HAMEED KUNJUversusNAZIM

                          [2017] 6 S.C.R. 375


                          HAMEED KUNJU                                      A
                                   v
                                NAZIM
                    (Civil Appeal No. 9151 of2017)
                            JULY 17, 2017                                   B

  [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE AND R. BANUMATHI, JJ.]
        Constitution of India - Art. 227 - Supervisory jurisdiction -
Exercise of; by the High Court - Eviction matter - Rounds of
litigation - Writ petition by tenant u!Art. 227 challenging the four        C
orders of trial court/executing court- High Court interfered with
the four orders impugned and allowed the petition - Case remanded
to trial court for deciding the eviction petition de novo on merits
with directions to trial court to allow the applications filed by tenant
- Justification of - Held: High Court erred in entertaining the
tenant's writ petition as also in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction   D
by interfering in the orders impugned therein - On facts or/and in
law, no case made out by tenant on the merits - High Court should
have dismissed the writ petition in limine since all the four orders
impugned in the writ petition were amenable to their challenge before
the appellate authority - Writ petition was not the proper remedy
                                                                            E
without first filing the appeal - Further, the High Court should have
appreciated the that the eviction decree had stood executed and
possession wJs already delivered to the landlord of all the suit shops
- Litigation had come to an end leaving no Lis pending- Furthermore,
not a case where tenant was unaware of the eviction proceedings
pending or/and decided against h_im nor a case that he was never            F
afforded any opportunity - Also High Court had no jurisdiction to
issue directions to trial court to pass a particular order by allowing
the application - Kerela Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act,
1965 - ss. 11 (2)(b) and 11 (3).
      Rent control and eviction - Rent Laws - Object of - Held: Is          G
to ensure speedy disposal of eviction cases between the landlord
and tenant and especially where the landlord seek eviction for his
bona fide need - Due attention to be paid by courts to ensure speedy
disposal of eviction cases.
                                                                            H
                                  375
376          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2017] 6 S.C.R.


A          Allowing the appeal, the Court

          HELD: 1.1 The facts would clearly reveal that the High
   Court not only erred in entertaining the respondent's writ petition
   but also erred in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction by
   interfering in the orders impugned therein. There was no case
 B made out on facts or/and in law by the respondent for entertaining
   his writ petition and interfere in the orders impugned therein.
   The impugned order is without jurisdiction and is set aside and
   all the applications filed by the respondent before the trial court
   in main eviction case are dismissed as being wholly misconceived ·
 C and devoid of any merit. [Paras 26, 27, 45, 49] [384-H; 385-A-B;
   388-C-F-G)

         1.2 In the first instance itself, the High Court, should have
   dismissed the writ petition in limine on the ground that since all
   the four orders impugned in the writ petition were amenable to
 D their challenge before the appellate authority, the writ petition
   was not the proper remedy without first filing the appeal and get
   the same decided by the appellate court on its merit in accordance
   with law. The High Court should have declined to entertain the
   writ petition under Article 227 on the ground of availability of an
   alternative remedy of appeal to the respondent. Indeed· the
 E respondent had actually filed appeal in the first round of litigation
   against the orders of the trial court. There was, therefore, no
   reason much less justifiable one for the High Court to have
   entertained the writ under Article 227 against as many as four
   orders passed by the trial court/ executing court. [Paras 28, 29]
 F [385-B-D]

          1.3 The executing court having seized of the applications
   filed by the respondent, there was no justification on the part of
   the High Court to have entertained the writ petition and decided
   them like an original court. All that the High Court, in such
 G circumstances, could do was to request the executing court to
   dispose of the pending applications filed by the respondent on
   merits leaving the parties to challenge the orders once passed
   on such applications by filing appeal, before the appellate
   authorities. It was, however, not done. [Para 30] [385-E-F]
 H
                   HAMEED KUNJU v. NAZTM                                 377


