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Supreme Court of India

GULJAR SINGH & ORS.versusDEPUTY DIRECTOR CONSOLIDATION AND ORS.

Citation
2009 INSC 505
Decided
15 April 2009
Disposal
Dismissed

Holding

The Deputy Director of Consolidation acted within his statutory jurisdiction and the High Court’s order cannot be set aside under Article 136, so the appeal is dismissed.

Summary

The dispute concerned 564 bighas of land that had been jointly purchased and later divided among several tenure holders, whose names were not correctly entered in revenue records. The appellants sought correction of the records, leading to a series of applications before the Sub‑Divisional Officer, Assistant Recording Officer, Consolidation Officer and finally the Deputy Director of Consolidation (DDC), who modified the basic year entries and cancelled earlier entries. The Allahabad High Court remanded the matter, directing the DDC to decide afresh; the DDC complied and the Uttaranchal High Court affirmed his order. The appellants challenged the DDC’s jurisdiction and the High Court’s decision via a special leave petition under Article 136, arguing that the DDC exceeded his powers, that the creation of Uttaranchal removed jurisdiction, and that procedural objections were barred. The Supreme Court held that the DDC’s powers under the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 are wide, that the DDC acted within jurisdiction, and that the High Court’s findings could not be disturbed absent gross irregularity, thus dismissing the appeal.

Issues considered

  • Whether the Deputy Director of Consolidation exceeded his jurisdiction in modifying basic year entries and correcting khatauni entries under the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953.
  • Whether the High Court of Uttaranchal's order can be interfered with under Article 136 of the Constitution.
  • Whether the creation of the State of Uttaranchal removed the jurisdiction of the Additional District Magistrate to exercise powers of the DDC under the Uttar Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000.
  • Whether objections raised by the respondents were barred by Section 11A of the Consolidation Act.
  • Whether the DDC complied with the directions of the Allahabad High Court in his final order.

Legislation cited

Subjects

Consolidation of HoldingsDeputy Director of ConsolidationArticle 136JurisdictionUttar Pradesh Reorganisation ActLand revenue recordsBasic year entriesRevision

Judgment

                       [2009] 5 S.C.R. 1080


A                    GULJAR SINGH & ORS.
                                v.
       DEPUTY DIRECTOR CONSOLIDATION AND ORS.
                 (Civil Appeal No. 2578 of 2009)
                               WITH
B         (Civil Appeal Nos. 2577 And 2579 of 2009)
                         APRIL 15, 2009
    [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND TARUN CHATTERJEE, JJ.]

c       Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953:

       Deputy Director, Consolidation - Powers of - Held: DDC
  is conferred with wide powers to adjudicate the issues posed
  before him - He could modify even the basic year entries, if           >
  found to be wrongly recorded - He has power to correct the
D
  khatauni entries - In the instant case, it cannot be said that
  either DOC or High Court exceeded their jurisdiction - After
  creation of State of Uttaranchal, all notifications issued by
  Government of Uttar Pradesh are applicable to State of
  Uttarancha/ - Therefore, the authority concerned could
E exercise power of DOC - Uttar Pradesh Reorganisation Act,
  2000- ss. 86 and 88.

        Constitution Of India, 1950:

F       Article 136 - Scope of - Held: Supreme Court would
  interfere only when there is gross irregularity in the judgment
  of High Court or if a substantial question of law of public
  importance has been raised in the petition - In the instant
  case, there was no perversity/arbitrariness in the judgment of
  High Court in affirming the well reasoned findings recorded
G
  by the DOC, the same can not be interfered with in exercise
  of power under Article 136.
                                                                    >-
     The land in dispute admeasuring 564 bighas, which
  was purchased along with other lands jointly by MS', the
H                         1080
          GULJAR SINGH & ORS. v. DEPUTY DIRECTOR              1081
                 CONSOLIDATION AND ORS.

