GULJAR SINGH & ORS.versusDEPUTY DIRECTOR CONSOLIDATION AND ORS.
- Citation
- 2009 INSC 505
- Decided
- 15 April 2009
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- ARIJIT PASAYAT
Holding
The Deputy Director of Consolidation acted within his statutory jurisdiction and the High Court’s order cannot be set aside under Article 136, so the appeal is dismissed.
Summary
The dispute concerned 564 bighas of land that had been jointly purchased and later divided among several tenure holders, whose names were not correctly entered in revenue records. The appellants sought correction of the records, leading to a series of applications before the Sub‑Divisional Officer, Assistant Recording Officer, Consolidation Officer and finally the Deputy Director of Consolidation (DDC), who modified the basic year entries and cancelled earlier entries. The Allahabad High Court remanded the matter, directing the DDC to decide afresh; the DDC complied and the Uttaranchal High Court affirmed his order. The appellants challenged the DDC’s jurisdiction and the High Court’s decision via a special leave petition under Article 136, arguing that the DDC exceeded his powers, that the creation of Uttaranchal removed jurisdiction, and that procedural objections were barred. The Supreme Court held that the DDC’s powers under the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 are wide, that the DDC acted within jurisdiction, and that the High Court’s findings could not be disturbed absent gross irregularity, thus dismissing the appeal.
Issues considered
- Whether the Deputy Director of Consolidation exceeded his jurisdiction in modifying basic year entries and correcting khatauni entries under the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953.
- Whether the High Court of Uttaranchal's order can be interfered with under Article 136 of the Constitution.
- Whether the creation of the State of Uttaranchal removed the jurisdiction of the Additional District Magistrate to exercise powers of the DDC under the Uttar Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000.
- Whether objections raised by the respondents were barred by Section 11A of the Consolidation Act.
- Whether the DDC complied with the directions of the Allahabad High Court in his final order.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Article 136
- Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953s. 11A, s. 33, s. 39, s. 48
- Uttar Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000s. 86, s. 88
Subjects
Judgment
[2009] 5 S.C.R. 1080
A GULJAR SINGH & ORS.
v.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CONSOLIDATION AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 2578 of 2009)
WITH
B (Civil Appeal Nos. 2577 And 2579 of 2009)
APRIL 15, 2009
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND TARUN CHATTERJEE, JJ.]
c Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953:
Deputy Director, Consolidation - Powers of - Held: DDC
is conferred with wide powers to adjudicate the issues posed
before him - He could modify even the basic year entries, if >
found to be wrongly recorded - He has power to correct the
D
khatauni entries - In the instant case, it cannot be said that
either DOC or High Court exceeded their jurisdiction - After
creation of State of Uttaranchal, all notifications issued by
Government of Uttar Pradesh are applicable to State of
Uttarancha/ - Therefore, the authority concerned could
E exercise power of DOC - Uttar Pradesh Reorganisation Act,
2000- ss. 86 and 88.
Constitution Of India, 1950:
F Article 136 - Scope of - Held: Supreme Court would
interfere only when there is gross irregularity in the judgment
of High Court or if a substantial question of law of public
importance has been raised in the petition - In the instant
case, there was no perversity/arbitrariness in the judgment of
High Court in affirming the well reasoned findings recorded
G
by the DOC, the same can not be interfered with in exercise
of power under Article 136.
>-
The land in dispute admeasuring 564 bighas, which
was purchased along with other lands jointly by MS', the
H 1080
GULJAR SINGH & ORS. v. DEPUTY DIRECTOR 1081
CONSOLIDATION AND ORS.