      1.4 The High Court should have appreciated the undisputed          A
fact that the eviction decree had stood executed and possession
was already delivered to the appellant of all the suit shops including
the shop in possession of the respondent in accordance with
provisions of Order XXI r. 35 CPC. It should also have been
appreciated that seven tenants had not pursued their case against        B
the same eviction decree and allowed the appellant to obtain
possession of the suit shops. Whereas it was only the respondent
who had raised the frivolous pleas against such action in these
proceedings. [Para 32] [385-G-H; 386-A)
      1.5 Once the possession had been delivered and decree
was recorded as satisfied in accordance with Jaw, the litigation         c
had come to an end leaving no tis pending. In these circumstances,
in the absence of any prima facie case having been made out on
any jurisdictional issue affecting the very jurisdiction of the Court
in passing the eviction decree, the High Court should have
declined to examine the legality of four orders impugned therein.        D
There was absolutely no case made out by the respondent on the
merits calling any kind of interference by the High Court in its
supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 in any of the four
orders. The reasons are not far to seek. [Para 33, 34] (386-B-C]
      1.6 The respondent was aware of the eviction proceedings           E
because he had been contesting the proceedings since inception
at every stage in the trial court and then in appeals. It was at his
instance, the appellate court had remanded the case to the trial
court and fixed the date for the parties to appear before the trial
court. Though the respondent knew the date of his appearance
before the trial court, yet he failed to appear on the said date and     F
all subsequent dates despite second service of notice of the
proceedings. In these circumstances, the trial court was fully
justified in passing the eviction order on merits against the
respondent. Once the final order had been passed, the remedy
of the respondent lies in filing appeal against such order to the        G
appellate court or apply for its setting aside u/Or. IX r. 13 CPC.
Respondent did not do so within the time prescribed for the
reasons best known to him. [Para 35, 36] [386-D-F)
      1.7 This is not a case where the respondent could be held
to be unaware of the eviction proceedings pending or/and decided         H
378          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2017] 6 S.C.R.


A against him nor it was a case holding that he was never afforded
  any opportunity to contest the eviction proceedings. On the other
  hand, the respondent was contesting the eviction proceedings
  as a "professional litigant" and was successful to a large extent
  in keeping the proceedings pending for ten years which enabled
  him to enjoy possession of the suit shop to the detriment of
B
  appellant's interest. [Paras 37, 38) [386-G-H; 387-A)
         1.8 No one prevented the respondent from appearing before
  the trial court after the remand and contest the proceedings on
  merits. Despite the knowledge of the proceedings and the date
  fixed by the appellate court at his instance, if the respondent did
C not appear in the trial court and failed to contest the eviction
  proceedings, he has to blame himself and none. If for one or other
  reason, he could not appear, no one prevented him to appear on
  subsequent dates and show good or sufficient cause for his
  absence on the previous date of hearing. [Para 39) [387-B-C]
D        1.9 The appellant had ensured compliance of the order of
  the earlier appellate court by paying the cost of Rs.4000/- to the
  respondent's counsel and Rs.2000/- to the legal services. Indeed,
  the very fact that the appellant had stated in his counter affidavit
  duly supported by an affidavit of his advocate, there was no reason
  for the High Court to have doubted the sworn testimony of the
E appellant and his advocate on this issue. It should have been
   accepted by the High Court for want of anything said by the
   respondent in rebuttal except denying. Thus, there was neither
   any basis nor any justifiable reason for the High Court to have
   directed holding of any factual inquiry into the question of payment
F of cost. The directions to hold an inquiry on this issue is, therefore,
  wholly illegal and uncalled for. [Para 40, 41) (387-D-F]
         1.10 The applications filed by the respondent for setting
   aside of the eviction orders and application for condonation of
   delay in filing such applications and an application filed for giving
G redelivery of suit shop were in the nature of abusing the process
   of the Court and were liable to be dismissed .which unfortunately
   the High Court failed to do so and went on to entertain such
   applications. [Para 42] [387-G]
         1.11 While issuing impugned directions, the High Court
   went to the extent of issuing direction to the trial court to "allow"
H
                     HAMEED KUNJU v. NAZIM                                      379


