Holding

A test identification parade is not substantive evidence; its absence does not make identification evidence inadmissible, and in the present case the identification was valid, so the conviction stands.

Summary

The appellants were convicted under Section 395 IPC for assaulting a complainant at a petrol pump and stealing cash. The trial court relied on eyewitness testimony and a test identification parade (TI parade) in which the accused were identified by two witnesses; the prosecution also recovered the stolen cash. On appeal, the accused contended that the TI parade was not conducted in accordance with required formalities and that identification without a proper parade should be inadmissible. The Supreme Court held that a TI parade is a procedural test, not substantive evidence, and its absence or procedural lapse does not automatically render identification evidence inadmissible; courts may accept such identification, especially when corroborated or when witnesses are credible. The Court found no infirmity in the witnesses' evidence and concluded that the requisite formalities were observed, thereby dismissing the appeal.

Issues considered

The admissibility and evidentiary value of identification of the accused in court when a test identification parade is absent or allegedly irregular.
Whether failure to conduct a proper test identification parade renders the identification evidence fatal to the prosecution.
Whether the evidence of PW 22 established compliance with the formalities of a test identification parade.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 162
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 162, s. 27, s. 9
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 395

Subjects

test identification paradeidentification evidenceIndian Evidence ActSection 9 Evidence ActSection 162 CrPCSection 395 IPCwitness credibilitycorroborationcriminal conviction

Judgment

HEERA AND ANR. A
STATE OF RAJAS THAN

JUNE 20, 2007

[DR. ARIJIT PASA YAT AND D.K. JAIN, JJ.] B

Evidence Act,1872:

Identification/Test identification Parade-Evidentiary value of-The
main object of holding a Test identification Parade, during the investigation C
stage, is to test the memory of the witnesses based upon first impression and
also to enable the prosecution to decide whether all or any of them could
be cited as eyewitnesses of the crime-The necessity for holding an
identification parade can arise only when the accused is not previously
known to the witnesses -However, it does not constitute substantive evidence- D
it is. des/rable that a test identification parade should be conducted as soon
as after the arrest of the accused-But failure to hold a test identification
parade would not make inadmissible the evidence of identification in Court--
In appropriate cases Court may accept the evidence of identification· even
without insisting on corroboration-Code of Criminal Procedure,1973,
S. 162-Section 9-Relevant facts. E
According to the prosecution, the appellants-accused persons along with
others assaulted the complainant with lath is and took away the cash lying in
the cash box from a petrol pump. The complainant received injuries on his
face and hands. A case under Section 395 of the Penal Code, 1860 was
_>. registered against the appellants. F
The trial court found the evidence of witnesses to be credible and cogent.
In the Test identification Parade ITI Parade!, the appellants were identified
by PWs 1 and 11. Recovery was also made pursuant to the information given
by the appellants in terms of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872. The trial G
court convicted the appeUants and the said conviction was maintained by the
High Court. Hence the appeal.

On behalf of the appellants, it was contended that the evidence of PW·
22 did not show that all the requisite formalities were adopted before the TI
Parad~ 1065
H
1066 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 7 S.C.R.

A Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: I. The necessity for:.._holding an identification parade can arise
only when the accused are not previously known to the witnesses. The whole
idea of a test identification parade is that the witnesses who claim to have
seen the culprits at the time of occurrence are to identify them from the midst
B of other persons without any aid or any other source. The test is done to check
upon their veracity. In other words, the main object of holding an identification
parade, during the investigation stage, is to test the memory of the witnesses
based upon first impression and also to enable the prosecution to decide
whether all or any of them could be cited as eyewitnesses of the crime. The
C identification proceedings are in the nature of tests and significantly, therefore
there is no provision for it in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and the
Evidence Act,1872. It is desirable that a test identification parade should be
conducted as soon as after the arrest of the accused. This becomes necessary
to eliminate the possibility of the accused being shown to the witnesses prior
to the test identification parade. This is a very common plea of the accused
D and, therefore, the prosecution has to be cautions to ensure that there is no
scope for making such an allegation. If, however, circumstances are beyond
control and there is some delay, it cannot be said to be fetal for the prosecution. -i-" ·
jPara 6111069-E-H; 1070-A)

Matru v. State of U.P., 11971) 2 SCC 75 and Santosh Singh v. lzhar
E Hussain, 119731 2 sec 406, relied on.