father of the appellants, and other persons, on division A
of shares of joint owners in the year 1951, fell in the share
of the said MS'. It was the case of the appellants that in
the year 1959 an application was moved before the Sub-
Divisional Officer stating that 17 tenure holders had
divided the property in 1951, but their names were not B
recorded in revenue records over the property in their
shares and possession. The said application was
allowed, but the names of the tenure holders were not
entered in the relevant records. Again during the
correction proceedings, MS', the father of the appellants, c
filed an application before the Asstt. Recording Officer on
11.1.1963 to give effect to the order of the Sub-Divisional
Officer, and though the application was allowed, the
revenue records were not corrected, However, during the
'·
consolidation proceedings, the Consolidation officer 0
allowed the claim of MS', but directed that since 'MS' had
co-opted his son, nephews, brothers and wife of his
deceased brother as co-tenants, his share in the property
was reduced. On appeal, the Settlement Officer
(Consolidation) set aside the order of Consolidation E
Officer and directed that entries in record of rights may
be made in accordance with order of Sub-Divisional
Officer passed on 31.8.1959. The Deputy Director of
Consolidation at the first instance rejected the revision
petition of the appellants, but consequent upon the order
of remand passed by the Allahabad High Court, allowed F
their revision petition petitions by his order dated
20.10.2004. Meanwhile the State of Uttaranchal came into
existence and the appellants filed writ petition before the
Uttaranchal High Court. The High Court dismissed the
writ petition. Consequently, the instant appeals were filed. G
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1. It has to be noted that the proceedings
started under the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act. 1953 H
1082 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 5 S.C.R.
A and the allocation of Chaks were made pursuant to the
orders passed by the Consolidation Officer and the DOC,
after duly considering the claims of the parties. It is well
settled that the DOC is conferred with wide powers under
the Act to adjudicate the issues posed before him. He
B could proceed to modify even the basic year entries if
found to be wrongly derived at. Therefore, it is not correct
to say that the DOC could not have modified the basic
year entries. The Khatuani prepared in the Bandobast
was incorrectly made and the courts below including the
c DOC had been duly conferred with power the Act to
correct the same. In correct the entries as per the order
of the Sub-Divisional Officer, passed on 31st of August,
1959 but the same was not complied with.[Para 14 and
15] [1093-D, E; 1095-B-C]
D Sheo Nand & Ors. vs. Deputy Consolidation Allahabad
and Ors. 2000 (3) sec 103, relied on.
1.2. The respondents had not accepted the order
passed by the Settlement Officer and they had filed their
E separate objections to this regard, Therefore, it cannot to
said that the objections were not raised earlier.
Furthermore, a reading of the application dated 6th of
July, 1959 would clearly show that the parties had
appeared before the authorities below prior to remand of
F the case to the DDC.[Para 16] [1095-D, E]
•
1.3. It is evident from the perusal of the order of the
order of the Allahabad High Court remanding the matter
that the several issued which were raised by the parties
were to be fully considered and the High Court finally
G directed the DOC to follow the procedure for coming to
a proper conclusion afresh on merits. Since the High
Court at Allahabad clearly directed the DOC to decide the
matter on merits and in compliance with the said direction,
the DOC considered the entire materials, oral and
H
GULJAR SINGH & ORS. v. DEPUTY DIRECTOR 1083
CONSOLIDATION AND ORS.
documentary, on record to decide the matter, it cannot be A
side that either the DOC or the High Court exceeded their
jurisdiction in coming to the findings arrived at by them.
[Para 17j [1095-A-C]
Vishnu Karnath vs. Ahmad Syed lshaque (AIR 1955 SC
B·
283, referred to.
2.1. Under Article 136 of the Constitution this Court
would interfere only when there is gross irregularity in the
judgment of the High Court or any substantial grounds
of law of public importance have been raised in the c
petition. If these conditions are not satisfied, it would not
be open to this Court to interfere with the concurrent
findings of the High Court as well as of the DOC in
exercise of its discretionary power under Article 136 of
the Constitution. [Para 5] [1089-D] D
~
2.2. All the facts leading to the dispute in the instant
case have been extensively deliberated in the High Court
which has reiterated in its judgment that the DOC had
complied with the judgment of the High Court of
E
Allahabad and followed the observations and directions
made by it. [Para 5] [1089-B, CJ
2.3. After a long period of litigation ranging for almost
50 years, the DOC decided according to the shares of the
parties after complying with the observations made by the F
Allahabad High Court and it is not pr0per to set aside the
orders on technical grounCfs and force the litigants to go
back again and again to. litigate on the same point. On a
review of the findings recorded by the DOC, the Court is ·
satisfied that he did the best he could do in performing G
his duty as had been mandated by the Allahabad High
Court. The High Court of Uttaranchal correctly noted that
the order passed by the DDC was not in contravention
of the directions of the Allahabad High Court. It has been
H
1084 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 5 S.C.R.
