Holding

The statements constitute criminal contempt of court, and the contemnor is guilty, warranting a two‑month imprisonment.

Summary

Haridas Das filed an interim application in Civil Appeal No. 7948/2004 making serious allegations of corruption and immorality against the Chief Justice of India and several other judges. The Supreme Court issued a show‑cause notice, and the applicant’s reply contained even more contemptuous statements, prompting the Court to initiate contempt proceedings. The Court examined whether such scurrilous attacks, which go beyond fair criticism and aim to lower the authority of the judiciary, constitute criminal contempt under Article 129 of the Constitution and the Contempt of Courts Act. It held that while fair and temperate criticism is permissible, attributing improper motives and seeking to bring the courts into hatred is punishable contempt. The contemnor’s apology was deemed insincere, and the Court sentenced him to two months’ imprisonment, disposing of the contempt proceedings.

Issues considered

Whether the statements alleging corruption and immorality of the Chief Justice and other judges amount to criminal contempt of court.
Whether fair criticism protected under Article 19(1)(a) and Article 129 is permissible in the present circumstances.
Whether the contemnor’s apology and claim of ignorance can mitigate liability for contempt.
Whether the prior dropping of contempt proceedings by the Guwahati High Court affects the present contempt action.
Appropriateness of imprisonment as a sanction for contempt of court.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 129, s. Article 19
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971s. Section 5

Subjects

contempt of courtjudicial criticismfreedom of speechArticle 129Criminal contemptscurrilous attackjudiciary integritypublic interest

Judgment

y

HARIDAS DAS A
v.
SMT. USHA RANI BANIK & ORS.

JULY 16, 2007

[DR. ARIJIT PASA YAT AND D.K. JAIN, JJ.] B

Contempt of Court:

Applicant in IA making serious allegations against Chief Justice of
India and Judges/Judicial Officers-Allegations found to be contemptuous- c
Show cause notice issued-After considering the reply which contained
allegations more contemptuous, proceedings for contempt of the Court
initiated against applicant-Held; While fair and temperate criticism of the
Court even if strong. may not be actionable, but attributing improper motives
or tending to bring Judges or Courts into hatred and contempt or obstructing D
directly or indirectly with the functioning of Courts is serious contempt of
which notice must be and will be taken-Statements made by contemnor
amount to a scurrilous attack on the integrity, honesty and judicial
competence and impartiality of Judges-It is offensive and intimidating-
Contemnor by making such scandalising statements and invective remarks
has interfered and seriously shaken the system of administration of Justice E
by bringing it down to disrespect and disrepute--Contemnor is guilty of
contempt of Court-Sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a period of two
months-Constitution of India-Article 129.

The applicant in the I.A. filed in Civil Appeal No. 7948 of2004, made
serious allegations against the Chief Justice of India. Notice was issued to F
him to show cause as to why proceedings for contempt be not initiated against
him. In reply, the contemnor made further allegations against the Judges,
which the Court found to be more contemptuous. When the matter came to be
heard, the contemnor appeared in-person and stated that he had also made
similar allegations against certain Judges of the Guwahati High Court which G
initiated C'ontempt proceedings against him but the High Court, however,
'< dropped the proceedings. The contemnor also made a malicious allegation that
the appeal should not have been heard by a Bench different from the one which
had granted the leave.

365 H
366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007) 8 S.C.R. ....
~
A Disposing of the ·contempt Proceedings, the Court

HELD: I. There is no doubt that the Court like any other institution
does not enjoy immunity from fair criticism. While fair and temperate
criticism of the Court even if strong, may not be actionable, but attributing
improper motives or tending to bring Judges or Courts into hatred and
B contempt or obstructing directly or indirectly with the functioning of Courts
is serious contempt of which notice must be and will be taken. Apart from the ;
fact that a particular statement is libelous, it can constitute criminal contempt
if the imputation is such that the same is capable of lowering the authority of
the Court. The gravity of the statement is that the same would scandalize the
c court. It is to be noted that what is permissible is legitimate criticism and not
illegitimate insinuation. No Court can brook with equariinity something which
may have tendency to interfere with the administration of justice.
(Paras 13, 22 and 261 (372-C, E; 376-C, 377-E)
i

