GOVT. OF A.P. AND ORS.versusM.T. KHAN

A                        GOVT. OF A.P. AND ORS.
                                       V.
                                                                               ·,•
                                 M.T. KHAN

                             DECEMBER 5, 2003

B           [DORAISWAMY RAJU AND ARIJIT PASAYAT, JJ.]

          Constitution of India-Articles 14 & 161 I Criminal Procedur~ Code,
    1973-Section 432-State issuing order granting remission of sentences to
    different categories of prisoners-Category of prisoners undergoing sen-
C   tence in the State convicted by court of another State excluded-Validity
    of--Held, the appropriate Government which passed the Government
    Order has no power under the 1aw to grant remission to such category
    of prisoners-Hence, the exclusion is valid and legitimate-Transfer of
    Prisoners Act, 1950.

D        Petitioner-State issued a Government Order by which the Gov-
    ernor of the State in exercise of the powers conferred under Article
    161 of the Constitution of India granted remission of the unexpired
    period of the sentences of different categories of prisoners co111victed
    by tile courts in the State. The Government Order included the
E   category of prisoners who have been convicted by courts of the State
    and undergoing sentences in other States and excluded the category of
    prisoners who were, convicted and sentenced by courts in othell" States
    and undergoing sentences in the petitioner-State. Writ petitions before
    High Court challenging the exclusion of the category from the ben'efit
    of the Order of remission as ,being arbitrary, discriminatory and
F   violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The State contended before
    the High Court that the it had no power to grant remissions to
    prisoners undergoing sentences in the State pursuant to convidions by
    the courts in other States. The High Court allowed the wrif petitions
    holding that the State had the_ power to grant remission for such
G   category of prisoners also and hence the exclusion was arbitrary and
    discriminatory.

         In appeal, the petitioner-State contended that the appropriate
    Government of the State has no power to grant remission to the
H   category of prisoners undergoing sentences in the State convicted by

                                      490
                     GOVT. OF A.P. v. M.T. KHAN                       491

courts in other States under Section 432(1) of the Criminal Procedure A
Code, 1973 read with Article 161 of the Constitution of India.

     Allowing the appeals, the Court

      HELD: 1.1. The Government has full freedom in excluding the B
category of persons which it thinks expedient to exclude. To the extent
the benefit of clemency to a given case or class of cases is a matter of
policy and to do it for one or some they need not do it for all, as long
as there is no insidious discrimination involved. In the given case, it
was not only due to lack of power, but also because of conscious
decision to exclude in the background of what it considered to be lack C
of authority and hence no exception could be taken to the same
h:gitimately. [496-E-F-G I

     1.2. It is inconceivable that a Council of Ministers of the State can
render any appropriate advice in respect of accused persons convicted D
by courtsin other States or that it could be competent to do so. The
Transfer of Prisoners Act, 1950 does not throw any light on the
controversy as wrongly held by the High Court. It only enables
transfer of .prisoners from one State to another State. It does not
purport to confer jurisdiction on the transferee State the power of
remission in respect of transferred prisoners. There is no scope of E
judicial modification or modulating the same so as to extend the
concession in excess of the very objective of the maker of the order
which seems to have been guided by considerations of State policy. The
scheme of remission cannot be modified or extended to the category
of prisoners to which it was specifically excluded. (498-D-E-F-GJ          F
       1.3. The High Court was not justified in obliterating a part of the
  Government Order and extending the benefits to the concerned
  prisoners. It amounts to the Court re-making the policy and redoing
. the Government Order itself. [499-C-DI
                                                                             G
      State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ratan Singh & Ors., [1976) 3 SCC 470,
 relied on.

     State of Punjab & Ors. v. Joginder Singh & Ors., AIR (1990) SC
 1396 and Sanaboina Satyanarayan v. Governm.ent of Andhra Pradesh & H
    492                SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A Ors., (2003) 5 sec 343, referred to.
          Surjit Singh v. State of Punjab, ILR (1975) 1 P & H 201, referred


          CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos.
B 551-552 of 1997.
         From the Judgment and Order dated 11.4.96 of the Andhra Pradesh
    High Gourt in W.P. No. 20018 and 21536 of 1995.

