HARBHAJAN SINGH ETCversusSTATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS

828                       [2019]
               SUPREME COURT     17 S.C.R. 828
                              REPORTS                     [2019] 17 S.C.R.


A                        HARBHAJAN SINGH ETC.
                                       v.
                     STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS
                        (Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009)
B                           DECEMBER 04, 2019
                 [N. V. RAMANA, SANJIV KHANNA AND
                         KRISHNA MURARI, JJ.]
             Punjab Religious Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent
      Recovery) Act, 1997 – Vires of 1997 Act – Challenge to, by the
C
      tenant on the ground that they are entitled to protection against
      eviction under East Punjab Rent Act which cannot be taken away
      under the Religious Premises Act – Held: Vires of the Religious
      Premises Act, a special enactment concerning landlord and tenant
      relationships, cannot be challenged on the ground that there are
D     already two other enactments governing general landlord and
      tenant relationships-Transfer of Property Act and East Punjab Rent
      Act – Constitution confers the power and authority on the State to
      enact two separate enactments on a similar subject if they seek to
      achieve different objectives and protect and preserve different sets
      of rights and make necessary classification to serve such varied
E
      ends – Religious Premises Act, unlike the East Punjab Rent Act and
      the Public Premises Act, concerns itself with the administration of
      premises belonging to religious institutions and seeks to regulate
      their rights as landlords vis-a-vis the tenants in occupation –
      Furthermore, the State legislature while enacting the Religious
F     Premises Act was aware that it has enacted East Punjab Rent Act,
      an existing statute governing landlord and tenant relationship –
      However, the State legislature in its wisdom deemed it appropriate
      to enact a law in respect of land and buildings belonging to
      “religious institutions” – East Punjab Urban Rent Restrictions
      Act, 1949.
G
            Punjab Religious Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent
      Recovery) Act, 1997 – Eviction proceedings against the tenants by
      the Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee under the East Punjab Rent
      Act – Subsequently, enactment of Religious Premises Act and
      ejectment proceedings against the tenant under the Religious
H
                                      828
 HARBHAJAN SINGH ETC. v. STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.                       829


Premises Act – Plea of tenant that Religious Premises Act creates       A
an artificial classification as tenants of land and buildings
belonging to or owned by religious institutions are no longer
entitled to protection under the East Punjab Rent Act though such
protection continues to be available to other tenants – Held:
Charitable or religious institutions or endownments fall into a
                                                                        B
separate category and form a class by themselves – Tenants
coming under them also form a separate class and can be treated
differently from others – Classification of properties of religious
institutions as a separate and distinctive class of properties would
not fall foul or be violative of Art. 14 – Granting exemption to
buildings belonging to charities, religious or secular institutions,    C
from rent control legislation, would not offend the equal protection
clause of Art. 14 as it is a reasonable classification based on
intelligible differentia and also satisfies the test of nexus as such
institutions not only serve public purpose but disbursement of their
income is governed by the objects for which they are created –
                                                                        D
Thus, the withdrawal of protection to the tenants of such buildings
was justified – Constitution of India – Art. 14 – East Punjab Urban
Rent Restrictions Act, 1949.
       Punjab Religious Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent
Recovery) Act, 1997 – s. 3 – “Unauthorised occupation of
religious premises” – Meaning of – Held: A person is deemed to          E
be in unauthorised occupation of any religious premises if he has,
before or after commencement of the Religious Premises Act,
entered into possession of a land or building belonging to a
religious institution otherwise than under or pursuant to any
allotment, lease or grant – A person who enters into possession         F
of the land or building belonging to or owned by a religious
institution and has valid and subsisting allotment, lease or grant
is clearly not an unauthorised occupant – Valid grants, leases and
allotments are not construed and treated as unauthorised
occupation – It is only when the terms of the grant, lease or
allotment are not adhered to or have been determined or the period      G
of allotment, lease or grant as fixed has come to an end, that the
person in occupation is treated to be in unauthorised occupation
– This is a pre-condition which confers the right on the religious
institution to seek eviction of a person in unauthorised occupation
of the religious premises – Determinative factor in deciding the        H
830           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2019] 17 S.C.R.


A     question of “unauthorised occupation” is the tenure of allotment,
      lease or the grant and terms and conditions as agreed or stated,
      and not payment of rent.
             Punjab Religious Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent
      Recovery) Act, 1997 – ss. 4, 5 – Eviction under – Held: Under
B     Section 4, a religious institution can make an application before
      the Collector if it is of the opinion that any person is in
      unauthorised occupation of any religious premises, situated within
      the Collector’s jurisdiction Punjab Religious Premises and Land
      (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1997 – Collector is authorised
      and is competent to pass an order of eviction when he is satisfied
C     that the religious premises are in unauthorised occupation Punjab
      Religious Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act,
      1997 – Order passed by the Collector is appealable before the
      Commissioner Punjab Religious Premises and Land (Eviction and
      Rent Recovery) Act, 1997 – Tenant, if still aggrieved, can invoke
D     the writ jurisdiction of the High Court – Thus, power of judicial
      review is always available and can be exercised by the High Court
      when required and necessary – Judicial review.
           Dismissing the appeal, the Court
            HELD: 1.1 There cannot be any doubt that the State
E     legislature, that is, the Legislative Assembly of the State of
      Punjab is entitled to enact the Punjab Religious Premises and
      Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1997, despite the fact
      that they had enacted the East Punjab Urban Rent Restrictions
      Act, 1949. It is accepted and judicial notice is taken by
F     acknowledging that the State legislature while enacting the
      Religious Premises Act was aware that it has enacted East
      Punjab Rent Act, an existing statute governing landlord and
      tenant relationship. However, the State legislature in its wisdom
      has deemed it appropriate to enact a law in respect of land and
      buildings belonging to “religious institutions”. The vires of the
G     Religious Premises Act, a special enactment concerning landlord
      and tenant relationships, cannot be challenged on the ground that
      there are already two other enactments governing general
      landlord and tenant relationships (Transfer of Property Act and
      East Punjab Rent Act). The Constitution confers the power and
H     authority on the State to enact two separate enactments on a
 HARBHAJAN SINGH ETC. v. STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.                    831


