Holding

The conviction under Section 3048 IPC is upheld as the High Court correctly applied the presumption of dowry death and properly evaluated the evidence.

Summary

The appellant Govindaraju was convicted under Section 3048 of the IPC for the death of his wife Susheela, who died from burn injuries within seven years of marriage. The prosecution alleged that the husband and his family demanded dowry, harassed Susheela for non‑payment, and subjected her to cruelty, leading to her unnatural death. The trial court acquitted the accused, but the Karnataka High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted Govindaraju, finding that the evidence of dowry demand, harassment, and the presumption under Section 1138 of the Evidence Act was established. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly appreciated the evidence, rejected the trial court’s erroneous findings, and affirmed the conviction. Consequently, the appellant's challenge was dismissed and the conviction under Section 3048 upheld.

Issues considered

The trial court erred in acquitting the accused despite evidence of dowry demand and harassment.
Whether the High Court was entitled to review the evidence afresh and overturn the acquittal.
Whether the facts established a presumption of dowry death under Section 1138 of the Evidence Act.

Legislation cited

Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 1138, s. 113-B
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 201, s. 302, s. 3048, s. 34

Subjects

dowry deathSection 3048 IPCpresumption under Evidence Actappellate review of evidencecrueltyunnatural death within seven yearsconvictionacquittal

Judgment

[2009] 9 S.C.R. 1074

\.-
A GOVINDARAJU l
v.
STATE OF KARNATAKA
(Criminal Appeal No. 570 of 2003)

MAY 29, 2009
B
[V. S. SIRPURKAR AND . R.M. LODHA, JJ.]
1..
J

Penal Code, 1860 - s.3048 - Death of woman within + ••
seven years of marriage·,_ Demand of dowry and cruelty
c alleged - Charges u/s. 302, 3048, 201 rlw. 34 /PC - Acquittal
by trial court - Conviction of husband uls. 3048 by High Court
- On appeal, held: Demand and payment of dowry and dowry
harassment, cruelty meted out to the deceased and her
unnatural death proved - High Court order justified - The }'
D case is covered by the presumption uls. 1138 of Evidence
Act - Evidence Act, 1872 --s. 1138. ¥-
-<
Appeal - Power of appellate .court - Review of evidence
- Permissibility - Held: The court has full power to review the
evidence and to arrive at its own independent conclusion
E
either in appeal against conviction or acquittal.

Appellant-accused alongwith his parents and brQther
was alleged to have killed his wife (deceased). One of the +
accused died before framing of the charges. Charges '
F were framed u/ss. 302, 3048, 201 r/w s.34 IPC. One of the
remaining three accused died during trial. Trial Court
acquitted both the accused. Hfgh Court, in appeal,
confirmed the acquittal of one accused; while convicted
the appellant u/s. 3048 IPC. Hen.ce the present appeal.
G
Dismissing the appeal, th~ Court i .....

HELD: 1. The judgment convicting the accused for
the offence u/s. 3048 IPC is correct. High Court has

H 1074
GOVINDARAJU v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 1075

appreciated the evidence very deeply and the trial court A
had gravely erred in not accepting the evidence of PW-
1, without any justifiable reason. It is a basic principle that
the evidence of witness has to be appreciated as a whole,
when the evidence of an ordinary witness, who is not
much educated and comes from a poor strata of society, 8
not having the advantage of education. The Court has to
keep in mind all these aspects. The witness is not
expected to remember every small thing, more
particularly when he faces the shock of the untimely
death of his near relative. The finding reached by the trial C
court that there was no payment of dowry, appears to be
a totally incorrect finding tending to be perverse. The
main reason for this appears to be contradiction in the
evidence of PW-1 and PW-18, completely ignoring the fact
that PW-18 was an illiterate woman and could not be
expected to remember the details regarding the date on D
which the amount was paid to the appellant. [Paras 13
and 16] [1084-F-H; 1085-A-B; 1087-B-C]

2. In returning the finding that there was no dowry
harassment to the deceased by the accused persons, the E
trial court had completely ignored the evidence of PW-3,
which remained absolutely unshaken on that issue. In
fact, even PW-5 had supported the case of the dowry
harassment and so did PW-6, who is the immediate
neighbour of appellant/A-1. Of course, PW-6 was declared F
hostile in his cross-examination. However, even he had
admitted that there used to be quarrels in the house of
the accused persons. The theory of love affair of the
deceased was also denied by this witness in his cross-
examination by the accused. PW-3 and PW-5 had . G
specifically referred about the ill treatment of the
deceased on account of non-payment of dowry and there
was absolutely no cross-examination ori the payment of
dowry, as also the complaints made by the deceased
H
1076 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 9 S.C.R.