2. The facts, which establish the identity of the accused persons, are
relevant under Section 9 of the Evidence Act As a general rule, the substantive
evidence of a witness is the statement made in Court. The evidence of mere
identification of the accused person at the trial for the first time is from its
F
very nature inherently of a weak character. The purpose of prior test
identification, therefore is to test strengthen the trustworthiness of that
evidence. It is accordingly considered a safe rule of prudence to generally
look for corroboration of the sworn testimony of witnesses in Court as to the
identity of the accused who are strangers to them, in the form of earlier
G identification proceedings. This rule of prudence, however is subject to
exceptions; when, for example, the Court is impressed by a particular witness
on whose testimony it can safely rely, without such or other corroboration.
The identification parades belong to the stage of investigation, and there is
no provision in the Code which obliges the investigating agency to hold, or
H confers a right ~pon the accused to claim, a test identification parade. They

--
HEERA AND ANR. v. ST ATE OF RAJASTHAN 1067

-,,·
do not constitute substantive evidence and t!tese parades are essentially A
governed by Section 162 of the Code. Failure to hold a test identification parade
would not make inadmissible the evidence of identification in Court. The
weight to be attached to such identification should be a matter for the Courts
of fact. In appropriate cases it may accept the evidence of identification even
without insisting on corroboration. !Para 71 (1070-A-F)
B
Kanta Prashadv. Delhi Administration, AIR (1958) SC 350, Vaikuntam
Chandrappa v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR (1960) SC 1340, Budhsen v.
-~ State of U.P., AIR (1970) SC 1321 and Rameshwar Singh v. State ofJammu
and Kashmir, AIR (1972) SC 102, relied on.

3. It is no doubt true that much evidentiary value cannot be attached to
c
the identification of the accused in Court where the identifying witness is a
total stranger who had just a fleeting glimpse of the person identified or who
had no particular reason to remember the person concerned, if the
identification is made for the first time in Court. (Para 11111072-DI
D
Jadunath Singh v. The State of Uttat Pradesh, 11970) 3 SCC 518,
Parkash Chand Sogani v. The State of Rajasthan, (Criminal Appeal no. 92 of
1956 decided on 15.01.1957 SC) and Habana Singh v. State of Jammu and
Kashmir, (1975] 4 SCC 480, Ram Nath Mahto v. State of Bihar, (1996) 8 SCC
630, Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar, (19951Supp.1SCC80, State of
Uttar Pradesh v. Boota Singh, (197911SCC31, Ramanbhai Naranbhai Patel E
v. State of Gujarat, (200011 SCC 358 and Munshi Singh Gautam v. State of
MP., (2005) 9 SCC 631, referred to.

State (Delhi Admn.) v. V.C. Shukla, AIR (1980) SC 1382, Rajesh Govind
Jagesha v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (2000) SC 160 and State ofH.P. v. Lekh
Raj, AIR (1999) SC 3916, cited. F
I,
/

4. In the instant case, the accused persons have been identified by PWs
1 and 11 and no infirmity was noticed in their evidence. Additionally, evidence
of PW 22 clearly shows that all requisite formalities with regard to Test
identification Parade were adopted and followed. (Para 171 (1074-E-F)
G
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 1307 of·

- . 2006.

From the Judgment and Order dated 2.12.2005 of the Rajasthan High
Court, Jodhpur in S.B. Crl. Appeal No. 94 of 2002.
H
1068 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 7 S.C.R.

A Tanuj Bagga Sharma, (A.C.) for the Appellants.

Naveen Kumar Singh, Mukul Sood, Shashwat Gupta and Aruneshwar
Gupta for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
DR. ARIJIT PASA YAT, J. 1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment
rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur
upholding the conviction of appellants for offence punishable under Section
395 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ( in short the 'IPC'). Custodial sentence ).--
of 10 years with fine of Rs.2000/- each with default stipulation as imposed by
C the trial Court was maintained. However, five co-accused were acquitted.

2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

On 24.1.1997 Prem Singh lodged an oral report alleging inter alia that he
is working at Lavri Petrol Pump for last 3 years. In the night at about 2 O'
D clock, since vehicles were not coming for filling up petrol, they were taking
rest in the office. Outside the office, two tankers were lying. In office, cook
Kanhaiya Lal, Bhim Singh and Fateh Singh were sleeping. At that time, about
seven persons wearing pant-shirt and sweater came there and started throwing
stones towards the office, due to which the glasses were broken. On this
E they wake up. Three accused persons came towards them and started beating
them with lathis, fo;- which he lifted a lathi and started giving blows to the
accused by lathi, on which all the accused fell on him. Two persons started
breaking the cash box. Complainant Prem Singh raised hue and cry, hearing
which neighbour Sh. Bhagwati Prasad Joshi came there. He was also beaten
by the accused persons. The accused persons took away the cash lying in
F the cash box. Complainant received injuries on his face and hands. The
accused persons had taken away a sum of Rs. I 0-12 thousand lying in the 1,

cash box.