similar subject if they seek to achieve different objectives and     A
protect and preserve different sets of rights and make necessary
classification to serve such varied ends. The Religious Premises
Act, unlike the East Punjab Rent Act and the Public Premises
Act, concerns itself with the administration of premises
belonging to religious institutions and seeks to regulate their
                                                                     B
rights as landlords vis-a-vis the tenants in occupation. [Para 8]
[840-B-E]
       1.2 Section 3 defines “unauthorised occupation of religious
premises by a person”. The expression ‘unauthorised
occupation’ is of some importance. A person is deemed to be in
unauthorised occupation of any religious premises if he has,         C
before or after commencement of the Religious Premises Act,
entered into possession of a land or building belonging to a
religious institution otherwise than under or pursuant to any
allotment, lease or grant. A person who enters into possession
of the land or building belonging to or owned by a religious         D
institution and has valid and subsisting allotment, lease or grant
is clearly not an unauthorised occupant. Such allottees, lessees
or persons in whose favour there is a grant, allotment or lease
that entitles the person to retain possession are fully protected
and cannot be evicted. In other words, primacy to the terms of
allotment, lease or grant is not interfered, and is duly accorded.   E
The terms of the allotment, lease or grant would be binding.
Valid grants, leases and allotments are not construed and treated
as unauthorised occupation. It is only when the terms of the
grant, lease or allotment are not adhered to or have been
determined or the period of allotment, lease or grant as fixed       F
has come to an end, that the person in occupation is treated to
be in unauthorised occupation. This is a pre-condition which
confers the right on the religious institution to seek eviction of
a person in unauthorised occupation of the religious premises.
Clause (b) states that if the allotment, lease or grant has been
determined or cancelled whether before or after the                  G
commencement of the Religious Premises Act, occupation of the
person would be treated as unauthorised occupation. Clause (c)
states that where a person is authorised to occupy any religious
premises, before or after commencement of the Religious
Premises Act, has sublet the religious premises in contravention     H
832            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2019] 17 S.C.R.


A     of the terms of allotment, lease or grant, or otherwise acted in
      contravention of the terms, express or implied, he shall be
      treated as an “unauthorised occupant”. Explanation to Section
      3 states that for the purpose of clause (a), which makes the term
      of allotment, lease or grant as a basis for determining whether
      a person is in authorised or unauthorised occupation, shall not
B
      be affected by the mere reason or the fact that such person has
      paid rent and, therefore, is deemed to have entered into
      possession as an allottee, lessee or guarantee. In other words,
      payment of rent would not be a determinative and relevant factor
      in deciding the issue and question of “unauthorised occupation”.
C     The tenure of allotment, lease or the grant and terms and
      conditions as agreed or stated, would be the crucial and
      determinative criterion. [Para 9] [840-H; 841-A; 842-F-H; 843-
      A-D]
               1.3 Under Section 4 of the Religious Premises Act, a
D     religious institution can make an application before the Collector
      if it is of the opinion that any person is in unauthorised occupation
      of any religious premises, situated within the Collector’s
      jurisdiction. The Collector thereupon is required to issue notice
      in writing calling upon the person to show-cause why the eviction
      order should not be made. Sub-section (2) prescribes the
E     requirement of a notice and sub-section (3) to Section 4
      prescribes the manner in which the notice is to be served. Under
      Section 5, the Collector is authorised and is competent to pass
      an order of eviction after considering the cause, if any, shown
      by the person to whom notice under Section 4 has been issued
F     and after examining the evidence that may be produced by such
      person. The person in occupation has to be given reasonable
      opportunity of being heard. The statutory requirement is that
      the Collector should be satisfied that the religious premises are
      in unauthorised occupation before he can make the order of
      eviction. The Collector must also record reasons. The Collector
G     is required to pass an order within a period of 45 days from the
      date of receipt of the application under Section 4 and the order
      passed has to be affixed on the outer door or on some other
      conspicuous part of the religious premises. If a person fails to
      comply with the order of eviction within 30 days from the date
H     of the order, the Collector, or any other officer duly authorised
 HARBHAJAN SINGH ETC. v. STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.                      833


by him, can evict the person and deliver possession of the             A
religious premises to the religious institution. He is entitled to
use force as may be necessary. The tenant, if aggrieved, can file
an appeal against the Collector’s order before the
Commissioner. Thereafter, the tenant is entitled to also invoke
the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 227 and
                                                                       B
226 of the Constitution of India if the grievance still persists.
The power of judicial review is always available and can be
exercised by the High Court when required and necessary.
[Paras 10, 20] [843-E-H; 844-A-B; 855-E]
       1.4 The issue of whether the properties of the religious
institutions for the purpose of rent control legislations can be       C
treated as a separate category is no longer res integra as this
aspect was examined in several decisions where this Court has
held that separate classification of properties of religious
institutions for rent legislations will pass a challenge under
Article 14 of the Constitution. It has been held in Nallamilli Rami    D
Reddi’s case that charitable or religious institutions or
endownments fall into a separate category and form a class by
themselves. Tenants coming under them also form a separate
class. Tenants can be treated differently from others.
Classification of properties of religious institutions as a separate
and distinctive class of properties would not fall foul or be          E
violative of Art. 14. [Para 11] [844-C-D; 845-D-E-H; 846-A]
      State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v. Nallamilli Rami
      Reddi and Others (2001) 7 SCC 708 : [2001] 2 Suppl.
      SCR 287 – relied on.
                                                                       F
       1.5 There have been number of central and state
legislations wherein religious institutions with or without other
charitable organisations have been treated as a separate and
distinct class and accorded legal treatment concomitant to such
distinctiveness within the scope of the same enactment or other
enactments, Sections 11 and 115BBC, the Income Tax Act,                G
1961; Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 and Karnataka Hindu Religious
Institutions and Charitable Endowments Act, 1997; Orissa Hindu
Religious Endowments Act, 1951; Himachal Pradesh Hindu
Public Religious Institutions and Charitable Endowments Act,
1984 as amended in 2018; Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings                 H
834            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2019] 17 S.C.R.


A     (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 and Goa,
      Daman and Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control
      Act, 1968, among others. [Para 12] [847-C-E]
             1.6 Whether a notification granting exemption to buildings
      belonging to charities, religious or secular institutions would
B     violate the equal protection mandate of Article 14, the Article
      14 requires that the classification must be based on rational
      grounds, that is, grounds germane to carrying out the policy or
      the purpose of the Act and by way of illustration it was stated
      that if such exemptions were granted in favour of all the buildings
      belonging to charities, religious or secular institutions, such
C     classification would be reasonable and proper being based on
      intelligible differentia having nexus to the object sought to be
      achieved. Rent Act would unquestionably be a piece of beneficial
      legislation intended to remedy the two evils, that is, rack-renting
      extraction of exorbitant rents and unreasonable eviction orders
D     generated by a large scale influx of population to big cities and
      urban areas post the Second World War creating acute shortage
      of accommodation in such areas. Rent enactments overtly
      protect the rights of the tenants in occupation of buildings in such
      areas from being charged unreasonable rents and from being
      unreasonably evicted. Therefore, such enactments even protect
E     tenancy after determination or end of their contractual periods
      by enlarging the definition of the term ‘tenant’. At the same time,
      the rent enactments often contain other significant provisions
      which indicate that the legislature itself felt that there may be
      areas and cases where these two evils were neither prevalent
F     nor apprehended, and as such landlords’ freedom need not be
      curtailed at all. It is in this context that several enactments give
      wider latitude to the landlords of religious, charitable,
      educational and other public institutions if the possession is
      required for purposes of such institutions. In other words, the
      legislature is entitled and can make rational classification of
G     buildings belonging to government and those belonging to
      religious, charitable, educational and other public institutions
      which are accorded different treatment on the well-founded
      assumption that such landlords are not expected to and would
      not indulge in rack-renting or unreasonable eviction. The
H     constitutional validity of granting exemption to buildings
 HARBHAJAN SINGH ETC. v. STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.                        835


