Supreme Court of India
H.D. VORAversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
- Citation
- 1984 INSC 44
- Decided
- 22 February 1984
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- P N BHAGWATI
Holding
An order of requisition, even if valid when made, ceases to be effective after a reasonable period and cannot continue for an unreasonably long time such as thirty years.
Summary
The appellant was allotted a flat in 1951 under an order of requisition issued by the State Government under the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, without the order specifying a public purpose. He occupied the flat, paying rent irregularly, and later the building was purchased by the third respondent who sought derequisition, arguing that the requisition could not continue for an indefinite period such as thirty years. The High Court ordered derequisition and eviction, which the appellant appealed. The Supreme Court held that a requisition, even if valid when made, must be of temporary character and cannot remain effective for an unreasonably long period; thirty years was deemed unreasonable. Consequently, the order of requisition was deemed void after the lapse of a reasonable time and the High Court's order was affirmed. The appeal was dismissed, with a conditional stay allowing the appellant to remain until a specified date upon undertaking to vacate.
Issues considered
- The order of requisition must state a public purpose.
- Whether a requisition can continue for an indefinite period.
- Whether an order of requisition remains valid after a lapse of thirty years.
- Whether payment of rent makes the occupier a tenant, thereby affecting the requisition.
- The distinction between requisition and acquisition of property.
Legislation cited
- Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948s. 6(4)(a)
- Constitution of Indias. Art.31(2)
Subjects
requisitionpublic purposetemporary natureland acquisitionBombay Land Requisition Actvalidity of requisition orderderequisitionacquisition vs requisitioncompensationtenancy
Judgment
.. \
A.
. H.D. VORA
v.
,1 '
STATE OF MAHARASflTRA & ORS. B
'•
. . Februaj'y 22,. 1984
.· ....
' '
[ P.N': BHAGWATI AND SABYASACHI MmcHARJI,
(
JJ.) • c
,
!)--~..,;.- Coi1~fifution'ojlndia 1950. Artic/eJl (2) &·Seventh SChedtile, List Ill f,lltrY ~2.
Acquisition and 'requisition of proPerty-Dijferences-Wh.fll a1e.
'
D
·. Power of r"equi.~itioh!.___WJ,;,, e.l.:erf'i.\'rlb!C'-Fo~· a' public purpose ·of trat1Jito1;y
· character ....
'
,__.._ iJ01nbaY land R_eq:tisition. Act 194? sect/on.6(_4)(a)-'-Requis_ition Of resid~ntial
/lat-Whether ~:ould conti.'1;1e'for a'I indefinite peririd.....:.-Tcnant payi~g rent (11rectfv ./o
landlord-Tenant whether hecoi11e4 direct tenant of. lan.d/ord-Whether feqtdsllion
.\
.
A._.;..order should set out explicitly lhe public-purpoSe.
\'
Prl:ictice and Procedure:. Writ Peition.::....Challenging Order of re-i}Uis1tio11 offiai
after a l~pse of thii-ty.,yearS-Whether maintainable.·. . . , '
'-' ' '
F
.• The appellant applied to.the Accomnlodation Depaitrnent of the Staie- Govern~
n1ent for allotment of a flai. -The Sta"te Governmentt urned down. the request but. ·
iequisitioned the flat bYa~ order dated 9th April: 195:1, under cl~use (a) ~·r ;ub~section
( 4) ·of section 6 of the
Bombay L~nci Requisition. Act, 19~8: Thi~ ordef of requ~si~ '
.tion: did not set out the pu'blic. purpose· for which the flat was_ reQuiSitiont!d. The_
A"lsistant Controller. of·Acconimo·datiori
. . by an Order
/
'
dated 25th' April,
. 1951 allotted . -G
the requisitiori~d flat to the apPellant who e;ntered into Occupation and paid rent
to the land!ady from time "to tim~_ but as he w.?s irregular and- ·comfnitted1 s_evcral \
defaults the Controller .of AccoinmodatiOTI sought. to terminate the atiotment. )
'
/
. · ·._: . , The 3rd re~p~ndent, on 3d!h May, }973 purchased .the: .buQding. in which the H
~-equ1sition'ed "flat was situated, and re~uested thC State' Govcr~M\nt '16 de-:rcquisi-
.· ' ' . ' .. . . ' . . .! ' .
