Holding

A brother of the deceased, as a legal representative, may maintain an application for compensation under Section 110‑A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.

Summary

The brothers of a 14‑year‑old boy who was killed in a bus accident filed an application under Section 110‑A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, seeking compensation as legal representatives of the deceased. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal awarded Rs 32,000 and the Gujarat High Court dismissed the transport corporation's appeal. The corporation challenged the award, arguing that only the spouse, parent or child could claim under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. The Supreme Court held that the term "legal representative" in Section 110‑A is not confined to those relatives and includes brothers who are heirs, that Chapter VIII of the Motor Vehicles Act substantively modifies the Fatal Accidents Act, and that the claim is therefore maintainable. The Court overruled a contrary Madhya Pradesh decision, affirmed the Gujarat High Court’s view, and dismissed the Special Leave Petition.

Issues considered

Whether a brother of a deceased person qualifies as a "legal representative" under Section 110‑A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
Whether the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 modify the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 with respect to who may claim compensation.
Whether the claim is barred by the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855's limitation to spouse, parent and child.
Whether Section 110‑A is merely procedural or creates a substantive right of action.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 2(11)
Fatal Accidents Act, 1855s. 1A, s. 2
Indian Succession Act, 1925s. 306
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939s. 102, s. 109-A, s. 109-C, s. 110-A, s. 110-B, s. 110-F, s. 92-A, s. 92-E

Subjects

legal representativemotor vehicle accident compensationMotor Vehicles Act 1939Fatal Accidents Act 1855Section 110-Asocial justicebrother as heirtort lawclaims tribunal

Judgment

A
GUJARAT STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION,
AHMED ABAD.
v.
RAMANBHAI PRABHATBHAI & ANOTHER

B MAY 11, 1987

[E.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND K.N. SINGH JJ.]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1939-Section llOA-'Legal represen-
tatives'-Who are-Not to be confined to spouse, parent and children of
the deceased.
c
Civil Procedure Code, 1908-Section 2 (ii)-'Legal representa-
tive'-Who is. --
Words and Phrases-'Legal representative'-Meaning of
D
The respondents-brothers of the deceased-instituted a petition
before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1939, claiming compensation for the death of their brother in an
accident on the ground that they were the heirs and legal represents- '1
lives of the deceased. The Tribunal awarded a compensation of
E Rs.32,000 to the claimants, and directed the Gujarat State Road Trans-
port Corporation to pay the said amount to the claimants. The appeal of
the Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation under Section UOD of
the Act was dismissed by the High Court.

In the special leave petition to this Court it was contended that the
F Tribunal and the High Court were in error in awarding compensation
in favour of the brothers of the deceased, since in law they were not
entitled to any compensation under the provisions of the Fatal Acci-
dents Act, 1855, and it was submitted that the provisions in Chapter
VIII of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 were merely procedural in charac-
ter under which an alternative forum is created for deciding the ques-
G lion of compensation payable in respect of injuries and death caused on
account of motor vehicles accidents, that they have not modified in any
manner the substantive law governing the said question, and, therefore,
the principles contained in the law of torts as modified by the Fatal
Accidents Act, 1855, alone would govern the said question even now.

H Dismissing the special leave petition, this Court

404

·--';,-- _____ __.,,,,_ ___
G.S.R.T.C. ._ RAMANBHAI 405

HELD: 1. Where a pedestrian, without negligence on his part, is A
injured or killed by a motorist whether negligently or not, he or his
legal representatives, as the case may be, shoUld be entitled to recover dama-
ges if the principle of socialjustiee should have any meaning at all. [416C]

2. To a limited extent relief has been granted under Section 92A
to the legal representatives of the victims who had died on account of B
motor vehicle accidents. Compensation of Rs.15,000 can be claimed
without proof of any negligence on the part of the owner of the vehicle
or of any other person. This part of the Act is clearly a departure from
the usual common law principle that a claimant should establish negli-
gence on the part of the owner or driver of the motor vehicle before
claiming any compensation for the death or permanent disablement
caused on account of a motor vehicle accident. To that extent the sub- c
stantive law stands modified. [416H, 417A-B]

3. The brother of the person who dies in a motor vehicle accident
is entitled to maintain a petition under Section l lOA of the Act if he is a
·legal representative of the deceased. [422C] D
y
4. Every legal representative who suffers on account of the death
of a person due to a motor vehicle accident should have a remedy for
realisation of compensation and that is provided by Sections HOA to
HOF of the Act. These provisions are in consonance with the principles
of law of torts that every injury ~ust have remedy. It is for the Motor E
Vehicles Accidents Tribunal to determine tbe compensation which
appears to it to be just as provided in Section HOB of the Act and
to specify the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid.
The determination of the compensation payable and its apportionment
as required by Section HOB of the Act amongst the legal representa-
tives for whose benefit an application may be filed under Section HOA F
of the Act have to be done in accordance with well-known principles of
law. [421F-H, 422A]

S.l Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section HOA of the Act
provided that the application for compensation arising out of an accident
may be made where death has resulted from the accident by all or any G
~ of the legal representatives of the deceased. The proviso to sub-section
(1) of Section HOA provides that where all the legal representatives of
the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation,
the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all
the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives
who have not so joined shall be impleaded as respondents to the H
application. [419A-B]
406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 3.S.C.R.