belonging to charities, religious or secular institutions, from rent     A
control legislation, would not offend the equal protection clause
of Article 14 of the Constitution as it is a reasonable classification
based on intelligible differentia and also satisfies the test of
nexus as such institutions not only serve public purpose but
disbursement of their income is governed by the objects for
                                                                         B
which they are created. The income and activities are not for
private benefit. Consequently, withdrawal of protection to the
tenants of such buildings was justified. [Para 13] [848-A-H; 849-
A-B]
      S. Kandaswamy Chettiar v. State of Tamil Nadu and
      Another (1985) 1 SCC 290 : [1985] 2 SCR 398 ; P.J.                 C
      Irani v. State of Madras [1962] SCR 169 – relied on.
      1.7 The landlords have been given certain statutory rights
under the rent enactments to seek eviction and these provisions
provide relief. In the absence of such rent control legislations,
a landlord has the right in law to evict the tenant either on the        D
termination of tenancy by efflux of time or other grounds after
giving notice under the Transfer of Property Act. Such rights
have been curtailed by the rent control legislations to give
protection to tenants having regard to the genuine and dire
needs but these should not be construed to destroy the rights
which have been given to the landlords. [Para 16] [852-E-F]              E

      Kewal Singh v. Smt. Lajwanti (1980) 1 SCC 290 :
      [1980] 1 SCR 854 – relied on.
      1.8 It is open to the legislature to pick out one class of
landlords out of several covered under a specific provision of a
                                                                         F
rent enactment so long as they form a class by themselves and
the legislature was free to provide benefit of a special procedure
to them in the matter of eviction against the tenants as long as
the legislation had the object to achieve and a special procedure
has reasonable nexus to the object to be achieved. [Para 17]
[853-F-G]                                                                G
      Ravi Dutt Sharma v. Ratan Lal Bhargava (1984) 2 SCC
      75 : [1984] 2 SCR 614 - relied on.
      1.9 What has been said about the Public Premises Act that
being a later enactment it would prevail over the provisions of
the Rent Control Act in respect of public premises, would be             H
836            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2019] 17 S.C.R.


A     equally applicable to the legislations made by the State legislature
      of the State of Punjab in respect of the two enactments under
      consideration, that is, the East Punjab Rent Act and the
      Religious Premises Act. No doubt, in Ashoka Marketing Ltd. Case
      it has been observed that the underlying reason for exclusion
      of property belonging to the government from the ambit of the
B
      Rent Control Act is that the government while dealing with the
      citizens in respect of property belonging to it would not act as a
      private landlord but would act in public interest, albeit this
      reasoning would equally apply to “religious institutions” as
      defined. The religious institutions are meant to carry out public
C     purpose and the legislature can proceed accordingly that the
      religious institutions would act in public interest for which they
      were established. [Paras 18, 19] [855-A-C]
            Ashoka Marketing Ltd. And Another v. Punjab National
            Bank and Others (1990) 4 SCC 406 : [1990] 3 SCR
D           649 – followed.
            S. Kandaswamy Chettiar v. State of Tamil Nadu and
            Another (1985) 1 SCC 290 : [1985] 2 SCR 398 ;
            Christ the King Cathedral v. John Ancheril and Another
            (2001) 6 SCC 170 : [2001] 3 SCR 1112 – relied on.
E                            Case Law Reference
      [2001] 2 Suppl. SCR 287           relied on            Para 11
      [1985] 2 SCR 398                  relied on            Para 13, 19
      [1962] SCR 169                    relied on            Para 13
F
      [1980] 1 SCR 854                  relied on            Para 16
      [1984] 2 SCR 614                  relied on            Para 17
      [2001] 3 SCR 1112                 relied on            Para 19

G     [1990] 3 SCR 649                  followed             Para 19
            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3674
      of 2009.
            From the Judgment and Order dated 06.07.2006 of the High
      Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil Writ Petition Nos.
H     14124, 14025 and 14754 of 1998.
 HARBHAJAN SINGH ETC. v. STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.                             837


     S.N. Chopra, P. N. Puri, Jashan Chopra, Mrs. Reeta Dewan Puri,           A
Abhishek Puri, Advs. for the Appellants.
      S. Gurukrishna Kumar, Sr. Adv., Mrs. Kamaldeep Gulati,
Ms. Uttara Babbar, Ms. Bhavana Duhoon, Manan Bansal, Advs. for
the Respondents.
                                                                              B
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
      SANJIV KHANNA, J.
       1. The afore-captioned Civil Appeal impugns the judgment dated
6th July 2006 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana which
dismissed five writ petitions challenging the vires of the Punjab Religious   C
Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1997 (‘Religious
Premises Act’, for short).
       2. The appellants before us are tenants in occupation of shops
located in Gurudwara Singh Sabha, a gurudwara at Kukar Majra, G.T.
Road, Mandi Gobindgarh, District Fatehgarh Sahib, Punjab. The                 D
appellants claim that they were inducted as tenants during the period
1965-69 by Gurudwara Singh Sabha. However, no formal lease or
agreements were executed and albeit, over a period of time, rents were
progressively increased. The appellants further claim that they are small
businessmen carrying on trade primarily connected with steel industry,
while one of the appellants runs a dhaba. By the letter dated 2nd             E
March 1978, the appellants were informed that the affairs of the
gurudwara had come under the control of Shiromani Gurdwara
Parbandhak Committee (‘SGPC’ for short) and they should, therefore,
pay the rent to SGPC. It is alleged that the appellants have been paying
rent to SGPC or the manager of the gurudwara but receipts have not            F
been regularly issued.
       3. In the year 1997, SGPC had filed an eviction petition against
one of the appellants, Harbhajan Singh, under Section 13 of the East
Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (‘East Punjab Rent Act’, for
short) on two grounds, viz., (i) failure to pay rent, and (ii) SGPC needed    G
the property for construction of shops. Harbhajan Singh had, thereafter,
deposited arrears of rent on the first date of hearing. The eviction
proceedings, however, had remained pending and were not decided.
      4. On 29 th January 1998, the Religious Premises Act was
enforced, and thereby introduced a summary procedure for evicting             H
838             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 17 S.C.R.