· A rightly pointed out by the High Court that in the exercise
of its revisional-cum-supervisory power, it cannot go into
the intricate details of facts and decide the questions
raised therein. However, in exceptional cases such
orders which are based on perversity and arbitrariness
· B can be interfered with by the High Court. [Paras 9 and 13)
[1091-C-D; 1093-A; 1091-B]
2.4. The concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the
authorities and affirmed by the High Court would clearly
show that such findings were arrived at on consideration
C of all materials placed before the court and after giving
proper hearing to the parties. Such findings of fact
cannot be interfered with in the exercise of power under
Article 136 of the Constitution. [Para 6) [1089-E]
D 3. It would not be correct to say that after the creation
of the separate state of Uttaranchal, Additional District
Magistrate, concerned had no jurisdiction to exercise
power of the DOC. Under s. 86 of the UP Reorganizations
Act, 2000 read with s. 88 thereof all the notifications
E issued by the Government of Uttar Pradesh are applicable
to the state of Uttaranchal. [Para 11) [1091-G; 1092-A]
Case Law Reference:
(2000) 3 sec 103 relied on para 14
F AIR 1955 SC 283 referred to para 18
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
2578 of 2009.
G From the Judgement & Order dated 19.11.2004 of the High
Court of Uttaranchal at Nainital in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.
1084(M/S)/2004.
WITH
H C.A. No. 2577/2009 and 2579/2009.
GULJAR SINGH & ORS. v. DEPUTY DIRECTOR 1085
CONSOLIDATION AND ORS.
Shyam Diwan, U.U. Lalit, A.K. Misra, K.K.Tyagi, A
P.Narasimha, Santosh Kr. Tripathi, Prakash Kumar Singh and
P.K. Singh, for the Appellants.
Ranjit Kumar, Mohit Choudhary, Manish Jain, Puja Sharma,
Om Prakash, D.P. Singh, Prakash Kumar Singh, D. Bharathi B
Reddy, Nidhi and P. Narasimhan for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
TARUN CHATTERJEE, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. This appeals are directed against the judgment and final
c
order dated 19th of November, 2004 of the High Court of
Uttaranchal at Nainital in W.P.Nos. 1231 (M/S), 1083(M/S) and
1084(M/S) of 2004 whereby, the High Court had dismissed the
writ petitions and affirmed the order dated 20th of October,
D
2004 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation (in short
D.D.C.), Udham Singh Nagar.
3. The relevant facts, which would assist us in appreciating
the controversy involved are narrated in a nutshell, which are
as follows: E
Mohan Singh, Bhan Singh and Ram Singh jointly
purchased an area of 302 Big has in the village of Jagannathpur,
Tehsil Kashipur, and District Udham Singh Nagar (hereinafter
referred to as 'the property in dispute'), out of which the share
F
of Mohan Singh was recorded as 101 Bighas. Thereafter, all
these persons together with three other persons, namely,
Saudagar Singh, Sohan Singh and Atma Singh acquired 1486
Bighas and 6 Biswas by a lease deed executed by Zaminder
Radhey Shayam in their favour. In the said deed, share of
G
Mohan Singh was specified as 464 Bighas. Therefore, in total,
.... Mohan Singh claimed his share in the property in dispute as
565 Bighas in respect of the aforesaid lands. Various objections
and counter objections were filed by other co-sharers disputing
the claim of Mohan Singh. In the Khatauni of 1359 F, the names
of 14 persons were recorded as tenure holders. The tenure H
1086 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 5 S.C.R.
