Holding

The Chief Justice of the High Court has the authority to constitute a Committee under the Rules, and the Committee’s recommendations, once approved by the Full Court, constitute a valid decision of the Court notwithstanding procedural irregularities.

Summary

The Rajasthan High Court had appointed a two‑Judge Committee, constituted by the Acting Chief Justice, to recommend merit criteria for promotion of Higher Judicial Service officers to the selection scale. The Full Court approved the Committee's recommendations and the Governor issued appointments, but several officers were denied selection grade and challenged the process. The High Court held that the Acting Chief Justice lacked authority to form the Committee and that the merit criteria could not be altered without consulting all judges, rendering the appointments illegal. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the statutory rules governing the High Court's administrative business, particularly Rules 14, 15, 21(2), 29(2) and 32 of the 1952 Rules, and the constitutional provisions under Articles 235, 227 and 229. It held that the Chief Justice does have jurisdiction to constitute such a Committee and that the Committee’s report, once approved by the Full Court, becomes a decision of the Court, unaffected by procedural irregularities. Consequently, the High Court’s finding of illegality was set aside and the appeals were allowed. The Court also clarified that ratification by a competent body can validate an initially irregular action.

Issues considered

The Acting Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court had jurisdiction to constitute a Committee of two judges under the Rules of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, 1952.
Whether the merit criteria for promotion to the selection scale could be formulated by a Committee without prior consultation of all judges as required by Rule 15.
Whether procedural irregularities in constituting the Committee or in the Full Court’s approval affect the validity of the promotion orders.
Whether the Full Court’s approval of the Committee’s recommendations ratifies the action and renders it valid under Rule 32 and constitutional provisions.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 225, s. Article 227, s. Article 229, s. Article 235
Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949s. Section 46
Rules of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, 1952s. Rule 14, s. Rule 15, s. Rule 21(2), s. Rule 2(2), s. Rule 23, s. Rule 29(2), s. Rule 32

Subjects

service lawjudicial appointmentsselection scaleHigh Court administrative powerscommittee constitutionArticle 235Rule 15Rule 21merit criteriapromotionratification of irregularities

Judgment

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN A
v.
P.P. SINGH AND ANR

JANUARY 27, 2003

[V.N. KHARE, CJ, S.S. SINHA AND DR. AR. LAKSHMANAN, JJ.] B

Service Law:

Rules of High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan, 1952-Rules 14, 15
and 21(2)-Rajasthan Higher Judicial Services Rules, 1969-Rule 23- C
Constitution of India, 1950-Article 235-Higher Judicial Services-
Administrative powers of High Court-Full Court constituting commiltee of
·j two Judges for consideration of individual merit of judicial officers for
appointment to selection· scale-Committee making recommendations-Full
Court by resolution taking decision-Acting ChiefJustice thereupon constituting D
committee of two Judges-Full Court on considering the report, approving
the names of officers-Justification of-Held: ChiefJustice has jurisdiction to
constitute a Committee-Further Rule I 5 does not postulate the prior approval
of the Full Court in relation to any action which may be initiated by the Chief
Justice, thus High Court erred in holding constitution ofthe commillee illegal.
E
Full Court constituted committee of two Judges for the purpose of
consideration of individual merit of the judicial omeers of Higher Judicial
Service for appointment to selection scale. Committee recommended that last
five years of ACRs to be considered in the merit criteria therefor. Full Court
by resolution took decis_ion to take three good ACRs out of five into F
consideration and regarding grant of super time scale to Rajasthan Judicial
Service ii adopted the criteria of five good ACRs out of seven for grant of
super time scale. Acting Chief Justice of High Court constituted a committee
of two Judges to make recommendations for formation of ofrtciating promotee
RHJS officers for their substantive appointment in their service and for
promotion of RHJS officers in the ordinary scale to selection scale. Committee G
submitted its report and the Full Court approved the names of officers who
were found fit for grant of selection scale and deferred the case of respondents.
Governor then issued notification and appointed the officers to the post of
selection grade. Respondents challen11ed the non-grant of selection 11rade to
them. High Court without dlsturbln11 the appointment of the officers held that
H

-
593
594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) 1 S.C.R.

A the Acting Chief Justice was not authorized to constitute the two Judges
Committee and also all the judges were not consulted, Committee appointed
by the Acting Chief Justice alone could not evolve the merit criteria; and the
earlier policy adopted by the Full Court could not be changed as jt provides
for prior consultation of judges and the subsequent approval thereof could
B nOt cure the illegality.

Appellant contended that the Acting Chief Justice had the jurisdiction
to constitute a Committee and the decision of the said Committee was
approved by the Full Court, the earlier policy decision must be ·held to have
been varied by High Court. . . ·· . -.. .. · . . ·· . • .
c It was contended for the first respondent that as the power of the Chief
Justice to constitute a Committee is governed by a statufory rule, he acted
without jurisdiction in appointing the said Committee;

Allowing the appeals, the Court
D
HELD: l.l. A Reading of the Rules oi' High Court of Judicature of
Rajasthan, 1952 shows that the Chief Justice has the requisite jurisdiction to
constitute a Committee and its report upon consultation of all the Judges of
. High Court in terms of Rule 15 shall become a decision of the Court. Further·
Rule 29(2) and Rule 32 shows that irregularity which might have taken place
E·. in the procedure laid down in Chapter III shall not affect the validity of the
,order paSsed or anything done in the Rule!: and shall be deemed to be disposed
of by the Court. Also the legalfiction created must also be given its full effect
(605-E, F)

