Holding

The conviction and death sentence are upheld as the circumstantial evidence unerringly establishes guilt and the case falls within the "rarest of rare" category.

Summary

Govindasami was accused of murdering his uncle Nagamalai, the latter's wife, two sons and a daughter in May 1984. The prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence: a land‑dispute motive, a wrist‑watch recovered from the crime scene that belonged to the accused, a blood‑stained lungi and a promissory note found on him, and an aruval (sharp instrument) recovered from a third party’s house that bore blood of the victims' group. The trial court acquitted him, but the Madras High Court reversed the acquittal, convicted him under IPC 302 and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the cumulative circumstances unerringly pointed to his guilt and that the murder was pre‑meditated, gruesome and without provocation, qualifying as a "rarest of rare" case, thereby upholding both the conviction and the death sentence. The appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The prosecution proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt solely on circumstantial evidence.
Whether the facts of the case satisfy the "rarest of rare" doctrine justifying the death penalty.

Legislation cited

Subjects

murdercircumstantial evidencedeath penaltyrarest of rarepremeditated murderIPC 302criminal appealconvictionsentencing

Judgment

GOVINDASAMI A
v.
STATE OF TAMIL NADU

APRIL 22, 1998

[M.K. MUKHERJEE AND S.S. MOHAMMED QUADRI, JJ.] B

Indian Penal Code, 1860 :

S.302-Accused committing murder of his uncle and four other members
of his family-Circumstantial evidence-Discarded by trail court-Accused C
acquitted-High Court reversed the-acquittal-Convicted the accused-
Found the circumstances leading to guilt of accused proved-Circumstances
indicating absence of sudden provocation-Pre-meditated crime-Attack on
victims while they were asleep-Nature and manner in which crime was
committed found to be gruesome, heinous, atrocious and cold-blooded D
murder-Imposition of death sentence on accused by High Court-Upheld-
Record does not indicate any extenuating or mitigating circumstances in
favour of accused-.£vidence-Circumstantial evidence-Sentence-
Jmposition of death sentence.

The accused-appellant was prosecuted for committing murder of his E
uncle (Dl), aunt, their two sons and a daughter. The prosecution case was
that at about 7 A.M. on 30.5.1984 when P.W.2 reached the house ofD-1 in
order to fetch milk, she found all the five victims lying dead with bleeding
injuries. She informed her husband (P.W. 3) who gave a report to the Village
Administrative Officer (P. W. 7) and stated that he suspected the accused and
his younger brother to have committed the murders as there was a land F
dispute between them and D-1. PW 7 submitted the report at the Police
Station. The Circle Inspector of Police (PW 26) went to the place of
occurrence and sent the dead bodies for post mortem examination. He seized
some articles from the spot including a wrist watch. Later, PW 27, an
Inspector of Police arrested the accused and seized a blood'stained 'lungi' G
(M.O. 10), and a promissory note (M.O. 20) from his person. On the statement
of the accused, PW 27, also recovered from the house of PW 14, a cycle and
a gunny bag containing a torch and an 'aruvaI', a sharp cutting instrument.
The 'aruval' and lungi were sent for chemical examination.

The prosecution, in order to establish the guilt of the accused, relied H
1135
1136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 2 S.C.R.

A upon four circumstances, namely: (i) the accused had a motive to commit
the crime as he had a boundary dispute with D-1 and two days prior to the
incident he had a quarrel with D-1 and his son; in the course of the said
quarrel D-1 beat him and coerced him to sign a promissory note: (ii) the
write watch recovered from the scene of crime belonged to the accused: (iii)
B the accused, at the time of his arrest, was wearing the blood stained 'lungi'
and had a promissory note (M.O. 20) with him: and (iv) recovery of'aruvar
pursuant to the statement of the accused, and the 'aruVlll' was found to be
stained with human blood of Group B which was the blood group of some of
the deceased. The trial court acquitted the accused holding that none of the
circumstances stood proved. But the High Court held the said circumstances
C were proved and unerringly pointed to the guilt of the accused; and it
convicted the accused and sentenced him to death. Aggrieved, the accused
filed the present appeal.

lt was contended for the appellant that the view taken by the trial court
of the evidence was a reasonable one and the High Court should not have ·
D interfered with it. It was also contended that even if the appellant was found
guilty, the case did not fall in the category of 'rarest of rare cases', and the
mere fact that the appellant committed five murders could not be a ground
for imposition of death sentence.

