Holding

A court may not intervene in the management of a temple governed by a specific statutory scheme unless the State fails to perform its statutory duties; the High Court’s appointment of a Commissioner and its directions exceeded its jurisdiction.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined a petition that arose from a letter alleging mismanagement, corruption and maladministration in the Guruvayur Temple, which the Kerala High Court had treated as a public‑interest litigation (PIL) and responded by appointing a Commissioner to conduct a wide‑ranging enquiry. The Court held that the Guruvayur Devasom Act, 1978 is a self‑contained code governing temple administration and that the State, not the courts, is the primary forum for addressing grievances unless the State fails to perform its statutory duties. It observed that the High Court had overstepped its jurisdiction by appointing a Commissioner, seizing records and directing the administration of the temple, actions that were more akin to the powers under the Commission of Enquiry Act and the Kerala Public Men’s Corruption Act, which are to be exercised by the State. The Court emphasized the need for judicial restraint in PILs, especially where the matter is covered by a specific statute and involves religious rites protected under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. Consequently, the Court expunged the adverse observations against the Managing Committee, directed the State to implement the High Court’s suggestions already acted upon, and left pending matters to be dealt with by the State within three months. The appeals were disposed of without any order as to costs.

Issues considered

Whether a letter alleging irregularities in the management of a temple can be treated as a public‑interest litigation under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution.
Whether the Kerala High Court had jurisdiction to appoint a Commissioner and direct the administration of the Guruvayur Temple despite the existence of the Guruvayur Devasom Act, 1978.
Whether the Court may intervene in matters governed by a specific statutory scheme unless the State fails to perform its statutory duties.
Whether the High Court’s directions infringed the fundamental rights of devotees under Articles 25 and 26.
Whether the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness were observed in the enquiry process.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Commission of Enquiry Act, 1952s. 3, s. 4, s. 5, s. 5A, s. 5B, s. 8B, s. 8C
Constitution of Indias. Article 226, s. Article 25, s. Article 26, s. Article 32

Subjects

public interest litigationtemple managementGuruvayur Devasom ActjurisdictionmandamusArticles 25 and 26statutory interpretationadministrative lawreligious institutionsjudicial restraint

Judgment

GURUVA YUR DEV ASWOM MANAGING COMMITTEE AND ANR. A
v.
C.K. RAJAN AND ORS.

AUGUST 14, 2003

[V.N. KHARE, CJ., S.B. SINHA AND G.P. MATHUR, JJ.] B

I
Guruvayoor Devasom Act, 1978, Sections 6, 17, 18, 23 to 26, 36, 38:

Sree Krishna Temple-Management of-Letter received by High Court
Judge containing complaint of serious irregularities in a temple-High Court C
treating the said letter as Public interest litigation petition-Correctness of-
Held: Not correct-When statute governs the field and State takes over the
management ordinarily court would not step in-Court to step in only when
State fails to perform its duty-High Court erred in appointing Commissioner
and taking recourse to the remedies provided for in other statutes-Recourse D
to the other statute may be resorted to when the State finds that its powers
under the Act governing the field are inadequate-However suggestions of
High Court which are already acted upon would not be reopened-Commission
of Enquiry Act-Kerela Public Men's Corruption (Investigation and Inquiries)
Act, 1987-Constitution of India, 1950--Articles 25, 26, 32, 226.
E
Public Interest Litigation-Maintainability and scope of-Discussed

One 'R' addressed a letter dated 3.2.1993 to one of the Judges of
the High Court of Kerala stating serious irregularities, corrupt practices,
maladministration and mismanagement prevailing in the Sree Krishna
temple. He was called by the High Court and his statement was recorded F

-
on 11.2.1993. The said letter was treated as an original petition, under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The High Court in its order dated
12.2.1993 highlighted 23 aspects of the matter which had been brought
to its notice and appointed a District Judge as the Commissioner to make
a general enquiry and in particular make a study on the various aspects G
highlighted in the said complaint. The Commissioner pursuant to the order
of the High Court seized all the records of the temple, examined 85
witnesses and submitted as many as 15 interim reports. An SLP was filed
against the order dated 12.2.1993 wherein certain observations were made.

619 H
620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Another SLP was filed which was dismissed on 10.5.93. Pursuant to
or in furtherance of the observations.made by this Court, an application
was filed for determining the maintainability of the matter as a
preliminary issue.

'B Commissioner filed his final report on 25.9.93. High Court gave its
judgement on 10.1.94 lamenting that the administration of temple has sunk
to low levels, and this litigation would give a turning point for the
improvement~and better .administration of the Devaswom. Aggrieved
Managing Committee filed the present appeal.

C :Disposing of-the.appeal, the Court

HELD : 1.1. The people. of India. have turned to courts more and
more for justice whenever there had been a legitimate grievance against
the State's statutory authorities and other public organizations. People
come to courts as the final .resort, to .protect their rights and to secure
D probity in public life. Public interest litigation has come to stay and its
necessity cannot be overemphasized. But with the passage of time, the
process was sometimes abused. Proceedings were initiated in the name of
public interest litigation for ventilating private .disputes •. Some petitions
were publicity oriented. A balance was, therefore, required to.be struck. ·'
[641-B,C, E, F)
E
Mumbai Kamgar Sabha, Bombay v. Mis Abdulbhai Faizullabhai and
Ors., (1976) 3 SCR 591 and Kapila Hingorani v. State of Bihar, JT (2003)
5 SC I, relied on.

1.2. The Cour.t in exercise of powers under Article 32 and Article
F 226 of the Constituti~n of India can entertain a petition filed. by any
interested person in the welfare of the people who is in. a disadvantaged
position and thus, not in a position to knock the doors of the Court. The
Court is constitutionally bound to protect the fundamental rights of such
disadvantaged people so as to direct the State to fulfill its constitutional
G promises. (641~H; 642-A]

S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, (1981) Supp. SCC 87; People's Union
for Deniocratic Rights and Ors. v. Union ofIndia, [19821 2 SCC 494; Bandhua
' Mukti Morcha v. Union of India and Ors., (1984) 3 SCC 161·and Janata Dal
v. H.S. Chowdhary and Ors., f 19921 4 SCC 305, relied on.
H
GURUVA YUR DEVASWOM MANAGING COMMITTEE v. C.K. RAJAN 621

1.3. Issues of public importance, enforcement of fundamental rights A
of large number of public vis-a-vis the constitutional duties and functions
of the State, if raised, the Court treats a letter or a telegram as a public
interest litigation upon relaxing procedural laws as also the law relating
to pleadings. (642-C)

Charles Sabra} v. Supdt. Central Jail, Tihar, New Delhi, (1978) 4 SCC B
104 and Hussainara Khatoon and Ors. v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar
(1980) 1 sec 81, relied on.

1.4. Whenever inju!itice is meted out to a large number of people,
the Court will not hesitate to step in. Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution C
o' India as well as the International Conventions on Human Rights provide
for reasonable and fair trial. (642-D)

Mrs. Mankeka Sanjay Gandhi and Anr. v. Miss Rani Jethmalani, AIR
(1979) SC 468 and Dwarka Prasad Agarwal (D) By Lrs. and Anr. v. B.D.
Agarwal and Ors., (2003) 5 SCALE 138, relied on. D
1.5. The common rule of locus standi is relaxed so as to enable the
Court to look into the grievances complaine<t on behalf of the poor,
depraved, illiterate and the disabled who cannot vindicate the legal wrong
or legal injury caused to them for any violation of any constitutional or
legal right. (643-B) E
·Fertilizer Corporation Kamagar Union v. Union of India, AIR (1981)
SC 344; Dr. D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, (1987) 1 SCC 378 and Balco
Employees' Union (Regd.) v. Union of India and Ors., (2002) 2 SCC 333,
relied on.
F
1.6. When the Court is prima facie satisfied about variation of any
constitutional right of a group of people belonging to the disadvantaged
category, it may not allow the State or the Government from raising the
question as to the maintainability of the petition. [643-C)

Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India and Ors., [198413 SCC 161, G
relied on.

1.7. Although procedural laws apply on PIL cases but the question
as to whether the principles of res judicata to principles analogous thereto
would apply depend on the nature of the petition as also facts and
H
622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A circumstances of the case'. (643-D(
Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of UP., (19891 Supp.
1 SCC 504 and Forward Construction Co. and Ors. v. Prabhat Manda!
(Regd), Andheri and Ors., (1986( 1 SCC 100, relied on.

B 1.8. The dispute between two warring groups purely in the realm of
private law would not be allowed to be agitated as a .public interest
litigation. However, in an appropriate case, although the petitioner might
have moved a Court in his private interest and for redressal of the personal
grievances, the Court in furtherance of the public interest may treat it
C necessary to enquire into the state of affairs of the subject of litigation in
the interest of justice. [643-E, Fl

Ramsharan Autyanuprasi and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., [1989)
Supp. l SCC 251 and Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil v. Dr. Mahesh Madhav
Gosavi and Ors., (1987) 1 SCC 227, relied on.
D
1.9. The Court in special situations may appoint Commission, or
other bodies for the purpose of investigating into the allegations and
finding out facts. It may also direct management of a public institution
taken over by such committee. [643-G)

E Bandhua Mukti Morcha, Rakesh Chandra Narayan v. State of Bihar,
[1989) Supp 1 SCC 644 and A.P. Pollution Control Board v. M V. Nayudu,
[1999) 2 sec 718, relied on.

Sachidanand Pandey and Anr. v. State of West Bengal and Ors., [19871
2 SCC 295; Janata Dal v. HS. Chowdhary and Ors., (1992) 4 SCC 305 and
F Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India and Ors., (2000) 10 SCC 664
referred to.

1.10. The Court would ordinarily not step out of the known areas of
Judicial review. The High Courts although may pass an order for doing
complete justice to the parties, it does not have a power akin to Article
G 142 of the Constitution of India. (645-El

1.11. Ordinarily the High Court should not entertain a writ petition
by way of Public Inter~st litigation questicning constitutionality or validity
of a Statute or a Statutory Rule. (645-FI

H Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409,
GURUVA YUR DEVASWOM MANAGING COMMITTEE t'. C.K. RAJAN 623

relied on. A
MC. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (20001 6 SCC 213, referred to.

2.1. The case at hand does not fall in any of the aforementioned
categories, where a PIL could be entertained. The right of a person
belonging to a particular religious denomination may sometimes fall foul . B
of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India. Only when the
fundamental right of a person is infringed by the State, an action in
relation thereto may be justified. Any tight other than the fundamental
rights contained in Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India may
either flow from a statute or from the customary laws. Indisputably a
devotee wili have a cause of action to initiate an action before the High C
Court when his right under statutory law is violated. He may also have a
cause of action by reason of action or inaction on the part of the State or
a statutory authority. An appropriate order is required to be passed or a
direction is required to be issued by the High Court. In some case, a person
may fell aggrieved in his individual capacity, but the public at large may D
not. It is trite, where a segment of public is not interested in the cause,
public interest litigation would not ordinarily be entertained. It is possible
to contend that the Hindus in general and the devotees visiting the temple
in particular are interested in proper management of the temple at the
hands of the statutory functionaries. The.Guruvayoor Devasom Act, 1978
is a self-contained Code. Duties and functions are prescribed in the Act E
and the rules framed thereunder. Forums have been created thereunder
for ventilation of the grievances of the affected persons. Ordinarily,
therefore, such forums should be moved at the first instance. The State
should be asked to look into the grievances of the aggrieved devotees, both
as parens partiae as also in discharge of its statutory duties. [648-B, C-H] p

State of WB. and Ors. v. Nuruddin Mallick and Ors., [1998] 8 SCC
143, referred to.