1.2 The powers of the Chief Justice under Articles 235 and 219 of the
F Constitution are different and distinct. Whereas control over the subordinate ·
courts vests in the High Court as whole, the.controlover High Court vests in
·· the Chief Justices only•. Howeve..., it does not mean that. a. Full Court ~an~ot
· authoriie Chief Justice in respect of any inatter whatsoever in relation· to
certain matters keeping the rest of it in its«rlf by the Full Court, authorization
G to act on its behalf in favour of the Chief Justice on a Committee of Judges ·
is permissible in law. How far and to what extent such power has been· or
can be delegated would be .discernible only from the rules. Such a power by
the Full Court can also be exercised from time to time. (606-8-D)

High Court ofJudicature for Rajasthan ~-Ramesh Chand Paliwal, [1998)
H 3 SCC 72; District Judge Barada/canto Mishra v. High Court.o/Orissa, (1976) 3
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN v. P.P. SINGH 595
SCC327;HighCourtof Punjabv.Stateo/Haryana, [197511 SCC843; Yoginath A
D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra, (1999[ 7 SCC 739; State o/Haryana v. lnder
Prakash Anand, [1976[ 2 SCC 977; State ofAssam v. S.N Sen, [1971[ 2 SCC 9
and All India Judges' Association v. Union of India. [1992[ 1SCC119,
referred to.

1.3. Judges of High Court under Rule 21(2) authorized the Chief Justice B
to constitute a committee which having been made in terms of the rule~ must·
be held to.have been made by High Court itself. Such authorization is not a
limited one, as thereby the extent1o which such authorization can be exercised
has not been spelt out. Furthermore, authorization in terms of Rule 21(2)
having been laid down in Chapter 111 which relates to the Administrative C
Business of the Court, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever even in the
matter of control of the High Court in terms of Article 235 of the Constitution,
.... .,. the Chief Justice of the High Court had the jurisdiction to exercise the said .
power. Once such a resolution authorizing the Chief. Jus!ice to constitute a
committee has been passed; there cannot be doubt whatsoever that the
exercise of power by the Chief Justice was absolutely valid. Therefore, ·it D
cannot be accepted that the Chief Justice could appoint the two-Judges
committee only with the approval of the Full Court and High Court erred in
holding that the constitution of the committee was illegal. [606-E-H; 607-BI

High Court ofJudicature a/Bombay v. Shirish Kumar Rangrao Patil, (lml
6 sec 339, referred to. E
1.4. Laying down the merit criteria for appointment to the selection
grade also was within the domain of the High Court and it could amend or
modify the same from time to time. For the said purpose Chief Justice could
appoint a committee, the recommendation \)'.hereof was to be subject to the
approval of the Full Court. Rule 15 does not say that before an action can be F
initiated in that behalf by the Chief Justice all the Judges are to be consulted.
It postulates a final decision in the matter specified therein and not initiation
of process therefor. Therefore, it cannot be accepted that the matter relating · ·
· to fixation of criteria for the purpose of appointment to the selection grade,
the two-Judges committee could not be made without consulting all the Judges.
It is based on a total misconception. Further the submission that all the Judges G
of the High Court are required to be consulted at a time is incorrect. Also
the submission that the two-Judges Committee was not justified in evolving
a merit criteria different from the one approved by Full Court is incorrect.
Two-Judges Committee did not take any final decision in that behalf. Having
regard.to the facts and circumstances of the case, upon consideration of.the H
596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003) l S.C.R.

A extant rules and the earlier decisions of the Full Court it applied certain
principles and criteria which inevitably was subject to approval of the Full
Court. f607"'.0.FI

l.S. Rule IS provides that all the judges shall be consulted in the matters.
B In the event, however, such consultation is to be effected by placing the matter
before a Full Court, all the Judges are therefor invited but the same would
not mean that in the event, one or more Judge(s) does/do not attend the Full
Court, the resolution passed by it shall be invalid. Rule 29 provides for a
quorum. In the case of a meeting of the Judges of the court, the quorum will
be complete if one-half or more of the Judges attend the same. Consultation
C with all the Judges would, thus, not mean that even if some of the Judges do
not choose to make themselves available in a Full Court meeting, consultation
with all the Judges shall not be complete. Question of consultation with the
Judges would not arise unless the subject matter therefor is identified. It is
for Hon 'ble Chief Justice of the High Court to identify such matters and place
the same before the Full Court with relevant papers and documents.
D Furthermore, the terminology 'consultation' used in RulP IS having regard
to purport and object thereof must be given its ordinary meanin·g. By giving
an opportunity to consultation or deliberation the purpose thereof is to enable
the Judges to make their respective points of view known to the others and
discuss and examine the relative merits of their view. It is neither in doubt
E nor in dispute that the Judges present in the meeting of the Full Court were
supplied with all the requisite documents and had full opportunity to deliberate
upon the agenda in question. (608-A, B, G, H; 611-B-D)