RC. Cooper v. Union of India, (1971) 1SCR512=AIR (1970) SC 1318;
,.
D Re D.C. Saxena"· CJ/, (19961 3 Supp. SCR 677=AIR (1996) SC 2481;
Advocate General, State of Bihar v. Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries: (1980)
2 SCR 1172=(1980) 3 SCC 311; Re.: S. Mulgaokar, (1978) 3 SCR 162=11978)
""'
3 SCC 339; Brahma Prakash Sharma and Ors. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh,
(1954) SCR I 169=AIR (1954) SC 10; Perpective Publications (P) Ltd v. The
State of Maharashtra, (1969) 2 SCR 779=AIR (1971) SC 221 and C.K.
E Daphatary and Ors. v. O.P. Gupta and Ors., (19711 Supp. SCR 76=AIR (1971)
SC 1132, relied on.

Andrew Paul Terence Ambradv. The Attorney Genera/ of Trinidad and 1
Tobago AIR (1936) PC 141; Regv. Gray, 1900 (2) QB 36; Attorney General
F v. Butterworth: (1963) 1 QB 696; Reg. V. Odham' Press Ltd ex.parte A.G.,
(1957) 1 QB 73 Morrisv. Crown Office, (19701 l All E.R. ·1079; Offutt US.v.
(1954) 348 U.S. 11; Jennison v. Baker, (19721 1 All E.R. 997; Bridges v.
California, (1911) 86 Law Ed. 192; Attorney General v. Times Newspapers,
(1974) AC 273; Metropolitan Properties Ltd v. Lennon, (19681 3 AH E.R.
304 and Chokolingo v. Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago, 11981 J l
G All E.R. 244, referred to.
;
2.1. In the instant case, a bare reading of the statements made by the .x ~

contemnor makes it clear that those amount to a scurrilous attack on the
...
integrity, honesty and judicial competence and impartiality of judges. It is
'
offensive and intimidating. The contemnor by making such scandalising
H
HARIDAS DAS v. USHA RANI BANIK [PASA YAT. J.] 367
statements and invective remarks has interfered and seriously shaken the A
system of administration of justice by bringing it down to disrespect and
disrepute. It impairs confidence of the people iri the Court.
(Para 25) [376-G; 377-AJ

Aswinin Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, (19531SCR215=AIR (1953)
SC 75, referred to. B
2.2. The contemnor, who appeared in-person, submitted that if he has,
committed any mistake, he may be excused and that he was offering
unconditional apology. At the same time he asserted that he would be in a
position to substantiate the allegations made in the affidavit filed by him. C
Further, the contemnor has made a malicious allegation that the appeal should,
not have been heard by a Bench different from the one which granted leave.
When the facts of the case are considered in the background of the principles
I

regarding law of contempt, the inevitable conclusion is that the contemnor
deserves no sympathy. In fact, the lenient approach of the Guwahati High Court
seems to have encouraged him to make statements on oath tarnishing the D
I

image of the Judges of the highest judiciary. His apology seems to be not
genuine. This is more so because he wanted to justify the statements made in
the application. The contemnor is guilty of contempt. He is sentenced to
undergo imprisonment for a period of two months.
(Paras 9, 10, 31 and 321 (370-F, G; 371-A; 379-C, D, E)
E
CIVIL APPELLATE JURJSDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7948 of2004.

Contempt Proceeding

From the Judgment and Order dated 14.11.2003 of the High Court of
Gauhati in RP 76/2002 in SA 12/1993. F
Chanchal Kumar Ganguli for the Appellant.

Smt. Usha Rani Banik, Respondent No. I-In-Person.

Apu Bainik, Contemnor-In-Person.
G
P.K. Chakravarty for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. l. "Judge bashing" and using derogatory a~d
contemptuous language against Judges has become a favourite pastime of H
368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007) 8 S.C.R.