.
..
'
, .
•
694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984) 2 S.C.R.
' •
A · ( tion .the ftat, as the aHotinent of tfie" fiat in favour of the appellant could not be s~id
ta bC for a• .PubliC purpose~ .. The State Govornn1enf did ·not pay any heed t~ this
. request.
-The 3rd respondent, thereupon filed a \Vrit Petition in the Hjgh Court
chaUengii:ig the validity of the order or .requisition, Contending that it. could not
B survfyf _for such a long·periOct 9.f time ahd that the Stilte Go~~rnment Was lherefore1'
bpund t.o de-requisition the flat. The High Court allowed the Writ Petition arid
directed the State Goveh1mcnt and the Controller of Accon1modation to de-r0Qui1i- ·•
·rion the flat, take steps. to evict the appellant, ilnd hand oYer vac:lnt pos!cssion.
In ap1~eal this ca·urt, it was contended inter alia on behalf of the appe1lant--
·,oonant. that even if the order of requisition was inYalid as having been made foi;:a pur-
pose· Other thf_ln a public purpose, the "3rd.respondent was not cntillcd to challen1e
the order of requisition after a lapse of ove~· 30 years and that the W~it Petition should. ·
haVc ·been dismissed by the Hig~ Court.
'·
Distnissing the Appeal,
- ... -
. 1-.IELD ;, l. The order .Qf rt<l-uisitioti c?ven if it was valid when made, ceased to
. '
be v<ilid and effective after expiration of a reasonable p~riod of ti1:11e· What period of ...>
time ·must be _regarded as -reasonable for the continuahce of an order-of roquisi-
tiofl depends on the htcts alld circu1nstances ot each case. [700 H]
E
In the inStant case, the or.der of requisition was made as far back as 9th
April 1951 a-nd·cvcn if it was made for ):iousing a homeless pefson,,· arid .. the appel-
lant at that tin1e;.fc!I \Vi thin that category, if cannot be alloVired to 'continue. for such
an inordin:~tcly long: pcrio.d as thirty years. [700 G] . .-- ""'
F
'·
2. Requisitioning 1nust be made for a public purpo11e• .11.nd 10 lona'aa iktr•
is a public purpose for ~hich an order of rcquisitiOn is made, it would b1 vaiid
irresp.cciive of whether such public purpose is recited in the o;der of fequisition or
not. But if the order is cha!lang"d• the State Goyernment would. have to aati1fy the
Court by placing the ·necessary.facts. sho":ing tbti pubic P\l}pose for which thr: erder
G of requi~ition. was 1nadc. [69'8 B,G]
3. There is a basic and· funda1ncntal distinction reco&nised by law betw_eea
requisition and acquisition. The Constitution itself in Entry 42 of List III of S1voatR
H Schedule maltes~a dis_tinction ~ehveen acquisition and requisitioning of ;,Property,
The ·origirial ~rticle 31 clause (2) of t~c Constitution also rccoa:nis~ this distincties.
••
. . '.
•
695.
H.D. VORA v. MAHARASHTRA
I
between con1pulsory acquisition and requisition -of p_roperty. ·The_ two conct-pts, / ·A.