PermanentEdition, 1960, Volume 9, page 3 and Corpus Juris Secundum
Volume 16A, Ed 1956, p. 1242, referred to.
F
1.6. The Committee was constituted for the purpose of considering the
cases of the eligible judicial officers. It was absolutely not necessary to place
the matter before the Full Court. The Acting Chief Justice constituted the
Committee for a specific purpose. The Committee merely submitted its opinion
G which was subject to approval by the Full Court. Once the opinion of the
matter is approved by the Full Court, it must be held that there had been a
compliance of Rule JS. It is, therefore, axiomatic that not only the Chief Justice
or High Court was free to initiate any proceedings and obtain the opinion of ·~
a Committee of Judges on such matters and the only legal requirement
therefor is to place such proposals together with the opinion of the Committee
.H before the Judges of the High ~ourt so that the matter can be fully thrashed
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN v. P.P. SINGH 597
out. Once the Full Court approves the recommendations made by the A
~...( Committee of Judges, it becomes decision of the Court which could be sent
to the Governor for acting thereupon. (608-D, E, G; 609-A-BI

State o/Uttar Pradesh v. Ba111k Deo Pali Tripathi and Anr. (1978) 2 SCC
102 and Registrar, High Court of Madras v. R. Rajiah, (1988) 3 SCC 211,
referred to. B
1.7. In the instant case for all intent and purport the report of the two-
Judges Committee has been approved by the Full Court. Once approved, it
terminated into a decision of the Full Court itself. Even the Governor bas
acted upon the recommendations of the High Court. Writ petitioners-lint
respondents did not question the appointments of the appointees in the High C
Court. Therefore, High Court, committed a manifest error in arriving at its
conclusion in so far as it failed to take into consideration that Rule 15 does
not postulate the prior approval of the Full Court in relation to any action
which may be initiated by the Chief Justice. (611-E, Fl
D
1.8. When an approval is required, an action holds good. Once if it
disapproved it losses its force. Only when a permission is required, the decision
does not become effective till permission is obtained. In the instant case, both
the aforementioned requirements have been fulfilled. In terms of Rule 2(2)
of the Rules, the decision of the Full Court would have retrospective effect
and retroactive operation. Further, in any view of the matter, even in a case E
where the initial action is illegal, the same can be ratified hy a body competent
therefor. (611-G, H; 612- A, B(

UP. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad and Anr. v. Friends Coop. Housing Society
ltd and Anr., (1995) 3 SCC 456, referred to.
F
Sri Parmeshwari Prasad Gupta v. The Union ofIndia, (1973) 2 SCC 543;
Marathwada University v. Seshrao Ba/want Rao Chavan, (1989) 3 SCC 132; Babu
Verghese and Ors. v. Bar Council ofKera/a and Ors., (1999( 3 SCC 422; Orissa
Small Industries Corpn. ltd and Anr. v. Narasingha Charan Mohanty and Ors.,
(1999) 1 SCC 465 and Brij Nath Pandey v. State of U.P. & Ors., JT (2000) 9 G
SC 464, referred to.

Barnard v. National Dock labour Board, (19531 1 All ER 1113,
referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 59 of2001. H
598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) I S.C.R.

A From the Judgment and Order dated· 2"3.11.2000 of the High Court of
Rajasthan in DBCWP 671/2000.

WITH

C.A. Nos. 60, ·61, 62, 63 and 64/200 I .
B Dipankar P. Gupta, Raj Kumar Gupta, Sheo Kumar Gupta, A.N.
Baradaiyar, Sandhya Goswami (NP), Sushi! Balwada, Surya Kant, Devendra
Singh (NP) and S.K. Bhattacharya (NP), for the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c S.B. SINHA, J. The effect of the recommendations of a Committee of
two Judges as regards criteria for grant of selection scale appointed by an ·
Acting Chief Justice which have subsequently been approved by a Full Court
of the High Court is in question in these appeals which arise out of a judgment
and order passed by a Division Bench of Rajasthan High Court dated 23rd
D November, 2000 in D.B. Civil Writ Petitions No. 671 of2000, 987 of 2000
and 1263 of 2000.

The High Court of Rajasthan in exercise of its power conferred upon
it under Section 46 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance 1949 read with
Article 225 of the Constitution M India and all other powers enabling it in
E that behalf made Rules .known as Rules of the High Court of Judicature for
Rajasthan; 1952 (hereinafter called and referred to as "the Rules").

The Rules came into force on or about lst October, 1952. Chapter 3 of
the ·said Rules refers to Administrative Business of the High Court.

F The Rules of the High ~ourt were amended by a Resolution of the Full
Court· of the High Court on 26.11.1966; and the relevant portion of the
Minutes thereof are as under :-

"Minutes of the proceedings of the Full Court Meeting held on.
Saturday, the 26th November, 1966, at 11 A.M. in the Chamber of
G the Hon'ble the Chief Justice.

***
AGENDA:

H I. Amendment in the High Court Rules relating to the Administrative
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN v. P.P. SINGH [S.B. SINHA, J.] 599

. Business of the Court. A
II. Any other matter which Hon'ble the Chief Justice may like to be
discussed.

DECISIONS:

ITEM NO. II :- B
The amendments proposed by the Hon'ble Administrative Judge
in Chapter Ill of the High Court Rules relating to the administrative
and executive business of the Court were considered.