A 5.2 The expression 'legal representative' has not been defined in )
the Act. Section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 defines 'legal
representative' as a person who in law represents the estate of a de·
ceased person and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate
of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative
character, the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the
8
party so suing or sued. [419C·D)

5.3 A legal representative ordinarily means a person who in law
represents the estate of a deceased person or a person on whom the ....
estate devolves on the death of an individual. [4190)

C 5.4 A legal representative in a given case need not necessarily be a
wife, husband, parent and rhild. [420B)

5.5 In an Indian family brothers, sisters and brothers' children
and some times foster children live together and they are dependent
D upon the bread·winner of the family ancl if the bread-winner is killed on
account of a motor vehicle accident, there is no justification to deny
them compensation relying upon the provisions of the Fatal Accidents
Act, 1855, which hl_)S been substantially modified by the provisions
contained in the Act in relation to cases arising out of motor vehicle
accidents. [422A·B]
E
5.6 The fact that the Parliam~nt declined to take any action on
the recommendation of the Law Commission to define the expression
'legal representative' suggests that Parliament intended that the expres·
sion 'legal representatives' in Section l lllA of the Act should be given a
wider meaning and it should not be confined to the spouse, parent and
F children of the deceased. [422G]

6.1 Although Chapter VIII of the Act provides for an alternative
forum for realisation of compensation payable on account of motor
vehicles accidents, these provisions are not merely precedural. They
substantially affect the rights of the parties. As the right of action
G created by the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was "new in its species, new in
its quality, new in its principles, in every way new", the right given to
the legal representatives under the Act to file an application for com-
pensation for death due to motor vehicle accident is equally new and an
enlarged one. This new right cannot be hedged in by all the limitations
of an action under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and
H new dangers require new strategies and new remedies. [415G, 420E-F)
G.S.R.T.C. v. RAMANBHAI 407

). 6.2 While the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 provides that a suit shall A
be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child of the
deceased, Section llOA(l) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 says that
the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of the legal
represent~tives of the deceased. Section 110A(l) in a way is a substitute
for the provisions of Section 1·A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. B
Similarly, Section HOB which authorises the Claims Tribunal to make
A an order determining the amount of compensation which appears to it
to be just, and specifying the person or persons to whom the compen·
lo--' sation shall be paid takes the place of the third paragraph of Sec·
lion l·A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which provides that in
every such action, the court may give such damages as it may think
proportionate to the loss resulting from such death to the parties respec· C
lively, for whom and for whose benefit such applicati011 shall be
\.- brought. [420A-C]

6.3 Perso.ns for whose benefit such application can be made and
the manner in which the compensation awarded may be distributed
0
amongst persons for whose benefit the application is made are dealt
Y with by Sections HOA and HOB and to that extent the provisions of the
Act do supersede the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, in·
sofar as motor vehicle accidents are concerned. [420D]

Megjibhai Khimji Vira and another v. Chaturbhai Taljabhai and E
others, AIR 1977 Gujarat 195 affirmed;

· -~. Budha v. Union of India and Ors., (1981] M.P.151 ove"uled;

Minu B. Mehla and Another v. Balkrishna Ramchandra Nayan
~ and Another, (1977] 2 S.C.R. 886; Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868] L.R. 3 F
H.L. 330, 340; P.B. Kader and others v. Thatchamma and others,
A.I.R. 1970 Kerala 241; Dewan Hari Chand and Others v. Municipal
Corporation of Delhi and another, A.I.R. 1973 Delhi 67; Perumal v.
Ellusamy Reddiar, [1974] ACJ 182 (Mad); Vanguard Insurance Co.
Ltd. v. Hanumantha Rao, [1975] ACJ 344 (Andhra Pradesh); Moham-
med Habibullah and another v. K. Seethammal, A.I.R. 1967 Mad. 123; G
~eena Kumari Kohli v. Punjab Roadways, (1967] ACJ 297 (Pb.) and
'~mt. lshwar Devi Malik v. Union of India, A.1.R. 1969 Delhi 183,
referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition
(Civil) No. 2802 of 1987.
H
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 3.S.C.R.

A From the Judgment and Order dated 24.12.1986 of the Gujarat J
High Court in F.A. No. 1379 of 1986.

S.K. Dholakia, R.C. Bhatia and P.C. Kapur for the Petitioner.

C.S. Vaidyanathan for the Respondents.
B
The Order of the Court was delivered by

VENKATARAMIAH, J. The question involved in this case is ·..,
whether a brother of a person who is killed in a motor vehicle accident
can claim compensation in a proceeding instituted before a Motor Acci-
C dents Claims Tribunal established under the provisions of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The High
Court of Gujarat has upheld such a claim in this case. This Special
Leave Petition is filed against the judgment of the High Court ques-
tioning the correctness of the said decision.