the applications filed by the respondent. The High Court failed                 A
to see that it curtailed the judicial powers of the trial court in
passing appropriate order on such applications. The High Court
had no jurisdiction to issue directions to the trial court to pass a
particular order. All that the High Court could do in such case
was to remand the case and leave the trial court to pass                        B
appropriate orders on the application(s) in exercise of its judicial
discretion. (Para 43: 44) (387-H; 388-A-C]
        2. The object of the Rent Laws all over the State is to ensure
speedy disposal of eviction cases between the landlord and tenant
and especially tl).ose cases where the landlord seek eviction for
his bona fide need. The eviction matters should be given priority               C
in their disposal at all stages of litigation and especially where
the eviction is claimed on the ground of bona fide need of the
landlord. There is a trust that due attention would be paid by all
courts to ensure speedy disposal of eviction cases. (Paras 47,
48) (388-E]                                                                     D
        CNIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 9151
of2017.
        From the Judgment and Order dated 11.01.2016 of the High Court
ofKerala at Ernakulam in OP (RC) No. 69 of2015 (0).
        Raghenth Basant, Ms. Liz Mathew, Advs. for the Appellant.               E
        Venkita Subramonium T. R. Adv. for the Respondent.
       The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
        ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J. 1. Leave granted.
        2. This appeal is filed by the appellant-landlord against the final
judgment and order dated 11.01.2016 passed by the High Court of Kerala          F
at Ernakulam in O.P.(RC) No. 69 of2015(0) whereby the High Court
allowed the petition filed by the respondent herein under Article 227 of
the Constitution oflndia.
        3. The controversy involved in this appeal is short. It arises out of
an eviction matter. However, in order to appreciate the controversy in          G
its proper perspective, we consider it apposite to set out the factual
background of the case in detail with a view to show as to how the
litigation between the parties progressed in the last 11 years before the
Courts below and how it was dealt with at different stages which
eventually led to passing of the impugned order giving rise to filing of this
appeal by the landlord by way of special leave before this Court.               H
380            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017] 6 S.C.R.



A            4. The appellant is the owner/landlord of eight schedule suit shops
      details of which are specified in the eviction petition. The respondent is
      in possession of one shop out of eight shops as tenant at a monthly rent
      of Rs.350/-. The remaining seven shops were in occupation of other
      tenants at all relevant time.
B            5. The appellant filed one eviction petition (OP(RC) No.3/2006)
      before the. Rent Controlling Court (hereinafter referred to as the "Trial
      Court") against his 8 tenants, which included the present respondent
      herein also. The eviction was claimed under Section 11 (2)(b) and 11 (3)
      of the Kerala Buildings (lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (hereinafter
      referred. to as "the Act") inter alia on the ground of bona fide need of
 C    the appellant to start business in the schedule suit shops. The appellant
      filed the eviction petition through his power of attorney holder. All the
      tenants including the respondent herein entered appearance and filed
      their written statements. They denied the material averrnents made in
      eviction petition.
 D           6. By order dated 13.08.2007, the Trial Court placed the
      respondents (tenants) ex parte because on that day none of the
      respondents appeared. The Trial Court then recorded evidence of the
      appellant (landlord) and his witness and adjourned the case to 21.08.2007
      for further hearing. On 21.08.2007 also, the tenants remained absent.
 E    The Court passed the eviction order on that day against all the tenants
      including the respondent herein by accepting the case set up by the
      appellant on merits.
             7. Felt aggrieved by the aforementioned eviction order, the tenants
      filed an appeal before the Rent Control Appellate Authority being RCA
 F    No. 5112007. By order dated 28.08.2008, the appellate authority allowed
      the appeal, set aside the order dated 21.08.2007 and remanded the eviction
      petition (RC(OP) No.3 of2006) to the Trial Court for its fresh disposal
      on merits in accordance with law.
             8. After the remand, the Trial Court adjourned the case on few
 G    dates such as 29.09.2008, 04.11.2008 and 03.12.2008 and then fixed for
      08.01.2009. On 08.01.2009, since the Power of Attorney of the appellant
      and proof affidavit were neither filed nor the Power of Attorney Holder
      was present, the Trial Court dismissed the eviction petition (3/2006) for
      default.