A     unauthorised occupants from the premises/property belonging to the
      religious institutions. Thereafter, SGPC had filed ejectment petitions
      under the Religious Premises Act before the Collector for eviction of
      the appellants stating that the appellants were in unauthorised
      occupation. The appellants, on receipt of notices from the Collector
      under Section 4 of the Religious Premises Act, had filed the writ petitions
B
      challenging the vires of the enactment before the High Court, which
      by the impugned judgment have been dismissed. The primary challenge
      before the High Court was to the explanation to clause (a) to Section
      3 of the Religious Premises Act on the ground that the provision creates
      an unintelligible classification to the disadvantage of the tenants who
C     are otherwise entitled to equal protection as other tenants under the
      East Punjab Rent Act.
             5. The pleas raised by the appellants were rejected by the
      Division Bench of the High Court after referring to the object and
      purpose behind the impugned enactment, that is, to preserve the property
D     of religious institutions, by observing that public at large has an inherent
      interest in the “religious institutions” which were prone to
      maladministration and mismanagement. Referring to the definition of
      “unauthorised occupants”, it was observed that a person who is in
      occupation of the premises belonging to a “religious institution” on a
      valid allotment, lease or grant is not to be treated as an “unauthorised
E     occupant” for the period of allotment, lease or grant. The explanation
      states that mere payment of rent by the tenant who is in unauthorised
      occupation shall not raise any presumption that such person had entered
      into possession as an allottee, lessee or under a grant. Referring to
      the detailed and comprehensive procedure for eviction under Sections
F     4 and 5 of the Religious Premises Act, it was held that the Collector
      has to be satisfied that the opposite party was in “unauthorised
      occupation” and only thereupon an eviction order can be passed after
      following the due procedure. A person aggrieved against the order
      passed by the Collector can file an appeal before the Commissioner
      under Section 8 of the Act. Referring to the factual matrix, the High
G     Court has observed that all contentions on merits should be raised before
      the authorities under the Religious Premises Act, in accordance with
      law.
             6. The primary contention raised by the appellants before us is
      that as tenants they are entitled to protection against eviction under the
H     East Punjab Rent Act, which protection it is submitted cannot be
    HARBHAJAN SINGH ETC. v. STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.                           839
                  [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

withdrawn and taken away under the Religious Premises Act. Further,            A
the definition of “unauthorised occupants”, as a result of explanation
to clause (a) of Section 3, is highly unjust and unfair as a tenant who
has been paying rent over a long period is deemed to be in “unauthorised
occupation” because of the termination of the lease, licence or grant,
or the time stipulated in the lease, license or grant has come to an end.
                                                                               B
This it is submitted is unjust and unfair. The Religious Premises Act
creates an artificial classification as tenants of land and buildings
belonging to or owned by “religious institutions” are no longer entitled
to protection under the East Punjab Rent Act though such protection
continues to be available to other tenants. Expansion or construction
of a new building by a religious institution as was pleaded by SGPC in         C
their eviction petition under the East Punjab Rent Act would not justify
eviction. There is no public purpose or objective in enacting the law,
that is, the Religious Premises Act, which has become a calculable
device and means to increase income of the religious institutions. This
Court in Ashoka Marketing Ltd. and Another v. Punjab National
                                                                               D
Bank and Others1 had examined and rejected the challenge to the vires
of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971
(‘Public Premises Act’, for short) after recording that the property
belonging to the government would fall under a separate class and that
the government, while dealing with the citizens in respect of the property
belonging to it, would not act for its own purpose as a private landlord       E
but would act in public interest. This is a crucial distinction between
the government and private landlords and, therefore, for the same
reasoning in inverse, the present appeal should be allowed as the
Religious Premises Act creates an artificial distinction and discriminates
against the tenants of “religious institutions”, though “religious
                                                                               F
institutions” as landlords are not a separate class. Thus, the Religious
Premises Act should be declared unconstitutional and illegal as it violates
Article 14 of the Constitution.
      7. The respondents, namely, the State of Punjab and also SGPC,
have contested the said submissions and contentions. Their submissions
and contentions would be noticed in the subsequent portion and in our          G
reasoning below.
       8. The East Punjab Rent Act was enacted in the year 1949, soon
after the Partition, with a view to protect tenants and to curtail the right
1
    (1990) 4 SCC 406                                                           H
840            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 17 S.C.R.


A     of the landlords to seek eviction notwithstanding the contract under the
      provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, (“Transfer of Property
      Act”, for short) which is a general enactment regulating landlord and
      tenant relationships. There cannot be any doubt that the State legislature,
      that is, the Legislative Assembly of the State of Punjab is entitled to
      enact the Religious Premises Act, despite the fact that they had enacted
B
      the East Punjab Rent Act. We must accept and take judicial notice by
      acknowledging that the State legislature while enacting the Religious
      Premises Act was aware that it has enacted East Punjab Rent Act, an
      existing statute governing landlord and tenant relationship. However, the
      State legislature in its wisdom has deemed it appropriate to enact a law
C     in respect of land and buildings belonging to “religious institutions”. The
      vires of the Religious Premises Act, a special enactment concerning
      landlord and tenant relationships, cannot be challenged on the ground
      that there are already two other enactments governing general landlord
      and tenant relationships (Transfer of Property Act and East Punjab Rent
      Act). The Constitution confers the power and authority on the State to
D
      enact two separate enactments on a similar subject if they seek to
      achieve different objectives and protect and preserve different sets of
      rights and make necessary classification to serve such varied ends. The
      Religious Premises Act, unlike the East Punjab Rent Act and the Public
      Premises Act, concerns itself with the administration of premises
E     belonging to religious institutions and seeks to regulate their rights as
      landlords vis-à-vis the tenants in occupation. In this regard, reference
      can be made to the object and purpose behind enacting the Religious
      Premises Act, which is as follows:
            “Since long various religious institutions have been representing
F           to the Government for vacation of their premises under
            unauthorised occupation. On careful thought being given by the
            Government, the State Government is of the opinion that the
            religious institutions are facing a lot of difficulties in this behalf.
            It is, therefore, expedient for the State Government to help the
G           religious institutions in getting their premises which are under
            unauthorised occupation vacated through summary proceedings.
            Hence, the Punjab Religious Premises and Land (Eviction and
            Rent Recovery) Bill, 1996.”
             9. Section 2(d) of the Religious Premises Act defines “religious
H     institution”. Section 2(e) defines ‘religious premises’ and Section 3
 HARBHAJAN SINGH ETC. v. STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.                             841
               [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

defines “unauthorised occupation of religious premises by a person”.          A
These provisions read as under:
      “(d) “Religious Institution’ means any gurudwara, temple, church,
      mosque, temple of Jains or Budhas - which is registered under
      the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (Central
      Act No. XXI of 1860) or is established under any statute and            B
      includes any other place of worship by whatever name, it may
      be called, which is registered as aforesaid or is established under
      any statute;
      (e) “religious premises”, means any land whether used for
      agricultural or non-agricultural purposes, or any building or part      C
      of a building belonging to a Religious Institution and includes, -
           (i) the garden, grounds and out-houses, if any, appertaining
               to such building or part of a building; and
           (ii) any fittings affixed to such building or part of a building
                for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof;”                   D

                                  xxx
      3. Unauthorised occupation of religious premises. - For the
      purposes of this Act, a person shall be deemed to be in
      unauthorised occupation of any religious premises-                      E
           (a) where he has, whether before or after the
               commencement of this Act, entered into possession
               thereof otherwise than under and in pursuance of any
               allotment, lease or grant; or
           (b) where he, being an allottee, lessee or grantee has, by         F
               reason of the determination or cancellation of his
               allotment, lease or grant in accordance with the terms
               in that behalf therein contained, ceased, whether before
               or after the commencement of this Act, to be entitled
               to occupy or hold such religious premises; or                  G
           (c) where any person authorised to occupy any religious
               premises has, whether before or after the
               commencement of this Act, -
               (i) sub-let, in contravention of the terms of allotment,
                   lease or grant, without the permission of the Religious    H
842      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 17 S.C.R.