A holders moved an application in the year 1959 before the Sub-
Divisional Officer, stating therein that 17 tenure holders divided
the property in dispute in 1951 and from that time, they were
in possession according to their division, but their names had
not been recorded in the revenue records according to their
B divisions and possession. It was alleged that they prayed for
correction of their names in the revenue records according to
amicable arrangement. The Sub-Divisional Officer allowed their
application, but in spite of that, it was claimed that their names
were not entered in the relevant revenue records. Thereafter,
c correction proceedings started in the concerned village and the
matter came up before the Asstt. Recording Officer, and Mohan
Singh (the father of the appellants) filed an application on 11th
of January, 1963 before the Asstt. Recording Officer to give
effect to the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer on the
D basis of the amicable arrangement arrived at between the
parties. The Assistant Recording Officer passed an order
directing to make entries in accordance with the order of the
Sub-Divisional Officer. In spite of that, according to the
appellants, the revenue records were not corrected and the
property in dispute was kept as separate Khatas in the name
E of different tenure holders. Thereafter, Ram Singh and others
also filed an application before the Consolidation Officer
praying that the Khatas be divided in pursuance of the order
passed-by the Sub-Divisional Officer. Mohan Singh, however,
alleged that the present entries in the revenue record must be
F maintained. It was the claim of Mohan Singh that he was
ignorant about the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, which was
passed on the basis of the alleged amicable arrangement
entered into by the parties and also claimed ignorance about
the application which was alleged to have been filed by him
G before the Assistant Recording Officer, thus refuting the claim
c! the Respondents that he was a party to the proceedings
before the Assistant Recording Officer. The Consolidation
Officer allowed the claim of Mohan Singh to the effect that his
total share in the aforesaid land was 564 Bighas, but he
H directed that since Mohan Singh had co-opted his son,
GULJAR SINGH & ORS. v. DEPUTY DIRECTOR 1087
CONSOLIDATION AND ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
nephews, brothers, and widow of his brother as co-tenants in A
his share, his share was reduced. The appellants thereafter filed
two appeals against the order of the Consolidation Officer. The
appeal filed by the appellants was dismissed by the Settlement
Officer (Consolidation}, whereas the appeal filed by Hari Singh
and others was allowed. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) B
~ while allowing the appeal of Hari Singh and others had set aside
the order of the Consolidation Officer and directed that the
entries in the record of rights may be prepared in accordance
with the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer dated 31st of
August, 1959. The appellants thereafter had filed two revision c
petitions against the order of the Settlement Officer
(Consolidation) and both the said petitions were rejected by the
DOC on 7th of July, 1975. Mohan Singh, the father of the
appellants then challenged the aforesaid orders before the High
Court of Allahabad by way of Writ Petition No. 7625 of 1975.
0
While disposing of the writ petition setting aside the order of
DOC and remanding the case back to DOC, the High Court
made the following observations :-
"This effect is apparent from the order of the Settlement
Officer (Consolidation) which has been affirmed by the E
DOC, that the order of the Consolidation Officer has been
set aside and without rec.ording his own finding on the point
indicated above, he has directed to implement the order
of the Sub-Divisional Officer on 31.8.1959. This, on the
face of it, is illegal. The order passed in a mutation F
proceeding has no evidentiary value in Court or Authority,
deciding the title of the partition merit. It was necessary for
the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and the DOC to
consider and decide the case on merit and to pass the
specific order. The orders of the Settlement Officer G
(Consolidation) and the DOC and manifestly erroneous in
law and are not liable to be maintained. Although the order
of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) is also illegal, but
the justice will be met if the case is decided by the Director
of Consolidation has the jurisdiction to consider the case H
1088 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 5 S.C.R.
A of the parties on the facts as well as law."