 H
                     HAMEED KUNJU v. NAZIM                                       381
                   [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

       9. The appellant then filed an application (IA 210/2010) and sought       A
restoration of his eviction petition and for setting aside of the order dated
08.01.2009 by which his eviction petition (3/2006) had been dismissed.
This application was listed for hearing on 15.03.2010. On the said date,
the appellant's (petitioner's) counsel was absent and hence, the Trial
Court dismissed the appellant's restoration application (I.A. No.210/20 I 0)
                                                                                 B
for default.
       I 0. Felt aggrieved by the said order, the appellant (petitioner)
filed another application being I.A. No. 437/2010 praying therein for
restoration ofhis earlier application, i.e., (IA-210/20 I 0). This application
was also dismissed vide order dated 27.09.2010 by the Trial Court.
                                                                                 c
       11. Aggrjeved by the said order, the appellant carried the matter
to the appellate authority in appeal being RCA 12/2011.
       12. By order dated 28.01.2014, the appellate Authority allowed
the appeal, set aside the aforementioned dismissal orders and restored
the appellant's original eviction petition being R.C.(OP) No. 3/2006 and         D
remanded the eviction petition to the Trial Court for trial on merits. The
appellate Court, however, while restoring the eviction petition directed
the appellant (petitioner) to pay a sum ofRs.4000/- by way of cost to
the tenants (respondents) and Rs.2000/- to the District Legal Services
Authority within 15 days failing which the appeal was to be dismissed.
The parties were directed to appear before the Trial Court on 28.02.2014         E
to enable the Trial Court to proceed with the trial of the eviction petition
and conclude the same at an early date.
        13. After remanq of the eviction petition to the Trial Court, though
there was no need to again issue notice to the parties for their appearance
for the reason that the appellate Court had already fixed the date for the       F
appearance of the parties before the Trial Court on 28.02.2014, yet the
Trial Court in its judicial discretion directed issuance of fresh notice to
all the parties to the eviction petition for their appearance and the case
was accordingly fixed for 27 .03.2014.
       14. On 27.03.2014, the case was adjourned for 02.06.2014 and              G
then to 10.07.2014. On 10.07.2014, none appeared for the tenants (8 in
number) despite service to them and hence the Trial Court proceeded to
record evidence of the petitioner (appellant) and heard the arguments.
The case was, however, adjourned to 22.07.2014, 25.07.2014 and lastly
                                                                                 H
382             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2017] 6 S.C.R.


A     to 31.07.2014. The respondents (tenants) though served and otherwise
      also had full knowledge. of the proceedings did not appear on any of
      these dates for the reasons best known to them.
              15. On 31.07.2014, the Trial Court passed an eviction order and
      decreed the appellant's eviction petition. The Trial Court directed eviction
B     of all the tenants from the suit shops including that of the respondent
      herein from his shop. Since the tenants did not vacate the suit shops, the
      appellant filed execution application (EP 60/2014). Notices were issued
      to the tenants for hearing of the execution case on 16.01.2015. As the
      Court did not sit on that day, the petition was adjourned to 0.4.02.2015.
      On that day, the tenants including the respondent entered appearance
C     pursuant to notice served on them. However, the petition was adjourned
      to 05.03.2015 to enable the tenants to file their objections. When the
      matter came up on 05 .03.2015, it was submitted on behal fof the tenants
      that their objections have been filed. However, the matter was adjourned
      to 19.03.2015. On 19.03.2015, the Trial Court found that the tenants
D     had not filed their objections and hence the Trial Court passed an order
      to deliver the suit shops to the appellant on 25.03.2015 and fixed the
      matter on 26.03.2015 for filing delivery report. The appellant (petitioner)
      accordingly took delivery of the suit shops with the police aid by breaking
      open the locks put on the suit shops.
 E           16. On 26.03.2015, the Executing Court noticed that the possession
      ofall the suit shops has been delivered to the appellant (decree holder),
      therefore, closed the execution case (E.P.No.60/2014) by recording
      satisfaction of the order.
             17. So far as seven out of eight tenants are concerned, they did
 p    not pursue the matter further. In other words, the seven tenants accepted
      the fate of their case and, therefore, this Court is not concerned about
      seven tenants.
            18. However, so far as the present respondent- tenant is concerned,
      he alone pursued the issue further and filed one application being EA
 G    No. 35/2015 in decided execution petition (EP 60/2014) and made a
      prayer therein that the order dated 19.03.2015 directing delivery of
      possession should be set aside.
             19. On 26.03.2015, the respondent filed one application (IA 789/
      2015) in main case (RC(OP)No.3/2006) and prayed therein that the
 H    eviction order dated 31.07.2014 passed by the Court be set aside on the
                    HAMEED KUNJU v. NAZIM                                    383
                  [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J,]