2.2. The doors of the courts must be kept open but the Court cannot
shut its eyes to the ground realities while entertaining a public interest G
litigation. Exercise of self-restraint, thus, should be adhered to, subject of
course to, just exceptions. The High Court in this case adopted an unusual
procedure. It directed seizure of the records only on the premise that the
writ petitioner contended that the allegations can be verified with reference
to the records. (651-G-H; 652-A[
H
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A 2.3. The Court should be circumspect in entertaining such public
interest litigation for another reason. There may be dispute amongst the
devotees as to what practices should be followed by the temple authorities.
There may be dispute as regard the rites and rituals to be performed in
the temple or omission thereof. Any decision .in favour of one sector· of
B the people may hurt the sentiments of the other. The Court normally, thus,
at the first instance would not enter into such disputed arena, particularly,
when by reason thereof the fundamental right of a group of devotees under
Articles 25 and 26 may be infringed. [650-B)

3.1. High Court without cogent and sufficient reason allowed
C Administr~tor to continue in office although his term was over and he was
posted elsewhere. The High Court took over the power of appointment of
the Commissioner bypassing the procedure set out in the Act by calling
upon the Government to furnish the names of 5 IAS Officers to the Court
so that it could exercise the power of appointment of the Commissioner.
[649-G-H; 650-A)
D
3.2. Administration of temple by entertaining complaints does not
lead to a happy state of affairs. Roving enquiry is not contemplated.
Principles of natural justice and fair play ought fo be followed even in
the pro bono public proceedings. The Court undoubtedly would be parens
partiae in relation to idols, but when the statute governs the field and the
E State takes over the management, ordinarily the Courts would not step
in. The court steps in by Mandamus when the State fails to perform its
duty. It shall also step in when the discretion is exercised but the same
has not been done legally and validly. [65-D-E; 651-E)

F Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and
Ors., f 19981 8 SCC 1, relied on.

3.3. The Court may appoint a Commissioner or amicus for finding
out the truth but when it cannot be found out otherwise. It should have
at the outset called upon the State as also the Managing Committee to
G express their view points. If the allegations are verifiable 09 records, the
courts could have itself examined the same. Before doing so, it must give
an opportunity to the parties to explain things. Only because the Court
arrives a prima facie finding that "all is not well", the same would not
necessarily mean that it must appoint a Commissioner and thereby
purporting to exercise jurisdiction akin to the provisions of the
H Commission of Enquiry Act, 1952 or Kerala Public Men's Corruption
GURUVAYUR DEVASWOM MANAGING COMMITTEE v. CK. RAJAN 625

(Investigations and Inquiries) Act, 1987. The power under the said statute A
is to be exercised by the State if an exigency of situaHon arises therefor.
(652-B, C-DJ

Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan, [196311 SCR
561 and Pannalal Pitti v. State of A.P., (1966] 2 SCC 498, relied on.
B
4. When the administration of the temple is within its control and it
exercises the said power in terms of a Statute, the State, it is expected,
normally would itself probe into the alleged irregularities. If the State
through its machinery as provided for in one Act can arrive at the requisite
finding of fact for the purpose of remedying the defects, it may not find it C
necessary to take recourse to the remedies provided for in another statute.
It is trite that recourse to a provision to another statute may be resorted
to when the State finds that its powers under the Act governing the field
is inadequate. The High Courts and the Supreme Court would not
ordinarily issue a writ of mandamus directing the State to carry out its
statutory functions in a particular manner. Normally, the Courts would D
ask the State to perform its statutory functions, if necessary within a time
frame and undoubtedly as and when an order is passed by the State in
exercise of its power under the Statute, it will examine the correctness or
legality thereof by way of judicial review. (653-F-G; 654-A)

Sri Adi Visheshwara Kashi Vishwanath Temple v. State of UP., (1997) E
4 SCC 606 at 633 and Sri Kanyaka Satram Committee v. Commissioner,
H.R.C. and Ors., (1997) 5 SCC 303 at 304, relied on.

State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak, (1983) 1 SCR 8 and
Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. and Ors., (2003) 2 SCC
111, referred to. F
5. The State admittedly implemented many of the suggestions of the
High Court. They would not be reopened. Some suggestions of the High
Court are pending consideration at the hands of the State. They may be
considered. The State shall, however, as regard the directions of the High G
Court which according to it cannot be complied with, pass appropriate
orders recording sufficient and cogent reasons therefor as expeditiously
as possible and not beyond a period of three months from the date of
communication of this order. If any proceeding is initiated in relation
thereto, the High Court may deal therewith in accordance with law. The
administration of the temple, it is stated, has been taken over by the State H
626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A and the other statutory functionaries. They shall, having regard to the fact
that special treatment has been accorded to the temple by .the State
Legislature, carry out its activities in true letter and spirit thereof. The
State and the statutory functionaries would be well advised to give full
credence to the tenets and practices subject of course to the provisions of
B the statute. The State should furthermore make all endeavocrs to see that
the sentiments of the devotees are respected. The adverse remarks made
in the impugned judgment against the appellant in C.A. No. 2151/1994
shall stand expunged. [664-E-H]

Sri Sri Sri Lakshmana Yatendrule and Ors. v. State of A.P. and Ors.,
C (1996) 8 SCC 705; Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union ofIndia and Or~., [1984)
2 SCR 67; State of Kera/a and Anr. v. N.M Thomas and Ors., [1976) 1 SCR
906; Charan Lal Sahu etc. etc. v. Union of India, (1989) Supp. 2 SCR 597;
Yogendra Nath Naskar v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta, [1969) 1
SCC 555 and Manohar Ganesh Tambekar v. Lakhmiram Govindram, ILR
(1888) ~2 Born 247, referred to.
D
Woolwich Building Socity v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (No.2),
[1992) 3 ALL LR 737 and Johnson v. Unisys Ltd, (2001) ALL ER, 801,
referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2148of1994.
E
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.1.94 of the Kerala High Court
in O.P. No. 2071 of 1993.
WITH
C.A. Nos. 2149, 2150 and 2151 of 1994.
F
K.K. Venugopal, V.R. Reddy, E.M.S. Anam, Fazlin Anam, Krishnan
Venugopal, M.K.D. Namboodari, K.R. Sasiprabhu, John Mathew, K.R.
Nambiar, M.P. Vinod (NP), A.Subba Rao, A.D. Sikri, A.Raghunath, Roy
Abraham,· Dr. Seema Jain, M.M. Kashyap, Sudarsh Menon (NP), N.
Sudhakaran (NP), C.N. Sreekumar (NP), Ms. Nalini Poduval (NP) and
G Aruneshwar Gupta (NP) for the Appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S.B. SINHA, J. Scope and ambit of a Public Interest Litigation .in the
"matter of management of a temple governed by the provisions of a statutory
H enactment is the primal question involved in· these appeals.
GURUVA YUR DEVASWOM MANAGING COMMITTEE v. C.K. RAJAN [SINHA, J.] 627
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS : A
Sree Krishna Temple, Guruvayur draws millions of people all over the
country. This ancient temple of unique importance is worshipped and held in
great reverence by lakhs of devotees. The temple owns extensive movable
and immovable properties and endowments. It has its own heritages and
traditions. B
The State of Kerala having regard to importance of the said temple
with a view to make suitable provision for the proper administration of the
Guruvayoor Devaswom enacted the Guruvayoor Devaswom Act, 1978 (Act
14of1978) (for short 'the Aci'). The management of the temple is carried C
out in terms of the provisions of the said Act.

RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTE :

Some of the relevant provisions of the said Act inter a/ia are:

"6. Dissolution and supersession of Committee: ·D
(1) If, in the opinion of the Government, the Committee is not
competent to perform or makes default in performing the duties
imposed on it under this Act or abuses or exceeds its powers; the
Government may after such inquiry as may be necessary, by
notification in the Gazette, supersede the Committee for such E
period, not exceeding six months, as the Government may deem
fit.

(2) Before issuing a notification under sub-section (1) the Goverr-ment
shall communicate to the Committee the grounds on which they
propose to do so, fix a reasonable time for the Committee to F
show cause against the proposal and consider its explanations
and objections, if any.

(3) Any member of the Committee may, within a period of one
month from the date of publication of the notification under sub-
section (1), institute a suit in the court to set aside the notification. a
(4) Where the Committee is superseded under this section the
Commissioner shall exercise the powers and perform the functions
of the Committee until the expiry of the period of supersession.

Provided that the period during which the Committee remains H
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A superseded shall not have the effect of extending the maximum term
of office of a member nominated under clause (d) or clause (e) of
sub-section (l) of section 4 beyond a period of two years.

17. Powers and duties of Administrator :

(l) The Administrator shall be the secretary to the Committee and
B its chief executive officer and shall, subject to the control of the
Committee, have powers to carry out its decisions in accordance
with the provisions of this Act.

(2) The Administrator shall arrange for the proper collection of
offerings made in the Temple.
c
(3) The Administrator shall have power to incur expenditure not
exceeding five thousand rupees to meet unforeseen contingencies
during the interval between two meetings of the Committee.

18. Establishment schedule :
D (1) The Administrator may, as soon as may be after the
commencement of this Act, prepare and submit to the Committee
a schedule setting forth the duties, designations and grades of the
officers and employees who may in his opinion constitute the
establishment of the Temple and embodying his proposals with
E regard to the salaries and allowances payable to them.
(2) The Committee shall forward the schedule submitted to it under
sub-section (1) with its recom~endations thereon to the
Commissioner for approval.
(3) The Commissioner shall, after considering the recommendations
F of the Committee, approve such schedule either without
modification or with such modifications as he deems necessary,
and there upon such schedule as approved by the Commissioner
shall come into force.
(4) No change shall be effected in the schedule except with the
G approval of the Commissioner.

(5) Subject to such exceptions as the Committee may by general or
special order direct, the officers. and employees of the Devaswom
in the service of the Devaswom iipmediately before the
commencement of this Act shall continue as such, and the
H conditions of their servke. shall be such as may be prescribed by
GURUVA YUR DEVASWOM MANAGING COMMITTEE v. C.K. RAJAN [SINHA, J.] 629

regulations made under this Act. A
(6) A person who does not profess the Hindu Religion or believe ill:
Temple worship shall be disqualified for being appointed as, or
for being, an officer or employee of the Devi;tswom.

