H. ANJANAPPA & ORS.versusA. PRABHAKAR & ORS.

                 [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1755 : 2025 INSC 121

                           H. Anjanappa & Ors.
                                    v.
                           A. Prabhakar & Ors.
                  (Civil Appeal No(s). 1180-1181 of 2025)
                               29 January 2025
              [J.B. Pardiwala* and R. Mahadevan, JJ.]


                            Issue for Consideration
       Whether a transferee pendente lite has a right to be impleaded in
       the suit by seeking leave to appeal and in case he is not impleaded,
       whether he is bound by the decree passed in the said suit.

                                   Headnotes†
       Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) - Order XXII, Rule 10,
       Order XII, Rule 10, Order I, Rule 10, Section 146; Transfer of
       Property Act, 1882 (“TP Act”) – Section 52 discussed.
       Principles governing grant of leave to appeal in an impleadment
       application made by a third party/transferee pendente lite
       summarised:
       Held: A transferee pendente lite does not have a right to be
       impleaded in a pending suit and the trial court can allow his / her
       impleadment either under Order I Rule 10 CPC or under Order XXII
       Rule 10, CPC after appreciating the specific facts of the case and
       the material on record – It is not an absolute rule that a transferee
       pendente lite, by way of leave, in all cases, be allowed to come on
       record as a party – Since a transferee pendente lite, is an assignee
       of interest in the property, as per Order XXII Rule 10 CPC, he can
       seek leave of the Court to come record on his own or at the instance
       of either party to the suit – If no such leave is sought, transferee
       pendente lite would be at its own peril and still be bound by the
       outcome of the concerned proceedings – A transferee pendente lite
       is governed by Section 52 of TP Act. [Para 58]
       Held: High Court erred in condoning the delay of 586 days in filing
       of first appeal by the Respondent No.1 and 2 as they were not at
       all vigilant of their rights and the High Court should have declined
       to interfere on the ground of delay itself [Para 23]


* Author
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    Held: Though Section 96 and 100 of CPC do no enlist persons
    who can file an appeal against a decree, a stranger can only
    file an appeal after he/she is granted leave to appeal by the
    appellate court on satisfying such court that he is “aggrieved” by
    the decree sought to be challenged – In this regard, Court relied
    on various judgments including Sri V.N. Krishna Murthy & Anr. v.
    Sri Ravikumar & Ors. C.A. No. 2701-2704 of 2020; Adi Pherozshah
    Gandhi vs. H.M. Seervai, AIR 1971 SC 385; Smt. Jatan Kumar
    Golcha vs. Golcha Properties Private Limited, (1970) 3 SCC 573;
    State of Punjab & Ors. vs. Amar Singh & Anr., (1974) 2 SCC 70,
    Baldev Singh vs. Surinder Mohan Sharma & Ors (2003) 1 SCC
    34, Srimathi K. Ponnalagu Ammani vs. The State of Madras
    represented by the Secretary to the Revenue Department,
    Madras and Ors., AIR 1953 Madras 485, Province of Bombay vs.
    W.I. Automobile Association, reported in AIR 1949 Bombay 141.
    [Paras 25-28, 30, 31, 32, 36, 37, 43]
    Held: Mere rejection of impleadment application filed under Order I
    Rule 10, CPC itself will not disentitle the transferee pendente lite
    to obtain leave to appeal and the same needs to be examined
    based on facts of the case. [Para 42]

    Concept of “person aggrieved” – Discussed:
    Held: “Person aggrieved” would mean a person whose right or
    interest has been adversely affected or jeopardized – Court relied
    on Shanti Kumar R. Canji vs. Home Insurance Co. of New York,
    (1974) 2 SCC 387 and State of Rajasthan & Ors. vs. Union of
    India & Ors., (1977) 3 SCC 592), Indian Bank Limited, Madras vs.
    Seth Bansiram Jashamal Firm through its Managing Partner, AIR
    1934 Mad 360. [Paras 35, 38]

    Principles governing “grant of leave to appeal” – Summarised:
    Held: Though Section 96 and 100 of CPC, which govern filing of
    first appeal do not enlist as to who can be an “appellant”; it is settled
    law that a complete stranger cannot be granted leave to file a first
    appeal unless he satisfies the court that he is a “person aggrieved”
    i.e., he is prejudicially affected and is bound by the decree – The
    grievance does not mean a psychological or an imaginary injury
    or a remote or indirect prejudice. [Para 43]

    Court clarified impact of Section 52, TP Act on the interest of
    the transferee pendente lite:
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                                  1757

               H. Anjanappa & Ors. v. A. Prabhakar & Ors.


     Held: In light of Section 52 of TP Act, a transfer pendente lite is itself
     not void but subservient to the outcome of the pending litigation –
     Reliance placed on Nagubai Ammal & Ors. vs. B. Shama Rao &
     Ors., AIR 1956 SC 593 and Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj, (2010)
     8 SCC 1 and Thomson Press (India) Ltd. vs. Nanak Builders &
     Investors P. Ltd., [2013] 2 SCR 74. [Paras 46, 47]

     Nature of the rights of a transferee pendente lite discussed
     in light of Section 146, Order XXII Rule 10 and order I Rule
     10 CPC:
     Held: In light of Section 146, CPC which allows a litigant’s
     representatives to pursue the case, a transferee pendente lite
     though not necessarily arrayed as a part to the lis but still a
     person claiming under the defendant – Court then referred to
     Order I Rule 10 (Suit in name of wrong persons) and Order XXII
     Rule 10 (Procedure in case of assignment before final order in
     suit) and held that both these provisions provided similar relief to
     a transferee pendente lite seeking to be brought on record in a
     pending suit – Court added that while dealing with any of these
     provisions, it is not material to adjudicate if the person sought to
     be impleaded as party in the suit is either necessary or proper
     party and it is enough he is claiming right under a party to the suit.
     On facts, Respondent No.1 and 2 bought the disputed property
     without the permission of the court and during the operation of an
     injunction order – As regards Respondent No.1 and 2’s claim of
     being bona-fide purchasers unaware of the fact that suit property
     was disputed and encumbered, they were permitted to initiate
     appropriate legal proceedings against Respondent No.7 who was
     their vendor. [Paras 9, 61]