Dismissing the appeal, this Court
E
HELD: 1.1. The circumstances relied on by the prosecution, each of
which unerringly points towards the guilt of the appellant, taken cumulatively,
are consistant only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the appellant and
wholly inconsistent with his innocence, therefore, the conviction recorded by
the High Court is correct. [1144-C]
F
2. The High Court did not base its decision to impose the penalty of
death solely on the fact that 5 persons were murdered, it also took into
consideration the other attending circumstances relating to murders. The
High Court held that the incident did not take place on account of any sudden
provocation but it was a pre-meditated one; all the five victims were attacked
G while they were sleeping and there was no scope or chance for them to face
the attack; there was no mental derangement of the accused; and the nature
and the manner in which the accused committed the five murders was found
to be gruesome, heinous, atrocious and cold-blooded. Besides the brutal
manner in which the appellant wiped out the entire family of his uncle
H (except one of his sons, PW-8, who fortunately at the material time was
GOVINDASAMI v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [M.K. MUKHERJEE,' J.] J 137

studying in a city obviously to grab his properties, has shocked the judicial A
conscience. The record does not indicate any extenuating or mitigating
circumstances in favour of the appellant. In the circumstances, the sentence
of death imposed upon the appellant by the High Court is justified.
[1145-G-H]
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR (1980) SC 898 and Mahesh v.
B
State of Madhya Pradesh, (1997] 3 SCC 80, relied on.
Shamshul Kanwar v. State of U.P., AIR (1995) SC 1748, cited.
~

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
900 of 1997.
From the Judgment and Order dated 2.9.97 of the Madras High Court c
in Crl. A. No. 30 of 1988.
Ranjan Mukherjee for the Appellant.
V. G. Pragasam for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was deEvered by D
-<:,
M.K. MUKHERJEE, J. This appeal under Section 379 Cr. P.C. is directed
against the judgment and order dated September 2, 1997 rendered by the
Madras High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 30 of 1988. By the impugned
judgment the High Court reserved the acquittal of the appellant of five
charges of murder, convicted him thereof and sentenced him to death. The
victims were Nagamalai (elder brother of the appellant's father), his wife, two E
sons and a daughter.,
2. The prosecution case briefly stated is as follows: -(i) On May 30, 1984
at or about 7.00 A.M. Sowndaram (P.W.2), a resident of village
Kondayapalayam, in which Nagamalai and appellant also lived, went to the
house of the former to fetch milk as it was her daily wont. Reaching there she F
~
found him, his wife, two sons and a daughter lying dead in the front yard of
their house with bleeding injuries on their persons. She rushed back to her
house and told her husband Kurukkal ( P.W.3) about the macabre murders.
P. W.3 then went to the house of N agamalai and, having seen the dead bodies,
apprised his co-villager Ramaswamy (P. W. l) of the incident. After a visit to
the house ofNagamalai, P.W.l went to the nearby village Varapalayam and
G
gave a report to Ramani Marimuthu (P.W.7), their Village Administrative Officer,
.. which was recorded by him. In that report he first described what he had seen
in the house of Nagamalai and then stated that he suspected that
Govindaswami (the appellant) and his younger brother had committed the
murders as there was a land dispute between them and Nagamalai. ' H
1138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1998) 2 S.C.R.

