GUDU RAMversusSTATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

                     [2012] 9 S.C.R. 1069


                          GUDU RAM                                    A
                                v.
              STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
              (Criminal Appeal No. 862 of 2008)

                     DECEMBER 4, 2012
                                                                      8
  [SWATANTER KUMAR AND MADAN B. LOKUR, JJ.]

     Penal Code, 1860 - s. 304, second part - Assault with
'thapi'- a wooden object shaped like a cricket bat used for
beating clothes while washing - Death of one person due to            C
head injuries and injury to another person (PW1) - Conviction
of accused-appellant u/s. 302 /PC - Justification - Held: PW1
categorically stated that appellant attacked him with a wooden
stick like a 'thapi' and pushed him in the bushes - Presence
of appellant (and none other) at the scene of occurrence not          D
in doubt - Medical evidence showed that injuries on PW1 as
also on the deceased could have been caused by a 'thapi' -
In the circumstances of the case, conclusion inescapable that
none other than the appellant attacked PW1 and the
deceased and inflicted injuries on them with a thapi -                E
Insinuation that PW1 committed the crime too nebulous - It
is true that the appellant caused multiple injuries on the
deceased, but it is difficult to infer therefrom that the appellant
intended to kill him - His intention seems to have been to
injure PW1 and to severely injure the deceased - The conduct          F
of PW1 also points to the intentions of the appellant - PW1
did not expect the assault on the deceased to be fatal,
otherwise he would have tended to the needs of the deceased
rather than have gone to call PW2 - The attack was not so
severe (in the estimation of PW1) as to have imminently               G
caused the death of the deceased - It is quite clear that the
appellant had no intention to k111 the deceased - However, the
nature and number of injuries and their location (the skull) as
well as the "weapon" used (a small wooden cricket bat) leads
                              1069                                    H
    1070    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 9 S.C.R.

A to the conclusion that to a reasonable person, an attack of the
  nature launched by the appellant on the deceased could
  cause his death - Clearly the appellant had knowledge that
  his actions were likely to cause the death of the deceased -
  He would, therefore, be guilty of culpable homicide not
B amounting to murder and liable to be sentenced under the
  second part of s.304 !PC.

       Witness - Hostile witness - Appreciation of - Held: The
  evidence of a hostile witness need not be completely rejected
  only because he has turned hostile - The Court must,
C however, be circumspect in accepting the testimony of such
  a witness and, to the extent possible, look for its corroboration.

      Evidence - Circumstantial evidence - Appreciation of -
  Held: No doubt, proof cannot be substituted by robust
D suspicion - But if all the facts and circumstances point to only
  one conclusion, it is difficult to ignore them and even in a case
  of circumstantial evidence, it is possible to secure a
  conviction.

E      PW-2 was living in a rented accommodation with his
  brother (PW-1 ), cousin brother ('D') and wife's cousin
  (appellant). On the incident night, during consumption of
  drinks and dinner, the appellant and 'D' got involved in a
  scuffle. To prevent the scuffle from escalating, PW1 asked
F 'D' to accompany him to PW2's place of work so that 'D'
  could spend the night over there away from the
  appellant. It is alleged that when PW1 and 'D' had walked
  about 50-60 yards, the appellant appeared from behind
  and hit PW1 on the head with a thapi [a wooden object
  shaped like a cricket bat used for beating clothes while
G washing] and pushed him into the bushes. Thereafter, the
  appellant hit 'D' with the thapi and pushed him also into
  the bushes. PW1 did not sustain any serious injury and
  so he got up and went to inform PW2 about the incident.
  Thereafter, PW 2 accompanied by PW1 came upon 'D'
H lying in the bushes and took him to the hospital where
  GUDU RAM v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH 1071

he succumbed to his injuries. The doctor was of the            A
opinion that 'D' died due to hemorrhagic shock as a
result of ante mortem head injuries. He was also of the
opinion that the injuries could possibly have been
caused by a wooden stick or thapi.
                                                               B
    The appellant was charged with having committed
the murder of 'D'. PW1, the only eyewitness to the crime,
turned hostile. The trial court, however, held that the
appellant had murdered 'D' and accordingly convicted
him under Section 302 IPC. In appeal, the High Court
upheld the conviction of the appellant holding that there      C
was sufficient evidence to conclude that none other than
the appellant caused the death of 'D'.