4. After remand by the High Court at Allahabad, the DOC
allowed the revision petition of the appellants by his order
dated 20th of October, 2004 and the entries of Bandobast and
consolidation were cancelled and the shares of the parties were
8
decided in the manner indicated in the said order. From a bare
reading of this order of DOC, it would be evident that the DOC
while deciding the matter afresh, all the questions directed to
be considered by the Allahabad High Court in the writ petition
C were duly considered after appreciating the evidence and the
respective cases made out by the parties and the DOC finally
came to the conclusion that the order of Consolidation Officer
and the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) must be
set aside and the entries of Bandobast and consolidation must
be cancelled. This is seen from the above order that all
D questions were duly decided and evidence, oral and
documentary, were duly considered and after that the aforesaid
findings were arrived at by the DOC. A thorough examination
of the findings arrived at by the DOC would show that there was
no question to be left out and for any reason whatsoever, the
E findings were not arrived at in a perverse manner or the findings
were arbitrary in nature. The appellants thereafter filed a writ
petition being aggrieved by the order of the DOC before the
High Court of Uttaranchal, at Nainital. It may be mentioned that
when the order of DOC was passed, after remand, in view of
F the U.P. Re-organisation Act, 2000 the writ petition then could
only be filed before the High Court at Uttaranchal and
accordingly the appellants, feeling aggrieved, filed a writ
application impugning the order of DOC before the High Court
of Uttaranchal at Nainital. The High Court by the impugned
G judgment had affirmed the order of the DOC and feeling
aggrieved, the appellants have filed this appeal by way of a
special leave in this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution,
which on grant of leave, was heard in the presence of the
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties.
H
GULJAR SINGH & ORS. v. DEPUTY DIRECTOR 1089
CONSOLIDATION AND ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
5.We have heard the arguments of the parties and A
perused the materials on record. We have also examined the
impugned order of the High Court and also the orders passed
by the authorities in respect of which challenge was made
before the High Court in the Writ Petitions. After going through
the judgment of the High Court, it is imperative to note that all 8
;
~ the facts leading to the dispute of this case have been
extensively deliberated in the High Court and the same had
reiterated in its judgment that the DOC had complied with the
judgment of the High Court of Allahabad in its order after
,.,.
following the observations and directions made by it. It is well c
settled that we are entitled to interfere with the judgment of the
High Court under Article 136 of the Constitution only when there
is gross irregularity in the judgment of the High Court or any
substantial grounds of law which are of public importance have
been raised in such a petition. If these conditions are not D
} satisfied, it would not be open to this Court to interfere with the
concurrent findings of the High Court as well as of the DOC in
the exercise of our discretionary power under Article 136 of the
Constitution.
6. In our view, the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by E
the authorities and affirmed by the High Court would clearly
show that such findings were arrived at on consideration of all
materials placed before the court and after giving proper
hearing to the parties. Such findings of fact, in our view, cannot
be interfered with in the exercise of our power under Article 136 F
of the Constitution. Therefore, the instant appeal is liable to be
dismissed for the reasons given hereinunder.
7.From the record, it appears that the DOC, after remand,
by the High Court of Allahabad in a writ application to decide G
the dispute between the parties afresh had considered all the
evidence of the present case and evidence on record by
J. following such directions of the High Court, and other materials
on record and accordingly, had set aside the order of the
Consolidation Officer and the Assistant Settlement Officer,
H
1090 SUPREME COURT REPORT~ {2009) 5 S.C.R.
A Consolidation, Kashipur, and thereby cancelled the entries of
Bandobast and consolidation. Keeping the findings arrived at
by the DDC which was affirmed by the High Court and while
doing so, the High Court made the following observations :
B "This Court is of opinion that every time in such a old case
it is not just and proper to quash the orders on technical 1
grounds and force the litigants to go back again and again
to litigate on the same point. In other words now in this
round of litigation, after 25 years of the order passed by
the Allahabad High Court, this Court should not go beyond
c examining if the directions of the Allahabad High Court
were complied with by the DDC in disposing of the revision
afresh or not."
