Holding

Statements made to police during investigation are inadmissible as substantive evidence; the inspector’s testimony is reliable without corroboration; the circumstantial evidence establishes that the accused obtained the bribe, invoking the presumption under §4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, and the conviction stands.

Summary

Hazari Lal, a police constable, demanded a Rs.60 bribe for releasing the complainant's scooter rickshaw. The complainant reported the demand to the Anti‑Corruption Department, where an inspector set a trap by marking six currency notes with phenol‑phthalene powder and handing them to the complainant, who passed them to the accused. The accused threw the notes across a wall; his hands and a handkerchief turned pink when tested with sodium bicarbonate, indicating contact with the powder. Many witnesses later turned hostile, and the trial court admitted their prior statements as substantive evidence. The Supreme Court held that statements made to police during investigation are barred by CrPC §162 and can be used only for contradiction, that the inspector’s evidence is trustworthy and does not require corroboration, and that the circumstantial facts proved the accused obtained the money, thereby attracting the presumption under Prevention of Corruption Act §4(1). Consequently, the conviction was upheld.

Issues considered

The admissibility of statements made to police officers during investigation as substantive evidence under CrPC §162 and Evidence Act §145.
Whether the testimony of a police officer who conducted a trap requires corroboration.
Whether the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to invoke the presumption of gratification under Prevention of Corruption Act §4(1).
Whether clerical witnesses can be considered independent for the purpose of panch witnesses.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedures. 162
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 114, s. 145, s. 27, s. 3, s. 32(1)
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 161
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947s. 4(1), s. 5(1), s. 5(2)

Subjects

Prevention of Corruption Actbriberypolice officer evidencecorroborationSection 162 CrPCcircumstantial evidencepresumption under §4(1)evidence law

Judgment

> HAZARI LAL
> A
v.
DELHI ADMINISTRATION
February 15, 1980
•
[R. S. SARKARIA AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.J
B
Prevention of CorruptiQn_ Act, 1947-Section 4(1)-Scope of-Accused
.charged with den?anding and taking illegal gratification-Many prosecution wit-
nesses turned hostile-Staten1ents 1nade by witnesses in the course of investiga-
.Jion-Jf could be used as substantive evidence-Evidence of police. inspector-

-- 1/ needs corroboraition.
·Panch l-Vitncsses-Clerks-lf could not be called independent lvUncs!.eS. C
The accused (appella.nt) who \Vas charged with offences under section 5(1)
{<!) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and section 161 of the Perutl Code
was convicted and sentenced by the Specit1l Judge. The convictions and
' ..entences were confirmed by the High Cuurt.

The prosecution alleged that the &eooter rickshaw of the complainant driven
'.by his driver was one day involved in a traffic accid'ent and the vehicle ;vas D
ttarken to the police station by the accused1 who was a police oonstablC. The
.cooiplainant obtained orders of the Magistrate for its releese but the accused
·detlined to release the vehicle unless he w.as paid a sum of Rs. 60. ·fhe
complainant was not prepared to pay the sum demanded. He then went to an
' inspector of the Anti-Corruption Department and lodged a complaint th at the
.accused was demanding illegal gratification from him for the release oI his
·.scooter rickshaw which \\'tls ordered by the Magistrate to be r'eleased'.

The prosecution further alleged that the lnsp·ector called two panch v:it-
nesses and after noting down the numbers of six ten rupee currency notes given
~y the complainant, treated them with phenol phthalene powder and gave them
to the complai1u1nt. It was arranged that the complainant should hand over
th'e currency notes to the accused and should thereafter make ai signal at whicb
·-the Inspector and panth witnesses would enter the room. The complainant F
carried out the plan as arranged and gave the call on which the Inspector
and panch witnesses enter'ed the room of the accused. On seeing the lnsptct<Jr,
·the accused 1-cn10\'ed the currency notes from his pocket aind flung then1 across
·the wall into the adjoining room. The notes were coll'etted and when com-
pared with the numbers noted earlier, they tallied. The hands of the accused
·were th'en dipped in sodium bicarbonate solution which, colourless earlier,
turned pink. Similarly the oondkerchief in the right side pocket of the G
·trousers of the accused was removed and also dipped in sodium bicarbonate
,solution. Th>! too turned pink.

Before the trial court many of the \Vi1.nesses turned hostile and one of the
,panch witnesses became mentally deranged.