Resolved that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 46 C
of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, and Articles 225, 227,
233, 234 and 235 of the Constitution of India and all other powers
enabling the Court in that behalf, the following changes and
amendments in Chapter IJI of the High Court Rules relating to the
administrative and executive business of the Court be effected :-

The words "Executive and" occurring in the heading of Chapter
D
I.
Ill shall be omitted;
2. For rules 14 to 22 the following rules shall be substituted :-

"14. Admin.istrative business relating to control over subordinate
courts and to superintendence over courts and tribunals.-All E
administrative business of the Court relating to the control over
subordinate courts vested in the Court under Article 235 of the
Constitution or otherwise and to the superintendence over the courts
and tribunals vested in the Court under Article 227 of the Constitution
or othel"Wise shall be disposed of as provided hereinafter.
F
15. Matters on which all Judges shall be consulted.-On ·the
following matters all the Judges of the Court shall be consulted,
namely:- ·

(c) proposals as to changes in or the issue of new rules for the
guidance of subordinate courts; G
(d) appointment, promotion and seniority of Judicial offices;
'--<( (e) withholding of promotion, supersession or reduction of Judicial
Officers;

. .
(f) removal or dismissal of any Judicial Officer
' H
600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003) I S.C.R.

A (g) compulsory retirement of Judicial Officers otherwise than by way
of punishment;
(h) important questions of policy or those affecting the powers and
status of the Court laid before the Court by the Chief Justice or
any other Judge;
B (i) any matter which the Chief Justice or the Administrative
Committee, as constituted under Rule 16, may consider fit to be ·
laid before them .for consideration.

16. Administrative Committee - (I) A Committee of Judges shall be
formed composed of the Chief Justice, the Administrative Judge and
c such other Judge or Judges as the Chief Justice may, from time to
time, appoint. This Committee shall be called the Administrative
Committee.

(2) Subject to these Rules, the Administrative Committee shall
act for the Court in its administrative business in respect of the matters
D
enu.merated in rule 17.

17. Matters on which the Administrative Committee shall be
consulted The Administrative Committee shall be consulted on the
following matters, namely -
E (a) the issue of general letters to subordinate courts;

(b) the issue of directions regarding the preparation of returns and
statements; and

(c) any other matter which the Chief Justice or the Administrative
F Judge may desire. to be brought before it.
18. Consultation how made.- The consultation with the Judges
and the Administrative Committee, referred to in Rules 15 and 17
respectively, shall be made either by circulating the papers connected
with the matter among the Judges or the Administrative Committee,
G as the case may be, or by laying the matter before a meeting of the
Judges or the Administrative Committee called by the Chief Justice.

19. Decision in case of difference of opinion.-All the matters ·
referred to in Rules 15 and 17 shall be disposed of in accordance with
the views of the majority, and in case the Judges~ including the Chief
H Justice, are equally divided, in accordance with tbe views of the
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN v. P.P. SINGH [S.B. SINHA, J.] 60 I
Chief Justice. A
20. Administrative business to be disposed of by the ChiefJustice.-
Subject to Rules 15 and 17, the administrative business referred to in
Rule 14 shall be disposed of by the Chief Justice.

21. Appointment of Administrative Judge and allocation of work.- B
( 1) The Chief Justice shall appoint a Judge to carry on the general
administration of the Court. Such Judge shall be called the
Administrative Judge and shall dispose of the administrative business
in accordance with rule 22.

(2) The Chief Justice may also, by a general or special order, C
allocate specified business for disposal to any other Judge or a.
Committee of Judges, and such Judge or Committee of Judges shall
dispose of the same, subject to any special directions of the Chief
Justice.

"26. Papers to be submitted to the Chief Justice after circulation.- D
After any papers have been circulated for opinion, they shall be
submitted again to the Chief Justice, who shall examine the matter
and issue orders in accordance with Rule 19."

"29.- Quorum.- The quorum necessary for the transaction of
business shall be not less than two-third of the Members in the case E
of a meeting of the Administrative Committee and not less than one-
half of the Judges in the case of a Judges' meeting."

I. The existing Rule 32 shall be re-numbered as Sub-Rule (I) of
that Rule, and the following new Sub-Rule (2) shall be added :-
"(2) For the removal of doubt, it is hereby mentioned that all F
administrative work disposed of by the Chief Justice, the
Administrative Judge or any other Judge or Judges to whom the
work has been assigned by the Chief Justice for disposal shall be
deemed to be disposed of by the Court."
Rule 32 of the said Rules is as under: G
32. Effect ofany irregularity in or omission to follow the procedure
laid down in this Chapter :-
(I) No irregularity in, or omission to follow, the procedure laid
down in this Chapter shall affect the validity of any order passed or H
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAIASTHAN v. P.P. SINGH (S.B. SINHA, J.] 603

deferred consideration of their cases for the time being. The Committee, A
however filed an additional report on 27.4.1999 whose cases were deferred
earlier.

The matter was placed before the Full Court on 30th April, 1999 by the
Chief Justice. Twenty Hon'ble Judges of the High Court participated therein.
By Resolution dated 30th April, 1999, the Full Court considered the report B
submitted by the said two Judges Committee and approved the name of 26
officers who were found fit for grant of selection scale. The cases of the
respondents herein along with four others, however, were deferred. The matter
relating to the additional report of the said two Judges' Committee was again
placed before the Full Court on 27-11-1999. lt accepted the report of the C
Committee and declined to grant selection scale to the respondents herein.
Pursuant to or in furtherance of the aforementioned recommendations made
by the High Court, the Governor by a notification dated 5.2.2000 made
appointment to the officers of Higher Judicial Service named therein to the
post of selection grade with effect from the date mentioned against their
names respectively. D
The first respondent in each of these appeals filed writ petitions
questioning non-grant of selection grade to them by filing writ petitions
before the Jaipur Bench of the Rajasthan High Court.