8. Thus being so observed, the Uttaranchal High Court went
D on to note that the perusal of the order dated 20th of October,
2004, showed that the DDC had then recorded the findings as i
to the claims of the parties keeping in view of the directions of
the Allahabad High Court. Therefore, the High Court was correct
to observe that the DDC had complied with the order of the
E Allahabad High Court and dismissed the petition of the
appellants. It is very important for the disposal of this case to
refer again to the relevant portion of the judgment of the High
Court to elaborate this observation made by the Court.
"Learned counsel for the appellants of all the three writ
F
petitions argued before me that share of one or the other '
is being shown to be less than what they had claimed. It
is further argued by all the appellants that as to their share,
claims were not properly considered. I may remind it here
that this Court is exercising its jurisdiction in supervisory-
G cum-revisional power and cannot decide the intricate
questions of facts relating to shares. Rather, from the
perusal of the impugned order, it is clear that in a detailed•
judgment of 14 pages learned Dy. Director of
Consolidation has given reasons for its findings on shares
H of each one of the parties. In the circumstances, it cannot
- GULJAR SINGH & ORS. v. DEPUTY DIRECTOR
CONSOLIDATION AND ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
1091
be said that the Dy. Director of Consolidation has not.· A
complied with the directions of Allahabad High Court while
disposing of the writ petition."
9. It has been rightly pointed out by the High Court that the
High Court in the exercise of its revisional-cum-supervisory 8
, power cannot go into the intricate details of facts and decide
the questions raised therein. We are in agreement with these
views of the High Court, except that in exceptional cases such
orders which are based on perversity and arbitrariness could
be interfered with by the High Court. After a long period of
... litigation ranging for almost 50 years, the DOC had decided C
according to the shares of the parties after complying with the
observations made by the Allahabad High Court as had been
noted by the High Court in its impugned judgment and it is not
proper to set aside the orders on technical grounds and force
~· the litigants to go back again and again to litigate on the same D
point. In any view of the matter, we are not in a position to
observe that there was anything for the High Court to interfere
with the order of the DOC, as it appears from the observations
made by the Allahabad High Court that the DOC will decide
the dispute and consider all aspects of the matter and the entire E
materials including the oral and documentary evidence on
record.
10. From the order dated 2oth of October, 2004, passed
> by the DOC, it is clear to us as to how the parties had got the F
shares given to them by the DOC. Learned counsel for the
appellants argued that the DOC had wrongly shown some of
the plots being submerged into the river bed. This Court is not
in a position to disbelieve what the DOC had stated unless firm
evidence to the contrary is on record. The appellants had not G
been able to produce any evidence to satisfy this contention.
11. The Learned Counsel for the appellants also raised a
contention that after the creation of the separate State of
Uttaranchal, Additional District Magistrate, Udham Singh Nagar
had no jurisdiction to exercise power of the DOC. We do not H
1092 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 5 S.C.R.
-
A agree to this contention as well. This is because all the
notifications issued by the Govt. of Uttar Pradesh are applicable
to the state of Uttaranchal under Section 86 of UP
Reorganization Act, 2000 read with Section 88 of the said Act.
Sections 86 and 88 which are necessary for our purpose are
B reproduced below : ~
"86. Territorial extent of laws:- The provisions of Part II shall
not be deemed to have affected any change in the
territories to which the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling
on Land Holdings Act, 1961 (U.P. Act 1of1961) and any
c other law in force immediately before the appointed day, ..
extends or applies, and territorial references of any such
law to the State of Uttar Pradesh shall, until otherwise
provided by a competent Legislature or other competent
authority be construed as meaning the territories within the
D existing state of Uttar Pradesh before the appointed day. ~ .
88. Power to construe laws:- Notwithstanding that no
provision or insufficient provision has been made under
Section 87 for adaptation of a law made before the
E appointed day, any court, tribunal or authority, required or
empowered to enforce such law may, for the purpose of
facilitating its application in relation to the State of Uttar
Pradesh or Uttaranchal, construe the law in such manner,
without affecting the substance, as may be necessary or
F proper in regard to the matter before the court, tribunal or
authority."
12. From the reading of the aforesaid two provisions, it
would not be possible for us to hold that the Additional District
Magistrate, Udham Singh Nagar had no jurisdiction to exercise
G power of the DOC.
13. It was next contended that the order .of the DOC,
Udham Singh Nagar dated 20th of October, 2004 was passed
in contravention of the directions issued by the High Court of
H Allahabad as stated herein earlier. As has been already
... GULJAR SINGH & ORS. v. DEPUTY DIRECTOR 1093
~ CONSOLIDATION AND ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.)
mentioned above, the High Court at Uttaranchal correctly noted A
that the order passed by the DOC was not in contravention of
the directions of the Allahabad High Court. The DOC had taken
into consideration the observations made by the Allahabad
High Court and after perusing all the material documents and
contentions of the parties, passed the order dated 20th of 8
October, 2004. Thus the contention that the DOC had not taken
into consideration the order of the Allahabad High Court cannot
be accepted and accordingly rejected.
14. It was next contended that the order of the Sub-
Divisional Officer, Kashipur, passed on 31st of August, 1959
c
under Sections 33 and 39 of the UP Land Revenue Act, could
not be relied on and form the basis of the order passed by the
DOC and the same cannot modify and disturb the basic year
entries as recorded in the Khata of the appellants. We do not
~ find any ground to uphold this contention. It has to be noted that D
the proceedings started under the UP Consolidation of Holdings
Act, and the allocation of Chaks were made pursuant to the
orders passed by the Consolidation Officer and the DOC, after
duly considering the claims of the parties. It is well settled that
the DOC is conferred with wide powers under the Act to E
adjudicate the issue posed before him. In order to elaborate
this point, it is essential to refer to the case of Sheo Nand &
Ors vs. Deputy Consolidation Allahabad and Ors. 2000 (3)
sec 103. In the said case, this Court, referring to Section 48
of the Act had noted that: F
"The Section gives very wide powers to the Deputy
Director. It enables him suo motu on his own motion or on
the (application of any person to consider the propriety,
legality, regularity and correctness of all the proceedings G
held under the Act and to pass appropriate orders. These
powers have been conferred on the Deputy Director in the
widest terms so that the claims of the parties under the Act
may be effectively adjudicated upon and determined so as
to confer finality to the rights of the parties and the
H
te-
1094 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 5 S.C.R.
A Revenue Records may be prepared accordingly.
'
Normally, the Deputy Director, in exercise of his powers,
is not expected to disturb the findings of fact recorded
concurrently by the Consolidation Officer and the
Settlement Officer (Consolidation), but where the findings
B
are perverse, in the sense that they are not supported by
the evidence brought on record by the parties or that they
are against the weight of evidence, it would be the duty of
the Deputy Director to scrutinize the whole case again so
as to determine the correctness, legality or propriety of the
c orders passed by the authorities subordinate to him. In a
case, like the present, where the entries in the Revenue
record are fictitious or forged or they were recorded in
contravention of the statutory provisions contained in the
U.P. Land Records Manual or other allied statutory
D provisions, the Deputy Director would have full power
under Section 48 to re-appraise or re-evaluate the
evidence on record so as to finally determine the rights of
the parties by excluding forged or fictitious revenue entries
or entries not made in accordance with law.
E
If, therefore, during the course of the hearing of the revision
filed by the appellant under Section 48 of the Act, the
Deputy Director reopened the whole case and scrutinized
the claim of the appellants in respect, of two other villages,
F it could not be said that the Deputy Director exceeded his
jurisdiction in any manner. It will be noticed that while
scrutinizing the evidence on record, the Deputy Director
had noticed that the entries were fictitious and in recording
some of the entries in the revenue record in favour of the
appellants, statutory provisions including those contained
G
in U.P. Land Records Manual were not followed. In that
situation, the Deputy Director was wholly justified in looking
into the legality of the entire proceedings and disposing
of the revision in the manner in which he has done."
H 15. From the above-quoted observations of this Court, it
GULJAR SINGH & ORS. v. DEPUTY DIRECTOR 1095
CONSOLIDATION AND ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
is clear that the DOC has wide range of discretionary powers A
'• mandated under the Act by which he could proceed to modify
even the basic year entries if found to be wrongly derived at.
Therefore, the contention that the DOC could not have modified
the basic year entries was not correct. It appears to us that the
Khatuani prepared in the Bandobast was incorrectly made and 8
the courts below including the DOC had been duly conferred
with power under the Act to correct the same. In fact, the
Assistant Recording Officer, Kashipur had passed an order in
1963 to correct the entries as per the order of the Sub-
Divisional Officer, Kashipur dated 31st of August, 1959 but the c
same was not complied with.
16. The learned counsel for the appellants also contended
that relying on Section 11A of the Act, any objection for the first
time could not be entertained by the authorities. We do not
I agree with this submission of the learned counsel for the D
appellants. We have already observed that the respondents
had not accepted the order passed by the Settlement Officer,
Consolidation, Kashfpur and they had filed their separate
objections to this regard, hence, the contention could not be said
to be correct and, therefore, it should be rejected. Further more, E
... a reading of the application dated 6th of July, 1959 would clearly
show that the parties had appeared before the authorities below
before the remand of the case to the DOC which would be
evident from Annexure R2.
F
17. It is evident from the perusal of the order of the
Allahabad High Court while passing the order of remand that
the several issues which were raised by the parties were fully
considered and finally directed the DOC to follow the
procedures for coming to a proper conclusion afresh on merits.
G
Since the High Court at Allahabad clearly directed the DOC to
decide the matter on merits and in compliance with the said
direction, the DOC considered all the entire materials, oral and
documentary, on record to decide the matter, we do not find
any excess jurisdiction exercised either by the DOC or by the
H
High Court in coming to a finding arrived at by them.
1096 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 5 S.C.R.
A 18. The DOC after complying with the observations made
by the Allahabad High Court had taken all steps to determine ,,
whether the consolidation process was proper or not. On this
count also, we are unable to agree with the contentions of the
learned counsel for the appellants. It may be noted that many
B of the original parties to the consolidation proceedings had died
over the period of time. At this stage on consideration of the
impugned judgment of the High Court as well as of the DOC,
we find that there is no evidence or material on record to
contradict or upset the findings of the High Court which affirmed
c the findings of the DOC. In this connection, reliance can be
placed to a decision of this Court in the case of Vishnu Karnath
vs. Ahmad Syed lshaque, [AIR 1955 SC 283] in which this Court
observed that:
"The finality given to the decision of the Settlement Officer
D (Consolidation) does not follow that it cannot be
questioned in the writ jurisdiction of the High Court where
there is an error apparent on the face of the record"
19. The observations made by this Court as above that
E there must be an error apparent on the face of the record affirms
our observation that for an appeal to be allowed in such a
situation such as this, a high standard must be met in the way
of evidence produced to support the case of the appellants as
noted herein earlier. All the materials and issues discussed in
~
F their petition were elaborately discussed and argued before the
High Court of Uttaranchal which had affirmed the findings of the
DOC and found no infirmity therein.
20. Lastly it was contended that the DOC exceeded his
jurisdiction contrary to the decision of the Allahabad High Court.
G The Allahabad High Court, as has been mentioned above,
directed the DDC to decide the case on merits. It has not come j.
to our notice that the Allahabad High Court, in any way,
specified the way the merits of the case should be determined.
We, therefore, believe, based on the review of his findings that
H he did the best he could do in performing his duty as had been
)
GULJAR SINGH & ORS. v. DEPUTY DIRECTOR 1097
CONSOLIDATION AND ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
mandated by the Allahabad High Court. A
21. Based on the reasons mentioned above, we do not
find any infirmity in the impugned judgment of the Uttaranchal
High Court and thus feel it unnecessary to interfere with the
same.
B
22. The appeals are thus dismissed. There will be no order
as to costs.
G.N. Appeals dismissed.
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.