A against the accused persons that she was ill treated on i
account of non-payment of Rs. 5,000/- The finding
recorded that there was no continuous onslaught, cruelty
or harassment was clearly an incorrect finding, without
even bothering to realize that there was no cross-
B examination of the witnesses like PWs-1, 3 and 5 on that
'issue, though they had very specifically asserted that the
deceased was being ill treated on account of non-
payment of dowry. [Para 13) [1085-8-G] t·
3. The High Court has full power to review the
c evidence and to arrive at its own independent conclusion
whether the appeal is against conviction or acquittal. The
High Court was also alive to the situation that it was
considering an acquittal judgment wherein, firstly, there
was a general presumption in favour of innocence of the
D person accused in a criminal case, which presumption
was strengthened by the acquittal, and further, that every .
accused is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt
regarding his guilt and that if the High Court acquitted
such acc'used, he would still retain that benefit in the
E appellate Court also. From the way the evidence has
been appreciated by the High Court, it is clear that the
High Court has disapproved of the findings given by the
Trial Court and has done the whole exercise of ,,..
a.ppreciation of evidence independently. The High Court
F has given a clear finding that the Trial Court was palpably
wrong in holding that the prosecution had failed to prove
the guilt of the accused, more particularly, under Section
3048, IPC. Here· was a case which was· completely
covered by the presumption u/s. 1138 of Evidence Act,
G since all the aspects such as the cruelty meted out to the
deceased, her unnatural death within the time span of
seven years and constant demands of dowry were
proved to the hilt. [Para 14] (1086-8-H]

Dhanna Etc. v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1996 (10) SCC
H
GOVINDARAJU v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 1077

-.I

' 79; Alarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat 2002 (3) SCC 57
and Beta! Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1996 (8) SCC
A

205, relied on.

Case Law Reference:

1996 (10) sec 79 Relied on. Para 14 B

2002 (3) sec 57 Relied on. Para 14
~

' 1996 (8) sec 205 Relied on. Para 14

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal c
No. 570 of 2003.

From the Judgment & Order dated 29.10.2002 of the High
Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Appeal No. 904
of 1997.
D
...,. - Naresh Kaushik, Rupesh Kaushik, Lalitha Kaushik for the
"' Appellants.

Anil Kr. Mishra, Sanjay R. Hegde for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by E

V.S. SIRPURKAR, J. 1. In this appeal which has been filed
~
j.
by one Govindaraju, original accused No. 1 before the Trial
Court (appellant herein), the challenge is against his conviction
for the offence under Section 3048 Indian Per.al Code (IPC) F
and the consequent punishment of rigorous imprisonment for
seven years. Initially, the appellanUaccused Govindaraju was
tried for offence under Section 302 and/or 3048, IPC along with
his father and mother, accused Nos. 2 and 3 respectively as
also his brother Vasu, accused No.4. They were tried for the G
).
r murder of Susheela, the wife of Govindaraju (present appellant)
which took place on the night between 28/29 January, 1987 in
her matrimonial home which was No. CH.27/1, 6th Cross,
Ashokapuram, Mysore.
H
1078 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 9 S.C.R.

A 2. Eventually, we are not concerned with accused Nos. 2
and 3 and also the accused No.4, Vasu, as the accused No. 2
Krishnaiah and accused No. 3, Eramma @ Marimadamma
died during the pendency of the trial and accused No. 4 was
acquitted both by Sessions Court and the High Court. Initially,
8 both the accused No.1 (for short "A-1 ") and his brother accused
No. 4 (for short "A-4") were acquitted by the 1st Additional
Sessions Judge, Mysore. However, in appeal by the State
against this acquittal, the present appellant Govindaraju was
convicted for the offence under Section 3048, IPC and was
c sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years.
That is how the accused is before us in this appeal.