ground that the tenants were neither put to notice nor were heard before     A
the order was passed. An application (IA 790/2015) for condonation of
delay of 180 days in filing the application for setting aside the order
dated 31.07.2014 was also filed. Another application (IA 791/2015) was
filed by the respondent seeking therein a prayer for redelivery of the
shop to him.
                                                                             B
      20. During pendency of these applications made by the respondent
and before any order could be passed by the Trial Court/Executing Court,
the respondent approached the High Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India in writ petition and questioned the legality and
correctness of four orders of the Trial Court/Executing Court. These
orders were: (1) eviction order dated 31.07.2014 passed by the Trial
                                                                             c
Court (2) order dated 19.03.2015 passed by the Executing Court which
had directed taking of delivery of suit shops (3) delivery report dated
25.03.2015 filed by the bailiff and (4) order dated 26.03.2015 of the
Executing Court closing the Execution Case No. 60/2014.
       21. The High Court allowed the writ petition and while in substance   D
quashed all the four orders impugned in the writ petition referred supra
remanded the case to the Trial Court for fresh trial with the following
directions:
             The Rent Control Court, Karunagapally shall pass
         orders allowing I.A.No.789 of 2015 and I.A. No.790 of               E
         2015 in R.C.(OP)N0.3 of 2006 expeditiously and in any
         event within two weeks from the date on which the
         petitioner produces a certified copy of this order. The
         landlord and the tenants shall in order to enable th~ rent
         control court to act as directed above, appear through              ,F
         counsel before the rent control court on 29.02.2016. The
         rent control court shall thereupon consider the question
         whether the landlord namely the appellant in
         R.C.A.No.12 of 2011 had complied with the stipulation
         regarding payment of the sum of Rs. 4,000/- as costs to
         the respondents in R.C.A.No.12 of 2011. This enquiry                G
         shall be completed before the closure of the civil courts
         for the summer vacation of 2016. Needless to say, if costs
         was not paid within the stipulated time, the rent control
         court will have no jurisdiction to dispose of R.C.(OP)No.3
         of 2006 afresh. In the event of the rent control court              H
384             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2017] 6 S.C.R.



A              entering a finding that the sum of Rs. 4,000/- was paid as
               costs to the respondents in R.C.A.No.12 of 2011 by the
               appellant therein within the stipulated time, the rent
               control court shall dispose of R.C.(OP)No.3 of 2006
               afresh, after affording both sides an opportunity to adduce
               oral and documentary evidence. Depending upon the
B
               outcome of the enquiry to be held by the rent control
               court, it will be open to the tenants to move the execution
               court for redelivery. Until such time as the rent control
               court takes a decision in the matter, the status7quo as on
               today as regards the petition schedule property in
c              R.C.(OP)No.3 of 2006 shall be maintained. In other
               words, the landlord shall not let it out to any one else
               and shall not transfer possession thereof to any third party.
               In view of the aforesaid directions, the Rent Control
               Court shall pass an order closing I.A.No.791 of 2015 in
               R.C.(O.P)No.3 of 2006, reserving liberty with the tenants
D
               to move the execution court for redelivery, if they
               succeed in the enquiry to be held rent control court,
               regarding payment of the sum of Rs. 4,000/- as costs.
             22. It is against this order, the landlord has felt aggrieved and filed
      this appeal by way of special leave before this Court.
 E
             23. Heard Mr. Raghenth Basant, learned counsel for the appellant
      and Mr. Venkita Subramoniam T.R., learned counsel for the respondent.
             24. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on pernsal
      of the record of the case, we are constrained to allow the appeal, set
 F    aside the impugned otder and dismiss the writ petition filed by the
      respondent out of which this appeal arises.
             25. The short question which arises for consideration in this appeal
      is whether the High Court was justified in allowing the writ petition filed
      by the respondent-tenant under Article 227 of the Constitution and was,
 G    therefore, justified in interfering in the four orders of the Trial Court/
      Executing Court impugned therein and, in consequence, justified in
      remanding the case to the Trial Court for deciding the eviction petition
      de nova on merits with specific directions to the Trial Court?
           26. In our considered opinion, the detailed facts mentioned supra
 H    would clearly reveal that the High Court not only erred in entertaining
                     HAMEED KUNru v. NAZIM                                       385
                   [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

