HARKESH CHANDversusKRISHAN GOPAL MEHTA & ORS.

                       [2017] 2 S.C.R. 285



                       HARKESH CHAND                                  A
                                v.
               KRISHAN GOPAL MEHTA & ORS.
                  (Civil Appeal No. 1778 of2010)
                      FEBRUARY 13, 2017                               B

         [S. A. BOBDE AND ASHOK BHUSHAN, JJ.]
        Rent Control and Eviction - Notice for termination of tenancy
of shop - Vis. 106 of Transfer of Property Act - Issued in September
1972 - Suit for eviction filed in October 1972 - Dismissed by trial
court on the ground that tenancy was protected by United Provinces
                                                                       c
(Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 - Order of'··..
trial court confirmed by Revisional Court - In writ petition High
Court held that on 15th July 1972 the 1947 Act was repealed and
the special notification [under new Act i.e. Uttar Pradesh Urban
Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972} D
covering the area in question was issued on 23"1 January 1973,
thus there was no protection of tenancy between 15'' July 1972 and
23"1 January 1973 and hence the notice terminating the tenancy
was valid - On appeal, held: The 1947 Act was made applicable to
the area in question by notification dated 31" March 1949 - By
                                                                       E
virtue of s. 24 of Uttar Pradesh General Clauses Act,· 1904, the
notification dated 31" March 1949 continued to exist even after
the 1947 Act was repealed upon reenactment of the 1972 Act -
 Hence, the suit is untenable - However, in the facts and
circumstances of the case as well as in the interest ofjustice, tenant
directed to hand-over the possession of the premises in question to F
 the land-lord after a period of three years.
       Disposing of the appeal, the Court
        HELD 1. It is clear from sub-section (2) of s. 1 of United
Provinces (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947,
                                                                      G
that it extended to the whole of the erstwhile United Provinces
and applied to every municipal area, cantonment area and notified
area as per the provincial Government Notification in the official
gazette. Undisputedly, the Governor declared that the provisions
of Section 2, 3(a), 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 12 and 16 of the 1947 Act shall
                                                                      H
                             285
286            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2017] 2 S.C.R.


A     apply to the area in question by a Notification dated 31" March,
      1949. [Para 14] [292-B-C]
             2.1 A plain reading of s. 24 of Uttar Pradesh General
      Clauses Act, 1904 suggests that any statutory instrument (which
      a notification is) issued under the repealed enactment continues
B     in force as if it were issued under the re-enacted provisions to
      the extent that it is not inconsistent with the re-enacted provisions.
      Such continuance exists till the statutory instrument is superseded
      by a statutory instrument issued under the re-enacted provisions.
      [Para 16] [292-G-H; 293-A]
c           2.2 Section 21 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings
      (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 provided
      the same restrictions on the eviction of tenants on specified
      grounds that Section 3 (a) of the 1947 Act did. Thus, there is no
      inconsistency whats()~ver found between the two provisions.
      There is also no express provision to the contrary in the
D     subsequent enactment i.e. 1972 Act. [Para 19] [293-E-F]
               2.3 The provisions of an Act, and a conditional legislation
      such as a notification, belong to a different order of things. A
      statutory instrument (i.e. the notification) itself does not enact
      the protection to the tenants. The Act of 1947 does that. The
E     notification merely makes the enactment applicable to the area
      in question. Apparently the purpose of the re-enacted provision
      is, inter alia, to protect the tenants from eviction, except on special
      grounds. Nothing in t,he 1972 Act shows that such a protection
      was intended to be removed from any area or for that matter, the
 F    area in question. In fact, the contrary is clear from the fact that a
      notification expressly applying the re-enacted provisions to the
      area in question was issued on the 21" of March, 1973. Thus,
      there can be no inconsistency between the notification applying
      the 1947 Act to the area in question and the re-enacted provisions
      of the Act unless the Act of 1972 clearly expresses an intention
 G    to remove the protection accorded to the tenants from an area.
      [Para 20] [293-F-H; 294-A-B]
             2.4 None of the conditions which derogate from the
      continuation of the notification exist in the present case. There
      is no express provision to the contrary, there is no supersession
 H
   HARKESH CHAND v. KRISHAN GOPAL MEHTA & ORS.                           287