A                  Institution, the whole or any part of such religious
                   premises; or
               (ii) otherwise acted in contravention of any of the terms,
                    express or implied, under which he is authorised to
                    occupy such religious premises.
B     Explanation. - For the purpose of clause (a), a person shall not
      merely by reason of the fact that he has paid any rent be deemed
      to have entered into possession as allottee, lessee or grantee.”
      “Religious institution” means any gurudwara, temple, church,
      mosque or temple of Jains or Buddhists which is registered under
C     the provisions of the Societies Registration Act or established
      under any statute. It also includes any place of worship by
      whatever name called which is registered as aforesaid or
      established under any statute. The definition is clear and no
      contention or issue is raised that the definition of the term
D     “religious institution” is vague or incomprehensible. Similarly, the
      expression “religious premises” has been defined in clear terms
      to mean land used for agricultural or non-agricultural purposes
      or any building or part of the building belonging to a religious
      institution. The definition clarifies that the expression “religious
      premises” would include garden, ground and out-house or any
E     fittings in the building or part of the building for more beneficial
      enjoyment. The expression “unauthorised occupation” is of some
      importance in view of the challenge and the contentions raised.
      A person is deemed to be in unauthorised occupation of any
      religious premises if he has, before or after commencement of
F     the Religious Premises Act, entered into possession of a land or
      building belonging to a religious institution otherwise than under
      or pursuant to any allotment, lease or grant. A person who enters
      into possession of the land or building belonging to or owned by
      a religious institution and has valid and subsisting allotment, lease
      or grant is clearly not an unauthorised occupant. Such allottees,
G     lessees or persons in whose favour there is a grant, allotment or
      lease that entitles the person to retain possession are fully
      protected and cannot be evicted. In other words, primacy to the
      terms of allotment, lease or grant is not interfered, and is duly
      accorded. The terms of the allotment, lease or grant would be
H     binding. Clause (b) states that if the allotment, lease or grant has
 HARBHAJAN SINGH ETC. v. STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.                            843
               [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

      been determined or cancelled whether before or after the               A
      commencement of the Religious Premises Act, occupation of the
      person would be treated as unauthorised occupation. Clause (c)
      states that where a person is authorised to occupy any religious
      premises, before or after commencement of the Religious
      Premises Act, has sublet the religious premises in contravention
                                                                             B
      of the terms of allotment, lease or grant, or otherwise acted in
      contravention of the terms, express or implied, he shall be treated
      as an “unauthorised occupant”. No contention, issue or objection
      has been raised viz. clause (c) to Section 3. Explanation to
      Section 3 states that for the purpose of clause (a), which makes
      the term of allotment, lease or grant as a basis for determining       C
      whether a person is in authorised or unauthorised occupation,
      shall not be affected by the mere reason or the fact that such
      person has paid rent and, therefore, is deemed to have entered
      into possession as an allottee, lessee or guarantee. In other words,
      payment of rent would not be a determinative and relevant factor
                                                                             D
      in deciding the issue and question of “unauthorised occupation”.
      The tenure of allotment, lease or the grant and terms and
      conditions as agreed or stated, and not mere payment of rent
      would be the crucial and determinative criterion.
       10. Under Section 4 of the Religious Premises Act, a religious
institution can make an application before the Collector if it is of the     E
opinion that any person is in unauthorised occupation of any religious
premises, situated within the Collector’s jurisdiction. The Collector
thereupon is required to issue notice in writing calling upon the person
to show-cause why the eviction order should not be made. Sub-section
(2) prescribes the requirement of a notice and sub-section (3) to Section    F
4 prescribes the manner in which the notice is to be served. Under
Section 5, the Collector is authorised and is competent to pass an order
of eviction after considering the cause, if any, shown by the person to
whom notice under Section 4 has been issued and after examining the
evidence that may be produced by such person. The person in
occupation has to be given reasonable opportunity of being heard. The        G
statutory requirement is that the Collector should be satisfied that the
religious premises are in unauthorised occupation before he can make
the order of eviction. The Collector must also record reasons. The
Collector is required to pass an order within a period of 45 days from
the date of receipt of the application under Section 4 and the order         H
844               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 17 S.C.R.


A     passed has to be affixed on the outer door or on some other conspicuous
      part of the religious premises. If a person fails to comply with the order
      of eviction within 30 days from the date of the order, the Collector, or
      any other officer duly authorised by him, can evict the person and deliver
      possession of the religious premises to the religious institution. He is
      entitled to use force as may be necessary. The tenant, if aggrieved,
B
      can file an appeal against the Collector’s order before the Commissioner.
      Thereafter, the tenant is entitled to also invoke the writ jurisdiction of
      the High Court under Articles 227 and 226 of the Constitution of India
      if the grievance still persists.
             11. The issue of whether the properties of the religious institutions
C     for the purpose of rent control legislations can be treated as a separate
      category is no longer res integra as this aspect was examined in several
      decisions where this Court has held that separate classification of
      properties of religious institutions for rent legislations will pass a challenge
      under Article 14 of the Constitution. In State of Andhra Pradesh and
D     Others v. Nallamilli Rami Reddi and Others2, this Court was faced
      with a challenge to the validity of Section 82 of the Andhra Pradesh
      Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987
      which had cancelled the leases of tenants of properties belonging to or
      given or endowed for the purpose of any charitable or any religious
      institution or endowment falling under the enactment, notwithstanding
E     the prevailing tenancy laws in the State of Andhra Pradesh, in order to
      augment the rents payable for such properties which stood frozen on
      account of the tenancy laws and since sale of such lands was not
      feasible. While examining the question of religious institutions as a
      separate and distinguishable class, this Court had expounded on the
F     scope of Article 14 of the Constitution and the kind of classification
      that would stand the test of Article 14 of the Constitution, as under:
               “8. What Article 14 of the Constitution prohibits is “class
               legislation” and not “classification for purpose of legislation”. If
               the legislature reasonably classifies persons for legislative
G              purposes so as to bring them under a well-defined class, it is not
               open to challenge on the ground of denial of equal treatment that
               the law does not apply to other persons. The test of permissible
               classification is twofold: (i) that the classification must be founded
               on intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons grouped