A (ii) P. W. 7 then left for village Kondayampalayam and after seeing the
dead bodies went to Puliampatti Police Station and submitted the report
(Ex.p. l ). On that report a case was registered and investigation taken up by ,...
Palanisamy (P.W. 26), the then Circle Inspector of Police. He went to the
house of Nagainalal held inquest upon the five dead bodies and sent them
B to the Government hospital, Sathyamangalam for post-mortem examination.
He seized some articles from the scene of crime, including a wrist watch with
its broken chain (M.0.1).

(iii) On June 4, 1984 the investigation of the case was taken over by~
Shri Beeman (P.W. 27), an Inspector of Police. On tjiat day he arrested the
C appellant and seized a blood stained lungi (M.O. 19) and a promissory note
(M.O. 20) from his person under a meino (P.Ex. 8). Pursuant to a statement
made by the appellant he then went to the house of Marimuthu (P.W. 14), an
astrologer by profession, in village Arasur and seized a cycle (M.O. 21) and
a gunny bag (M.O. 23) containing a torch light (M.O. 18) and an aruval, (M.O.
22), a heavy sharp. cutting instrument. The aruval, lungi and some other
D articles seized from the scene of crime were sent to the Forensic Science
Laboratory (F.S.L.) for chemical examination. After receipt of report of such ;.-
examination and on completion of investigation police submitted charge-sheet
against the appellant.

E 3. The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges and contended that
he was falsely implicated.

4. That Nagamalai, his wife, two sons and a daughter met with homicidal
death in front of their house stands proved by overwhelming evidence on
record. Indeed, this part of the prosecution case was not challenged by the
F defence. Apart from the uncontroverted evidence of P.Ws. 1,2,3, and 7, all of
whom claimed to have seen the dead bodies of the 5 persons lying with r-
bleeding injuries in front of their house, the evidence of P.W.27, who held
inquest upon the dead bodies, proves that fact. From the evidence of the
three doctors, namely, Dr. Ulaganathan (P.W.16), Dr. Saroja (P.W. 17) and Dr.
G Marimuthu (P.W. 18), who held post-mortem examination upon one or the
other of those dead bodies, we get that each of them had a number of deep
cut injuries all over their bodies. While Nagamalai had 6 such injuries, his
sons, Moorthy and Balasubramanian, had 12 and 4 respectively, his wife ~
Ponnathal had 4 and daughter Anbu Selvi had 2. When shown the aruval
(M.O. 22), the doctors opined that all the injuries could be caused by such
H a weapon. From the evidence of the above witnesses it is thus abundantly
GOVINDASAMI v. STATE OF TAMIL NADIJ [M.K MUKHERJEE, J.] 1139
clear that the 5 deceased met with homicidal death in front of the their house A
in the night between May 29 and May 30, 1984.

5. The pivotal question that now falls for our determination is whether
the prosecution has been able to conclusively prove that the appellant is the
perpetrator of the above murders. In absence of any eye witness to prove the
same the prosecution relied upon the following circumstances:- (i) the appellant B
had a motive to commit the murders as he was having a boundary dispute
with Nagamalai over their properties and two days prior to the murders he had
a quarrel with Nagamalai and his son Moorthy in course of which he (the
appellant) was beaten up. Besides, Nagamalai coerced the appellant to sign
a promissory note; c
(ii) from the scene of crime a wrist watch with a broken chain (M.O. I)
belonging to the appellant was recovered;

(iii) at the time of his arrest on June 4, 1984 the appellant was found
wearing a blood stained lungi (M.O. 19) and having a promissory note (M.O. D
20) with him; and

(iv) pursuant to the statement made by the appellant aruval (M.O. 22)
was recovered from the house of P.W. 14 on June 4,1984 and it was found
to be stained with human blood of group 'B', which was also the blood group
of some of the deceased. E
6. On consideration of the evidence adduced by the prosecution to
prove the above circumstances the trial Court held that none of them stood
proved an, accordingly, it acquitted the appellant. In reversing the findings
of the trial Court, the High Court held that all the above circumstances stood
firmly established and that those circumstances unerringly pointed to the F
guilt of the appellant.

