GURMEET KAURversusDEVENDER GUPTA & ANOTHER

                   [2024] 11 S.C.R. 1602 : 2024 INSC 967

                               Gurmeet Kaur
                                     v.
                          Devender Gupta & Another
                   (Criminal Appeal No(s). 4825-4826 of 2024)
                                 26 November 2024
                         [B.V. Nagarathna* and
                    Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh JJ.]


                               Issue for Consideration
          Issue arose whether the appellant while discharging her duty as a
          public servant on the relevant date, there was any excess in the
          discharge of the said duty which did not require the first respondent
          to take a prior sanction for prosecuting the appellant.

                                     Headnotes†

          Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.197 – Prosecution of
          Judges and public servants – Appellant-District Town Planner
          (Enforcement) and 12 others forcibly entered the college of
          the respondent-chairman, created chaos and took away the
          college telephone forcibly – Complaint filed but no action
          taken – Thereafter, the appellant asked for the building map/
          plan and other documents, and one of the accused demanded
          illegal gratification but the respondent refused – Consequently,
          the appellant forcibly entered the college premises along with
          police personnel with heavy machinery and equipment for
          demolition and after vacating the campus, the demolition took
          place – In a writ petition, the Local Commissioner appointed by
          the High Court submitted his report that the existing building
          was constructed prior to 2004 much before the notification
          whereby respondent’s college area was declared controlled
          area – Private complaint filed – All accused discharged except
          the appellant-and accused nos.2 and 4 – Summoning order
          passed against them u/ss. 452, 506, 427, 384, 440, 166 read
          with s.120-B IPC – Thereafter, petition u/s. 482 CrPC by the
          appellant seeking quashing of the complaint, all consequential
          proceedings, and the summoning order – High Court dismissed
          the petition – Correctness:

*Author
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               Gurmeet Kaur v. Devender Gupta & Another


     Held: Appellant who is accused of carrying out the demolition was
     doing so within the scope and ambit of her authority – Not a case
     where appellant carried out the demolition dehors any legal backing
     or basis; neither was the said act of carrying out of the demolition
     outside the scope of her authority as the District Town Planner in
     the Enforcement Division – Appellant was carrying out the orders
     of the superior officers – There is a correlation between the act
     of demolition and the discharge of official duty – Demolition was
     carried out during the course of performance of appellant’s official
     duties – Fact that an application was filed seeking regularisation
     of the construction put up by the first respondent would indicate
     that even according to the first respondent, there was a digression
     and other irregularities in the construction put up which required
     regularisation – It cannot be said that when such an application
     was pending, the appellant had no authority to demolish the
     construction – Impugned demolition cannot also be termed as
     an “excess” – First respondent ought to have sought sanction for
     prosecution u/s.197 – Same, not having been done vitiated the
     initiation of the criminal proceeding against the appellant – Thus,
     the summoning order and the consequent steps taken by the trial
     court pursuant to the said summoning order quashed – Since there
     was no prior order of sanction passed u/s.197 of the CrPC, the
     initiation of the complaint itself, is non est. [Paras 32, 33]

     Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.197 – Prosecution of
     Judges and public servants – Object and purpose of s.197:
     Held: Is to protect officers and officials of the State from unjustified
     criminal prosecution while they discharge their duties within the
     scope and ambit of their powers entrusted to them – Reading of
     s.197 indicate that there is a bar for a Court to take cognizance
     of such offences mentioned in the said provision except with
     the previous sanction of the appropriate government when the
     allegations are made against, inter alia, a public servant – Salient
     words relevant under sub-section (1) of s.197 are “is accused of
     any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting
     or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court
     shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous
     sanction” – Thus, for the purpose of application of s.197, a sine
     qua non is that the public servant is accused of any offence
     which had been committed by him in “discharge of his official
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    duty” – Said expression clearly indicate that s.197 would not
    apply to a case if a public servant is accused of any offence
    which is de hors or not connected to the discharge of his or her
    official duty. [Para 22]

                             Case Law Cited
    State of Orissa v. Ganesh Chandra Jew [2004] 3 SCR 504 : (2004)
    8 SCC 40; Om Prakash v. State of Jharkhand [2012] 9 SCR 125 :
    (2012) 12 SCC 72 – relied on.
    Urmila Devi v. Yudhvir Singh [2013] 16 SCR 542 : (2013) 15 SCC
    624; Amrik Singh v. State of Pepsu [1955] 1 SCR 1302 : (1955)
    1 SCR 1302 at 1307 – distinguished.
    D.T. Virupakshappa v. C. Subhash [2015] 5 SCR 534 : (2015)
    12 SCC 231; Abdul Wahab Ansari v. State of Bihar [2000] Supp.
    3 SCR 747 : (2000) 8 SCC 500; D. Devaraja v. Owais Sabeer
    Hussain [2020] 6 SCR 453 : (2020) 7 SCC 695; Bhagwan Prasad
    Srivastava v. N.P. Mishra [1971] 1 SCR 317 : (1970) 2 SCC 56;
    Punjab State Warehousing Corporation v. Bhushan Chander [2016]
    4 SCR 537 : (2016) 13 SCC 44; Bakhshish Singh Brar v. Gurmej
    Kaur [1988] 1 SCR 450 : (1987) 4 SCC 663; Amod Kumar Kanth
    v. Association of Victim of Uphaar Tragedy [2023] 6 SCR 669 :
    Criminal Appeal No.1359 of 2017; Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bihari
    [1955] 2 SCR 925 : AIR 1956 SC 44 – referred to.

                               List of Acts
    Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas Restriction of
    Unregulated Development Act, 1963; Code of Criminal Procedure,
    1973; Penal Code, 1860.