By reason of the impugned judgment the High Court inter alia held : E
(I) The Acting Chief Justice was not authorised to constitute the two
Judges Committee, and, thus, it could not make/ lay down any
merit criteria.
(2) As all the Judges of the High Court have not been consulted, the F
Committee appointed by the Acting Chief Justice alone cou Id not
evolve the merit criteria in view of sub-rule (h) of Rule 15 of
1952 Rules.

(3) The earlier policy decision adopted by the Full Court could not
be changed as Rule 15 of 1952 provides for prior consultation of G
the Judges of the High Court and as all Judges were not consulted
in the matter subsequent approval thereof could not cure illegality.
The said writ petitions were disposed of with the following directions:-

(i) We direct the respondents to consider the cases of all the three
petitioners afresh against the vacancies occasioned in 1998 and 1999 H
604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003) I S.C.R.

A in view of the merit criterion evolved and approved by the Full Court
in the year 1990 and 1994. If they are found eligible for promotion
· to selection scale of the RHJS, they can be accorded the selection
scale by creating supernumerary posts in terms of Rule 18 of the
Rajasthan Service Rules.

B (ii) This decision shall not affect the order dated February S, 2000
whereby selection scale of the RHJS was granted to twenty six .officers.

(iii) The fresh consideration as directed above is expected to be done
as expeditiously as possible, in the meanwhile three posts in the
. selection scale of the RHJS shall be kept vacant.
c
However, it was observed:

"It is however made clear that though we have declared the entire
exercise of the respondents in granting selection scale as illegal yet
we do not intend to unsettle the grant of selection scale to twenty six
D judicial officers as they are not before us. We, therefore, direct that
this decision shall not affect the order dated February S, 2000 of the
respondent whereby selection scale was granted to twenty six judicial
officers. But if the petitioners, after consideration of their service
record from 1993 to 1997 and from 1994 to 1998 are found eligible .
E for selection .scale, they shall be considered with reference to the
selection of 1998 and 1999 when their junior colleagues were
promoted. The petitioners in that event can be accorded the selection
scale of the RHJS by creating supernumerary posts in terms of Rule
18. of the Rajasthan Service Rules."

F Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, would submit
that having regard to the provisions of the Rules, the High Court must be
held to have committed an error in holding that the Acting Chief Justice had
no jurisdiction to constitute the Committee. It was contended that once it is
held that the Acting Chief Justice had the jurisdiction to constitute a Committee
and the deeision ofthe said Committee was approved by the Full Court, the
G earlier policy decision must be held to have been varied by the High Court.
The learned counsel in support of the said contentions has placed strong
reliance in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi and Anr.,
reported in [1978) 2 SCC 102, Brij Nath Pandey v. State of U.P. & Ors.,
JT (2000) 9 SC 464, Registrar, High Court of Madras v. R. Rajiah, [1988)
H 3 sec 211.
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN v. P.P. SINGH IS.B. SINHA, J,] 605
Mr. Surya Kant, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the first A
respondent in each case, would, on the other hand, submit that as the power
of the Chief Justice to constitute a Committee is governed by a statutory rule,
he must be held to have acted without jurisdiction in appointing the said
Committee. Strong reliance in support of the said contention has been placed
in Orissa Small Industries Corpn. Ltd and Anr. v. Narasingha Charan B
Mohanty and Ors., [ 1999) l SCC 465.

The term "Chief Justice" will include the Judges authorised to act on
his behalf in view of interpretation clause contained in Rule 3. Chapter Ill
of the Rules provides for administrative business of the Court. In terms of
Rule 14 of the Rules, Administrative Business of the Court relating to C
control over subordinate courts vested either under Article 235 or 227 of the
Constitution of India were to be disposed of as provided therein.

The Rules have been made by the High Court. The High Court, therefore,
can also amend the rules. It is not the case of the writ petitioners-First
respondents herein that the High Court had no jurisdiction to evolve the D
criteria for grant of selection scale to the officers of the Rajasthan Judicial
Service or Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service. It may be true that by reason
of Resolution dated 5th October, 1990 the Full Court inter a/ia opined that
for the purpose of grant of selection scale three good ACRs out of five ACRs
were to be taken into consideration but the said decision of the Full Court
was subject to amendment/modification thereof. E
A reading of the aforementioned rules clearly goes to show that the
Chief Justice has the requisite jurisdiction to constitute a Committee and the
report of the Committee upon consultations of all the Judges of the High
Court in terms of Rule 15 shall become a decision of the Court. Rule 29(2) F
and Rule 32 as quoted (supra) also clearly show that even an irregularity
which might have taken place in the procedure laid down in Chapter III shall
not affect the validity of the order passed or anything done in the Rules and
the same shall be deemed to be disposed of by the Court. The legal fiction
created must also be given its full effect.
G
It is beyond any pale of controversy that the control over the subordinate
courts within the meaning of Article 235 of the Constitution of India is that
of the High Court. Such control of the High Court includes general
superintendence of the working of the subordinate courts, disciplinary control
over lhe Presiding Officers, disciplinary proceedings, transfer, confirmation
and promotion and app~intrnent etc. Such control vested in the High Court H
606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) l S.C.R~

A is complete. [See High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v: Ramesh Chand
Paliwa/, [1998] 3 SCC 72, District Judges Baradakanta Mishra v. High ;).......
Court ofOrissa, [1976] 3 SCC 327, High Court of Punjab v.State of Haryana,
[1975] l SCC 843, Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra, [1999] 7
sec 739,'State of Haryana v. lnder Prakash Anand, [1976] 2 sec 977 and
B State of Assam v. S.N. Sen, [1971] 2 SCC 9.