7. Mr. Ranjan Mukherjee, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant,
first submitted that the reasons given by the trial Court for rejecting the
relevant and material evidence of the proser:ution were weightier and had not G
been completely displaced by the High Court. He next submitted that, in any
case, the view of the evidence taken by the trial Court was also a reasonable
one. In such a situation, he argued, the High Court should not have reversed
the order of acquittal, by ignoring the well-settled principles laid down by this
Court in this regard. He lastly submitted that even if it was assumed that the
High Court was justified in so doing, it was not justified in imposing the H
1140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1998] 2 S.C.R.

A sentence of death.

8. As against this Mr. Pragasam, learned counsel for the State, submitted
that the reasons given by the trial Court for discarding the entire prosecution
evidence were patently untenable and had been rightly dispelled by the High
Court. According to him the powers of the High Court to review the evidence
B and reach its own findings in an appeal against acquittal are as wide as those
of the trial Courts.

9. This being a statutory appeal we have gone through the entire
evidence on record keeping in view the judgments of the Courts below. Our
C such exercise persuades us to hold that each of the findings of the trial Courts
is patently wrong.

I 0. Coming first to the motive, the prosecution examined five witnesses
to prove the same; and they are Ramaswamy (P.W.1), Donnuswamy (P.W.4).
Govindaswamy (P.W. 5), Ramaswamy (P.W. 6) and Ganesan (P.W. 8), the
D surviving son of the deceased Nagamalai, who at the material time was in
Coimbatore. P.W.l, who is related to both the deceased and the appellant,
testified that there were disputes between them with regard to the boundaries
of their land and that he and other Panchayatdars attempted to settle the
disputes. P.W.4 stated that about 1-1/2 year before the incident the mother
E of the appellant complained to him about the boundary dispute and grazing
of cattle and that he and others mediated and settled the dispute before the
date of occurrence. Similar is the evidence of P.W.5. The evidence of P.W.8
in this regard is that due to land dispute there were frequent quarrels between
his father and the appellant. In disbelieving the evidence adduced by the
prosecution to prove the motive the trial Court observed that there were
F discrepancies in the evidence of the above witnesses as to when the Panchayat
was convened and who were the participants. Having carefully gone through
the evidence we do not find any material contradiction to discredit them. On
the contrary, we find that their evidence unmistakably proves that there were
disputes between them regarding the boundaries of their lands and the most
G eloquent proof in support thereof (which has gone completely unnoticed by
the trial Court as also by the High Court) is the evidence of Ramaswamy (P.W.
6) of village Ponnampalayan. From his evidence we get that two days prior
to the occurrence he had seen Nagamalai and his son Moorthy quarrelling
with the appellant in connection with their lands. He further stated that the
appellant came to him and complained that Nagamalai got an empty promissory
H note signed by him and beat him up. He next stated that he advised them not
GOVINDASAMI v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [M.K. MUKHERJEE. J.] 1141
to quarrel. This witness was not at all cross-examined with reference to the A
above aspects of his evidence. When the above uncontroverted evidence of
P.W.6 is read along with the evidence of the witnesses mentioned earlier there
cannot be any manner of doubt that the prosecution has succeeded in
proving that there was dispute between the appellant and Nagamalai over
their lands and that only two days before the incident they had a qua~rel over B
that dispute in course of which the former beat the appellant and, thereafter
compelled him to sign a promissory note.