      father of the appellants, and other persons, on division        A
      of shares of joint owners in the year 1951, fell in the share
      of the said MS'. It was the case of the appellants that in
      the year 1959 an application was moved before the Sub-
      Divisional Officer stating that 17 tenure holders had
      divided the property in 1951, but their names were not          B
      recorded in revenue records over the property in their
      shares and possession. The said application was
      allowed, but the names of the tenure holders were not
      entered in the relevant records. Again during the
      correction proceedings, MS', the father of the appellants,      c
      filed an application before the Asstt. Recording Officer on
      11.1.1963 to give effect to the order of the Sub-Divisional
     Officer, and though the application was allowed, the
      revenue records were not corrected, However, during the
'·
     consolidation proceedings, the Consolidation officer             0
     allowed the claim of MS', but directed that since 'MS' had
     co-opted his son, nephews, brothers and wife of his
     deceased brother as co-tenants, his share in the property
     was reduced. On appeal, the Settlement Officer
     (Consolidation) set aside the order of Consolidation             E
     Officer and directed that entries in record of rights may
     be made in accordance with order of Sub-Divisional
     Officer passed on 31.8.1959. The Deputy Director of
     Consolidation at the first instance rejected the revision
     petition of the appellants, but consequent upon the order
     of remand passed by the Allahabad High Court, allowed            F
     their revision petition petitions by his order dated
     20.10.2004. Meanwhile the State of Uttaranchal came into
     existence and the appellants filed writ petition before the
     Uttaranchal High Court. The High Court dismissed the
     writ petition. Consequently, the instant appeals were filed.     G

         Dismissing the appeals, the Court

          HELD: 1.1. It has to be noted that the proceedings
     started under the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act. 1953         H
    1082      SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 5 S.C.R.

A and the allocation of Chaks were made pursuant to the
  orders passed by the Consolidation Officer and the DOC,
  after duly considering the claims of the parties. It is well
  settled that the DOC is conferred with wide powers under
  the Act to adjudicate the issues posed before him. He
B could proceed to modify even the basic year entries if
  found to be wrongly derived at. Therefore, it is not correct
  to say that the DOC could not have modified the basic
  year entries. The Khatuani prepared in the Bandobast
  was incorrectly made and the courts below including the
c DOC had been duly conferred with power the Act to
  correct the same. In correct the entries as per the order
  of the Sub-Divisional Officer, passed on 31st of August,
  1959 but the same was not complied with.[Para 14 and
  15] [1093-D, E; 1095-B-C]
D       Sheo Nand & Ors. vs. Deputy Consolidation Allahabad
    and Ors. 2000 (3) sec 103, relied on.

      1.2. The respondents had not accepted the order
  passed by the Settlement Officer and they had filed their
E separate objections to this regard, Therefore, it cannot to
  said that the objections were not raised earlier.
  Furthermore, a reading of the application dated 6th of
  July, 1959 would clearly show that the parties had
  appeared before the authorities below prior to remand of
F the case to the DDC.[Para 16] [1095-D, E]
                                                                 •
       1.3. It is evident from the perusal of the order of the
  order of the Allahabad High Court remanding the matter
  that the several issued which were raised by the parties
  were to be fully considered and the High Court finally
G directed the DOC to follow the procedure for coming to
  a proper conclusion afresh on merits. Since the High
  Court at Allahabad clearly directed the DOC to decide the
  matter on merits and in compliance with the said direction,
  the DOC considered the entire materials, oral and
H
        GULJAR SINGH & ORS. v. DEPUTY DIRECTOR              1083
               CONSOLIDATION AND ORS.
    documentary, on record to decide the matter, it cannot be       A
    side that either the DOC or the High Court exceeded their
    jurisdiction in coming to the findings arrived at by them.
    [Para 17j [1095-A-C]

         Vishnu Karnath vs. Ahmad Syed lshaque (AIR 1955 SC
                                                                    B·
    283, referred to.

         2.1. Under Article 136 of the Constitution this Court
    would interfere only when there is gross irregularity in the
    judgment of the High Court or any substantial grounds
    of law of public importance have been raised in the c
    petition. If these conditions are not satisfied, it would not
    be open to this Court to interfere with the concurrent
    findings of the High Court as well as of the DOC in
    exercise of its discretionary power under Article 136 of
    the Constitution. [Para 5] [1089-D]                           D
~
         2.2. All the facts leading to the dispute in the instant
    case have been extensively deliberated in the High Court
    which has reiterated in its judgment that the DOC had
    complied with the judgment of the High Court of
                                                                    E
    Allahabad and followed the observations and directions
    made by it. [Para 5] [1089-B, CJ

         2.3. After a long period of litigation ranging for almost
    50 years, the DOC decided according to the shares of the
    parties after complying with the observations made by the F
    Allahabad High Court and it is not pr0per to set aside the
    orders on technical grounCfs and force the litigants to go
    back again and again to. litigate on the same point. On a
    review of the findings recorded by the DOC, the Court is ·
    satisfied that he did the best he could do in performing G
    his duty as had been mandated by the Allahabad High
    Court. The High Court of Uttaranchal correctly noted that
    the order passed by the DDC was not in contravention
    of the directions of the Allahabad High Court. It has been
                                                                   H
      1084        SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 5 S.C.R.