     The question raised in the instant appeal was
whether, despite PW1, the sole eyewitness to the incident,     D
turning hostile, could the Trial Court and the High Court
legitimately hold that the appellant committed the murder
of 'D'.

    Disposing of the appeal, the Court
                                                               E
     HELD: 1.1. Despite the sole eyewitness PW1 turning
hostile, it can and should be held on the facts of this case
that though the appellant did commit a crime, it was not
of murder but culpable homicide not amounting to
murder. (Para 1] (1075-G]                                      F

    1.2. The evidence of a hostile witness need not be
completely rejected only because he has turned hostile.
The Court must, however, be circumspect in accepting
his testimony and, to the extent possible, look for its        G
corroboration. [Para 23] [1081-E]

    1.3. From the evidence of PW1, it is clear that he
categorically stated that the appellant attacked him with
a wooden stick like a thapi and pushed him in the
bushes. To this extent the evidence of PW1 is quite clear      H
   1072    SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A and he did not recant from this. Then he goes on to say
  that though he noticed the appellant, he did not actually
  see him beat 'D' or throw him in the bushes. But the fact
  is that 'D' was beaten by someone and pushed into the
  bushes. There is nothing to suggest the presence of any
B third person. The presence of the appellant (and none
  other) at the scene of occurrence is not in doubt. [Para
  27) [1082-E-G]
       1.4. The medical evidence shows that injuries on PW1
  could have been caused by a blunt wooden stick such
C as a thapi. Again, to this extent, the evidence of PW1 is
  consistent. As per the medical evidence, the injuries on
  'D' could also have been caused by a similar wooden
  stick or thapi. Under these circumstances, the conclusion
  is inescapable that none other than the appellant
D attacked PW1 and 'D' and inflicted injuries on them with
  a thapi. [Para 28) [1082-H; 1083-A]
       1.5. PW1 was a credible witness and his testimony
  to the extent that it implicates the appellant should be
E accepted. The insinuation that PW1 committed the crime
  was too nebulous. The family dispute between PW1 and
  'D' was obviously not particularly serious since 'D' had
  ventured to stay with PW1 and his brother PW2 in the
  same rented accommodation for about one year. In any
  event, this was not even the case set up by the appellant
F in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. [Paras 33, 34)
  [1084-A-C]
       Karuppanna Thevar v. State of T.N. (1976) 1 SCC 31;
  Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana (1976) 1 SCC 389: 1976
G (2) SCR 921; Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa (1976)
  4 sec 23; Bhajju v. State of M.P. (2012) 4 sec 327 and
  Ramesh Harijan v. State of UP. (2012) 5 SCC 777 - relied
   on.
      2. The conduct of the appellant leaves a lot to be
H desired. The Trial Judge and the High Court found it
  GUDU RAM v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH                    1073

suspicious (and so does this Court) that on the                    A
intervening night of 12th and 13th November, 2003 the
appellant should leave the place of occurrence for his
village. According to the statement of the appellant under
Section 313 Cr.P.C. he had left the place of occurrence
before the incident took place. This may or may not be             B
true, but it is certainly relevant for appreciating his
conduct. In this context, it would be worthwhile to refer
to Section 8 of the Evidence Act, 1872 which makes
relevant the conduct of the appellant subsequent to the
crime. Similarly, the recovery of a bloodstained pajama            c
from the appellant's house adds to the circumstances
that call for an explanation from the appellant. However,
no explanation has been forthcoming on either issue.
[Paras 29, 30 and 31) [1083-B-E]

     3. No doubt, proof cannot be substituted by robust            D
suspicion. But if all the facts and circumstances point to
only one conclusion, it is difficult to ignore them and even
in a case of circumstantial evidence, it is possible to
secure a conviction. The present case is much stronger
since there is an eyewitness to the incident and both the          E
Trial Court and the High Court accepted the version of
events given by PW1. In such circumstances, this Court
should not normally interfere with the conclusion
expressed concurrently by the Trial Court and the High
Court. Interference is, however, permissible in                    F
exceptional circumstances - but the circumstances of
this case are not found to be exceptional. [Para 32] [1083-
F-H]

      Ramachandran v. State of Kera/a 2012 (10) SCALE 592          G
- relied on.