the respondent's writ petitiOli but also erred in exercising its supervisory     A
jurisdiction by interfering in the orders impugned therein.
       27. In our considered view, there was no case made out on facts
or/and in law by the respondent for entertaining his writ petition and
interfere in the orders impugned therein.
        28. In the first instance itself, the High Court, in our view, should    B
have dismissed the writ petition in limine on the ground that since all the
4 orders impugned in the writ petition were amenable to their challenge
before the appellate authority, the writ petition was not the proper remedy
without first filing the appeal and get the same decided by the appellate
Court on its merit in accordance with law. In other words, the High              c
Court should have declined to entertain the writ petition under Article
227 on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy of appeal to
the respondent. Indeed the respondent had actually filed appeal in the
first round oflitigation against the orders of the Trial Court.
      29. There was, therefore, no reason much less justifiable one for          D
the High Court to have entertained the writ under Article 227 against as
many as four orders passed by the Trial Court/ executing Court.
       30. In any case, in our considered view, the executing Court having
seized of the applications filed by the respondent, there was no justification
on the part of the High Court to have entertained the writ petition and          E
decided them like an original court. All that the High Court, in such
circumstances, could do was to request the executing Court to dispose
of the pending applications (IAs) filed by the respondent on their
respective merits leaving the parties to challenge the orders once passed
on such applications by filing appeal, before the appellate authorities. It
was, however, not done.                                                          F
        31. Be that as it may, there was yet another reason which should
have persuaded the High Court to decline to entertain the writ petition at
its threshold.
       32. The High Court should have appreciated the undisputed fact
                                                                          G
that the eviction decree had stood executed and possession was already
delivered to the appellant of all the suit shops including the shop in
possession of the respondent in accordance with provisions of Order 21
Rule 35 of the Code. It should also have been appreciated that seven
tenants had not pursued their case against the same eviction decree and-.
                                                                                 H
386             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2017) 6 S.C.R.


A     allowed the appellant to obtain possession of the suit shops. Whereas it
      was only the respondent who had raised the frivolous pleas against such
      action in these proceedings.
             33. In our considered view, once the possession had been delivered
      and decree was recorded as satisfied in accordance with law, the litigation
B     had come to an end leaving no /is pending. In these circumstances, in
      the absence of any prima facie case having been made out on any
      jurisdictional issue affecting the very jurisdiction of the Court in passing
      the eviction decr~e, the High Court should have declined to examine the
      legality of four orders impugned therein.
c            34. Apart from what is held supra, we are of the considered opinion
      that there was absolutely no case made out by the respondent on the
      merits calling any kind of interference by the High Court in its supervisory
      jurisdiction under Article 227 in any of the four orders. The reasons are
      not far to seek.
D            35. It is not in dispute that the respondent was aware of the eviction
      proceedings because he had been contesting the proceedings since
      inception at every stage in the Trial Court and then in appeals. It is also
      not in dispute that it was at his instance, the appellate Court had remanded
      the case to the Trial Court by order dated 28.01.2014 and fixed the date
      for the parties to appear before the Trial Court. It is also not in dispute
 E    that though the respondent knew the date (28.02.2014) of his appearance
      before the Trial Court, yet he failed to appear on 28.02.2014 and all
      subsequent dates despite second service of notice of the proceedings.
             36. In these circumstances, in our considered view, the Trial Court
      was fully justified in passing the eviction order on merits on 31.07.2014
 F    against the respondent. Once the final order had been passed, the remedy
      of the respondent lies in filing appeal against such order to the appellate
      Court or apply for its setting aside under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code.
      The respondent did not do so within the time prescribed for the reasons
      best known to him.
 G          37. In our considered opinion, this is not a case where the
      respondent could be held to be unaware of the eviction proceedings
      pending or/and decided against him nor it was a case holding that he
      was never afforded any opportunity to contest the eviction proceedings.
             38, On the other hand, we have no hesitation in forming an opinion
 H    that the respondent was contesting the eviction proceedings as a
                     HAMEED KUNW v. NAZIM                                        387
                   [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