· A rightly pointed out by the High Court that in the exercise
    of its revisional-cum-supervisory power, it cannot go into
    the intricate details of facts and decide the questions
    raised therein. However, in exceptional cases such
    orders which are based on perversity and arbitrariness
· B can be interfered with by the High Court. [Paras 9 and 13)
    [1091-C-D; 1093-A; 1091-B]

         2.4. The concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the
    authorities and affirmed by the High Court would clearly
    show that such findings were arrived at on consideration
  C of all materials placed before the court and after giving
    proper hearing to the parties. Such findings of fact
    cannot be interfered with in the exercise of power under
    Article 136 of the Constitution. [Para 6) [1089-E]

  D      3. It would not be correct to say that after the creation
    of the separate state of Uttaranchal, Additional District
    Magistrate, concerned had no jurisdiction to exercise
    power of the DOC. Under s. 86 of the UP Reorganizations
    Act, 2000 read with s. 88 thereof all the notifications
  E issued by the Government of Uttar Pradesh are applicable
    to the state of Uttaranchal. [Para 11) [1091-G; 1092-A]

                            Case Law Reference:
          (2000) 3 sec 103              relied on            para 14
  F       AIR 1955 SC 283               referred to          para 18

          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
      2578 of 2009.

  G       From the Judgement & Order dated 19.11.2004 of the High
      Court of Uttaranchal at Nainital in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.
      1084(M/S)/2004.

                                      WITH

  H C.A. No. 2577/2009 and 2579/2009.
            GULJAR SINGH & ORS. v. DEPUTY DIRECTOR                 1085
                   CONSOLIDATION AND ORS.

             Shyam Diwan, U.U. Lalit, A.K. Misra, K.K.Tyagi,               A
        P.Narasimha, Santosh Kr. Tripathi, Prakash Kumar Singh and
        P.K. Singh, for the Appellants.

           Ranjit Kumar, Mohit Choudhary, Manish Jain, Puja Sharma,
       Om Prakash, D.P. Singh, Prakash Kumar Singh, D. Bharathi            B
       Reddy, Nidhi and P. Narasimhan for the Respondents.

            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

            TARUN CHATTERJEE, J. 1. Leave granted.

            2. This appeals are directed against the judgment and final
                                                                           c
       order dated 19th of November, 2004 of the High Court of
       Uttaranchal at Nainital in W.P.Nos. 1231 (M/S), 1083(M/S) and
       1084(M/S) of 2004 whereby, the High Court had dismissed the
       writ petitions and affirmed the order dated 20th of October,
                                                                           D
       2004 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation (in short
       D.D.C.), Udham Singh Nagar.

            3. The relevant facts, which would assist us in appreciating
       the controversy involved are narrated in a nutshell, which are
       as follows:                                                         E

             Mohan Singh, Bhan Singh and Ram Singh jointly
        purchased an area of 302 Big has in the village of Jagannathpur,
        Tehsil Kashipur, and District Udham Singh Nagar (hereinafter
        referred to as 'the property in dispute'), out of which the share
                                                                          F
        of Mohan Singh was recorded as 101 Bighas. Thereafter, all
       these persons together with three other persons, namely,
       Saudagar Singh, Sohan Singh and Atma Singh acquired 1486
       Bighas and 6 Biswas by a lease deed executed by Zaminder
       Radhey Shayam in their favour. In the said deed, share of
                                                                          G
       Mohan Singh was specified as 464 Bighas. Therefore, in total,
....   Mohan Singh claimed his share in the property in dispute as
       565 Bighas in respect of the aforesaid lands. Various objections
       and counter objections were filed by other co-sharers disputing
       the claim of Mohan Singh. In the Khatauni of 1359 F, the names
       of 14 persons were recorded as tenure holders. The tenure H
    1086       SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 5 S.C.R.