                            List of Keywords
    Discharging duty as public servant; Excess in discharge; Prior
    sanction; District Town Planner (Enforcement); Illegal gratification;
    Demolition; Local Commissioner; Controlled area; Summoning
    order; Orders of superior officers; Correlation between act of
    demolition and discharge of official duty; Regularisation of
    construction; Authority to demolish construction; Sanction for
    prosecution u/s. 197 CrPC; Previous sanction of appropriate
    government; Public servant; Acting or purporting to act in discharge
    of his official duty.
[2024] 11 S.C.R.                                                         1605

              Gurmeet Kaur v. Devender Gupta & Another


                           Case Arising From
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No(s).
     4825-4826 of 2024
     From the Judgment and Order dated 18.09.2017 and 01.11.2017 of
     the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRM-M No.
     4549 of 2015 and CRM No. 33535 of 2017 respectively

                        Appearances for Parties
     Alok Sangwan, Sr. A.A.G., Mukul Rohtagi, Sr. Adv., Sameer Rohtagi,
     Sumit Kumar Sharma, Samar Vijay Singh, Rajat Sangwan, Ms.
     Sabarni Som, Fateh Singh, Advs. for the Appellant.
     Aseem Mehrotra, Ms. Deeksha Mehrotra, Rajeev Singh, Akshay
     Amritanshu, Ms. Drishti Saraf, Ms. Pragya Upadhyay, Ms. Swati
     Mishra, Advs. for the Respondents.

                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
                                Judgment

     Nagarathna, J.