3. The prosecution case was that Susheela was married
to the present appellant on 25.05.1986. The original accused
Nos. 2 and 3 were parents of the present appellant, while A-4,
D with whom we are not· concerned, was his brother. Susheela
died due to burn injuries in her matrimonial home on the night
of 28/29 January, 1987. She had no father. Hence, her
matrimonial uncle, Ram Krishan had celebrated her marriage.
After he came to know about the death of Susheela, he filed a
E complaint at 9:30 a.m. on 29.01.1987 on the basis of which the
further investigation was started and the charge-sheet was filed
against the four accused persons. Evem before that, A-2,
Krishnaiah expired and hence the charges were framed against
accused Nos. 1, 3 and 4 for the offence under Section 302,
F 3048: 201 read with Section 34, IPC.
I , . ,

4. After the charges were framed, A-3 Eramma @
Marimadamma also expired ahd, therefore, the evidence was
recorded only against the appellant/original accused· No.1
G Govindaraju and his brother A-4, Vasu. The prosecution case
initially was that at the time of marriage the accused had
demanded the dowry of Rs;5,000/- and even thereafter during
the subsistence of marriage he kept on pestering Susheela and
her uncle for dowry. At the time when Susheela expired she was
pregnant. She was treated by her in-laws in a cruel manner and
H
GOVINDARAJU v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 1079
[V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

' ultimately murdered, or as the case may be, she committed
suicide due to the cruel treatment of her in-laws and her
A

husband. As a result of this, she died barely within a few months
of her marriage. In support of the prosecution case number of
witnesses came to be examined including PW-1, her
matrimonial uncle, PW-2, her brother, PW-3 another elderly 8
relative and her mother as also some other relations including
. ,. t PW-4 along with other witnesses on investigation and the
medical aspect.

5. Initially, the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Mysore
acquitted all the accused persons which acquittal was
c
challenged before the High Court which set aside the judgment
of the Sessions Judge insofar as the present appellant is.
concerned and convicted him ·for the offence under Section
l 304-8.
) D
-( " 6. The Learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the
' appellant, vehemently contended that the High Court had erred
in upsetting the judgment of acquittal passed by the Trial Court.
In that, the High Court had not found specifically that the findings
on acquittal recorded by the Trial Court were in any manner E
perverse. He further pointed out that the case of the prosecution
~ was initially to the effect that all the accused persons had
.; committed murder of Susheela and the charge under Section
304-8 IPC was also be framed against the accused persons.
The charge under Section 302 having failed and not having F
been accepted by the Trial Court, the very basis of the
prosecution case was knocked down. This aspect has not been
considered by the High Court. Further, the Learned Counsel
urged that the story that this accused (appellant herein) in
. )- particular and all the other accused in general, meted out cruel
treatment to deceased Susheela, was a myth, as there is no G
evidence, whatsoever, to suggest that Susheela wa~. in any
manner, physically tortured or ill-treated. The Learned Counsel
pointed out that there was no necessity on the part of the
=t
appellant/accused to claim dowry from the family members of
H
1080 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 9 S.C.R.
...
A Susheela, who he knew, were the poor lot. This was apart from '
the fact that he himself was earning quite well being a Cashier
in a Bank. The Learned Counsel pointed out that even at the
time of marriage, the husband had not insisted on any dowry.
It is further pointed out that the appellant/accused loved his wife
B and was a caring husband, particularly because she was
pregnant. It was missed by the High Court that the appellant/
accused had taken the deceased for a picnic at a place called -t ~ ;

Balamoori, barely a couple of days prior to the incident. It was
lastly suggested that the evidence of PWs 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 18
c was not trustworthy and the witnesses were· given to
exaggerations. According to the Learned Counsel, the
Sessions Judge had taken a possible view of the matter and,
therefore, the High Court should have given due weight to the
judgment of acquittal.
"(
D 7. The Learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the -(.

prosecution, however, supported the judgment and invited our
attention to the evidence of PW-1 Ramakrishna, PW-2
Doreswamy, PW-3 Chikkaputtaiah, PW-4 Mariyamma, PW-6
Shankaranarayana, as also, PW-18 Puttasiddamma, who is
E the mother of the deceased. The Learned prosecutor also
invited our attention to the fact that the first three witnesses and
-;...
more particularly, the mother had spoken specifically about the \; .....
demands· of dowry by the accused and there was very little or >-
no cross-examination on the issue of dowry. Further, all the four
F witnesses. have spoken about the complaint of ill-treatment
being given by the appellant/accused and his parents.
According to the Counsel, the death of Susheela being
unnatural death within seven years of the marriage and she
having been treated cruelly, there is a presumption under
_,, ~

G Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, which would nail the
accused. Our attention was also invited to the evidence of
Doctors.