23. Accounts and Audit :
B
(l) The Committee shall keep regular accounts of all receipts and
disbursements.
(2) The accounts of the Devaswom shall be subject to concurrent
audit, that is to say, the audit shall take place as and when
expenditure is incurred. c
(3) The audit shall be made by auditors appointed in the prescribed
manner, who shall be deemed to be public servants within the
meaning of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code (Central Act 45
of 1860).

24. Authority to whom audit report is to be submitted: D

After completing_ the audit for any year or shorter period or for any
transactions as he deems fit, the auditor shall send a report to the
Commissioner.

33. Power of Government to call for records and pass orders : E
(1) The Government may call for and examine the record of the
Commissioner or of the Committee in respect of any proceeding,
not being a proceeding in respect of which a suit or application
to the court is provided by this Act, to satisfy themselves that the
provisions of this Act have not been violated or the interests of F
the Devaswom have been safeguarded and if, in any case, it
appears to the Government that any decision or order passed in
such proceeding has violated the provisions of this Act or is not
in the interest of the Devaswom, they may modify, annual or
reverse such decision or order or remit such decision or order for G
reconsideration :

Provided that the Government shall not pass any order prejudicial to
any party unless he has had a reasonable opportunity of making his
representations.

(2) The Government may stay the execution of any such decision H
630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A or order pending the exercise of their powers under sub-
section (I) in respect thereof.

36. Removal of difficulties :

If.any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of this Act,
B the Government may, as occasion may require, by order do anything
not inconsistent with this Act or the rules made thereunder, which
appears to them necessary for the purpose of removing the difficulty.

38. Rules:

(I) The Government may, by notification in the Gazette, make rules
c to carry out the purposes of this Act. ·
(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the
foregoing power, such rules may provide for -

(a) the publication of the administration report under section
D 13;

(b) the CU$tody of the records and properties of the Devaswom;

(c) the payment of contributions towards the leave allowances,
I-
pension and provident fund of the Administrator;

E (d) any other matter which is required to be, or may be,
prescribed under this Act.

. (3) Every rule made under this Act shall be laid as soon as may
be after it is made before the Legislative Assembly while it
is in session for a total period of fourteen days which may
F be comprised in one session or in two successive sessions,
and if, before the expiry of the session in which it is so laid
or the session immediately following, the Legislative
Assembly makes any modification in the rule or decides that
the rule should not be made, the rule shall thereafter have
effect only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the
G case may be so however that any such modification or
annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of
anything previously done under that rule."

The State of Kerala in exercise of its power conferreq under Section
H 38 of the Act made rules known as The Guruvayoor Devaswom Rules, 1980
GURUVAYUR UEVASWOM MANAGING COMMITTEE v. C.K. RAJAN [SINHA, J.] 631

(for short 'the Rules'). Rule 10 of the Rules provides for publication of A
Administration Report and is in the following terms :

"10. Committee to submit Administration Report: The Committee
J shall prepare and submit to the Commissioner, a report on the
administration of the affairs of the Devaswom relating to each calendar
year within three months of the completion of the year. B
(2) The Commissioner shall forward such report with his comments
to Government within 30 days l)f its receipt by him.
(3) The Administration report shall among other things contain details
about, (i) the working of the Act, (ii) the income and expenditure,
(iii) the amenities provided to the worshippers, (iv) the works
c
undertaken, (v) the festivals conducted, (vi) special features or
incidents during the year, (vii) financial position, (viii) working
of subordinate temples and other institutions under the
management of the Devaswom and (ix) such other matters of
public interest. D
(4) The report shall be published on the notice board of the
Devaswom and in the Kerala Gazette.
(5) Abstract of the report shall be published at least in one Malayalam
daily having wide circulation in the area."
E
The statutory provisions contained in the said Act and the rules framed
thereunder are of wide amplitude as would appear from the following :

(a) Section SC read with section 5(3)(c) of the Act read with section
5(4) pennits the State Government to initiate proceedings against, and remove,
any member of the Managing Committee if they are satisfied that he has been F
guilty of corruption or misconduct in the administration of the temple;

(b) Section 6 pennits the State Government to dissolve and supersede
the Managing Committee as a whole for incompetence or default in perfonning
its duties imposed on it under Section I 0 of the Act after giving it an

- opportunity to show cause;
G

(c) Section 13 read with rule 10 pennits the monitoring of the Managing
Committees functioning by requiring it to submit and public a report on the
administration of the affairs of the temple;
H
632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A (d) Section 23 read with rule 17 provides for the Committee keeping
regular accounts of receipts and disbursements and concurrence audit of those
accounts, i.e., an audit that takes as and when an expenditure is incurred, by
auditors appointed in the prescribed manner;

(e) Section 25 provides that the auditor shall specify in its report all
B cases of irregular, illegal or improper expenditure or failure to recover money
or rather properties to the Devaswom or loss or waste of money or other
property thereof, caused by neglect or misconduct; ··-
(t) Section 26(2) permits the Commissioner appointed under Section
C 2(b) of the Act to pass an order of surcharge against the Managing Committee
or any officer or employee if he is satisfied that they are guilty of
misappropriation or willful waste or of gross neglect resulting in loss to the
temple after giving them an opportunity to show cause why an order of
surcharge should not be passed; and

D (g) Under Section 33, the State Government in tum is empowered to
call for and modify, annul or reverse decision of the Commissioner or of the
Managing Committee after calling for and examining the record if the
government is satisfied that the decision has violated the provisions of the
Act or is not in the interest of the temple after giving a reasonable opportunity
to any party that rriay be prejudiced by such order.
E
GENESIS OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATlON:

One Shri C.K. Rajan addressed a letter dated 3.2.1993 to one of the
Hon'ble Judges of the High Court of Kerala and thereby bringing to his
notiCe purported serious irregularities, corrupt practices, mal-administration
F and mismanagement prevailing in the temple. He was called by the High
Court and its Registrar recorded his statement on 11.2.1993. The said letter
was treated as an original petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. The High Court in its order dated 12.2.1993 highlighted 23 aspects of
the matter which had been brought to its notice and appointed one Shri S.
G Krishnan Unni; District Judge Officiating as the Director of Training, High
Court of Kerala as the Commissioner to make a general enquiry and in
particular make a study on the various aspects highlighted in the said complaint.
The Commissioner pursuant to the order of the High Court seized all the
records of the temple, examined 85 witnesses and submitted as many as 15
interim reports on 15.2.1993, 10.3.1993, 30.3.1993, 3.4.1993, 16.4.1993,
H
GURUVA YUR DEVASWOM MANAGING COMMITTEE v. C.K. RAJAN [SINHA, J.] 633

12.5.1993, 9.6.1993, 26.6.1993, 20.7.1993, 21.7.1993, 4.8.1993, ll.8.1993, A
13.8.1993, 2.9.1993, 2.9.1993. It submitted its final report on 25.9.1993.

An order passed by the High Court on 12.2.1993 was the subject matter
/ of a Special· Leave Petition before this Court being SLP (Civil) .. ./93 CC
20040 wherein this Court suggested in its order dated 26.3.1993 the following
guidelines for consideration of the Court : B
"(i) It is not disputed that the management of the Guruvayur temple
is governed by the Guruvayur Devaswom Act, 1978. There may
be other State legislations governing the funr.tioning of religious
institution in the State. The High Court shall take into
consideration the relevant provisions of these enactments. C
(ii) The Guruvayur Devaswom Managing Committee and the State
of Kerala are necessary parties in this public interest litigation.
The High Court shall take into consideration the objections
including of preliminary nature raised/ to be raised by these
parties. D
(iii) The appointment, tenure of office and other conditions of service
of the Administrator and other officers connected with the
Guruvayur, as are provided by law shall be kept in view while
passing any orders concerning these officers.
The High Court is requested to conclude the proceedings E
expeditiously and if possible, within six months from today."

Another Special Leave Petition was filed praying for an order restraining
the Enquiry Commissioner from submitting his final report being SLP (Civil)
NO. 3231/93 but the same was dismissed vide this Court's order dated
10.5.1993 observing : F
"Learned counsel for the petitioner urged and vehemently pleaded for
restraining the Enquiry Commissioner from submitting his final report
as in that case the High Court may not decide the preliminary objection
raised on their behalf that there being a detailed procedure provided
in the Statute, the High Court should not have exercised its G
extraordinary jurisdiction. We do not find any justification for such
apprehension.

In the result, this petition fails and is dismissed."

Pursuant to or in furtherance of the observations made by this Court, H
634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A an application was filed for detennining the maintainability of the matter as
a preliminary issue. However, in the meantime, the Commissioner had
submitted l 0 interims reports, examined a number of persons and a large
number of persons were also impleaded as parties in the writ petition.

Mr. V.R. Reddy appearing for the State of Kerala allegedly conceded
B that the plea regarding want of jurisdiction raised did not merit consideration
at that stage and the same had become infructuous.

The. Bench noticed that the reports contained various observations and
recommendations as regard the interim reports. Some sta~ements were filed
in respect of some of the reports by some of the respondents only. Correctness
c or otherwise of various reports and suggestions made therein were, however,
not questioned.

The third respondent had filed the following statements to the following
interim reports :
D No. of the Date of the
interim reports statement.
3 5.4.1993
4 17.10.1993
6 17.10.1993
E
7 17.10.1993
8 17.10.1993
9 17.10.1993
IO 17.10.1993
F
11 17.10.1993
12 17.10.1993 ..
13 17.10.1993
14 18.9.1993
G 17.10.1993
15

The first respondent - State of Kerala had fiied the following statements
in relation to the following. interim reports :

"l. Statement filed by the Commissioner and Secretary (Finance)
H
GURUVAYUR DEVASWOM MANAGING COMMITTEE v. C.K. RAJAN [SINHA, J.] 635

dated 15.10.1993 A
2. Statement filed by the Government Pleader dated 2.12.1993

3. Preliminary objections dated 29.5.1993".

As noticed hereinbefore, the Commissioner filed his final report on
25.9.1993. B
The State of Kerala prayed for time for filing objections to the
Commissioner's final report and was granted time thrice but it ultimately
failed to respond thereto.

No affidavit by way of an objection to the said reports was filed by any C
party. During hearing of the matter, the Chainnan, the Guruvayur Devaswom
Managing Committee (for short 'the Committee'), and the State agreed with
many of the recommendations made by the Commissioner. Appellant herein
also substantially agreed with various recommendations of the Commissioner.

The Court specifically asked for objections to the recommendations of D
the Commissioner. The fifth respondent - M.P. Gopalakrishnan and the third
respondent - Chainnan of the Committee filed objections but at the argument
stage only a few of the matters stated in the statements were highlighted or
pressed.

Upon considerations of the various matters the High Court in its E
impugned judgment arrived at its findings on the recommendations of the
Commission, the summary whereof has been stated in para 64 thereof.