A holders moved an application in the year 1959 before the Sub-
  Divisional Officer, stating therein that 17 tenure holders divided
  the property in dispute in 1951 and from that time, they were
  in possession according to their division, but their names had
  not been recorded in the revenue records according to their
B divisions and possession. It was alleged that they prayed for
  correction of their names in the revenue records according to
  amicable arrangement. The Sub-Divisional Officer allowed their
  application, but in spite of that, it was claimed that their names
  were not entered in the relevant revenue records. Thereafter,
c correction proceedings started in the concerned village and the
  matter came up before the Asstt. Recording Officer, and Mohan
  Singh (the father of the appellants) filed an application on 11th
  of January, 1963 before the Asstt. Recording Officer to give
  effect to the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer on the
D basis of the amicable arrangement arrived at between the
  parties. The Assistant Recording Officer passed an order
  directing to make entries in accordance with the order of the
  Sub-Divisional Officer. In spite of that, according to the
  appellants, the revenue records were not corrected and the
  property in dispute was kept as separate Khatas in the name
E of different tenure holders. Thereafter, Ram Singh and others
  also filed an application before the Consolidation Officer
  praying that the Khatas be divided in pursuance of the order
  passed-by the Sub-Divisional Officer. Mohan Singh, however,
  alleged that the present entries in the revenue record must be
F maintained. It was the claim of Mohan Singh that he was
  ignorant about the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, which was
  passed on the basis of the alleged amicable arrangement
  entered into by the parties and also claimed ignorance about
  the application which was alleged to have been filed by him
G before the Assistant Recording Officer, thus refuting the claim
  c! the Respondents that he was a party to the proceedings
  before the Assistant Recording Officer. The Consolidation
  Officer allowed the claim of Mohan Singh to the effect that his
  total share in the aforesaid land was 564 Bighas, but he
H directed that since Mohan Singh had co-opted his son,
       GULJAR SINGH & ORS. v. DEPUTY DIRECTOR      1087
     CONSOLIDATION AND ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]

    nephews, brothers, and widow of his brother as co-tenants in        A
    his share, his share was reduced. The appellants thereafter filed
    two appeals against the order of the Consolidation Officer. The
    appeal filed by the appellants was dismissed by the Settlement
    Officer (Consolidation}, whereas the appeal filed by Hari Singh
    and others was allowed. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation)      B
~   while allowing the appeal of Hari Singh and others had set aside
    the order of the Consolidation Officer and directed that the
    entries in the record of rights may be prepared in accordance
    with the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer dated 31st of
    August, 1959. The appellants thereafter had filed two revision      c
    petitions against the order of the Settlement Officer
    (Consolidation) and both the said petitions were rejected by the
    DOC on 7th of July, 1975. Mohan Singh, the father of the
    appellants then challenged the aforesaid orders before the High
    Court of Allahabad by way of Writ Petition No. 7625 of 1975.
                                                                        0
    While disposing of the writ petition setting aside the order of
    DOC and remanding the case back to DOC, the High Court
    made the following observations :-

         "This effect is apparent from the order of the Settlement
         Officer (Consolidation) which has been affirmed by the E
         DOC, that the order of the Consolidation Officer has been
         set aside and without rec.ording his own finding on the point
         indicated above, he has directed to implement the order
         of the Sub-Divisional Officer on 31.8.1959. This, on the
         face of it, is illegal. The order passed in a mutation F
         proceeding has no evidentiary value in Court or Authority,
        deciding the title of the partition merit. It was necessary for
        the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and the DOC to
        consider and decide the case on merit and to pass the
        specific order. The orders of the Settlement Officer G
        (Consolidation) and the DOC and manifestly erroneous in
        law and are not liable to be maintained. Although the order
        of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) is also illegal, but
        the justice will be met if the case is decided by the Director
        of Consolidation has the jurisdiction to consider the case H
    1088       SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 5 S.C.R.


A       of the parties on the facts as well as law."