3. On this report a case under Section 395 IPC was registered and
investigation commenced. On completion of investigation, charge sheet was
G filed. Thirty seven witnesses were examined by the prosecution to forther its
version. Accused persons pleaded innocence and claimed trial. The trial
court found evidence of witnesses to be credible and cogent. It is to be noted
that in the Test Identification Parade (in short the 'TI Parade"). A 1-Heera,
A-6 Nopa i.e. the present appellants were identified. Recovery were also
H made pursuant to the information given by them in terms of Section 27 of the
HEERA AND ANR. v. ST ATE OF RAJASTHAN (PASA YAT. J. J I069
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the 'Evidence Act'). The Tl Parade of A
the accused persons was conducted through Shri Mahendra Kumar, Civil
Judge and Judicial Magistrate. PW-I-Prem Singh identified Al and A6. PW-
! I- Bhanwar Singh identified A 1- Heera. As noted above, trial Court convicted
all the seven accused persons and in appeal conviction of present appellants
was maintained by the High Court.
B
4. Learned counsel for the appellants in support of the appeal submitted
that the seven persons were arrested. There was no reason as to why only
- <i appellants were held guilty. PW 4-Bhagwati Prasad was a neighbour of the
victim. It was also submitted that the evidence of the PW 22- Puran Puri does
not show that all the requisite formalities were adopted before the Test C
Identification Parade was conducted.

5. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand supported the
judgment of the High Court.

6. As was observed by this Court in Matru v. State ofU.P.. [1971] 2 SCC D
75 identification tests do not constitute substantive evidence. They are
primarily meant for the purpose of helping the investigating agency with an
assurance that their progress with the investigation into the offence is.
proceeding on the right lines. The identification can only be used as
corroborative of the statement in court. (See Santokh Singh v. Izhar Hussain,
[ 1973] 2 SCC 406). The necessity for holding an identification parade can arise E
only when the accused are not previously known to the witnesses. The whole
idea of a test identification parade is that witnesses who claim to have seen
the culprits at the time of occurrence are to identify them from the midst of
other persons without any aid or any other source. The test is done to check
upon their veracity. In other words, the main object of holding an identification
F
parade, during the investigation stage, is to test the memory of the witnesses
based upon first impression and also to enable the prosecution to decide
whether all or any of them could be cited as eyewitnesses of the crime. The
identification proceedings are in the nature of tests and significantly, therefore,
there is no provision for it in the Code and the Evidence Act. It is desirable
that a test identification parade should be conducted as soon as after the G
arrest of the accused. This becomes necessary to eliminate the possibility of
the accused being shown to the witnesses prior to the test identification
parade. This is a very common plea of the accused and, therefore, the
prosecution has to be cautious to ensure that there is no scope for making
such allegation. If, however, circumstances are beyond control and there is H
1070 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 7 S.C.R.

A some delay, it cannot be said to be fatal to the prosecution.

7. It is trite to say that the substantive evidence is the evidence of
identification in Court. Apart from the clear provisions of Section 9 of the
Evidence Act, the position in law is well settled by a catena of decisions of
this Court. The facts, which establish the identity of the accused persons, are
B relevant under Section 9 of the Evidence Act. As a general rule, the substantive
evidence of a witness is the statement made in Court. The evidence of mere
identification of the accused person at the trial for the first time is from its
very nature inherently of a weak character. The purpose of a prior test
identification, therefore, is to test and strengthen the trustworthiness of that
C evidence. It is accordingly considered a safe rule of prudence to generally
look for corroboration of the sworn testimony of witnesses in Court as to the
identity of the accused who are strangers to them, in the form of earlier
identification proceedings. This rule of prudence, however, is subject to
exceptions, when, for example, the Court is impressed by a particular witness
on whose testimony it can safely rely, without such or other corroboration.
D The identification parades belong to the stage of investigation, and there is
no provision in the Code which obliges the investigating agency to hold or
--~-
confers a right upon the accused to claim, a test identification parade. They
do not constitute substantive evidence and these parades are essentially
governed by Section 162 of the Code. Failure to hold a test identification
E parade would not make inadmissible the evidence of identification in Court.
The weight to be attached to such identification should be a matter for the
Courts of fact. ln appropriate cases it may accept the evidence of identification
even without insisting on corroboration. [See Kanta Prashad v. Delhi
Administration, AIR (1958) SC 350, Vaikuntam Chandrappa and Ors. v. State
ofAndhra Pradesh, AIR (1960) SC 1340, Budhsen and Anr. v. State of U.P.,
F AIR (1970) SC 1321 and Rameshwar Singh v. State of Jammu and Kashmir,
AIR (1972) SC 102].