     4.1. It is true that the appellant caused multiple
injuries on 'D', but it is difficult to infer from this that the
appellant intended to kill him. His intention seems to have
been to injure PW1 and to severely injure 'D' and after            H
    1074   SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A beating them up with a thapi, he pushed them into the
  bushes and walked away. It cannot be imagined that his
  intention was to injure PW1 but kill 'D'- he would be
  leaving behind PW1 as an eyewitness. [Para 36] [1084-
  E-F]
B
       4.2. The conduct of PW1 also points to the intentions
  of the appellant. PW1 did not expect the ·assault on 'D' to
  be fatal, otherwise he would have tended to the needs of
  the victim rather than have gone to call PW2. That the
C delay in attending to 'D' may have eventually led to his
  death is another matter altogether, but the attack was not
  so severe (in the estimation of PW1) as to have
  imminently caused the death of 'D'. [Para 37] [1084-G-H]

      4.3. Even though the situation in pregnant with
D hypotheses, it is quite clear that the appellant had no
  intention to kill 'D' and even the rejection of the
  hypotheses cannot lead to the conclusion that the
  appellant intended to kill 'D'. [Para 38] [1085-A]

E      4.4. However, the nature and number of injuries and
  their location (the skull) as well as the "weapon" used (a
  small wooden cricket bat) leads to the conclusion that to
  a reasonable person, an attack of the nature launched by
  the appellant on 'D' could cause his death. While it may
  be difficult to delve into the mind of the attacker to
F decode his intentions, knowledge of the consequences
  of his actions can certainly be attributed to him. [Para 39]
  [1085-B-C]
       4.5. Accordingly, it is clear that the appellant had
G knowledge that his actions are likely to cause the death
  of 'D'. He would, therefore, be guilty of culpable homicide
  not amounting to murder. Under the circumstances, the
  conviction of appellant for the murder of 'D' is set aside
  but he is convicted under the second part of Section 304
H IPC. However, inasmuch as the appellant has already
   GUDU RAM v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH 1075


undergone over eight years of actual imprisonment and                 A
almost eleven years including remissions earned, under
the circumstances, he is sentenced to imprisonment for
the period already undergone. -{Paras 40, 41 and 42] [1085-
D-G]
                       Case Law Reference:                            B
     (1976) 1 sec 31               relied on             Para 24
     1976 (2) SCR 921              relied on             Para 25
     (1976) 4 sec 23               relied on             Para 25
     (2012) 4 sec 327              relied on             Para 26
                                                                      c
     (2012) 5 sec 111              relied on             Para 26
     2012 (10) SCALE 592           relied on             Para 32
    CRIMINAL AP PELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
                                                                      D
No. 862 of 2008.
    From the Judgment and Order dated 31.10.2007 of the
High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla in Criminal Appeal
No. 562 of 2004.
     T. Anamika for the Appellant.                                    E
    Naresh K. Sharma and Abhishek Sood for the
Respondent.
     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
      MADAN 8. LOKUR, J. 1. The question before us is                 F
whether, despite the sole eyewitness to the incident turning
hostile, could the Trial Court and the High Court legitimately hold
that the appellant committed the murder of Dalip Singh. In our
opinion, despite the sole eyewitness turning hostile, it can and
should be held on the facts of this case that though the              G
appellant did commit a crime, it was not of murder but culpable
homicide not amounting to murder.
The facts:
    2. PW-2 Sheetal Singh was an employee of the Himachal
Pradesh Transport Corporation, posted in a workshop of the            H
    1076     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A   Corporation at Taradevi in Himachal Pradesh. He was living in
    a rented accommodation and for the last about one year, his
    brother PW-1 Jai Pal Singh and the deceased Dalip Singh (his
    cousin brother) were living with him. The appellant (a cousin of
    Sheetal Singh's wife) joined them in the rented accommodation
    about a week prior to the alleged murder of Dalip Singh by the
8
    appellant.