The High Court lamented :

"The temple and the idol of Guruvayur is the very Brahman itself, so F
easily obtained,Jwhich can, in the ordinary course, be obtained only
after undergoing all trials and tribulations. That is the greatness of
this Lord of Guruvayur (Sree Krishna), the temple sought by millions
all over and about which every Hindu holds a candle, but alas! Its
administration has sunk to low levels, to be ashamed of; we hope and G
pray that this litigation will give a turning point for the improvement
and better administration of the Devaswom." ·

SUBMISSIONS :

Mr. K.K. Venugopal and Mr. V.R. Reddy, the learned senior counsels H
636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A appearing on behalf of the appellant and the State of Kerala respectively, at
the outset invited our attention to the orders of this Court dated 26.3.1993
passed in SLP (C) No ... ./93 CC 20040, and orders dated 26.4.1993 as well
as l 0.5.1993 passed in SLP (C) No. 3231193 and submitted that keeping in
view of the fact that this Court was approached at least on three different
B occasions wherein the jurisdiction of the Court to initiate a public interest
litigation was questioned, the High Court committed a manifest error in not
deciding the same as a p1eliminary issue.

The learned counsels further drew our attention to the order passed in
CMP No. l 0669 of 1993 requesting the High Court to consider the
C maintainability as a preliminary issue. It was submitted that a wrong statement
has further been recorded in the said order to the effect that the Managing
Committee has unanimously resolved welcoming the enquiry and they would
not take steps assailing the same.

The High Court was further wrongly opined that the said CMP has
D become infructuous having regard to the fact that l 0 interim reports have
been submitted by the Enquiry Commissioner and the work of the
Commissioner was practically nearing completion.

Mr. Venugopal would urge that the High Court misdirected itself in not
only entertaining the letter of the Fifth Respondent as a public interest litigation
E but also by appointing a commissioner and directing seizure of all the
documents resulting in serious adverse publicity against the appellant·
committee, purported to be relying on or on the basis of the statement of
Respondent No. l that some of the allegations made by him would be borne
out from the records maintained by the temple.

F Drawing our attention to the provisions of Commission of Enquiry Act,
1952 and the Kerala Public Men's Corruption (Investigations and Inquiries)
Act, 1987 (Act 24 of 1988), the learned counsel would submit that for all
intent and purport the High Court exercised its jurisdiction in terms thereof
and, thus, assumed a jurisdiction which it did not have. A full-fledged enquiry
G akin to the provisions of the 1952 Act and Kerala Public Men's Corruption
(Investigations and Inquiries) Act, 1987 is unknown in a public interest
litigation and in this behalf our attention has been drawn to the appointment
of amicus as also the appointment of lawyers for the Commissioner.

The learned counsel, in particular, drew our attention to the order dated
H 17th February, 1993 passed in O.P. No. 2071 of 1993 and submitted that a
GURUVA YUR DEVASWOM MANAGING COMMITTEE v. C. K. RAJAN [SINHA, J.] 63 7
perusal thereof would show that '-e High Court even directed the Director of A
Public Relations for wide publication of these matters and invited complaints
and suggestions from the public in general.

By reason of the said order, the High Court also appointed M/s. Menon
& Menon, Chartered Accountants, Ernakulam as auditors. The Enquiry
Commissioner was given accommodation at the High Court as also at B
Guruvayur. The Registrar of the High Court was directed to depute appropriate
and necessary staff to the Enquiry Commissioner. Even a police officer was
appointed to assist the Enquiry Commissioner in the field work.

The High Court also, the learned counsel would submit, must be held
to have committed a manifest error in taking over the administration of the C
temple for all intent and purport; even by going to the extent of directing that
the Administrator would not be transferred.

Mr. Venugopal would urge that the said Act contains provisions for
effective management of the temple and the purported assumption of D
jurisdiction by the High Court must be held to be bad in law. Further contention
of the leamed counsel was that the Commissioner examined 85 witnesses but
their names and particulars, although asked for, were not supplied nor were
they allowed to be cross-examined. It was pointed out that the names of the
witnesses and the documents which were marked as Exhibits were indicated
only in the Final Report and despite the fact that no opportunity was given E
to the affected parties to cross-examine the witnesses, strictures were passed
against them relying on or on the basis of their unsworn testimony.

The learned counsel would urge that the High Court acted illegally and
without jurisdiction in passing the impugned directions purported to be acting
as a parens patriae inasmuch as the statutory acts governed the field. There F
is no reason, the learned counsel would contend, to by-pass the provisions of
the Act as also the Code of Civil Procedure.

The learned counsel would argue that a roving enquiry is not
contemplated in a public interest litigation. G
Mr. Venugopal would further submit that when the management of a
temple is governed by a statutory enactment wherein power has been conferred
upon the Government to look into the grievances and pass an appropriate
orders thereupon, the High Court must be held to have exceeded its jurisdiction
in issuing the impugned directions inasmuch as before embarking thereupon H
638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. ··

A it was obligatory on its part to ask the Government to remedy the defects. It
is not a case, the learned counsel would contend, where the complainant
belonged to a weaker section or was not in a position to take recourse of the
said Act or initiate a proceeding in terms of Section 92 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Mr. Venugopal would contend that indisputably the High Court
B as inherent powers but such inherent powers cannot be exercised in defiance
of law. Once such a power is exercised by an organ of the State, the same
would be against the rule of law.

Mr. Reddy appearing on behalf of the State of Kerala drew our attention
to. the affidavit filed by the State and submitted that the High Court
C misunderstood his submissions to the effect that he had not pressed the High
Court to decide the maintainability of the petitioner as a preliminary issue.
According to the teamed counsel, as by the time the order of this Court dated
12.2.1993 was communicated; IO interim reports had been submitted, a
submission was made only to the effect that the merit of those reports may
be directed to be considered by the State. The learned counsel would contend
D that the very fact that the parties agitated the question of jurisdiction second
time before this Court is a clear pointer to show that the question as regards
jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain such application was not given up.

Mr. Subba Rao, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent No. 5, on the other hand, would submit that there are precedents
E wherein enquiries were directed to be made through a Commission for finding
out the correctness or otherwise of the allegations made in a writ petition. It
was submitted that even provisions of the Commission of Enq!-liry Act was
resorted to for the purpose of enquiry as regard management of temples.
Reference in this connection has been made on Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji
p Maharaj v. The State of Rajasthan and Ors., (1964] I SCR 561 and Sri Sri
Sri Lakshmana Yatendrule and Ors. v. State of A.P. and Ors., (1996] 8 SCC
705.
.-
Mr. Subba Rao would argue that devotees who are mostly conservatives
would expect that the management of the temple is carried out strictly in
G terms of the heritage and traditi:>n of the temple and tenets and practices
relating to offering of puja and matters ancillary thereto and connected
therewith should scrupulously be followed. Any deviation or departure from
the established practices and tenets would hurt the sentiments of the devotees
and as such they would be entitled to bring the same to the notice of the High
H Court which is conferred with the jurisdiction to investigate into the matter
GURUVAYURDEVASWOM MANAGING COMMITTEE v. C.K. RAJAN [SINHA, J.] 639

not only in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution but A
also in tenns of various statutes as also under the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908. Referring to the decision of this Court in Bandhua Mukthi Morcha v.
Union of India and Ors., (1984] 2 SCR 67, Mr. Subba Rao would submit that
therein this Court has laid down the procedure for making enquiry into the
allegations or causing the same to be made for the purpose of gathering
necessary facts so as to grant appropriate reliefs to the needy and poor. Mr. B
Subba Rao would urge that the High Court has merely followed the procedure
laid down by this Court in Bandhua Mukti Morcha (supra) and, thus, the
question of giving an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses or their
particulars be disclosed does not arise. Only when a report is submitted, the
concerned parties were entitled to file affidavits thereagainst. But in this case, C.
even no such affidavit has been filed.

Mr. Subba Rao has drawn our pointed attention to the following orders:

(i) Order dated 25.8.1993 of the High Court in C.M.P. No. 10669
of 1993 filed by Guruvayur Devasom Managing Committee; D
(ii) Judgment dated I 0.1.1994
(iii) Order dated 25th August, 1993 in C.M.P. No. 10699/93 in O.P.
No. 2071 of 1993.

The learned counsel would submit, in view of the aforesaid it does not E
lie in the mouth of any of the learned counsels to contend that the High Court
had no jurisdiction to initiate the proceedings. Reliance in this connection has
also been placed on State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak and
Anr., (1983] 1 SCR 8.

Mr. Subba Rao would further urge that only because a floodgate of F
litigation would be opened if a public interest litigation is entertained, the
same itself cannot be a ground for holding that public interest litigation
should be entertained. Our attention in this connection has been drawn on
Woolwich Building Society v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, (No. 2) (1992)
3 All ER 737 and Johnson v. Unisys Ltd, (2001) 2 All ER 801.
G
Mr. Subba Rao would urge that the High Court is a parens patriae in
relation to the devotees is neither in doubt nor in dispute. Reliance in this
behalf has been placed on State of Kera/a and Anr. v. N. M Thomas and Ors.,
[I 976] 1 SCR 906 at 951 and Charan Lal Sahu etc. etc. v. Union of India
and Ors., (1989] Supp. 2 SCR 597 at 638. H
640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Power of the High Court and this Court under Articles 226 and 32 of
the Constitution of India remain untrammeled despite existence of statutory
provisions controlling the power of executive and, thus, it was argued that ·
the High Court and this Court cannot be stripped of its constitutional powers
to look into the omissions and commissions on the part of the administrators
B of the temple. A proceeding initiated as a public interest litigation would lie
before the High Court or this Court, according to Mr. Subba Rao, when it is
found that despite existence of statutory provisions the State or the other
statutory functionaries were not taking recourse to the provisions thereof for
remedying the grievances of the devotees. In any event, as a Hindu temple
is a juristic person the very fact that Section 92'ofthe Code of Civil Procedure
C seeks to protect the same, for the self-same purpose Articles 226 ·and 32
could also be taken recourse to. Our attention in this behalf has been drawn
on Yogendra Nath Naskar v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Calcutta, (1969]
l SCC 555 and Manohar Ganesh Tambekar v. Lakhmiram Govindram, ILR
(1888) 12 Born 247.

D SCOPE OF PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION :
The Courts exercising their power of judicial review found to its dismay
that the poorest' of the poor, depraved, the illiterate, the urban and rural
unorganized labour sector, women, children, handicapped by 'ignorance,
indigence and illiteracy' and other down trodden have either no access to
E justice or had been denied justice. A new branch of proceedings known as
'Social Interest Litigation' or 'Public lriterest Litigation' was evolved with a
view to render complete justice to the aforementioned classes of persons. It
expanded its wings in course of time. The Courts in pro bono publico granted
relief to the inmates of the prisons, provided legal aid, directed speedy trial,
F maintenance of human dignity and covered several other areas. Representative
actions; pro bono publico and test litigations were entertained in keeping
with the current accent on justice to the common mart and a necessary
disincentive to those who wish to by pass the real issues on the merits by
suspect reliance on peripheral procedural shortcomings. (See Mumbai Kamgar
Sabha, Bombay v. Mis. Abdulbhai Faizul/abhai and Ors., (1976] 3 SCR
G 591).