8. In Jadunath Singh and Anr. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, (1970] 3
sec 5 J8, the submission that absence oftest identification parade in all cases
is fatal, was repelled by this Court after exhaustive considerations of the
G authorities on the subject. That was a case where the witnesses had seen the
accused over a period of time. The High Court had found that the witnesses
were independent witnesses having no affinity with deceased and entertained
no animosity towards the appellant. They had claimed to have known the
appellants for the last 6-7 years as they had been frequently visiting the town
H of Bewar. This Court noticed the observations in an earlier unreported decision
HEERAANDANR. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [PASAYAT,J.] 1071

of this Court in Parkash Chand Sogani v. The State of Rajasthan (Criminal A
Appeal No. 92 of 1956 decided on January 15, 1957), wherein it was observed:-

"It is also the defence case that Shiv Lal did not know the appellant.
But on a reading of the evidence of P. W. 7 it seems to us clear that
Shiv Lal knew the appellant by sight. Though he made a mistake
about his name by referring to him as Kailash Chandra, it was within B
the knowledge of Sh iv Lal that the appellant was a brother of Manak
Chand and he identified him as such. These circumstances are quite
enough to show that the absence of the identification parade would
not vitiate the evidence. A person who is well-known by sight as the
brother of Manak Chand, even before the commission of the occurrence, C
need not be put before an identification parade in order to be marked
out. We do not think that there is any justification for the contention
that 'the absence of the identification parade or a mistake made as to
his name, would be necessarily fatal to the prosecution case in the
circumstances."
D
9. The Court concluded:
-;
"It seems to us that it has been clearly laid down by this Court,.in
Parkash Chand Sogani v. The State of Rajasthan (supra) (AIR Cri LJ),
that the absence of test identification in all cases is not fatal and if
the accused person is well-known by sight it would be waste of time E
to put him up for identification. Of course if the prosecution fails to
hold an identification on the plea that the witnesses already knew the
accused well and it transpires in the course of the trial that the
witnesses did not know the accused previously, the prosecution would
run the risk of losing its case."
F
\
> I0. In Harbajan Singh v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, {1975] 4 SCC
480, though a test identification parade was not held, this Court upheld the
conviction on the basis of the identification in Court corroborated by other
circumstantial evidence. In that case it was found that the appellant and one
Gunnukh Singh were absent at the time of roll call and when they were
arrested on the night of 16th December, 1971 their rifles smelt of fresh G
gunpowder and that the empty cartridge case which was found at the scene
of offence bore distinctive markings showing that the bullet which killed the
• ----4 deceased was fired from the rifle of the appellant. Noticing these circumstances
this Court held:-
H

'f

-
1072 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 7 S.C.R.

A "In view of this corroborative evidence we find no substance in the
argument urged on behalf of the appellant that the Investigating
Officer ought to have held an identification parade and that the failure
of Munshi Ram to mention the names of the two accused to the
neighbours who came to the scene immediately after the occurrence
shows that his story cannot be true. As observed by this Court in
B JadunathSingh v. State ofU.P., AIR (1971) SC 363 absence oftest
identification is not necessarily fatal. The fact that Munshi Ram did
not disclose the names of the two accused to the villages only shows
that the accused were not previously known to him and the story that
the accused referred to each other by their respective names during
C the course of the incident contains an element of exaggeration. The
case does not rest on the evidence of Munshi Ram alone and the
corroborative circumstances to which we have referred to above lend
enough assurance to the implication of the appellant."

11. It is no doubt true that much evidentiary value cannot be attached
D to the identification of the accused in Court where identifying witness is a
total stranger who had just a fleeting glimpse of the person identified or who
had no particular reason to remember the person concerned, ifthe identification
is made for the first time in Court.

12. In Ram Nath Mahto v. State of Bihar, [1996] 8 SCC 630 this Court
E upheld the conviction of the appellant even when the witness while deposing
· in Court did not identify the accused out of fear, though he had identified him
in the test identification parade. This Court noticed the observations of the
trial Judge who had recorded his· remarks about the demeanour that the
witness perhaps was afraid of the accused as he was trembling at the stare
F of Ram Nath-accused. This Court also relied upon the evidence of the
Magistrate, PW-7 who had conducted the test identification parade in which
the witness had identified the appellant. This Court found, that in the
circumstances if the Courts below had convicted the appellant, there was no
reason to interfere.