Jn appeal it was contended before this Court that ( 1) the courts below
had made free use of the statements made by the witnesses in the course of n
'investigation as if they were substantive evidence and, if they were excluded, the
.rest of the evidence would not be sufficient to draw the presumption under
1054 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1980] 2 S.C.R.

A soctioo 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, (2) the fact that the lmp<C·
t.or wa<> the very police officer 'vho laid the trap, should be sufficient to insist
on corroboration of his evidence.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD: l(a) The courts below were clearly wrong in using as substan-
tive evidence statements made by witnesses in the course of investigation. •
B [1059El
(b) Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure imposes a bar on µte·
use of any statement made by any person to a police officer in the course .of.
,
investigaition at nny enquiry or trial in respect of any offence under inve~tiga
tion at the tirne wh'en such statement was made, except for the purpose of
contradicting the witnesses in the manner provided by section 145 of the Evi-
dence Act W'here any part of such statement is so used any part thereof
c may also he used in the re-examination of the witness for the limited purpose
of explaining any matter referred to in his cross-examination. The only other
exception to this emb&rgo on the use of statements made in the course of an
investigation relates to the statements falling within the provisions of section
32 ( 1) of the Evidence Act or permitted to be proved under s. 27 of the
Evidence Act. [1059A-(\,l
D (c) The contention of the prosecution that the earlier statements with whk:h
witnesses were confronted for the purpose of contradiction could be takeil
into consideration by the Court in view of the definition of "proved" in section
3 of the Evidence Act has no substance. The definition of the term ''proved"
dOes not enable a Court to take into consideration matters, including tililte-·
ments. whose use is statutorily barred. [1059G]
2(ai) The evidence of the Inspector is entirely trustworthy and there is no
E need to seek any corroboration. [1059H]
(b) Ther'e is no rule of prudence which has crystallised into a rule: of
law, nor any rule of prudence which requires that the evidence of such t'.lolice
officers should be treated on the same footing as evidence of accomplices and·
there should be insistence on corroboration. In the facts and· circunlStanceS
of a particular c21>e a court may be disinclined to act upon the evidence' ot:
F such an officer without corroboration, but, equally in the facts and circum-
1tances of another case the court may unhesitatingly accept the evidence 0f suc·h
an officer. It is aJJ a matter of appreci·ation of evidence and on i;uch mattc;rs.
there can be no hard and fast rule nor can there be any prccedential guidance ..
[1060A-Bl
In the instant case the proved facts were that the complainant mad~ a
report to the Inspector, and currency notes whose numbers were noted ~nd
G which were treated with phenol phthaJene powder were handed ov~r t..1 the·
complainant. Th'e complainant went into the accused's room and came out
after a short while giving the agreed signal. When the Inspector rushed in,.
the accused thre\v the currency notes acros~ the wall into the adjoining roon1.
His hands and the handkerchief when dipped in sodium bicarbonate ,ofutilln
turned pink and l·astly instead of giving a plausible explanation as lo how thii
phenol phthalene powder came to his hands and the handkerchief in bis .poc::ket
H all that he could say was that he "knew nothing about it". From all thcse-
facts the only inference that follows is that currency notes were obtaine!f.- br
the accused from the cotnplainant. It is not necessary that the passing .of • •
HAZARI LAL v. DELHI ADMN. (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 1055

money should be proved by direct evidence, it may also be proved by circum· A
> )
stantial evidence. The events which followed in quick sucoession in the present
case led to the only inference that the money was obtained by the accused
from the complainant.

3. Under section 114 of the Evidence Act the Court may presume tt.e
existence of any !'act which is likely to have happened regard being had to the
' common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private B
business, in their relation to facts of the particular case. One of the illustra-
tions to this section is that the Court may pr'csume that a person Who is in
possession of stolen goods soon after the theft is either the thief or has received

1
-<
) .
the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless h'e can account for his possession.
So too in .the facts and circumstances of the present case the Court may pre-
sume that the accused who tcok out the currency notes from his po.;::ket and
flung then1 across the wall had' Obtained them from the complainant \l.·ho, a
few ntinutes earlier, was shown, to have been in possession of th'e notes. Once
it is found that the accused had obtained the money from the complai11a11t
C

the presumption under section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is
immediately attracted. The presumption is rebuttable, but in the present case
there is no material to rebut the presumption. The accused was, therefore, ·
rightly convicted by the courts below. [1061D-FJ
Sita Ram v. The State of Rniasthan AIR 1975 SC 1432; Sura; Mal v. D
The Sitate (Delhi Administration) AIR 1979 SC 1408 held inapplicable.
4. There is no force in the contention that persons holding clerical posts
could not be called independent witnesses on the ground that they would be
under fear of disciplinary action if they did not support th'e prosecution case.
The respectability and verasity of a witness is not necessarily dependent upon
his status in Jife and it cannot be S<'1id that clerks are less tn1thful and amen- E
able than superior officers. [1060E]
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 211
of 1974.
Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated

r-·· 19-4-1974 of the Delhi High Court in Crl. A. No. 186172.
Frank Anthony, S. K. Dholakia and R. C. Bhatia for the Appel-
lant.
F

H. S. Marwah and R. N. Sachthey for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. The appellant Hazari Lal was convicted
G
by the learned Special Judge, Delhi, of offences under section 5(2)
read with section 5(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947,
and Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code. On the first count he was
sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years
and to pay a fine of Rs. 500. On the second connt he was sentenced
to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years. The two H
sentences were directed to nm concnrrently. The convictions and
sentences were confirmed by the High Conrt of Delhi.
• J
l3-138SCI/80
1056 SUPREME COURT REPORr; [1980] 2 s.c.R. '
A The case which the prosecution set out to prove before the Trial •
Judge was briefly as follows :

The scooter rickshaw belonging to Sri Ram (P.W.3) and driven
by his driver Ram Lubhaya (P.W. 6) was involved in an accident on
July 12, 1969. The scooter rickshaw and a tonga which were involv-
B ed in the accident were taken to the Police Station, Kashmere Gate
by the accused, a Police constable attached to that station. P.W. 3
obtained orders from the Magistrate for the release of his vehicle and

~
went to the Police Station to obtain delivery of tile vehicle. The
accused, who was present took him outside and told him that the
vehicle would be given to him only if he paid a bribe of Rs. 60.
c P.W. 3 then went away. He went to the Anti Corruption Depart- \. )

ment and made statement to Inspector Paras Nath, P.W. 8. After
recording the statement of P.W. 3, P.W. 8 sent for two persons
Davinder Kumar (P.W. 4) and Kewal Krishan. The statement of
P.W. 3 was read out to P. W. 3 in the presence of the two Panch ,
D witnesses Davinder Kumar and Kewal Krishan. P. W. 3 then produced
six currency notes of the valne of Rs. 10 each. The numbers of the
notes were noted and they were treated with phenol phthelene powder.
After the usual instructions were given to P .W. 3 and the panch wit-
nesses, the raiding party proceeded towards Kashmere Gate. P.W. 3,
1 >
P.W. 6 and Kewal Krishan went into the Police Station, while P.W.
E 8 and others stayed outside. The money was handed over to the
accused who took it and put it inside the right hand pocket of his
trousers. P.W. 6 and Kewal Krishan then came out and signalled to
'P.W. 8 whereupon P.W. 8 and the Panch witnesses went inside the
Police Station. The accused was present inside. As soon as he saw
the party led by P.W. 8 he took out the currency notes from the right
F side pocket of his trousers and threw them across the wall into the
adjoining room. P. W. 8. instructed some of the police officers accom-
panying him to rush to the adjoining room and to keep a watch over
the notes which must have fallep. there. He then introduced himself
to the accused and took him to the adjoining room. Some of the notes
were lying on the table of the Duty Officer in that room while others
G
had fallen on the ground near the chair of the Duty Officer. The ,,.-""'i.
six notes were collected in the presence of the witnesses and their
numbers were compared with the numbers noted before they proceeded
on the raid. The numbers tallied. The accused was questioned by
the Jllspector and he denied that he had demanded any bribe and kept
H silent about the acceptance of the bribe. Both the hands of the accus-
ed were dipped in sodium carbonate solution and the solution which
was previously colourless turned pink. The same test was repeated
HAZARI LAL v. DELHI ADMN. (Chinnappa Reddy,!.) 1057

with the handkerchief which was taken out of the right hand side A
pocket of the accused and also with the trousers of the accused. Each
test resulted in the bicarbonate solution turning pink. After comple-
tion of the investigation a charge-sheet was laid against the accused
being for offences under s. 5 (2) read with s. 5 (1 )( d) of the Preven-
• tion of Corruption Act and s. 161 of the Indian Penal Code.
B
All that has been mentioned in the previous paragraph was what

y
' }
the prosecution set out to prove before the Trial Court. But many
of the witnesses turned volte face. P.W. 3 stated in his evidence that
on the first occasion when he went to the Police Station to obtain
delivery of his scooter rickshaw it was not the accused that was present
but one Hawaldar. It was the Hawaldar and not the accused that c
demanded the bribe of Rs. 60 from him. According to him at the time
of the raid, when he, P.W. 6 and Kewal Krishan went inside the
Police Station they found the accused there and asked him to take
' the sum of Rs. 60 and return the scooter rickshaw. P.W. 3 stretched
his hand with the money towards the pocket of the accused's trousers
but the accused said the money might be paid to the person for whom D
it was meant. He refused to receive the money and jerked P.W. 3's
hand with his hand as a result of which the notes came to be flung
across the wall into the neighbouring room. He told the Inspector
that the notes had been flung across the wall and that the accused had
neither demanded the amount from him nor accepted the money from
E
him. On the other hand the accused had refused to take the money
from him. The Inspector recovered the notes from the neighbouring
room, placed them on the table and thereafter subjected the handker-
chief and the pocket of the accused's trousers to the phenol phthelene
test. The implication of this part of the evidence was that it was as
a result of the handling of these articles by the Inspector that they F
came to have phenol phthelene powder and that was the reason why
the solution turned pink. P. W. 3 was treated as hostile and cross-
examined by the prosroution with reference to the earlier statements
made by him. P.W. 6 followed suit and he too was declared hostile
and cross-examinied by the prosecution with reference to bis earlier
statements. G
Of the two panch witnesses Kewal Krishan was not examined as
he had become mentally deranged before the trial of the case. Davin-
der Kumar was examined as P.W. 4. This witness supported the pro-
secution case i'n some particulars but in regard to other particulars
he made statements contrary to his earlier statements. He was also H
; . treated as hostile and cross-examined by the prosecution. In subs-
tance bis chief-examination was to the affect that P.W.3, P.W.6 and
1058 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 2 S.C.R.

A Kewal Krishan went inside the Police Station, while he stayed outside
with the Inspector P.W. 8. P.W.3, P.W.6 and Kewal Krishan came
out after sometime and stated that the accused had accepted the
bribe. The raiding party then went inside. On seeing the Inspector
the accused got suspicious and threw away the currency notes across
the wall into the neighbouring room. In examinatio\1-in-chief he
B also stated that before they proceeded to the Police Station for the
raid, statement of both P.W.3 and P.W.6 had been recorded. He
stated that after the bribe was given P.W.3 also came out and signall-
•
ed to P.W.8 that the bribe had. b;ien given. Another statement made
by him in chief-examinatio'n was that he was unable to remember if
the Inspector questioned the accused at the time of the raid. As
c these statements were contrary to his earlier statements he was cross-
examined by the prosecution.

Paras Nath, (P.W.8) spoke to the complaint made to him by
P.W.3., the action that he took, the raid etc. Regarding the actual
raid he stated that P.W.3, P.W.6 and Kewal Krishan first went in·
D side the Police Station. After sometime, P.W.6 and Kewal Krishan
came out and signalled that P.W.3 had passed the bribe money and
•
that P.W.3 and the accused were in the room. When he went i'n, the
a"ccused took out the notes from the right side pocket of his trousers
and threw them across the wall into the adjoining room. He theii 1 '

E spoke to the test made by him etc.
On this evidence both the learned Sessions Judge and the High
Court found the accused gnilty of the two offences with which he
was charged. Shri Frank Anthony, learned counsel for the appel-
lant submitted that the Courts below had made free use of the state-
ments made by the witnesses in the course of the investigation .as if
F such statements were substantive evidence. If those statements were
exclnded from consideration there would be no evidence of any
demand or acceptance of bribe by the accused. All that the prose-
cution would be left with would be the evidence of the Inspector
and P.W.4 to the effect that the accused took out the currency notes
from the right side pocket of his trousers and flung them across the
G
wall into the adjoining room. That evidence accordi'ng to the learned
counsel would not be sufficient, even if accepted, to draw the pre-
sumption under s. 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Re-
liance was placed upon the decision of this Court in Sita Ram v. The
State of Rajasthan,(') and Suraj Mal v. The State (Delhi Adminis-
e tration(') .
(l) AIR 1975 SC 1432•.
(2) AIR 1979 SC 1408. • •
HAZARI LAL v. DELm ADMN. (Chinnappa Reddy,!.) 1059

The learned counsel was right in his submission about the free A
use made by the Courts below of statements of witnesses recorded
during the course of investigation. Section 162 of the Code of Cri-
minal Procedure imposes a bar on the· use of any statement made by
any person to a Police Officer in the course of investigation at any
enqniry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the
time when such statement was made, except for the purpose of con- B
tradicting the witness in the manner provided by s.145 of the Indian
Evidence Act. Where any part of such statement is so used any
part t.hereof may also be used in the re-examination of the witness
for the limited purpose of explaining any matter referred to in his
cross-examination. The only other exceptions to this embargo on
I the use of statements made in the counse of an investigation, relates c
to the statements falling within the provisions of s. 32(1) of the
Indian Evidence Act or permitted to be proved under s. 27 of the
l'ndian Evidence Act. S.145 of the Evidence Act provides that a wit-
ness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him
in writing and reduced into writing and relevant to matters in ques-
D
tion, without such writing being shown to him or being proved but,
I that if it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention
must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of
it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him. The
Courts below were clearly wrong in using as substantive evidence
statements made by witnesses in the courne of investigation. Shri E
H. S. Marwah, learned counsel for the Delhi Administration amazed
us by advancing the argument that the earlier statements with which
witnesses were confronted for the purpose of contradiction could be
taken into consideration by the Court in view of the definition of
"proved" in section 3 of the Evidence Act which is, "a fact is said
to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court p • 1
. '
either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that
a prudent man, ought, in the circumstances of the particular case to
act upon the supposition that it exists." We need say no more on
' the submission of Shri Marwah except that the definition of proved
does not enable a Court to take into consideration matters, includ-
ing statements, whose use is statutorily barred . G
. After excluding irrelevant material we are left with the evidence
of P.W.8 and that of P.W.4 whose evidence corroborates that of
P.W.8 in several material particulars. We, however, wish to say that
the evidence of P.W.8 is entirely trustworthy and there is no need to
~eek any corroboration. We are not prep~red to accept the sub· B
mission of Shri Frank A'nthony that the fact that he is the very Police
Officer who laid the trap should be sufficient for us to insist upon
1060 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 2 s.c.R.

A corroboration. We do wish to say that there is no rule of prudence
which has crystallized into a rule of law, nor indeed any rule of pru-
dence, which requires that the evidence of such officers should be
treated on the same footing as evidence of accomplices and there
should be insistence on corroboration. In the facts and circumstances
of a particular case a Court may be disinclined to act upon the evi-
B dence of such an officer without corroboration, but, equally, in the
facts and circumstances of another case the Court may unhesitatingly
accept the evidence of such an officer. It is all a matter of apprecia-
tion of evidence and on such matters there can be no hard and fast
rule, nor can there be any precedential guidance. We are forced to
say this because of late we have come across several judgments of
c Courts of Session and sometimes even of High Courts where refe-
rence is made to decisions of this Court on matters of appreciation
of evidence and decisions of pure question of fact. \Vhile on this
subject of appreciation of evidence we may also refer to an argu-
ment of Shri Frank Anthony based on the observations of a learned
D single judge in Kharaiti Lal v. The State,(') that pe~ons holding
clerical posts and the like should not be called as panch witnesses,
as such witnesses could not really be called independent witnesses
as they would always be under fear of disciplinary action if they did
not support the prosecution case. We do not think we can accept the
submission of Shri Frank Anthony. The respectability and the vera-
E city of a . witness is not necessarily dependent upon his status in life
and we are not prepared to say that Clerks are less truthful and
· more amenable than their superior officers.

From the evidence of P.W.8 and that of P.W.4 we may take the
following facts as established : P.W.3 made a report to P.W.8. He
F produced six currency notes of the denomination of ten rupees whose
numbers were noted and which were treated with phenol phthelene
powder. Thereafter the notes were handed over to P.W.3. P.W.3,
P.W.6 and Kewal Krishan went inside the Police Station. After
sometime P.W.6 and Kewal Krishan came out and gave a sigbal.
P.W.8 then went inside the Police Station. On seeing him the accus-
G
ed who was inside the Police Station with P.W.3 took out some cnr-
rency notes from the right side pocket of his trousers and threw them
across the partition wall into the adjoining room. The notes which
were so thrown out by the accused, were found to be the same notes
which had been treated with phenol phthelene and handed over to
B P.W.3 before the raid. The handkerchief which was taken out of
tl1e right side pocket of the trouser of the accused as well as the
(I) 1965(1)DelhiLawTimes362.
HAZARI LAL v. DELHI ADMN. (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 1061

right side pocket itself were subjected to a test which showed that A
they too had come into contact with phenol phthelene powder. It
may be rioted that the circulll\Stance that the handkerchief (Ex.P-4)
recovered from the right side pocket of the pant on the person of the
accused was subjected to the colour test which indicated the presence
of phenol phthelene powder on that handkerchief was put to the
appellant in his examination under section 313, Criminal Procedure B
Code. Instead of giving any explanation as to how this phenol
phthelene powder came on the handkerchief lying in his pocket, the
apP"llant replied : "I k"now nothing about it." From these facts the
irresistable inference must follow, in the absence of any explanation
from the accused, that currency notes were obtained by the accused.
from P.W.3. It is not necessary that the passing of money should c
be proved by direct evidence. It may also be proved by circums-
tantial evidence. The events which followed ih quick succession in
the present case lead to the only inference that the money was obtain-
ed by the accused from P.W.3. Under s.114 of the Evid·~nce Act
the Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks D
likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of
natural events, huma'n conduct and public and private business, in
their relation to facts of the particular case. One of the illustrations
to s.114 of the Evidence Act is that the Court may presume that a
person who is in possession of the stolen goods soon after the theft,
is either the thief or bas received the goods knowing them to be E
stolen; unless he can account for his possession. So too, in the facts
ahd circumstances of the present case the Court may presume that
the accused who took out the currency notes from his pocket and
flung them across the wall had obtained them from P.W.3, who a
few minutes earlier was shown to have been in possession of the
notes. Once we arrive at the finding that the accused had obtained F
the money from P.W.3, the presumption under s.4(1) of the Preven-
tion of C9rruption Act is immediately attracted. The presumption
is of course rebuttable but in the present case there is no material
to rebut the presumption. The accused was, therefore, rightly con-
victed by the Courts below.
G
We will now refer to the two decisions of this Court on which.
Shri Frank Anthony relied. In Sita Ram v. The State of Rajasthan,
(supra) the evidence of the complainant was rejected and it was held
that there was no evidence to establish that the accused had received
ahy gratification from any person. On that finding the presumption
under s.4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was not drawn. H
The question whether the rest of the evidence was sufficient to estab-
lish that the accused had obtained the money from the complainant
I 062 SUPREME CC(JRT REPORTS [1980] 2 s.c.R:

A was not considered. All that was taken as established was the re-
covery of cert_a_in money from the person of the accused and it was
held that mere recovery of money was not enough to entitle the
drawing of the presumption under s.4 (1) of the Prevention of Cor-
ruption Act. The Court did not co"nsider the further question whe-
ther recovery of the money alongwith other circumstances could
B
establish that the accused had obtained gratification from any per-
son. Jn the present case we have found that the circnmstances
established by the prosecution entitled the Court to hold that the
accused received the gratification from P.W.3. In Suraj Mal v. The
State (Delhi Administration) (supra) also it was said mere recovery
c of money divorced from the circumstances under which it was paid
was not sufficient when the substantive evidence in the case was not
reliable to prove payment of briln or to show that the accused volun-
tarily accepted the money. There can be no quarrel with that pro-
position but where the recovery of the money coupled with other
circumstances leads to the conclusion that the acc11sed received grati-
D fication from some person the Court would certainly be entitled to
draw the presumption under s.4( 1) of the Prevention of Corruption
Act. In our view both the decisions are of no avail to the appellant
and as already observed by us conclusions of fact must be drawn
on the facts of each case and not on the facts of other cases. In
other words there can be no precedents on questions of facts. The
appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

P.B.R. Appeal dismissed.