A some people. These statements tend to scandalize and lower the authority of
the Courts and can not be permitted because, for functioning of democracy,
an indepenc!ent judiciary to dispense justice without fear and favour is
paramount. Its strength is the faith and confidence of the people in that
institution. That cannot be permitted to be undermined because that will be
B against the public interest.

2. Judiciary should not be reduced to the position of flies in the hands
of wanton boys. Judge bashing is not and cannot be a substitute for
constructive criticism.

C 3. During hearing of Civil Appeal No. 7948 of 2004-!t was noted that
the contemnor had filed an application styled as "LA for interim directions"
purported with a prayer to initiate contempt proceedings against respondent
No.4-Smt. Sharmista Das. Reference was made to a letter purported to have
been written by respondent No.4 and sent to the President of India praying
for removal of the then Chief Justice of India for his proved incapacity,
D misbehaviour and for appointment of Mr. Apu Banik (Contemnor). It was
further stated as follows:

"That a dispassionate study without harbouring any pre~conceived
motion of water-tight evidences, under possession, will prove beyond.
doubt how incapable, corrupt and worthless is the present Chief
E Justice of the Supreme Court. "

(emphasis supplied)

4. The apparent course for the tirade, as appears from the 'petition itself
is an order dated 16.4.2004 in SLP No. 6751 of 2004. The letter purported to
F have been written by one Sharmista Das to the President of India was
annexed to the petition. Some portion of the letter forms part of the petition.
Finding this statement in the IA to be contemptuous, notice was issued to
the contemnor to show cause as to why proceedings for contempt shall not
be initiated. Contemnor filed his reply to the notice. Certain statements in the
G reply were found to be more contemptuous, particularly para 4 thereof. Even
though the contemnor wanted to withdraw the IA and tender regrets, it was
not considered desirable to accept the prayer. Therefore, by order dated
2.5.2006 the matter was adjourned granting the contemnor opportunity to
appear and file further reply/affidavit if he wanted to do so.

H 5. By order dated 26.2.2007, it was observed as follows:
I
i

HARIDASDASv. USHARANIBANIK [PASAYAT,J.) 369
'y
"In the application reference was made to some parts of the letter A
purportedly written by respondent no.4. At this juncture it is relevant
to note that the name of respondent no.4 was deleted at the request
of the appellant. In the show cause reply the contemnor made
allegations against numerous judicial officers (Judges), stating that
they are as immoral, inefficient, incompetent and bribe-takers. The
said statement was felt to be contemptuous by this Court and the B
contemnor was put to notice as to why action shall not be taken for
I
making the statement. At this juncture it is also necessary to refer to
some other parts of the "affidavit part-I (reply)" filed by the contemnor
which are per se contemptuous. He has stated as follows at para 7:

(I) "The allegation in this case was irrelevant and uncalled for as the
c
truth was far from the spirit of the highly biased oh!.ervation. "

, (underlined for emphasis)
-
This was with respect to the order passed on 23.2.2006 by this
Court while dealing with the appeal. D
(2) It is stated at para 14 that the case was "Unprecedentedly taken
away/diverted from the court of one Hon 'ble Judge who dealt with the
case more than anybody else. It is stated that "numerous legal
practitioners in the Supreme Court raised their eyebrows" because of
this. The contemnor has made a statement that only the Judge who E
granted leave is entitled to hear the civil appeal.

(3) It is also to be noted that allegations have been made against the
Judges of the Guwahati High Court that they got eliminated witness,
Smt. Ila Rani Das by stooping iow ..
F
(4) The contemnor in para 12 has also made a statement that the unfair
means were adopted by the appellant and his counsel in misleading
the Judges which would be clear if paras 8 and 9 of the judgment
dated 14. l I-.2003 of the Guwahati High Court in Review Petition No .
. 76/2002 are perused.
G
As noted above, the statements are pet se contemptuous. The
.... contemnor who is present in Court is directed to show cause within
a period of three weeks as to why action for contempt shall not be
taken against him for making aforesaid statements.
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007) 8 S.C.R. 'r
370
-..,,(
A The matter shall be listed on 26th March, 2007, when the contemnor
shall appear in person. Ordered accordingly".