          G.Prabhakar for the Appellant.
c
          P. Vittal Rao and C.S. Panda for B. Kanta Rao for the Respondent.

          The Judgment of the Court was d~livered by

D        ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. : These two appeals raise an interesting
    question involving the scope and ambit of Article 161 of the Constitution'
    of India, 1950 (in short the 'Constjtution'). The question is whether the
    Governor of a particular State in exercise of clemency powers under Article
    161 of the Constitution can grant remission to prisoners convicted by courts
    outside the concerned State, but undergoing sentences in jails in the: State.
E   Present appeals relate to the State of Andhra Pradesh. The Andhra Pradesh
    High Court in the two writ petitions (W.P. nos. 20018 and 21536 of 1995)
    held in the affirmative and hence these appeals.

            One S. Appala Swamy was convicted for the offence punishable
F   under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC') and
    sentenced to imprisonment for life by the Sessions Judge, Bastar at
    Jagdalpur, Madhya Pradesh. While serving the said sentence at the: District
    Jail, Jagdalpur he was transferred to the Visakhapatnam Jail in Andhra
    Pradesh. Writ petition No.20018 of 1995 related to him. The other writ
G   petition No.21536/1995 related to convict Rajender who was c:onvicted
    under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life by the IV
    Additional Session5 Judge, Thane, Maharashtra. While serving the sen-
    tence in the Central Prison, Erawada, Maharashtra: he was transferred to
    the Central Prison Warangal in the State of Andhra Pradesh.

H          Respondent M.T. Khan claiming to be the President of Andhra
             GOVT. OF A.P. v:M.T. KHAN [PASAYAT, J.]                     493

Pradesh Civil Liberties Committee ...filed writ petitions c.ontending that their A
continued incarceration was illegal and arbitrary. At the time of filing the
writ petitions the actual sentence undergone by S. Appala Swamy was
about 11 years and 6 months, while th"!t of Rajender was in excess of 14
years. As by 14.5 .1995 Rajender had completed more than 14 years of
actual sentence including the femand period, the Government of Andhra B
Pradesh forwarded his case for consideration of the State of Maharashtra
on 12.9.1994 for taking the appropriate action. The Government of
Maharashtra passed an order on I .12.1995 under sub-section ( l) of Section
432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Code')
remitting "that portion of the sentence of imprisonment for life which is
in excess of 14 years of total imprisonment including all remissions subject C
to completion of actual imprisonment of I 4 years .... subject to the condition
of the (said) person's good behaviour and conduct in prison till the time
of his release .. "

      The Government of Andhra Pradesh issued G.O.Ms. No.4, Home D
(Prisons-C) Department dated 17. l .1995 by which the Governor of Andhra
Pradesh in exercise of his powers conferred by Article 16 l of the
Constitution remitted the unexpired residue of the sentences of different
categories of prisoners convicted by the courts in the State for offences
against laws relating to matters to which the executive power of the State E
extends. The relevant portion reads as follows:

              "(a) All convic~ed prisoners· sentenced to imprisonment
         for life and governed by Section 433-A, Cr.P.C., who have
         completed 14 years of total sentence including I 0 years of actual    F
         sentence as on 14. I.1995 shall be released.

               (b) All convicted prisoners sentenced to imprisonment for
         life and governed by Section 433-A, Cr.P.C. aged more than 65
         years and have undergone more than 5 years of actual sentence _
         and a totalsentence of7 years as on 14.01.1995 shall be released". G

Paragraph 3 of the G.O. indicated that all prisoners eligible for release as
on 14.1.1995 falling under the afore-noted two categories were to be
released. Paragraph· 4 indicated that the above remissions and reductions
in sentences shall also apply to prisoners who have been convicted by H
    494                SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A   courts situated within the State of Andhra Pradesh and are undergoing the:
    sentences in other States. Five categories of prisoners were excluded from
    the purview of the aforesaid benefit and one of the excluded categories to
    which this case relates was:

                  "Prisoners convicted and sentenced by courts situated out-
B
             side the state of Andhra Pradesh".

