HARSHAD CHIMAN LAL MODIversusD.L.F. UNIVERSAL LTD. AND ANR.

A                         HARSHAD CHIMAN LAL MODI
                                          v.
                        D.L.F. UNIVERSAL LTD. AND ANR.

                                DECEMBER I4, 2005

B                   [ARIJIT PASAYAT AND C.K. THAKKER, JJ.]


           Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:

           S.16 read with Order Vil. Rule 10-Suitfor possession of immovable
C property-Return of plaint for presentation to proper court-Effect on the
    proceedings carried on in the suit meanwhile-Plea that the trial court may
    be directed to take up the suit from the stage at which it stood transferred-
    Held, cannot be allowed, since the court while deciding the appeal arising
    out of the order of return of the plaint, did not grant the prayer-It is not
D   a case of transfer of a suit but lack of jurisdiction of the Court.

          Appellant filed a suit in the Delhi High Court, inter alia, for specific
    performance of contract and recovery of possession of the property. Though
    written statement was filed, but no objection as regards jurisdiction of the
    court was raised therein. The said suit was transferred to the District Court
E   in Delhi. Thereafter, the defendants filed an application for amendment of the
    written statement by raising an objection that since the suit was for recovery
    of possession of imnioveable property situated at G urgaon, the Delhi Court
    had no jurisdiction. The trial court ordered return of the plaint for
    presentation to proper court. The High Court as well as the Supreme Court
F   affirmed the order dismissing the appeal of the plaintiff*. Meanwhile in view
    of the interim orders, the trial court proceeded with trial of the suit and the
    matter reached the stage of final arguments and final orders, but as there
    was a direction not to pronounce the judgment, the suit was adjourned sine
    die.

G         The plaintiff filed the present application praying that since the
    pleadings are complete, evidence is recorded and the arguments are over, the
    Supreme Court may direct the Gurgaon Court to take up the suit from the
    stage at whicll it stood transferred.

           Rejecting the application, the Court
H                                        740
                HARSHADCHIMANLALMODlv. D.L.F. UNIVERSAL LTD.                  74 J

      HELD: 1.1. The application is ill-founded and deserves to be dismissed. A
In the civil appeal decided by this Court*, it was held that since the dispute
related to immovable property and the prayer was for specific performance of
an agreement of sale of immovable property and recovery of possession
thereof, the relevant provision was Section 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908. Under Clause (d) of the said section, only Gurgaon Court had
jurisdiction. It was also held that notwithstanding the agreement between the B
parties that only Delhi Court had jurisdictioa, the said clause could not
operate as Section 20 of the Code could not be invoked. Section 20 would apply
where two or more courts had jurisdiction and the parties by an agreement
consented that one of such courts would try the suit. Since Delhi Court had
no jurisdiction, the contention of the defendants was upheld and the plaint C
was ordered to be returned to the plaintiff for presentation to the proper Court
                                                                       (744-B-DI

      *Harshad Chimanlal Modi v. DLF Universal Ltd & Anr., (2005) 7 SCC
791, relied on.
                                                                                      D
      1.2. The provisions of Section 24 and/or Section 25 of the Code have no
application to the case on hand, as it is not a case of 'transfer' of a suit but of
lack of jurisdiction of the Court. Likewise, the provisions of Rule 15 of Order
18 also cannot be pressed in service. (744-E-F)

      1.3. As was already held in the appeal, the suit could not have been            E
instituted in Delhi Court keeping in view the subject matter which was
immovable property and recovery of possession thereof. Considering all these
factors, this court did not grant the prayer made at the time of hearing of the
appeal which has been made in this application. The application, therefore,
cannot be allowed and the prayer cannot be granted now. (744-F-G)
                                                                                      F
     Amar Chand lnani v. Union of India, (1973) 1 SCC 115; AIR (1973)
SC 313, relied on.

      Joginder Tuli v. S.L. Bhatia & Anr., f 1997) 1 SCC 502, distinguished.

     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : I.A. No. 3 In Civil Appeal No. 2726               G
of2000.