6. At this juncture, it would be necessary to quote para 4 of the reply
filed by the contemnor. The same reads as follows:

B "4. The deponent had personally met Hon'ble Chief Justice of India
in his officer Chamber on 6.8.2001 and submitted to His Lordship a
memorandum relating to judicial corruption and offered hi.s cooperation
to prove that numerous judicial officers (Judges) are immoral, inept,
inefficient, incompetent and bribe-takers.

c (emphasis supplied)

7. When the matter was taken up for hearing on 15.2.2007, the contemnor
stated that though he had signed the IA in question he did not know the
contents as well as the contents of the- accompanying letter. He further stated
that he is in a position to justify the statement in para 4 of the show cause ,.
D reply. It was further stated by him that he had made similar allegations against
certa_in Judges of the Guwahati High Court and though initially contempt
proceedings were initiated, they were dropped. This according to him was
proof of the fact that the Guwahati High Court accepted that whatever
allegations he had made toucliing the integrity of the Judges were correct.

E 8. He _stated that contempt criminal No. 91200 I was initiated against him
by the High Court as he alleged corruption against the then Chief Justice R.S.
Mongia, Justices Iqbal Ahmad Ansari, A.K. Pattanaik, N.S. Singh, G.N. Sharma
and a District Judge and Additional District Magistrate and others. It appears
that the High Court perused the record and the earlier orders passed by the
F Court and taking "overall view of the entire matter·', felt that there was no
need to peruse further and need to be closed.

9. The contemnor who appeared in person submitted before us that if
he has committed any mistake, he may be excused and that he was offering
unconditional apology. At the same time he asserted that he woul_d be in a
G position to substantiate the allegations in para 4 of the affidavit filed by him,
arid the allegations against the then Judges. He also filed an affidavit for
"expeditious rectification of the judgment dated 21.3 .2006". It is to be noted h
....
that after the judgment was delivered a review application was filed which was
dismissed. The affidavit appeared to be a further attempt in abusing the
process of the Court.
H
-J
HARIDASDASv. USHA RANI BANIK [PASAYAT.J.) 371

10. Further, the contemnor has made a malicious allegation that tl\e A
-,,.,. appeal should not have been heard by a Bench different from the one which
granted leave. His affidavit in this regard reads as follows:

"It is also pertinent to mention here with both Hon'ble Chief
Justice Y.K. Sabharwal and Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.G. Balakrishnan told
the deponent that the case only be listed in the Court of the Justice B
who granted leave as a matter of unwritten rule when the deponent
on different occasions tried to get the case mentioned in their respective

• courts. Both said that only Justice G.P. Mathur can consider it.

It is worth mentioning that Hon'ble Registrar General Mr. Jain
himself told the deponent that Hon'ble Justice G.P. Mathur who granted C
leave is only entitled to hear the Civil Appeal.

But when the case was unprecedentedly taken away/diverted
from the court of Justice G.P. Mathur who dealt with the case more
than anybody else, numerous legal practitioners in the Supreme Court
raised their eyebrows." D
11. At the outset, we may say that though the contemnor claim to be
an illiterate, various petitions filed by him show that he is really not $0.
Reference has been made by him to various decisions, quotations from
authorities while he argued the cases in person for some of the parties in the E
Civil Appeal and before the High Court. May be that somebody else is behind
him, but that does not in any way dilute the gravity of the acts done by him.

12. There is guarantee of the Constitution of India that there will be
freedom of speech and writing, but reasonable restriction can be imposed. It
will be of relevance to compare the various suggestions as prevalent in F
America and India. It is worthwhile to note that all utterances against a Judge
or concerning a pending case do not in America amount to contempt of Co~rt.
In Article 19 the expression "reasonable restrictions" is used which is almost
at par with the American phraseology "inherent tendency" or "reasonable
tendency". The Supreme Court of America in Bridges v. California, (1911) 86
Law Ed. 192 said: G
"What finally emerges from the clear and present danger cases i$ a
working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious
and the degree of imminence extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished."
H
~
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007) 8 S.C.R.