It is also'-true that the powers of the Chief Justice under Articles 235 _
and 229 of the Constitution of India are different and distinct. Whereas control
over the subordinate courts vests in the High Court as a whole, the control
over the High Court vests in the Chief Justices only. [See All India Judges'
C Association v. Union of India, [1992] l SCC 119]. However, the same does
not mean that a Full Court cannot authorise the Chief Justice in respect of
any matter whatsoever. In relation to certain matters keeping the rest of it in
itself by the Full Court, authorization to act on its behalf in favour of the.
: Chief Justice on a Committee of Judges is permissible in law. How far and
to what extent such power has been or can be delegated would be discernible
D only from the rules. Such a power by the Full Court can also be exercised
from time to time. ·

The Judges of the Rajasthan High Court, as noticed. hereinbefore, in~
terms of sub-rule (2) of Rule 21 of the Rules authorised the Chief Justice to
E consti~ute a· committee.· Such constitution of the committee by the Chief
Justice having been made in terms- of the rules must be held to have been
made by the High Court itself. Such· authorization is not a limited one as
thereby the extent to which such authorization can be exercised h;is not been
spelt out.. Furthermore, authorization in terms of sub-rule (2) of Rule 21 of
the Rules having been laid down in Chapter III which relates to the
F Adiniriistrative Business of the Court, ther.e cannot be any doubt whatsoever
·even in the matter of control of the High Court in terms of Article 235 of the
Constitution of India, the Chief Justice of the High Court had the jurisdiction
to exercise the said power.

Once such ·a resolution authorising the Chief Justice to .constitute a
G committee has been p11ssed; having regard to the decision of this Court in the·
High Court ofJudicature of Bombay v. Shirish Kumar Rangrdo Patil, [1997]
6 sec 339, there cannot be doubt whatsoever that the exercise of power by
the. Chief Justice in that ·behalf. was absolutely· valid. It is, therefore, not
. correct to contend that the Chief Justice could appoint the. two-Judges
·H committee only with the approval of the Full Court.
HIGH COURT OF JUDICA.TURE FOR RAIASTHAN v. P.P. SINGH lS.B. SINHA, I.) 607

Exercise of power by the Chief Justice, however, indisputably must be A
~ made in terms of the rules. The questions raised in these appeals must,
therefore, be considered from that angle.

The High Court, in our opinion, therefore, clearly erred in arriving at
the aforementioned finding that the constitution of the committee was illegal.
B
The submission on behalf of the respondents to the effect that in the
matter relating to fixation of criteria for the purpose of appointment to the
selection grade, the two-Judges committee could not be made without
consulting all the Judges is stated to be rejected. The said submission is based.
on a total misconception. Laying down the merit criteria for appointment to
the selection grade also was within the domain of the High Court. It could
c
·1 not only lay down such criteria but also amend or modify the same from time
1- to time. For the said purpose also the Chief Justice could appoint a committee,
the recommendation whereof was to be subject to the approval of the Full
Court. Rule 15 of the Rules does not say that before an action can be initiated
in that behalf by the Chief Justice all the Judges are to be consulted. Rule 15 D
of the Rules postulates a final decision in the matter specified therein and not
initiation of process therefor.
.
~~ It is also incorrect to contend that all the Judges of the High Court are

...
required to be consulted at a time.
E
The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents is again not
correct in contending that the two-Judges Committee was not justified in
evolving a merit criteria different from the one approved by the Full Court.
The two-Judges Committee did not take any final decision in that behalf. It

,...J..
having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and upon consideration F
of the extant rules as well as the earlier decisions of the Full C<>urt applied
certain principles and criteria which inevitably was subject to approval of the
Full Court.

The procedure for holding a Full Court meeting as quoted supra would
clearly show that the meeting whicli had requisite quorum as contemplated G
under Rule 29 would amount to compliance of the Rules.
·~
Although Rule 15 provides that all the Judges shall be consulted in the
• matters enumerated therein but Rule 18 provides for the mode and manner
thereof.
H
608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003) 1 S.C.R.
-'
A If such consultation is to be made by circulation, undoubtedly, the
relevant documents are required to be circulated to all the Judges. In the ;,...·
event, however, such consultation is to be effected by placing the matter
before a Full Court, all the Judges are therefor invited but the same would
not mean that in the event, one or more Judge (s) does/do not attend the Full
Court, the resolution passed by it shall be invalid: Rule 29 provides for a
B quorum. In the case of a meeting of the Judges of the court, the quorum will
be complete if one-half or more of the Judges attend the same. Consultation
with all the Judges would, thus, not mean that even if some of the Judges do -,.
not choose to make themselves available in a Full Court Meeting, consultation
with all the Judges shall not be complete.
c We may notice that even in the Full Court meeting held on 26th
November, 1966 all the Hon'ble Judges of the High Court were not present.
!
The Committee was constituted for the purpose of considering the cases ~
of concerned officers. It is not and cannot be the case or the contention of
D the writ petitions that even for the purpose of considering the case of the
eligible judicial officers at the threshold, it was absolutely necessary to place
the matter before the Full Court. The Acting Chief Justice constituted the
Committee for a specific purpose. The Committee merely submitted its opinion
I
which was subject to approval by the Full Court. Once the opinion· of the
matter is approved by the Full Court, in our opinion, it must be held that
A"'
E there had been a compliance of Rule 15 of the Rules.