  The two convicts involved in the writ petitions were covered by the
  aforesaid exclusion which was challenged to be arbitrary, without any basis
  and not proper exercise of power conferred under Article 161 of the
C Constitution. It was contended that the power pf clemency under Article
   161 was unfettered and ex.tended to all prisoners serving sentences in the
  jails of State of Andhra Pradesh and there was no rational basis to exclude
  one category of prisoners on the ground that they were convicted by courts
  situate outside the State of Andhra Pradesh. The exclusion was character-
D ized as arbitrary, discriminatory and in violation of Article 14 of the
  Constitution. There was no impediment in this regard either in the Transfer
  of Prisoners Act, 1950 (in short the 'Prisoners Act') or any other enactment.
  The prayer for release of the two convicts was opposed by the State on
  the ground that the State of Andhra Pradesh has no power to grant
E remissions to prisoners undergoing sentences in the State pursuant to
  convictions given by courts of competent jurisdiction located in other
  States. It was further submitted that the exclusion was not because the State
  did not want to extend the benefit, but because of the reason that it had
  no power to deal with the concerned prisoners. The High Court refen·ed
F to Section 432 ofthe Code and Article 161 of the Constitution; and came
  to hold that the State's view was wrong and power to direct such release
  was available •mder Article 161. Though the State had the power to do it,
  erroneous view was taken that it did not have the power to do it. Since
  power was available and State was under mistaken impression that it did
  not have the power, therefore, non-exercise was arbitrary. Distinction tried
G to be made between prisoners of one category who were convicted and are
  undergoing sentences inside the State and those convicted outside the State
  serving sentences inside the State is without any rational basis and
  impugned G.O. so far as it relates to the exclusion, inflicted impermissible
  and unjustifiable hardship on the transferred prisoners and violated the
H equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. Therefore, sub-
             GOVT. OF A.P. v. M.T. KHAN [PASAYAT, J.]                    495

paragraph (I) of paragraph 4 of the G.O. was held to be inconsequential A
and inseverable from the rest of the G.O. In essence, direction was given
to consider the case of the two convicts in accordance with the provisions
of the G.O. without reference to sub-para (1) of paragraph 4.

         In support of the appeals, learned counsel for the State of Andhra B
 Pradesh submitted that the High Court has clearly mis-interpreted Article
 161 which clearly refers to "appropriate Government". The appropriate
 Government so far· as the convicts are concerned is the Government within
 whose territorial jurisdiction the said convicts were convicted. The fortui-
 tous circumstance of a convict serving the sentence inside the State would
 not empower the Government to exercise powers under Article 161 of the C
 Constitution so far as that convict is concerned. Otherwise, it would lead
·to a very anomalous situation. Supposing a convict has served sentence in
 more than one States, can it be said that Government of different States
 can exercise power of remission in respect of an accused who at some
 anterior point of time or in present time has served or is serving the D
 sentence in a jail located within that State. In the G.O. the contra situation
 has been taken note of. A prisoner convicted by a Court inside the State
 and serving sentence outside is covered by the G.O. Furthermore, at this
 juncture, it is appropriate to take note of a decision of this Court in State
 of Madhya Pradesh v. Ratan Singh and Ors., [1976] 3 SCC 470. That case E
 related to Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (in short
 the 'Old Code') corresponding to Section 433 of the new Code. In that case
 the decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Surjit Singh v. State of
  Punjab, !LR (1975) 1 Pb. And Har. 201 was referred to and the view
  expressed by the High Court was approved in the following terms:
                                                                                F
               '~There is, however, nothing to indicate that for the purposes
         of remission and suspension of sentences under Section 401,
         Criminal Procedure Code, the Legislature intended to adopt a
         different definition of 'appropriate Government'. In short, under
         Section 401, Criminal Procedure Code, the Government of the G
         State of conviction and not the Punjab Government was compe-
         tent to remit the balance of the sentence of these life convicts. All
         that the Punjab Government could do was to forward the cases
         of these life convicts to the appropriate Government for remitting
         the remaining term of their life imprisonment, in exercise of the H
     496                SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A             power under Section 40 I, Criminal Procedure Code. The Punjab
              Government has already made such a reference in favour of the
              petitioners to the Governments of the States of conviction. Neither
              the Punjab Government nor the Superintendent of Jail concerned
              can release the prisoners under any of the statutory rule!; contained
B             in Punjab Jail Manual without receiving the necessary orders of
            · the appropriate Government under Section 40 I. Pt!nding the
              receipt of orders of the appropriate Government, theTefore, the
              detention of the petitioners could not by any reasoning is cailed
              illegal".