A The vehemence of the language used is not alone the measure of the power >-
to punish for contempt of Court. The fires which it kindles must constitute --.,/

an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice. The
stream of administration of justice has to remain unpolluted so that purity of
Court's atmosphere may give vitality to all the organs of the State. Polluters
of judicial firmament are, therefore required to be well ~en care of to maintain
B the sublimity of Court's environment; so also to enable it to administer justice
fairly and to the satisfaction of all concerned. To similar effect were the
observations of Lord Morris in Attorney General v. Times Newspapers, ( 1974) )
AC 273 at page 302. It was observed that when unjustifiable interference is
suppressed it is not because those charged with the responsibilities of
c administration of justice are concerned for their own dignity, it is because the
very structure of ordered life is at risk if the recognised Courts of the Land
are so flouted and their authority wanes and is supplanted.

13. There is no doubt that the Court like any other institution does not
enjoy immunity from fair criticism. No Court can Claim to be always right
D although it does not spare any effort to be right according to the best of the
ability, knowledge and judgment of the Judges. They do not think themselves ,•
to be in possession of all truth to hold that wherever others differ from them
are in error. No one is more conscious of his limitations and fallibility than
a Judge. But because of his training and the assistance he gets from learned
counsel he is apt to avoid mistakes more than others. While fair arid temperate
E
criticism of the Court even if strong, may not be actionable, but attributing
improper motives or tending to bring Judges' or Courts into hatred and
contempt or obstructing directly or indirectly with the functioning of Courts
is serious contempt of which notice must be and will be taken. Respect is
expected not only from those to whom the judgment of the Court is acceptable
F but also from those to whom it is repugnant. Those who err in their criticism
by indulging in vilification of the institution of Court, administration of justice
and the instruments through which the administration acts, should take heed
for they will act at their own peril. To similar effect were the observations of
Hidayatullah, C.J., (as the learned judge was then) in R.C. Cooper v. Union
of India, AIR (1970) SC 1318).
G
14. There is an abundance of empirical decisions upon particular
instances of conduct which has been held to constitute contempt of Court.
We shall now refer to a few. Lord Russel of Killowen, L.C. J, has laid down 4 ~
in Reg v. Gray. (1900) 2 QB 36 at 40 as follows:
H
f

f
HARIDASDASv. USHARANIBANIK [PASAYAT,J.) 373
i

"Any act done or writing published calculated to bring a Court or a
A
Judge of the Court into contempt, or to lower his authority, is a
""" contempt of Court."

15. It cannot be denied that judgments are open to criticisms and in the
said case it was observed :
B
"Judges and Courts are alike open to criticism and if reasonable
argument or expostulation is offered against any judicial act as contrary
to law or public good, no Court could or would treat that as contempt '
of Court''. Indeed, Section 5 of the Act now provides that a person
1
shall not be guilty of contempt of Court for publishing any fair
comment on the merits of any case which has been heard and finally c
decided. But, if such a defence is taken, it is always open to test
whether the publication alleged to be offending was by way of fair
comment on the merits of the case or was personal scurrilous abuse
of a Judge as a Judge, for abuse of a Judge or a Court or attacks on
the personal character of a Judge are clearly punishable contempt. As
stated in para 2 at page 21 ofVolume-9 ofHalsbury's Laws of England;
D
Fourth Edition, ''The punishment is inflicted. not for the purpos·e of
~

I protecting either the Court as a whole or the individual Judges of the
Court from a repetition of the attack, but of protecting the public, and
specially those who either voluntarily or by compulsion are subject
to the jurisdiction of the Court, from the mischiefthey will incur ifthe E
authority of the tribunal is undermined or impaired."

16. Th~ view was echoed by this Court in Re. D.C. Saxena v. CJ/, AIR
(1996) SC 2481 In the same volume of Halsbury's Laws of England at para 27
it is stated thus: "Any act done or writing published which is calculated to
bring a Court or a Judge into contempt or to lower its authority or to interfere F
\ with the due course of justice or the lawful process of the Court, is a contempt
of Court."