       3. On the intervening night of 12th and 13th November,
  2003 Sheetal Singh was at work. Around 8 p.m., the appellant,
  Dalip Singh and Jai Pal Singh planned to cook some meat and
C consume some whisky brought by the appellant.

         4. During the consumption of drinks and dinner, a minor
    brawl took place between the appellant and Dalip Singh as a
    result of Dalip Singh's refusal to consume more whisky. At that
    time, Jai Pal Singh intervened and some sort of a truce was
0
    worked out.

       5. Later, Jai Pal Singh went to urinate and upon his return,
  he found the appellant and Dalip Singh involved in a scuffle.
  To prevent the scuffle from escalating, Jai Pal Singh asked
E Dalip Singh to accompany him to Sheetal Sing h's place of work
  so that Dalip Singh could spend the night over there away from
  the appellant.

       6. According to the prosecution, when Jai Pal Singh and
F Dalip Singh had walked about 50-60 yards, the appellant
  appeared from behind and hit Jai Pal Singh on the head with
  a thapi and pushed him into the bushes. (A thapi is a wooden
  object shaped like a cricket bat used for beating clothes while
  washing). Thereafter, the appellant hit Dalip Singh with the thapi
G and pushed him also into the bushes.

        7. Jai Pal Singh did not sustain any serious injury and so
    he got up and went to inform Sheetal Singh about the incident.

      8. Thereafter, Sheetal Singh accompanied by Jai Pal
H Singh went to the rented accommodation of Sheetal Singh
  GUDU RAM v. STATE OF HI MAC HAL PRADESH                  1077
           [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]

since Jai Pal Singh had told him that a quarrel had taken place     A
in the rented accommodation between Dalip Singh and the
appellant. When they did not find either the appellant or Dalip
Singh in the rented accommodation, they went to search for
them and at that time, upon hearing some cries, they came
upon Dalip Singh lying in the bushes. The appellant was             B
apparently not traceable.
    9. Both Jai Pal Singh and Sheetal Singh brought Dalip
Singh back to the rented accommodation. Thereafter an
ambulance was called and Dalip Singh was taken to the
hospital where he succumbed to his injuries.                        C

     10. The appellant was charged with having committed the
murder of Dalip Singh. He pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
In all, the prosecution examined 17 witnesses and also
produced several documents and articles during the trial.           D
Decision of the Trial Judge:
     11. The Trial Judge analyzed the statements of the
witnesses and the documents on record and concluded that the
appellant had murdered Dalip Singh. It was held that the            E
appellant's presence in the rented accommodation along with
Jai Pal Singh and Dalip Singh on the intervening night of 12th
and 13th November, 2003 was not in dispute. It was also held
that Dalip Singh died an unnatural death.
      12. It was argued before the Trial Judge that the sole eye    F
witness, Jai Pal Singh had stated in his cross examination that
he had not actually seen the appellant beat Dalip Singh or push
him into the bushes. This witness was then cross-examined by
the Public Prosecutor on the ground that he was suppressing
the truth. However, the Trial Judge relied on the evidence of Jai   G
Pal Singh and held that he had positively deposed that the
appellant had attacked Dalip Singh. Even though Jai Pal Singh
may not have actually seen the attack, but it was clear that the
appellant had hit and pushed Dalip Singh in the bushes after
the attack on Jai Pal Singh.                                        H
    1078        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A        13. In addition, the Trial Judge also noted the
    disappearance of the appellant in the middle of the night from
    the place of occurrence and his being later located in his village.
    This gave room for suspicion with regard to the conduct of the
    appellant post the incident.
B
       14. The Trial Judge noticed the statement of PW-7
  Rajinder Singh to the effect that there was some land dispute
  between the family of Dalip Singh and Jai Pal Singh and that
  they were on inimical terms. However, he was of the view that
  the terms between them were not so strained as made out,
C otherwise there was no reason for Dalip Singh to stay in the
  rented accommodation along with Sheetal Singh and Jai Pal
  Singh for about a year. The Trial Judge also took note of the
  suspicion expressed by PW-7 Rajinder Singh that Jai Pal
  Singh may have caused the death of Dalip Singh but did not
D give much credence to this suspicion in view of the statement
  of Jai Pal Singh. The attempt to shift the blame onto Jai Pal
  Singh was, accordingly, discounted.