       4. After remand by the High Court at Allahabad, the DOC
  allowed the revision petition of the appellants by his order
  dated 20th of October, 2004 and the entries of Bandobast and
  consolidation were cancelled and the shares of the parties were
8
  decided in the manner indicated in the said order. From a bare
  reading of this order of DOC, it would be evident that the DOC
  while deciding the matter afresh, all the questions directed to
  be considered by the Allahabad High Court in the writ petition
C were duly considered after appreciating the evidence and the
  respective cases made out by the parties and the DOC finally
  came to the conclusion that the order of Consolidation Officer
  and the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) must be
  set aside and the entries of Bandobast and consolidation must
  be cancelled. This is seen from the above order that all
D questions were duly decided and evidence, oral and
  documentary, were duly considered and after that the aforesaid
  findings were arrived at by the DOC. A thorough examination
  of the findings arrived at by the DOC would show that there was
  no question to be left out and for any reason whatsoever, the
E findings were not arrived at in a perverse manner or the findings
  were arbitrary in nature. The appellants thereafter filed a writ
  petition being aggrieved by the order of the DOC before the
  High Court of Uttaranchal, at Nainital. It may be mentioned that
  when the order of DOC was passed, after remand, in view of
F the U.P. Re-organisation Act, 2000 the writ petition then could
  only be filed before the High Court at Uttaranchal and
  accordingly the appellants, feeling aggrieved, filed a writ
  application impugning the order of DOC before the High Court
  of Uttaranchal at Nainital. The High Court by the impugned
G judgment had affirmed the order of the DOC and feeling
  aggrieved, the appellants have filed this appeal by way of a
  special leave in this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution,
  which on grant of leave, was heard in the presence of the
  learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties.
H
              GULJAR SINGH & ORS. v. DEPUTY DIRECTOR      1089
            CONSOLIDATION AND ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
                 5.We have heard the arguments of the parties and                A
            perused the materials on record. We have also examined the
            impugned order of the High Court and also the orders passed
           by the authorities in respect of which challenge was made
           before the High Court in the Writ Petitions. After going through
           the judgment of the High Court, it is imperative to note that all     8
       ;
~          the facts leading to the dispute of this case have been
           extensively deliberated in the High Court and the same had
           reiterated in its judgment that the DOC had complied with the
           judgment of the High Court of Allahabad in its order after
,.,.
           following the observations and directions made by it. It is well      c
           settled that we are entitled to interfere with the judgment of the
           High Court under Article 136 of the Constitution only when there
           is gross irregularity in the judgment of the High Court or any
           substantial grounds of law which are of public importance have
           been raised in such a petition. If these conditions are not           D
       }   satisfied, it would not be open to this Court to interfere with the
           concurrent findings of the High Court as well as of the DOC in
           the exercise of our discretionary power under Article 136 of the
           Constitution.
                6. In our view, the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by    E
           the authorities and affirmed by the High Court would clearly
           show that such findings were arrived at on consideration of all
           materials placed before the court and after giving proper
           hearing to the parties. Such findings of fact, in our view, cannot
           be interfered with in the exercise of our power under Article 136     F
           of the Constitution. Therefore, the instant appeal is liable to be
           dismissed for the reasons given hereinunder.

                7.From the record, it appears that the DOC, after remand,
          by the High Court of Allahabad in a writ application to decide         G
          the dispute between the parties afresh had considered all the
          evidence of the present case and evidence on record by
       J. following such directions of the High Court, and other materials
          on record and accordingly, had set aside the order of the
          Consolidation Officer and the Assistant Settlement Officer,
                                                                                 H
    1090       SUPREME COURT REPORT~ {2009) 5 S.C.R.


A Consolidation, Kashipur, and thereby cancelled the entries of
  Bandobast and consolidation. Keeping the findings arrived at
  by the DDC which was affirmed by the High Court and while
  doing so, the High Court made the following observations :

B       "This Court is of opinion that every time in such a old case
        it is not just and proper to quash the orders on technical 1
        grounds and force the litigants to go back again and again
        to litigate on the same point. In other words now in this
        round of litigation, after 25 years of the order passed by
        the Allahabad High Court, this Court should not go beyond
c       examining if the directions of the Allahabad High Court
        were complied with by the DDC in disposing of the revision
        afresh or not."