D The brief facts of the case are these. On account of the negli-
gence on the part of the driver of a bus belonging to the petitioner, the 'l
Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad, a boy
named Bhanubhai, aged 14 years, was run over by the bus resulting in
his untimely death. Ramanbhai and Dineshbhai, who were the
brothers df the deceased, instituted a petition before the Motor Acci-
E dents Claims Tribunal (Auxiliary), Vadodara, claiming compensation
for the death of their brother alleging that they were the heirs and legal
representatives of the deceased. The Tribunal awarded a sum of )ti
Rs.32,000 as compensation to the claimants and directed the Gujarat
State Road Transport Corporation to pay the said amount to the
claimants. Against the award of the Tribunal, the Gujarat State Trans-
F port Corporation filed an appeal before the High Court of Gujarat
under section 1100 of the Act. That appeal was dismissed. This
Special Leave Petition is filed against the judgment of the High Court.

The only point convassed before us in this Special Leave Petition
is that the Tribunal and the High Court were in error in awarding
G compensation in favour of the brothers of the deceased, sinct in law
they were not entitled to any compensation under the provisions of the --1.
Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 and m support of the said contention, re-
liance was placed by the petitioner on the decision of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court in Budha v. Union of India and others, A.LR.
1981 M.P. 151. In the present case the High Court of Gujarat while
H passing its order has preferred to follow its own decision in Magjibhai
G.S.R.T.C. v. RAMANBHAI [VENKATARAMIAH, J.J 409
)
Khimji Vira and another v. Chaturbhai Taljabhai and others, A.LR. A
1977 Gujarat 195 in which it had held that all the heirs and legal
representatives of the deceased could maintain the claim petition
under section 110-A of the Act and had awarded compensation in
favour of the nephews of the deceased. On account of the divergence
of opinion prevailing in the High Courts on the question involved in
~ this case we have found it necessary to give reasons in support of our ll
decision on this Special Leave Petition.

lo>- On account of the close association which came to be established
between India and Great Britain owing to the British rule which lasted
for over two centuries, in the High Courts established in India the
English Common Law which was based on principles of justice, equity C
and good conscience came to be applied wherever they were called
~ upon to award damages or compensation for civil wrongs committed
by the defendants in the suits. The application of the English Common
Law, however, had to conform to Indian circumstances and conditions
which necessarily involved a selective application of the English Law
in India. "The adoption of the rules of English Law by the Indian D
Y Courts" observes M.C. Setalvad in his 'Common Law in India' (The
Hamlyn Lectures, Twelfth Series, Page 53) "was neither automatic
nor uncritical. Although they started with a presumption that a rule of
English Law would be in accordance with the principles of justice,
equity and good conscience, they bore in mind the reservation which
was later expressed by the Privy Council in the words 'if found appli- E
cable to Indian society and circumstances.'" In the course of the appli-
cation of the principles of the English Law of Torts in India the Indian
courts came to recognise and apply the maxim actio persona/is
moritur cum persona-a personal action dies with the parties to the
cause of action. An action for a tort had to be begun in the joint
lifetime of the wrongdoer and the person in ju red. The development of F
railways in England, led to a great upsurge in the number of accidents,
many of which were fatal. When it was realised that the cause of action
for recovery of damages for the death of a person caused by the wrong-
ful act of another person did not survive on the death of the person to
his legal representatives in England as a measure of law reform the
~atal Accidents Act, 1855 was passed for compensating the families of G
persons killed by accidents. That Act provided that "whensoever the
death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default,
and the act, neglect, or default is such as would (if death had not .
ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and
recover damages in respect thereof, then and in every such case the
person who would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be H
410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 3.S.C.R.
).,
A liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the
person injured". The said Act further provided that "every such action
shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent, and child of the
person whose death shall have been so caused, and shall be brought by
and in the name of the executor or administrator of the person de-
ceased; and in every such action the jury may give such damages as
B they may think proportioned to the injury resulting from such death to~
the parties respectively for whom and for whose benefit such action shall
be brought; and the amount so recovered, after deducting the costs not ~
recovered from the defendant, sliall be divided amohgst the before-
mentioned parties in such shares as the jury by their_ verdict shall find
and direct." Within a few years after the passing of the said English
c Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855•came to be
passed on the 27th of March, 1855 in India. This Act contains in all five -.I
sections. Its preamble runs thus:

"Whereas no action or suit is llDW maintainable in any
Court against a person who, by his wrongful act, neglect, or
D default, may have caused the death of another person, and
it is often-times right and expedient that the wrong-doer in Y
such case should be answerable in damages for the injury so
caused by him. It is enacted as follows:-"

Sections lA and 2 of that Act which are relevant for our present
E purpose read thus:

"lA. Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by
wrongful act, neglect, or default, and the act, neglect or
default is such as would (if death had not ensued) have
entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover
F damages in respect thereof, the party who would have been
liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action or
suit for dam~ges, notwithstanding the death of the person
injured, and although the death shall have been caused
under such circumstances as amount in law to felony or
other crime.
G ....
Every such action or suit shall be for the benefit of the
wife, husband, parent and child, if any, of the person whose
death shall have been so caused, and shall be brought by
and in the name of the executor, administrator or represen-
tative of the person deceased;
H