"professional litigant" and was successful to a large extent in keeping          A
the proceedings pending for ten years which enabled him to enjoy
possession of the suit shop to the detriment of appellant's interest.
       39. In our considered opinion, no one prevented the respondent
from appearing before the Trial Court after the remand and contest the
proceedings on merits. Despite the knowledge of the proceedings and              B
the date fixed by the appellate Court at his instance, if the respondent
did not appear in the ,Trial Court and failed to contest the eviction
proceedings, he has to blame himselfand none. If for one or other reason,
he could not appear on 28.02.2014, no one prevented him to appear on
subsequent dates of hearing and show good or sufficient cause for his
absence on the previous date of hearing.
                                                                                 c
       40. Apart from what is held above and disagreeing with the view
of the High Court which persuaded the High Com1 to again remand the
case, we are of the considered opinion that the appellant had ensured
compliance of the order of the earlier appellate Court by paying the cost
of Rs.4000/- to the respondent's counsel and Rs.2000/- to the leg~! D
services. Indeed, the very fact that the appellant had stated in his counter
affidavit duly supported by an affidavit of his advocate (pages 51-52 of
SLP counter affidavit Para 5), there was no reason for the High Court
to have doubted the sworn testimony of the appellant and his advocate
on this issue. It should have been accepted by the High Court for want E
of anything said by the respondent in rebuttal except denying.
        41. In the light of what we have held above, there was, in our
view, neither any basis nor any justifiable reason for the High Court to
have directed holding of any factual inquiry into the question of payment
of cost. The directions to hold an inquiry on this issue is, therefore, wholly   p
illegal and uncalled for.
       42. We are also of the considered opinion that the applications
filed by the respondent for setting aside of the eviction orders dated
31.07.2014, 19.03.2015 and26.03.201.5 and application forcondonation
of delay in filing such applications and lastly, an application filed for        G
giving redelivery of suit shop were in the nature of abusing the process
of the Court and were liable to be dismissed which unfortunately the
High Court failed to do so and went on to entertain such applications.
      43. We also find that while issuing impugned directions, the High
Court again exceeded its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 when         H
388                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2017] 6 S.C.R.


A     it went to the extent of issuing direction to the Trial Court to "allow" the
      applications IA Nos. 789 and 790 of2015 filed by the respondent.
             44. In so doing, the High Court failed to see that the High Court
      curtailed the judicial powers of the Trial Court in passing appropriate
      order on such applications. The High Court had no jurisdiction to issue
B     directions to the Trial Court to pass a particular order by either allowing
      the application or rejecting it. All that the High Court could do in such
      case was to remand the case and leave the Trial Court to pass appropriate
      orders on the application(s) in exercise of its judicial discretion.
           45. Be that as it may, once we hold that the impugned order is
c     without jurisdiction, the same deserves to be set aside.
             46. Learned counsel for the respondent (tenant) while supporting
      the impugned order argued some points but in the light of our findings
      recorded supra the points urged by learned counsel for the respondent
      has not substance. We, therefore, do not consider it necessary to deal
D     with them in detail.
            47. Before parting, we consider it apposite to observe that the
      object of the Rent Laws all over the State is to ensure speedy disposal
      of eviction cases between the landlord and tenant and especially those
      cases where the landlord seek eviction for his bona jide need.

 E           48. We sincerely feel that the eviction matters should be given
      priority in their disposal at all stages of litigation and especially where
      the eviction is claimed on the ground of bona fide need of the landlord.
      We hope and trust that due attention would be paid by all courts to
      ensure speedy disposal of eviction cases.
             49. As a result of the foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds
 F
      and is allowed with costs ofRs.25,000/- payable by the respondent to
      the appellant. The impugned order is set aside and all the aforementioned
      applications filed by the respondent before the Trial Court in main eviction
      case No. RC(OP)No.3/2006 and EP No. 60/2014 are dismissed as being
      wholly misconceived and devoid of any merit. Costs as awarded above.
 G
      Nidhi Jain                                                    Appeal allowed.