       15. The Trial Judge also took into account the recovery,
E during interrogation, of a bloodstained pajama from the
  appellant's house. This pajama had human bloodstains as per
  the report of the forensic science laboratory. It was noted that
  though the bloodstains on the pajama were not matched with
  the blood group of Dalip Singh, the appellant had failed to
F explain the bloodstains.

       16. The Trial Judge noted the injuries on Dalip Singh as
  given by PW-16 Dr. Uvi Tyagi, Registrar, Department of
  Forensic Medicine, l.G.M.C., Shimla. The injuries suffered by
  Dalip Singh were found to be ante mortem and were as
G follows:-

           1.    Two contusions on forehead 2 cm. above left
                 eyebrow 2.5 cm. apart from each other each of size
                 1 cm. in dimension, bluish in colour.
H
  GUDU RAM v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH                    1079
           [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]

      2.    A grazed abrasion over the root of the nose 2.5 cm.     A
            brownish in colour.

      3.    On opening the dressing (which was completely
            soaked in blood) surgically stitched wounds over
            the occipital region of the head. They were four in
                                                                    B
            number.

      17. The doctor was of the opinion that Dalip Singh died
due to hemorrhagic shock as a result of the ante mortem head
injuries. He was also of the opinion that the injuries could
possibly have been caused by a wooden stick or thapi. The Trial     C
Judge noted that Jai Pal Singh was also injured and, as per
the medical opinion, a blunt wooden stick could have caused
his injury.

      18. The appellant admitted in his statement recorded under    D
Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that he was
residing with Sheetal Singh. He admitted his presence in the
rented accommodation on the intervening night of 12th and 13th
November, 2003 but denied having consumed any drinks.
According to him, only Jai Pal Singh and Dalip Singh were           E
drinking. He denied having had a brawl with Dalip Singh and
denied any knowledge of the events which resulted in the death
of Dalip Singh. In fact, he stated that he had left Taradevi for
his village before the alleged incident took place. The appellant
did not produce any witness in defence.
                                                                    F
     19. On the basis of the above material, the Trial Judge held
that the appellant had murdered Dalip Singh and accordingly
he was convicted for an offence punishable under Section 302
of the Indian Penal Code.
                                                                    G
Decision of the High Court:

     20. Feeling aggrieved by the conviction and sentence
passed by the Trial Judge, the appellant preferred an appeal
to the High Court. By a judgment and order dated 31.10.2007
passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Criminal            H
    1080    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A Appeal No.562 of 2004, the conviction of the appellant for an
  offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code
  was upheld. The High Court held that there was sufficient
  evidence to conclude that none other than the appellant caused
  the death of Dalip Singh.
8
    Evidence of a hostile witness:

         21. The prime question that we are required to consider
    is the credibility of Jai Pal Singh since he was the only
    eyewitness to the crime and had turned hostile.
c
         22. Jai Pal Singh stated in his examination in chief as
    follows:

        "When we were still going, Gudu also came from behind
        and gave me beatings with the help of a wooden stick and
D       threw me aside in the bushes. Gudu then also gave
        beatings to Dalip Singh and threw him in the bushes. I
        alone went to Sheetal Singh and informed him about the
        occurrence. Sheetal Singh came with me to the scene of
        occurrence and on search, we found Dalip Singh lying in
E       injured condition at the place where quarrel had taken
        place outside the house of Sheetal Singh. Dalip Singh had
        sustained injuries on his head, which was bleeding and,
        therefore, we took him to Snowdon Hospital in an
        ambulance, where he was declared as dead."
F
    In his cross-examination, Jai Pal Singh stated as follows:

        "After sustaining hurt at the place of occurrence, I have
        fallen down to the depth of about 5 feet. I did not see Gudu
        causing injuries to Dalip Singh, but I only noticed him when
G       he threw Dalip Singh near me in the bushes. I could not
        see Gudu while throwing Dalip Singh in the bushes. When
        Dalip Singh fell down, his head had struck- against the
        ground."