The Court in pro bono publico proceedings intervened when there had
been callous neglect as a policy of State, a lack of probity in public life,
abuse of power in control and destruction of environment. It also protected
H the inmates of persons and homes. It sought to restrain exploitation of labour

~.
GURUVA YUR DEVASWOM MANAGING COMMITTEE v. C.K. RAJAN [SINHA, J.] 641

practices. A
The court expanded the meaning of life and liberty as envisaged in
Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It jealously enforced Article 23 of the
Constitution. Statutes were interpreted with human rights angle in view.
Statutes were interpreted in the light of international treatises, protocols and
conventions. Justice was made available having regard to the concept of B
human right even in cases where the State was not otherwise apparently
liable. (See Kapila Hingorani v. State of Bihar, reported in JT (2003) 5 SC
1)

The people of India have turned to courts more and more for justice
whenever there had been a legitimate grievance against the State's statutory C
authorities and other public organizations. People come to courts as the final
resort, to protect their rights and to secure probity in public life.

Pro bono publico constituted a significant state in the present day judicial
system. They, however, provided the dockets with much greater responsibility D
for rendering the concept of justice available to the disadvantaged sections of
the society. Public interest litigation has come to stay and its necessity cannot
be overemphasized. The courts evolved a jurisprudence of compassion.
Procedural propriety was to move over giving place to substantive concerns
of the deprivation of rights. The rule of locus standi was diluted. The Court
in place of disinterested and dispassionate adjudicator became active participant E
in the dispensation of justice.

But with the passage of time, things started taking different shapes. The
process was sometimes abused. Proceedings were initiated in the name of
public interest litigation for ventilating private disputes. Some petitions were
publicity oriented. F
A balance was, therefore, required to be struck. The Courts started
exercising greater care and caution in the matter of exercise of jurisdiction
of public interest litigation.

The Court insisted on furnishing of security before granting injunction G
and imposing very heavy costs when a petition was found to be bogus. It
took strict action when it was found that the motive to file a public interest
litigation was ob~ique.

The decisions rendered by this Court in different types of public interest H
642 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A litigations are varied.

The principles evolved by this Court in this behalf may be suitably
summarized as under :

(i) The Court in exercise of powers under Article 32 and Article 226
B of the Constitution of India can entertain a petition filed by any interested
person in the welfare of the people who is in a disadvantaged position and,
thus, not in a position to knock the doors of the Court.

The Court is constitutionally bound to protect the fundamental rights of
such disadvantaged people so as to direct the State to fulfill its constitutional
C. promises. (See S.P. Gupta v. Union of India., [1981] supp. SCC 87; People's
Union for Democratic Rights and Ors. v. Union of India, [1982] 2 SCC 494
and Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India and Ors., [1984] 3 SCC 161
and Janata Dal v. HS. Chowdhary and Ors., [1992] 4 SCC 305).

(ii) Issues of public importance, enforcement of fundamental rights of
D large number of public vis-a-vis the constitutional duties and functions of the
State, if raised, the Court treat a letter or a telegram as a public interest
litigation upon relaxing procedural laws as also the law relating to pleadings.
(See Charles Sobraj v. Supdt. Central Jail, Tihar, New Delhi, {1978] 4 SCC
104 and Hussainara Khatoon and Ors. v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar,
E [19801 1 sec 81).

(iii) Whenever injustice is meted out to a large number of people, the
Court will not hesitate in stepping in. Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution
of India as well as the International Conventions on Human Rights provide
for reasonable and fair trial.
F
In Mrs. Mankeka Sanjay Gandhi and Anr. v. Miss Rani Jethmalani,
AIR (1979) SC 468, it was held :

"2. Assurance of a fair trial is the first imperative of the dispensation
of justice and the central criterion for the court to consider when a
G motion for transfer is made is not the hypersensitivity or relative
convenience of a party or easy availability of legal services or like
mini-grievances. Something more substantial, more compelling, more
imperiling, from the point of view of public justice and its attendant,
environment, is necessitous if the Court is to exercise its power of
transfer. This is the cardinal 'principle although the circumstances
H
GURUVA YUR DEVASWOM MANAGING COMMITTEE v. C.K. RAJAN [SINHA, J.] 643

may be myriad and vary from case to case. We have to test the A
petitioner's grounds on this touch-stone bearing in mind the rule that
normally the complainant has the right to choose any court having
jurisdiction and the accused cannot dictate where the case against
him should be tried. Even so, the process of justice should not harass
the parties and from that angle the court may weigh the circumstances." .B
(See also Dwarka Prasad Agarwal (D) By LRs. and Anr. v. B.D. Agarwal
and Ors., (2003) 5 SCALE 138).

(iv) The common rule of locus standi is relaxed so as to enable the
Court to look into the grievances complained on behalf of the poor, depraved,
illiterate and the disabled who cannot vindicate the legal wrong or legal C
injury caused to them for any violation of any constitutional or legal right.
' (See Fertilizer Corporation Kamagar Union v. Union of India, AIR (1981)
SC 344, S.P. Gupta (supra), People's Union for Democratic Rights (supra),
Dr. D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, [1987] l SCC 378 and Ba/co Employees'
Union (Regd.) v. Union of India and Ors., [2002] 2 SCC 333). D
(v) When the Court is prima facie satisfied about variation of any
constitutional right of a group of people belonging to the disadvantaged
category, it may not allow the State or the Government from raising the
question as to the maintainability of the petition. (See Bandhua Mukti Morcha
(supra)). E
(vi) Although procedural laws apply on PIL cases but the question as
to whether the principles of res judicata or principles analogous thereto would
apply depend on the nature of the petition as also facts and circumstances of
the case. (See Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P.,
[1989] Supp. l SCC 504 and Forward Construction Co. and Ors. v. Prabhat F
Manda/ (Regd), Andheri and Ors., [1986] 1 SCC 100).

(vii) The dispute between two warring groups purely in the realm of
private law would not be allowed to be agitated as a public interest litigation.
(See Ramsharan Autyanuprasi and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., [1989] G
Supp. 1 sec 251 ).

(viii) However, in an appropriate case, although the petitioner might
have moved a Court in his private interest and for redressal of the personal
grievances, the Court in furtherance of the public interest may treat it necessary
to enquire into the state of affairs of the subject of litigation in the interest H
644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A of justice. (See Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil v. Dr. Mahesh Madhav Gosavi
and Ors., [ 1987] 1 SCC 227).

(ix) The Court in special situations may appoint Commission, or other
bodies for the purpose of investigating into the allegations and finding out
facts. It may also direct management of a public institution taken over by
B such committee. (See Bandhua Mukti Morcha (supra), Rakesh Chandra
Narayan v. State of Bihar, [1989] Supp. 1 SCC 644 and A.P. Pollution
Control Board v. MV. Nayudu, [1999] 2 SCC 718).

In Sachidanand Pandey and Anr. v. State of West Bengal and Ors.,
C [1987] 2 SCC 295, this Court held :

"61. It is only when courts are apprised of gross violation of
fundamental rights by a group or a class action on when basic human
rights are invaded or when there are complaints of such acts as shock
the judicial conscience that the courts, especially this Court, shouid
leave aside procedural shackles and hear such petitions and extend its
D
jurisdiction under all available provisioQs for remedying the hardships
and miseries of the needy, the underdog anc!. the neglected. I will be
second to none in extending help when such is required. But this does
mean that the doors of this Court are always open for anyone to walk
in. It is necessary to have some self-imposed restraint on public interest
E litigants."

In Janata Dal v. HS. Chowdhary and Ors., [1992] 4 SCC 305, this
Court opined :
"109. It is thus clear that only a person acting bona.fide and having
F sufficient interest in the proceeding of PIL will along have a locus ·
standi and can approach the court to wipe out the tears of the poor
and needy, suffering from violation of their fundamental rights, but
not a person for personal gain or private profit or political motive or
any oblique consideration. Similarly, a vexatious petition under the
colour of PIL brought before the court for vindicating any personal
G grievance, deserves rejection at the threshold."
The Court will not ordinarily transgress into a policy. It shall also take
utmost care not to transgress its jurisdiction while purporting to protect the
rights of the people from being violated.

In Narmada Bachao Ando/an v. Union of India. and Ors., [2000] IO
H
GURUVAYUR D.EVASWOM MANAGING COMMITTEE v. C.K. RAJAN [SINHA, J.j 645

sec 664, it was held : A
"229. It is now well settled that the courts, in the exercise of their
jurisdiction, will not· transgress into the field of policy decision.
Whether to have an infrastructural project or not and what is the type
of project to be undertaken and how it has to be executed, are part
of policy-making process and the courts are ill-equipped to adjudicate B
on a policy decision so undertaken. The court, no doubt, has a duty
to see that in the undertaking of a decision, no law is violated and
people's fundamental rights are not transgressed upon except to the
extent permissible under the Constitution. Even then any challenge to
such a policy decision must be before the execution of the project is C
undertaken. Any delay in the execution of the project means overrun
in costs and the decision to undertake a project, if challenged after its
execution has commenced, should be thrown out at the very threshold
on the ground of latches if the petitioner had the knowledge of such
a decision and could have approached the court at that time. Just
because a petition is termed as a PIL does not mean that ordinary D
principles applicable to litigation will not apply. Latches is one of
them.

232. While protecting the rights of the people from being violated in
any manner utmost care has to be taken that the court does not
transgress its jurisdiction. There is, in our constitutional framework a E
fairly clear demarcation of powers. The court has come down heavily
whenever the executive has sought to impinge upon the court's
jurisdiction."

(x) The Court would ordinarily not step out of the known areas of
judicial review. The High Courts although may pass an order for doing F
complete justice to the parties, it does not have a power akin to Article 142
of the Constitution of India.

(xi) Ordinarily the High Court should not entertain a writ petition by
way of Public Interest Litigation questioning constitutionality or validity of G
a Statute or a Statutory Rule.

In MC. Mehta v. Kamal Nath [2000] 6 SCC 213, it was held :

"20. The scope of Article 142 was considered in several decisions
and recently in Supreme Court Bar Association 'Ii. Union of India, H
646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A (1998] 4 SCC 409 by which the decision of this Court in Vinay
Chandra Mishra, Re [1995] 2 SCC 584 was partly overruled, it was
held that the plenary powers of this ·Court under Article 142 of the
Constitution are inherent in the Court and are "COMPLEMENTARY"
to those powers which are specifically conferred on the Court by
various statutes. This power exists as a separate and independent
B basis of jurisdiction apart from the statutes. The Court further observed
that though the powers conferred on the Court by Article 142 are
curative in nature, they cannot be construed as powers which authorise
the Court to ignore the substantive rights of a litigant. The Court .
further observed that this power cannot be used to "supplant"
c substantive law applicable to the case or cause under consideration of
the Court. Article 142, even with the width of its amplitude, cannot
be used to build a new edifice where none existed earlier, by ignoring
express statutory provisions dealing with a subject and thereby achieve
something indirectly which cannot be achieved directly."