     Leave granted.
2.   Being aggrieved by the order dated 18.09.2017 passed in
     CRM-M-4549-2015 by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at
     Chandigarh in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code of
     Criminal Procedure, 1973 dismissing the petition as not maintainable;
     and order dated 01.11.2017 passed in application bearing CRM
     No.33535 of 2017 declining to recall the order dated 18.09.2017,
     the appellant is before this Court.
3.   The relevant facts of the case are that the appellant herein filed a
     petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
     (for short “CrPC”) seeking quashing of complaint No.1383 dated
     13.03.2010/11.11.2011 titled “Devender Gupta vs. Director, Town and
     Country Planning and others” along with the proceedings thereof.
     The said complaint was filed by Devender Gupta under Sections 323,
     452, 506, 427, 384, 440, 166, 148, 149 read with Section 34 of the
     Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “IPC”) along with all consequential
     proceedings and the impugned order dated 20.11.2014 passed by
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     the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Gurgaon summoning
     the appellant herein and two others for the aforesaid offences were
     assailed before the High Court.
4.   The original complaint filed by Devender Gupta-first respondent herein
     under various provisions of the IPC referred to above against the
     present appellant, who was at the relevant time, the District Town
     Planner (Enforcement) and twelve others was that on 24.09.2006, the
     appellant had forcibly entered Anupama College of Engineering and
     Anupama Institute of Management, both situated at Gurgaon District
     of which the first respondent was the Chairman, in her official jeep
     along with some other officials and created chaos and had taken
     away the college telephone No.2241615 forcibly. That the college
     had resisted initially but the appellant refused to oblige them; a
     complaint was lodged before the Bilaspur Police Post regarding the
     said incident but no action was taken. Thereafter, the complainant
     met the appellant herein on 10.11.2006 along with his advocate
     but the appellant had asked for the building map/plan and other
     documents and the first respondent-complainant had produced the
     said documents. However, one of the accused, Manipal demanded
     Rs.20,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty lakhs Only) as an illegal gratification
     but the first respondent-complainant refused to oblige the same.
     Consequently, on 05.02.2007 at about 9.45 A.M., the appellant
     forcibly entered the college premises along with sufficient number
     of police personnel with heavy machinery and equipment for the
     purpose of demolition and after vacating the campus of the staff and
     students, the demolition took place. The said action of the appellant
     was with a mala fide intention owing to non-payment of the bribe
     made previously; that an FIR was registered on the instructions of
     accused No.5 and the same was found to be false.
     Further, Writ Petition (C) No.16184/2001 had also been filed in which
     the High Court had appointed a Local Commissioner to inspect the
     college campus and he had submitted his report on 18.10.2007 stating
     that there was an existing building which was constructed prior to
     the year 2004 which was much before the notification being issued
     under the provisions of The Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled
     Areas Restriction of Unregulated Development Act, 1963 (“the Act”
     for the sake of brevity). Therefore, the Notification issued under the
     said Act was not applicable to the subject building inasmuch as its
     construction was prior to 05.08.2005.
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5.   The aforesaid complaint was filed under Section 200 of the CrPC as
     a private complaint and on preliminary evidence and recording the
     statement of the complainant and witnesses namely CW-1 and CW-2
     and documentary evidence at Ex.PA to PZ, Ex. PAA to Ex.PDD.,
     the Trial Court issued a summoning order on 20.11.2014 against the
     present appellant and two others only under Sections 323, 452, 506,
     427, 384, 440, 166 read with Section 120-B of the IPC.
6.   Being aggrieved by the summoning order and also the very filing
     of the complaint against the appellant herein, the aforesaid petition
     was filed before the High Court. On considering the pleadings on
     record as well as the contentions, the High Court dismissed the
     said writ petition. Although there were two main facets of the said
     writ petition: one with regard to the quashing of the complaint itself
     on merits on the premise that no offence whatsoever was made
     out; the second aspect of the said case assumes significance
     inasmuch as the contention of the appellant before the High Court
     was that there was no sanction order passed under Section 197
     of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) and therefore,
     the very initiation of the criminal proceedings against the appellant
     herein were vitiated.
7.   The High Court dismissed the said writ petition by stating that at
     that stage it could not categorically be opined whether there was an
     illegal act as such which was committed by the public servant namely
     the appellant herein which required sanction, or the requirement of
     sanction was unnecessary having regard to the nature of the acts
     complained against; that it required a detailed inquiry inasmuch
     as the Trial Court had held that there was a prima facie evidence
     against the appellant herein. In the above premise, the Writ Petition
     was dismissed.
8.   Learned senior counsel Sri Mukul Rohatgi assisted by Sri Sameer
     Rohatgi, learned counsel submitted that taking into consideration the
     allegations against the appellant herein, it is a clear case where the
     appellant, during the course of the discharge of her official duties
     had carried out the demolition on the basis of the instructions of her
     superior officers and therefore, there was no malicious act, malice
     or any illegal act which could have been attributed to the appellant
     herein let alone any criminal act which could have been alleged
     against the appellant herein.
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9.   It was submitted that the High Court ought to have gone into the
     aspect as to whether any offence at all was made out and quashed
     the criminal complaint. It was further submitted that given the nature of
     allegations against the appellant herein, it can be noted that the said
     allegations emanate from the nature of the duties that the appellant
     carried out on 05.02.2007 inasmuch as the demolition of the illegal
     construction was carried out on the said date which neither can be
     termed to be an instance of “excess” in the discharge of her duties
     nor can it be said that there was a criminal intent on the part of the
     appellant herein. The appellant had simply performed her duties as
     per the instructions of her superior officers.
10. It was therefore submitted that the sanction for prosecution within the
    scope and ambit of Section 197 of the CrPC, which is a mandatory
    requirement, had to be taken from the State Government before the
    initiation of criminal proceedings even though the criminal proceedings
    in the instant case is under Section 200 of the CrPC by way of a
    private complaint. In this regard our attention was also drawn to
    Sections 20 and 21 of the Act to contend that no suit, prosecution
    and other legal proceedings would lie against any person in respect
    of anything which has been done in good faith or intended to be done
    in pursuance of the Act or the rules made thereunder. Further, no Civil
    Court would have any jurisdiction to entertain or decide any question
    relating to matters under the Act or the rules made thereunder. It was
    submitted that the object and purpose of obtaining sanction under
    Section 197 of the CrPC is in order to protect the bona fide acts of
    officers and officials done during the discharge of their official duties
    and that the salutary intent of the said provision must be realised
    and hence, before initiation of any criminal proceeding, the condition
    precedent of obtaining a sanction is a mandatory requirement and
    hence, in the instant case the absence of any sanction order being
    issued by the State Government has vitiated the very initiation of
    the criminal complaint against the appellant herein. In support of
    this submission, reliance was placed on the following decisions of
    this Court:
     (1)   D.T. Virupakshappa vs. C. Subhash (2015) 12 SCC 231
           (“D.T. Virupakshappa”);
     (2)   Abdul Wahab Ansari vs. State of Bihar (2000) 8 SCC 500
           (“Abdul Wahab Ansari”)
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     (3)   D. Devaraja vs. Owais Sabeer Hussain (2020) 7 SCC 695
           (“D. Devaraja”)
     (4)   Amod Kumar Kanth vs. Association of Victim of Uphaar
           Tragedy and Anr., Crl. Appeal No.1359/2017 disposed of
           on 20.04.2023.
11. It was submitted that having regard to the position of law which
    squarely apply to the facts of the present case, the impugned order
    may be set aside and the initiation of the criminal proceedings against
    the appellant may be quashed and all consequential orders thereby
    may be quashed.
12. Per contra, learned counsel for the first respondent Sri Aseem
    Mehrotra, at the outset submitted that the impugned order would not
    call for any interference; that the appellant would now have to face the
    criminal trial; and that the appellant has had the benefit of the interim
    order of stay of proceedings at the hands of this Court. Therefore,
    the appeal may simply be dismissed in limine, so that the appellant
    would stand the test of criminality which has been alleged against
    her. It was contended that the first respondent was constrained to
    file the complaint owing to the fact that the Notification issued under
    the Act was not at all applicable and that the demolition carried out
    by the appellant herein was with vengeance and malice; that she
    had no authority to carry out the demolition of the building which
    was constructed prior to 05.08.2005 inasmuch as the notification did
    not apply to the period prior to 05.08.2005.
13. Further, the first respondent herein had made an application for
    regularization of the alleged illegal construction, the same was
    pending consideration and instead of considering the application for
    regularization made by the first respondent herein, the Department
    kept the same pending and went ahead with the demolition. This has
    caused not only monetary loss but also has prejudiced the institutions
    of which the first respondent is the Chairman.
14. In this regard, learned counsel for the first respondent drew our
    attention to the following judgments of this Court:
     (1)   Bhagwan Prasad Srivastava vs. N.P. Mishra (1970) 2 SCC
           56 (“Bhagwan Prasad Srivastava”)
     (2)   Urmila Devi vs. Yudhvir Singh (2013) 15 SCC 624, (“Urmila
           Devi”)
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     (3)   Punjab State Warehousing Corporation vs. Bhushan
           Chander (2016) 13 SCC 44 (“Bhushan Chander”)
     (4)   Bakhshish Singh Brar vs. Gurmej Kaur (1987) 4 SCC 663
           (“Bakhshish Singh Brar”)
15. Learned counsel for the first respondent submitted that there is
    sufficient material against the appellant herein who cannot be
    given the benefit of the legal position that the absence of sanction
    prior to the initiation of criminal proceeding would vitiate the entire
    proceeding. He submitted that in the event this Court was to hold
    that the sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC was a necessary
    condition to be complied with by the first respondent herein in the
    context of filing a criminal complaint under Section 200 of the CrPC,
    then, in the absence of such sanction being taken till date, liberty may
    be reserved to the first respondent herein to make a representation
    for seeking such a sanction.
16. Learned counsel for the second respondent-State, Sri Akshay
    Amritanshu with reference to his counter affidavit and other pleadings
    submitted that having regard to the fact that appellant herein was on
    the relevant day discharging her duties as a District Town Planner and
    it was in accordance with the scope and ambit of her authority that
    the demolition was carried out, the first respondent herein could not
    have initiated the criminal proceeding as against her in the absence
    of an order of sanction for doing so under the provisions of Section
    197 of the CrPC.
17. Learned counsel for the second respondent-State also submitted that
    there is no merit in the arguments of the first respondent’s counsel
    that the appellant herein ought to have been slow in carrying out
    the demolition inasmuch as the application for regularisation was
    pending before the Department and therefore the act of demolition
    of the illegal structure was an instance of excess as demonstrated
    by the various dicta of this Court. He submitted that in view of the
    conspectus of facts in the instant case, it was not at all a case of excess
    inasmuch as the Department which had to consider the application for
    regularisation was a different wing and the representation made for
    regularisation was not an impediment for carrying out the demolition.
    It was therefore submitted that appropriate orders may be made in
    this appeal.
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18. It was also submitted that this Court may be mindful of the fact that
    when an officer or an official of the State is carrying out the duty
    entrusted, the object and purpose of passing an order of sanction for
    prosecution under Section 197 of the CrPC must be borne in mind
    that a public servant ought not to be exposed to criminal prosecution
    or other kinds of litigation which would be wholly unjustified.
19. In the circumstances, learned counsel for the second respondent
    submitted that the impugned order may be set aside and appropriate
    relief may be granted to the appellant herein.
20. We have considered the arguments advanced at the bar in light of
    the facts which emanate in this case. At this stage itself, we may
    opine that we would confine the scope of this appeal to the question
    whether it was necessary for the first respondent herein to have made
    an application seeking sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC and
    thereafter proceeded to file the complaint under Section 200 of the
    CrPC. We also state that having regard to our reasoning and our
    decisions, it may not be necessary to go into the merits whether the
    appellant herein had indeed committed the offences alleged against
    her and therefore, the same ought to be quashed also.
21. For ease of reference, Section 197 of the CrPC is extracted as under:
          “197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants.
          (1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate
          or a public servant not removable from his office save by
          or with the sanction of the Government, is accused of any
          offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting
          or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no
          Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with
          the previous sanction-
          (a) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the
          case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged
          offence employed, in connection with the affairs of the
          Union, of the Central Government;
          (b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the
          case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged
          offence employed, in connection with the affairs of a State
          of the State Government :[Provided that where the alleged
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          offence was committed by a person referred to in clause
          (b) during the period while a Proclamation issued under
          clause (1) of Article 356 of the Constitution was in force
          in a State, clause (b) will apply as if for the expression
          “State Government” occurring therein, the expression
          “Central Government” were substituted.] [Added by Act
          43 of 1991, Section 2 (w.e.f. 2-5-1991).]
22. As already noted, the object and purpose of the said provision is
    to protect officers and officials of the State from unjustified criminal
    prosecution while they discharge their duties within the scope and
    ambit of their powers entrusted to them. A reading of Section 197
    of the CrPC would indicate that there is a bar for a Court to take
    cognizance of such offences which are mentioned in the said provision
    except with the previous sanction of the appropriate government
    when the allegations are made against, inter alia, a public servant.
    There is no doubt that in the instant case the appellant herein was
    a public servant but the question is, whether, while discharging
    her duty as a public servant on the relevant date, there was any
    excess in the discharge of the said duty which did not require the
    first respondent herein to take a prior sanction for prosecuting the
    appellant herein. In this regard, the salient words which are relevant
    under sub-section (1) of Section 197 are “is accused of any offence
    alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to
    act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance
    of such offence except with the previous sanction”. Therefore, for
    the purpose of application of Section 197, a sine qua non is that the
    public servant is accused of any offence which had been committed
    by him in “discharge of his official duty”. The said expression would
    clearly indicate that Section 197 of the CrPC would not apply to a
    case if a public servant is accused of any offence which is de hors
    or not connected to the discharge of his or her official duty. However,
    there are a line of judgments which have considered this expression
    in two different ways which we shall now advert to.
23. Learned senior counsel and learned counsel for the appellant have
    submitted the following judgments which indicate that Section 197(1)
    would apply prior to the initiation of a criminal proceeding under
    Section 197 of the CrPC. On the basis of the said judgments they
    have contended that it is during the discharge of her official duty that
    the demolition had taken place in the instant case and therefore, the
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     necessity of an order of sanction being passed by the Government
     was a sine qua non prior to initiation of the criminal proceeding. The
     judgments relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the appellant
     herein could be adverted to at this stage.
     a)   In D.T. Virupakshappa vs. C. Subhash (2015) 12 SCC 231
          (“D.T. Virupakshappa”), the appellant therein was accused
          in a private complaint before the Civil Judge (Junior Division)
          and JMFC, on which the learned Magistrate took cognizance,
          registered Criminal Case No.74 of 2009 and issued summons to
          the appellant therein. The offences alleged were under Sections
          323, 324, 326, 341, 120, 114, 506 read with Section 149 of
          the IPC. The appellant therein moved the High Court under
          Section 482 of the CrPC which was declined by the impugned
          order therein. The main contention of the appellant therein was
          that the learned Magistrate could not have taken cognizance
          of the alleged offences and issued process to the appellant
          without sanction from the State Government under Section 197
          of CrPC, and on that sole ground, the High Court should have
          quashed the proceedings. It was alleged that the appellant
          therein exceeded in exercising his power during investigation of
          a criminal case and assaulted the respondent therein in order to
          extract some information with regard to the death of a person,
          and in that connection, the respondent therein was detained
          in the police station for some time. Therefore, the allegation
          of the appellant therein had an essential connection with the
          discharge of the official duty and therefore, the previous sanction
          was necessary. The issue of “police excess” during investigation
          and requirement of sanction for prosecution in that regard, was
          also a subject-matter in State of Orissa vs. Ganesh Chandra
          Jew (2004) 8 SCC 40 (“Ganesh Chandra Jew”) which was
          relied upon. There was also reliance on Om Prakash vs. State
          of Jharkhand (2012) 12 SCC 72 (“Om Prakash”). The Court
          held that the ratio of the aforesaid two judgments squarely apply
          to the case of the appellant therein and having regard to the
          factual matrix of that case, it was observed that the offensive
          conduct was reasonably connected with the performance of
          the official duty of the appellant therein. Therefore, the learned
          Magistrate could not have taken cognizance of the case without
          the previous sanction of the State Government and the High
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         Court had missed this crucial point in the impugned order. This
         Court observed that in case such sanction is obtained and the
         same is produced before the learned Magistrate, the matter
         could be proceeded further before the learned Magistrate in
         accordance with law.
    b)   In Abdul Wahab Ansari vs. State of Bihar (2000) 8 SCC
         500 (“Abdul Wahab Ansari”), the facts were that the son of
         the deceased, who was respondent No.2 therein, had filed
         a complaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, alleging
         commission of offences by the appellant therein under Sections
         302, 307, 380, 427, 504, 147, 148 and 149 of the IPC as well as
         Section 27 of the Arms Act. The Chief Judicial Magistrate was
         of the opinion that the provisions of Section 197 of the CrPC
         would have no application to the facts of the case. Further, there
         was sufficient evidence available to establish a prima facie case
         and therefore had directed issuance of non-bailable warrants
         against the appellant therein and other accused persons. The
         appellant therein moved the High Court under Section 482 of
         the CrPC praying, inter alia, that no cognizance could be taken
         without a sanction of the appropriate Government, as required
         under Section 197 of the CrPC as the appellant was discharging
         his official duty pursuant to an order of the competent authority.
         The High Court opined that all the questions could be raised
         at the time of framing of charge and disposed the application
         filed by the appellant therein. Before this Court, two questions
         were raised and it was observed that previous sanction of the
         competent authority being a precondition for the Court taking
         cognizance of the offences if the offences alleged had been
         committed by the accused was in discharge of his official duty,
         the question touched upon the jurisdiction of the Magistrate in
         the matter of taking cognizance and therefore, there was no
         requirement that an accused should wait for taking such plea till
         the charges were framed. Placing reliance on certain decisions
         of this Court, it was observed in this case that the appellant
         therein had been directed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to
         be present with police force and remove the encroachment in
         question and in the course of discharge of his duty to control the
         mob, he had directed for opening of fire, which was in exercise
         of the power conferred upon him and the duty imposed upon
[2024] 11 S.C.R.                                                              1615