8. We have seen the judgment of the Trial Court, as' well
as, the High Court closely. In his judgment, the Sessions Judge
H
.....

GOVINDARAJU v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 1081
... [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
\
was almost convinced that this was a case of murder. He A
..... pointed out that there was no explanation on the part of the
accused persons as to how Susheela got burnt and who was
the person who threw water on the body of Susheela, as the
body was found wet when the witnesses reached the spot. The
Sessions Judge also expressed, though in a halting manner, B
that though when the outsiders reached the house of the
ll i accused where the deceased died, the door was closed from
inside, the said door could be locked from inside by putting
hand through the window, which had the enough space and,
therefore, the Sessions Judge expressed his suspicion. He also c
pointed out that the case that the deceased had committed
suicide and had died at 7' 0 clock in the morning, was also
not convincing. However, the Sessions Judge gave a benefit
of doubt to discard the theory of murder, on the ground that the
door was locked from inside and was closed and had to be D
)'
-.. broken by all the persons, who came there. The Sessions
Judge had noted that there were no soot particles found either
in the respiratory passage or inside the lungs of the deceased
~ and, therefore, a theory could be propounded that she died first
and then was burnt. However, the Sessions Judge also found
E
that the Doctor, in his evidence, had fixed the time of death
between 18 to 24 hours prior to the post mortem, which took

,.
J
-+ place on 29.1.1987. The Sessions Judge had also discussed
in details the fact that there were no struggle marks on the dead
body of Susheela, which was a circumstance in favour of the
accused to rule out the theory of murder. Be that as it may, the F
Sessions judge, however, has in the clearest possible terms,
come to the conclusion that Susheela had died as she had
committed suicide.

- r 9. It was then that the Sessions Judge went on to examine
as to whether the suicide was on account of the cruel treatment
having been given to the deceased Susheela and on that
backdrop, the Trial Court examined the evidence and came to
G

the conclusion that indeed Susheela was in the advance stage
of pregnancy and, therefore, it was unlikely that she would H
1082 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 9 S.C.R.
....
t
A commit suicide for no reason. This finding was criticized as an
.A
inferential finding by the defence, but in our opinion, it would
not be so. F~r this purpose, the evidence of PWs, who were
the relations would be extremely relevant.

10. In his evidence, PW-1 Ramakrishna spoke about the
B
demand of Rs.5,000/- on account of dowry at the time of
marriage, which he could not arrange and, therefore, had
promised the appellant/accused that he would pay later on and
-t .>

that he actually paid Rs.2,000/- before the death of Susheela.
It was pointed out by the defence that there was some
c contradiction in the evidence of PW-1 and PW-18 on this issue
on payment of Rs.2,000/-. However, in our opinion, that ..;.
contradiction is minor, considering the fact that PW-18 is_ an
illiterate person. When we see the evidence of PW-1, who was
extensively cross-examined, we find tha.t his claim about the·
D demand of dowry remains unshaken in his cross-examination. '(
.,.
Here was a poor man, who had to take loans for arranging the
marriage of his sister's daughter though he himself hardly had
any income. He specifically claimed that he took loans from the
Society and was paying the installments on account of that. He
E also specifically stated that Susheela complained to him on 2-
3 occasions when she had come to his place, where her mother
also stayed, that she was in trouble on account of the non- .+-
.....
payment of Rs.5,000/-, which this witness had agreed to pay .,:_
at the time of marriage. He claimed that the accused persons
F were harassing Susheela for not bringing -the balance amount
of dowry and that every time, he had to pacify. He also asserted
that the accused were not sending Susheela to his house at
the time of festivals and that they had sent Susheela to his house
only twice after the marriage. At this juncture, it must be
/