G 13. In Suresh Chandra Bahriv. State of Bihar, [1995] Supp I S~C 80,
this Court held that it is well settled that substantive evidence of the witness
is his evidence in the Court but when the accused person is not previously
known to the witness concerned then identification of the accused by the
witness soon after his arrest is of great importance because it furnishes an .~,

H assurance that the investigation is proceeding on right lines in addition to
HEERA AND ANR. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN (PASA Y AT. J.] I073

furnishing corroboration of the evidence to be given by the witness later in A
Court at the trial. From this point of view it is a matter of great importance,
both for the investigating agency and for the accused and a fortiori for the
proper administration of justice that such identification is held without avoidable
and unreasonable delay after the arrest of the accused. It is in adopting this
course alone that justice and fair play can be assured both to the accused B
as well as to the prosecution. Thereafter this Court observed:-

"But the position may be different when the accused or a culprit who
stands trial had been seen not once but for quite a number of times
at different point of time and places which fact may do away with the
necessity of a TI parade." C
14. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Boota Singh and Ors., [ 1979] 1 SCC 31,
this Court observed that the evidence of identification becomes stronger if
the witness has an opportunity of seeing the accused not for a few minutes
but for some length of time, in broad daylight, when he would be able to note
the features of the accused more carefully than on seeing the accused in a D
dark night for a few minutes.

15. In Ramanbhai Naranbhai Patel and Ors. v. State of Gujarat, [2000]
1 SCC 358 after considering the earlier decisions this Court observed:-

"It becomes at once clear that the aforesaid observation!; were made E
in the light of the peculiar facts and circumstances wherein the police
is said to have given the names of the accused to the witnesses.
Under these circumstances, identification of such a named accused
only in the Court when the accused was not known earlier to the
witness had to be treated as valueless. The said decision, in turn,
relied upon an earlier decision of this Court in the case of State (Delhi F
_,
.• Admn.) v. V C. Shukla, AIR (1980) SC 1382 wherein also Fazal Ali, J.
speaking for a three-Judge Bench made similar observations in this
- regard. In that case the evidence of the witness in the Court and his
identifying the accused only in the Court without previous
identification parade was found to be a valueless exercise. The G
observations made therein were confined to the nature of the evidence
deposed to by the said eye-witnesses. It, therefore, cannot be held,
as tried to be submitted by learned Counsel for the appellants, that
in the absence of a test identification parade, the evidence of an eye-
witness identifying the accused would become inadmissible or totally
useless; whether the evidence deserves any credence or not would H
A
1074 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 7 S.C.R.

always depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is, of
...
<
course, true as submitted by learned Counsel for the appellants that
the later decisions of this Court in the case of Rajesh Govind Jagesha
v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (2000) SC 160 and State of H.P. v. Lekh
Raj, AIR (1999) SC 3916, had not considered the aforesaid three-Judge
Bench decisions of this Court. However, in our view, the ratio of the
B aforesaid later decisions of this Court cannot be said to be running
counter to what is decided by the earlier three-Judge Bench judgments
on the facts and circumstances examined by the Court while rendering
these decisions. But even assuming as submitted by learned Counsel
for the appellants that the evidence of, these two injured witnesses
_,
c i.e. Bhogilal Ranchhodbhai and Karsanbhai Vallabhbhai identifying
the accused in the Court may be treated to be of no assistance to the
prosecution, the fact remains that these eye-witnesses were seriously
injured and they could have easily seen the faces of the persons
assaulting them and their appearance and identity would well within
~
imprinted in their minds especially when they were assaulted in broad
D daylight. They could not be said to be interested in roping in innocent
persons by shielding the real accused who had assaulted them." \;-
16. These aspects were recently highlighted in Munshi Singh Gautam
(dead) and Ors. v. State of M.P .. (2005] 9 SCC 631 ).

E I 7. In the instant case the accused persons have been identified by
PWs I and I I and no infirmity was noticed in their evidence. Additionally,
evidence of PW 22 clearly shows that all requisite formalities with regard to
Test Identification Parade were adopted and followed. In that view of the
matter there is no merit in the appeal which is accordingly dismissed.
F 18. We record our appreciation for the able manner in which Ms. Tanuj
Bagga Sharma, learned Amicus Curiae assisted the Court.

V.S.S. Appeal dismissed.