by any statutory instrument under the re-enacted provisions and           A
there is nothing inconsistent in the continuance of the notification
with any of the re-enacted provisions. [Para 22] [294-D-E]
        2.5 The notification under the 1947 Act continued in spite
of its repeal and the enactment of the 1972 Act. It cannot be said
that in the hiatus between the repeal of the 1947 Act and the             B
issuance of a notification applying the 1972 Act to the area in
question the Legislature intended that the tenants had no
protection from eviction and there was an unrestricted right to
evict them. [Para 27] [297-A-B]
       2.6 The old Act, i.e. 1947 Act applied to the area in question     c
by virtue of notification dated 31" of March, 1949, when the suit
for the eviction of the appellant was filed. The suit is untenable
for the want of permission under the provisions of the 1972 Act
and is liable to be dismissed. [Para 29] [297-D-E]
       The Chief Inspector of Mines and Anr v. Lala Karam                 D
       Chand Thapar Etc. [1962] 1 SCR 9; The State of
       Bombay v. Pandurang Vinayak Chaphalkar and Ors.
       [1953] 4 SCR 773; Neel alias Niranjan Majumdar v.
       The State of West Bengal (1972) 2 SCC 668 : [1973]
       1 SCR 675; State of Punjab v. Harnek Singh (2002) 3
       SCC 481 : [2002] 1 SCR 1060 - relied on.                           E

       3. However, in view of the circumstances of this case, as
well as in the interest of justice, it is directed that the appellant-
tenant shall hand over possession of the premises to the
respondent after a period of three years from the date of judgment.
The premise admittedly belongs to the respondent, which he bona           F
fide needs after the said period. [Para 30] [297-E-F]

                       Case Law Reference

[1962] 1 SCR 9                  relied on               Para 23
                                                                          G
[1953] 4 SCR 773                relied on               Para 24
[1973] 1 SCR 675                relied on               Para 28
[2002] 1 SCR 1060               relied on               Para 29

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288             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                               [2017] 2 S.C.R.
                                 '

A            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1778
      of20l0.
             From the Judgment and Order dated 27.08.2009 of the High
      Court ofUttranchal at Nainital in Writ Petition No. 4882 of2001.
             Nikhil Goel, Ms. Naveen Goel, Ashutosh Ghade, Advs. for the
B     Appellant.
              Anurag Dubey, Rajesh Pathak, Abhishek Chakarbarty (For S.
      R. Setia), R. D. Upadhyay, Advs. for the Respondents.
              The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c             S. A. BOBDE, J. l. This is a tenant's appeal. In the impugned
      judgment, the High Court directed the tenant to be evicted. The Trial
      Court dismissed the suit for eviction filed by the respondent-landlord.
      The Revisional Court dismissed the landlord's appeal. In the Writ Petition,
      the High Court reversed the concurrent findings of both the courts below.
D              2. The tenancy is in respect to a small shop situated in a rural
      area in the village ofDaishwala, ~Doiwala Town, located in the Dehradun
      district of Uttarakhand. On the I 9'h of September, 1972, the landlord
      issued a notice terminating the tenancy of the shop under Section l 06 of
      the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and demanded the possession of the
      shop.
E
              3. The landlord filed the present suit for eviction on the I" of
      October 1972. The Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Dehradun
      dismissed Small Cause Case No.85of1972 with costs. The Trial Court
      held that even though The United Provinces (Temporary) Control of
      Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (U.P. Act No. III of 1947) hereinafter
F
      referred to as "the Act of 194 7" had been repealed by the aforementioned
      date and replaced by a new rent act' hereinafter referred to as "the Act
      of 1972" which was brought into force on the I S'h of July, 1972, the old
      act applied to the suit property.
               4. The Additional District Judge, Dehradun, dimissed the revision
G     petition No. 43 of 1976 filed by the landlord. It was held that the notification
      by which the provisions of the old act were applicable to the Doiwala
      area in the year 1949 continued and remained in force on the date when