11. To prove the second circumstance, the prosecution firstly relied
upon the evidence of P.W. 26 and P.W.7. P.W.26 testified that in presence of
Mariamuthu (P.W. 7), The Village Administrative Officer, and K. Anumugam C
he seized a HMT wrist watch with the word 'Cheran' engraved thereon
(M.0.1 ), which was found near the dead body of Moorthy under a memo (Ext.
P.6). The above testimony of P.W. 26 stands corroborated by that of P.W. 7
and the seizure memo, contemporaneously prepared. The evidence adduced
by the prosecution to prove the above recovery was not challenged by the
defence. Next, to prove that the seized wrist watch belonged to the appellant, D
the prosecution examined Sabesan (P.W 11), who is a resident of the same
village and at the material time was working as a bus-conductor in Jeeva
Transport Corporation. He testified that his uncle gave him a HMT wrist
watch with the word. 'Cheran' written thereon, which he (his uncle) had
purchased from a worker ofCheran Transport Corporation. After he (P.W. 11) E
had used the wrist watch for 2/3 years he sold it to the appellant, whom he
knew from before, for Rs. 240/- about two years before the incident. He
identified M.O. I as the wrist watch which he sold to him. P.W. 11 was cross-
examined at length but nothing could be elicited to discredit him. Rather, it
was elicited that 10/15 days prior to the incident he had seen the appellant
~~thes~. F
12. The trial Court disbelieved the evidence of P.W. 11 principally on the
ground that he did not furnish any receipt regarding purchase of the wrist
watch by his uncle or sale to the appellant nor could he give the number of
the wrist watch. According to the trial Court, since any person could have G
owned that wrist watch and could be present at the scene of crime, recovery
of the same did not and could not incriminate the appellant. The above
reasons are, to say the least, untenable. It is a matter of common knowledge
that a person has any uncanny sense of identifying his own belongings,
particularly articles of regular personal use. The trial Court was, therefore, not
at all justified in discarding the assertion of P. W. 11, who admittedly bore no H
1142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 2 S.C.R.

A animus against the appellant, that the wrist watch (M.O. I) earlier belonged
to him . While on this point it is pertinent to mention that the word 'Cheran'
engraved in M.O. I unmistakably supported P.W. 11 's version. Equally
unjustified was the trial Court in disbelieving his fu1ther assertion that he sold
the wrist watch to th(; appellant for absence of receipt relating to the sale or
B purchase of the same for it is also common knowledge that in such petty
transactions in villages no body insists thereupon. It must, therefore, be said
that the prosecution has been able to fim1ly establish that the wrist watch
found at the place of occurrence belonged to the appellant.

13. That brings us to the third circumstance. P.W. 27, the Inspector of
C Police, who took up the investigation of the case on June 4, 1984 from P.W.
26, testified that on that day he arrested the appellant at Pullyampatty bus
stop and seized a blood stained lungi (M.O. 19) and a promissory note (M.0.
20) in presence of witnesses one of whom was Murugesan (P.W. 9), a Revenue
Inspector. The evidence of P.W. 9 and the seizure memo (Ext. P-8) fully
corroborate the evidence of P. W. 27 in this respect and the report of the
D Chemical Examiner show that th(\ lungi contained human blood. It is of course
true that the Serologist could not give any definite opinion as to its blood ,>...

group due to disintegration but absence thereof does not in any way affect
the prosecution case. In discarding the evidence regarding recovery of the
hand note the trial court observed that the hand-writing expert could not give
E any definite opinion that the signature appearing thereon was that of the
appellant but it failed to consider that when the factum of the above recovery
is read along with the admission made by the appellant before P.W. I of his
having been coerced by Nagamalai to execute a hand note in his favour the
recovery of the hand note is a strong incriminating circumstance against him.