-
~
G observed that there was hardly any distance between the house
of this witness and Susheela's matrimonial house. Susheela's
house was in the other street, which was near the house of the
witness. It is strange that a newly married girl like Susheela
could be sent to her parental house, which is so near only on
H 2-3 occasions. That is also the claim of the other witnesses like
GOVINDARAJU v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 1083
""--.' [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
~
PWs 2, 3 and 18. PW-1 also pointed out that a day prior to A
""-· death, Susheela was not taking any food and, therefore, he and
his elder brother's son Doreswamy (PW-2) went to the house
of accused situated in the 6th Cross, Ashokapuram, Mysore
in the evening and at that time, the appellant/accused was not
present in his house and Susheela cried on his being asked B
as to why she is not having any food and had expressed that
~ -->- she was afraid to continue to live in her husband's house, as
the husband and his relatives were harassing and that she could
be taken to her parental house.

11. The witness further asserted that when at his instance,
c
Susheela had started taking her food, the appellant/accused
came there and got angry as to how she was having food and
he was not called. At that time also, when the witness wanted.
to take Susheela along with him, the appellant/accused
y expressed that she should remove her Thali (an ornament worn D
" by a married lady) and then alone she could leave the hoJse. If
this was the treatment received by Susheela and that too
before her maternal uncle, it could be imagined what could be
the state of affairs otherwise. Thereafter, the witness saw only
the dead body of the girl. All these assertions could not be E
shaken in the cross-examination in any manner. Beyond giving
4- the suggestions that there were no demands from bridegroom's
,,.
7''
side for dowry, there was hardly anything in his cross-
examination. True it is that he admitted that he had not stated
about the demand of the accused about Rs.5,000/- during the F
marriage talks. However, he explained that the talk of dowry did
not take place at the time of marriage talks and it was only later
that the demand was made. Some stray suggestions were given
·like Susheela used to come to his house often or that he himself
~-
was pestering Susheela for money on account of the G
expenditure that he had incurred for her marriage, which the
witness had refuted. The most important part is a wild
suggestion given to the witness that Susheela used to move
about and that she had an affair with one Shridhara, who was
the son of PW-3 Chikkaputtaiah and that the appellant/accused
H
.
....
l•
1084 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 9 S.C.R.
......
'!
A had asked the wife not to go to the house of PW-3
Chikkaputtaiah. A suggestion was thrown that Susheela wantea .....
to marry Shridhara. Naturally, the suggestion was refuted.

12. This was almost an imaginary case invented by the
defence that Susheela had a love affair with Shridhara and out
B
of frustration, she committed suicide. There is absolutely no
basis for this theory. We have examined evidence of PW-3
..} ;
Chikkaputtaiah very closely on this aspect. Even he refuted all
the suggestions in this behalf. It must be remembered here th~t
the distance between the house of the accused and the
c Susheela's maternal uncle's house could be covered within five
to ten minutes. Even the house of PW-3 Chikkaputtaiah was
near the house of PW-1. Under such circumstances, if Susheela
had an affair and used to move about with Shridhara prior to
her marriage, it was impossible that the appellanVaccused
D would not know about such a liaison. That theory seems to have y
been invented only to add colour to Susheela's suicide and was
,,.
rightly rejected by the Appellate Court. The fact that Susheela
did not take food for two days prior to her death, itself goes on
to prove the mental torture that she suffered and as if it was
E not sufficient, she was chided by the appellanVaccused a day
prior to her death on the trifle issue that she had taken the food
earlier to him and he was not called for and that she could go
t-
to her house only after removing her Thali (ornament worn by a "'\

married lady). .-.
F
13. There can be no doubt that in the evening, the
appellant/accused was not present. The High Court has
appreciated the evidence very deeply and in our opinion, the
Sessions Judge had gravely erred in not accepting the evidence
of this witness without any justifiable reason. It is a basic
G -{ .f-
principle that the evidence of witness has to be appreciated
as a whole, when the evidence of an ordinary witness, who is
not much educated and comes from a poor strata of society
-
not having the advantage of education. The Court has to keep
in mind all these aspects. The witness is not expected to
H
GOVINDARAJU v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 1085
[V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