H Later during his cross-examination, it is recorded as follows:
  GUDU RAM v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH                    1081
           [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]

    "At this stage, the learned public prosecutor seeks            A
    permission to cross-examine the witness on the ground
    that the witness is suppressing the truth. Heard. Keeping
    in view the substantial variation in the statement of the
    witness recorded in the court and recorded under Section
    161 Cr. P.C. with regard to the actual position of beatings.   B
    Learned Public Prosecutor is permitted to cross-examine
    the witness.

     xxxxx Cross-examination xxxxx (by learned P.P.)

    "My statement was recorded by the police. I had not seen       C
    the accused Gudu giving beatings to Dalip Singh with any
    thing and I also did not see the accused Gudu throwing
    Dalip Singh in the bushes. (Confronted with portion A to
    A with police statement of the witness Ext. PB, wherein it
    is so recorded). I did not state this to the police. It is     D
    incorrect to suggest that I have deposed falsely today in
    collusion with the accused."

     23. The law on the treatment of the evidence of a hostile
witness is that the evidence of such a witness need not be         E
completely rejected only because he has turned hostile. The
Court must, however, be circumspect in accepting his testimony
and, to the extent possible, look for its corroboration.

      24: In Karuppanna Thevar v. State of TN., (1976) 1 SCC
31 this Court held that the testimony of a hostile witness may     F
not be rejected outright "but the court has at least to be aware
that, prima facie a witness who makes different statements at
different times has no regard for truth. The court should
therefore be slow to act on the testimony of such a witness and,
normally, it should look for corroboration to his evidence."       G

    25. Similarly, in Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana,
(1976) 1 SCC 389 this Court held:

    "But the fact that the court gave permission to the
    prosecutor to cross-examine his own witness, thus              H
    1082      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A         characterising him as, what is described as a hostile
          witness, does not completely efface his evidence. The
          evidence remains admissible in the trial and there is no
          legal bar to base a conviction upon his testimony if
          corroborated by other reliable evidence."
B
    (Incidentally this passage is incorrectly attributed to P.N.
    Bhagwati, J in Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa, (1976)
    4 SCC 23. It should be correctly attributed to P.K. Goswami,
    J).

C        26. These basic principles have been reiterated recently
    in Bhajju v. State of M.P., (2012) 4 SCC 327 and Ramesh
    Harijan v. State of U.P., (2012) 5 SCC 777. In Bhajju one of
    us (Swatanter Kumar, J) held for the Court:

0         "The view that the evidence of the witness who has been
          called and cross-examined by the party with the leave of
          the court, cannot be believed or disbelieved in part and
          has to be excluded altogether, is not the correct exposition
          of law."
E      27. If we consider the totality of the evidence of Jai Pal
  Singh, it is clear that he categorically stated that the appellant
  attacked him with a wooden stick like a thapi and pushed him
  in the bushes. To this extent the evidence of Jai Pal Singh is
  quite clear and he did not recant from this. Then he goes on to
F say that though he noticed the appellant, he did not actually see
  him beat Dalip Singh or throw him in the bushes. But the fact
  is that Dalip Singh was beaten by someone and pushed into
  the bushes. There is nothing to suggest the presence of any
  third person. The presence of the appellant (and none other)
G at the scene of occurrence is not in doubt.

       28. The medical evidence shows that injuries on Jai Pal
  Singh could have been caused by a blunt wooden stick such
  as a thapi. Again, to this extent, the evidence of Jai Pal Singh
H is consistent. As per the medical evidence, the injuries on Dalip
  GUDU RAM v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH                     1083
           [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]