D (See also Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India, (1998] 4
sec 409).
This Court in Ba/co Employees' Union (Regd) (supra) succinctly opined:

"Public interest litigation, or PIL as it is more commonly known,
E entered the Indian judicial process in 1970. It will not be incorrect to
say that it is primarily the Judges who have innovated this type of
litigation as there was a dire need for it. At that stage, it was intended
to vindicate public interest where fundamental and other rights of the
people who were poor, ignorant or in socially. or economically
disadvantageous position and were unable to seek legal redress were
F required to be espoused. PIL was not meant to be adversarial in
nature and was to be a cooperative and collaborative effort of the
parties and the court so as to secure justice for the poor and the
weaker sections of the community who were not in a position to
protect their own interests. Public interest litigation was intended to
G mean nothing more than what. words themselves said viz. "litigation
in the interest of the public".

While P!L initially was invoked mostly in cases connected with the
relief to the people and the weaker sections of the society and in
areas where there was violation of human rights under Article 21, but
H with the passage of time, petitions have been entertained in other
GURUVAYUR DEVASWOM MANAGING COMMITTEE v. CK. RAJAN [SINHA,J.] 647

spheres. Prof. S. B. Sathe has summarised the extent of the jurisdiction A
which has now been exercised in the following words :

"PIL may, therefore, be described as satisfying one or more of the
following parameters. These are not exclusive but merely descriptive:

- Where the concerns underlying a petition are not individualist but B
are shared widely by a large number of people (bonded labour,
,, undertrial prisoners, prison inmates).

- Where the affected persons belong to the disadvantaged sections of
society (women, children, bonded labour, unorganised labour etc.).

- Where judicial law making is necessary to avoid exploitation (inter- C
country adoption, the education of the children of the prostitutes).

- Where judicial intervention is necessary for the protection of the
sanctity of democratic institutions (independence of the judiciary,
existence of grievances redressal forums).
D
- Where administrative decisions related to development are harmful
to the environment and jeopardize people's right to n'atural resources
such as air or water."

There is, in recent years, a feeling which is not without any foundation
that public interest litigation is now tending to become publicity interest E
litigation or private interest litigation and has a tendency to be
counterproductive.

PIL is not a pill or a panacea for all wrongs. It was essentially meant
to protect basic human rights of the weak and the disadvantaged and
was a procedure which was innovated where a public-spirited person F
files a petition in effect on behalf of such persons who on account of
poverty, helplessness or economic and social disabilities could not
approach the court for relief. There, have been, in recent times,
increasingly instances of abuse of PIL. Therefore, there is a need to
re-emphasize the parameters within which PIL can be resorted to by G
a petitioner and entertained by the court. This aspect has come up for
consideration before this Court and all we need to do is to recapitulate
and re-emphasize the same."

We do not intend to say that the dicta of this Court in Balco Employees
Union (supra) contains the last words. But the same may be considered to be H
·648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A in the nature of guidelines for entertaining public interest litigation.

Incidentally, on administrative side of this Court, certain guidelines
have been issued to be followed for entertaining Letters/Petitions received by
this Court as Public Interest Litigation.

B We do not intend to lay down any strict rule as to the scope and extent
of Public Interest Litigation, as each case has to be judged on its own merits.
Furthermore, different problems may have to be dealt with differently.

THE PRESENT CONTROVERSY:

C The case at hand does not fall in any of the aforementioned categories,
where a PIL could be entertained.

No reported decision has also been brought to our notice where a
Public Interest Litigation was entertained in similar matter..

D We have also not come across any case so far where the functions
required to be performed by statutory functionaries had been rendered
redundant by. a Court by issuing directions upon usurpation of statutory power.
The right of a person belonging to a particular religious denominations may
sometimes fall foul of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India. Only
'whence the fundamental right of a person is infringed by the State an action
·E in relation thereto may be justified. Any right other than' the fundamental
rights contained in Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India may either
flow from a statute or from the customary laws. Indisputably a devotee will
have a cause of action to initiate an action before the High Court when his
right under statutory law is violated. He may also have a cause of action by
F reason of action or inaction on the part of the State or a statutory authority;
an appropriate order is required to be passed or a direction is required to be
issued by the High Court. In some cases, a person may feel aggrieved in his
individual capacity, but the public at large may not.

It is trite, where a segment of public is not interested in the cause,
G public interest litigation would not ordinarily be entertained.
It is possible to contend that the Hindus ·in general and the devotees
visiting the temple in particular are interested in proper management of the
temple at the hands of the statutory functionaries. That may be so but the Act
is a self-contained Code. Duties and functions are prescribed in the Act and
·H the rules framed thereunder. Forums have been created thereunder for
GURUVA YUR DEVASWOM MANAGING COMMITTEE 11. C.K. RAJAN [SINHA, J.] 649

ventilation of the grievances of the affected persons. Ordinarily, therefore, A
such forums should be moved at the first instance. The State should be asked
to look into the grievances of the aggrieved devotees, ~oth as parens patriae
as also in discharge of its statutory duties.

In State of WB. and Ors. v. Nuruddin Mallick and Ors., [1998] 8 SCC
143, it has been held : B
"28. It is not in dispute in this case that after the management sent
its letter dated 6-8-1992 for the approval of its 31 ~:taff, viz., both
teaching and non-teaching staff, both the District Inspector of Schools
and the Secretary of the Board sought for certain infonnation through C
their letters dated 21-9-1992. Instead of sending any reply, the
management filed the writ petition in the High Court, leading to
passing of the impugned orders. Thus, till this date the appellant-
authorities have not yet exercised their discretion. Submission for the
respondents was that this Court itself should examine and decide the
question in issue based on the material on record to set at rest the D
long-standing issue. We have no hesitation to decline such a
suggestion. The courts can either direct the statutory authorities, where
it is not exercising its discretion, by mandamus to exercise its
discretion, or when exercised, to see whether it has been validly
exercised. It would be inappropriate for the Court to substitute itself
for the statutory authorities to decide the matter. E
(Emphasis Supplied)

Existence of certain gray areas may not be ruled out but such a case
was required to be made out before the High Court which has not been done
in the instant case. For any court of law including this Court, it is difficult
to draw a strict line of demarcation as to which matters and to what extent F
a public interest litigation should be entertained but, as noticed hereinbefore,
the decisions of this Court render broad guidelines. This Court and the High
Court should, unless there exists strong reasons to deviate or depart therefrom,
not undertake an unnecessary journey through the public interest litigation
path. G
The High Court should not have proceeded simply to supplant, ignore
or by-pass the statute. The High Court has not shown any strong and cogent
reasons for an Administrator to continue in an office even after expiry of his
tenure. It appears from the orders dated 7th February, 1993 that the High
Court without cogent and sufficient reason allowed Administrator to continue H
650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A in office although his term was over and he was posted elsewhere. He also
could not have been conferred powers wider than Section I 7 of the Act. The
High Court took .over the power of appointment of the Commissioner
bypassing the procedure set out in the Act by calling upon the Government
to furnish the names of 5 IAS Officers to the Court so that it could exercise
B the power of appointment of the Commissioner.

The Court should be circumspect in entertaining such public interest
litigation for another reason. There may be dispute amongst the devotees as .
to what practices should be followed by the temple authorities. There may be
dispute as regard the rites and rituals to be performed in the temple or omission
C thereof. Any decision in favour of one sector of the people may hurt the
sentiments of the other. The Courts normally, thus, at the first instance would
not enter into such disputed arena, particularly, when by reason thereof the
fundamental right of a group of devotees under Articles 25 and 26 may be
infringed. Like any other wing of the State, the Courts also while passing an
order should ensure that the fundamental rights of a group of citizens under
D Articles 25 and 26 are not infringed. Such care and caution on the part of the
High Court would be a welcome step.

Where access to justice poses a fundamental problem facing the third
world today, its importance in India has increased. Laws are designed to
improve the socio-economic conditions of the poor but making the law is not
E enough, it must be implemented. The core issues which have been highlighted
by the learned counsels by the party must be considered fr.om that angle.
Administration of temple by entertaining complaints does not lead to a happy
state of affairs. Roving enquiry is not contemplated. Principles of natural
justice and fair play ought to be followed even in the pro bono public
F proceedings. The Courts undoubtedly would be parens patriae in relation to
idols, but when the statute governs the field and the State takes over the
management, ordinarily the Courts would not step in.

In Charan Lal Sahu (supra) the history of the doctrine ofparens patriae
was traced. This Court stated:
G
"36. Therefore, conceptually and from the jurisprudential point of
view, especially in the background of the Preamble to the Constitution
of India and the mandate of the Directive Principles, it was possible
to authorise the Central Government to take over the claims of the
victims to fight against the multinational corporation in respect of the
H claims. Because of the situation the victims were under disability in
GURUVAYUR DEVASWOM MANAGING COMMITTEE v. C.K. RAJAN [SINHA, J.] 651

pursuing their claims in the circumstances of the situation fully and A
properly. On its plain terms the State has taken over the exclusive
right to represent and act in place of every person who has made or
is entitled to make a claim for all purposes connected with such claim
in the same manner and to the same effect as such person. Whether
such provision is valid or not in the background of the requirement
of the Constitution and the Code of Civil Procedure, is another debate. B
But there is no prohibition or inhibition, in our opinion, conceptually
• or jurisprudentially for the Indian State taking over the claims of the
victims or for the State acting for the victims as the Act has sought
to provide. The actual meaning of what the Act has provided and the
validity thereof, however, will have to be examined in the light of the C
specific submissions advanced in this case."

Mr. Subba Rao referred to N.M Thomas (supra) for the proposition
that court is also a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 but that would
not mean that in a given case the court shall assume the role of the Executive
Government of the State. Statutory functions are assigned to the State by the D
Legislature and not by the Court. The Courts while exercising its jurisdiction
ordinarily must remind itself about the doctrine of separation of powers which,
however, although does not mean that the Court shall not step-in in any
circumstance whatsoever but the Court while exercising its power must also
remind itself about the rule of self-restraint. The Courts, as indicated
hereinbefore, ordinarily is reluctant to assume the functions of the statutory E
functionaries. It allows them to perform their duties at the first instance.

The court steps in by Mandamus when the State fails to perform its
duty. It shall also step in w~en the discretion is exercised but the same has
not been done legally and validly. It steps in by way of a judicial review over
the orders passed. Existence of alternative remedy albeit is no bar to exercise F
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India but ordinarily it
will not do so unless it is found that an order has been passed wholly without
jurisdiction or contradictory to the constitutional or statutory provisions or
where an order has been passed without complying with the principles of
natural justice. (See Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, G
Mumbai and Ors., [ 1998] 8 SCC I).

It is trite that only because floodgates of cases will be opened, by itself
may not be no ground to close the doors of courts of justice. The doors of
the courts must be kept open but the Court cannot shut its eyes to the ground
realities while entertaining a public interest litigation. H
652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 2 s.c·.R.

A Exercise of self-restraint, thus, should be adhered to, subject of course
to, just exceptions.