111 .. <f:! S
G.S.R.T.C. v. RAMANBHAJ [VENKATARAMIAH, J.] 411

and in every such action, the Court may give such damages A
as it may think proportioned to the loss resulting from such
death to the parties respectively, for whom and for whose
benefit such action shall be brought, and the amount so
reco.vered, after deducting all costs and expenses, including
the costs not recovered from the defendant, shall be
deivided amongst the before-mentioned parties, or any of B
them, in such shares as the Court by its judgment or decree
shall direct.

2. Provided always that not more than one action or suit

- shall be bro11ght for and in respect of the same subject-
matter of complaint:
c
Provided that in any such action or suit the executor,
administrator or representative of the deceased may insert
a claim for, and recover any pecuniary Joss to the estate of
the deceased occasioned by such wrongful act, neglect or
default, which sum, when recovered, shall be deemed part D
y of the assets of the estate of the deceased." (emphasis
added)

The comparison between the English Fatal Accidents Act, 1846
and the Indian Fatal Accidents A.ct, 1855 shows that they are almost
identical insofar as the persons for whose benefit action for compensa- E
lion could be brought on the death of a person, and they are, wife,
husband, parent and child of the deceased. The English law was, how-
ever, modified insofar as the above question was concerned by the
Fatal Accidents Act, 1959. Section 1 of that Act provides that the
persons for whose benefit and by whom an action may be brought
under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1846 shall include any person who is, or F
is the issue of a brother, sister, uncle or aunt of the deceased person
and in deducing any relationship for the purposes of the said Act it
further provides that (a) an adopted person should be treated as a
child of the person or the persons by whom he was adopted and not of
the child of any other person; and subject thereto (b) any relationship
by affinity should be treated as a relationship by consanguinity, any G
relationship of the half blood as a relationship of the whole blood and
the step-child of any person as a child; and (c) an illegitimate person
should be treated as a legitimate child of his mother and reputed
father. After the above Act was passed in 1959 in England there came
to be appointed a Commission, called the Royal Commission on Civil
Liberty and Compensation for Personal Injury under the Chairman- H
412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1987] 3.S.C.R.

A ship of Lord Pearson in the year 1973 to consider to what extent, in
what circumstances and by what means compensation should be pay-
able in respect of personal injury (including ante-natal injury) suffered
by any person (a) in the course of employment; (b) through the use of
a motor vehicle or other means of transport; (c) through the manu-
facture, supply or use of goods or services; (d) on premises belonging
B to or occupied by another or ( e) otherwise through the act or omission
of another where compensation under the pres~nt law is recoverable
only on proof of fault or under the rules of strict liability having regard
to the cost and other implications of the arrangements for the recovery
of compensacion, whether by way of compulsory insurance or other-
wise. During the period when the Royal Commission was still collect- '
c ing evidence to prepare its Report the Fatal Accidents Act, 1976 which
was a consolidating Act incorporating the provisions of the Fatal Acci-
-
dents Acts 1846 to 1959 was brought into force on September 1, 1976
in England. The Royal Commission submitted its report in March,
1978. After considering the evidence placed before it on the law pre-
vailing in many of the countries the Pearson Cm;nmission recom-
D mended as follows:
y
"399. Claims for damages following death may be made
under the present law on behalf of the relatives of the
deceased and on behalf of his estate.

E The relatives' claill' for pecuniary Loss.

400. An action may be brought on behalf of certain depen-
dent relatives of the deceased for pecuniary loss (lost
dependency) under the Fatal Accidents Acts in England,
Wales and Northern Ireland. In Scotland, the equivalent
F action is for loss of support and funeral expenses under the
Damages (Scotland) Act 1976.

The entitlement to claim.

401. Claims under the Fatal Accidents Acts may be
G made on behalf of the deceased's spouse, parent, grandpa-
rent, child, grandchild, brother, sister, uncle, aunt, and-
in the case of the last four relatives-their issue. Relation-
ships by marriage are treated as blood relationships; a leg-
ally adopted child is treated as a natural child; and an
illegitimate child is treated as the legitimate child of his
h mother and reputed father. 'Half' and 'step' relationships
G.S.R.T.C. v. RAMANBHAI (VENKATARAMIAH, l.] 413

are treated as full relationships. A

402. In Scotland, those entitled to claim damages for
loss of support also include all ascendants and descendants;
any person accepted by the deceased as a child of his family
(whether or not legally adopted); and a divorced spouse. B
The full list, contained in Schedule I to the Damages (Scot-
land) Act, 1976, is as follows:

a. any person who immediately before the deceased'>
death was the spouse of the deceased;

b. any person who was a parent or child of the deceased; C

c. any person not falling within paragraph-b above who
was accepted by the deceased as a child of his family;