17. The above proposition has been approved and followed by Lord
Atkin in Andrew Paul Terence Ambrad v. The Attorney General of Trinidad
and Tobago, AIR (1936) PC 141. It was observed as follows:
G

''No wrong is committed by any member of the public who exercised
... -j
the ordinary right of criticism in good faith in private or public the
public act done in the seat of justice. The path of criticism is public
way, the wrong headed are permitted to err therein, provided that H
374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 8 S.C.R.

members of the public abstain from·imputing improper motives to
A
those taking part in the administration of justice and are genuinely .
exercising a right of criticism and not acting in malice or attempting
to impart the administration of Justice, they are immune. Justice is not
a cloistered virtue; she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and
respectful even though outspoken comments of ordinary men":
B
Lord Justice Donovan in Attorney General v. Butterworth, (1963) I QB 696
after making reference to Req. v. Odham 's Press Ltd ex parte A.G., (1957) 1
QB 73 said: "whether or not there was an intention to interfere with the
administration of justice is relevant to penalty not to quit". This makes it clear
C that an intention to interfere with the proper administration of justice is an
essential ingredient of the offence of contempt of court and it is enough if
the action complained of is inherently likely so to interfere. In Morris v.
Crown Office, [ 1970] 1 All E.R. 1079 page 1081, Lord Denning M.R. said: that
the course of justice must not be deflected or interfered with. Those who do
it strike at the very foundations of our society. In the same case, Lord Justice
D Solmon spoke:

'The sole purpose of proceedings for contempt is to give our courts
the power effectively to protect the rights of the public by ensuring ...
that the administration of justice shall not be obstructed or prevented." t
l\
E Frank Further, J. in Offutt v. U.S., (1954) 348 U.S. 11 expressed his view as
follows:

"It is a mode of vindicating the majesty of law, in its active
manifestation against obstruction and outrage."

F In Jennison v. Baker. [ 1972] 1 All E.R. 997 at page 1006 it is stated:

"The law should not be seen to sit by limply, while those who defy
it go free, and those who seek its protection lose hope."

18. Chinappa Reddy, J. speaking for the Bench in Advocate General,
G State of Bihar v. Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries, [ 1980] 3 SCC 311 citing
those two decisions in the cases of Offutt .and Jennison (supra) stated thus:

" ..... It may be necessary to punish as a contempt a cause of conduct
which abuses and makes a mockery of the judicial process and which
...
thus extends its pernicious influence beyond the parties to the action
and affects the interest of the public in the administration of justice.
H
HARIDASDASv. USHARANIBANIK (PASAYAT,J.] 375

The public have an interest, an abiding and a real interest, and vital A
stake in the effective and orderly administration of justice, because
unless justice is so administered, there is the peril of all rights and
liberties perishing. The Court has the duty of protecting the interest
of the public in the due administration of justice and, so, it is entruste~
with the power to commit for contempt of Court not in order to protect
the dignity of the Court against insult or injury as the expression B
"Contempt of Court" may seem to suggest but to protect and t~
vindicate the right of the public and the administration of justice shall'
not be prevented, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with."

19. Krishna Iyer, J. in his separate judgment In Re. S. Mulgaokar, [ 1978)' C
3 sec 339 while giving broad guidelines in taking punitive action in the matter
of contempt of Court has stated:

" .... .lfthe Court considers the attack on the judge or judges scurrilous,
offensive, intimidatory or malicious beyond condonable limits, the
strong ann of the law must, in the name of public interest and public D
justice, strike a blow on him who challenges the supremacy of the rule
of law by fouling its source and stream"

20. In the case of Brahma Prakash Sharma and Ors. v. The State of
Uttar Pradesh, AIR (1954) SC 10 this Court after referring to various decisions
of the foreign countries as well ~s of the Privy Council stated thus: E
"It will be an injury to the public if it tends to create an apprehension
in the minds of the people regarding the integrity, ability or fairness
of the Judge or to deter actual and prospective litigants from placing
complete reliance upon the Court's administration of justice, or if it is
likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of the Judge himself in the F
discharge of his judicial duties. It is well established that it is not
necessary to prove affinnative that there has been an actual interference
with the administration of justice by reason of such defamatory
statement; it is enough if it is likely or tends in any way to interfere
with the proper administration of law."
G
21. It may be noted here that in the illustrated case Re: S. Mulgaokar 's
. , case (supra) it was held that the judiciary cannot be immune from criticism.
But, when such criticism is based on obvious distortion or gross mis-statement
and make in a manner which seems designed to lower respect of the judiciary
and destroy public confidence in it, it cannot be ignored.
H
376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 8 S.C.R.