remember every small thing, more particularly when he faces A
the shock of the untimely death of his near relative. The finding
reached·by the Sessions· Judge in his judgment that there was
no payment of dowry appears to be a totally incorrect finding
tending to be perverse. The main reason for this appears to
be contradiction in the evidence of PW71 and PW-18, B
completely ignoring the fact that PW-18 was an illiterate woman
and could not be expected to remember the details regarding
the date on which the amount of Rs.2,000/- was paid to the
appellant. In returning the finding that there was no dowry
harassment to Susheela by the accused persons, the Sessions c
Judge had completely ignored the evidence of PW-3, which
remained absolutely unshaken on that issue. In fact, even PW-
5 B. Puttaiah had supported the case of the dowry harassment
and so did PW-6 Shankaranarayana, who is the immediate
neighbour of appellant/A-1. Of course, PW-6
0
Shankaranarayana was declared hostile in his cross-
examination. However, even he had admitted that there used
to be quarrels in the house of the accused persons. The
fantastic theory of Susheela's love affair with Shridhara was
also denied by this witness in his cross-examination by the E
accused. PW-3 and PW-5 had specifically referred about the
ill treatment of dowry and there was absolutely no cross-
examination on the payment of dowry, as also the complaints
made by Susheela against the accused persons that she was
ill treated on account of non-payment of Rs.5,000/- The finding
recorded that there was no continuous onslaught, cruelty or F
harassment was clearly an incorrect finding, without even
bothering to realize that there was no cross-examination of the
witnesses like PWs-1, 3 and 5 on that issue, though they had
very specifically asserted that Susheela was being ill treated
on account of dowry. G

14. The learned counsel seriously criticized the judgment
of the High Court contending that the High Court had not given
due weightage to the findings of acquittal as recorded by the
Trail Court. When we see the judgment of the High Court, it is H
1086 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 9 S.C.R.

~

A clear that the High court has not only considered the whole 1
prosecution evidence .closefy but has also considered the
defence evidence. The criticism is not correct. The High Court
has relied on the judgment of this Court reported as Dhanna
Etc. v. State ofMadhya Pradesh [1996 (10) SCC 79) to show
- ,.-
8 that .the High Court has full power to review the evidence and !'-..
to arrive at its own independent conclusion whether the appeal
is against conviction or acquittal. The High Court was also alive ·
to the situation that it was·. considering an acquittal judgment -1 0:
wherein, firstly, there was a general presumption in favour of
'
c innocence of the person accused in a criminal case, which 'F
presumption was strengthened by the acquittal, and further, that
every accused is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt
regarding his guilt and that if the High Court acquitted such
accused, he would still retain that benefit in the appellate Court --.....
D also. The High Court has also relied on the ruling reported as
Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State Of Gujarat [2002 (3) SCC 57] r
't
to the effect that the paramount consideration of the Court would .,;..:
be to avoid miscarriage of justice arising from acquittal of guilty.
One other judgment rightly relied on by the High Court is Beta/
Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 1996 (8) SCC
E 205 to the· effect that the appellate Court can come to its own
conclusion about the credibility of the witnesses, if such
credibility depends on factors other than the demeanor of
witnesses. From the way the evidence has been appreciated 1-
\
by the High Court, it is clear that the High Court has -\
F disapproved of the findings given by the Trial Court and has
done the whole exercise of appreciation of evidence
independently. The High Court has given a clear finding in para
28 of its judgment that the Trial Court was palpably wrong in
holding.that the prosecution had failed to prove the guilt of the
G accused, more particularly, under Section 3048, IPC. Here was
a case which was completely covered by the presumption ~

under Section 1138 of the Indian Evidence Act since all the

..
asp·ects such as the cruelty meted out to Susheela, her
unnatural death within. the time span of seven years and
H constant demands of dowry were proved to the hilt. ,
GOVINDARAJU v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 1087
[V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

15. We have no doubt that the there were many things than A
'- what meets the eye in the death of Susheela who dierl in her
own bedroom of burn injuries. We would have expected some
explanation on that count. It was clear that she died in the wee
hours and yet there was nothing, even suggestive, of any
explanation. The High Court has severally commented on all B
these aspects and we do not find anything wrong with the High
Court's judgment.

16. In that view, we hold that the judgment convicting the
accused of the offence under Section 3048, IPC is correct and C
the appeal has no merits. It is accordingly dismissed.

K.K.T. Appeal dismissed.

I
1