d. any persoP who was an ascendant or descendant (other D
than a parent or child) of the deceased;
y
e. any person who was, or was the issue of, a brother,
sister, uncle or aunt of the deceased; and

f. any person who, having been a spouse of the deceased, E
had ceased to be so by virtue of a divorce .
. __.,__
403. We think that there is a good case for extending the
present entitlement in England, Wales and Northern Ire-
land to conform with Scots law. We agree with the Law
Commission that a child accepted by the deceased and F
maintained by him as a 'child of the family', even though
not legally adopted, has at least as good a claim to damages
for lost dependency as, say, a step child; and that where a
divorced spouse can demonstrate dependency on the
deceased (if, for example, he or she has been awarded
maintenance payments) he or she should also be abfu. to G
claim damages. The inclusion under Scots law of all
ascendants and descendants further means that claims by a
dependent great-grandparent or great-grandchild can be
considered. Although the likelihood of such claims is in
practice remote, we see no reason why they should in
principle be excluded. H

. . . . . .~T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ._ __,._ _~--~~~--
414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 3.S.C.R.

A 404. We recommend that the relatives entitled to claim ~
damages for lost dependency in England, Wales and North-
ern Ireland should be the same as those entitled to claim
damages for loss of support under the Damages (Scotland)
Act, 1976."

B From the recommendation of the British Royal Commission, which is
extracted above, it is seen that the Royal Commission recommended
that the area of entitlement to damages following death should be
expanded so as to include a larger number of relatives. In our country
the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 has remained unamended, but we have
still to consider the effect of the amendment of the Act, i.e., Motor
c Vehicles Act, 1939 on the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. But, before
examining the relevant provisions of the Act it is necessary to refer to
the 85th Report of the Law Commission of India on claims for com- -f
pensation under Chapter VIII of the Act which was submitted as late
as May, 1980. The Law Commission of India after taking into consid-
eration the differences of opinion prevailing in the various High
D Courts on the question of the persons who should be entitled to claim
compensation on the death of a person, recommended that the entitle- y
ment to such compensation should be confined to the spouse, parent
and children of the deceased as specified in the Fatal Accidents Act,
1855 overlooking the amendments made in England and other coun-
tries by expanding the list of relatives who are entitled to claim com-
E pensation on the death of a person. It is surprising that the Law Com-
mission of India recommended that the provisions of the Fatal Acci- ~-- .._
dents Act, 1855 should be adhered to insofar as the persons who were
entitled to claim compensation was concerned. We shall now proceed
to consider the effect of the amendment of the Act insofar as the ~
question of compensation payable on the death of a person as a result
F of a motor vehicle accident is concerned.

It is submitted that the provisions in Chapter VIII of the Act to
which we shall presently refer are merely procedural in character
under which an alternative forum is created for deciding the question of
compensation payable in respect of injuries and death caused on
G a.:count of motor vehicles accidents and that they have not modified iiy
any manner the substantive law governing the said question. In other
words it is argued that the principles contained in the Law of Torts, as
modified by the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, alone would govern the
said question even now. In support of the above submission reliance is
placed on the decision of this Court in Minu B. Mehta and Another v.
H Balkrishna Ramchandra Nayan and Another, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 886. In
G.S.R.T.C. v. RAMANBHAI [VENKATARAMIAH, J.] 415

that case that Court affirmed the finding of the High Court that the A
motor vehicle accident which was the cause of the death in that case
had happened on account of the negligence of the driver of the vehi-
cle and hence damages were payable to the claimant therein and at
page 894 this Court observed that the said finding was sufficient to
conclude the judgment but the Court felt that it was desirable to deal
with the question of law that had been dealt with at considerable B
length by the High Court as to whether it was incumbent on the clai-
mant to prove negligence on the part of the driver of the motor vehicle
before he would be entitled to compensation. The High Court had in
the course of its judgment after upholding that the driver was negli-
gent, observed that having regard to the changed conditions of modern
society where a large number of motor vehicles were put on road thus C
exposing innocent third parties to grave accidents very often resulting
\,- in injuries to their lives and limbs, it was necessary in public interest to
'
take the view that proof of negligence was unnecessary on the part of
the drivers of the motor vehicles before claiming compensation. The
learned Judges of this Court were, however, of the view that the above
observation was inconsistent with the law of the land and that no D
damages could become payable without proof of negligence on the
part of the driver of the motor vehicle involved in the accident. They
further observed that the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Act were
merely procedural and had not altered the substantive law. With great
respect it should be observed that the observations of this Court on the
above question were in the nature of obiter dicta since as already E
stated there was no necessity to go into the question whether proof of
negligence on the part of the driver of the motor vehicle was necessary
or not to claim damages under Chapter VIII of the Act because it had
been found both by the High Court and this Court that such negligence
had been intact established. In the case before us, however, it is .neces-
sary to examine the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Act to ascertain F
whether there has been any modification by necessary implication of
the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 insofar as the persons
who are entitled to claim compensation on account of motor vehicles
accidents, is

~ It is true that Chapter VIII of the Act provides for an alternative G
forum for realisation of compensation payable on account of motor
vehicles accidents but as we shall presently show it is not correct to say
that the said provisions in Chapter VIII of the Act are merely
procedural.