A 22. Though certain imputations against the Judge may be only libelous ·
against that particular individual, it may at times amount to contempt also
depending upon the gravity of the allegations. In Brahma Prakash Sharma 's
case (supra) this Court held that a defamatory attack on a Judge may be a
libel so far as the judge is concerned and it would be open to him to proceed
against the libellor in a proper action if he so chooses. If, however, the
B publication of the disparaging statement is calculated to interfere with the due
course of justice or proper administration of law by such Court, it can be
punished separately as contempt. The same view has been taken in Perspective
Publications (P) Ltd v. The State of Maharashtra. AIR (1971) SC 221 and
CK. DaphtaryandOrs. v. OP. Gupta and Ors., AIR (1971) SC 1132. Therefore,
C apart from the fact that a particular statement is libelous, it can constitute
criminal contempt if the imputation is such that the same is capable of
lowering the authority of the Court. The gravity of the aforesaid statement
is that the same would scandalize the court.

23. The right to criticize an opinion of a court, to take issue with it upon
D its conclusions as to a legal proposition, or question its conception of the
farts, so long as such criticisms are made in good faith and are in ordinarily
decent and respectful language and are not designed to willfully or maliciously
misrepresent the position of the Court, or tend to bring it into disrespect, or
lessen the respect due to the authority to which a Court is entitled, cannot
E be questioned. The right of free speech is one of the greatest guarantee to
liberty in a free country like ours, even though that right is frequently and
in many instances 'tmtrageously abused. If any considerable portion of a
community is led to believe that either because of gross ignorance of the law
or because of a wrong reason, it· cannot rely upon the courts to administer
justice that portion of the community, upon some occasion, is very likely to
F come to the conclusion that it is better not to take any chances on the courts
failing to do their duty.

24. Judiciary is the bed rock and handmaid of democracy. If people lose
faith in justice parted by a Court of law, the entire democratic set up would
crumble down. In this background, observations of Lord Denning M.R. in
G Metropolitan Properties Ltd. v. Lennon. [ 1968] 3 All E.R. 304 are relevant:
"Justice must be rooted in confidence, and confidence is destroyed when
right minded people go away thinking, the Judge is based."

25. Considered in the light of the aforesaid position in law, a bare
H reading of the statements makes it clear that those amount to a scurrilous
r

HARIDASDASv. USHARANIBANIK (PASAYAT.J.) 377
'-' attack on the integrity, honesty and judicial competence and impartiality of A
judges. It is offensive and intimidating. The contemnor by making such
scandalising statements and invective remarks has interfered and seriously
shaken the system of administration of justice by bringing it down to disrespect
and disrepute. It impairs confidence of the people in the Court. Once door is
opened to this kind of allegations, aspersions and imputations, it may provide
a handle to the disgruntled litigants to malign the Judges, leading to character
B
_4 assassination. A good name is better than good riches. Immediately comes
to one's mind Shakespeare's Othello, Act II, Scene 3, 167:-

"Good name in man and woman, dear my Lord is the immediate jewel
of their souls; who steals my purse, steals trash; its something,.
nothing; 'T was mine, its his, and has been slate to thousands; But
c
he that filches from me my good name,

Robs me of that which not enriches him

And makes me poor indeed."
...
I
D
26. Majesty of Law continues to hold its head high notwithstanding
such scurrilous attacks made by persons who feel the law Courts will absorb
~nything and every thing, including attacks on their honesty, integrity and
impartiality. But it has to be borne in mind that such divinity and magnanimity
is not its weakness but its strength. It generally ignores irresponsible statements
which are anything but legitimate criticism. It is to be noted that what is E
permissible is legitimate criticism and not illegitimate insinuation. No Court
can brook with equanimity something which may have tendency to interfere