      'The Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act,
      1972
H
   HARKESH CHAND v. KRISHAN GOPAL MEHTA & ORS.                                   289
                 [S. A. BOBDE, J.]

the notice of termination of the tenancy was issued. Accordingly, the             A
tenancy was protected by the Act of 194 7.
       5. The landlord approached the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad by way ofWrit Petition No. 25951 of2000. This writ petition
was transferred to the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nanital and re-
numbered as Writ Petition No. 4882 of 2001.                                       B
        6. The High Court of Uttarakhand upheld the landlord's plea
that the notice which terminated the tenancy of the shop under the
provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 was valid. The High
Court held that the old Act under which the Doiwala area was covered
by a notification had been repealed and replaced by the new Act. The              c
old Act of 1947 did not cover the rural areas that are not specially notified.
The special notification with respect to Doiwala area came into existence
only on the 23'' of January, 1973 and therefore, between the 15"' ofJuly,
1972 (when the old act along with its notification stood repealed), and
the 23'' of January, 1973 (when the notification was issued), there was
no protection to the tenants in Doiwala area under apy law. Thus, the             D
notice terminating the tenancy was valid. Accordingly, the High Court
allowed the writ petition and set aside the orders of the Trial Court and
the Revision Court by which the landlord's suit was dismissed.
          7. Aggrieved by the order of the High Court that decreed the
suit for eviction filed by the respondent-landlord, the appellant approached      E
this Court. This Court granted special leave to appeal, and hence this
appeal.
        8. The questions that fall for consideration before us are -
        (i) Whether or not, the tenancy in question is protected by Act
                                                                                  F
No.Ill of 1947.
        (ii) Whether or not, the notification dated 3 l" of March 1949
which applied the provisions of the Act of 1947 to Doiwala town was in
force on the 19"' of September, 1972, i.e. when the landlord terminated
the tenancy and sought possession of the suit premises.
                                                                                  G
       (iii) Whetherornot, Section 24 of the U.P. General Clauses Act,
1904 continued the notification dated 31" of March 1949 that protects
Doiwala town by applying the provisions of the Act of 1947.
      9. A similar notification was issued under the re-enacted Act of
1972 on the 21" of March, 1973. The Act of 194 7 was a temporary                  H
290             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2017] 2 S.C.R.


A     statute enacted to control the letting and renting of property as well as to
      prevent the eviction of tenants from such accommodation. The provisions
      of the Section 3 (c) of the Act of 1972 inter a!ia restricted evictions
      without the permission of the District Magistrate which could be granted
      only on the grounds specified in the Act.
B            10. The Act of 1947 was extended from time to time and was in
      force when the Act of 1972 was enacted.
              Sub-section (2) of Section I of Act No.Ill of 194 7 provided as
      follows:-
              "Section 1...
c
              (2) It extends to the whole of the United Provinces and applies
              to every Municipal Area and Cantonment Area and to every
              Notified Area contiguous to such municipal area or cantonment
              area and to accommodation situated within one mile of the
              boundaries of any such municipal area, cantonment area and
D             notified area, and to such other area as the Provincial Government
              may. from time to time. notify in the official Gazette in this behalf."
                                                              (emphasis supplied)
             Sub-section (2) brought the Act into force on the l" day of
      October, 1946. It provided as follows:-
E
             "(2) It extends to the whole of the United Provinces and applies
                  to every Municipal Area and Cantonment Area and to every
                  Notified Area contiguous to such municipal area or
                  cantonment area and to accommodation situated within one
                  mile of the boundaries of any municipal area, canton111ent
F
                  area and notified area, and to such other area as the Prov.incial
                  Government may, from time to time, notify in official Gazette
                  in this behalf."
            Sub-section (4), which provided for its expiry on the 30'"
      September, 1948, read as follows:-
G
              "(4) It shall cease to have effect on the expiry of September 30,
              1948, except as respects things done or omitted to be done before
              the expiration thereof, and Section 6 of the United Provinces
              General Clauses Act, 1904, shall apply upon the expiry of the
              Act as ifit had then been repealed by an United Provinces Act."
H
   HARKESH CHAND v. KRISHAN GOPAL MEHTA & ORS.                                  291
                            rs.
                     A. BO~DE, J.l