When the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was enacted there were no H
.
416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 3.S.C.R.

motor vehicles on the roads in India. Today, thanks to the modern
A civilization, thousands of motor vehicles are put on the road and the
largest number of in juries and deaths are taking place on the roads on
account of the motor vehicles accidents. In view of the fast and con-
stantly increasing volume of traffic, the motor vehicles •1pon the roads
may be regarded to some extent as coming within the principle of
fl liability defined in Rylands v. Fletcher, [1868] LR. 3 H.L. 330, 340.
From the point of view of the pedestrian the.roads of this country have
been rendered by the use of the motor vehicles highly dangerous. 'Hit
and run' cases where the drivers of the motor vehicles who have caused
the accidents are not known are increasing in number. Where a pedest-
rian without negligence on his part is injured or killed by a motorist
whether negligently or not, he or his legal representatives as the case
c may be should be entitled to recover damages if the principle of social
justice should have any meaning at all. In order to meet to some extent
the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in
road accidents there has been a continuous agitation through out the
world to make the liability for damages arising out of motor vehicles
D accidents as a liability without fault. In order to meet the above social
demand on the recommendation of the Indian Law Commission Chap-
ter VIIA was introduced in the Act. Sections 92-A to 92-E of the Act
are to be found in Chapter VIIA. Section 92-E of the Act provides that
the provisions of Chapter VIIA shall have effect notwithstanding any-
thing contained in any other provision of the Act or of any other law
E for the time being in force. Section 92-A of the Act provides that
where the death or permanent disablemenl"i'lf any person has resulted
from an accident ansing out of the use of a.motor vehicle or motor
vehicles, the owner of the vehicle shall, or, as the case may be, the
owners of the vehicles shall, jointly and severally, be liable to pay
compensation in respect of such death or disablement in accordance
F with the provisions of the said section. The amount of compensation
which is payable thereunder in respect of the death of any person is a
fixed sum of fifteen thousand rupees and the amount of compensation
payable under it in respect of the permanent disablement of any
person is a fixed sum of seven. thousand and five hundred rupees.
Sub-section (3) of section 92-A of the Act provides that in any claim
G for compensation under sub-section (!)of section 92-A, the claimant
shall not be required to plead and establish that the death or perma-
nent disablement fn respect of which the claim has been made was due
to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the
vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person. It is thus seen
that to a limited extent relief has been granted under section 92-A of
H the Act to the legal representatives of the victims who have died on
G.S.R.T.C. v. RAMANBHAI [VENKATARAMIAH, J.J 417

account of motor vehicles accidents. Now they can claim Rs.15,000 A
without proof of any negligence on the part of the owner of the vehicle
or of any other person. This part of the Act is clearly a departure from
the usual common law principle that a claimant should establish negli-
gence on the part of the owner or driver of the motor vehicle before
claiming any compensation for the death or permanent disablement
caused on account of a motor vehicle accident. To that extent the B
substantive law of the country stands modified. The special provisions
contained in section 109-A to section 109-C of the Act providing for a
scheme for granting relief to victims or the legal representatives of
victims of 'hit and run' motor vehicle accident cases is another novel

- effort on the part of the Government to remedy the situation created
by the modern society which has been responsible for introducing so
many fast moving vehicles on roads. Now we shali analyse the provi-
sions of Chapter VIII of the Act which deals with the insurance of
c
motor vehicles against third party risk. Sections 93 to Ill-A are in
that Chapter. The Act insists that the owner of a motor vehicle should
take out an insurance policy to cover \bird party risk except in some
specified cases. Section 102 of the Act provides that notwithstanding D
anything contained in section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925,
y the death of a person in whose favour a certificate of insurance has
been issued, if it occurs after the happening of an event which has
given rise to a claim under the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Act
shall not be a bar to the survival of any caus"i of action arising out of
the said event against his estate or against the !nsuret. The death of an E
owner of a motor vehicle which is involved in a motor vehicle accident
in whose favour a certificate of insurance has been issued is thus no
longer a bar to the survival of any cause of action arising out of the said
event. Section llO of the Act provides for the establishment of Claims
Tribunals. It provides that a State Government may by notification in
the Official Gazette, constitute one or.more Motor Accidents Claims F
Tribunals for such areas as may be specified in the notification for the
purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of
accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out
of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third
party so arising, or both. Section 110-F of the Act bars jurisdiction of
Civil Courts where any Claims Tribunal has been constituted for any G
area to entertain any question relating to any claim for compensation
which may be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal for that area.
On the occurrence of any motor vehicles accident, an application for
compensation arising out of it can be made before the Claims Tri·
bunal. Section 1lO·A of the Act which is material for the purpose of
this case reads thus: H
418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1987) 3.S.C.R.