o-~e of·rcquisition and the other or"acquisitidn arc tt)_tally 'Ji~1inct aild independent. 4'
·A~quisiting 111eans the aCquiring of the Cntire title ofThc·rXpropriatcd owner wliaf-"
ever the ..:Jature. and extent of that title m<ly b'c:,Thc entire bundle of riSliiS which
.was vested in the original holder passes on acquisition to the acquircr leaving nothing
tO the forn1er. The concept of acquisition aS an air of per'n1anenoe and finality in . ·•
a
ihat there .is tran~,ference of the title of the original_.holder to the acqui-ri~g _autho-_
B
rity. But the conCept of requisitiOn involves n1crc!y _taking of '.'do1n:iin or control
0 _ver propertY without acquiring rights of owncrsl~ip" and n1us.1.by itsscry na_turc
be of tempo'rary duration. [699 .F-H] .;
7
•
4. If the Govern111ent wants to f.ak.I'; over the propcrt.J' fo'r an iJ::1dcfinite period ·
of time, the Govcrnmen.t mUst acquire'· tiJ.e,_proPcrly but 'it cannot use fhe p~wer. -of c'
requiSition foi achiCvillg tha.t objCct.. The power.Of r~quisiiio_n is cxcrcisc~ble by tile
Government onJy_ for a ·Public' purpose which is of~ a tntnsitory ~.character..lf the'
public purpose for \Vhich the -preinises ·a re required is of a perennial or perman·cnt
characte~.fron1 th~ very incepti.on, no order can. be pas.Sect r.cciuisition.ing the premi-
ses and in such a case the order of requisition, if passed. would a fraud upon the
.statute. \Vhat ever be'th.e Public pu"rpose for which""an order of reqllisition ffiade, it. D
Is by its ·vefy nature 'temporary in ch<i racter.'an~·· it cannot ~ndure for _an . ind..:finite
period of time.. The period of tin1e .for Which an Order of requisition n1ay be conti-
.nued ca'nnot be:an unreasonably long period S~ch as thirty y~ars' a1id ~t must therefoJ~C
be held, that. the order of requisition, cVcn: "if .la lid when 1nade, ceased to bC valid
+ and effective. The Writ ,Petition ch<ii!engin& the order of r·equisition after a. Iaps'e
of over thirty years was therefore ri1aintainable. [700 C-F, 101 ·A]
E
5. The a~·~llant Was an a~lotteeof the flat un~e_r t~1·~
order of re~uisi~orl.
and
·he was liable to pay con1pensation for the use and occL1pation of the fla't to the State
Govetnment and the State-Governnient, \Vas in -its turn liable to pay con1pensatioll
\
·for the requisitioning of thC flat._ Jf, instead of. the appellant payillg .. ~olnpensation
tO the State Govern~ent and, the Stat~ Goycrnn1cnt nuking payn1.cnt of an identical E
amount to. the _owner, the appeJl~ni paid directl.Y tO. the oWner with the -exprcs-s ~r
imP.:liCd ass~nt of the State ·aovernmeni; the order of:req~isition could ~oi cease
to _be valid and effective•.It did nOt · rliatt~r whether the appellant .described the.
amount pa.id by hi1n to the ownef as rent, because whatevet was.do11e by hin1 was
uuder the ordC:r,of ret}Uisitjon and So Jong as the order Of requisition sto"od,. hiS pos-
~essio~ of the flat Was attfibutable · OnlY to the Order of .rcquiSitioi1 and.·nO ·pay- G
ment of an.amount' described as rent could possible alter the nature of hi~ occ\lpatioll
·of the flat or make-~in1 a tenant in respeC.t of th~.fl~t. 1701 F-H]
•
State of.Bo111bay v. -Bhanji Munj1 & Anr.·(1955] S.C.R. -777; Chiranf;ttal's H ,~
case [1950] S.C.R. 869; referred to.
T=
696 SUPREME (,QURT REPORTii (1984] . 2 S.C:..R.
..
....._
A CIVIL APPELLATE )uRISDICTION : Civil Appeal. No. 1212
of.1984. , '
Appeai by Special leave.lro~ the Judgment and order dated
'
B
.th\ 20th October, 1983 of the Bombay High Court in W 0 Appeal
. No. 779 of 1983. ·
'
P.R. Mridu!, G. l'ishwanath & Par(iat Sinha, for the App~llan1.