Singh could also have been caused by a similar wooden stick          A
or thapi. Under these circumstances, the conclusion is
inescapable that none other than the appellant attacked Jai Pal
Singh and Dalip Singh and inflicted injuries on them with a
thapi.
                                                                     B
    29. To this, we may add the conduct of the appellant, which
leaves a lot to be desired.
     30. The Trial Judge and the High Court found it suspicious
(and so do we) that on the intervening night of 12th and 13th
November, 2003 the appellant should leave Taradevi and go            c
to his village at Rohru. According to the statement of the
appellant under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. he had left Taradevi
before the incident took place. This may or may not be true,
but it is certainly relevant for appreciating his conduct. In this
context, it would be worthwhile to refer to Section 8 of the         D
Evidence Act, 1872 which makes relevant the conduct of the
appellant subsequent to the crime.
     31. Similarly, the recovery of a bloodstained pajama from
the appellant's house adds to the circumstances that call for an
explanation from the appellant. However, no explanation has          E
been forthcoming on either issue.
      32. No doubt, proof cannot be substituted by robust
suspicion. But if all the facts and circumstances point to only
one conclusion, it is difficult to ignore them and even in a case
                                                                     F
of circumstantial evidence, it is possible to secure a conviction.
The present case is much stronger since there is an eyewitness
to the incident and both the Trial Court and the High Court
accepted the version of events given by Jai Pal Singh. In such
circumstances, we should not normally interfere with the
conclusion expressed concurrently by the Trial Court and the         G
High Court. We have recently expressed this view in
Ramachandran v. State of Kerala 2012 (10) SCALE 592 and
it need not be repeated. Interference is, however, permissible
in exceptional circumstances - but we do not find the
circumstances of this case to be exceptional.                        H
    1084     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A        33. We are, therefore, prepared to agree with the Trial
    Court and the High Court that Jai Pal Singh was a credible
    witness and that his testimony to the extent that it implicates
    the appellant should be accepted.

       34. We are in agreement with the Trial Judge that the
8 insinuation that Jai Pal Singh committed the crime was too
  nebulous. The family dispute between Jai Pal Singh and Dalip
  Singh was obviously not particularly serious since Dalip Singh
  had ventured to stay with Jai Pal Singh and his brother Sheetal
  Singh in the same rented accommodation for about one year.
C In any event, this was not even the case set up by the appellant
  in his statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C.

    Intention to kill:
       35. The next question to be considered is whether the
D appellant had the intention to kill Dalip Singh. Here we have
  some difficulty in accepting the understanding of the events as
  narrated by the Trial Court and the High Court.
        36. It is true that the appellant caused multiple injuries on
E Dalip Singh, but it is difficult to infer from this that the appellant
  intended to kill him. His intention seems to have been to injure
  Jai Pal Singh and to severely injure Dalip Singh and after
  beating them up with a thapi, he pushed them into the bushes
  and walked away. It cannot be imagined that his intention was
F to injure Jai Pal Singh but kill Dalip Singh - he would be leaving
  behind Jai Pal Singh as an eyewitness.

       37. It seems to us that the conduct of Jai Pal Singh also
  points to the intentions of the appellant. Jai Pal Singh did not
  expect the assault on Dalip Singh to be fatal, otherwise he
G would have tended to the needs of the victim rather than have
  gone to call Sheetal Singh. That the delay in attending to Dalip
  Singh may have eventually led to his death is another matter
  altogether, but the attack was not so severe (in the estimation
  of Jai Pal Singh) as to have imminently caused the death of
H Dalip Singh.
   GUDU RAM v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH                     1085
            [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]

      38. Even though the situation is pregnant with hypotheses,      A
it is quite clear that the appellant had no intention to kill Dalip
Singh and even the rejection of the hypotheses cannot lead to
the conclusion that the appellant intended to kill Dalip Singh.

      39. However, the nature and number of injuries and their        8
location (the skull) as well as the "weapon" used (a small
wooden cricket bat) lead us to conclude that to a reasonable
person, an attack of the nature launched by the appellant on
Dalip Singh could cause his death. While it may be difficult to
delve into the mind of the attacker to decode his intentions,         C
knowledge of the consequences of his actions can certainly be
attributed to him.

     40. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the appellant
had knowledge that his actions are likely to cause the death of
Dalip Singh. He would, therefore, be guilty of culpable homicide      D
not amounting to murder and liable to be sentenced under the
second part of Section 304 of the IPC.

Conclusion:

     41. Under the circumstances, we partly allow this appeal         E
and set aside the conviction of the appellant for the murder of
Dalip Singh but convict him of an offence punishable under the
second part of Section 304 of the IPC.

     42. We have been informed that the appellant has already         F
undergone over eight years of actual imprisonment and almost
eleven years including remissions earned. Under the
circumstances, we sentence him to imprisonment for the period
already undergone.
                                                                      G
     43. The appeal is disposed of on the above terms.

B.B.B.                                      Appeal disposed of.