H     2
          AIR 2001 SC 3616
 HARBHAJAN SINGH ETC. v. STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.                                 845
               [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

       together from others who are left out of the group, and (ii) that          A
       differentia must have a rational connection to the object sought
       to be achieved. Article 14 does not insist upon classification,
       which is scientifically perfect or logically complete. A classification
       would be justified unless it is patently arbitrary. If there is equality
       and uniformity in each group, the law will not become
                                                                                  B
       discriminatory, though due to some fortuitous circumstance arising
       out of peculiar situation some included in a class get an advantage
       over others so long as they are not singled out for special
       treatment. In substance, the differentia required is that it must
       be real and substantial, bearing some just and reasonable relation
       to the object of the legislation.”                                         C
       Holding the above, this Court in Nallamilli Rami Reddi (supra)
had reversed the decision of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court observing that religious institutions fall into a separate
category and land or property held by them have a special character.
Clearly, the tenants under a religious institution would form a separate          D
class by themselves and such classification, if made, would achieve the
object of promoting the interests of the religious institutions. Therefore,
classification of properties of “religious institutions” as a separate and
distinctive class of properties would not fall foul or be violative of Article
14 of the Constitution. It was elucidated that whether a tenancy act
                                                                                  E
should be applicable to religious institutions or should be kept out is not
an aspect which the Court would decide. It is instead for the legislature
to determine the extent of applicability of such tenancy laws to religious
institutions and the extent of protection that should be made available.
This Court has, therefore, rejected the argument that religious institutions
as landlords or tenants of religious institutions cannot be treated and           F
regarded as a separate category in respect of whom protection as
available to other tenants under the rent law would not be available.
Such classification cannot be a ground or the basis to interfere with
the validity of an act or provision. However, the Courts can interfere
when the policy is irrational. Summing up the ratio, this court in
                                                                                  G
Nallamilli Rami Reddi (supra) had held:
       “15. We may sum up the upshot of our discussion:
             1. That charitable or religious institutions or endowments
                fall into a separate category and form a class by
                themselves. If that is so, tenants coming under them              H
846   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2019] 17 S.C.R.


A         also form a separate class. Therefore, they can be
          treated differently from others.
       2. In operation of the Act it is possible that it may result
          in hardship to some of the tenants but that by itself will
          not be a consideration to condemn the Act.
B      3. The manner in which the charitable or religious institution
          or endowment would deal with the properties that are
          resumed after the provisions of Section 82 of the Act
          come into force by cancelling the existing leases, is in
          the region of speculation.
C      4. Fresh tenancy can be entered into and there is no
          material before the court as to what was the rent paid
          by tenants at the time when the Act came into force, in
          terms of Section 18(2) of the Act or as provided under
          the Andhra Act or under the Telangana Act. In the
D         absence of such a material, it would be hazardous for
          the court to reach any conclusion, one way or the other,
          to state that the tenants would be frozen and, therefore,
          there is no likelihood of charitable or religious institution
          or endowment getting higher rents. If there is no
          material one way or the other, the presumption that the
E         Act is good should prevail.
       5. It is a matter of policy with the legislature as to whether
          all provisions of the Tenancy Acts should be exempt in
          its application to the charitable or religious institution or
          endowment in their entirety.
F
       6. The identification of “landless poor persons” and
          protection given to them is justified as enunciated earlier.
       7. It will be very difficult to predict at this stage that the
          result of Section 82 of the Act would be so hazardous
          as not to achieve the object for which it was enacted.
G
          It would not only result in displacing the old tenants by
          new tenants, it may also achieve other social objectives
          in another manner. If appropriate provisions are made
          under the Rules and if the leases are given to small
          holders of land, another social objective could be
H         achieved.
    HARBHAJAN SINGH ETC. v. STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.                            847
                  [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

              8. In what manner charitable or religious institution or          A
                 endowment would deal with matters of this nature is
                 mere guesswork at this stage. On some hypothetical
                 approach the High Court could not have declared a law
                 to be invalid.”
        Therefore, it was clearly held that tenants of religious institutions   B
fall in a separate class which is identifiable. Further, on the question,
whether cancellation of a “lease” in their favour would achieve the
objectives of the act in question, it was observed, that there was no
material before the Court to show that such cancellation would not carry
out the purposes of the “religious institutions”.
                                                                                C
      12. There have been number of central and state legislations
wherein religious institutions with or without other charitable
organisations have been treated as a separate and distinct class and
accorded legal treatment concomitant to such distinctiveness within the
scope of the same enactment or other enactments. {See – Sections 11
and 115BBC, the Income Tax Act, 1961; Karnataka Rent Act, 1999                  D
and Karnataka Hindu Religious Institutions and Charitable Endowments
Act, 1997; Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951; Himachal
Pradesh Hindu Public Religious Institutions and Charitable Endowments
Act, 1984 as amended in 2018; Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings
(Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 and Goa, Daman             E
and Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1968, among
others}.
        13. We would like to refer to a decision of this Court in S.
Kandaswamy Chettiar v. State of Tamil Nadu and Another3 wherein
challenge was made to the exemption granted to buildings owned by               F
Hindu, Christian and Muslim religious public trusts and public charitable
trusts from the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent
Control) Act, 1960, by delegated legislation, in the form of an exemption
notification issued under Section 29 of the above Act. A three Judge
Bench of this Court in S. Kandaswamy Chettiar (supra) referred to
the judgment of a five Judge Bench of this Court in P.J. Irani v. State         G
of Madras4 wherein identical provisions contained in earlier enactment,
namely, the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1959 were
upheld in the context of Article 14 of the Constitution of India on the
3
    AIR 1985 SC 257
4
    AIR 1961 SC 1731                                                            H
848             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 17 S.C.R.


A     basis that the Preamble and operative provisions of that Act gave
      sufficient guidance for exercise of discretionary power vested with the
      State Government. Whether a notification granting exemption to
      buildings belonging to charities, religious or secular institutions would
      violate the equal protection mandate of Article 14, it was observed, that
      Article 14 requires that the classification must be based on rational
B
      grounds, that is, grounds germane to carrying out the policy or the
      purpose of the Act and by way of illustration it was stated that if such
      exemptions were granted in favour of all the buildings belonging to
      charities, religious or secular institutions, such classification would be
      reasonable and proper being based on intelligible differentia having nexus
C     to the object sought to be achieved. Rent Act, it was observed, would
      unquestionably be a piece of beneficial legislation intended to remedy
      the two evils, that is, rack-renting extraction of exorbitant rents and
      unreasonable eviction orders generated by a largescale influx of
      population to big cities and urban areas post the Second World War
      creating acute shortage of accommodation in such areas. Rent
D
      enactments overtly protect the rights of the tenants in occupation of
      buildings in such areas from being charged unreasonable rents and from
      being unreasonably evicted. Therefore, such enactments even protect
      tenancy after determination or end of their contractual periods by
      enlarging the definition of the term ‘tenant’. At the same time, the rent
E     enactments often contain other significant provisions which indicate that
      the legislature itself felt that there may be areas and cases where these
      two evils were neither prevalent nor apprehended, and as such landlords’
      freedom need not be curtailed at all. It is in this context that several
      enactments give wider latitude to the landlords of religious, charitable,
      educational and other public institutions if the possession is required for
F
      purposes of such institutions. In other words, the legislature is entitled
      and can make rational classification of buildings belonging to government
      and those belonging to religious, charitable, educational and other public
      institutions which are accorded different treatment on the well-founded
      assumption that such landlords are not expected to and would not indulge
G     in rack-renting or unreasonable eviction. Relying upon the observations
      in P.J. Irani (supra), it was held that constitutional validity of granting
      exemption to buildings belonging to charities, religious or secular
      institutions, from rent control legislation, would not offend the equal
      protection clause of Article 14 of the Constitution as it is a reasonable
      classification based on intelligible differentia and also satisfies the test
H
 HARBHAJAN SINGH ETC. v. STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.                               849
               [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