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          him under the orders of the Magistrate. Hence, Section 197(1)
          of the CrPC applied to the facts of the case. Since no sanction
          had been taken, the cognizance by the Magistrate was bad in
          law and therefore, the same was quashed qua the appellant
          therein and the appeal was allowed.
     c)   In D. Devaraja vs. Owais Sabeer Hussain (2020) 7 SCC
          695 (“D. Devaraja”), the facts were that the High Court had
          disposed of the application under Section 482 of the CrPC which
          was filed for quashing the order passed by the Additional Chief
          Metropolitan Magistrate III, Bengaluru City in taking cognizance
          of a private complaint, inter alia, against the appellant-accused
          therein, for offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 220,
          323, 330, 348 and 506-B read with Section 34 of the IPC. The
          High Court did not quash the impugned order of the Additional
          Chief Metropolitan Magistrate dated 27.12.2006, but remitted
          the complaint back to the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan
          Magistrate instead, with, inter alia, liberty to the appellant-
          accused therein to apply for discharge. The question considered
          by this Court was whether the learned Magistrate could, at all,
          have taken cognizance against the appellant therein, in the
          private complaint, in the absence of a sanction under Section
          197 of the CrPC read with Section 170 of the Karnataka Police
          Act, 1963, as amended by the Karnataka Police (Amendment)
          Act, 2013, and if not, whether the High Court should have
          quashed the impugned order of the Magistrate concerned,
          instead of remitting the complaint to the Magistrate concerned
          and requiring the appellant-accused therein to appear before
          him and file an application for discharge. Referring to several
          judgments of this Court, Indira Banerjee, J. speaking for the
          Bench observed in paragraph 66 to paragraph 71 as under:
                “66. Sanction of the Government, to prosecute a police
                officer, for any act related to the discharge of an official
                duty, is imperative to protect the police officer from
                facing harassive, retaliatory, revengeful and frivolous
                proceedings. The requirement of sanction from the
                Government, to prosecute would give an upright
                police officer the confidence to discharge his official
                duties efficiently, without fear of vindictive retaliation
                by initiation of criminal action, from which he would be
1616                                                [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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        protected under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal
        Procedure, read with Section 170 of the Karnataka
        Police Act. At the same time, if the policeman has
        committed a wrong, which constitutes a criminal
        offence and renders him liable for prosecution, he
        can be prosecuted with sanction from the appropriate
        Government.
        67. Every offence committed by a police officer
        does not attract Section 197 of the Code of Criminal
        Procedure read with Section 170 of the Karnataka
        Police Act. The protection given under Section 197
        of the Criminal Procedure Code read with Section
        170 of the Karnataka Police Act has its limitations.
        The protection is available only when the alleged act
        done by the public servant is reasonably connected
        with the discharge of his official duty and official duty
        is not merely a cloak for the objectionable act. An
        offence committed entirely outside the scope of the
        duty of the police officer, would certainly not require
        sanction. To cite an example, a policeman assaulting a
        domestic help or indulging in domestic violence would
        certainly not be entitled to protection. However, if an
        act is connected to the discharge of official duty of
        investigation of a recorded criminal case, the act is
        certainly under colour of duty, no matter how illegal
        the act may be.
        68. If in doing an official duty a policeman has acted
        in excess of duty, but there is a reasonable connection
        between the act and the performance of the official
        duty, the fact that the act alleged is in excess of duty
        will not be ground enough to deprive the policeman of
        the protection of the government sanction for initiation
        of criminal action against him.
        69. The language and tenor of Section 197 of the
        Code of Criminal Procedure and Section 170 of
        the Karnataka Police Act makes it absolutely clear
        that sanction is required not only for acts done in
        discharge of official duty, it is also required for an
[2024] 11 S.C.R.                                                         1617