Interpretation of a Statute depends upon the text and context thereof. A J

Statute should be interpreted having regard to the purpose and object for
which the same was made. The Chief Justice of a High Court although first
amongst the Judges, by the nature of office he holds, he is the head of the
F
State Judiciary. Authorisation by the Full Court in favour of the Chief Justice
~-
to constitute a Committee and/or take actions for the subordinate judiciary
must be viewed from that context. Rule 15 of the Rules provides for such
matters which require consultations with the other Judges of the High Court.

G Question of consultation with the Judges would not arise unless the
subject matter therefor is identified. It is for Hon'ble the Chief Justice of the
High Court to identify such matters and place the same before the Full Court
with relevant papers and documents. '}--'
,_
It is, therefore, axiomatic that not only the Chief Justice of High Court
H was free to initiate any proceedings and obtain the opinion of a Committee ·
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN v. P.P. SINGH [S.8. SINHA, J.] 609
of Judges on such matters and the only legal requirement therefor is to place A
such proposals together with the opinion of the Committee before the Judges
of the High Court so that the matter can be fully thrashed out. Once the Full
Court approves the recommendations made by the Committee of Judges, it
becomes decision of the Court which could be sent to the Governor for acting
thereupon.
B
An almost identical question came up for consideration whether the
High Court can delegate its power to a Judge or a small Committee of the
Judges of the Court so as to authorise it to act on this behalf in State of Uttar
Pradesh v. Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi and Another (supra). In no uncertain
terms it was held :- C
" ..... The control vested in the High Courts by that article
comprehends, according to our .decisions, a large variety of matters
like transfers, subsequent postings, leave, promotions other than initial
promotions, imposition of minor penalties which do not fall within
Article 31 I, decisions regarding compulsory retirements, D.
recommendations for imposition of major penalties which fall within
Article 31 I, entries in character rolls and so forth. If every Judge is
to be associated personally and directly with the decision on every
one of these matters, several important matters pertaining to the High
Court's administrative affairs will pile into arrears like court arrears.
In. fact, it is no exaggeration to say that the control will be better and E
more effectively exercised if a smaller committee of Judges has the
authority of the court to consider the manifold matters falling within
the purview of Article 235. Bearing in mind therefore the nature of
the power which that article confers on the High Court, we are of the
opinion tha(it is wrong to characterize as 'delegation' the process F
whereby the entire High Court authorises a Judge or some of the
Judges of the Court to act on behalf of the whole Court. Such an
authorization effectuates the purpose of Article 235 and indeed without
it the control vested in the High Court over the subordinate courts
will tend gradually to become lax and ineffective. Administrative G
functions are only a part, though an important part, of the High Court's
constitutional functions. Judicial functions ought to occupy and do in
fact consume the best part of a Judge's time, For balancing these
two-fold functions it is inevitable that the admini.strative duties should
be left to be discharged by some on behalf of all the Judges. Judicial
functions brook no such sharing of responsibilities by any H
I'

(jlO SUPREME COURT REPORTS ; (2003] 1 S.C.R.
\_~...,..
A instrumentality." .' ~:
In Registrar, High Court of Madras v. R. Rajiah (supra),, it was observed:
K
"23. In Rajiah 's case, a Review Committee consisting of three judges
was appointed by a resolution of the High Court. In the meeting of
B the Review Committee held on June 25, 1979 to con~ider the case of
the respondent Rajiah, only two judges of the High CQurt were present.
The two judges came to the conclusion that the respondent, Rajiah,
should be compulsorily retired with effect from April 2, 1980. The
r
Division Bench found that the third judge had no notice of the meeting
held on June 25, 1979, but he agreed with the view expressed by the
c two judges with a slight modification that the respondent would retire
with effect from March 3, 1980 under Rule 56(d) of the Fundamental
Rules. The Division Bench of the High Court took the view that as
'f
all the three judges had not sat together and considered the question
of compulsory retirement of respondent Rajiah, and that, further the
D third judge having also modified the decision of the two judges,
namely, that the respondent would be compulsorily retired with effect
from March 3, 1980, the impugned order of compulsory retirement of
the respondent, Rajiah, was vitiated. It is true that the members of the
Review Committee should sit together and consider the question of
)4;
compulsory retirement, but simply because one of them did not
E participate in the meeting, and subsequently agreed with the view
expressed by the other two judges, it would not vitiate the decision
of the Committee to compulsorily retire the respondent. The third
..
judge might (sic not) be justified in correcting the date with effect
from which the respondent would compulsorily retire, but that is a ~
F very minor issue and would not, in our opinion, make the decision :.--
invalid. ~-

24. In regard to the case of the other respondent, namely, K.
Rajeswaran, the High Court took the view that the constitution of the
Review Committee by the Chief Judge and not by the Full Court was
G illegal. We are unable to accept the view of the High Court. We fail
to understand why the Chief Justice cannot appoint a Review
Committee or an Administrative Committee. But in one respect the
) - <;
High Court is, in our opinion, correct, namely, that the decision of
the Review Committee should have been placed before a meeting of
the judges. In the case of the respondent, K. Rajeswaran, the decision ~
,,_
H -and recommendation of the Review Committee was not placed before
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJAS THAN v. P.P. SINGH [S.B. SINHA, I.] 61 J

the Fu(] Court Meeting. Nor is there any material to show that the A
same was circulated to the judges. In that sense, the recommendation
of the Review Committee was not strictly legal."