of nexus as such institutions not only serve public purpose but                 A
disbursement of their income is governed by the objects for which they
are created. The income and activities are not for private benefit.
Reference in this regard was made to the counter affidavit wherein
the government had explained that they were satisfied that the rents
received by exempted religious institutions were very low, meagre and
                                                                                B
that the provisions of fixation of fair rent under the rent act would not
meet the ends of justice and would in fact result in the tenant exploiting
the situation. Consequently, withdrawal of protection to the tenants of
such buildings was justified. It was observed in S. Kandaswamy
Chettiar (supra) as under:
      “11... In our view, the aforesaid material clearly shows that             C
      buildings belonging to such public religious and charitable
      endowments or trusts clearly fell into a class where undue
      hardship and injustice resulting to them from the uniform
      application of the beneficial provisions of the Act needed to be
      relieved and the exemption granted will have to be regarded as            D
      being germane to the policy and purposes of the Act. In other
      words the classification made has a clear nexus with the object
      with which the power to grant exemption has been conferred
      upon the State Government under S.29 of the Act.
      xx                           xx                      xx
                                                                                E
      14... It is obvious that if the trustees of the public religious trusts
      and public charities are to be given freedom to charge the normal
      market rent then to make that freedom effective it will be
      necessary to arm the trustees with the right to evict the tenants
      for non-payment of such market rent. The State Government
      on materials before it came to the conclusion that the ‘fair rent’        F
      fixed under the Act was unjust in case of such buildings and it
      was necessary to permit the trustees of such buildings to recover
      from their tenants reasonable market rent and if that be so non-
      eviction when reasonable market rent is not paid would be
      unreasonable and if the market rent is paid by the tenants no
                                                                                G
      trustee is going to evict them. It is, therefore, clear that granting
      total exemption cannot be regarded as excessive or unwarranted.
      15. Apart from this aspect of the matter it is conceivable that
      trustees of buildings belonging to such public religious institutions
      or public charities may desire eviction of their tenants for the
                                                                                H
850               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 17 S.C.R.


A              purpose of carrying out major or substantial repairs or for the
               purpose of demolition and reconstruction and the State
               Government may have felt that the trustees of such buildings
               should be able to effect evictions without being required to fulfil
               other onerous conditions which must be complied with by private
               landlords when they seek evictions for such purposes. In our
B
               view, therefore, the total exemption granted to such buildings
               under the impugned notification is perfectly justified.”
             14. These two judgments were followed by the two Judge Bench
      decision of this Court in Christ the King Cathedral v. John Ancheril
      and Another5 wherein similar exemption notification under the Kerala
C     Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 granting exemption in
      public interest to the buildings of all churches/mosques of all minority
      religions and of all Dioceses, Archdioceses, Monasteries, etc. was
      challenged. One of the contentions raised was that no data or material
      was produced by the State and hence the decision and ratio in S.
D     Kandaswamy Chettiar (supra) would not be applicable. Rejecting the
      said contention, it was observed:
               “6.The law had been stated by this Court to the effect that public
               religious or charitable endowments or trusts constitute a well-
               recognised group which serves not only public purposes, but
E              disbursement of their income is governed by the objects with
               which they are created and buildings belonging to such
               endowments or trusts clearly fall into a class distinct from the
               buildings owned by private landlords. It is in respect of three areas
               a regulation would be made under the Act, as has been done in
               other similar enactments and these areas are: (i) with respect to
F              regulation of lease of buildings (residential or non-residential); (ii)
               control of rent of such buildings; and (iii) control of eviction of
               tenants from such buildings. A public trust, as has been held in
               S. Kandaswamy Chettiar case is not likely to act unreasonably
               either in the matter of enhancement of rent or eviction of tenants
G              being institutions of religion or charity. On that basis, this Court
               upheld the validity of the exemption granted under the Tamil Nadu
               Act in favour of such trust or endowment. In the present case,
               the contention has been specifically put forth that the appellants
               fall into that very category which came up for consideration
      5
H         (2001) 6 SCC 170
HARBHAJAN SINGH ETC. v. STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.                              851
              [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

   before this Court in S. Kandaswamy Chettiar case. Therefore,               A
   no distinction can be made between that class of owners of the
   buildings in that case and in the present case. We do not
   understand as to what other material was required by the Court
   in a matter of this nature if the contention put forth before this
   Court is not that churches or mosques, dioceses, archdioceses,
                                                                              B
   monasteries, convents, wakfs and madarsas are not religious and
   charitable in nature.
   7. Shri Nageswara Rao, the learned counsel appearing for the
   contesting respondents submitted that there is total non-
   application of mind by the Government in the matter of grant of
                                                                              C
   exemption and the guidelines indicated in S. Kandaswamy
   Chettiar case have not been followed in the present case and,
   therefore, the exemption should not have been granted in the
   present case. In S. Kandaswamy Chettiar case an affidavit had
   been filed as to the lower rents that were being paid and that
   the tenants were exploiting the situation and had brought the              D
   charitable institutions to a situation of helplessness and that position
   not having been challenged the Court made those orders. If we
   bear in mind the fact that the purpose of the Act is apparently
   to prevent unreasonable eviction and also to control rent and if
   the trustees of religious and public charities are given freedom
                                                                              E
   to charge normal market rent with the further freedom to evict
   the tenants for not paying such market rent, the result would be
   unjust and cause hardship to them. But apprehension, by itself,
   is not sufficient. There is no material on record to show that in
   any of these cases the landlords would resort to such a course
   of action. On the other hand, if the building belonging to such            F
   public trust or religious institution is exempt from the Act, the
   purpose of the trust could be carried out much better, is quite
   clear. If that is the object with which the Government has granted
   exemption, we do not think there is any reason to quash the
   notifications impugned before the High Court.
                                                                              G
   xx                           xx                       xx
   9. An argument is sought to be raised on the basis of ownership
   of property that there should not have been a distinction as is
   being made in the present case. That was the very basis of
   distinction made in case of statutory bodies like the Housing              H
852               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 17 S.C.R.