              Gurmeet Kaur v. Devender Gupta & Another


                act purported to be done in discharge of official duty
                and/or act done under colour of or in excess of such
                duty or authority.
                70. To decide whether sanction is necessary, the test
                is whether the act is totally unconnected with official
                duty or whether there is a reasonable connection with
                the official duty. In the case of an act of a policeman
                or any other public servant unconnected with the
                official duty there can be no question of sanction.
                However, if the act alleged against a policeman is
                reasonably connected with discharge of his official
                duty, it does not matter if the policeman has exceeded
                the scope of his powers and/or acted beyond the
                four corners of law.
                71. If the act alleged in a complaint purported to be
                filed against the policeman is reasonably connected
                to discharge of some official duty, cognizance thereof
                cannot be taken unless requisite sanction of the
                appropriate Government is obtained under Section
                197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and/or Section
                170 of the Karnataka Police Act.”
          It was concluded that the High Court had erred in law refusing
          to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC to
          set aside the impugned order of the learned Magistrate taking
          cognizance of the complaint, after having held that it was a
          recognized principle of law that sanction was a legal requirement
          which empowers the court to take cognizance. This Court
          allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and order under
          appeal and the complaint was quashed for want of sanction.
     d)   In Amod Kumar Kanth vs. Association of Victim of Uphaar
          Tragedy, Criminal Appeal No.1359 of 2017 disposed of by
          three-Judge Bench of this Court on 20.04.2023 of which one
          of us (Nagarathna, J.) was a member, it was observed that the
          question of cognizance being taken in the absence of sanction
          and thereby Section 197 of the CrPC being flouted is not to be
          conflated and thereby confused with the question as to whether
          an offence has been committed. The salutary purpose behind
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        Section 197 of the CrPC is protection being accorded to public
        servants. In paragraphs 28, 29 and 31, it was observed as under:
             “(28) The State functions through its officers.
             Functions of the State may be sovereign or not
             sovereign. But each of the functions performed by
             every public servant is intended to achieve public
             good. It may come with discretion. The exercise of
             the power cannot be divorced from the context in
             which and the time at which the power is exercised
             or if it is a case of an omission, when the omission
             takes place.
             (29) The most important question which must be
             posed and answered by the Court when dealing
             with the argument that sanction is not forthcoming is
             whether the officer was acting in the exercise of his
             official duties. It goes further. Even an officer who acts
             in the purported exercise of his official power is given
             the protection under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. This is
             for good reason that the officer when he exercises the
             power can go about exercising the same fearlessly no
             doubt with bona fides as public functionaries can act
             only bona fide. In fact, the requirement of the action
             being bona fide is not expressly stated in Section
             197 of the Cr.P.C., though it is found in many other
             statutes protecting public servants from action, civil
             and criminal against them.
                                      xxxx
             (31) One ground which has found favour with the
             High Court against the appellant is that the appellant,
             according to the High Court, could raise the issue
             before the Magistrate.
             Here we may notice one aspect. When the question
             arises as to whether an act or omission which
             constitutes an offence in law has been done in the
             discharge of official functions by a public servant
             and the matter is under a mist and it is not clear
             whether the act is traceable to the discharge of his
[2024] 11 S.C.R.                                                           1619