"110-A. Application for compensation.-(!) An
A
application for compensation arising out of an accident in
the nature specified in sub-section ( 1) of section l Hl may be
made-

(a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or
B
( aa) by the owner of the property; or

(b) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or _...,
any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or

c (c) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or
all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as
-
the case may be.

Provided that, where all the legal representatives of
the deceased have not joined in any such application for
D compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of
or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the
deceased and the legal representatives who have not so
joined shall be impleaded as respondents to the appli-
cation.

E (2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be
made to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the
area in which the accident occurred, and shall be in such
form and shall contain such particulars as may be pres-
cribed.

F Provided that where any claim for compensation
under section 92A is made in such application, the applica-
tion shall contain a separate statement to that effect
immediately before the signature of the applicant.

(3) No application for such compensation shall be
G entertained unless it is made within six months of the
occurrence of the accident:

Provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the
application after the expiry of the said period of six months
if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by suffi-
H cient cause from making the application in time."
G.S.R.T.C. v. RAMANBHAI [VENKATARAMIAH, J.J 419

Clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (I) of section 110-A of the Act A
provide that an application for compensation arising out of an accident
may be made where death has resulted from the accident by all or any
of the legal representatives of the deceased or by any agent duly
authorised by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased.
The proviso to sub-section (I) of section I 10-A provides that where all
the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such B
) application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf
of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and
1r-· the legal representatives who have not so joined shall be impleaded as
respondents to the application. The expression 'legal representative'

- has not been defined in the Act. Section 2( 11) of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 defines 'legal representative' as a person who in law C
represents the estate of a deceased person and includes any person
~- who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party
sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the
estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued. The above
definition, no doubt, in terms does not apply to a case before the
Claims Tribunal but it has to be stated that even in ordinary parlance D
y the said expression is understood almost in the same way in which it is
defined in the Code of Civil ·Procedure. A legal representative ordi-
narily means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased
person or a person on whom the estate devolves on the death of an
individual. Clause (b) of sub-section (!) of section 110-A of the Act
authorises all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased to E
make an application for compensation before the Claim• Tribunal for
,..- .__._ the death of the deceased on account of a motor vehicle accident and
clause (c) of that sub-section authorises any agent duly authorised by
all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased to make it. The
~ proviso to sub-section i 1) of section llO-A of the Act appears to be of
some significance. It provides that the application for compensation F
shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representa-
tives of the deceased. Section 110-A( I) of the Act thus expressly states
that (i) an application for compensation may be made by the legal
representatives of the deceased or their agent and (ii) that such appli-
cation shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal
\representatives. Both the persons or person who can make an applica- G
rtion for compensation and the persons for whose benefit such applica-
tion can be made are thus indicated in section 110-A of the Act. This
section in a way is a substitute to the extent indicated above for the
provisions of section IA of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which pro-
vides that "every such action or suit shall be for the benefit of the wife,
husband, parent and child, if any, of the person whose death shall have H
420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987) 3.S.C.R.

A been so caused, and shall be brought by and in the name of the ~
executor, administrator or representative of the person deceased."
While the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 provides that such suit shall be for
the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child of the deceased,
section 110-A(l) of the Act says that the application shall be made on
behalf of or for the benefit of the legal representatives of the deceased.
B A legal representative in a given case need not necessarily be a wife, l
husband, parent and child. It is further seen from section 110-B of the )'..
Act that the Claims Tribunal is authorised to make an award determin-
ing the amount of compensation ,which appears to it to be just and
specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid.
This provision takes the place of the third paragraph of section lA of
c the Fatal Accidents Act, 18"55 which provides that in every such action,
the Court may give such damages as it may think proportioned to the
-
loss resulting from such death to the parties respectively, for whom
and for whose benefit such action shall be faought. Persons for whose
benefit such an application can be made and the manner in which the
compensation awarded may be distributed amongst the persons for
D whose benefit the application is made are dealt with by section 110-A
and section 110-B of the Act and to that extent the provisions of the )'
Act do supersede the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 in so
far as motor vehicles accidents are concerned. These provisions are
not merely procedural provisions. They substantively affect the rights
of the parties. As the right of action created by the Fatal Accidents
E Act, 1855 was "new in its species, new in its quality, new in its princi-
ples, in every way new" the right given to the legal representatives
under the Act to file an application for compensation for death due to
a motor vehicle accident is equally new and an enlarged one. This new
right cannot be hedged in by all the limitations of an action under the
Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require
F new strategies and new remedies.