-
with the administration of justice. Some people find judiciary a soft target
because it has neither the power of the purse nor the sword, which other
wings of democracy possess. It needs no reiteration that on judiciary millions F
pin their hopes, for protecting their life, liberty, property and the like. Judges
do not have an easy job. They repeatedly do what rest of us (the people) see!Q
to avoid, make decisions, said David Pannick in his book "Judges". Judges
are mere mortals, but they are asked to perform a function which is truly
I
divine.
G
27. What is contempt of Court has been stated in lucid terms by Oswal4
in Classic "Book on Contempt of Court". It is said:
-i

"To speak generally, contempt of court may be said to be consfaute4
by any conduct that tends to bring the authority and demonstration
H
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 8 S.C.R.

A of law into disrespect and disregard or to interfere with or prejudice
parties, litigant or their witnesses during the litigation."

"Contempt in the legal acceptance of the term, primarily signifies
disrespect to that which is entitled to legal regard, but as a wrong
purely moral or affecting an object not possessing a legal status, it
B has in the eye of the law no existence. In its origin all legal contempt
will be found to consist in an offence more or less direct against the
...
sovereign himself as the fountainhead of law and justice or against
his palace where justice was administered. This clearly appears from
old cases."

C 28. Lord Diplock, speaking for the Judicial Committee in Chokolingo v.
Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago, [ 1981] I All E.R. 244, summarized
the position thus: "Scandalising the Court is a convenient way of describing
a publication which, although it does not relate to any specific case either pa11
of pending or any specific Judge, is a scurrilous attack on the judiciary as
D a whole which is calculated to undermine the authority of the Courts and
public confidence in the administration of justice. Thus, before coming to the
cvnclusion as to whether or not the publication amounts to a contempt, what
will have to be seen is, whether the criticism is fair, temperate and made in
good faith or whether it is something directed to the personal character of a
Judge or to the impartiality of a Judge or court. A finding, one way of the
E other, will determine whether or nor the act complained of amounted to
cdntempt."

29. Mahajan, Jin Aswini Kumar Chose v. Arabinda Bose. AIR (1953)
SC 75, observed as follows:-

F "No objection could have been taken to the article had it merely I

preached to the Courts of law the sermon of divine detachment. But
when it proceeded to attribute improper motives to the Judges, it not
only transgressed the limits of fair and bona fide criticism but had a
clear tendency to affect the dignity and prestige of this Court ..... It is
obvious that if an impression is created in the minds of the public that
G the Judges in the highest Court of the land act on extraneous
considerations in deciding cases, the confidence of the whole
community in the administration of justice is bound to be undermined
and no greater mischief than that can possibly be imagined ..... We
would like to observe that it is not the practice of this Court to issue
H
HARIDAS DAS v. USHA RANI BANIK [PASAYAT, J.] 379
such rules except in very grave and serious cases and it is never over- A
sensitive to public criticism; but when there is danger of grave mischief
being done in the matter of administration of justice, the animadversion
cannot be ignored and viewed with placid equanimity ..... "

30. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that anyone who
intends to tarnish the image of judiciary should not be allowed to go B
unpunished. By attacking the reputation of Judges, the ultimate victim is the
institution. The day the consumers of justice loose faith in the institution that
.\
would be the darkest day for mankind. The importance of judiciary needs no
reiteration.

31. When the background facts highlighted above are considered in the C
background of the principles set out above, the inevitable conclusion is that
I
the contemnor deserves no sympathy. In fact, the lenient approach of the
Guwahati High Court seems to have encouraged him to make statements on
oath tarnishing the image of the Judges of the highest judiciary. His apol9gy
seems to be not genuine. This is more so because he wanted to justify the D
statements made in para 4.

32. Therefore, we find the contemnor guilty of contempt. He is senten~ed
to undergo imprisonment for a period of two months. He shall be taken into
custody and sent to Tihar Jail, New Delhi, forthwith to serve the sentence
~ar~ , E
33. The contempt proceedings stand disposed of.

R.P. Contempt proceedings disposed of.