                                Case Law Cited
     Sri V.N. Krishna Murthy & Anr. v. Sri Ravikumar & Ors. [2020] 7
     SCR 1148 : C.A. No. 2701-2704 of 2020; Adi Pherozshah Gandhi v.
     H.M. Seervai [1971] 1 SCR 863 : AIR 1971 SC 385; Smt. Jatan
     Kumar Golcha v. Golcha Properties Private Limited [1971] 3 SCR
     247 : (1970) 3 SCC 573; State of Punjab & Ors. v. Amar Singh
     & Anr. [1974] 3 SCR 152 : (1974) 2 SCC 70; Baldev Singh v.
     Surinder Mohan Sharma & Ors. [2002] Supp. 4 SCR 43 : (2003)
     1 SCC 34; Shanti Kumar R. Canji v. Home Insurance Co. of New
     York [1975] 1 SCR 550 : (1974) 2 SCC 387; State of Rajasthan &
     Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [1978] 1 SCR 1 : (1977) 3 SCC 592;
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    Nagubai Ammal & Ors. v. B. Shama Rao & Ors. [1956] 1 SCR
    451 : AIR 1956 SC 593; Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj [2010] 7
    SCR 424 : (2010) 8 SCC 1; Thomson Press (India) Ltd. v. Nanak
    Builders & Investors P. Ltd. [2013] 2 SCR 74; Smt. Saila Bala
    Dassi v. Sm. Nirmala Sundari Dassi and Anr. [1958] 1 SCR 1287;
    Raj Kumar v. Sardari Lal [2004] 1 SCR 838 : (2004) 2 SCC 601;
    Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash University [2001] 3 SCR
    1129 : (2001) 6 SCC 534; Amit Kumar Shaw v. Farida Khatoon
    [2005] 3 SCR 509 : AIR 2005 SC 2209 – relied on.
    Srimathi K. Ponnalagu Ammani v. The State of Madras represented
    by the Secretary to the Revenue Department, Madras and Ors.,
    AIR 1953 Madras 485; Province of Bombay v. W.I. Automobile
    Association, AIR 1949 Bombay 141; Indian Bank Limited, Madras
    v. Seth Bansiram Jashamal Firm through its Managing Partner,
    AIR 1934 Mad 360 – relied on.
    In re Ex Tsar of Bulgaria (1921) 1 Ch D 107; In re Markham
    Markham v. Markham (1881) 16 Ch D 1; In re Padstow Total Loss
    and Collision Assurance Association (1882) 20 Ch.D 137; Attorney
    General v. Marquis of Ailesbury (1885) 16 QBD 408 – relied on.

                               List of Acts
    Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

                            List of Keywords
    Transferee pendente lite; Lis pendens purchaser; Third party;
    Bona-fide purchaser; Necessary and proper party; Impleadment;
    Leave to appeal; Specific performance of contract; Subsequent
    purchaser; Agreement to sell; Sale consideration; Power of attorney;
    Section 52 Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Code of Civil Procedure,
    1908; Order XXII Rule 10; Order I Rule 10; Section 146; Aggrieved
    person; Person aggrieved.

                           Case Arising From
    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No(s). 1180-1181
    of 2025
    From the Judgment and Order dated 16.11.2022 of the High Court
    of Karnataka at Bengaluru in IA Nos. 1 and 3 of 2018
    With
    Civil Appeal No(s). 1182-1183 of 2025
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                     1759

               H. Anjanappa & Ors. v. A. Prabhakar & Ors.


                        Appearances for Parties
     Anand Sanjay M Nuli, Sr. Adv., M/s. Nuli & Nuli, Ms. Akhila
     Wali, Harpawan Kumar Arora, Ms. Prashi Tyagi, Advs. for the
     Appellants.
     Gautam Narayan, Sr. Adv., Ms. Asmita Singh, Abheet Mangleek,
     Tushar Nair, Anirudh Anand, Punishk Handa, Advs. for the
     Respondents.

                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                               Judgment

     J.B. Pardiwala, J.

1.   Leave granted.
2.   Since the issues raised in the above captioned appeals are the same,
     the parties are also same and the challenge is also to the self-same
     judgment and order passed by the High Court, those were taken up
     for hearing analogously and are being disposed of by this common
     judgment and order.
3.   The appeals arise from the order passed by the High Court of
     Karnataka at Bengaluru dated 16.11.2022 in I.A. Nos. 1 & 3 of 2018
     respectively in Regular First Appeal No. 1303 of 2018 by which the
     High Court allowed the said I.A. Nos. 1 & 3 of 2018 respectively
     filed by the respondents herein and thereby condoned the delay of
     586 days in filing the said appeal against the judgment and decree
     dated 16.09.2016 passed by the Senior Civil Judge and JMFC,
     Devanahalli in Original Suit No. 458 of 2006 instituted for specific
     performance of contract. By the order passed in I.A. Nos 1 & 3 of
     2018 respectively, the High Court granted leave to appeal to the
     Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein (subsequent purchasers) against
     the original judgment and decree of specific performance as they
     were not parties in the suit proceedings.
4.   The facts giving rise to these appeals may be summarised as
     under.
     The description of the parties before this Court and before the Trial
     Court is tabulated as follows:
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          BEFORE               BEFORE THE                       REMARKS
        THIS COURT             TRIAL COURT
        Appellants     Plaintiffs                         Ag re e me n t o f Sa l e
                                                          Holders/Purchasers
        Respondent     Not a party as their impleadment   L i s  P e n d e n s
        Nos. 1-2       application was rejected. Order    Purchasers (Alleged to
                       remained unchallenged and          have purchased from
                       hence, attained finality           Subsequent Purchaser)
        Respondent     LRs. Of Original Defendant         Original Owner
        Nos. 3-5       No. 1
        Respondent     Defendant No. 2                    GPA Holder
        No. 6
        Respondent     Defendant No. 3                    Subsequent Purchaser
        No. 7

    For the sake of convenience, the parties shall be referred to in terms
    of their status before the Trial Court.
    (I)     One Late Smt. Daisy Shanthappa – Original Defendant No.1
            (since deceased represented through her LRs-Respondents
            Nos. 3-5 herein) was the absolute owner of lands bearing Sy.
            No. 176/42 measuring 32 acres and Sy. No. 176/43 measuring
            10 acres, situated adjacent to each other in Bagalur Village,
            Jala Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk. The Suit Schedule Property
            was agreed to be sold to the plaintiffs, the appellants herein,
            vide an Agreement of Sale dated 05.09.1995 for a total sale
            consideration of Rs.20,00,000/- by the Defendant No.1 through
            her Power of Attorney holder one Shri V. Chandramohan
            (Original Defendant No. 2/ Respondent No.6 herein). Earnest
            money of Rs.5,00,000/- was paid and the Defendant Nos. 1
            & 2 undertook to get the unauthorized occupants in the Suit
            Schedule Property evicted.
    (II)    Since the unauthorized occupants on the Suit Schedule Property
            were not evicted by the Defendant Nos.1 & 2, a Supplementary
            Agreement dated 10.03.1997 was executed extending the time
            for execution of Sale Deed. Out of the entire sale consideration
            of Rs.20,00,000/- a substantial amount of Rs.15,00,000/- was
            paid by the appellants herein to the Defendant No. 1.
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                       1761

               H. Anjanappa & Ors. v. A. Prabhakar & Ors.


     (III) While such being the case, and during the subsistence of Sale
           Agreement in favour of the Plaintiffs, the Defendant No.1 having
           lost her right over the suit schedule property in pursuance of the
           general power of attorney executed in favour of Defendant No.2,
           which has been acted upon, allegedly executed a Sale Deed in
           favour of Respondent No. 7/Defendant No. 3 selling land to an
           extent of 40 acres out of 42 acres for a sum of Rs.40,00,000/-.
           The plaintiffs became aware of the aforementioned sale transfer,
           when the Defendant No.3 attempted to change the revenue
           records in his name.
     (IV) Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiffs filed O.S. No.1093/2003
          (later renumbered as O.S. No.458/2006) before the Court
          of Principal Civil Judge (Sr. Dn.) Bengaluru Rural District
          (hereinafter referred to as the Trial Court) inter alia seeking
          Specific Performance of the Agreement of Sale. The Trial Court
          upon appreciating the case of the plaintiffs admitted the suit and
          on 17.12.2003 passed a specific Order of Temporary Injunction
          restraining the Defendant Nos. 1-3 from alienating and creating
          third party rights in the Suit Schedule Property.
     (V) The Defendant No.3 however, in contravention of specific
         order of injunction and during the subsistence of the order
         of injunction, sold a portion of Suit Schedule Property to the
         extent of 4 Acres (and 6 Acres) in Sy. No. 176/43 in favour of
         Respondents Nos. 1-2 herein.
     (VI) It is relevant to note that the Defendant No.1 executed a Deed
          of Confirmation in favour of the plaintiffs admitting the Agreement
          of Sale in favour of the plaintiffs and further acknowledged
          the receipt of a substantial sum of Rs. 15,00,000/- out of
          Rs.20,00,000/- in furtherance of the Agreement of Sale dated
          05.09.1995 and further stating that the sale made by her in
          favour of Defendant No.3 was due to the fact that she was
          being misled by some persons of oblique mindsets.
    (VII) At this stage, on 10.07.2007, the Respondent Nos. 1-2
          respectively herein filed an Interlocutory Application - I.A.
          No.4 in O.S. No.458/2006 seeking to implead themselves as
          Defendants in the said suit. The said I.A. No.4 was however
          rejected by the Trial Court vide Order dated 06.08.2014 on the
          ground that the Respondent Nos. 1-2 herein had purchased
1762                                                        [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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          the portion of Suit Schedule Property without the permission of
          the court, during the pendency of suit and in contravention of a
          Specific Order of Injunction against alienation and creation of
          third party rights. The same being contrary to Section 52 of the
          Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short, “Transfer of Property
          Act”). The said order of rejection of impleadment never came
          to be challenged in appeal and thereby, the said issue has
          attained finality.
   (VIII) Thereafter, the Trial Court upon appreciation of evidence on
          record passed its final Judgment and Decree in O.S. No.
          458/2006 decreeing the suit of the plaintiffs and granting relief
          of specific performance with a specific direction to execute a
          sale deed within a period of 2 months. Assailing the legality
          of the said Order, the Defendant No. 3 (who is the Vendor of
          Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 herein) filed R.F.A. No.396/2017 before
          the High Court which came to be dismissed on 04.07.2017.
    (IX) It is in the aforestated backdrop that the Respondent Nos.1 &
         2 respectively, in spite of a Specific Order of Injunction against
         the Defendant No. 3 (Vendor of the Respondent Nos.1 & 2)
         of not creating third party rights, purchased the suit property
         in contravention of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.
         More importantly the application for impleadment in the Suit
         also came to be rejected and having not been challenged by
         the contesting Respondent Nos. 1 & 2, the issue had attained
         finality. After dismissal of the appeal filed by their Vendor i.e.,
         Defendant No. 3, Respondent Nos 1 & 2 proceeded to challenge
         the order of Trial Court decreeing the Suit of the plaintiffs. After
         almost 2 years of passing of the Judgment and Decree dated
         16.09.2016 in O.S. No.458/2006 and 11 years from the filing
         of the Impleadment Application, the Respondent Nos. 1 & 2
         herein preferred RFA No.1303/2018 before the High Court
         challenging the said Decree.
    (X) The Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 filed I.A. No.1 & 3 of 2018
        seeking condonation of delay of 586 days in preferring RFA
        No.1303/2018, and also prayed for leave to appeal. The said
        I. A.s were opposed by the plaintiffs. The High Court, however,
        vide the impugned order allowed both the I.A. Nos. 1 & 3 of
        2018 respectively by condoning the inordinate and unexplained
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                      1763

               H. Anjanappa & Ors. v. A. Prabhakar & Ors.


           delay of 586 days and further permitting the Respondents Nos. 1
           and 2 herein to prefer the appeal by granting leave.
5.   Being aggrieved by the same, the plaintiffs are here before this Court
     with the present appeals.

     SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS
6.   Mr. Anand Sanjay M. Nuli, the learned senior counsel appearing for
     the appellants (original plaintiffs) vehemently submitted that the High
     Court committed a serious error in condoning the unexplained and
     inordinate delay of 586 days in preferring the regular first appeal
     and also by granting leave to file appeal to the Respondent Nos. 1
     and 2 i.e., subsequent purchasers of the suit property. According
     to the learned counsel, it is not just enough for the Respondent
     Nos. 1 and 2 respectively to say that they were not aware of the suit
     proceedings before the Trial Court. The Respondent Nos. 1 and 2
     had, in fact, preferred an application for being impleaded in the suit
     as defendants and such application which was filed on 10.07.2007
     came to be rejected vide order dated 06.08.2014. The said order
     was never challenged by the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein and
     it has attained finality.
7.   Mr. Nuli submitted that having purchased the suit property pendente
     lite on 05.04.2004 and that too in contravention of the order of
     temporary injunction dated 17.12.2003 passed by the Trial Court,
     the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 respectively do not deserve any
     indulgence. It was argued that the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 cannot
     be said to be bona fide purchasers of the suit property for value
     without notice.
8.   In such circumstances referred to above, the learned senior counsel
     prayed that there being merit in his appeals, those may be allowed.

     SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NOS. 1 AND 2
     RESPECTIVELY
9.   Mr. Gautam Narayan, the learned senior counsel appearing for the
     subsequent purchasers i.e. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 submitted
     that no error, not to speak of any error of law, may be said to have
     been committed by the High Court in passing the impugned order.
     According to the learned counsel, there is no question of law involved
     in the present appeals warranting any interference with the impugned
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     order passed by the High Court. He would submit that his clients
     are bona fide subsequent purchasers of the suit property and as
     subsequent purchasers, they have a substantial interest in the suit
     property and also in the final outcome of the suit.
10. The learned counsel submitted that the order passed by the Trial
    Court, in itself, would not render the transfer made to the subsequent
    purchasers ineffective and the validity of such transfer is always
    subject to the outcome of the litigation.
11. The learned counsel submitted that in the present case, collusion
    between the vendor of the answering respondents who are
    subsequent purchasers pendente lite i.e., Defendant No. 3 and the
    plaintiffs, is writ large on the face of the record. He submitted that
    the bar on transfer of immovable property which is subject matter
    of a litigation under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is not
    applicable to the present case as Section 52 expressly excludes
    from its ambit collusive proceedings and, therefore, the High Court
    correctly granted an opportunity to his clients to establish this fact
    by allowing them to prefer an Appeal.
12. He submitted that unfortunately the Defendant No. 3 colluded with
    the plaintiffs in order to get the suit decreed vide judgment dated
    16.09.2016 as is borne out from the following facts:
     (i)    Defendant No. 3 did not cross-examine the witnesses of the
            Plaintiffs;
     (ii)   Defendant No. 3 did not lead any rebuttal evidence in the suit;
     (iii) Despite filing an appeal against the decree dated 16.09.2016, he
           withdrew the Appeal without stating any reason on 04.07.2017,
           and
     (iv) In fact, even after having succeeded in the suit and obtaining
          a decree dated 16.09.2016, the plaintiffs did not get the same
          executed and have allowed the Defendant No.3 to enter into
          a registered agreement of sale dated 12.09.2019 for the suit
          property for a consideration of Rs.20 crores with third parties.
     In light of the aforesaid facts, he submitted that the High Court was
     justified in granting permission to the answering respondents to
     prefer an appeal against the decree dated 16.09.2016 in order to
     defend their rights.
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                      1765

               H. Anjanappa & Ors. v. A. Prabhakar & Ors.


13. He further submitted that the impugned order is also justified in the
    context of settled law that a subsequent purchaser should ordinarily
    be allowed to implead himself in pending proceedings in order to
    protect his interests when the transferor fails to do so.
14. He submitted that the approach of the High Court in the impugned
    order is only a logical extension of the aforesaid principle in so far
    as it only extends to subsequent purchasers, i.e., the answering
    respondents, the opportunity to defend their interests in the face of
    ex facie collusion by their vendors with plaintiffs in the suit.
15. No prejudice would be caused to the plaintiffs if the Respondent
    Nos. 1 and 2 are merely allowed to agitate their appeal on merits
    keeping in view the fact that they are subsequent purchasers for
    value who were duped by their vendor.
16. He submitted that the condonation of delay in preferring the appeals
    is justified in view of Section 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963 read with
    Section 5 thereof.
17. He submitted that his clients, both of whom are senior citizens,
    were residing with their children in Scotland when their application
    for impleadment was rejected by the Trial Court and were assured
    by Defendant No. 3 that he would defend their interest in the suit
    and therefore due to the trust and faith reposed in him, they did not
    make any efforts to prosecute the suit or the Appeal.
18. In the last, the learned counsel submitted that the lis pendens
    purchasers although not arrayed as parties in the suit, yet they are
    the persons who could be said to be claiming as defendants under
    Section 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short “CPC”).
19. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned senior counsel
    prayed that there being no merit in the present appeals, those may
    be dismissed.

     ANALYSIS
20. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
    having gone through the materials on record, the only question that
    falls for our consideration is whether the High Court committed any
    error in passing the impugned order.
21. The High Court in the impugned order observed as under:-
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          “13. In these two applications, we are concerned with the
          prayer for leave to prosecute the appeal and condonation
          of delay. It is not disputed that appellants have purchased
          4 acres of land out of the suit schedule property. They did
          file an application to implead themselves in the suit, but
          unsuccessfully. One of the main ground urged in support
          of the application for condonation of delay is that they
          were assured by their vendor-third defendant that he would
          protect their interest.
          14. Shri Holla, pointed out in para 18 of the judgment that
          the learned trial Judge has adverted to the evidence of
          P.W. 2 and his evidence has remained unchallenged as
          he was not subjected to cross-examination and none of
          the defendants stepped into the witness box. Further the
          third defendant has filed R.F.A.No.396/2017 and withdrew
          the same. It is pleaded in the affidavit in support of the
          application for condonation of delay that the appellants
          are aged 75 and 66 years respectively and living with
          their children in Scotland. This averment has remained
          unrebutted.
          15. Keeping in view the fact that appellants have purchased
          the immovable property measuring 4 acres, that they
          are senior citizens and their vendor has not defended
          the suit nor prosecuted the first appeal filed before this
          Court, we are of the opinion that rights of the parties
          cannot be scuttled by dismissal of the application seeking
          condonation of delay. Curiously appellants’ vendor namely
          the third defendant/ respondent No.8, though served and
          represented by advocate has remained absent. Thus, the
          allegations made against him in appellants’ affidavit have
          remained uncontroverted. Therefore, in our considered
          view, the instant applications merit consideration.
          16. In view of the above, I.As.No.1 & 3 of 2018 are allowed
          subject to appellants paying cost of Rs. 25,000/- for each
          of the applications and cumulatively Rs.50,000/- to the
          plaintiffs/ respondent Nos.1 to 3.”
22. Thus, a plain reading of the impugned order passed by the High Court
    would indicate that what weighed with the High Court was the fact
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                        1767

               H. Anjanappa & Ors. v. A. Prabhakar & Ors.


     that the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 respectively are aged 75 and 66
     years and are living with their children in Scotland. The High Court
     proceeded further to observe that the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have
     purchased 4 acres of land out of a large chunk of subject property
     and their vendor i.e. the original owner failed to protect their interest
     in the suit proceedings.
23. We are of the view that the High Court committed an egregious
    error in condoning delay of 586 days in filing the regular first appeal
    on mere asking. We are not convinced with the sufficient cause
    assigned by the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 respectively for the delay
    of 586 days. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot
    be said that the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were vigilant of their so
    called rights. The High Court should have put an end to the entire
    litigation by declining to condone the delay itself far from granting
    leave to appeal.
24. Having taken the view that the High Court committed an egregious
    error in condoning the delay, we could have closed this matter
    without observing or saying anything further by setting aside the
    impugned order passed by the High Court. However, we would like
    to say something also as regards the grant of leave to appeal by the
    High Court in favour of the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 respectively,
    more particularly in light of two submissions canvassed by Mr.
    Nuli, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants herein. The
    first submission canvassed by the learned counsel is that once
    the impleadment application filed by the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2
    respectively herein invoking the provisions of Order I Rule 10 CPC
    came to be rejected by the Trial Court and the said order attained
    finality, thereafter there is no question of seeking leave to appeal
    against the final decree granting specific performance, and the
    second submission canvassed by the learned counsel is that the
    findings recorded by the Trial Court while rejecting the impleadment
    application would operate as re judicata in the appeal that may
    be filed by the transferee pendente lite against the final decree of
    specific performance.

     LAW GOVERNING THE GRANT OF LEAVE TO APPEAL
25. Sections 96 and 100 respectively of the Code of Civil Procedure,
    1908 (for short, the “CPC”) provide for preferring an appeal from any
    original decree or from decree in appeal respectively. The aforesaid
1768                                                     [2025] 1 S.C.R.

                        Supreme Court Reports


     provisions do not enumerate the categories of persons who can file
     an appeal. However, it is a settled legal proposition that a stranger
     cannot be permitted to file an appeal in any proceedings unless
     he satisfies the court that he falls within the category of aggrieved
     persons. It is only where a judgment and decree prejudicially affects
     a person who is not a party to the proceedings, he can prefer an
     appeal with the leave of the appellate court. [see : Sri V.N. Krishna
     Murthy and another vs. Sri Ravikumar and others (Civil Appeal
     Nos.2701-2704 of 2020, decided on 21st August 2020)].
26. A five-Judge Bench of the Privy Council in Nagendra Nath Dey
    vs. Suresh Chandra Dey, AIR 1932 PC 165, speaking through
    Sir Dinshaw Mulla observed that there is no definition of appeal in
    the CPC, but there is no doubt that any application by a party to
    an appellate Court, asking it to set aside or revise a decision of a
    subordinate Court, is an appeal within the ordinary acceptation of
    the term, and that it is no less an appeal because it is irregular or
    incompetent.
27. A party to a suit adversely affected by a decree or any of his
    representatives-in-interest may file an appeal. But a person who is
    not a party to a decree or order may, with the leave of the court,
    prefer an appeal from such decree or order if he is either bound by
    a decree or order or is aggrieved by it or is otherwise prejudicially
    affected by it.
28. In Adi Pherozshah Gandhi vs. H.M.Seervai, AIR 1971 SC 385, a
    Constitution Bench of this Court in paragraph 46 held thus:
          “46. Generally speaking, a person can be said to be
          aggrieved by an order which is to his detriment, pecuniary
          or otherwise or causes him some prejudice in some form
          or other. A person who is not a party to a litigation has
          no right to appeal merely because the judgment or order
          contains some adverse remarks against him. But it has
          been held in a number of cases that a person who is not
          a party to suit may prefer an appeal with the leave of the
          appellate court and such leave would not be refused where
          the judgment would be binding on him under Explanation
          6 to section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.”
29. In Smt. Sukhrani (dead) by L.R’s and others vs. Hari Shanker and
    others, AIR 1979 SC 1436, the interlocutory order was not challenged.
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                             1769

               H. Anjanappa & Ors. v. A. Prabhakar & Ors.


     The same was challenged after the final order was passed by the
     court. This Court in paragraph 5 of the report held thus:
           “5. It is true that at an earlier stage of the suit, in the
           proceeding to set aside the award, the High Court recorded
           a finding that the plaintiff was not entitled to seek reopening
           of the partition on the ground of unfairness when there
           was neither fraud nor misrepresentation. It is true that the
           plaintiff did not further pursue the matter at that stage by
           taking it in appeal to the Supreme Court but preferred
           to proceed to the trial of his suit. It is also true that a
           decision given at an earlier stage of a suit will bind the
           parties at later stages of the same suit. But it is equally
           well settled that because a matter has been decided at
           an earlier stage by an interlocutory order and no appeal
           has been taken therefrom or no appeal did lie, a higher
           Court is not precluded from considering the matter again
           at a later stage of the same litigation.”
30. We may also refer to the observations of this Court in the case of
    Smt. Jatan Kumar Golcha vs. Golcha Properties Private Limited,
    reported in (1970) 3 SCC 573. The same reads thus:
           “It is well settled that a person who is not a party to the
           suit may prefer an appeal with the leave of the Appellate
           Court and such leave should be granted if he would be
           prejudicially affected by the Judgment.”
31. This Court in the case of State of Punjab and others vs.
    Amar Singh and another, reported in (1974) 2 SCC 70, while dealing
    with the maintainability of appeal by a person who is not party to a
    suit, has observed thus:
           “Firstly, there is a catena of authorities which, following
           the dictum of Lindley, L.J., in re Securities Insurance Co.,
           [(1894) 2 Ch 410] have laid down the rule that a person
           who is not a party to a decree or order may with the leave
           of the Court, prefer an appeal from such decree or order
           if he is either bound by the order or is aggrieved by it or
           is prejudicially affected by it.”
32. In the case of Baldev Singh vs. Surinder Mohan Sharma and
    others, reported in (2003) 1 SCC 34, this Court held that an appeal
1770                                                        [2025] 1 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


     under Section 96 of the CPC would be maintainable only at the
     instance of a person aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment
     and decree. While dealing with the concept of person aggrieved, it
     was observed in paragraph 15 as under:
          “A person aggrieved to file an appeal must be one whose
          right is affected by reason of the judgment and decree
          sought to be impugned.”
33. In the aforesaid judgment, a compromise decree was passed in
    a suit between husband and wife to the effect that their marriage
    stood dissolved from an earlier date by virtue of a memorandum of
    customary dissolution of marriage. The said decree was sought to
    be challenged by a person who was having a property dispute with
    the husband and who had filed complaints against the husband to
    the employer of the husband, in contravention of the Employment
    Rules having contracted a second marriage. This Court, while holding
    that the person who was seeking to challenge the decree had no
    locus standi to do so, held: (a) that there is no dispute that as against
    the decree, an appeal would be maintainable in terms of Section 96
    of the CPC; such an appeal, however would be maintainable only
    at the instance of a person aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the
    judgment and decree; (b) that the dispute between the said person
    and the husband was in relation to a property and the said person,
    save for making complaints to the employer of the husband, had
    nothing to do with the marital status of the husband; (c) locus of a
    person to prefer an appeal in a matter of this nature is vital; (d) the
    court cannot enlarge the scope of locus, where the parties are fighting
    litigations; (e) the pleas of the said person did not disclose as to
    how and in what manner he would be prejudiced if the compromise
    decree was allowed to stand; (f) that the challenge by the said
    person was not bona fide; and, (g) even if the compromise decree
    was a judgment in rem, the said person could not have challenged
    the same as he was not aggrieved therefrom.
34. In the case of A. Subash Babu vs. State of A.P. and another,
    reported in (2011) 7 SCC 616, this Court held as under:
          “The expression ‘aggrieved person’ denotes an elastic and
          an elusive concept. It cannot be confined that the bounds of
          a rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. Its scope and
          meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                           1771

               H. Anjanappa & Ors. v. A. Prabhakar & Ors.


           content and intent of the statute of which contravention is
           alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature
           and extent of the complainant’s interest and the nature
           and extent of the prejudice or injuries suffered by him.”
35. The expression ‘person aggrieved’ does not include a person who
    suffers from a psychological or an imaginary injury; a person aggrieved
    must, therefore, necessarily be one, whose right or interest has been
    adversely affected or jeopardized (see : Shanti Kumar R. Canji vs.
    Home Insurance Co. of New York, (1974) 2 SCC 387 and State of
    Rajasthan & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors., (1977) 3 SCC 592).
36. We may also refer to a Division Bench decision of the Madras High
    Court in the case of Srimathi K. Ponnalagu Ammani vs. The State of
    Madras represented by the Secretary to the Revenue Department,
    Madras and Ors., reported in AIR 1953 Madras 485. The High
    Court laid down the test to find out when it would be proper to grant
    leave to appeal to a person not a party to a proceeding against the
    decree or judgment passed in such proceedings in following words:
           “Now, what is the test to find out when it would be proper to
           grant leave to appeal to a person not a party to a proceeding
           against the decree or judgment in such proceedings?
           We think it would be improper to grant leave to appeal to
           every person who may in some remote or indirect way
           be prejudicially affected by a decree or judgment. We
           think that ordinarily leave to appeal should be granted to
           persons who, though not parties to the proceedings, would
           be bound by the decree or judgment in that proceeding
           and who would be precluded from attacking its correctness
           in other proceedings.”
37. We may look into the decision in the case of Province of Bombay
    vs. W.I. Automobile Association, reported in AIR 1949 Bombay
    141, and the English practice on which that decision is based. In the
    Province of Bombay case, Chagla C.J. and Bhagwati J. held that
    a person not a party to a suit may prefer an appeal if he is affected
    by the order of the Trial Court provided he obtained leave from the
    Court of appeal. The learned Chief Justice observed as follows:
           “The Civil Procedure Code does not in terms lay down as
           to who can be a party to an appeal. But it is clear and this
           fact arises from the very basis of appeals, that only a party
1772                                                      [2025] 1 S.C.R.

                        Supreme Court Reports


          against whom a decision is given has a right to prefer an
          appeal. Even in England the position is the same. But it
          is recognised that a person who is not a party to the suit
          may prefer an appeal if he is affected by the order of the
          trial Court, provided he obtains leave from the Court of
          appeal; therefore whereas in the case of a party to a suit
          he has a right of appeal, in the case of a person not a
          party to the suit who is affected by the order he has no
          right but the court of appeal may in its discretion allow
          him to prefer an appeal.”
                                                (Emphasis supplied)

38. Bhagwati J. referred to the decision of the Madras High Court in
    Indian Bank Limited, Madras vs. Seth Bansiram Jashamal Firm
    through its Managing Partner, AIR 1934 Mad 360, and accepted
    it as authority for the position that no person who is not a party to a
    suit or proceeding has a right of appeal. But if he was aggrieved by
    a decision of the court, the remedy open to him was to approach the
    appellate court and ask for leave to appeal which the appellate court
    would grant in proper cases. The learned Judge cites a passage
    from the decision in In re Securities Insurance Company, (1894)
    2 Ch D 410, where Lindley L.J. said that the practice of the Courts
    of Chancery, both before and after 1862, was well-settled that while
    a person who was a party could appear without any leave a person
    who without being a party was either bound by the order or was
    aggrieved by it or was prejudicially affected by it could not appeal
    without leave.
39. The law has been succinctly explained as regards the grant of
    leave to appeal in In re Markham Markham vs. Markham, (1881)
    16 Ch D 1; In re Padstow Total Loss and Collision Assurance
    Association, (1882) 20 Ch. D 137 at p. 142; Attorney General vs.
    Marquis of Ailesbury, (1885) 16 QBD 408 at p. 412, and In re Ex
    Tsar of Bulgaria, (1921) 1 Ch D 107 at p. 110. The position is thus
    stated in the Annual Practice for 1951 at page 1244:
          “Persons not parties on the record may, by leave obtained
          on an ‘ex parte’ application to the Court of appeal, appeal
          from a judgment or order affecting their interests, as under
          the old practice.”
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                         1773

                H. Anjanappa & Ors. v. A. Prabhakar & Ors.


40. Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 26, page 115, gives the same rule
    in a different form:
            “A person who is not a party and who has not been served
            with such notice (notice of the judgment or order) cannot
            appeal without leave, but a person who might properly
            have been a party may obtain leave to appeal.”
41. In more or less similar terms, the rule and its limits are stated in
    Seton on Judgments and Orders, 7th Edn., Vol. 1, at p. 824:
            “Where the appellant is not a party to the record he can
            only appeal by leave to be obtained on motion ‘ex parte’
            from the Court of Appeal..... Leave to appeal will not be
            given to a person not a party unless his interest is such
            that he might have been made a party.”
                                                   (Emphasis supplied)

42. On the anvil of the decisions cited supra, the instant case may be
    examined. Admittedly, the application filed by the Respondent Nos.
    1 and 2 respectively under Order I Rule 10 CPC for being impleaded
    as party to the suit was rejected by the Trial Court. The said order
    was not challenged. In view of the authoritative pronouncement of the
    cases cited supra, the conclusion is irresistible that rejection of the
    application filed under Order I Rule 10 CPC is per se not a ground
    to reject the application for leave to file appeal. The appellate court
    has to see whether the transferee pendente lite is aggrieved by a
    decree or is otherwise prejudicially affected by it. The appellate court
    has to examine that if the decree is allowed to stand, the same will
    operate res judicata.
43. The principles governing the grant of leave to appeal may be
    summarised as under:
     i.     Sections 96 and 100 of the CPC respectively provide for
            preferring an appeal from an original decree or decree in appeal
            respectively;
     ii.    The said provisions do not enumerate the categories of persons
            who can file an appeal;
     iii.   However, it a settled legal proposition that a stranger cannot be
            permitted to file an appeal in any proceedings unless he satisfies
            the court that he falls within the category of an aggrieved person;
1774                                                         [2025] 1 S.C.R.

                          Supreme Court Reports


     iv.    It is only where a judgment and decree prejudicially affects a
            person who is not a party to the proceedings, he can prefer an
            appeal with the leave of the court;
     v.     A person aggrieved, to file an appeal, must be one whose right
            is affected by reason of the judgment and decree sought to
            be impugned;
     vi.    The expression “person aggrieved” does not include a person
            who suffers from a psychological or an imaginary injury;
     vii.   It would be improper to grant leave to appeal to every person
            who may in some remote or indirect way be prejudicially affected
            by a decree or judgment; and
     viii. Ordinarily leave to appeal should be granted to persons who,
           though not parties to the proceedings, would be bound by
           the decree or judgment in that proceeding and who would be
           precluded from attacking its correctness in other proceedings.
44. The issue can also be examined from a different angle.
45. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act reads thus:
            “52. Transfer of property pending suit relating thereto.—
            During the pendency in any Court having authority within
            the limits of India excluding the State of Jammu and
            Kashmir or established beyond such limits by the Central
            Government of any suit or proceedings which is not
            collusive and in which any right to immoveable property
            is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot
            be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the
            suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other
            party thereto under any decree or order which may be
            made therein, except under the authority of the Court and
            on such terms as it may impose.”
46. A transfer pendete lite is not illegal ipso jure but remains subservient
    to the pending litigation. In Nagubai Ammal & Ors. vs. B. Shama
    Rao & Ors., AIR 1956 SC 593, this Court while interpreting Section
    52 of the Transfer of Property Act observed:
            “…The words “so as to affect the rights of any other party
            thereto under any decree or order which may be made
            therein”, make it clear that the transfer is good except to
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                              1775

               H. Anjanappa & Ors. v. A. Prabhakar & Ors.


           the extent that it might conflict with rights decreed under
           the decree or order. It is in this view that transfers pendente
           lite have been held to be valid and operative as between
           the parties thereto.”
47. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Vinod Seth v.
    Devinder Bajaj, (2010) 8 SCC 1, where this Court held that Section
    52 does not render transfers affected during the pendency of the
    suit void but only render such transfers subservient to the rights as
    may be eventually determined by the Court. The following passage
    in this regard is apposite:
           “42. It is well settled that the doctrine of lis pendens does
           not annul the conveyance by a party to the suit, but only
           renders it subservient to the rights of the other parties to the
           litigation. Section 52 will not therefore render a transaction
           relating to the suit property during the pendency of the suit
           void but render the transfer inoperative insofar as the other
           parties to the suit. Transfer of any right, title or interest in
           the suit property or the consequential acquisition of any
           right, title or interest, during the pendency of the suit will
           be subject to the decision in the suit.”
48. In Thomson Press (India) Ltd. vs. Nanak Builders & Investors
    P. Ltd., [2013] 2 SCR 74, Justice T.S. Thakur (As His Lordship then
    was), while concurring with Justice M.Y. Eqbal, summed up the legal
    position as follows:
           “There is, therefore, little room for any doubt that the
           transfer of the suit property pendete lite is not void ab
           initio and that the purchaser of any such property takes the
           bargain subject to the rights of the plaintiff in the pending
           suit. Although the above decisions do not deal with a fact
           situation where the sale deed is executed in breach of an
           injunction issued by a competent Court, we do not see
           any reason why the breach of any such injunction should
           render the transfer whether by way of an absolute sale
           or otherwise ineffective. The party committing the breach
           may doubtless incur the liability to be punished for the
           breach committed by it but the sale by itself may remain
           valid as between the parties to the transaction subject only
           to any directions which the competent Court may issue in
           the suit against the vendor.
1776                                                      [2025] 1 S.C.R.

                       Supreme Court Reports


        The third dimension which arises for consideration is about
        the right of a transferee pendete lite to seek addition as a
        party defendant to the suit under Order I, Rule 10 CPC.
        I have no hesitation in concurring with the view that no one
        other than parties to an agreement to sell is a necessary
        and proper party to a suit. The decisions of this Court
        have elaborated that aspect sufficiently making any further
        elucidation unnecessary. The High Court has understood
        and applied the legal propositions correctly while dismissing
        the application of the appellant under Order I, Rule 10
        CPC. What must all the same be addressed is whether
        the prayer made by the appellant could be allowed under
        Order XXII Rule 10 of the CPC, which is as under:
        “Procedure in case of assignment before final order in suit. –
        (1) In other cases of an assignment, creation or devolution
        of any interest during the pendency of a suit, the suit may,
        by leave of the court, be continued by or against the person
        to or upon whom such interest has come or devolved.
        (2) The attachment of a decree pending an appeal
        therefrom shall be deemed to be an interest entitling the
        person who procured such attachment to the benefit of
        sub-rule (1).”
        A simple reading of the above provision would show that in
        cases of assignment, creation or devolution of any interest
        during the pendency of a suit, the suit may, by leave of
        the Court, be continued by or against the person to or
        upon whom such interest has come or devolved. What
        has troubled us is whether independent of Order I Rule 10
        CPC the prayer for addition made by the appellant could be
        considered in the light of the above provisions and, if so,
        whether the appellant could be added as a party-defendant
        to the suit. Our answer is in the affirmative. It is true that
        the application which the appellant made was only under
        Order I Rule 10 CPC but the enabling provision of Order
        XXII Rule 10 CPC could always be invoked if the fact
        situation so demanded. It was in any case not urged by
        counsel for the respondents that Order XXII Rule 10 could
        not be called in aid with a view to justifying addition of the
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                         1777

               H. Anjanappa & Ors. v. A. Prabhakar & Ors.


           appellant as a party defendant. Such being the position
           all that is required to be examined is whether a transferee
           pendete lite could in a suit for specific performance be
           added as a party defendant and, if so, on what terms.”
                                                (Emphasis supplied)

49. We shall now look into Section 146 CPC. It provides:
           “146. Proceedings by or against representatives ─ Save
           as otherwise provided by this Court or by any law for the
           time being in force, where any proceeding may be taken
           or application made by or against any person, then the
           proceeding may be taken or application may be made by
           or against any person claiming under him.”
50. A lis pendens transferee from the defendant, though not arrayed as
    a party in the suit, is still a person claiming under the defendant.
    The same principle of law is recognized in a different perspective
    by Rule 16 of Order XXI of the CPC which speaks of transfer or
    assignment inter vivos or by operation of law made by the plaintiff-
    decree-holder. The transferee may apply for execution of the decree
    of the Court and the decree will be available for execution in the same
    manner and subject to the same conditions as if the application were
    made by the decree-holder. It is relevant to note that a provision like
    Section 146 of the CPC was not be found in the preceding Code
    of Civil Procedure, 1859 and was for the first time incorporated in
    the CPC. In Order XXI Rule 16 also an explanation was inserted
    through amendment made by Act No. 104 of 1976 w.e.f. 01.02.1977
    where by the operation of Section 146 CPC was allowed to prevail
    independent of Order XXI Rule 16 CPC.
51. A decree passed against the defendant is available for execution
    against the transferee or assignee of the defendant-judgment-
    debtor and it does not make any difference whether such transfer
    or assignment has taken place after the passing of the decree or
    before the passing of the decree without notice or leave of the Court.
52. The law laid down by a four-Judge Bench of this Court in Smt.
    Saila Bala Dassi vs. Sm. Nirmala Sundari Dassi and Anr., [1958]
    SCR 1287, is apt for resolving the issue arising for decision herein.
    A transferee of property from defendant during the pendency of the
    suit sought himself to be brought on record at the stage of appeal.
1778                                                        [2025] 1 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


     The High Court dismissed the application as it was pressed only by
     reference to Order XXII Rule 10 of the CPC and it was conceded by
     the applicant that, not being a person who had obtained a transfer
     pending appeal, he was not covered within the scope of Order 22
     Rule 10. In an appeal preferred by such transferee, this Court upheld
     the view of the High Court that a transferee prior to the filing of the
     appeal could not be brought on record in appeal by reference to
     Order XXII Rule 10 of the CPC. However, the Court held that an
     appeal is a proceeding for the purpose of Section 146 and further
     the expression “claiming under” is wide enough to include cases of
     devolution and assignment mentioned in Order XXII Rule 10. Whoever
     is entitled to be but has not been brought on record under Order XXII
     Rule 10 in a pending suit or proceeding would be entitled to prefer
     an appeal against the decree or order passed therein if his assignor
     could have filed such an appeal, there being no prohibition against
     it in the CPC. A person having acquired an interest in suit property
     during the pendency of the suit and seeking to be brought on record
     at the stage of the appeal can do so by reference to Section 146
     of the CPC which provision being a beneficent provision should be
     construed liberally and so as to advance justice and not in a restricted
     or technical sense. Their Lordships held that being a purchaser
     pendente lite, a person will be bound by the proceedings taken by
     the successful party in execution of decree and justice requires that
     such purchaser should be given an opportunity to protect his rights.
     [See : Raj Kumar vs. Sardari Lal, (2004) 2 SCC 601]
53. In Dhurandhar Prasad Singh vs. Jai Prakash University, reported
    in (2001) 6 SCC 534, this Court held that the plain language of Order
    XXII Rule 10 CPC does not suggest that leave can be sought by that
    person alone upon whom the interest has devolved. It simply says
    that the suit may be continued by the person upon whom such an
    interest has devolved and this applies in a case where the interest of
    the plaintiff has devolved. Likewise, in a case where interest of the
    defendant has devolved, the suit may be continued against such a
    person upon whom interest has devolved, but in either eventuality, for
    continuance of the suit against the persons upon whom the interest
    has devolved during the pendency of the suit, leave of the court has
    to be obtained. If it is laid down that leave can be obtained by that
    person alone upon whom interest of a party to the suit has devolved
    during its pendency, then there may be preposterous results as such
    a party might not be knowing about the litigation and consequently
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                           1779

                H. Anjanappa & Ors. v. A. Prabhakar & Ors.


     not feasible for him to apply for leave and if a duty is cast upon him,
     then in such an eventuality he would be bound by the decree even
     in cases of failure to apply for leave. As a rule of prudence, initial
     duty lies upon the plaintiff to apply for leave in case the factum of
     devolution was within his knowledge or with due diligence could
     have been known by him. The person upon whom the interest has
     devolved may also apply for such a leave so that his interest may
     be properly represented as the original party, if it ceased to have
     an interest in the subject-matter of dispute by virtue of devolution
     of interest upon another person, may not take interest therein, in
     ordinary course, which is but natural, or by colluding with the other
     side. If the submission of Mr. Nuli is accepted, a party upon whom
     interest has devolved, upon his failure to apply for leave, would
     be deprived from challenging correctness of the decree by filing a
     properly constituted suit on the ground that the original party having
     lost interest in the subject of dispute, did not properly prosecute or
     defend the litigation or, in doing so, colluded with the adversary.
54. In Amit Kumar Shaw vs. Farida Khatoon, AIR 2005 SC 2209,
    this Court held that a transferee pendente lite to the extent he has
    acquired interest from the defendant is vitally interested in the litigation,
    where the transfer is of the entire interest of the defendant; the latter
    having no more interest in the property may not properly defend the
    suit. He may collude with the plaintiff. Hence, though the plaintiff is
    under no obligation to make a lis pendens transferee a party, under
    Order XXII Rule 10 an alienee pendente lite may be joined as party.
    As already noticed, the court has discretion in the matter which must
    be judicially exercised and an alienee would ordinarily be joined as a
    party to enable him to protect his interests. The court has held that
    a transferee pendente lite of an interest in immovable property is a
    representative-in-interest of the party from whom he has acquired that
    interest. He is entitled to be impleaded in the suit or other proceedings
    where his predecessor-in-interest is made a party to the litigation; he
    is entitled to be heard in the matter on the merits of the case. This
    judgment has been followed in Thomson Press (India) Ltd. (supra).
55. In fact, the scope of Order I Rule 10 and Order XXII Rule 10 CPC
    is similar. Therefore, the principles applicable to Order XXII Rule
    10 CPC, in order to bring a purchaser pendente lite on record, are
    applicable to Order I Rule 10 CPC. Under Order I Rule 10(2) CPC,
    the Court is required to record a finding that person sought to be
1780                                                         [2025] 1 S.C.R.

                          Supreme Court Reports


     impleaded as party in the suit is either necessary or proper party.
     While Section 146 and Order XXII Rule 10 CPC confers right upon
     the legal representative of a party to the suit to be impleaded with
     the leave of the Court and continue the litigation. While deciding an
     application under Section 146 and Order XXII Rule 10 CPC, the
     Court is not require to go in the controversy as to whether person
     sought to be impleaded as party in the suit is either necessary or
     proper party. If the person sought to be impleaded as party is legal
     representative of a party to the suit, it is sufficient for the Court to
     order impleadment/substitution of such person.
56. Thus, a lis pendens transferee though not brought on record under
    Order XXII Rule 10 CPC, is entitled to seek leave to appeal against the
    final decree passed against this transferor, the defendant in the suit.
    However, whether to grant such leave or not is within the discretion
    of the court and such discretion should be exercised judiciously in
    the facts and circumstances of each case.
57. Having regard to the fact that the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2
    respectively purchased the suit property during the pendency of
    the suit instituted for specific performance and that too, while the
    injunction against the original owner (transferor) was operating, the
    Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 respectively could not be said to have
    even made out any good case for grant of leave to appeal.
58. From a conspectus of all the aforesaid judgments, touching upon
    the present aspect, broadly, the following would emerge:
     i.     First, for the purpose of impleading a transferee pendente lite,
            the facts and circumstances should be gone into and basing
            on the necessary facts, the Court can permit such a party to
            come on record, either under Order I Rule 10 CPC or under
            Order XXII Rule 10 CPC, as a general principle;
     ii.    Secondly, a transferee pendente lite is not entitled to come on
            record as a matter of right;
     iii.   Thirdly, there is no absolute rule that such a transferee pendente
            lite, with the leave of the Court should, in all cases, be allowed
            to come on record as a party;
     iv.    Fourthly, the impleadment of a transferee pendente lite would
            depend upon the nature of the suit and appreciation of the
            material available on record;
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                            1781

                  H. Anjanappa & Ors. v. A. Prabhakar & Ors.


     v.       Fifthly, where a transferee pendente lite does not ask for leave
              to come on record, that would obviously be at his peril, and the
              suit may be improperly conducted by the plaintiff on record;
     vi.      Sixthly, merely because such transferee pendente lite does not
              come on record, the concept of him (transferee pendente lite) not
              being bound by the judgment does not arise and consequently
              he would be bound by the result of the litigation, though he
              remains unrepresented;
     vii.     Seventhly, the sale transaction pendente lite is hit by the
              provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act; and,
     viii. Eighthly, a transferee pendente lite, being an assignee of interest
           in the property, as envisaged under Order XXII Rule 10 CPC,
           can seek leave of the Court to come record on his own or at
           the instance of either party to the suit.

     CONCLUSION
59. In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that the impugned
    order passed by the High Court is unsustainable in law.
60. In the result, the appeals succeed and are hereby allowed. The
    impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside.
61. If the Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 feel that they have been duped or
    cheated by the Respondent No. 7/Defendant No. 3, then it shall be
    open for them to avail appropriate legal remedy before the appropriate
    forum in accordance with law for the purpose of recovery of the
    amount towards sale consideration paid at the time of execution of
    the sale deed.
62. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of accordingly.

     Result of the case: Appeals allowed.




     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Niti Richhariya, Hony. Associate Editor
                                 (Verified by - Shadan Farasat, Sr. Adv.)