Amongst the High Courts in India there is a cleavage in the
opinion as regards the maintainability of action under section 110-A of
the Act by persons other than the wife, husband, parent and child of
the person who dies on account of a motor vehicle accident. All these
G cases are considered by the High Court of Gujarat in its decision in-1
Magjibhai Khimji Vira and another v. Chaturbhai Taljabhai and others
(supra). The first set of cases are those which are referred to in para-
graph 5 of the above decision which lay down that every claim applica-
tion for compensation arising out of a fatal accident would be gover-
ned by the substantive provisions of sections lA and 2 of the 1855 Act
H and no dependent of the deceased other than the wife, husband, pa-
G.S.R.T.C. v. RAMANBHAI [VENKATARAMIAH, J.] 421

.J.rent or child would be entitled to commence an action for damages
A
against the tortfeasors. Amongst these cases are P.R Kader and others
v. Thatchamma and others, A.LR. 1970 Kerala 241 and Dewan Hari
Chand and others v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and another,
A.1.R. 1973 Delhi 67. The second group of cases are those referred to
in paragraph 6 of the decision of the Gujarat High Court. They are
Perumal v. Ellusamy Reddiar, [1974) ACJ 182 (Mad) and the Van- B
A guard Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hanumantha Rao, [1975) ACJ 344
(Andhra Pradesh). These cases lay down that while the compensation
..... payable under section lA of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 is restricted

- to the relatives of the deceased named therein the compensation pay-
able under section 2 thereof may be awarded in favour of the re-
presentatives of the deceased who are entitled to succeed to the estate
of the deceased. The third group of cases are those referred to in
c
~ paragraph 7 of the judgment of the Gujarat High Court. They are
Mohammed Habibullah and another v. K. Seethammal, A.LR. 1967
Mad. 123; Veena Kumari Kohli v. Punjab Roadways, [1967) ACJ 297
(Pb.) and Smt. Ishwar Devi Malik v. Union of India. A.LR. 1969
Delhi 183 which take the view that a claim for compensation arising D
'; out of the use of a motor vehicle would be exclusively governed by the
provisions of sections 1IO to 110-F of the Act and bears no connection
to claims under the 1855 Act and the Claims Tribunal need not follow
the principles laid down under the latter Act. Having considered all
the three sets of decisions referred to above, Ahmadi, J. who wrote the
judgment in Megjibhai Khimji Vira and another v. Chaturbhai Tai- E
jabhai and others (supra) came to the conclusion that an application
- -i.:_
made by the nephews of the deceased who died on account of a motor
vehicle accident was clearly maintainable under section 110-A of the
Act.
~
rl We feel that the view taken by the Gujarat High Court is in F
consonance with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience
having regard to the conditions of the Indian society. Every legal
representative who suffers on account of the death of a person due to a
motor vehicle accident should have a remedy for realisation of com-
pensation and that is provided by sections 110-A to 110-F of the Act.
~ These provisions are in consonance with the principles of law of torts G
that every in jury must have a remedy. It is for the Motor Vehicles
Accidents Tribunal to determine the compensation which appears to it
to be JUSt as provided in section 110-B of the Act and to specify the
person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid. The determi·
nation of the compensation payable and its opportionment as required by
section l!OB of the Act amongst the legal representatives for whose H

,, :··
422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 3.S.C.R.

A benefit an application may be filed under section 110-A of the Act
have to be done in accordance with well-known principles of law. We
should remember that in an Indian family brothers, sisters and
brothers' children and some times foster children live together and
they are dependent upon the bread-winner of the family and if the
B bread-winner is killed on account of a motor vehicle accident, there is
no justification to deny them compensation relying upon the provi- )._
sions of the Fatal Ac idents Act, 1855 which as we have already held
0

has been substantially modified by the provisions contained in the Act
in relation to cases arising out of motor vehicles accidents. We express
our approval of the decision in Megjibhai Khimji Vira and another v.
Chaturbhai Taljabhai and others, I supra) and hold that the brother of a
C person who dies in a motor vehicle accident is entitled to maintain a
petition under section 110-A of the Act if he is a legal representative of
-
the deceased.

We have carefully gone through the decision of the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh in Budha v. Union of India and others (supra). We
D feel that the view taken in that decision is a narrow one and does not
give full effect to the object with which sections 110-A and 110-B of Y
the Act were enacted. We overrule the said decision.

Before concluding we-may add that although the Act was exten-
sively modified after the receipt of the report of the Law Commission,
E Parliament did not choose to amend section 110-A of the Act by defin-
ing the expression 'legal representatives' in relation to claims under
Chapter VIII of the Act as 'the spouse, parent and children of the
deceased' as recommended by the Law Commission. The Law Com-
mission had observed in its 85th report that it would be appropriate to
F assign to the expression 'legal representative' the same meaning as had
been given to the expression 'representative' for the purposes of the
Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 and that would effectively carry out the
purpose of social justice underlying Chapter VIII of the Act, to which
the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was the nearest approximation. This
recommendation was made after referring to the divergent views ex-
pressed by the various High Courts on the meaning of the expression
G 'legal representatives' in section 110-A of the Act. The fact that Parlia- 1
ment declined to take any action on the recommendation of the Law
Commission of India suggests that Parliament intended that the expre-
ssion 'legal representatives' in section 110-A of the Act should be
given a wider meaning and it should not be confined to the spouse,
H parent and children of the deceased.

:
G.S.R.T.C. v. RAMANBHAI [VENKATARAMIAH, J.] 423

We, therefore, do not find any ground to interfere with the judg- A
ment of the Gujarat High Court against which this Special Leave Peti-
tion has been filed. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed.

N.P.V. Petition dismissed.