C Though Ratan Singh 's case (supra) was noticed by the High Court in the
      impugned judgment a distinction was sought to be made on the ground that
    · the interpretation given to the expression 'appropriate government' has no
      application when the power of Governor under Article 161 of the
      Constitution is invoked.
D
            In our considered opinion, the High Court went wrong in putting
    such restrictive interpretation or understanding of the ratio of the decision.
    The High Court came to the conclusion that the decision of the Government
    not to extend remission was not because it did not want to do so but because
E it was under the belief that it had no such power. The High Court thought
    that it had. The question is not so much of what the Government wanted
  . to do, but whether it had the power of clemency in a matter like the one
    under consideration. It was considered expedient that the power is to .be
    exercised in respect to a particular category of prisoners. The Government
    had full freedom in doing that and even excluding category of persons
F which it thinks expedient to exclude. To extend the benefit of clemency
    to a given case or class of cases is a matte~ of policy and to do it for one
    or some they need not do it for all, as long as there is no insidious
    discrimination involved. In the case at hand it was not only due to lack
    of power, but also because of conscious decision to exclude in the
G background of what it considered to be lack of authority, and i111 our view
    no exception could be taken to the sarrie, legitimately.

            In State of Punjab and Ors. v. Joginder Singh and Ors., AIR (1990)
     sc 1396 this Court held as follows:
H                  "In Gopal Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra, [1961]
    GOVT. OF A.P. v. M.T. KHAN [PASAYAT, J.]                   497

  3 SCR 440, this Court held that a sentence of transportation for A
  life or imprisonment for life must be treated as transportation or
  imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the
  convict's normal life, unless the said sentence is commuted or
. remitted.by the appropriate Government. Dealing with the Rules
  framed under the Prisons Act, 1894, this Court held that even B
  though they were statutory in character they did not confer an
  indefeasible right on a prisoner sentenced to transportation for life
  to an unconditional release on the expiry of a particular term
  including remissions. It held that the rules .framed under the
  Prisons Act enabled a prisoner to earn remissions - ordinary, C
  special and State - the said remissions were to be given credit
  towards his term of imprisonment and for the purpose of working
  out the remissions the sentence of transportation for life was
  equated with a definite period, but it is only for that particular
  purpose and not for any other purpose. Lastly it observed that the D
  question of remission was exclusively within the province of the
  appropriate Government.