       8. Thus being so observed, the Uttaranchal High Court went
D on to note that the perusal of the order dated 20th of October,
  2004, showed that the DDC had then recorded the findings as i
  to the claims of the parties keeping in view of the directions of
  the Allahabad High Court. Therefore, the High Court was correct
  to observe that the DDC had complied with the order of the
E Allahabad High Court and dismissed the petition of the
  appellants. It is very important for the disposal of this case to
  refer again to the relevant portion of the judgment of the High
  Court to elaborate this observation made by the Court.

        "Learned counsel for the appellants of all the three writ
F
        petitions argued before me that share of one or the other '
        is being shown to be less than what they had claimed. It
        is further argued by all the appellants that as to their share,
        claims were not properly considered. I may remind it here
        that this Court is exercising its jurisdiction in supervisory-
G       cum-revisional power and cannot decide the intricate
        questions of facts relating to shares. Rather, from the
        perusal of the impugned order, it is clear that in a detailed•
        judgment of 14 pages learned Dy. Director of
        Consolidation has given reasons for its findings on shares
H       of each one of the parties. In the circumstances, it cannot
-             GULJAR SINGH & ORS. v. DEPUTY DIRECTOR
            CONSOLIDATION AND ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
                                                          1091


                be said that the Dy. Director of Consolidation has not.· A
                complied with the directions of Allahabad High Court while
                disposing of the writ petition."

                  9. It has been rightly pointed out by the High Court that the
            High Court in the exercise of its revisional-cum-supervisory 8
      ,     power cannot go into the intricate details of facts and decide
           the questions raised therein. We are in agreement with these
            views of the High Court, except that in exceptional cases such
            orders which are based on perversity and arbitrariness could
           be interfered with by the High Court. After a long period of
...         litigation ranging for almost 50 years, the DOC had decided C
           according to the shares of the parties after complying with the
           observations made by the Allahabad High Court as had been
           noted by the High Court in its impugned judgment and it is not
           proper to set aside the orders on technical grounds and force
      ~·   the litigants to go back again and again to litigate on the same D
           point. In any view of the matter, we are not in a position to
           observe that there was anything for the High Court to interfere
           with the order of the DOC, as it appears from the observations
           made by the Allahabad High Court that the DOC will decide
           the dispute and consider all aspects of the matter and the entire E
           materials including the oral and documentary evidence on
           record.

                 10. From the order dated 2oth of October, 2004, passed
      >    by the DOC, it is clear to us as to how the parties had got the   F
           shares given to them by the DOC. Learned counsel for the
           appellants argued that the DOC had wrongly shown some of
           the plots being submerged into the river bed. This Court is not
           in a position to disbelieve what the DOC had stated unless firm
           evidence to the contrary is on record. The appellants had not     G
           been able to produce any evidence to satisfy this contention.

                11. The Learned Counsel for the appellants also raised a
           contention that after the creation of the separate State of
           Uttaranchal, Additional District Magistrate, Udham Singh Nagar
           had no jurisdiction to exercise power of the DOC. We do not       H
    1092        SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 5 S.C.R.
                                                                                    -
A agree to this contention as well. This is because all the
  notifications issued by the Govt. of Uttar Pradesh are applicable
  to the state of Uttaranchal under Section 86 of UP
  Reorganization Act, 2000 read with Section 88 of the said Act.
  Sections 86 and 88 which are necessary for our purpose are
B reproduced below :                                                        ~

        "86. Territorial extent of laws:- The provisions of Part II shall
        not be deemed to have affected any change in the
        territories to which the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling
        on Land Holdings Act, 1961 (U.P. Act 1of1961) and any
c       other law in force immediately before the appointed day,                    ..
        extends or applies, and territorial references of any such
        law to the State of Uttar Pradesh shall, until otherwise
        provided by a competent Legislature or other competent
        authority be construed as meaning the territories within the
D       existing state of Uttar Pradesh before the appointed day.           ~   .

        88. Power to construe laws:- Notwithstanding that no
        provision or insufficient provision has been made under
        Section 87 for adaptation of a law made before the
E       appointed day, any court, tribunal or authority, required or
        empowered to enforce such law may, for the purpose of
        facilitating its application in relation to the State of Uttar
        Pradesh or Uttaranchal, construe the law in such manner,
        without affecting the substance, as may be necessary or
F       proper in regard to the matter before the court, tribunal or
        authority."
      12. From the reading of the aforesaid two provisions, it
  would not be possible for us to hold that the Additional District
  Magistrate, Udham Singh Nagar had no jurisdiction to exercise
G power of the DOC.