The High Court in this case adopted an unusual procedure. It directed
seizure of the records only on the premise that the writ petitioner contended
that the allegations can be verified with reference to the records.
B
Concededly, in view of decision of this Court in Bandhua Mukthi Morcha
(supra) the Court may appoint a Commissioner or amicus for finding out the
truth but what has been overlooked by the High C<;>urt was that it could take
recourse thereto when truth cannot be found out otherwise. It should have at
the outset called upon the State as also the Managing Committee to express
C their view points. Reliance placed by Mr. Subba Rao on Bcindhua Mukthi
Morcha (supra) is not apposite as therein the purpose was to activate the
statutory machinery for protecting the basic fundamental right of any person
under Article 21 and 23 of the Constitution of India. If the allegations are
verifiable on records, the courts could have itself examined the same. Before
D doing so, it must give an opportunity to the parties to explain things. Only
because the Court arrives at prima facie finding that "all is not well", the
same would not necessarily mean that it must appoint a Commissioner and
thereby purporting to exercise jurisdiction akin to the provisions of the
Commission of Enquiry Act, 1952 or Kerala Public Men's Corruption
(Investigations and Inquiries) Act, 1987. The power under the said statute is
E to be exercised by the State if an exigency of situation arises therefor.

The expression "public men" has been defined in Kerala Public Men's
Corruption (Investigations and Inquiries) Act, 1987. The said definition
includes the Chairman and members of the Appellant Management Committee.
F Their alleged acts of omission or commission could, therefore, be a subject
matter of inquiry under the said Act. The High Court further assumed the
jurisdiction akin to the Commission of Enquiry Act by appointing a
Commissioner to engage in a wide range inquiry into the affairs of an
institution. Such a course of action was also uncalled for in absence of any
allegation that the persons in charge of the documents would destroy or
G tamper with the evidence. No reason was assigned by the High· Court as to
why such an extreme step was necessary. No emergent situation has been
pointed ou.t by the Fifth Respondent to act in such a hurry.

The very fact that our attention has been drawn that the State in a given
situation can take recourse to the Commission of Enquiry Act, 1952 for the
H purpose of enquiring into the alleged irregularities in the matter of management
GURUVAYUR DEVASWOM MANAGING COMMITTEE v. C.K. RAJAN [SINHA, J.] 653
of temple is itself a pointer to the fact that the State may take recourse thereto A
if such a course of action may be found to be necessary by the State itself.

In this connection, it may be noticed:

(a) Under Section 3 of the Commission of Enquiry Act, where the
appropriate government is of the opinion that it is necessary so to do B
and resolutions are passed by the concerned legislatures, it may appoint
a Commission of Inquiry for the purpose of making inquiry into any
definite matter of public importance.

(b) Under Section 3(4), the report of the Commission, along with the
action taken report of the Government, is laid before the concerned C
legislature.

(c) Under Section 4, the powers of the Commission include summoning
and examining a witness, requiring production of any document,
requisitioning any public record and the like. Under Section 5, the
Commission may authorise a Gazetted Officer to enter any place or D
building and seize documents, which in the opinion of the Commission
would be useful for the purposes of the enquiry.

(d) Under Sections 5A and 5B, the Commission may utilize the services
of officers, investigation agencies or assessors for the purposes of the
inquiry. E
(e) Under Sections 8B and 8C, the Commission provides an
opportunity of hearing to all persons who may be prejudicially affected
by the inquiry, including the opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses.
F
[See Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan, [1963]
I SCR 561 and Pannalal Pitti v. State of A.P., (1996] 2 SCC 498].

When the administration of the temple is within its control and it
exercises the said power in terms of a Statute, the State, it is expected,
normally would itself probe into the alleged irregularities. If the State through G
its machinery as provided for in one Act can arrive at the requisite finding
of fact for the p'urpose of remedying the defects, it may not find it necessary
to take recourse to the remedies provided for in another statute. It is trite that
recourse to a provision to another statute may be resorted to when the State
finds that its powers under the Act governing the field is inadequate. The H
654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A High Courts and the Supreme Court would not ordinarily issue a writ of
mandamus directing the State to carry out its statutory functions in a particular
manner. Normally, the Courts would ask the State to perfonn its statutory
functions, if necessary within a time frame and undoubtedly as and when an
order is passed by the State in exercise of its power under the Statute, it will
B examine the correctness or legality thereof by way of judicial review.

Keeping these principles in mind, we do not also think that the High
Court rightly exercised its jurisdiction in appointing a police officer to help
the Commissioner, asking the State not to transfer the administrator against
whom allegedly there were serious allegations or whose tenn was over or
C appoint a administrator from the panel of names furnished by the State. The
question has been raised as to whether having regard to the fact that Sree
Krishna temple can be visited by any devotee who has a right to worship
Lord Vishnu can enjoy any denominational right to manage temple. We may,
however, notice that this Court in Sri Adi Visheshwara Kashi Vishwanath
Temple v. State of U.P., [1997] 4 SCC 606 at 633, held:
D
" ... Every Hindu .... has a right of entry into the Hindu temple and
worship the deity. Therefore, the Hindu believers of Shaiva fonn of
worship are not denominational worshippers. They are part of the .
Hindu religious form of worship.. They are not entitled to the
protection, in particular, of clauses (b) and (d) of Article 26 as a
E religious denomination in the matter of management, administration
and the governance of the temples."

(See also Sri Kanyaka Satram Committee v. Commissioner, H.R.C.
and Ors., [1997] 5 SCC 303 at 304).

F We do not intend to say anything further, as at present advised.

We further do not intend to enter into the controversy as to whether the
complaint of the first respondent was actuated by any person's ill-will or bias
towards the appellant.

G EFFECT OF THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT:
Mr. Reddy submitted a status report on the action which has already
been taken or yet to be taken or not possible to be taken which is reproduced
below:

H
GURUVAYUR DEVASWOM MANAGING COMMITTEE v. C.K. RAJAN [SINHA, J.] 655
Para 65 of the judgment Action taken/reply of the High Court A
U(i) Vigilance enquiry to be Vigilance enquiry was conducted
ordered against Shri Rajan, and the allegation was not
former Member of the substantiated in the enquiry.
Managing Committee to find
out whether he is holding B
income disproportionate to his
income.

(ii) "Production of film Action is underway to make use of
Guruvayoor Mahathmyam" the prints of the film and to recover
Action to be taken to levy the the loss, if any, from the persons C
loss. responsible after ascertaining the
actual loss.

(iii) Follow up action regarding Devaswom has taken action
Ooottupura and Western
Gopuram D
(iv) Works at Vengad estate, Loss Devaswom has taken action.
of 142 bags of cement

(v) Obtaining 4 Kgs of Gold lying The gold has been received back by
with the Reserve Bank of the Devaswom as Gold lockets of E
India. "Guruvayoorappan"

V Part-I, Chapter 3 of final report

(i) Politicisation in the This issue is pending before the
nomination of the members of Supreme Court of India in another F
Guruvayoor Devaswom Civil Appeal No. 6675/99. At
Managing Committee should present persons who are not
be avoided. members of any political party alone
are appointed as members of the
Committee. G
(ii) Remedial measures in Devaswom is taking action in
the 'Devaprasanam' to be consultation with the 'Thanthri'.
performed.

X Part- I Chapter 4 of final report
H
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A (i) Method for quality Devaswom has already taken action
checking of goods

(ii) Special arrangements for Devaswom is doing this regularly.
Darshan to sick, handicapped,
disabled, etc.
B
y Rules to be framed for free This has been framed by the
accommodation in the Guest Devaswom.
Houses

z Part I Chapter 8 of the Final
c report

Recommendations regarding Devaswom has implemented this.
movable & immovable
properties

D Z(l) Recommendation regarding This has been implemented. A
management of finance. senior officer from the Accountant ,.
General's Office has been appointed
as Chief Finance & Accounts Officer
on deputation basis and two
Assistant Audit Officers from the
E
Accountant General's Office have
also been on deputation basis.

Depositing the funds in This has been implemented. But
F Guruvayoor Branches of the there have been practical difficulties
Banks due to lack of competitive demands
for deposits.

Comments regarding the Government consider the
performance of Devaswom observation as totally unfortunate
G Commissioner and not justifiable. The
Commissioner who is the Secretary
to Government was holding
additional charge of the
Commissioner. The Commissioner
H was in fact discharging his duties to
GURUVA YUR DEVASWOM MANAGING COMMITTEE v. C.K. RAJAN [SINHA, J.) 657

the satisfaction of the Government A
and taking steps to strengthen the
Devaswom administration. The
Hon 'ble High Court did not
appreciate these facts while
commending on his performance.
B
Z(2) Construction of Sree Padmam Explanation of the Devaswom
building obtained and remedial action taken.

Z(3) & (4) Appointment of District Government are not agreeable with
Judge as Law Officer cum this recommendation/direction. As C
disciplinary authority per the Guruvayoor Devaswom Act
and the Regulations there-under,
Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing
Committee is the appointing and
disciplinary authority in respect of
the employees of the Devaswom. D
Government do not consider it
necessary to have a District Judge
as disciplinary authority. As far as
Law Officer is concerned, there is a
team of Lawyers to attend the legal
matters of the Devaswom. In view E
of these facts, Government do not
consider it necessary to post a
District Judge as suggested by the
Hon'ble High Court.

Z(5) Functioning of the Devaswom While commenting on the statutory
F
Commissioner and the powers of the Commissioner, the
Government Court has adversely commented on
the performance of the
Commissioners, past and present. It
is submitted that the specific G
comments of the High Court against
the Commissioner are totally
unfortunate and not justified. The
Commissioner who is a Secretary
to Government was holding the H
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A additional charge of the
Commissioner. The Commissioner
was in fact discharging his duty to
the satisfaction of the Government
and had taken all steps to rejuvenate
and strengthen the Devaswom
B administration. The Hon'ble High
Court did not appreciate these facts
and in fact adversely commented on
his performance. The High Court has
also adversely commented on the
c performance of the Devaswom
Commissioners since the inception
of the Act. The Court has observed
that the Devaswom Commissioner
during the period of Judgment and
his predecessors since the Act came
D into being in 1978 have been mere
'spectators, not involved, not
concerned seriously with the
administration. The observation
cannot be justified in anyway. The
E. Commissioner as well as the
Government take interest in the
matters relating to the Devaswom in
order to ensure that the functioning
of the Managing Committee and the
Administrator is in accordance with
F the provisions of the Act and Rules.
Proper directions are also given as
and when needed, exercising the
provisions of the Act.

G Z(6) Recommendation regarding The question regarding politicisation
politicisation and is now being considered by the
administrative disfunction Hon'ble Supreme Court in another
(para 55 of the judgment) & Civil Appeal No. 6675/99. However,
recommendations regarding at present, persons who are not
accommodation facilities to members of any political party alone
H pilgrims and acquisition of are appointed as members of the
GURUVA YUR DEVASWOM MANAGING COMMITTEE v. C.K. RAJAN [SINHA, J.] 659

land (para 57 of the judgment) Committee. Regarding the A
suggestion to make the term of the
Managing Committee as four years,
the Legislature, after considering the
entire matter had decided that the
term of nominated members shall be B
two years only. However, they cmi
be renominated after the period, if
the Government desire so. Regarding
direction to construct cheap lodging
houses for devotees, Devaswom has
already initiated action on this. As C
regards the direction to acquire lands
within a radius of 100 mts. from the
outer wall of the temple, action has
been initiated for acquisition of land
as a phased programme.
D
Z(7) There should be a technical There is already an audit conducted
audit in every five years (para by the Local Fund Audit Department.
58 of the judgment) They take care of the technical
matters also. Government do not
consider that a special technical audit E
in every five years is necessary.

