Tribunal is set aside. Order dismissing the respondent from the police
service is upheld. (709-G-H, 710-A·B, 712-B, 713-B]                          H
                                  707
    708                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A         Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur, [1972] 2 SCR 218 and Union of
    India v. Parma Nand, [1989] 2 SCR 19, relied on.

            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 6964 of
    1994.

B        From the Judgment and Order dated 4.9.91 of the Tamil Nadu
    Administrafive Tribunal, Madras in T.A. No. 1256 of 1989.

            Mrs. Aruna Mathur for the Appellants.

            S. Srinivasan for the Respondent.
c
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

            KULDIP SINGH, J. Delay condoned.

            Special leave granted.
D
           A. j\ajapandian, respondent in the appeal herein, joined service as
    Sub Inspector Police in the State of Tamil Nadu. He was promoted to the
    post of Inspector in the year 1977. The Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceed-
    ings, Madras, held inquiry against him on three charges out of five framed
E   against him. Jn the departmental inquiry the Tribunal found the three
    charges proved against the respondent and as a consequence he was
    dismissed from service by the order dated February 7, 1984. He challenged
    the order by way of writ petition before the Madras High Court. The writ
    petition was subsequently transferred to the Tamil Nadu Administrative
    Tribunal. The Administrative Tribunal by its order dated September 4,
F   1991 allo~ed the transfer petition and set aside the dismissal order. This
    appeal by the State of Tamil Nadu is against the order of the Administra-
    tive Tribunal.

           The Administrative Tribunal set aside the order of dismissal solely
G   on re-appreciation of the evidence recorded by the inquiring authority and
    reaching the conclusion that the evidence was not sufficient to prove the
    charges against the respondent. We have no hesitation in holding at the
    outset that the Administrative Tribunal fell into patent error in re-ap-
    preciating and going into the sufficiency of evidence. It has been authorita-
    tively settjed by string of authorities of this Court that the administrative
H   Tribunal cannot sit as ~ Court of Appeal over a decision based on the
        GOVT.OFT.N. v. A RAJAPANDIAN [KULDIP SINGH,J.]                 709

findings of the inquiring authority in disciplinary proceedings. Wl:tere A
there is some relevant material which the disciplinary authority has ac-
cepted and which material reasonably support the conclusion reached by
the disciplinary authority, it is not the function of the Administrative
Tribunal to review the same and reach different finding than that of the
disciplinary authority. The Administrative Tribunal, in this case, has found B
no fault with the proceedings held by the inquiring authority. It has
quashed the dismissal order by re-appreciating the evidence and reaching
a finding different than that of the inquiring authority.

      The charges framed against the respondent were as under : -

        "Charge I(i) :
                                                                               c
           The accused officer had failed to seize cash Rs. 578. 53 found
        on the person of Christopher, one of the accused in the above case ·
        and to treat the same as case property, but treated as personal
        ~.                                                                     D
        Chmge III:

            That actuated by corrupt motive and in abuse of his position
        and authority when he was working as Sub-Inspector of Police
        (Crime) D-2 Anna Salai Police Station, Madras demanded and             E
        received an illegal gratification of Rs. 100 on 6-4-1974 at about 6
        P.M. outside the D-2 Anna Salai Police Station, Madras-2 from
        Mr. K.R. Padmanabhan (mentioned under charge I) for arresting
        the absconding accused involved in Crime No. 427n4 under Sec-
        tion 420 IPC of D-2 Anna Salai Police Station, Madras-2 and also
        for investigation of the case.                                         F

        Charge W:

            That actuated by corrupt motive and in abuse of his position
        and authority, when he (accused officer) was working as Sub-In-
        spector of Police (Crime) D-2 Police Station, Madras, he (accused      G
        officer) demanded an illegal gratification of Rs. 2,000 from Mr.
        KR. Padmanabhan, witness mentioned under Charge I, when he
        came to D-2 Police Station after two days of registration of the
        case (Cr. No. 427n4) Section 420 !PC D-2 Anna Salai Police
        Station, Madras to find out the progress of his case, to go to         H
    710                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A           Tirunelveli and other places in search of the absconding accused
            concerned in Cr. No.427/74 of D-2 Police Station, and received
            Rs. 500 as illegal gratification from the said Padmanabhan in the
            front verandah of the D-2 Police Station, Madras-2 at about 5.30
            P.M. on 12.4.1974 and at the same time also demanded another
            sum .of Rs. 1,000 as illegal gratification stating that the amount of
B           Rs . .$00 given was inadequate to meet the expenses."

          During the inquiry apart from documentary evidence PW-I K.R.
    Padmanabhan, PW-2 Dr. Hakeem Syed Karimullah Hussain Khadiri, PW-
    3 lsheq, PW"5 Azeez Ahmed and PW-6 Thirunavukkarasu were examined
C   as witnesses. On the basis of the evidence produced before the inquiring
    authority, the charges were held to be proved against the respondent.