Furthermore, the terminology 'consultation' used in Rule 15 having
regard to purport and object thereof must be given its ordinary meaning. In
Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition, 1960, Volume 9, page 3) to 'consult' B
is defined as 'to discuss something together, to deliberate'. Corpus Juris
Secundum (Volume 16A, Ed. 1956, page 1242) also says that the word
'consult' is frequently defined as meaning 'to discuss something together, or
to deliberate'. By giving an opportunity to consultation or deliberation the
purpose thereof is to enable the Judges to make their respective points of C
view known to the others and discuss and examine the relative merits of their
view. It is neither in doubt nor in dispute that the Judges present in the
meeting of the Fun Court were supplied with an the requisite documents and
had fu(] opportunity to deliberate upon the Agenda in question.

There is another aspect of the matter which may require consideraiion. D
For an intent ,and purport the report of the two Judges Committee has been
approved by the Fu(] Court. Once approved, it terminated into a decision of
the Fu(] Court itself. In the instant case even the Governor has acted upon the
recommendations of the High Court. The writ petitioners-first respondents
herein did not question the appointments of the appointees before the High
Court. Thus, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that for a(] intent and E
purport the opinion of the two Judges Committee received approval at the
hands of the Fu(] Court.

The High Court, in our opinion, further committed a manifest error in
arriving at its conclusion in so far as it failed to take into consideration that F
Rule 15 does not postulate the prior approval of the Fu(] Court in relation to
any action which may be initiated by the Chief Justice.

When an approval is required, an action holds good. Only if it
disapproved it losses its force. Only when a permission is required, the decision
does not become effective till permission is obtained. (See U.P. Avas Evam G
Vikas Parishad and Anr. v. Friends Coop. Housing Society Ltd and Anr.,
[1995] Supp. 3 SCC 456). In the instant case both the aforementioned
requirements have been fulfi(]ed.

There is another aspect of the matter. In terms of Rule 2(2) of the
Rules, the decisio'1 of the Fu[]·Court would have a retrospective effect and H
612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] I S.C.R.
....
A retroactive operation.

In any view of the matter, even in a case where the initial action is
· illegal, the same can be ratified by a body competent therefor. This aspect of
the matter has not been considered by the High Court at all. In Sri Parmeshwari
Prasad Gupta v. The Union of India, [1973] 2 SCC 543 this Court held :
·B
" ...... Even if it be assumed that the telegram and the letter terminating
the services of the appellant by the Chairman was in pursuance to the
invalid resolution of the Board of Directors passed on December 16,
1953 ·to terminate his services, it would not follow that the action of
.the Chairman could not be .ratified in a regularly convened meeting
c :of the Board of Directors. The point is that even assuming that the
·Chairman was not legally authorised to terminate the services of the
appellant, he was acting on behalf of the Company in doing so,
because, he purported to act in pursuance of the invalid resolution.
Therefore, it was open to a regularly constituted meeting of the Board
D ·of Directors to ratify that action which, though unauthorized, was
.done on behalf of the Company. Ratification would· always relate
back to the date of the act ratified and so it must be ·held that the
services of the appellant were validly terminated on December 17,
1953 ......."

E (See also Marathwada University v. Seshrao Ba/want Rao Chavan, ·
(1989] 3 SCC 132 para 28, Babu Verghese and Ors. v. Bar Councilof Kera/a
and Ors., (1999) 3 SCC 422 para 35 and Barnard v. National Dock Labour
Board, [1953] 1 All ER 1113). . .

In Orissa Small Industries Corpn. Ltd And Anr. v. Narasingha Charan
F ...
Mohanty and Ors., (supra) where upon the learned counsel has placed strong
reliance, this Court held :

" ...... That apart, the Court is not entitled to assess the respective merit
of the candidates for adjudging their suitability for being promoted
G .and the only right the. employee has is a right of consideration. The
said right of consideration not having been infringed in the present
case, the High Court was not justified in issuing the impugned direction
for reconsideration of his case ..... "
·"'··
The said decision, therefore, militates against the contentions of the
H respondents.
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN " P.P. SINGH [S.B. SINHA: J.] 613

furthermore, the first respondent herein in these cases Shri P.P. Singh, A
Shri G.P. Pandey has,.been granted selection scale in RHJS with effect from
1.8.2000 and Shri P.K. Bhatia has been given with effect from 29.3.2000.
Shri P.P. Singh has also retired from service on superannuation.

We are of the opinion that impugned judgment of the High Court
cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. The appeals are allowed B
but in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to
costs.

N.J. Appeals allowed .

•