      In Maru Ram v. Union of India, [1981] 1 SCR 1196, this
Court repelled the challenge to Section 433A both on the question
of competence of Parliament to enact the provision and its E
constitutional validity. While interpreting Sections 432, 433 and
433A of the Code, this Court pointed out that wide powers of
remission and commutation of sentences were conferred on the
appropriate government but an exception was carved out for the
extreme category of convicts who were .sentenced to death but F
whose sentence had been commuted. under Section 433 into one
of imprisonment Jor life .. Such a pris.oner is oot to be released
unless he has served at least .14 years of imprisonment. The Co~rt
refused to read down Section 433A to give overriding effect to
the Remission rules of the. State~ 1lt categorically ruled that G
Remission Rules and like provisions stand excluded so far as
'lifers' punished for capital offences are concerned. Remissions
by"way of reward or otherwise' cannot cut do~n the sentence
awarded by the Court except under Section 432 of the Code or
ir exercise of constitutional power under .Articles 72/161 of the H
     498                SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A             Constitution. Remission cannot detract from the quantum and
              quality of the judicial sentence except to the extent permitted by
              Section 432 of the Code, subject of course to Section 433A, or
              where the clemency power under the Constitution is invoked. But
              while exercising the constitutional pmver under Articles 721161,
B             the President or the Governor, as the case may be, must act on
              the advice of the Council of Ministers. The power under Articles ·
              72 and 161 ofthe Constitution is absolute and cannot be fettered
              by any statutory provision such as Sections 432, 433 and 433A
              of the Code. This power cannot be altered, modified or interfered
c             with in any manner whatsoever by any statutory provisions or
              Prison Rules".
                                                        (Italicised for emphasis)

           The Governor, in terms of the dicta laid in the last noted casi! has to
D    act on the advice of the Council of Ministers. It is inconceivable that a
     Council of Ministers of the State of Andhra Pradesh can render any
     appropriate advice in respect of accused persons convicted by Courts of
     Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra or that it would be competent to do so.
     The Prisoners Act does not throw any light on the controversy as wrongly
     held by the High Court. It only enables transfer of prisoners from one State
E    to another. It does not purport to confer jurisdiction on the transferee State'
     the power of remission in respect of transferred prisoners. In Sanaboina
     Satyanarayan v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Ors., [2003] 5
     Supreme· 343, it was held that· the grant of remission as well as the
     conditions formed a compendious single common pattern or scheme of
F    concession by way ofremission, pregnated with a policy designed in public
     interest and safety and interests of the society. There is no scope for
     judicial modification or modulating the same so as to extend the concession
     in excess of the very objectiye of th~ maker of the order which seems to
                  .              .~\f:.·

     have been guided by cons·i'derations of State policy. The scheme of
G    remission cannot be modified or extended to the category of prisoners to
     which it was specifically excluded.

          Section 4~2 of the Code corresponds to and reproduces almost word
     for word Section 401 and sub-section (3) of Section 402 of the old Code.
·H   Sub-sections (l) to (4) of Section 432 of the Code reproduce word for word
            GOVT. OF A.P. v. M.T. KHAN [PASAYAT, J.]                  499

sub-sections (I) to (4) of Section 401 of the old Code. Sub-section (5) A
reproduces word for word sub-section (6) of the old Section. Sub-section
(6) similarly reproduces sub-section (4-A) of the old Section. Sub-section
(5) of old Section 40 I had been omitted earlier in 1950. Sub-section (7)
corresponds to sub-section (3) of Section 402 of the old Code. The main
paragraph and Clause (a) reproduce the old provision word for word B
without any change. Clause (b) is slightly different, but without any change
of substance. That clause reads:

       "(b) in other cases, the State Government."

      According to us, in view of the legal position delineated by the ratio C
in Ratan Singh 's case (supra) which has full application to the case on
hand, the High Court was not justified in obliterating a part of the G.O.
and extending the benefits to the concerned prisoners. It amounts to the
Court re-making the policy and redoing the G.O. itself. The High Court's
judgment to that extent is erroneous and needs to be set aside which we D
direct. But after serving the requisite sentence, the appropriate Government
which according to us in the present case are States of Madhya Pradesh
and Maharashtra respectively, their cases shall be considered by those two
State Governments who shall take necessary decision as to whether their
release is permissible and desirable. The appeals are allowed to the E
aforesaid extent.

B.S.                                                    Appeals allowed.




                                                                     '