          The Administrative Tribnnal, while reversing the enquiring authority,
    discussed the evidence pertaining to charge No. III in the following words:

D
            "According to PW-1 when the amount of Rs. 100 was handed over,
            PW-2 and PW-5 were also present nearby and they knew about
            the· same. PW-2 in his evidence is emphatic that the amount of Rs.
            100 was handed over to the applicant by PW-1 in his presence
            which was also witnessed by PWs 3 and 5. PW-3 is equally emphatic
E           that he did not see the amount of Rs. 100 passing over to the
            applicant. PW-5 is not an 'independent witness and by his own
            ad!llission he follows whatever PW-2 says. PW-5 says that there
            are four divisions in the D-2 Police Station and it is crowded police
            station. The contradiction in the evidence is that while PW-1 says
            th~t PWs 2 and 5 were present when the amount was handed over
F
            to the applicant and PW-2 says that himself along with PWs 3 and
            5 ~ave witnessed the amount being handed over to the applicant
            whereas PW-3 categorically denies to have seen the amount being
            paid to the applicant. When pointed out, the Tribunal brushed it
            aside, merely with the observation that the Tribunal does not see
G           any material contradiction in the facts of the case, and there is no
            reason to disbelieve the version of the prosecntion witnesses 1, 2,
            3 and 5.''

    Similarly, regarding charge No. IV relating to demand of illegal gratifica-
H tion of Rs. 2,000, the Administrative Tribunal observed as under :
  GOVf. OFT.N. v. A RAJAPANDIAN [KULDIP SINGH, J.]             711

 "The prosecution has cited five witnesses in support of the charge A
 but they have dispensed with the evidence of F athima Bi wife of
 PW-2. She is a more important witness to prove this charge
 because she is the person who has obtained a loan of Rs. 750 by
 pledging some jewels in the Janopakara Nidhi, Triplicane. Accord-
 ing to PW-4, the accountant of the said Nidhi, one Fathima Bi B
 claiming to be the wife of Syed Karimulla pledged some gold jewels
 on 11.4.1974 and obtained a loan of Rs. 750. Unless the said
 Fathima Bi is examined, one cannot be sure whether Fathima Bi
 referred to by PW-4 is the wife of PW-2 or not. PW-4 has categori-
 cally stated that the husband's name and address were given by
 the mortgagee and he has no personal knowledge. She has affixed C
 her thumb impression in the register of the Janopakara Nidhi at
 the time of the pledging of the jewels and according to PW-4 only
 those mortgagees who are not literate are asked to afflX their
 thumb impression. While Fathima Bi has affixed her thumb im-
  pression in the register of the said Nidhi, she has signed in the D
  statement before the Inspector of Vigilance when she was en-
  quired. Therefore, it is obvious that when she is a literate there is
  no reason why she has affixed her thumb impression while pledging
  the jewels. The prosecution has not let in any evidence to show
  that subsequent to the pledging of the jewels Fathiroa Bi wife of
  PW-2 has learnt to sign. Therefore, in view of the conduct of the E
  prosecution in dispensing with the evidence of Fathiroa Bi, there
  is considerable suspicion about their case. 11

Regarding Charge No.I, the Administrative Tribunal held as under:
                                                                      F
  "It can at best be described as a lapse on the part of the applicant
  in the investigation and it will not constitute a corrupt practice and
  therefore, would not fall within the scope of reference to the
  Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings. The police officers are
  governed by the Police Standing Orders and by the Criminal
  Procedure Code and in the matter of seizure of cash, from the G
  person of the accused. Considering the circumstances, it is well
  within their rights to treat the cash as personal property and there
  is nothing in doing the same."

We have quoted above three paragraphs from the impugned order H
    712                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A of the Administrative Tribunal to show that the Tribunal re-appreciated
    the evidence recorded before the inquiring authority. The Administrative
    Tribunal reached different conclusions from the inquiring· al!thority on its
    own evaluation of the evidence. The Tribunal fell into patent error and
    acted wholly beyond its jurisdiction. It is not necessary for us to go into the
    merits of appreciation of evidence by the two authorities because we are
B
    of the view that the Administrative Tribunal has no jurisdiction to sit as an
    appellate authority over the findings of the inquiring authority.

          This Court in Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur, [1972] 2 SCR 218
    held as under :
c           "A disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial. The standard of
            proof required is that of preponderance of probability and not
            proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the inference that Nand Kumar
            was a person likely to have official dealings, with the respondent
            was one which reasonable person would draw from the proved
D           fa~ts of the case, the High Court cannot sit as a court of appeal
            over a decision based on it. Where there are some relevant
            materials which the authority has accepted and which materials
            1I1ay reasonably support the conclusion that the officer is guilty, it
            is not the function of the High Court exercising its jurisdiction
            under Art. 226 to review the materials and to arrive at an inde-
E
            pendent finding on the materials. If the enquiry has been properly
            held the question of adequacy or reliability of the evidence cannot
            be convassed before the High Court."

          In Union of Jndia v. Parma Nand, [1989] 2 SCR 19 this Court
F observed as under :
            ''We must unequivocally state that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal
            \o interfere with the disciplinary matters or punishment cannot be
            ~quated with an appellate jurisdiction. The Tribunal cannot inter·
            fere with the findings of the Inquiry Officer or competent authority
G           where they are not arbitrary or utterly perverse. It is appropriate
            to remember that the power to impose penalty on a delinquent
            officer is conferred on the competent authority either by an Act
            of legislature or rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the
            Constitution. If there has been an enquiry consistent with the rules
H           and in accordance with principles of natural justice what punish·
        GOVT. OF T.N. v. A RAJAP ANDIAN [KULDIP SINGH, J.]            713

        men! would meet the ends of justice is a matter exclusively within A
        the jurisdiction of the competent authority. If the penalty can
        lawfully be imposed and is imposed on the proved misconduct, the
        Tribunal has no power to substitute its own discretion for that of
        the authority."

      We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the impugned order of the   B
Administrative Tribunal and uphold the order dismissing the respondent
from the police service. No costs.

A.G.                                                     Appeal allowed.