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                 official functions, the Court may in a given case tarry
                 and allow the proceedings to go on. Materials will be
                 placed before the Court which will make the position
                 clear and a delayed decision on the question may
                 be justified. However, in a case where the act or the
                 omission is indisputably traceable to the discharge
                 of the official duty by the public servant, then for the
                 Court to not accept the objection against cognizance
                 being taken would clearly defeat the salutary purpose
                 which underlies Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. It all
                 depends on the facts and therefore, would have to
                 be decided on a case-to-case basis.”
     It was concluded that learned Magistrate had erred in the facts of the
     said case in taking cognizance against the appellant therein contrary
     to the mandate of Section 197 of the CrPC and on that short ground
     alone, the appeal was allowed and the proceedings challenged
     in Section 482 were quashed. However, it was observed that the
     same would not stand in the way of the competent authority taking
     a decision in the matter and/or granting sanction for prosecuting the
     appellant therein in accordance with law.
24. Learned counsel for the first respondent tried to distinguish the said
    judgments by another set of judgments of this Court wherein the
    question, whether the officer or official in discharge of the official duties
    had exceeded limits of the official authority or capacity and therefore,
    there was no necessity for seeking a sanction for prosecution for
    the excess committed by an officer or official during the course of
    discharge of duty. In this regard, the following judgments have been
    relied upon by the learned counsel for the first respondent.
     a)    In Bhagwan Prasad Srivastava vs. N.P. Mishra (1970) 2 SCC
           56 (“Bhagwan Prasad Srivastava”), the facts were that the
           appellant therein had used defamatory language towards the
           complainant and the two accused persons had insulted and
           humiliated him in the eyes of the public. The question before this
           Court was whether complainant’s case was covered by Section
           197 of the CrPC and previous sanction of the superior authority
           was necessary before the trial court could take cognizance of
           the complaint. It was held that the alleged offence consisted
           of the use of defamatory and abusive words and of getting the
1620                                                     [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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        complainant forcibly turned out of the operation theatre by the
        cook. This was not a part of the official duty of the appellant
        therein as a Civil Surgeon or that it was directly connected with
        the performance of his official duty that without so acting he could
        not have properly discharged it. Consequently, it was observed
        that it was not necessary to seek sanction under Section 197
        of the CrPC. It was observed that the object and purpose
        underlying Section 197 of the CrPC is to afford protection to
        public servants against frivolous, vexatious or false prosecution
        for offences alleged to have been committed by them while acting
        or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duty. This
        Section is designed to facilitate an effective and unhampered
        performance of their official duty by public servants by providing
        for scrutiny into the allegations of commission of offences by
        them by their superior authorities and prior sanction for their
        prosecution as a condition precedent to the cognizance of the
        cases against them by the courts. The said provision therefore
        cannot be construed too narrowly or too widely. A too narrow
        and pedantic construction may render it otiose for it is no part
        of an official duty to commit an offence. This Court was of the
        view that it is not the “duty” which requires examination so much
        as the “act” because the official act can be performed both in
        the discharge of the official duty as well as in, dereliction of it.
        One must also guard against too wide a construction. Therefore,
        a line has to be drawn between the narrow inner circle of strict
        official duties and acts outside the scope of official duties. Thus,
        there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the
        discharge of the official duty; the act must bear such relation
        to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable claim, but
        not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of
        the performance of his duty.
        Referring to Amrik Singh vs. State of Pepsu (1955) 1 SCR
        1302 at 1307 (“Amrik Singh”), the test to be adopted was,
        if the act complained of is directly concerned with his official
        duties so that, if questioned, it could be claimed to have been
        done by virtue of the office, then sanction would be necessary;
        and that would be so, irrespective of whether it was, in fact, a
        proper discharge of his duties, because that would really be
        a matter of defence on the merits, which would have to be
[2024] 11 S.C.R.                                                       1621