Z(9) Recommendation to conduct a A detailed study has been conducted
study by the Institute of by the Centre for Managem '!nt
Management in Government Development. Their report is under
on the administrative reforms consideration of the Devaswom. F
to be carried out in the
Devaswom.

Z(l 0) The post of Commissioner, These posts are now held by two
Guruvayoor Devaswom and separate persons.
the Secretary to Government, G
Devaswom Department should
be held by two persons.

Z(J I) Direction to submit a panel of Not implemented as the Hon'ble
five senior IAS Officers Supreme Court has stayed this
(Secretaries to Government) to 41 direction. Government cannot agree H
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A the High Court to enable the to this direction, as the direction is
Court to select one person as against the statutory provision.
Devaswom Commissioner. Appointing the Commissioner for
Guruvayoor Devaswom is as per
section 2(b) of the Guruvayoor
Devaswom Act, 1978. Furnishing a
B panel of names and selection by the
Court are matters extraneous to the
provisions of the Act.

C We will advert to this issue a little later.

RE: PRELIMINARY ISSUE ABOUT MAINTAINABILITY OF THE
WRIT PETITION:

The learned counsel for the parties have addressed us at great length on
D this issue. But in our opinion the question of examining the maintainability
of the writ petition as a preliminary issue by the High Court has become
academic. Parties addressed the High Court on the merit of the matter and
upon considering the rival submissions, the imp'.lgned order has been passed.
•
In its order disposing C.M.P. No. 10669 of 1993, the High Court
E recorded:

"As we stated earlier, our function herein is only to record and not
,to adjudicate. The rival submissions made before us pose interesting
questions on varied matters which are of far reaching and wide
consequences. We are of the view that the weighty submissions made
F by counsel to the extent they are relevant when the final report comes
up for consideration may be considered in depth then, Some of the
pleas raised by Mr. Kelu Nambiar have not so far been highlighted
or 'adjucated in any decision of this Court. All that we want to say is
that at least some of them will require very serious consideration in
evaluating the final report and in moulding the final relief to be
.G
afforded in this litigation. As was made clear even from the beginning
of the arguments, it is not our function to adjudicate the above pleas
at this stage. We make that position clear and leave the point there."

For the reasons stated therein, the High Court has proceeded in the
H matter on merit. We do not find any illegality therein.
GURUVA YUR DEVASWOM MANAGING COMMITTEE v. C.K RAJAN [SINHA, J.] 661

Furthennore, in this case the appellant and the State took part in the A
proceedings. The State advisedly did so having regard to the fact that before
the question of maintainability of the writ petition could be decided, the
enquiry had reached almost a closing point. We are not impressed with the
submission of Mr. Reddy that he while conceding that the Court may proceed
with the matter represented before the High Court that the suggestions and
observations made by the Commissioner in the said interim reports could be B
considered by the State. This Court would only go by the records of the High
Court. It will not ordinarily entertain any doubt as regards correctness or
otherwise of the proceedings of the High Court. This is the state oflaw which
is finnly established. (See Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak (supra).

In Bhavnagar University v. Pa/itana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd and Ors.,
c
[2003] 2 SCC 111 a three-judge Bench of this Court, of which one of us
(Sinha, J.) is a member held :

"Before parting with the case, we may notice that Mr. Tanna appearing
on behalf of the South Gujarat University in C.A. No. 1540 of 2002 D
submitted that various other contentions had also been raised before
the High Court. We are not prepared to go into the said contentions
inasmuch assuming the same to be correct, the remedy of the appellants
would lie in filing appropriate application for review before the High
Court. Incidentally, we may notice that even in the special leave
petition no substantial question of law in this behalf has been raised E
nor any affidavit has been affinned by the learned advocate who had
appeared before the High Court or by any officer of the appellant
who was present in court that certain other submissions were made
before the High Court which were not taken into considerati.m. In
State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak and Anr., AIR F
(1982) SC 1249, this Court observed :-

"When we drew the attention of the learned Attorney General
to the concession made before the High Court, Shri A.K.
Sen, who appeared for the State of Maharashtra before the
High Court and led the arguments for the respondents there G
and who appeared for Shri Antulay before us intervent:d and
protested that he never made any such concession and invited
us to peruse the written submission .made by him in the High
Court. We are afraid that we cannot launch into an inquiry
as to what transpired in the High Court. It is simply not
H

"
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A done. Public Policy bars us. Judicial decorum restrains us.
Matters of judicial record are unquestionable. They are not
open to doubt. Judges cannot be. dragged into the arena.
"Judgments cannot be treated as mere counters in the game
of litigation". (Per Lord Atkinson in ·somasundaran v.
Subramanian, AIR (1926) PC 136). We are bound to accept
B the statement of the Judges recorded in their judgment, as to
what transpired in court. We cannot allow the statement of
the Judges to be co~tradicted by statements at the Bar or by
affidavit and other evidence. If the Judges say in their
judgment that something was done, said or admitted before
c them, that has to be the last word on the subject. The principle
is well-settled that statements of fact as to what transpired at
the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the court, are
conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict
such statements by affidavit or other evidence. If a party
thinks that the happenings in court have been wrongly
D recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent upon the party, while
the matter is still fresh in the minds of the Judges, to call the
attention of the very Judges, who have made the record to
the fact that the statement made with regard to his- conduct
was a statement that had been made in error (Per Lord
E Buckmaster in Madhusudan v. Chandrabati, AIR (1917) PC
30). That is the only way to have the record corrected. If no
such step is taken, the matter must necessarily end there. Of
course a party may resile and an Appellate·Court may permit
him in rare and appropriate cases to resile from a concession
on the ground that the concession was rriade on a wrong
F appreciation of the law and had led to gross injustice; but,
he may not call in ques.tion the very fact of making the
concession as recorded in the judgment."

The said decision has been followed by this Court recently in Roop
G Kumar v. Mohan Thedani, (2003) 3 Supreme 296. It held :

"I 0. It would be logical to first deal with the plea relating to absence
of forum of appeal. It is to be noted that the parties agreed before the
High Court that instead of remanding the• matter to trial Court, it
should consider materials on record and render a verdict. After having
done so, it is not open to the appellant to tum round or take a plea
H

..
GURUVA YUR DEVASWOM MANAGING COMMITTEE v. C.K. RAJAN [SINHA, J.] 663
that no concession was given. This is clearly a case of sitting on the A
fence, and is not to be encouraged. If really there was no concession,
the only course open to the appellant was to move the High Court in
line with what has been said in State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas
Shrinivas Nayak and Anr., [1982] 2 SCC 463. In a recent decision
Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill Pvt. ltd. and Ors., B
(2002) AIR SCW 4939 the view in the said case was reiterated by
observing that statements of fact as to what transpired at the hearing,
recorded in the judgment of the Court, are conclusi·:e of the facts so
stated and no one can coi1tradict such statements by affidavit or other
evidence. If a party thinks that the happenings in Court have been
wrongly recorded in a juctgment, it is incumbent upon the party, C
while the matter is still fresh in the minds of the Judges, to call the
attention of the very Judges who have made the record. That is the
only way to have the record corrected. If no such step is taken, the
matter must necessarily end there. It is not open to the appellant to
contend before this Court to the contrary."
D
The conduct of the appellant is also not wholly free from blemish. It
did not take a firm stand. It passed different resolutions at different points of
time. It evidently prevaricated its stand from stage to stage. Before us a
purported minute of the meeting dated 27.10.1993 has been placed which is
in the following terms :
E
"It was decided that objection/submission are to be given before the
Krishnaunni Commission appointed by the Hon'ble High Court of
Kerala and it may be filed jointly or severally by the members of the
Managing Committee after consulting with Devaswom Advocate Shri
K.P. Dandapani of Emakulam. If the Managing Committee members F
find it necessary, they may engage separate Advocate.

DECISION NO. I

It is decided that the members jointly or severally shall file objections/
submission against the final report submitted by Krishnan Unni
Commission appointed by the Kerala High Court after consulting the G
Devaswom Advocate Mr. K.P. Dandapani, Ernakulam. It is also
decided that if the Managing Committee members so choose can
approach the Advocate separately.

H
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A DECISION No. 2

xxxxx
DECISION No. 3

Mr. M.N. Sukumaran Nayar, Senior Advocate, has been appearing
.B for Shri A.P. Mohandas and Shri P.N. Narendranathan Nair, Members
of the Managing Committee in the case O.P. No. 2071 of 1993 of the
Hon'ble High Court of Kerala in which Krishnan Unni Commission
is appointed to. enquire into allegations of corruption in Guruvayur
pevaswom. It was decided to pass bills of Advocates fee as and when
C received."

Nothing stated in the said minutes run counter to the observations made
by the High Court in its order dated 25.8.1993. The High Court itself invited
objections to the reports, as would appear from its impugned judgment. The
impugned judgment of the High Court shows that the appellant did file its
D objections in relation to certain reports which have been considered.

CONCLUSION :

The curtain of this litigation must be drawn here and now. The State
admittedly implemented many of the suggestions of the high Court. They
E would not be reopened. Some suggestions of the High Court are pending
consideration at the hands of the State. They may be considered. The State
shall, however, as regard the directions of the High Court which according
to it cannot be complied with, pass appropriate orders recording sufficient
and cogent reasons therefor as expeditiously as possible and not beyond a
period of three months from the date of communication of this order. The
F High Court, if any proceeding is initiated in relation thereto, may deal therewith
in accordance with law. The administration of the temple, it is stated, has
been taken .over by the State and the other statutory functionaries. They shall,
we have no doubt in our mind, having regard to the fact that special treatment
has been accorded to the temple by the State Legislature, carry out its activities
G in true letter and spirit thereof. The State and the statutory functionaries
would be well advised to give full credence to the tenets and practices subject
of course to the provisions of the statute. The State should furthermore make
all endeavours to see that the sentiments of the devotees are respected. In
view of our findings aforementioned, the adverse remarks made in the
impugned judgment against the appellant in C.A. No. 2151 /1994 shall stand
H expunged.
GURUVA YUR DEVASWOM MANAGING COMMITTEE v. C.K. RAJAN [SINHA, J.] 665

Before parting with this case, however, we must complement the High A
Court about the gigantic task undertaken by it leading to discovery of a
number of irregularities in the matter of management of temple detected in
the process. We hope and trust that the judgment of the High Court would
prove to be an eye-opener to the State and now onwards it will be able to
fulfill the hopes and aspirations of millions of devotees of Lord Krishna. B
These Appeals are disposed of on the aforementioned terms. No order
as to costs.

D.G. Appeals disposed of.