        Section 43 of the Act of 1972 repealed the Act of 194 7.                 A
Sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the Act of 1972 extended the Act of 1972
to the whole of Uttar Pradesh.
         11. A notification under Section 1 ( 1) of the Act of 1972 declaring
that the Act shall apply to Doiwala town area was issued on the 21" of
March, 1973. Even though, the subsequent Act is essentially a re-                B
enactment of the earlier Act of 194 7, the landlord acted on the
presupposition that with the repeal and re-enactment of the Act of 194 7
on the 15'" of July, 1972, the notification dated 31" March, 1949 also
ceased to exist, thus assuming that there was no law restricting the
eviction of tenants in the Doiwala area during the period between the
two notifications; ergo, terminating the tenancy on the l 9'h of September,
                                                                                 c
 1972.
       (a) As stated earlier, the primary question before us is as to
whether or not there existed a protection of tenants in the Doiwala area
under Act No.III of 194 7 by virtue of the notification dated 31" March,
1949                                                                             D

       The answer to this depends on whether Section 24 of the U.P.
General Clauses Act, 1904 continued the notification dated 31" March,
1949.
        12. Shri Nikhil Goel, Advocate for the appellant, contended that         E
by virtue of Section 24 of the U.P. General Clauses Act, the notification
dated 31" March, 1949 that applied Act No.III of 1947 to the Doiwala
area continued even after the expiry of the Act. Thus, the protection to
the tenants in the Doiwala area also continued and was in force on the
1" of October, 1972, when the suit was filed. The protection of the
tenants under the 1947 Act continued throughout and in any case up to            F
the issue of the notification dated 23'' of January, 1973, under the Act
No. XIII of 1972. It made no difference that the new Act of 1972 was
specifically applicable to Doiwala town area by the aforesaid notification.
As long as there was nothing inconsistent in the notification dated 31"
March, 1949 with the re-enacted provisions of the Act of 1972, the               G
notification continued in force by virtue of Section 24 of the U.P. General
Clauses Act, 1904.
        13. Thus, it was submitted that at all times, and particularly on
the date when the notice was issued on the 19'h of September, 1972, and
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292            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017] 2 S.C.R.