              Gurmeet Kaur v. Devender Gupta & Another


          investigated at the trial, and could not arise at the stage of the
          grant of sanction, which must precede the institution of the
          prosecution. It was further observed that the quality of the act
          that is important and if it falls within the scope and range of
          the official duties of the public servant concerned the protection
          contemplated by Section 197 of the CrPC will be attracted. On
          the facts of the aforesaid case, it was observed that sanction
          was unnecessary and therefore, the appeal was dismissed.
          We feel that the aforesaid case would not apply to the present
          case having regard to the facts that have been elucidated above.
     b)   Sanction for prosecution of a police officer accused of causing
          grievous injuries and death in conducting raid and search and
          whether the police officer concerned while acting in purported
          discharge of official duty exceeded limits of his official capacity,
          were issues which were determined in Bakhshish Singh Brar
          vs. Gurmej Kaur (1987) 4 SCC 663 (“Bakhshish Singh Brar”).
          The matter arose before this Court because the petitioner
          therein being a government servant was being proceeded
          against in the absence of a sanction under Section 197 of the
          CrPC for the offences under Sections 148, 302, 325, 323, 149
          and 120-B of the IPC. The contention of the petitioner therein
          was that cognizance of the offence under Section 197 of the
          CrPC could not have been taken nor the trial proceeded with
          without the sanction of the appropriate authorities. The question
          was, whether, while investigating and performing his duties as
          a police officer, was it necessary for the petitioner therein to
          conduct himself in such a manner which would result in such
          consequences such as injuries of one of the alleged accused
          and consequent death. Dwelling on the said issue, this Court
          observed that in the facts and circumstances of each case,
          protection of public officers and public servants functioning in
          discharge of official duties and protection of private citizens have
          to be balanced by finding out as to what extent and how far is
          a public servant working in discharge of his duties or purported
          discharge of his duties and whether the public servant has
          exceeded his limits. Taking note of Section 197 of the CrPC
          which is at the stage of taking cognizance, this Court observed
          that the criminal trial should not be stayed in all cases at the
          preliminary stage and it was observed on the facts of the case
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         that the trial should proceed and the question of sanction under
         Section 197 of the CrPC may be agitated after some evidences
         have been noted by the trial court.
    c)   In Urmila Devi vs. Yudhvir Singh (2013) 15 SCC 624, (“Urmila
         Devi”) there are two concurring judgments by this Court. In the
         said case, the facts were that the appellant therein had filed a
         complaint against the respondent alleging that the respondent
         therein had threatened the appellant and another person that
         if they did not withdraw the complaint filed by them earlier as
         against a third person under Section 500 of the IPC both of
         them will not remain in service. The learned Chief Judicial
         Magistrate, Panchkula had summoned the accused Nos.1 to
         10 and 12 to face the trial for the offences under Sections
         323, 354, 389, 452, 458, 500 and 506 read with Sections 34
         and 120-B of the IPC. It was contended that none of the acts
         complained of against the respondent therein would amount
         to exercise of any powers in his official capacity as the SDM
         and, therefore, he could not have taken umbrage under Section
         197 of the CrPC. On considering the allegations against the
         respondent therein, this Court observed that the behaviour
         of the respondent therein as written in the complaint of the
         appellant, if found to be true, could only be held to be a high-
         handed one bordering on indecency of the highest order,
         wholly abusing his status as the SDM and can never be held
         to have acted within the statutory framework of law. That none
         of the actions alleged against the respondent therein by the
         appellant therein could be held to be one in which he acted
         in his capacity as the Executive Magistrate. This is because
         the respondent therein could not have barged into the house
         of a lady, that too at odd hours of 10.00 pm accompanied by
         a posse of police officers under the guise of ascertaining the
         truthfulness or otherwise of a complaint and for that purpose
         engage the services of two cameraman also with video cameras.
         It was observed that having regard to the aforesaid allegations
         against the respondent therein, the invocation of Section 197
         of the CrPC was wholly uncalled for and consequently the
         impugned orders of the learned Additional Sessions Judge as
         well as the High Court was set aside and the appeal filed by
         the appellant complainant was allowed.
[2024] 11 S.C.R.                                                        1623

              Gurmeet Kaur v. Devender Gupta & Another


          T.S. Thakur, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) in his
          concurring judgment discussed the term “official” in its various
          connotations. For the purpose of understanding the expression
          “acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties”
          in Section 197 of the CrPC which provides for obtaining a
          sanction of a public servant before he could be proceeded
          against for offences alleged to have been committed by him. It
          was observed that the test of direct and reasonable connection
          between the official duty of the accused and the acts allegedly
          committed by them is, therefore, the true test to be applied while
          deciding whether the protection of Section 197 of the CrPC is
          available to a public servant accused of the commission of an
          offence. It was further observed that public functionaries cannot
          under the cloak of purported discharge of official duties resort
          to harassment and humiliation of the citizens on the pretext of
          a complaint having been received by them, especially when
          the same does not disclose the commission of any offence
          triable by the Executive Magistrate or cognizable by the police.
          Therefore, the allegations made against the respondent therein
          in the said case were held to be outside the scope of discharge
          of official duties and hence, the plea that Section 197 of the
          CrPC had to be applied, was rejected.
          It is necessary to appreciate the backdrop of the facts in the
          aforesaid case in which the complaints were made by the
          appellant therein against the respondent therein which we have
          epitomized above. It appears that the SDM in the aforesaid case
          was inquisitive about the adulterous relationship between the
          appellant therein and another person and a complaint having
          been received in that regard, had entered the house of the
          appellant (a woman) after sunset with a posse of police force,
          carrying video cameras for conducting an unwarranted search of
          the house, humiliating and invading the privacy of the appellant
          therein, insulting and humiliating another person by asking him
          to undress and dragging both of them to the police station for
          medical examination against their wishes, especially when
          male doctors were asked to examine the appellant therein (a
          woman) without any lawful justification for doing so. Therefore,
          the said judgment squarely turns on the glaring facts of the
          said case and cannot at all be applied to the facts which arise
          in the present case.
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    d)   In Punjab State Warehousing Corporation vs. Bhushan
         Chander (2016) 13 SCC 44 (“Bhushan Chander”), the
         allegations against the respondent accused who was working
         as a Godown Assistant in State Corporation was that he
         misappropriated 11 gunny bales valuing Rs.38,841 and tampered
         with the record of the department concerned. Prosecution under
         Sections 409, 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC was initiated without
         obtaining any sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC. Inter
         alia, it was contended that the question of invoking Section 197
         of the CrPC would not arise in the case of employees of Public
         Sector Undertakings (PSU). Allowing the appeal, it was held that
         there has to be reasonable connection between the omission
         or commission and the discharge of official duty or the act
         committed was under the office held by the official concerned.
         If the acts, omission or commission of which are totally alien to
         the discharge of the official duty, question of invoking Section
         197 of the CrPC would not arise. In the said case, this Court
         observed that on the factual matrix as it obtained sanction
         under Section 197 of the CrPC was unnecessary. Reliance was
         placed on the judgment of this Court in Matajog Dobey vs. H.C.
         Bihari, AIR 1956 SC 44 (“Matajog Dobey”) wherein it was
         opined that there must be a reasonable connection between the
         act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such
         relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable but
         not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course
         of the performance of his duty. In such an event, the need for
         obtaining a sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC would
         arise. Ultimately, in order to answer this query, the facts of each
         case would have to be considered and whether an offence has
         been committed in the course of official duty or not, or under
         colour of office cannot be answered hypothetically. In the said
         case, it was held the High Court was not right in setting aside
         the conviction and sentence on the ground that the trial is
         vitiated in the absence of sanction. Consequently, the appeal
         was allowed and the judgment and order passed by the High
         Court was set aside and the matter was remanded to decide
         the revision petition in accordance with law.
25. We have considered the facts of the present case in light of the
    aforesaid rulings and the observations made by this Court. The
[2024] 11 S.C.R.                                                      1625