F 14. Having found that the first three circumstances stand firmly
established we turn our attention to the last circumstance. As earlier noticed,
the appellant was apprehended by P.W. 27 on June 4, 1984 in presence of
P.W.9 and one Arumugam. According to P.W. 27, after his arrest the appellant
made a statement which he recorded in presence of the above witnesses. The
G statement (Ext. P-7), to the extent it is admissible under Section 27 of the
Evidence Act, was to the effect that if permitted he would identify and hand
over the cycle, torch light, gunny bag and aruval. After making the statement,
the appellant led them to the house of P. W.14 in village Arasur. Reaching
there he brought out, from the house of P.W. 14 a cycle (M.O. 21), a gunny
bag (M.0.23), a torch light (M.O. 18) and an aruval (M.0.22) . In presence
H of the witnesses, namely, P.W. 9 and Arumugam P.W. 27 seized those articles
GOVINDASAMI v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [M.K. MUKHERJEE, J.] 1143
under a memo which was attested by both of them. P. W. 27 further stated that A
he sent the seized articles, including the aruval for chemicals analysis .
.....
15. While supporting the testimony of P.W. 27, P.W. '>, who is an
independent witness, stated that in his presence and that of Arumugam the
Inspector (P.W. 27) interrogated the appellant. In course of the interrogation
the appellant stated that he would identify and hand over the aruval and B
cycle if taken to Arasur and the statement so made was recorded by P.W. 27
(Ext. P. 7) and attested by him and Arumugam. He next stated that after the
.,_ blood stained lungi and promissory note were seized (about which we have
discussed earlier) he along with P.W. 27, the appellant and Arumugam
proceeded to Arasur where the appellant identified the house of astrologer
Marimuthu (P.W.14). From that house he took out a cycle with a gunny bag
c
tied in the carrier of the cycle. In that gunny bag one aruval and one torch
light were found. In cross-examination he stated that the aruva/ was found
to be blood stained. He denied the defence suggestion that he was deposing
falsely at the instance 9f the police.
D
16. In his evidence P.W. 14 stated that on May 31, 1984 at or about 7
"' A.M. the appellant came to his house on a cycle and sought his professional
advice for which he gave him Rs. 2/-. The appellant then left his house leaving
behind his cycle and the gunny bag stating that he would take them back in
the evening. When he asked about the contents of the gunny bag he told
E
him that there were some coirs in it. The appellant, however did not return
as promised, but after four days he came to his house accompanied by the
police. After entering his house the appellant took out the cycle and the
gunny bag and brought out one aruval and a torch light therefrom. This
witness was cross-examined at length but nothing could be elicited to discredit
him. This witness hails from a different village altogether and there is nothing F
to suggest even as to why he would depose falsely against the appellant
'"' whom he did not know from before. The trial Court disbelieved the evidence
of P.W. 14 on the grounds that it was not expected of him to remember each
of the 20-40 persons who used to come daily to seek his advice and that,
admittedly, he did not keep any account of his professional activities. In o~r . G
considered view both the grounds are wholly unsustainable; the former is
factually incorrect, in that he (P.W. 14) stated that on an average 5-10 persons
came daily to seek his advice and so far as the second one is concerned, it
j...
was not expected of P.W. 14 who was earning his livelihood in a village as
an astrologer charging Rs. 2/- per person, to keep accounts of his income.
Having carefully gone through the evidence of P.Ws. 27, 9 and 14 we have H
1144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998) 2 S.C.R.

A no hesitation in concluding that the prosecution has been able to conclusively
prove that pursuant to the statement of the appellant that he would hand over
the aruval, it was recovered from the house of P.W.14. The reports of the
Chemical Examiner show that the seized aruval contained human blood of
group 'B' and the blood seized from the spot where the dead bodies were
B lying was also of group 'B'. The fourth circumstance, thus, also stands
cogently established.

17. When the above four circumstances, each of which unerringly
points towards the guilt of the appellant, are taken cumulatively, there is no
escape from the conclusion that they are consistent only with the hypothesis
C of the guilt of the appellant and wholly inconsistent with his innocence. We,
therefore, uphold the conviction of the appellant as recorded by the High
Court.