A     the date when the suit for eviction was filed on the I" of October, 1972,
      the appellant's tenancy in the Doiwala town area was protected by the
      notification issued under Act No. Ill of 194 7. The notice issued by the
      respondent-landlord tenninating the tenancy under Section I 06 of the
      Transfer of Property Act was not val id and hence, the suit filed on the
      basis of such a notice was not tenable.
B
      Applicability of U.P. Act No. III of 1947 to Doiwala Area
               14. It is clear from sub-section (2) of Section I of the Act of
      1947 that it extended to the whole of the erstwhile United Provinces and
      applied to every municipal area, cantonment area and notified ;irea as
c     per the provincial government notification in the official gazette.
      Undisputedly, the Governor declared that the provisions of Section 2,
      3(a), 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 12 and 16 of the Act shall apply to Doiwala town
      located in Dehradun by a notification dated 31" March, 1949 because
      this notification has never been expressly repealed.
D     Whether the notification dated 31" March, 1949 continued by
      virtue of Section 24 of the U. P. General Clauses Act, 1904.
              15. The question whether the notification dated3 I" March, 1949
      continued to exist even after the Act was repealed upon the reenactment
      of the Act of 1972 may be considered.
E             Section 24 of the U.P. General Clauses Act, 1904:-
                "24. Continuation of appointments, notifications, orders, etc.,
                issued under enactments repealed and re-enacted. - Where.
                any enactment is repealed and re-enacted by an [Uttar Pradesh]
                Act, with or without modification, then, unless it is otherwise
 F              expressly provided, any appointment, [or statutory instrument
                or form], made or issued under the repealed enactment, shall,
                so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions re-enacted,
                continue in force, and be deemed to have been made or issued
                under the provisions so re-enacted, unless and until it is
                superseded by any appointment, [or statutory instrument or
 G              form] made or issued under the provisions so re-enacted."
                                                            (emphasis supplied)
             16. A plain reading of the above provision suggests that any
      statutmy instrument (which a notification is) issued under the repealed
      enactment continues in force as if it were issued under the re-enacted
 H
   HARKESH CHAND v. KRISHAN GOPAL MEHTA & ORS.                                   293
                 rs. A. BOBDE, J.l
provisions to the extent that it is not inconsistent with the re-enacted         A
provisions. Such continuance exists till the statutory instrument is
superseded by a statutory instrument issued under the re-enacted
provisions.
        l 7. It is therefore necessary; to see whether the notification
dated 31" March, 1949, issued underthe Act of 1947 is inconsistent with           B
the re-enacted provisions of the Act of 1972. Obviously, if the 1949
notification cannot stand along with the re-enacted provisions and is
inconsistent with them, it cannot be said to have been continued in force
by virtue of Section 24 of the U. P. General Clauses Act, 1904.
         18. The Governor of the erstwhile United Provinces, through
the said notification, simply declared that the provisions of Sections 2,
                                                                                  c
3(a), 4, 5, 6 etc. shall apply to Doiwala town in Dehradun district. The
effect of this notification thus, was that the protection to the tenants
offered by Section 3 (a) i.e. the restrictions on eviction, applied to Doiwala
town.
         19. We find nothing inconsistent between the protection accorded        D
to the tenants under the Act of 194 7 as applied to Doiwala town by the
notification dated 31" March, 1949, and the protection accorded to the
tenants in the re-enacted provision of the Act of 1972, both of which
regulated the eviction of tenants in the whole ofUttar Pradesh. Section
21 of the later act provided the same restrictions on the eviction of tenants     E
on specified grounds that Section 3 (a) of the 1947 Act did. Thus, there
is no inconsistency whatsoever found between the two provisions. We
also, do not find any express provision to the contrary in the subsequent
enactment.
        20. The provisions of an Act, and a conditional legislation such          F
as a notification, belong to a different order of things. A statutory
instrument (i.e. the notification) itself does not enact the protection to
the tenants. The Act of 194 7 does that. The notification merely makes
the enactment applicable to the Doiwala area. Apparently the purpose
of the re-enacted provision is, inter a/ia, to protect the tenants from
eviction, except on special grounds. Nothing in the Act shows that such           G
a protection was intended to be removed from any area or for that matter,
the Doiwala area. In fact, the contrary is clear from the fact that a
notification expressly applying the re-enacted provisions to the Doiwala
area was issued on the 2l"ofMarch, 1973.
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294                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017] 2 S.C.R.