              Gurmeet Kaur v. Devender Gupta & Another


     relevant facts of the case are that on 05.08.2005, a notification was
     issued under the provisions of the Act. The said notification declared
     the area around the Government Primary School at village Bilaspur
     as a Controlled Area under the provisions of the said Act. The area
     of the respondent College (Anupama College) was also declared
     as a Controlled Area. Thereafter, on 06.03.2006, First Show-Cause
     Notice was issued by the predecessor of the appellant herein to
     the respondent regarding additional construction raised in Anupama
     College. The representatives of the first respondent sought time to
     file a reply. When the matter stood thus on 19.06.2006, the appellant
     was appointed as District Town Planner (Enforcement), Gurgaon.
26. As there was no reply to the show-cause notice and the construction
    continued, the appellant herein issued restoration order under Section
    12(2) of the Act on 09.10.2006. The appellant also lodged FIR No.364
    dated 13.10.2006 with Police Station Bilaspur. Subsequently, on the
    request made by the appellant, the District Magistrate deputed two
    Duty Magistrates for overlooking the demolition. On 04.02.2007 and
    05.02.2007, the demolition operation of the additional unauthorized
    construction was carried out. The respondent made a complaint
    against the appellant to the Senior Town Planner, Town and Country
    Planning Department stating that the appellant had demanded illegal
    gratification of Rs.20 lakhs and when that was not paid, the appellant
    had carried the demolition of the main building without serving any
    notice and thereby causing loss to the College. The appellant informed
    the Director, Town and Country Planning that all the construction
    raised after the date of notification had been demolished.
27. Subsequently, a second show-cause notice under Section 12(2) was
    issued owing to re-erection of the demolished portion. On 12.03.2007,
    the appellant relinquished her charge of DTP (E), Gurgaon owing
    to her transfer. Subsequently, on 05.04.2007, a preliminary report
    was submitted by the ADC Gurgaon to the effect that the demolition
    was unlawful.
28. CWP No.6425 of 2017 was filed by the first respondent before the
    High Court seeking quashing of second show-cause notice dated
    12.03.2007. The appellant herein was arraigned as respondent no.4
    in the said writ petition. In response to the said writ petition, the ADC
    Gurgaon submitted modified and amended report specifically holding
    that the demolition was as per law. Another restoration order was
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     passed on 21.08.2007 due to continued unauthorized construction
     by the respondent. However, later on, accepting the report of the
     Local Commissioner, the High Court vacated the stay granted to the
     first respondent, while observing that the ADC Report had been filed
     by the Government and the first respondent herein had threatened
     the Local Commissioner and deserves no relief.
29. That, it is only after lapse of three years from the date of demolition,
    first respondent herein filed a Criminal Complaint No.1383 of 2010
    under Sections 34, 148, 149, 166, 323, 384, 427, 440, 452 and 506
    IPC in the Court of Additional CJM, Gurgaon against 13 accused. The
    JMFC discharged all other accused except the appellant and accused
    nos.2 and 4 in Complaint No.1383 of 2010 and the summoning
    order was passed against the appellant and accused nos.2 and 4,
    namely, Senior Town Planner and Junior Engineer, Town & Country
    Planning (E).
30. It is in the aforesaid circumstances that the appellant filed the petition
    under Section 482 CrPC before the High Court seeking for quashing
    of the summoning order dated 20.11.2014, in which initially a stay
    was granted and thereafter the said CRM-M was dismissed as not
    maintainable.
31. We have perused the impugned order of the High Court in light of
    the aforesaid facts and submissions and the judicial dicta on the
    position of law applicable in the instant case.
32. We find that the facts of the present case would clearly indicate that
    the appellant herein who is accused of carrying out the demolition
    was doing so within the scope and ambit of her authority. We find
    that this is not a case where the appellant herein carried out the
    demolition dehors any legal backing or basis; neither was the
    said act of carrying out of the demolition outside the scope of her
    authority as the District Town Planner in the Enforcement Division.
    The appellant was carrying out the orders of the superior officers.
    There is a correlation between the act of demolition and the
    discharge of official duty. The demolition was carried out during the
    course of performance of appellant’s official duties. The fact that an
    application was filed seeking regularisation of the construction put
    up by the first respondent would indicate that even according to the
    first respondent, there was a digression and other irregularities in
    the construction put up which required regularisation. However, the
[2024] 11 S.C.R.                                                     1627

                 Gurmeet Kaur v. Devender Gupta & Another


     contention of learned counsel for the first respondent is that when
     such an application was pending, the appellant had no authority to
     demolish the construction. We do not think that such an argument
     would impress us for the reason that the mere pendency of the
     application seeking regularisation before another department would
     have been an impediment for carrying out the demolition inasmuch
     as there was sufficient basis for doing so and was done under the
     orders of the superior authority and not independently as such. The
     fact that an application for regularization of the construction put
     up was filed implied that there was a deficiency/irregularity in the
     construction put up by the respondent No.1 herein. The impugned
     demolition cannot also be termed as an “excess”.
33. In the circumstances, we observe that the first respondent herein
    ought to have sought sanction for prosecution under Section 197 of
    the CrPC in the instant case. The same, not having been done vitiated
    the initiation of the criminal proceeding against the appellant herein.
    Consequently, the summoning order and the consequent steps taken
    by the Trial Court pursuant to the said summoning order are liable
    to be quashed and are thus quashed. Insofar as the very initiation
    of the complaint is concerned, we observe that since there was no
    prior order of sanction passed under Section 197 of the CrPC, the
    initiation of the complaint itself, is non est.
     However, we reserve liberty to the first respondent herein to take
     steps in accordance with law and seek an order of sanction.
     The appeals are allowed and disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

     Result of the case: Appeals allowed.



     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain