Supreme Court of India
HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD.versusMAWASI & ORS. ETC.ETC.
- Citation
- 2012 INSC 257
- Decided
- 2 July 2012
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- G S SINGHVI
Holding
The Supreme Court dismissed the review petitions, finding no ground for review as there was no error apparent, no new material, and the documents did not substantiate the claim of common management or overvaluation.
Summary
The Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation (HSIDC) sought review of a Supreme Court judgment that fixed compensation for land acquired for an industrial township, alleging that the market value was based on a fraudulent sale deed (Exhibit P1) between two companies allegedly under common management and that the price was inflated. HSIDC produced documents such as search reports, incorporation certificates, and sale deeds to support its claim, but the Court found these did not prove common control or an oblique motive. The Court held that no new or important evidence was discovered, no mistake or error was apparent on the record, and the earlier dismissal of similar review petitions barred further review. Consequently, the power of review under Article 137 and Order 47 Rule 1 CPC could not be exercised. The review petitions were dismissed and HSIDC was ordered to pay compensation and costs.
Issues considered
- The maintainability of the review petitions in view of earlier dismissals.
- Whether the sale deed Exhibit P1 was a genuine transaction and whether its price was overvalued.
- Whether HSIDC discovered new and important matter that could affect the judgment.
- Whether there is a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record justifying review.
- Whether the statutory provisions on review (Article 137, Order 47 Rule 1 CPC) permit the Court to entertain the petition.
Legislation cited
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 47 Rule 1
- Constitution of Indias. Article 137, s. Article 145
- Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. Section 25, s. Section 4(1), s. Section 6(1)
Subjects
land acquisitioncompensationreview of judgmentArticle 137Order 47 Rule 1 CPCsale deedovervaluationcommon managementstatutory benefits
Judgment
[2012] 6 S.C.R. 237
HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT A
CORPORATION LTD.
V.
MAW.A.SI & ORS. ETC.ETC.
(Review Petition (C) No. 235-578 of 2011)
JULY 2, 2012 B
[G.S. SINGHVI AND SUDHANSU JYOTI
. MUKHOPADHAYA, JJ.]
Review: Scope of - Land Acquisition - Award of C
compensation by Supreme Court - Review petition against
the judgment of Supreme Court on the ground that it was
based on sale deed Exhibit P1 which was not genuine since
the sale transaction had taken place between two corporate
entities controlled by same management and the land was D
overvalued with oblique motive - Similar review petitions filed
earlier were dismissed - Held: The earlier review petitions
were dismissed on the ground that no material was produced
by petitioner to substantiate its assertion - In the instant review
petitions, petitioner placed on record certain documents, E
however, the documents neither singularly nor collectively
supported the petitioner's plea that management of the two
companies, i.e., the vendor and the vendee, was under the
control of the same set of persons or that the vendee had paid
unusually high price with some oblique motive - The power F
of review is a creature of the statute and no Court or quasi-
judicial body or administrative authority can review its
judgment or order or decision unless it is legally empowered
to do so - Article 137 empowers Supreme Court to review its
judgments subject to the provisions of any law made by
Parliament or any rules made under Article 145 of the G
Constitution - The Rules framed by Supreme Court under
that Article lay down that in civil cases, review lies on any of
the grounds specified in Or.47 Rule 1, CPC - No case was
made out by petitioner for exercise of power under Article 137
237 H
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 6 S.C.R.
A rlw Or.47, r.1, CPC - The petitioner did not offer any
explanation as to why it did not lead any evidence before the
reference Court to show that sale deed Exhibit P1 was not a
bona fide transaction and the vendee had paid unusually high
price for extraneous reasons - Petitioner's assertion about
B commonality of the management of two companies was ex-
facie incorrect leading to an irresistible inference that
impugned judgment did not suffer from any error apparent on
the face of the record warranting its review- Even otherwise,
while deciding the review petitions, Supreme Court cannot
c make roving inquiries into the validity of the transaction
involving the sale of land or declare the same to be invalid
by assuming that the vendee had paid higher price to take
benefit of an anticipated joint venture agreement with a foreign
company - Constitution of India, 1950 - Articles 137, 145 -
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Or.47, r.1 - Land Acquisition.
0
The review petitioner was aggrieved with the
judgment dated 17.8.2012 whereby the Supreme Court
allowed the appeals by the land owners and gave
direction for payment of compensation @ Rs.20 lakhs per
E acre with all statutory benefits and dismissed the appeals
filed by petitioner against the judgment of the High Court.
Similar review petitions were filed earlier and were
dismissed on 13.1.2011.
F The stand of the petitioner was that the High Court
committed error by determining market value of the
acquired land solely on the basis of Exhibit P1 ignoring
other sale deeds by which similar parcels of land were
sold@ Rs.7 lacs per acre or less. It was further pleaded
that the determination of market value needs
G reconsideration since the sale deed Exhibit P1 on which
reliance was placed by the High Court and the Supreme
Court was not genuine transaction; that by Exhibit P1, the
sale transaction had taken place between two corporate
entities, which were controlled by the same management
H
HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 239
CORPORATION LTD. v. MAWASI
and the land was overvalued with an oblique motive of A
helping the land owners to claim higher compensation
and this fact came to the knowledge of the review
petitioner only after dismissal of the appeals by the
Supreme Court. The further stand of the petitioner was
that dismissal of earlier review petition would not operate B
as a bar to the maintainability of these petitions because
till 13.1.2011, the officers of the petitioner did not have any
inkling about the composition of the two companies and
the fact that the vendor had purchased the land in 1993
at the rate of Rs.6 lakhs per acre only and the relevant c
facts came to their notice only in October, 2010
Dismissing the review petitions, the Court
HELD: 1. A careful reading of order dated 13.1.2011
would show that in the earlier review petitions, the D
petitioner had sought reconsideration of judgment dated
17.8.2010 on the premise that the vendor and the vendee
had common management and that the price mentioned
in the sale deed had been manipulated with an oblique
motive. The Court declined to entertain this plea by E
observing that the petitioner had not produced any
material to substantiate its assertion. Along with the
instant batch of review petitions, the petitioner placed on
record the search reports, Certificate of Incorporation,
Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association F
of vendor showing the purchase of land by the vendor
by sale deeds dated 16.8.1993 and 18.8.1993, annual
return of vendee company showing 'SKP', 'GSG' and 'JP'
as the Directors. The documents neither singularly nor
collectively supported the petitioner's plea that G
management of the two companies, i.e., the vendor and
the vendee, was under the control of the same set of"
persons or that the vendee had paid unusually high price
with some oblique motive. As a matter of fact, 'SKP' and
'JP' were appointed as Directors of the vendee company
H
240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 6 S.C.R.
A on 9.6.1994 and 'GSG' was so appointed on 9.2.1997
whereas the agreement for sale was executed on
31.5.1994. The petitioner did not controvert the averments
contained in the reply affidavit filed in the instant review
petition, perusal of which makes it clear that in 1993
B similar parcels of land had been sold at the rate of
Rs.15,73,289/- and Rs.13,74,345/- per acre. Therefore, it
cannot be said that the vendee company had paid
exorbitantly high price to the vendor com,pany for
extraneous reasons and there was no valid ground for
c indirect review of order dated 13.1.2011. [Para 8] (265-C-
H; 266-A-C]
2. The power of review is a creature of the statute
and no Court or quasi-judicial body or administrative
authority can review its judgment or order or decision
D unless it is legally empowered to do so .. Article 137
empowers this Court to review its judgments subject to
the provisions of any law made by Parliament or any
rules made under Article 145 of the Constitution. The
Rules framed by this Court under that Article lay down
E that in civil cases, review lies on any of the grounds
specified in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908. [Para 9] (266-C-E]
3. The petitioner did not offer any explanation as to
F why it did not lead any evidence before the Reference
Court to show that sale deed Exhibit P1 was not a bona
fide transaction and the vendee had paid unusually high
price for extraneous reasons. The parties had produced
several sale deeds, majority of which revealed that the
G price of similar parcels of land varied from Rs. 6 to 7 lakhs
per acre. A reading of the sale deeds would have
prompted any person of ordinary prudence to make an
enquiry as to why the vendee company had paid more
than Rs.2,42,00,000/- for 12 acres land, which was
purchased by the vendor only a year back at an average
H
HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 241
CORPORATION LTD. v. MAWASI
price of Rs.6 lakhs per acre. However, neither the A
advocate for the petitioner nor its officers/officials, who
were dealing with the cases made any attempt to lead
such evidence. This may be be.cause they were aware of
the fact that at least in two other cases such parcels of
land had been sold in 1993 for more than Rs.13 lakhs and B
Rs.15 lakhs per acre and in 1996, a sale deed was
executed in respect of the land of village Naharpur Kasan
at the rate of Rs.25 lakhs per acre. This omission coupled
with the fact that the petitioner's assertion about
commonality of the management of two companies is ex- c
facie incorrect and lead to an irresistible inference that
judgment dated 17.8.2010 did not suffer from any error
apparent on the face of the record warranting its review.
Surely, in gt1ise of seeking review, the petitioner cannot
ask for de novo hearing of the appeals.[Para 19) [274-F- D
H; 275-A-C]
· 4. The petitioner's plea that the documents produced
along with the review petitions could not be brought to
the notice of the Reference Court and the High Court
despite exercise of due diligence by its officers did not E
commend acceptance because it had not explained as to
why the concerned officers/officials, who were very
much aware of other sale transactk>ns produced by
themselves and the landowners did not try to find out the
reasons for wide difference in the price of land sold by F
Exhibit P1 and other parcels of land sold by Exhibits P2
to P13 and Exhibits R1 to R15. [Para 20) [275-D-E]
5. While deciding the review petitions, this Court
cannot make roving inquir.ies into the validity of the G
transaction involving the sale of land or declare the same
to be invalid by assuming that the vendee had paid
higher price to take benefit of an anticipated joint venture
agreement with a foreign company. Of course, the
petitioner did not controvert the statement made by the H
respondents that the vendee had sold the land in 2004
242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012) 6 S.C.R.
A for a sum of Rs.13,62,00,0001- i.e. at the rate of
Rs.1,13;00,0001- per acre. [Para 21) [275-F-H]
S. Nagaraj v. State ofKarnataka 1993 Supp (4) SCC
595: 1993 (2)Suppl. SCR 1; Raja Prithwi Chand Lal
Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai AIR 1941 FC 1; Rajunder Narain
8
Rae v. Bijai Govind Singh (1836) 1 Moo PC 117; Moran Mar
Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius
AIR 1954 SC 526: 1955 SCR 520; Thungabhadra Industries
Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P. (1964) 5 SCR 174; Aribam T/eshwar
C Sharma v. Aibam Pishak Sharma (1979) 4 SCC 389; Meera
Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury (1995) 1 SCC 170:
1994 (5) Suppl. SCR 503; Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi
(1997) 8 SCC 715: 1997 (4) Suppl. SCR 470; Lily Thomas
v. Union of India (2000) 6 SCC 224: 2000 (3) SCR 1081;
Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik (2006) 4 SCC 78: 2006 (3)
D SCR 87; State of West Bengal v. Kamal Sengupta (2008) 8
sec 612: 2008 (10) SCR 4 - relied on.
Case Law Reference:
1993 (2) Suppl. SCR 1 relied on Para 10
E
AIR 1941 FC 1 relied on Para 10
(1836) 1 Moo PC 117 relied on Para 10
1955 SCR 520 relied on Para11
F
(1964) 5 SCR 174 relied on Para 12
(1979) 4 sec 389 relied on Para 13
1994 (5) Suppl. SCR 503 relied on Para 14
G 1997 (4) Suppl. SCR 470 relied on Para 15
2000 (3) SCR 1081 relied on Para 16
2006 (3) SCR 87 relied on Para 17
2008 (10) SCR 4 relied on Para 18
H
HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 243
CORPORATION LTD. v. MAWASI
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Review Petition (C) A
No. 235-578 of 2011.
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 6561,6528, 6531, 6529, 6552,
6567,6535,6836,6560,6571,6530,6525,6527,6570,6546, B
6565, 6548, 6550, 6563, 6537, 6532, 6569 ' 6534, 6559,
6572,6583,6580,6573,6584,6588,6590,6575,6823,6853,
6855,6554,6566,6557,6533, 6558,6541, 6556,6562,6568,
6564,6539,6538,6553,6540,6852,6576,6587,6582,6581,
6577,6574,6585, 6578,6579,6854,6666-6667,6757,6747-
6755,6831,6756,6591,6651,6606,6592,6658,6594,6595, c
. 6650:6657,6655,6596,6597,6620,6621,6602,6603,6622,
6598,6624,6647,6654,6599,6607,6608,6623,6609,6600,
I
6601,6649,6593,6605,6610,6611,6612,6653,6613,6642,
6652,6643, 6614,6659, 6645,6648, 6656, 6646, 6626,6615,
6616;6644,6625,6639,6636,6637,6627,6631,6628,6638, D
6641,6629, 6630, 6619, 6635, 6640, 6632, 6633, 6824-6827,
6664c6665., 7724, 7725, 7723 of 2009
And
6871-6875, 6876-6878, 53, 1370, 2475, 4212, 4213, E
4214,4215,4218,4220,4221,4222,4224,4225,4226,4227,
4228, 4223, 4229, 4230, 4231, 4232,.4233, 4234, 6879, 6880,
6881, 6882, 6883, 6884, 6885-6888, '6889, 6890, 6891, 6892,
6893,,6894,6895,6896,6897,6898,6899,6900,6901,6902,
6903,6904,6905,6906,6907,6908,6909,6910,6911,6912, F
6913,6914,6915,6916,6917,6918,6919,6920,6921,6922,
6923,6924,6925,6926,6927,6928,6929,6930,6931,6932,
6933,6934,6935,6936, 6937, 6938, 6939,6940, 6941, 6942,
6943,6944,6945,6946,6947,6948,6949,6950,6951,6952,
6953,6954,6955,6956,6957,6958,6959,6960, 6961,6962, G
6963,6964,6965,6966,6967,6968,6969,6970,6971,6972,
6973,6974,6975,6976,6977,6978,6979,6980,6981,6982,
6983,6984,6985,6986,6988,6989,6990,6991,6992,6993,
H
244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 6 S.C.R.
A 6994,6995, 6996-6997, 7002, 7003, 7004, 7005, 7006, 7007,
7008, 7009, 7010, 7011, 7012,7013, 7014, 7015, 7016, 7017,
7018, 7019, 7020, 7021, 7022, 7023, 7024, 7025, 7026, 7027,
7028, 7029, 7030, 7031, 7032, 7033, 7034, 7035, 7036, 7037,
7038, 7039, 7040, 7041, 7042, 7043, 7044, 7045, 7046, 7047,
B 7048 of 2010
WITH
I.A. Nos.2066-2067, I.A. No.3 in C.A. No. 6515 of 2009,
Conmt.Pet.(C) No.51/2011 In C.A.No.6526/2009,
C Conmt.Pet.(C)No.52/2011 In C.A.No.6537/2009 and
Conmt.Pet.(C)No.89/2011 In C.A.No.6854/2009.
Gopal Suibramanium, Altaf Ahmed, J.L. Gupta, Paras
Kuhad, S.R. Singh, P.S. Patwalia, Manjit Singh, AAG, Annam
D D.N. Rao, Atul Sharma, Abhishek Aggarwal, Neelam Jain,
Kirthi Kiran Kota, Pavan Malik, Dr. Kailash Chand, Naresh
Kaushik, Sanjeev K. Bhardwaj, Lalita Kaushik, Devendra ~ingh,
Ghanshyam, S.S. Shamshery, R.C. Kohli, Anil Mittal, V. Sushant
Gupta, Jatin Chaturvedi, Sanjay Jain, Ram Naresh Yadav, Tarjit
Singh, Kamal Mohan Gupta, Raj Shekhar Rao, Karan Laheri,
E Vikash Pathak, Senthil Jagadisan, Gyanendra Singh, Vishwa
Pal Singh, Surjeet Singh, Swetank Shantanu, Pratap Shanker,
Ashutosh Thakur, Priya Ranjan Roi, Rajesh Kumar, Neeraj
Shekhar, Gagan Gupta for tlie appearing parties.
F The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G.S. SINGHVI, J.1. Undeterred by the dismissal of two
similar petitions, Haryana State Industrial Development
Corporation (HSIDC) has filed these petitions for review of
G judgment dated 17.08.2010 passed in Civil Appeal No. 6515
of 2009 and batch whereby the appeals filed by it against the
judgments of the learned Single Judge of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court were dismissed, those filed by the
landowners were allowed and a direction was given for payment
H
HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 245
CORPORATION LTD. v. MAWASI [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
of compensation at the rate of Rs. 20 lakhs per acre with all A
statutory benefits.
2. The facts necessary for deciding whether the petitioner
has succeeded in making out a case f<:Jr review are
encapsulated below: B
2.1. For the purpose of setting up an Industrial Model
Township at Manesar, District Gurgaon, the Government of
Haryana acquired large chunks of land. By Notification dated
30.4.1994 issued under Section 4(1) of· the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 (for short, 'the Act'), the State Government proposed C
the acquisition of 256 acres 3 kanals and 17 marlas land
situated in village Manesar. The declaration under Section 6(1)
was published on 30.3.1995. The Land Acquisition Collector
passed award dated 28.3.1997 and fixed market value of the
acquired land at the rate of Rs.3,67,400/- per acre. Additional D
District Judge, Gurgaon (hereinafter described as 'the
Reference Court') to whom the reference was made under
Section 18 considered the pleadings and evidence of the
parties and determined the amount of compensation by
dividing the acquired land into two blocks, i.e., 'A' and 'B'. For E
the land ~omprised in Block 'A' which fell within 500 yards of
National Highway No.8, the Reference Court fixed the amount
of compensation at the rate of Rs.6,57,994.13 per acre. The
remaining land was included in Block 'B' and the amount of
compensation was fixed at Rs.3,91, 196.97 per acre. F
2.2. By another Notification dated 15.11.1994 issued
under Section 4(1 ), the State Government proposed the
acquisition of 1490 acres 3 kanals and 17 marlas land situated
in villages Manesar, Naharpur Kasan, Khoh and Kasan. The
declaration issued under Section 6(1) was published on G
10.11.1995. By an award dated 3.4.1997, the Land Acquisition
Collector fixed market value at the rate of Rs.4, 13,600/- per
acre. The Reference Court divided the land into two Blocks. For
the land comprised in Block 'A', the Reference Court
determined the amount of compensation at the rate of H
246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 6 S.C.R.
A Rs.6,89,3331- per acre. The remaining land was included in
Block 'B' and no enhancement was granted in the
compensation determined by the Land Acquisition Collector.
2.3. Before proceeding further, we may mention that in
B support of their claim for award of higher compensation, the
land owners had produced 13 sale deeds which were marked
Exhibits P1 to P13. Of these, Exhibit P1dated16.9.1994 was
in respect of 12 acres land situated in village Naharpur Kasan,
which was sold by Mis. Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. to Mis.
Duracell India Pvt. Ltd: and was proved by Shri Albel Singh,
C authorised signatory of Mis. Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. The
land owners also produced copy of Massavi Chakbandi of
Village Khoh (Exhibit P14) and Aks-shajras of the four villages
(Exhibits P15 to P18). On behalf of the State Government, Shri
.Arun Kumar Pandey, Manager, HSIDC was examined as RW-
D 1 and sale deeds marked Exhibits R1 to R15 were produced
along with other documents. The Reference Court did consider
Exhibit P1 but did not rely upon the same for the purpose of
determining the amount of compensation.
E 2.4. The appeals filed by the landowners who were
affected by Notification dated 15.11.1994 were disposed of by
the learned Single Judge of the High Court vide judgment dated
19.5.2006 and market value of the entire acquired land was
fixed at Rs.15 lakhs per acre. The learned Single Judge
F referred to the sale deed Exhibit P1 and opined that the same
reflected market value which a willing buyer would have paid
to a willing seller. The reasons assigned by the learned Single
Judge for arriving at this conclusion are extracted below:
G "The claimants have produced various sale instances to
prove their claim. Sale deed Ex.Pl is dated September 16,
1994 whereby 96 kanals and 13 marlas ( more than 12
acres ) of land in village Naharpur Kasan was sold by the
owner, Mis. Heritage Furniture Private Limited to Mis .Dura
H Cell India Private Limited for a sale consideration of
HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 247
CORPORATION LTD. v. MAWASI [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
Rs,.2,42,00,000/-, reflecting the average price of A
Rs,20,03, 103/- per acre. The aforesaid sale instance has
been proved by the statement of one Albel Singh PWI, who
at the relevant time was the authorised signatory of the
seller Company, Mis. Heritage Furniture Private Limited.
The aforesaid witness has clearly proved that the said B
transaction was genuinely entered between the two
companies and the entire payment was made through
bank drafts. The factum of the payment having been made
through bank drafts is also reflected in the sale deed
Ex.Pl. Some other sale instances relied upon by the c
claimants are Ex.P2, P3, P4, P7 and P8. Vide Ex.P2 land
measuring 9 kanals was sold on June 4, 1994 for
consideration of Rs.7,87,500/-, reflecting an average price
of Rs.7 lacs per acre. Similarly Ex.P3 is also dated June
24, 1994 pertaining to sale of 10 kanals 10 marlas of land D
reflecting average sale price of Rs,7,00,000/- Ex.P4 is
dated October 25, 1991 whereby land measuring 9 kanals
9 marl as in Manesar was sold for Rs. 9, 15,470/- reflecting
an average price of Rs,7,75,000/- per acre. Ex.P7 and
Ex.PS are also the sale instances dated June 24, 1994
with regard land measuring 9 marlas each reflecting an E
average price of Rs,7,00,000/-per acre. The remaining sale
instances Ex.P9 and P13 are of the year 1996 'i.e. more
than two years after the date of notification under section
4 of the Act. Similarly the sale instances Ex.PIO, P11 and
Pl2 pertain to the sale of land in village Noorangpur. The F
said sale instances are, thus, not relevant.
On the other hand, the sale instances relied upon by
the State are Ex.RI to Ex. R15 but they have rightly been
rejected by the reference court itself on the ground that the G
said sale instance reflected an average price which is even
less than the one assessed by the Collector and, as such,
in view of the provisions of section 25 of the Act, the same
were not relevant and worth consideration.
H
248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 6 S.C.R.
A As noticed above, the land which was acquired in
the present proceedings is approximately 1500 acres. The
sale instance Ex.Pl in my considered view, reflects as near
as possible, the market value of the acquired land on the
date of notification under section 4 of the Act. The said
B sale had taken place on September 16, 1994. The recitals
in the sale deed reflect that there was a prior agreement
between the two companies on May 31, 1994 with regard
to the sale of the land. It is also recited in the sale deed
that the entire sale consideration was paid by the
c purchaser-company to the seller company by bank drafts.
The aforesaid fact is also proved by Albel Singh, PWI. In
this view of the matter, since the aforesaid transaction was
between two companies, then obviously , there is no
justification to doubt the authenticity of the said sale
transaction. Moreover, the land covered under the
D
aforesaid sale transaction is a big chunk of land i.e more
than 12 acres. The said land was situated in village
Naharpur Kasan i.e. one of the villages from which the
present land was also acquired. In these circumstances to
my mind, the said sale instance could not have been
E rejected by the reference Court, in any manner. Although
the other sale instances Ex. P2, P3, P7 and P8 reflect the
market price of Rs. 7 lacs per acre but it is also apparent
that the aforesaid transactions pertain to small piece of
land and are between private persons. In these
F circumstances, the possibility of the aforesaid sale deeds
being undervalued, with a view to save stamp duty and
registration charges, can also not be ruled out. However,
there is no justification to prefer the aforesaid sale deeds
Ex.P2, P3, P7 and P8 over and above the sale deed Ex.Pl
G which is a transaction between the two cooperate bodies
and wherein the entire sale consideration had been paid
through bank drafts. The aforesaid sale also pertains to a
big chunk of land i.e. more than 12 acres. It may als~ be
noticed that the acquired land was owned by
H approximately more than 350 persons, thus each having
HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 249
CORPORATION LTD. v. MAWASI [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
a small holding. Therefore, the sale-deed Ex.Pl duly A
reflects the market value, which a willing buyer would have
paid to a willing seller. "
(underlining is ours)
2.5. The appeals filed by the landowners affected by the B
first acquisition were disposed of by the learned Single Judge
vide judgment dated 5.9.2008. He referred to judgment dated
19.5.2006 but applied the cut of 20% and fixed market value
of the acquired land at the rate of Rs.12 lakhs per acre.
c
2.6. The petitioner had challenged the judgments of the
High Court on several grounds but the only point argued by the
learned senior counsel appearing on its behalf was that the
High Court committed serious error by determining market
value of the acquired land solely on the basis of Exhibit P1 D
ignoring other sale deeds by which similar parcels of land were
sold at the rate of Rs. 7 lakhs per acre or less. This is evinced
from the following extracts of the judgment under review:
"Shri Amarendera Sharan, learned Senior Counsel and
Shri Ravindra Sana, learned counsel appearing for the E
Corporation argued that the High Court committed serious
error by fixing market value of the acquired land at Rs. 15
lakhs per acre in one batch of appeals and Rs. 12 lakhs
in the other batch of appeals by relying upon the sale deed,
Ext. P-1 excluding other sale transactions, which were F
produced before the Reference Court. The learned counsel
submitted that the value of 12 acres of land which was sold
by Ext. P-1 was wholly disproportionate to the prevailing
market value and, therefore, the same could not be made
basis for fixing market value of the acquired land G
measuring more than 1490 acres. Shri Amarendera
Sharan emphasised that actual market value of the
acquired land was not more than Rs. 7 lakhs and the High
Court committed serious error by discarding other sale
transactions through which similar parcels of land were H
250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 6 S.C.R.
A sold for Rs. 7 lakhs or less. The learned Senior Counsel
submitted that if the High Court had given due weightage
to other sale transactions, market value of the acquired
land could not have been fixed at Rs. 15 lakhs or even Rs.
12 lakhs per acre."
B
2.7. This Court rejected the aforesaid argument and
observed:
"In our view, the learned Single Judge did not commit any
error by relying upon sale transaction Exhibit P1 for the
c purpose of fixing market value of the acquired land.
Undisputedly, that sale transaction was between two
corporate entities and the entire sale price was paid
through bank drafts. It is also not in dispute that the land
which was subject matter of Exhibit P1 is situated at village
D Naharpur Kasan and is adjacent to the acquired land. The
Corporation and the State Government did not adduce any
evidence to prove that the land sold vide Exhibit P1 was
over valued with an oblique motive of helping the land
owners to claim higher compensation. Therefore, we do
E not find any justification to discard or ignore sale deed
Exhibit P1. The refusal of the learned Single Judge to rely
upon other sale transactions in which sale price of the land
was shown as Rs. 7 lakhs per acre also does not suffer
from any legal infirmity because it is well-known that
F transactions involving transfer of properties are usually
undervalued with a view to avoid payment of the requisite
stamp duty and registration charges."
2.8. With a view to generate funds necessary for payment
of additional compensation to the landowners, the petitioner
G increased the cost of land to be allotted to the prospective
industrial entrepreneurs and others. IMT Industrial Association,
which claims to be a representative body of the plot holders
protested against this decision of the petitioner and persuaded
it to seek review of judgment dated 17 .8.2010.
H
HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 251
CORPORATION LTD. v. MAWASI [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
2.9. In the review petitions filed on behalf of the petitioner, A
ovhich were registered as Review Petition Nos.2107-2108 of
:201 O, it was pleaded that the determination of market value
1eeds reconsideration because the sale deed Exhibit P1 on
ovhich reliance was placed by the High Court and this Court was
1ot a genuine transaction. According to the petitioner, M/s. B
-teritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd.
~ere controlled by the same management and this fact was
)rought to the notice of the concerned officers only after
jisposal of the appeals by this Court. IMT Industrial Association
•iled 1.A.Nos.5 and 6 for impleadment as party to the review c
)etitions. This Court dismissed the review petitions and the
-mpleadment applications vide order dated 13.1.2011,
)aragraphs 4 to 8 of which are extracted below:
"4. In the review petitions, it has been averred that the sale
transaction dated 16.9.1994, upon which reliance was D
placed by the learned Single Judge of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court and by this Court for grant of
enhanced compensation was motivated because parties
to the transaction were under the control and management
of the common board of directors and this fact came to E
the notice of the review petitioner only after dismissal of
the appeals by this Court.
5. In paragraph 'A' of the grounds of the review petitions,
the review petitioner has referred to the composition of M/ F
s. Dura Cell India Private Limited and Heritage Furniture
Private Limited to show that both the companies have
common management.
6. The review petition is supported by an affidavit of Shri
Hamvir Singh, Deputy General Manager (I.A.), Haryana G
State Industrial and Infrastructure Development
Corporation Ltd. In paragraph 2 of his affidavit, the
deponent has stated that contents of the review petition
(pages 25 to 43), list of dates (pages B to P) and other
applications are true to my knowledge and the information H
252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 6 S.C.R.
A derived from records of the case. However, he has not
enclosed any document on the basis of which this assertion
has been made.
7. We have carefully perused the entire record and are
B
convinced that the judgment of which review has been
sought does not suffer from any error apparent warranting
its reconsideration. The review petitioner has not produced
any material to substantiate its assertion that the price
mentioned in the sale deed relied upon by the courts was
manipulated with an oblique motive. Hence, the review
c petitions are dismissed.
8. The application filed by IMT Industrial Association is
wholly misconceived. The members of the applicant are
beneficiaries of the acquisition of the land because plots
D have been allotted to them out of the acquired land which
belong to the respondents and others. Therefore, they do
not have the locus standi to be heard in the proceedings
relating to determination of market value of the acquired
land and that too in a petition filed by the Corporation for
E review of the judgment of this Court. It is not the pleaded
case of the applicant that its members were not aware of
the fact that the plots have been carved out of the land
acquired by the State Government for and on behalf of the
Corporation and that the price mentioned in the allotment
F letter was tentative and further that in paragraph 5 of the
allotment letter, it was specifically mentioned that they will
have to pay additional price in the event of enhancement
in the compensation. It is quite surprising that members
of the applicant-Association paid price of the plots at the
rate of Rs.2200/- per square yard and they are objecting
G
to the payment of compensation to the land owners at the
rate of less than Rs.500/- per square yard. This shows that
members of the applicant want to take advantage of the
measure taken by the State Government for compulsory
acquisition of the land of the farmers and want to deprive
H
HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 253
CORPORATION LTD. v. MAWASI [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
them of just and reasonable compensation. Consequently, A
the impleadment application is dismissed."
3. Soon thereafter, the petitioner filed these petitions by
reiterating that sale deed Exhibit P1dated16.9.1994 executed
by Mis. Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. in favour of M/s. Duracell 8
India Pvt. Ltd. was not a bona fide transaction and the High
Court and this Court committed serious error by relying upon
the same for the purpose of determining the amount of
compensation. In paragraph A of the review petition, the
petitioner has set out the brief history of the two companies and C
pleaded that at the time of the execution of sale deed both the
entities were under the control of the same set of persons. It
has also been averred that the facts relating to composition of
the Board of Directors of two companies could not be
ascertained by exercising due diligence and the true nature of
Exhibit P1 was revealed only after the judgment of this Court. D
According to the petitioner, M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd.
had purchased different parcels of land from the farmers by
executing 10 different sale deeds executed on 16th and 18th
August, 1993 at an average price of Rs.6 lakhs per acre and,
as such, there was no occasion for M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. E
to have purchased the same land just after one year at the rate
of Rs.20,03, 103/- per acre. It is the petitioner's case that
exorbitant price is shown to have been paid by the vendee to
the vendor because its Indian promoters were to be benefited
by the proposed joint venture between the Indian company and F
M/s. Duracell Inc. USA. Another·ground taken by the petitioner
is that sale deeds Exhibits P-2, P-3, P-4, P-7 and P-8, three
of which were executed in June, 1994 and one in October,
1991 at an average price of Rs.7 lakhs per acre reflected true
market value of the acquired land and in the absence of any G
cogent evidence, the High Court and this Court could not have
discarded the same by assuming that the same were
undervalued.
4. On 30.3.2011, this Court issued notice to the
H
254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 6 S.C.R.
A landowners and granted stay subject to certain conditions which
included a direction to the Managing Director of the petitioner
to file an affidavit and disclose the names of the officers/officials
responsible for not bringing the facts relating to Exhibit P1 to
the notice of the High Court and this Court. In compliance of
B that order, Shri Rajiv Arora, the Managing Director of the
petitioner filed affidavit dated 27.7.2011 in which he did not
disclose the names of the concerned officers/officials but
claimed that the functionaries of the Corporation did not
suspect the bona tides of the sale deed executed between M/
c s. Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd.
because the same was a registered instrument and they did
not know that the two companies were controlled by the same
set of persons. Shri Arora further claimed that the facts relating
to two companies were brought to the notice of the concerned
D officers by the representatives of the Manesar Industrial Welfare
Association, who were given opportunity of personal hearing
in compliance of the order passed by the Punjab and Haryana
High Court in Writ Petition No.6527/2010. According to Shri
Arora, the information made available by the Association was
E got verified from the records of the Registrar of Companies and
the same was found to be correct. In support of the affidavit of
its Managing Director, the petitioner has placed on record the
following documents:
(i) Search Reports issued by M/s AKG and Co relating
F to Mis Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. and M/s Duracell
India Pvt Ltd dt. 20.1.2011 and 21.2.2011;
(ii) Certificate of Incorporation of Heritage;
(iii) MoA and AoA of Heritage;
G
(iv) Mutations showing the purchase of land by Heritage
under sale deeds dt. 16.8.1993 and 18.8.1993 at
an average price of Rs 6 lac per acre;
(v) Annual Return of Duracell dt. 14.6.2000 showing
H
HARYANif. STATE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 255
CORPORATION LTD. v. MAWASI [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
Saroj Kumar Poddar, Gurbunder Singh Gill and A
Jyotsana Poddar as the Directors;
(vi) True copy of sale deed dt. 16.9.1994;
(vii) Statement of Albel Singh substantiating the
statements of the petitioners. B
5. Some of the landowners have filed reply affidavits. Their
stand .is that Exhibit P1 reflected true market value of the
acquired land as on the date of issue of notifications under
Section 4(1) and that the petitioner's assertion that the c
transaction was not genuine is not correct. They have denied
that the vendor and vendees were under the control of the same
management and that exorbitantly high price was paid for 12
acres land in anticipation of some collaboration between M/s.
Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. Duracell Inc. USA, which would D
have benefited the former. With a view to avoid repetition, we
may notice the averments contained in paragraphs 4 to 9 of
the reply affidavit filed in Review Petition No.239/2011 and
paragraph 5 of the reply affidavit filed on behalf of the
landowners who were respondents in Civil Appeal No.6561/ E
2009. The same read as under:
Paragraphs 4 to 9 of the reply affidavit filed in Review
Petition No.239/2011
"4. I state that vide 5 sale deeds all dt. 6. 7 .1992 land F
measuring 49 kanals 2 marlas situated in Village Kherka
Daula, District Gurgaon was sold by some of the co-
owners to one Sh. D. C. Rastogi s/o Sh. L. P. Rastogi at
the sale price of Rs.1,35,000/- per acre. The said village
is at the distance of about 2 km from the land in question. G
Copies of 5 sale deeds all dt. 6. 7 .1992 are collectively
Annexure R-1 hereto. Thereafter the vendee Sh. D. C.
Rastogi sold the said land in terms of agreement to sell
dt.6.12.1993 vide sale deed dated 16.3.1994 at the rate
of about Rs.15,73,289/- per acre. This shows that there
H
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 6 S.C.R.
A was a jump in the price of the land in that area equal to
almost 11 times of the original price. It is also common
knowledge that the parties often undervalue the land price
in order to minimize stamp duty and the land might have
been sold at a higher price. Copy of sale deed dt.
B 16.3.1994 is Annexure R-2 hereto. Thus if M/s Heritage
Furniture Pvt. Ltd. purchased land, which is subject matter
of sale deed dt.16.9.1994, Ex.P.1, in the year 1993 at a
price of about Rs.6 lakhs per acre as alleged by the review
petitioner even though there is no evidence of purchase
c at such rate then its value increasing to Rs.20 lakhs per
acre in the year 1994 is commensurate with the market
trend. Moreover agreement to sell dt.31.5.1994 was
executed after first notification u/s 4 on 30.4.1994 and it
is a common knowledge that after publication of section
4 notification, the value of the land increases.
D
5. It is further submitted that vide sale deed dt.14.12.1993
(Ex.P.10) one Mis. DCN lnternatinal Ltd. sold land
measuring 62 kanals 7 marlas situated in Village
Naurangpur District Gurgaon for Rs.95,21, 160/- i.e. at the
E rate of Rs.13, 74,345/- per acre. Copy of sale deed dt.
14.12.1993 is Annexure R.3 hereto.
6. I further state that sale deed dt. 16.9.1994 (Ex.P .1) was
executed pursuant to agreement to sell dt.31.5.1994
between Mis Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. (vendor) and M/
F
s Duracell (India) Pvt. Ltd. (vendee) wherein the vendor
agreed to sell the land in question measuring about 12
acres to the vendee at a sale price of Rs.2,42,00,000/-
(Rs. Two crore forty lakhs only) as is clear from the recital
in the sale deed itself. Ultimately vide sale deed
G
dt.16.9.1994 the said land was sold at the same sale price
by the vendor to the vendee. Thus the sale price of the land
was agreed upon and fixed on 31.5.1994 as is clear from
the recitation of the sale deed itself.
H 7. I further state that as per assertion of the review
HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 257
CORPORATION LTD. v. MAWASI [GS. SINGHVI, J.]
petitioner Mis. Heritage Furniture Pvt. (vendor) and Mis A
Duracell (India) Pvt. Ltd. (vendee) had common persons
in their Board of Directors namely Sh. Saroj Kumar
Poddar, Ms. Jyotsana Poddar and Sh. Gurvinder Singh
Gill. The review petitioner has filed search reports of both
the said companies to show that the abavoe said three B
persons were common directors of both the companies.
However, from the said search report of Mis. Duracell
(India) Pvt. Ltd. it is clear the two directors namely Sh.
Saroj Kumar Poddar and Ms. Jyotsana Poddar were
appointed as Directors of this company on 9.6.1994 c
whereas Sh. Gurvinder Singh gill was appointed as its
Director on 9.2.1997. Thus all the three alleged common
Directors of the vendor and vendee companies were not
on the Board of Directors of Mis Duracell (India) Pvt. Ltd.
on or before 31.5.1994 on which date the agreement to D
sell of the land in question was executed and the sale price
was fixed. The said three directors had no interest in Mis.
Duracell (India) Pvt. Ltd. (vendee) as on 31.5.1994 when
the sale price of the land was fixed.
8. I further state that except for making a bald allegation E
that the sale price of the said land was inflated intentionally
so that the vendee company would increase its share
holding in a Joint Venture it was going to enter into with
one Duracell INC USA, this assertion has not been
substantiated by placing ay cogent evidence on record. So F
much so that even it has not been pleaded in the review
petition as to whether Joint Venture between Mis Duracell
(India) Pvt. Ltd. and Mis. Duracell INC USA did take place
or not. To the knowledge of the deponent there was no joint
venture between Mis. Duracell (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Mis. G
Duracell INC USA. This fact that there was no Joint
Venture between the said two companies also stands
proved from the fact that the land purchased vide said sale
deed dt.16.9.1994 was sold by Mis Duracell (India) Pvt.
Ltd. vide sale deed dt.28.4.2004 to one Mis Lattu Finance H
258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 6 S.C.R.
A & Investments Ltd. at a sale consideration
Rs.13,62,00,000/- i.e. approximately at the rate of
Rs.1, 13,00,000/- (Rs.one crore thirteen lakhs per acre
approximately). At the time the name of M/s Duracell
(India) Pvt. Ltd. had been changed to M/s Gillette India Ltd.
B on account of its amalgamation with other company. In this
sale deed dt. 28.4.2004 entire history of purchase of land
by M/s. Duracell (India) Pvt. Ltd. from Mis. Heritage
Furniture Pvt. Ltd. in 1994 onwards has been recited,
which includes construction of industrial building over the
c said land, its conversion of status from Pvt. Ltd. to Public
Ltd. Company, its amalgamation with Indian Shaving
Products ltd. in the year 2000 and its change of name from
Indian Shaving Products ltd. to Gillette India Ltd. in
December, 2000 and thereafter its sale to Mis. Lattu
Finance & Investments Ltd. However, in the entire
D
recitation there is no mention of any joint venture with M/s
Duracell INC USA.
9. It is submitted by the respondents/land owners that the
said sale deed (Ex.P.1) reflects true market price of the
E land in the year 1994 when section 4 notifications for the
acquired land was issued. The allegation of the review
petitioner that the sale deed (Ex.P .1) reflects inflated price
is false and baseless. It is further submitted that another
sale deed dt.17.7.1996 which is on record as (Ex.P.9)
F reflects the market value of the land in one of the acquired
villages at Rs.25,00,000/- (Rs. Twenty five lakhs) per acre.
In this transaction 1 kanal 11 marlas of land situated in
Village Naharpur Kasan, has been sold at a price of
Rs.4,84,375/-. This sale deed also proves that the market
G price of the acquired land in the year 1994 was Rs.20 lakhs
per acre. Copy of sale deed dt.17. 7.1996 is Annexure R-
4 is hereto. It may be mentioned here that the same
purchaser purchased different pieces of land at the same
rate vide 15 different sale deeds and the total land
H purchased was 18 kanals 5 marlas i.e. more than 2.25
HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 259
CORPORATION LTD. v. MAWASI [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
acres." A
Paragraph 5 of the reply affidavit filed on behalf of the
landowners who were respondents in Civil Appeal
No.6561/2009.
"5. That the present review petition is being filed only on B
the ground that Ex. P-1, which has been relied upon by the
Hon'ble High Court as well as upheld by this Hon'ble Court
was entered by the corporate which were under the control
and management of common board of directors and hence
it is not the correct market value. In reply thereto the C
respondents humbly submits that:-
a) This fact for the first time is brought into the notice at
the level of this Hon'ble Court, therefore review petition are
estopped by their own conduct. D
b) That merely the both the corporate have common board
of directors does not prove that the sale in between the
corporate was an escalated rates, rather it should be on
other side i.e. common board would have trying to get the
sale as possible as on lower rate. Therefore the ground E
for review is not legally justifiable.
c) It is submitted that later on corporate Gillette India Ltd.
made a sale deed (land in issue of Ex.P-1) dated
28.4.2004 to another corporate namely Laltu Finance and F
Investment Ltd. for a sum of Rs. 13,62,00,000/- of land
measuring 96 Kanalas and 13 Marlas. (i.e. one crore sixty
lacs per acre). It is submitted that this sale can not be said
to be an escalated rate and therefore the Ex. P-1 denotes
the correct market value at the relevant time. A copies of G
the relevant sale deeds are annexed herewith and marked
as ANNEXURE R-1.
d) It is also submitted that some other sale deeds at the
relevant time (20.9.1996) were executed in favour of Time
Master Pvt. Ltd. which came around 25 lakh per acre. H
260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 6 S.C.R.
A Details of the same are as follows-
Sr. No. Vasika No. Dt. Land sold Sale Consideration
1. 8725 20.9.1996 1K 1-1/2M 3,55,000/-
B 2. 8726 20.9.1996 1K 8M 3,59,375/-
3. 8727 20.9.1996 1K 1-1/2M 3,53,000/-
4. 8728 20.9.1996 1K 5M 4,06,000/-
c 5. 8799 20.9.1996 1K 9M 3,75,000/-
6. 8807 20.9.1996 1K 5M 4,06,000/-
7. 8815 20.9.1996 1K 6M 4,08,000/-
D 8. 8825 20.9.1996 1K 1M 3,53,000/-
9. 8832 20.9.1996 OK 17M 2,75,000/-
10. 8839 20.9.1996 1K 6M 4,08,000/-
E 11. 8846 20.9.1996 1K 5M 4,06,000/-
12. 8854 20.9.1996 1K 1M 3,55,000/-
13. 8861 20.9.1996 OK 17M 2,75,000/-
F Total land sale is 15 Kanals 3 Marlas total amount 4734375/
- i.e. at rate of Rs.25 lakh per acre.
14. 5431 17.7.96 1K 11M 4,84,375/-
i.e. at the rate of Rs. 25 lakh per acre.
G
It is submitted at sale deed No.5431 (at sr. no. 14) was
already produced as Ex.P-9 before Reference Court in
favour of Time Master Pvt. Ltd. by Vinod Kumar vendor.
Thus time master India Pvt. Ltd. purchased total land
H
HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 261
CORPORATION LTD. v. MAWASI [G.S. SINGHVI, J.)
measuring 16 kanals 14 marlas at the rate of Rs. 25 lakhs A
per acre.
{e) It is also relevant to point out the following are the sale
transactions in December 2006 of the village Naharpur/
Kasan.
B
Land sold of Village Naharpur/Kasan
Sr. No. Vasika No Dt. Land sold Sale consideration Per acre
1. 18628 4.12.06 12K 16.5M 2,56,50,000/- 1,60,00000
c
2. 18742 5.12.06 5K 13M 1, 13,00,000/- 1,60,00000
3. 18743 5.12.06 5K14M 74,00,000/- 1,60,00000
4. 19350 14.12.06 5K13M 1, 13, 00, 0001- 1,60,00000
D
(f) it is also submitted that the rate on which auction sale
of Tower side on acquired land is done on 30.6.2006.
Tower Area in Amount of per sq yard
Site No. meter consideration
E
J 6804 95.10 crores 116865/- per sq. yd
K 5832 101.50 crores 145518/- per sq. yd
L 6804 93.00 crores 114284.50/- per sq. yd
F
(g) It is also submitted the following details of auction by
HSIDC IMT Manesar.
Auction sales by HSIDC IMT Manesar
G
Allotment of SCO Sites for shopping booth in Sector-I, IMT
Manesar auction held on 18.8.2009.
H
262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 6 S.C.R.
A Sr.No. Site No. Area in Sq. Mts Price of Site
1. T-1 144 2,67,50,000/-
2. T-2 144 2,33,50,000/-
B 3. T-3 144 2,29,00,000/-
4. T-4 144 2,29,00,0001~
5. T-5 144 2,31,00,000/-
c 6. T-7 144 2,28,00,000/-
7. T-8 144 2,25,00,000/-
8. T-9 144 2,22,00,000/-
D 9. T-10 144 2, 16,00,000/-
10. D-1 108 1,82,00,000/-
11. D-2 108 1,58,00,000/-
E 12. D-3 108 1,62,50,000/-
13. D-4 108 1,60,00,000/-
14. D-5 108 1,51,00,000/-
F 15. D-6 108 1,38,50,000/-
16. D-7 108 1,40,00,000/-
17. D-8 108 1,37,00,000/-
G 18. D-9 108 1,35,00,000/-
19. D-10 108 1,33,50,000/-
Total area 2376 square mts. total Rs.35,78,50,000/- i.e.
150610.26 per Mt.i.e. Rs.12,5928.58 per yard i.e.
H Rs.60,94,94,327/- per acre.
HARYANA STATE. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 263
CORPORATION LTD. v. MAWASI [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
Allotment of SCO Sites for shopping booth in Sector-1, A
IMT Manesar auction held on 11.8.2010.
1. D-10 108 2, 12,50,000/-
2. D-12 108 1,89,50,000/-
B
3. D-14 108 1,90,00,000/-
4. D-15 108 1,88,50,000/-
5. D-16 108 1,92,00,000/-
c
Allotment of Triple Storey SCO Sites for in Sector-1, IMT
Manesar, auction held on 11.8.2010 on following rates.
1. 11 144 3,03,00,000/-
1. 11 144 3,03,00,000/- D
2. 12 144 3,00,00,000/-
3. 12-A 144 2,87,00,000/-
Total area 972 sq mts allotted for total amount of E
Rs.186250000/- i.e Rs.191615.22 per Mt. i.e.
Rs.160213.67 per square yard or Rs. 77,54,34189/- per
acre."
6. $/Shri Gopal Subramanium and Altaf Ahmed, learned F
senior advocates and other counsel who appeared for the
petitioner relied upon reports dated 20.1.2011 and 21.1.2011
prepared by the Chartered Accountant M/s. AKG and Company
to show that at least two of the Directors, namely, Shri Saroj
Kumar Poddar and Ms. Jyotsana Poddar were common to the G
management of the two companies and submitted that land was
shown to have been purchased by M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd.
at a very high price because it was hoping to reap benefit of
the i()int venture agreement with M/s. Duracell Inc. USA.
Learned counsel pointed out that the vendor, namely, M/s. H
264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 6 S.C.R.
A Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. had purchased 12 acres land from
different landowners at an average price of Rs.6 lakhs per acre
and argued that even if the benefit of 12% notional increase in
the value of land was allowed to the vendor, no person of
ordinary prudence would have purchased the same land after
8 a period of 13 months at the rate of more than Rs.20 lakhs per
acre. Learned counsel also referred to the statement of the
authorised signatory of the vendor M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt.
Ltd. to drive home the point that the Sale Deed Exhibit P1 was
not a bona fide transaction. Learned senior counsel then argued
C that dismissal of Review Petition Nos.2107-2108 of 2010
cannot operate as a bar to the maintainability of these petitions
because till 13.1.2011, the officers of the petitioner did not have
any inkling about the composition of the two companies and
the fact that the vendor had purchased the land in 199;3 at the
rate of Rs.6 lakhs per acre only and the relevant f;icts came to
D their notice only in October, 2010 from the representatives of
IMT Industrial Association.
7. S/Shri J.L. Gupta, S.R. Singh, P.S. Patwalia and Paras
Kuhad, senior advocates and other counsel, who appeared for
E the landowners argued for dismissal of the review petitions.
They emphasized that the very premise on which the review
petitions have been filed, namely, discovery of the facts relating
to composition of the board of directors of the two companies
is incorrect because no-one from:,the Poddar group on the
F board of directors of M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. till 9.6.1994.
Shri J. L. Gupta and Shri Paras Kuhad pointed out that Shri
Saroj Kumar Poddar and Ms. Jyotsana Poddar were taken on
the board of directors of M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. after
execution of the agreement for sale and no joint venture ·
G agreement was executed between the vendee, i.e., Mis.
Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. Duracell Inc. USA. Shri Paras
Kuhad also referred to the Memorandum of Association and
Articles of Association of M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. to show
that S/Shri Jyoti Sagar and Sajay Singh were the only promoters
H of the company. Learned counsel then argued that the petitioner
HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 265
CORPORATION LTD. v. MAWASI [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
cannot seek review of judgment dated 17.8.2010 on the pretext A
of discovery of facts relating to composition of the two
companies because no evidence was adduced before the
Reference Court to prove that the sale deed Exhibit P1 was
not a bona fide transaction or that vendee had paid exorbitant
price for extraneous reasons. Learned counsel further argued B
that after dismissal of Review Petition Nos.2107-2108 of 2010,
the petitioner cannot revive its prayer because there was total
absence of diligence on the part of its officers.
8. We shall first consider whether the petitioner's prayer
for review should be entertained by ignoring the dismissal of C
similar petitions by this Court vide order dated 13.1.2011. A
careful reading of that order shows that in Review Petition
Nos.2107-2108 of 2010, the petitioner had sought
reconsideration of judgment dated 17.8.2010 on the premise
that the vendor and the vendee had common management and D
that the price mentioned in the sale deed had been manipulated
with an oblique motive. The Court declined to entertain this plea
by observing that the petitioner had not produced any material
to substantiate its assertion. Along with the present batch of
review petitions, the petitioner has placed on record the search E
reports prepared by M/s AKG and Company, Certificate of
Incorporation, Memorandum of Association and Articles of
Association of M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd., mutations
showing the purchase of land by M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt.
Ltd. vide sale deeds dated 16.8.1993 and 18.8.1993, annual F
return of M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. showing Shri Saroj Kumar
Poddar, Shri Gurbunder Singh Gill and Ms. Jyotsana Poddar
as the Directors and the statement of Albel Singh, but these
documents neither singularly nor collectively support the
petitioner's plea that management of the two companies, i.e., G
the vendor and the vendee, was under the control of the same
set of persons or that the vendee had paid unusually high price
with some oblique motive. As a matter of fact, Shri Saroj Kumar
Poddar and Ms. Jyotsana Poddar were appointed as Directors
of M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. on 9.6.1994 and Shri Gurbunder H
266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 6 S.C.R.
A Singh Gill was so appointed on 9.2.1997 whereas the
agreement for sale was executed on 31.5.1994. The petitioner
has not controverted the averments contained in paragraphs 4
and 5 of the reply affidavit filed in Review Petition No.239/2011,
perusal of which makes it clear that in 1993 similar parcels of
s land had been sold at the rate of Rs.15, 73,289/- and
Rs.13,74,345/- per acre. Therefore, it cannot be said that M/s.
Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. had paid exorbitantly high price to M/s.
Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. for extraneous reasons and we do
not find any valid ground for indirect review of order dated
c 13.1.2011.
9. At this stage it will be apposite to observe that the
power of review is a creature of the statute and no Court or
quasi-judicial body or administrative authority can review its
judgment or order or decision unless it is legally empowered
D to do so. Article 137 empowers this Court to review its
judgments subject to the provisions of any law made by
Parliament or any rules made under Article 145 of the
Constitution. The Rules framed by this Court under that Article
lay down that in civil cases, review lies on any of the grounds
E specified in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 which reads as under:
"Order 47, Rule 1:
1. Application for review of judgment.-
F
(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved-
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed,
but from which no appeal has been preferred,
G (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed,
or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small
Causes,
H
HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 267
CORPORATION LTD. v. MAWASI [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
and who, from the discovery of new and important matter A
or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was
not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him
at the time when the decree was passed or order made,
or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the
face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, B
desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order
made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to
the court which passed the decree or made the order.
(2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order
may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the C
pendency of an appeal by some other party except where
the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and
the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present
to the Appellate Court the case of which he applies for the
review. D
Explanation- The fact that the decision on a question of law
on which the judgment of the Court is based has been
reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a
superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for E
the review of such judgment."
10. The aforesaid provisions have been interpreted in
several cases. We shall notice some of them. In S. Nagaraj v.
State of Kamataka 1993 Supp (4) SCC 595, this Court referred
to the judgments in Raja Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury v. F
Sukhraj Rai AIR 1941 FC 1 and Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai
Govind Singh (1836) 1 Moo PC 117 and observed:
"Review literally and even judicially means re-examination
· or re-consideration. Basic philosophy inherent in it is the G
universal acceptance of human fallibility. Yet in the realm
of law the courts and even the statutes lean strongly in
favour of finality of decision legally and properly made.
Exceptions both statutorily and judicially have been carved
out to correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. H
268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 6 S.C.R. .
A Even when there was no statutory provision and no rules
were framed by the highest court indicating the
circumstances in which it could rectify its order the courts
cuffed out such power to avoid abuse of process or
miscarriage of justice. In Raja Prithwi Chand Lal
B Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai the Court observed that even
though no rules had been framed permitting the highest
Court to review its order yet it was available on the limited
and narrow ground developed by the Privy Council and the
House of Lords. The Court approved the principle laid down
by the Privy Council in Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai
c Govind Singh that an order made by the Court was final
and could not be altered:
" ... nevertheless, if by misprision in embodying the
judgments, by errors have been introduced, these
D Courts possess, by Common law, the same power
which the Courts of record and statute have of
rectifying the mistakes which have crept in .... The
House of Lords exercises a similar power of
rectifying mistakes made in drawing up its own
E judgments, and this Court must possess the same
authority. The Lords have however gone a step
further, and have corrected mistakes introduced
through inadvertence in the details of judgments; or
have supplied manifest defects in order to enable
F the decrees to be enforced, or have added
explanatory matter, or have reconciled
inconsistencies."
Basis for exercise of the power was stated in the same
decision as under:
G
"It is impossible to doubt that the indulgence
extended in such cases is mainly owing to the
natural desire prevailing to prevent irremediable
injustice being done by a Court of last resort, where
H
HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 269
CORPORATION LTD. v. MAWASI [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
by some accident, without any blame, the party has A
not been heard and an order has been inadvertently
made as if the party had been heard."
Rectification of an order thus stems from the fundamental
principle that justice is above all. It is exercised to remove B
the error and not for disturbing finality. When the
Constitution was framed the substantive power to rectify
or recall the order passed by this Court was specifically
provided by Article 137 of the Constitution. Our
Constitution-makers who had the practical wisdom to
visualise the efficacy of such provision expressly conferred
c
the substantive power to review any judgment or order by
Article 137 of the Constitution. And clause (c) of Article 145
permitted this Court to frame rules as to the conditions
subject to which any judgment or order may be reviewed.
In exercise of this power Order XL had been framed D
empowering this Court to review an order in civil
proceedings on grounds analogous to Order XLVll Rule 1
of the Civil Procedure Code. The expression, 'for any other
sufficient reason' in the clause has been given an
expanded meaning and a decree or order passed under E
misapprehension of true state of circumstances has been
held to be sufficient ground to exercise the power. Apart
from Order XL Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules this
Court has the inherent power to make such orders as may
be necessary in the interest of justice or to prevent the F
abuse of process of Court. The Court is thus not precluded
from recalling or reviewing its own order if it is satisfied
that it is necessary to do so for sake of justice."
11. In Moran Mar Basselios Catho/icos v. Most Rev. Mar G
Poulose Athanasius AIR 1954 SC 526, the three-Judge Bench
referred to the provisions of the Travancore Code of Civil
Procedure, which was similar to Order 47 Rule 1 CPC and
observed:
"It is needless to emphasise that the scope of an H
270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 6 S.C.R.
A application for review is much more restricted than that of
an appeal. Under the provisions in the Travancore Code
of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order 47
Rule 1 of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the court of
review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the
B definitive limits fixed by the language used therein.
It may allow a review on three specified grounds, namely,
(i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence
which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within
the applicant's knowledge or could not be produced by him
c at the time when the decree was passed, (ii) mistake or
error apparent on the face of the record, and (iii) for any
other sufficient reason.
It has been held by the Judicial Committee that the words
0 "any other sufficient reason" must mean "a reason sufficient
on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the
rule". See Chhajju Ram v. Neki AIR 1922 PC 12 (0). This
conclusion was reiterated by the Judicial Committee in
Bisheshwar Pratap Sahi v. Parath Nath AIR 1934 PC 213
E (E) and was adopted by on Federal Court in Hari Shankar
Pal v. Ana th Nath Mitter AIR 1949 FC 106 at pp. 110, 111
(F). Learned counsel appearing in support of this appeal
recognises the aforesaid limitations and submits that his
case comes within the ground of "mistake or error apparent
F on the face of the record" or some ground analogous
thereto."
12. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of AP. (1964)
5 SCR 174, another three-Judge Bench reiterated that the
power of review is not analogous to the appellate power and
G observed:
"A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby
an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies
only for patent error. We do not consider that this furnishes
H a suitable occasion for dealing with this difference
\
HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 271
CORPORATION LTD. v. MAWASI [G.S. SINGHVI, J.)
exhaustively or in any great detail, but it would suffice for A
us to say that where without any elaborate argument one
could point to the error and say here is a substantial point
of law which stares one in the face, an9 there could
reasonably be no two opinions, entertained about it, a clear
case of error apparent on the face of the record would be B
made out."
13. In Aribam Tu/eshwar Sharma v. Aibam Pishak
Sharma (1979) 4 sec 389, this Court answered in affirmative
the question whether the High Court can review an order
passed under Article 226 of the Constitution and proceeded C
to observe:
"But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power
of review. The power of review may be exercised on the
discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, D
after the exercise of due diligence was not within the
knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not
be produced by him at the time when the order was made;
it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent
on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised E
on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on
the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That
would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of
review is not to be confused with appellate powers which
may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of F
errors committed by the subordinate court."
14. In Meera Bhanja v. Nirma/a Kumari Choudhury
(1995) 1 sec 170, the Court considered as to what can be
characterised as an error apparent on the fact of the record and
observed: G
"....... it has to be kept in view that an error apparent on
the face of record must be such an error which must strike
one on mere looking at the record and would not require
any long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there H
272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 6 S.C.R.
A may conceivably be two opinions. We may usefully refer
to the observations of this Court in the case of
Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun
Bhavanappa Tirumale AIR 1960 SC 13i wherein, K.C.
Das Gupta, J., speaking for the Court has made the
following observations in connection with an error apparent
B
on the face of the record:
"An error which has to be established by a long-
drawn process of reasoning on points where there
may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be
c said to be an error apparent on the face of the
record. Where an alleged error is far from self-
evident and if it can be established, it has to be
established, by lengthy and complicated
arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ
D of certiorari according to the rule governing the
powers of the superior court to issue such a writ."
15. In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi (1997) 8 SCC 715,
the Court observed:
E "An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected
by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an
error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court
to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1
CPC ........ A review petition, it must be remembered has
F a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal
in disguise"."
16. In Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2000) 6 SCC 224,
R.P. Sethi, J., who concurred with S. Saghir Ahmad, J.,
G summarised the scope of the power of review in the following
words:
"Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the
statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review
cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere
H possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for
HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 273
CORPORATION LTD. v. MAWASI [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
review. Once a review petition is dismissed no further A
petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of
following the practice of the binding nature of the larger
Benches and not taking different views by the Benches of
coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be
followed and practised." B
17. In Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik (2006) 4 SCC 78,
the Court observed:
"The parameters are prescribed in Order 47 CPC and for
the purposes of this lis, permit the defendant to press for C
a rehearing "on account of some mistake or error apparent
on the face of the records or for any other sufficient reason".
The former part of the rule deals with a situation attributable
to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is
manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions are not D
possible. Neither of them postulate a rehearing of the
dispute because a party had not highlighted all the aspects
of the case or could perhaps have argued them more
forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to the court and
thereby enjoyed a favourable verdict." E
18. In State of ~Vest Bengal v. Kamal Sengupta (2008) 8
sec 612, the Court considered the question whether a Tribunal
established under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 can
review its decision, referred to Section 22(3) of that Act, some
F
of the judicial precedents and observed:
"At this stage it is apposite to observe that where a review
is sought on the ground of discovery of new matter or
evidence, such matter or evidence must be relevant and
must be of such a character that if the same had been G
produced, it might have altered the judgment. In other
words, mere discovery of new or important matter or
evidence is not sufficient ground for review ex debito
justitiae. Not only this, the party seeking review has also
to show that such additional matter or evidence was not H
274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 6 S.C.R.
A within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due
diligence, the same could not be produced before the court
earlier.
The term "mistake or error apparent" by its very connotation
B signifies an error which is evident per se from the record
of the case and does not require detailed examination,
scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal
position. If an error is not self-evident and detection thereof
requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot
be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record
c for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC or Section 22(3)(f)
of the Act. To put it differently an order or decision or
judgment cannot be corrected merely because it is
erroneous in law or on the ground that a different view
could have been taken by the court/tribunal on a point of
D fact or law. In any case, while exercising the power of
review, the court/tribunal concerned cannot sit in appeal
over its judgment I decision."
19. In the light of the propositions laid down in the
E aforementioned judgments, we shall now examine whether the
petitioner has succeeded in making out a case for exercise of
power by this Court under Article 137 of the Constitution read
with Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. This consideration needs to be
prefaced with an observation that the petitioner has not offered
F any explanation as to why it did not lead any evidence before
the Reference Court to show that sale deed Exhibit P1 was not
a bona fide transaction and the vendee had paid unusually high
price for extraneous reasons. The parties had produced several
sale deeds, majority of which revealed that the price of similar
G parcels of land varied from Rs. 6 to 7 lakhs per acre. A reading
of the sale deeds would have prompted any person of ordinary
prudence to make an enquiry as to why M/s. Duracell India Pvt.
Ltd. (vendee) had paid more than Rs.2,42,00,000/- for 12 acres
land, which have been purchased by the vendor only a year
back at an average price of Rs.6 lakhs per acre. However, the
H
HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 275
CORPORATION LTD. v. MAWASI [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
fact of the matter is that neither the advocate for the petitioner A
nor its officers/officials, who were dealing with the cases made
any attempt to lead such evidence. This may be because they
were aware of the fact that at least in two other cases such
parcels of land had been sold in 1993 for more than Rs.13
lakhs and Rs.15 lakhs per acre and in 1996, a sale deed was 8
executed in respect of the land of village Naharpur Kasan at
the rate of Rs.25 lakhs per acre. This omission coupled with
the fact that the petitioner's assertion about commonality of the
management of two companies is ex-facie incorrect leads to
an irresistible inference that judgment dated 17.8.2010 does C
not suffer from any error apparent on the face of the record
warranting its review. Surely, in guise of seeking review, the
petitioner cannot ask for de novo hearing of the appeals.
20. The petitioner's plea that the documents produced
along with the review petitions could not be brought to the D
notice of the Reference Court and the High Court despite
exercise of due diligence by its officers does not commend
acceptance because it had not explained as to why the
concerned officers/officials, who were very much aware of other
sale transactions produced by themselves and the landowners E
did not try to find out the reasons for wide difference in the price
of land sold by Exhibit P1 and other parcels of land sold by
Exhibits P2 to P13 and Exhibits R1 to R15.
21. Before concluding, we would like to add that while
deciding the review petitions, this Court cannot make roving
F
inquiries into the validity of the transaction involving the sale of
land by Mis. Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. to M/s. Duracell India
Pvt. Ltd. or declare the same to be invalid by assuming that
the vendee had paid higher price to take benefit of an
anticipated joint venture agreement with a foreign company. Of G
course, the petitioner has not controverted the statement made
by the respondents that the vendee had sold the land to M/s.
Lattu Finance and Investments Ltd. in 2004 for a sum of
Rs.13,62,00,000/- i.e. at the rate of Rs.1, 13,00,000/- per acre.
H
276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 6 S.C.R.
A 22. In the result, the review petitions are dismissed. The
interim order passed on 30.3.2011 stands automatically
vacated. The petitioner shall pay cost of Rs.25,000/- in each
case. The amount of cost shall be deposited with the Supreme
Court Legal Services Committee within a period of three
8 months.
23. However, it is made clear that the petitioner shall be
free to withdraw the amount which it had deposited in
compliance of this Court's order dated 30.3.2011. In any case,
the petitioner shall pay the balance amount of compensation
C to the landowners and/or their legal representatives along with
other statutory benefits within three months from today.
24. In view of the dismissal of the review petitions and the
direction given for payment of the balance amount, the
o contempt petitions and all the pending interlocutory applications
are disposed of as infructuous.
D.G. Review petitions dismissed.
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