c Ram Jethma/ani & Soli J. Sorahjee, M.N. Shroff. Ta/egankar
&: B. v. Desai, for the Respondents. ·
The Judgi11ent of the Court was delivered bv
D
BHAGwATi, .J. Special Leave Granted.·
/ This appeal by ~pecial leave raises a short.question of la;_; as
to whether an order of requisition of premises can be continued for
E an indefinite period of tinte ot it must necessarily be ~f temporary
duration. The facts giving rise to this. appeal are few' and may be
b;iefly stated as follows :
. . . . . . \ :
.One Rukmanibai was the owner of a building bearing .House 1
F \ No. '65, Police Station Road,. Ville Parle West, Bombay. The
ground
; .
floor of this building
' ' . wlii~h was in the
comprised of- a flat ~
occupation of one N.C. Shah as a tenant and ·since N.C. Shah•was
going. to vacate the flat, Rukmanibai gave intimatiqh of the proposed
'yacanc)' to the State Government· and requested the State 'Govern-
ment to allot the· premises to the appellant who was., h'er nearest
G · relative. The appellant also addressed' a letter dated 12th' March '
1951 to the Chief.Officer of the Accommodation Department of the
Government of Bombay requesting that 'he should be allotted the·
.fiat which was going to . be vacated by N.C. Shah. It appears
however that the tequest of the appeallant was turned down by the
H ,' · State Government
. \
and ultimately the fiat was ' requisitioned
. .
by ' an -...
·
.
order dated 9th Apt.ii 1951 made by the State Government in exer-
J ' ' '
/
/
.. H.D: VORA V'. MAHARASHTRA (Bhagwati, J.)
. .' I
697
I ..,
' .
icise of the.powers co.nferred u~der clause (a) ·or sub-section (4) of
section ().of the Bombay Land Requisition Act.·· 1948. This order i
of req~isition did. not set out the public purpose for which the fiat .
·was .'.requisitioned." Now curiously enough, though it was decided
. '
by the State Government not io. ailot the fiat to the appellant and
his application. for al!otment was spe.cifically rejected, the Assistant
;Contr01lerof Accommodation p·ossed an order on 25th April 1951 · B
. alloting the..._.req1lisit.ioned 'fiat to the appcll~nt and pursuant to the
:. .. ord•'r of aJlotm0 nt, the appella~t entred 'into occupation of ·the fiat.
The appellant thereafter"' paid rent to Rukmanibai from time to
. ____..--. time but the payinent "of rent wes very irregular and .the appella~t
. committed sever~] defaults . in: payment of refit with the result that
.. not Jess than seven orders had to be passed _by ·the Accommodation
Department of "the Government {)f Bombay ctifetting the appellant .
c
·.to vacate the.flat beca.use his chronic defaults. Uitimatcly, however,
each time no . action for evidion was taken by .th_e .Controller of·
Acconlinod?tion. presumably bepuse the appeJtant must haye paid··
up the rent. It is significant t6 note that in· the· year 1964 the
. ·: .appel!ent: requested tlie Controller of-Accommodation to defequistion. D
·the fiat and f~ allow him to become direct tenant.of Rukmani Bai
but .his applicati,on was ·rejected. by letter dated 25th Ma_rch 1964.
. The appeliant also· thereafter i~•. the year .J 979 ·applied to the.
Controller of Accommodation f,)r sa.nction .. to erect a kitchen ·
platform ii) the· fiat put this appli\:ation was turned down by ·a letter
dated 20th March 1979. addressed by the Controller of Accommoda- , E
.
A...,/. tion.- The appe!Jant throughout. this period conti~ued to occupy the
fiat ·as an allottec under the orde.r of requisition ,and paid. rent to
Ruk]llanibai frpm time ·io. time, though i"regulary. '\
F·
The building in .which the requisitioned fia!.w~s ~ituate, was
purchased by the 3rd fespondent froln Rnkmanibai on 30th May.
1973. 'fhe 3rd-respondent, after purchase of the building,· regues-
ted the· State .Government to derec(Uisition ·the fiat - "inas111uch as
_;, the attotment of the. ·fiat in .. favour of the appellant -could not be
for a public' purpose. .·The "S.ta te Government diif not pay· any G
heel! to this request of the ,3rd respondent ·with the result, tha.t tbe .
3rd re&pondent was constrained io 'file writ petition ·Np. 1210. of.
1980 in the High Co11rt of Bombay challenging the· validity qf
the order of requisition a~ld co1tlellding that it cO~ld- Iloi "surviv~
for such a. long period of ·time and .the State Government was
th~refore bound. to derequis.ilion the fiat. ·
~·
.~
. ,.
698' SUPREME COURT RErOl\TS . [1984] 2 S.C.R.
A One of the grounds on' which the validity o(tpe order of
requisition was challenged· w~s that the order of requisition. did
not set out the public purpose for which it was made, This ground
of chalien'ge was negatived .by the Hi~h · Co~rt and, .in our opinion,
rightly, because it is not necessary that the orcter of requisition
must explicitly set out the public purpose for which it is made,
B · The only requirement of the law is that the i;.equisitioning must .
• be made• for a public ·purpose and: so long as there is a public
purpose for which an order of requisition, is made, it would be
· _valid irrespective whether s·uch public purpose is recited in the
order of requisition or not It bas, ip fact, been Sp held by this Court - . /--·
· in State ofBombay v. Bhanji Munji & A.nr. <1 > where Bose, J. speaking
c on behalf, of the Court pbserveq :
/ ,
'
"In our opinion, it is not necessary to set out
the purpose of the requisition in the. order. The
desirability' of such a course is obvious because when
it is n.ot done, proof of \he purpose must be given in
D other ways and' that exposes the authorities to the
kind of charges we find here and to the danger that
the courts will consider them well founded. But in.
itself an omission to set out the purpose in the order
is not fatal so long as the facts are established to the
E. · satisfaction Of the court in some other way." .
- ,
The order of requisition could n~
therefore be successfully . . J :
attacked on the ground that it did not set out the public purpose
for which it was,made, But as pointed out by Bose, J. in the above·
dassagc quoted from this iddgment in Bhanji Munji's case (supra),
F the State Government would have to show ihat the order of requisi- 'J<•
.,
tion was made for a public· purpose andAhe necessary facts showii1g.
the public purpose for which the order of requisition was made would '
have to be established by the State Government to the satisfaction
of the court. The High Court held ill' the present case that no
material was placed' before it to. s.ho,w what was the public purpose
G for which the order of requisition was made and in fact, theQ' was
no denial on the. part of the State Governme,nt or the appella'ht of
the averment made on behalf of the 3rd. respondent that the appellant
was neither a government servant nor a homeless.person. This view
H
..
taken. by the High Court appears to be well-lounded and it is J\Ot
(1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 777.
.•
'
H.p. VORA v, MAHARASHTRA (Bhagwati, J.)_ 699
'possi~ to hold on the material placed_ before us that the order of A
···"'" requisition was· made for a public purpose.
But it was contended on ·behalf of the appellant that even ·•
if the order of requisition was invalid as having lieen made for a
·purpose oti1or than a pitbliC p·u.rpose, the ·3rd responileni was not ' B
entitled to challenge the. same aftet-a lapse of over _30 years and the
writ petitio•1 should therefore have been dismissed by the Higl1 Court.·
Now if the only , ground. on which the order .of· requisition· was
challenged. in the. writ petition was that it was not. made for a
public purpose and was therefore void; perhaps it might have .been
possible to successfully repel· this ground of challenge by raising an c.
• olojection that the High Court Shouk\. not have entertaiaed the writ
petition Ghallenging the order of requisition "aftet a lapse of over 30
years. But we find that there fa also another ground of challenge·
· urged on .behalf of the 3rd respondent.and that is a' very formidable·
, ground· to which there is no· answer, The argument urged under'
this ground of challenge wits that'-'tn order of ',requisition is by jts D
very nature temporary in character· anq it 'cannot endure for 'an·
ii1definite period Of tim'e. and the Order·of }eqisition in the .present case
therefore ceased to b~ valid and .effective after the expiration of a
reasonable per.ad of time and that it could ·not, under any_ circum-
+
stance~, conti11ue for a period of about 3u years and hencf it was
liable to be. quashed and \ . set aside or in any event the State Govern- E
ment was bound to revoke "the .same and to_ dereqilisition the flat.
This Contention has·, in o~ur opinion, great fo_r,;e and must be sustained.
There is a -basic and fundamental distinction, recognised by .law.
betw~en r,:;quis.ition and acquisitinn_. The Consqtution itself in Entry
42 '.of List !fl of the Seventh Schedule makes a distinction between.
acquisition and requisitioning of property. The original Article 31. F
clause (2) cif the .,Constitution also recognised 'this distihction _bet-
ween . Compuisory acquisition and. requisitioning of ·pri,peity. The
two concfepts, one of requisition and the· other of acquisition are
totally :c',istiric\ and independent. Acquisition.., means ,the. acquiri1ig ' '·· "
, . of the· entire title of the expropri ated owner \Vhatever u1? nature anct·· .,.
1
. I • extent of that title inay be .. The ·entire bundle' of rights which was G
vested ii1 the original llolder passes on acquisition to the acquirer
leaving nothing to the former. Vide : Observations of Mukherjee, J. ·
in Chiranjitla/'s.case. The c01icept' of acquisition has an aif of
permanence -and finality in thO:t there is tra;osference of the title. of· '
· tl1e original holder to. the acquiring authority. But the concept of ·H
• ;.requisition involves merely taki.n'g of '.'domain or control over pro-'
"" '\ , • \. . ' . - . I
•
,
700 .SUPRE\fF. COURT
. ')lEPORTS [1984j 2. S.C R ..
A perty with?ut acquiri'ng rights of o;,,nershii:>> and musi by its very.
. nature be of temporary duration. lf requisiti~ning of property could '
icGitimately continue for an indefinite period of time, t!ie dis\irictic·n.
between requisition an4 acquisition v,:ould tend ..to become blurred,
because in that event for all practical purposes the right to pcssess'on
and enjoyineIJ~ of the property ,\vhich constit~tes a major constituent
B. element of the right of ownership wonld be vested indefinitely with-
out any limitaiion of time in the reuuisitioning authority and it would
. be possible for the authority to sub.stantially take over 'the prope<rty
·'without acquiring it and . paidng fu.11.market value· as comp\nsaticn
und~r th~and. Acquisition Act, 1894. We do not think that the
g~vernrneilt can unde~the guise cf requisition continued for an
c inc\efidc pericd of time,, in substance acquire the property; bec.ause
that wo.uld be a fre.ud on the ·power conferred en the government.
If the governmei wants to take over the, pror>_ertv for an iudefini&
period 0( time, the government must acquire the property but it can-·
not, use the power of requisition for achieving that object. The
power of requisition ·is exercisable by the i:overnrnent · c)nl~ fer a
D public purpose which is of a transitory· character. .. If the public pur-
.p0sc for.which the premises are requ;rcd is of a perenn.i~l or.permanent
character from.the very inception, no oraer can be passed requisition-
ing the premises and in such a case the order of requisition, if passed',
·would be a fraud upon the statute, 'ror the . government would be
requisitioning the premises when ,really speaking they want the pre-.
E . mises fdr acquisitjon, the object 0 ~ taking the. premises being net
transitory but permanent in cha.ractct. Where·'t]Je.purpose for .which
the prerniscs are .required is of ,such a chameter that. from the very
inception it can rieve'r be .served by req-;,isitioning the premises ,tut
can be. achieved only by acquiring ti1e property which would be the
case where. the purpose is o( a permanent character. or likely to
F ·SUQSist for an indefinite period Ol time, the government may acquire ·~ '
the premises .but it certainly cannot requisition the premises and
continue the req~isit!oning. inde~P.it'cly. Here in the present .case ....
the order of requisition -was made as far ·back as 9th April ·1951' and
• even if it .was mai!e for housing a. homeless person and the appel-
lant al .thaMirne fell within the category of homeless person, it 'can-
G not be allowed to continue for such an inordinately Jong period. as
thirty vears,"' We must therefore hold tliat the order of requisition
even. if it wa-s valid when made, ceased to be valid and effective after
the expiration 'of'a reasonable period of time. His not necessary for
us to deciile what period of time rn;iy be regarded as reasonable for
; the contlnuanCe ef an ordc;r of r·~ql:iSitit::1~ iri a giv,~n caSe, bccau~e
0
H
u'tim:Jely the an·swer to this question must depiend on the facts and
I'
•
• /
. . .