       13. It was next contended that the order .of the DOC,
  Udham Singh Nagar dated 20th of October, 2004 was passed
  in contravention of the directions issued by the High Court of
H Allahabad   as stated herein earlier. As has been already
...          GULJAR SINGH & ORS. v. DEPUTY DIRECTOR      1093
      ~    CONSOLIDATION AND ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.)

          mentioned above, the High Court at Uttaranchal correctly noted     A
          that the order passed by the DOC was not in contravention of
          the directions of the Allahabad High Court. The DOC had taken
          into consideration the observations made by the Allahabad
          High Court and after perusing all the material documents and
          contentions of the parties, passed the order dated 20th of         8
          October, 2004. Thus the contention that the DOC had not taken
          into consideration the order of the Allahabad High Court cannot
          be accepted and accordingly rejected.

                14. It was next contended that the order of the Sub-
          Divisional Officer, Kashipur, passed on 31st of August, 1959
                                                                              c
          under Sections 33 and 39 of the UP Land Revenue Act, could
          not be relied on and form the basis of the order passed by the
          DOC and the same cannot modify and disturb the basic year
          entries as recorded in the Khata of the appellants. We do not
      ~   find any ground to uphold this contention. It has to be noted that D
          the proceedings started under the UP Consolidation of Holdings
          Act, and the allocation of Chaks were made pursuant to the
          orders passed by the Consolidation Officer and the DOC, after
          duly considering the claims of the parties. It is well settled that
          the DOC is conferred with wide powers under the Act to E
          adjudicate the issue posed before him. In order to elaborate
          this point, it is essential to refer to the case of Sheo Nand &
          Ors vs. Deputy Consolidation Allahabad and Ors. 2000 (3)
          sec 103. In the said case, this Court, referring to Section 48
          of the Act had noted that:                                          F

              "The Section gives very wide powers to the Deputy
               Director. It enables him suo motu on his own motion or on
              the (application of any person to consider the propriety,
               legality, regularity and correctness of all the proceedings   G
              held under the Act and to pass appropriate orders. These
              powers have been conferred on the Deputy Director in the
              widest terms so that the claims of the parties under the Act
              may be effectively adjudicated upon and determined so as
              to confer finality to the rights of the parties and the
                                                                             H
                                                                             te-
    1094      SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 5 S.C.R.


A      Revenue Records may be prepared accordingly.
                                                                         '
       Normally, the Deputy Director, in exercise of his powers,
       is not expected to disturb the findings of fact recorded
       concurrently by the Consolidation Officer and the
       Settlement Officer (Consolidation), but where the findings
B
       are perverse, in the sense that they are not supported by
       the evidence brought on record by the parties or that they
       are against the weight of evidence, it would be the duty of
       the Deputy Director to scrutinize the whole case again so
       as to determine the correctness, legality or propriety of the
c      orders passed by the authorities subordinate to him. In a
       case, like the present, where the entries in the Revenue
       record are fictitious or forged or they were recorded in
       contravention of the statutory provisions contained in the
       U.P. Land Records Manual or other allied statutory
D      provisions, the Deputy Director would have full power
       under Section 48 to re-appraise or re-evaluate the
       evidence on record so as to finally determine the rights of
       the parties by excluding forged or fictitious revenue entries
       or entries not made in accordance with law.
E
       If, therefore, during the course of the hearing of the revision
       filed by the appellant under Section 48 of the Act, the
       Deputy Director reopened the whole case and scrutinized
       the claim of the appellants in respect, of two other villages,
F      it could not be said that the Deputy Director exceeded his
       jurisdiction in any manner. It will be noticed that while
       scrutinizing the evidence on record, the Deputy Director
       had noticed that the entries were fictitious and in recording
       some of the entries in the revenue record in favour of the
       appellants, statutory provisions including those contained
G
       in U.P. Land Records Manual were not followed. In that
       situation, the Deputy Director was wholly justified in looking
       into the legality of the entire proceedings and disposing
       of the revision in the manner in which he has done."
H      15. From the above-quoted observations of this Court, it
            GULJAR SINGH & ORS. v. DEPUTY DIRECTOR      1095
          CONSOLIDATION AND ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]