      From the Judgment and Order dated l. l l :99 of the Delhi High Court in
C.R. No. 506 of 1998.
     Dushyant Dave, Ms. Indu Malhotra, Zubin Pratap and Vikas Mehta for
the Appellant.                                                                        H
    742                     SUPREME COU~T REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A         Ms. B. Vijayalakshmi Menon for the Respondents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

         C.K. THAKKER, J. This interlocutory application is filed by the applicant/
  appellant in a disposed of appeal. The applicant was the original plaintiff who
B instituted a suit on the Original Side of the High Court of Delhi for declaration,
  for specific performance of agreement, for possession of· property and for
  permanent injunction. The suit was filed in 1988. Written statement was filed
  by the defendants-respondents in 1989 contesting the claim of the plaintiff
  on merits but without raising any objection as to jurisdiction of the Court. The
  jurisdiction of the Court was 'admitted'. The suit was then transferred to
C District Court, Delhi in 1993. In 1997, issues were framed which did not include.
  issue as to jurisdiction of the Court as it was not disputed by the defendants.
  After more than eight years of filing of the written statement, however, an
  application was filed by the defendants under Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code
  of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') seeking an
D amendment in the written statement by raising an .objection as. to jurisdiction
  of the Court. It was contended that the suit was for recovery of immovable
  property situated in Gurgaon District. Under Section 16 of the Code, such a
  suit for recovery of property could only be instituted within the local limits
  of whose jurisdiction the property was situated. Since the property was in
  Gurgaon, Delhi Court had no jurisdiction. The said application was allowed
E in spite of objection by the plaintiff.
          On the basis of the amended written statement, an additional issue was
    framed by the trial Court as to the jurisdiction of Delhi Court to entertain and
    try the suit. After hearing the parties, the trial Court held that the suit was
F   covered by Clause (d) of the Section 16 of the Code and Delhi Court had no
    jurisdiction as the property was' situated at Gurgaon. Accordingly, the plaint
    was ordered to be returned to the plaintiff for presentation to proper Court.
    The said order was confirmed by the High Court as well as by this Court: (See
    Harshad Chimanlal Modi v. DLF Universal Ltd. & Anr., [2005] 7 SCC 791).

G          In the present application, it is stated by the applicant that when he
    approached this Court against the judgment and order.of the High Court of
    Delhi, notice was issued on December 6, 1999 and status ' quo was ordered to
    be maintained. On April 17, 2000, leave was granted and the operation of the
    judgment of the High Court was stayed. The Additional District Judge, Tis
    Hazari, Delhi was allowed to proceed with the suit. It was, however, stated
H   that the Court would not deliver judgment 'until further orders'. According
             HA RS HAD CHI MAN LAL MODI v. D.L. F. UNIVERSAL LTD. [THAKKER, J.)   743

    to the applicant, in pursuance of the said order, the trial Court proceeded with    A
.·" the suit, pleadings were completed by the parties, evidence was led and the
    matter was ready for final arguments and for disposal. It is further stated that
    an order was passed by the District Court on April 11, 2005 declaring that the
    defendants' evidence was closed but since the judgment could not be
    pronounced in the light of direction issued by this Court on April 17, 2000,
    the suit was adjourned sine die. This Court finally decided the appeal and          B
    delivered the judgment on September 26, 2005 con finning the order passed by
    the trial Court as well as by the High Court. According to. the applicant, now
    the suit will have to be tried and decided by the Gurgaon Court. Since 17
    years have passed from the institution of the suit and the pleadings are
    complete, evidence is recorded and the arguments are over, this Court may           C
    direct the Gurgaon Court to take up the suit from the stage at which it stands
    transferred and to decide it expeditiously.                                    ·

           The application is resisted by the respondent by filing a counter. It is
    contended that the application is not maintainable as it is misconceived.
    According to the respondent, in the guise of interim application, the appellant     D
     is seeking review of the judgment of this Court. Such a prayer was made when
    the appeal was heard by this Court, but the prayer was not granted. According
    to the respondents, this Court held that there was inherent lack of jurisdiction
    in Delhi Court and since the subject matter of the suit was immovable property
    and the prayer in the plaint related to recovery of possession of such property,    E
  · the only Court which had jurisdiction was Gurgaon Court where the property
    was situated. In view of the settled legal position, the Court directed return
    of the plaint for presentation to proper Court. According to the respondents,
    when the plaint will be presented before Gurgaon Court, it would not be
    treated as continuation of proceedings of the Court which had no jurisdiction
    but a suit would commence on the day when the plaint would be presented             F
    to the proper Court. Hence, the prayer made by the applicant to direct
    Gurgaon Court to try suit from the stage at which it was in Delhi Court cannot
    be granted. The application, therefore, deserves to be dismissed.

         A rejoinder is filed by the applicant submitting that in case of transfer
   of a suit for want of jurisdiction, the Code provides the transferee Court to G
   proceed with the suit from the stage at which it has been transferred. The
   applicant asserted that proceedings before Delhi Court were not null and
   void. Precisely for that reason, at the time of hearing of Special Leave Petition,
   this Court allowed the trial Court to proceed with the suit and the only order
   passed by the Court was not to pronounce judgment "until further orders". H
    744                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A   It was, therefore, submitted that this is .immensely a fit case to exercise
    inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code and plenary powers under
    Article 142 of the Constitution for grant of the prayer of the applicant.

           Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, in our opinion, the
    application is ill-founded and deserves to be dismissed. It may be stated that
B   in Civil Appeal which was decided by us on September 26, 2005, we have held
    that since the dispute related to immovable property and the prayer was for
    specific perfonnance of an agreement of sale of immovable property and
    recovery of possession thereof, the relevant provision was Section 16 of the
    Code. Under Clause (d) of the said section, only Gurgaon Court had
C   jurisdiction. We also held that notwithstanding .the agreement between the
    parties that only Delhi Court had jurisdiction, the said clause could not
    operate as Section 20 of the Code could not be invoked. According to us,
    Section 20 would apply where two or more courts had jurisdiction and the
    parties by an agreement consented that one of such courts would try the suit.
    Since Delhi Court had no jurisdiction, the contention of the defendants was
D   upheld and the plaint was ordered to be returned to the plaintiff for presentation
    to the proper Court.

          The learned counsel for the respondents is also right in submitting that
    a similar prayer, which is made in the present application, was sought at the
    time of hearing of the Appeal, but it was not granted.
E
          In our opinion, the provisions of Section 24 and/or Section 25 of the
    Code have no application to the case on hand. The respondents are right in
    urging that this is not a case of 'transfer' of a suit but of lack of jurisdiction
    of the Court. Likewise, the provisions of Rule 15 of Order 18 a\so cannot be
F   pressed in service which covers those cases where a successo~ judge deals
    with the evidence recorded by his predecessor and proceeds with the suit
    from the stage at which it was left by his predecessor.

        We may in this connection refer to a decision of this Court in Amar
    Chand Jnani v. Union of India, (1973] 1SCC115: AIR (1973) SC 313. In that
G case, the plaintiff-a practising advocate, sustained serious injuries in a railway
    accident while travelling by a train. He instituted a suit for damages in Kamal
    Court which was then transferred to Panipat Court. The plaint was, however,
    returned for presentation to proper Court since Panipat Court had no
    jurisdiction to hear the suit. In pursuance of the said order, the plaint was
    presented to Ambala Court. At the time of presentation of the plaint to
H   Ambala Court, an objection was raised that the suit was barred by limitation.
         HARSHAD CHI MAN LAL MODI v. D.L.F. UNIVERSAL LTD. [THAKKER, J.]   745

The question before the Court was as to whether the suit was filed within the A
period of limitation. This Court held that since the Kamal Court had no
jurisdiction to entertain the suit, it was not a proper Court. The submission
that the suit instituted in Ambala Court after the plaint was returned from
Kamal Court should be deemed to be a continuation of the suit filed in Kamal
Court had been negatived.
                                                                                  B
      Considering the provisions of the Limitation Act and Order 7, Rule JO
of the Code, the Court stated:

       "It was, however, argued by Counsel for the appellant that the suit
       instituted in the Trial Court by the presentation of the plaint after it   C
       was returned for presentation to the proper Court was a continuation
       of the suit filed in the Kamal Court and, therefore, the suit filed in
       Karna! Court must be deemed to have been filed in the trial Court. We
       think there is no substance in the argument, for, when the plaint was
       returned for presentation to the proper Court and was presented in
       that Court, the suit can be deemed to be instituted in the proper          D
       Court on~y when the plaint was presented in that Court. In other
       words, the suit instituted in the Trial Court by the presentation of the
       plaint returned by the Panipat Court was not a continuation of the suit
       filed in the Kamal Court". (emphasis supplied)

       Reliance placed on behalf of the applicant on a decision in Joginder E
 Tuli v. S.L. Bhatia & Anr., [1997] I SCC 502 does not carry the case any
further. In that case, the suit when filed was within the jurisdiction of the
Court and it was properly entertained. In view of amendment in the plaint
during the pendency of the suit, however, the plaint was returned for
presentation to proper Court taking into account the pecuniary jurisdiction of F
the Court. Such is not the situation here. As we have already held in the
appeal, the suit could not have b~en instituted in Delhi Court keeping in view
the subject matter which was immovable property and recovery of possession
thereof Considering all these factors, we had not granted the prayer made at
the time of hearing of the appeal which has been made in this application. The
application, therefore, cannot be allowed and the prayer cannot be granted G
now.

      For the foregoing reasons, the application deserves to be dismissed and
is accordingly dismissed, however, with no order as to costs.

RP.                                                        Application rejected. H