A             Thus, there can be no inconsistency between the notification
      applying the Act to the Doiwala area, and the re-enacted provisions of
      the Act unless the Act of 1972 clearly expresses an intention to remove
      the protection accorded to the tenants from an area.
              21. Section 24 of the General Clauses Act, 1904 clearly provides
B     that a statutory instrument issued under a repealed enactment shall
      continue in force and be deemed to have been made or issued under the
      re-enacted provisions unless
              (a) the re-enacted provision expressly provides otherwise
              or
c
              (b) it is superseded by a statutory instrument made under the re-
              enacted provision
              The section further provides that the extent to which the statutory
      instrument under the repealed enactment shall continue is "so far as it is
      not inconsistent with the re-enacted provisions."
D
              22. We find that none of the conditions which derogate from the
      continuation of the notification exist in the present case. There is no
      express provision to the contrary, there is no supersession by any statutory
      instrument under the re-enacted provisions and there is nothing
      inconsistent in the continuance of the notification with any of the re-
 E
      enacted provisions.
               23. At this stage, it is apposite to consider the central purpose of
      the General Clauses Act in relation to a statute. In The Chief Inspector
      of Mines and Anr vs. Lala Karam Chand Thapar Etc'., this Court
      stated its purpose as follows:-
 F
              " ... it will be profitable to remember that the purpose of the
              General Clauses Act is to place in one single statute different
              provisions as regards interpretations of words and legal principles
              which would otherwise have to be specified separately in many
              different acts and regulations. Whatever the General Clauses
 G            Act says, whether as regards the mean in gs of words or as regards
              legal principles, has to be read into every statute to which it
              applies."
              24. The decision of this Court in The State of Bombay vs.
       '(1962) I SCR 9
 H
   HARKESH CHAND v. KRISHAN GOPAL MEHTA & ORS.                                295
                 rs. A. BOBDE, J.l
Pandurang Vinayak Chapha/kar and Ors 3, throws a light on the                 A
present case. The Building Control Ordinance, enacted in 1948
empowered the provincial Government to extend its provisions to any
other area as may be specified by notification. A notification was issued
on the 15"' ofJanuary, 1948 extending the provisions of the Ordinance to
Ratnagiri district.
                                                                               B
        The aforementioned Ordinance was repealed by an Act which
contained a provision empowering the State Government to issue a
notification to extend the Act to any other specified area. The Act
provided that the Bombay General Clauses Act would apply to the repeal
as if the Ordinance were an enactment.
                                                                               c
         The respondent started constructing a cinema at Ratnagiri district
on the l 5'h of August, 1948, after the commencement of the Act. Since
the district ofRatnagiri was not specified in the Schedule to the Act, the
respondent assumed that the Act did not apply to Ratnagiri. As a result,
the construction was carried out without obtaining the permission of the
Controller.                                                                    D

        The High Court acquitted the respondent, and the State preferred
an appeal to this Court. This Court held that, by virtue of the repealing
provision and Section 25 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904
which is in pari materia with the provisions of the U.P. General Clauses
Act, 1904, the notification issued under the Ordinance continued in force      E
under the Act (XXXI of 1948). Therefore, the provisions of the Act
stood extended to the other areas as indicated in the notification. The
appeal was allowed and the judgment of the High Court was set aside.
          25. We find that the ratio in the above case squarely applies to
 the present case. An identical notification extending the provisions of an    F
.earlier enactment to an area was issued through an Ordinance. Though
 the repealing Act was not specifically extended to that area, it was held
 that the notification under the earlier enactment continued in force under
 the new enactment by virtue of the General Clauses Act, 1904.
         26. In The Chief Inspector of Mines case (supra), the question        G
that fell for consideration was whether or not the regulations framed
under the Mines Act, 1923 (for short, "the 1923 Act") continued in force
after its repeal by the Mines Act, 1952. The accused was prosecuted
for the violation of the regulations framed under the 1923 Act. The
 '(I953)4SCR 773                                                               H
296            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2017] 2 S.C.R.