          is clear that the DOC has wide range of discretionary powers          A
'•        mandated under the Act by which he could proceed to modify
          even the basic year entries if found to be wrongly derived at.
          Therefore, the contention that the DOC could not have modified
          the basic year entries was not correct. It appears to us that the
          Khatuani prepared in the Bandobast was incorrectly made and           8
          the courts below including the DOC had been duly conferred
          with power under the Act to correct the same. In fact, the
          Assistant Recording Officer, Kashipur had passed an order in
          1963 to correct the entries as per the order of the Sub-
          Divisional Officer, Kashipur dated 31st of August, 1959 but the       c
          same was not complied with.

                16. The learned counsel for the appellants also contended
          that relying on Section 11A of the Act, any objection for the first
          time could not be entertained by the authorities. We do not
      I   agree with this submission of the learned counsel for the             D
          appellants. We have already observed that the respondents
          had not accepted the order passed by the Settlement Officer,
          Consolidation, Kashfpur and they had filed their separate
          objections to this regard, hence, the contention could not be said
          to be correct and, therefore, it should be rejected. Further more,    E
...       a reading of the application dated 6th of July, 1959 would clearly
          show that the parties had appeared before the authorities below
          before the remand of the case to the DOC which would be
          evident from Annexure R2.
                                                                                F
               17. It is evident from the perusal of the order of the
          Allahabad High Court while passing the order of remand that
          the several issues which were raised by the parties were fully
          considered and finally directed the DOC to follow the
          procedures for coming to a proper conclusion afresh on merits.
                                                                                G
          Since the High Court at Allahabad clearly directed the DOC to
          decide the matter on merits and in compliance with the said
          direction, the DOC considered all the entire materials, oral and
          documentary, on record to decide the matter, we do not find
          any excess jurisdiction exercised either by the DOC or by the
                                                                                H
          High Court in coming to a finding arrived at by them.
    1096        SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 5 S.C.R.


A      18. The DOC after complying with the observations made
  by the Allahabad High Court had taken all steps to determine               ,,
  whether the consolidation process was proper or not. On this
  count also, we are unable to agree with the contentions of the
  learned counsel for the appellants. It may be noted that many
B of the original parties to the consolidation proceedings had died
  over the period of time. At this stage on consideration of the
  impugned judgment of the High Court as well as of the DOC,
  we find that there is no evidence or material on record to
  contradict or upset the findings of the High Court which affirmed
c the findings of the DOC. In this connection, reliance can be
  placed to a decision of this Court in the case of Vishnu Karnath
  vs. Ahmad Syed lshaque, [AIR 1955 SC 283] in which this Court
  observed that:

        "The finality given to the decision of the Settlement Officer
D       (Consolidation) does not follow that it cannot be
        questioned in the writ jurisdiction of the High Court where
        there is an error apparent on the face of the record"

        19. The observations made by this Court as above that
E there must be an error apparent on the face of the record affirms
  our observation that for an appeal to be allowed in such a
  situation such as this, a high standard must be met in the way
  of evidence produced to support the case of the appellants as
  noted herein earlier. All the materials and issues discussed in
                                                                        ~
F their petition were elaborately discussed and argued before the
  High Court of Uttaranchal which had affirmed the findings of the
  DOC and found no infirmity therein.

        20. Lastly it was contended that the DOC exceeded his
  jurisdiction contrary to the decision of the Allahabad High Court.
G The Allahabad High Court, as has been mentioned above,
  directed the DDC to decide the case on merits. It has not come        j.
  to our notice that the Allahabad High Court, in any way,
  specified the way the merits of the case should be determined.
  We, therefore, believe, based on the review of his findings that
H he did the best he could do in performing his duty as had been
)
       GULJAR SINGH & ORS. v. DEPUTY DIRECTOR      1097
     CONSOLIDATION AND ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]

    mandated by the Allahabad High Court.                             A

         21. Based on the reasons mentioned above, we do not
    find any infirmity in the impugned judgment of the Uttaranchal
    High Court and thus feel it unnecessary to interfere with the
    same.
                                                                      B
         22. The appeals are thus dismissed. There will be no order
    as to costs.
    G.N.                                     Appeals dismissed.


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