. '
. ' \ ..
• .
H.D. VORA V, MAHARASHTRA (Bhagivali; J.) 701
·circumstances of each case but there can be no ·doubt that whatever A
be .. the public purpose fo~ which an order of •requisition is made,'
·the·period of .time for which the order o( requisitioir 'may be con-
Hnued' cannot be an unreasonably long period such as thirty years .
.The High Court was, therefore, in .any view of the matter, right in
holding '.that in the circumstances the order. of 'requisit'<>p could not .
survive 'any longer an« the State Governmeni. was' bound to revoke B
· / the order of requisition and d.erequisition ihe flat ·and ·to take steps
to evict the appellant from the flat and to hand <\vervacarit ·posses-
sion of it to the. 3rd respondent. 1 '·
' I
---- .)
Th~e ~ls;·
·was cme .other conte.ntion' \1rged on behalf of the' c
appellant in a desperate attempt to pr6tcct his possession of the flat
arrd that contention was, cince he had'paid rent of th~ flat to Rukma· .
nibai and such rent was accepted by ,her; he. ha\l becoine a direct
'tenant .of Rukmanibai and the order of requisition had become
totally irreleva~t so far as .as his p:issession .of the flat i~ concerned. ·
This contention'is,.in our opi~ion, wholly unfounded .. The appellant' D
, admittedly came into occupation· of-the flat as 'an·''1!Jottee under the
order .of requisition passed by' the· State Government and 'eyen if
any r~nt was paid by tho ilppellant to ·Rukmanibai and such rent
was acce'pte~ by her, it did not,'have the effect of putting an end to
" the order of requisition .. The appejlant was an ~Uottee of tqe flat
under the order of requisitio~ and he was liable to pay compensation
! for the use .and occupation of the fla·t to the State Gov.ernment and the
-1'.~ -.State ·Qovernment was ·in its triml.iable. 'to 'pay compensation to.
Rukmanibai for:the:requisitiqning of.the flat and i( therefore, ·instead.
of the ·appellant paying compensation to the State· ·Government :ind · \
. ,\
the State Government rhakiiig payment.'of ap identical amount to '. - F
Rukmanibai, the appellant paid directly to Rukmanibai with the
. -express or in any event implied· assent of the State .Governmeni, the
· ·.order of requisition.Tould not cease· to be valid and effective. It did
' 'not matt~r at all whether the .appellant described the am.cunt paid '·
by him to Rukmanibai as rent, because whatever was done by him
: was ·under the order of requisition and · so long as ,the order of.
· requisitioii stood, his possession of the flafwas attribut.able only' to G
the order of requisition and no payment of an amount described as
rent could possibly alter the nature of his occupation of the flat or .
. make him a teriant of Rukmanibai in respect of the flat.·
,. . I. . . .
H
We are \herefo,re of the view that the High Court ._wa,• right.
\
. SIJPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 S.C.R .
A in allowing the writ petition ard directing the State Government and
the Cq.ntroller of Accommodati.on to derequisitio~ the flat and to
take steps to evict the appellant and !,O. hand over vacant and peaceful
possession of the flat to the 3rd respondent'. We accordingly dismiss
the appeal, and confirm the order· passed by the High CoHrt but
(n j:.lie circumstances of the case, the appellant shall not be evicted
from. the flat until 28th February, 1985, provided the appellant files
B a~ undertaking in this Court within two'_weeks from today that he
will vacate the flat and hand over its vacant possession to the 3rd
respo~dent on or before tl1at date .. There wilt be 'no order as to
'.
c
c<"ts of the appeal.
N.VK Appeal dismissed .
.
•
\
•
•
•
,. .
•
" I
\
.. , .
'
' ... •
•
'
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.
Try "requisition"Sign in to search