A     appellants applied for the quashing of the criminal proceedings on the
      ground that they were prosecuted for the breach of the regulations that
      had ceased to exist by the repeal of the Mines Act, 1923. The regulations
      were ".as if enacted in this Act", and therefore, repealed along with the
      1923 Act.
B            This Court held that though the regulations were a part of the
      1923 Act for some purposes, but for the purpose of continuity of existence
      they would not be considered a part of the Act:-
              " ... even though the Act is repealed, the regulation will continue
              to exist, in accordance with the provisions of Section 24 of the
C             General Clauses Act 1904."'
              Section 24 was given full effect for holding that the regulations
      or rules framed under a repealed law would continue in force in spite of
      the repeal. Expounding on the purpose of Section 24 of the General
      Clauses Act, 1904, the Court held:-
D
              '·'One may pause here to remember that regulations framed under
              an Act are of the very greatest importance. Such regulations are
              framed for the successful operation of the Act. Without proper
              regulations, a statute will often be worse than useless. When an
              Act is repealed, but re-enacted, it is almost inevitable that there
E             will be some time lag between the re-enacted statute coming
              int_o force, and regulations being framed under the re-enacted
              statute. However efficient the rule making authority may be, it is
              impossible to avoid some hiatus between the coming into force
              of the re-enacted statute and the simultaneous repeal of the okl
              Act, and the making ofregulations. Often, the time lag would be
 F
              considerable. Is it conceivable that any legislature, in providing
              that regulations made under its statute will have effect as if
              enacted in the Act, could have intended by th OS!:. words to say
              that if ever·the Act is repealed and re-enacted (as is more than
               likely to happen sooner or later), the regulations will have no
G             existence for the purpose of the re-enacted statute, and thus the
              re-enacted statute, for some time at least, will be in many respects,
               a dead letter."'

      'Page 19,(1962) I SCR 9
      'Page 20, ( 1962) I SCR 9
H
   HARKESH CHAND v. KRISHAN GOPAL MEHTA & ORS.                                   297
                           rs.
                    A. BOBDE, J.l

        27. We are in respectful agreement with the above observations.          A
Applying the said observations to the present case, it must be held that
the notification under the 1947 Act continued in spite of its repeal and
the enactment of the 1972 Act. It cannot be said that in the hiatus between
the repeal of the 194 7 Act and the issuance ofa notification applying the
1972 Act to the Doiwala area, the Legislature intended that the tenants
                                                                                 B
had no protection from eviction and there was an unrestricted right to
evict them.
        28. This Court construed Section 24 of the General Clauses Act
1904, in a similar way in Neel alias Niranjan Majumdar vs. The State
of West Bengal'. It was held that though the offence of the possession
of a sword would allege to have been committed in 1970, i.e. after the
                                                                                 c
repeal of the Arms Act, 1878, the notification dated 19'h of March, 1923
issued under the repealed Arms Act of 1878 would continue in force and
would be deemed to have been enacted under the new Act by virtue of
Section 24 of the General Clauses Act, 1904.
      29. This Court has taken a concurrent view in State of D
Punjab vs. Harnek Singh".
         30. In the result, we hold that the old Act, i.e. the Act No.Ill of
194 7 applied to the Doiwala area by virtue of notification dated 31" of
March, 1949, when the ~uit for the eviction of the appellant was filed.
The suit is untenable for the want of permission under the provisions of          E
the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 and is liable to be dismissed. However,
having heard the learned counsels for both sides on the point, and in
view of the circumstances of this case, as well as in the interest of
justice, we direct thatthe appellant-tenant shall hand over possession of
the premises to the respondent after a period of three years from today.          F
The premise admittedly belongs to the respondent, which he bona fide
needs after the said period. Till the time the appellant hands over the
possession to the respondent, the appellant shall pay a monthly rent of
Rs.4,000/-to the respondent.
         Accordingly, the appeal is disposed off.                                 G

Kalpana K. Tripathy                                        Appeal disposed of.


'(l 972 )2 sec 668
 '(2002J 3 sec 481
                                                                                 H