A              Board, local authorities which was noticed in Jayakaran v.
               Kerala Health R & W Society case or registered wakfs which
               was considered in Lakshmanan v. Mohamood. When such
               bodies or institutions fall into a distinct class by themselves and
               exemption granted to them would serve a public purpose, namely,
               to carry out the objects of the trust or the endowment or religious
B
               activity in a broad sense, we do not think that the fine distinction
               sought to be made by the High Court in this regard is justified.
             15. Appropriate at this stage would also be reference to two
      earlier decisions of this Court which had examined the provisions of
      the rent control legislations, namely, Kewal Singh v. Smt. Lajwanti6
C     and Ravi Dutt Sharma v. Ratan Lal Bhargava7.
             16. In Kewal Singh (supra), the challenge made was to the
      provisions of summary eviction in case of bona fide requirement under
      the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. It was observed that the rent control
      legislations are a piece of social legislations and are meant mainly to
D     protect tenants from frivolous evictions but, at the same time, they must
      do justice to the landlord and to this extent the enactment should avoid
      placing such restrictions on their right to evict the tenants so as to
      destroy the legal right to property. Therefore, the landlords have been
      given certain statutory rights under the rent enactments to seek eviction
E     and these provisions provide relief. In the absence of such rent control
      legislations, a landlord has the right in law to evict the tenant either on
      the termination of tenancy by efflux of time or other grounds after giving
      notice under the Transfer of Property Act. Such rights have been
      curtailed by the rent control legislations to give protection to tenants
      having regard to the genuine and dire needs but these should not be
F     construed to destroy the rights which have been given to the landlords.
      It was observed:
               “21. There is yet another important aspect of the matter which
               may be mentioned here. Prior to the enactment of the rent control
               legislation in our country, the relationship of landlord and tenant
G              was governed by our common law viz. the Transfer of Property
               Act (Sections 107 to 111). The tenant was inducted with his tacit
               agreement to be regulated by the conditions embodied in the
               contract and could not be allowed to repudiate the agreement
      6
          AIR 1980 SC 161
H     7
          AIR 1984 SC 967
 HARBHAJAN SINGH ETC. v. STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.                             853
               [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

      reached between him and the landlord during that period. The            A
      tenant was, therefore, bound in law to vacate the premises either
      voluntarily or through a suit after he was given a notice as
      required by the Transfer of Property Act under the terms and
      conditions of the lease. However, as a piece of social reform in
      order to protect the tenants from capricious and frivolous eviction,
                                                                              B
      the legislature stepped in and afforded special protection to the
      tenant by conferring on him the status of a statutory tenant who
      could not be evicted except under the conditions specified and
      the procedure prescribed by the Rent Control Acts. Thus to this
      extent, the agreement of lease and the provisions of the Transfer
      of Property Act stood superseded. At the same time, the Rent            C
      Control Acts provided the facilities of eviction to the landlord on
      certain specified grounds like bona fide personal necessity or
      default in payment of rent, etc. Thus any right that the tenant
      possessed after the expiry of the lease was conferred on him
      only by virtue of the Rent Control Act. It is, therefore, manifest
                                                                              D
      that if the legislature considered in its wisdom to confer certain
      rights or facilities on the tenants, it could due to changed
      circumstances curtail, modify, alter or even take away such rights
      or the procedure enacted for the purpose of eviction and leave
      the tenants to seek their remedy under the common law.
      22. Thus, we do not see how can the tenant challenge the validity       E
      of such a provision enacted by the legislature from which the
      tenant itself derived such rights.”
       17. Similar are the observations of this Court in Ravi Dutt
Sharma (supra) which had quoted several passages from Kewal Singh
(supra) to observe that it is open to the legislature to pick out one class   F
of landlords out of several covered under a specific provision of a rent
enactment so long as they form a class by themselves and the
legislature was free to provide benefit of a special procedure to them
in the matter of eviction against the tenants as long as the legislation
had the object to achieve and a special procedure has reasonable nexus        G
to the object to be achieved.
      18. In Ashoka Marketing Ltd. (supra), the five Judge
Constitution Bench of this Court had upheld applicability of the Public
Premises Act to a corporation established by a Central Act that is owned
and controlled by the Central Government, therein a nationalised bank.        H
854            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 17 S.C.R.


A     After referring to several judgments, this Court had explained the effect
      of Article 14 of the Constitution observing that the two statutes, namely,
      the Rent Control Act and the Public Premises Act were enacted by
      the same legislature, that is, the Parliament, in exercise of powers for
      matters enumerated in the Concurrent List. The Public Premises Act
      being a later enactment would prevail over the provisions of the Rent
B
      Control Act in respect of public premises. Referring to the provisions
      of the Rent Control Act, it was observed:
            “55. The Rent Control Act makes a departure from the general
            law regulating the relationship of landlord and tenant contained
C           in the Transfer of Property Act inasmuch as it makes provision
            for determination of standard rent, it specifies the grounds on
            which a landlord can seek the eviction of a tenant, it prescribes
            the forum for adjudication of disputes between landlords and
            tenants and the procedure which has to be followed in such
            proceedings. The Rent Control Act can, therefore, be said to be
D           a special statute regulating the relationship of landlord and tenant
            in the Union territory of Delhi. The Public Premises Act makes
            provision for a speedy machinery to secure eviction of
            unauthorised occupants from public premises. As opposed to the
            general law which provides for filing of a regular suit for
E           recovery of possession of property in a competent court and for
            trial of such a suit in accordance with the procedure laid down
            in the Code of Civil Procedure, the Public Premises Act confers
            the power to pass an order of eviction of an unauthorised
            occupant in a public premises on a designated officer and
F           prescribes the procedure to be followed by the said officer before
            passing such an order. Therefore, the Public Premises Act is also
            a special statute relating to eviction of unauthorised occupants
            from public premises. In other words, both the enactments,
            namely, the Rent Control Act and the Public Premises Act, are
            special statutes in relation to the matters dealt with therein. Since,
G           the Public Premises Act is a special statute and not a general
            enactment the exception contained in the principle that a
            subsequent general law cannot derogate from an earlier special
            law cannot be invoked and in accordance with the principle that
            the later laws abrogate earlier contrary laws, the Public Premises
H           Act must prevail over the Rent Control Act.”
 HARBHAJAN SINGH ETC. v. STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.                               855
               [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

       19. What has been said about the Public Premises Act would               A
be equally applicable to the legislations made by the State legislature
of the State of Punjab in respect of the two enactments under
consideration, that is, the East Punjab Rent Act and the Religious
Premises Act. No doubt, in this decision it has been observed that the
underlying reason for exclusion of property belonging to the government
                                                                                B
from the ambit of the Rent Control Act is that the government while
dealing with the citizens in respect of property belonging to it would
not act as a private landlord but would act in public interest, albeit this
reasoning would equally apply to “religious institutions” as defined. The
religious institutions as held are meant to carry out public purpose and
the legislature can proceed accordingly that the religious institutions         C
would act in public interest for which they were established. {See above
S. Kandaswamy Chettiar (supra) and Christ the King Cathedral
(supra)}
       20. As noticed above, valid grants, leases and allotments are not
construed and treated as unauthorised occupation. It is only when the           D
terms of the grant, lease or allotment are not adhered to or have been
determined or the period of allotment, lease or grant as fixed has come
to an end, that the person in occupation is treated to be in unauthorised
occupation. This is a pre-condition which confers the right on the
religious institution to seek eviction of a person in unauthorised
occupation of the religious premises. Further, an order passed by the           E
Collector is appealable before the Commissioner and if still aggrieved,
a tenant can invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, as mentioned
above. Therefore, power of judicial review is always available and can
be exercised by the High Court when required and necessary.
      21. Accordingly, we do not find any merit in the present appeal           F
and the same is dismissed. However, in the facts of this case, there
would be no order as to costs.


Ankit Gyan                                                  Appeal dismissed.
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