18. Lastly, comes the question of sentence. Mr. Mukherjee submitted
that the present case did not fall in the category of 'rarest of rare cases'
D justifying imposing the extreme penalty of death. According to him, the mere
fact that the appellant committed five murders cannot be made a ground for
imposition of death sentence. In making the above submission he strongly
relied upon the judgment of this Court in Shamshul Kanwar v. State of U.P,
AIR (1995) SC 1748, wherein it was observed that a large number of deaths
E on one side cannot ipso facto be a ground to bring the case into the category
of 'rarest of rare cases'. He also relied upon some other judgments of this
Court wherein sentences of death were commuted. To avoid prolixity we
refrain from referring to those cases as they turned on their own facts. In
responding to the above contention of Mr. Mukherjee, Mr. Pragasam relied
upon the observations recorded by the High Court while imposing the death
F sentence.

19. From the impugned judgment we find that the High Court first
discussed the principles laid down by this Court, for imposing death sentence
in Bachan Singh v. State ofPunjab, AIR (1980) S.C. 898, and other cases and
then stated as under :-
G
"Now, we are going to consider the law laid down by the Apex Court
of our land in the above rulings with reference to the present case on
hand. Admittedly, as seen from the facts and circumstances of the
case, the following are proved beyond doubt :

H (1) There is no provocation or any quarrel between the accused and
GOVINDASAMI v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [M.K. MUKHERJEE, J.] 1145
the five deceased. All the five deceased were unanned and sleeping A
during midnight and also they were helpless. There was no scope
or chance for them to face the attack.

(2) It is proved beyond doubt that it was a pre-meditated one, but not
on account of any sudden provocation.

(3) There is no mental derangement for the accused to kill 5 human B
beings in five strokes one after another and they were killed
during the course of their sleep.

(4) The nature and the manner in which the accused committed the
five murders found to be gruesome, calculated, heinous, atrocious
and cold-blooded murder. C
Accordingly, in the above circumstances, it is proved beyond doubt
that the said heinous and calculated offence committed by the
respondent/accused in killing the 5 persons with five strokes one after
the another is a rarest of the rare cases of the present age in this State
as a whole. D
We are of the clear view that the way in which he cut the neck
of five individuals, while they were sleeping during mid-night, is really
a pre-meditated, atrocious and calculated murder. As such we are of
the clear opinion that if a human being of this nature viz., the
respondent /accused is allowed to continue to live in the present E
society, there is great threat to the co-human beings. There is no
safety or protection for the innocent, helpless, un-anned fellow human
beings in the society. In view of the above special reason and the
peculiar circumstances of the case on hand, we are of the clear view
that it is just, proper, appropriate, fit and deserving case where the F
capital punishment of death could be awarded to the respondent/
accused."

20. From the above quoted observations, it is seen that the High Court
did not base its decision to impose the penalty of death solely on the fact
that 5 persons were murdered but also other attendant circumstances relating G
to the murders. Having given our anxious and deep consideration to this
aspect of the matter we are in complete agreement with the reasons canvassed
by the High Court to impose the capital punishment. We only wish to add
that the brutal manner in which the appellant wiped out the entire family of
his uncle [except one of his sons, (P.W.8) who, fortunately at the material time
was studying in Coimbatore], obviously to grab his properties, has shocked H
1146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 2 S.C.R.

A our judicial conscience. Nonetheless we looked into the record to find out
whether there was any extenuating or mitigating circumstances in favour of
the appellant but found none. If, inspite thereof, we commute the death
sentence to life imprisonment we will be yielding to spasmodic sentiment,
unregulated benevolence and misplaced sympathy.

B 21. In Mahesh v. State ofMadhya Pradesh, [ 1987] 3 SCC 80, this Court,
while refusing to commute the death sentence, observed:-

"It will be mockery of justi~e to permit the accused to escape the
extreme penalty of law when faced with such evidence and such cruel
acts. To give the lesser punishment for the accused would be to
C render the justicing system of this country suspect . The common man
will lose faith in courts. Jn such cases, he understands and appreciates
the deterrence more· than the reformative jargon."

As the above observations squarely apply in facts of the instant case
D we uphold the sentence of death imposed upon the .appellant.

22. In the result, the appeal fails and the same is hereby dismissed.

R.P. Appeal dismissed.

r