ILANGOVANversusSTATE OF TAMIL NADU REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE

1132                     [2020]REPORTS
               SUPREME COURT   6 S.C.R. 1132                  [2020] 6 S.C.R.


 A                                ILANGOVAN
                                         v.
          STATE OF TAMIL NADU REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE
                         (Criminal Appeal No. 1285 of 2010)
 B                             SEPTEMBER 02, 2020
       [N. V. RAMANA, S. ABDUL NAZEER AND SURYA KANT, JJ.]
             Penal Code, 1860:
              ss. 304 (Part II) and 324 – Prosecution u/ss. 302 and 324 –
 C     Against four accused – For causing death of one person and for
       causing injuries to two – Trial Court convicted the appellant-accused
       u/ss. 302 & 324, while acquitting the other accused – High Court,
       in appeal of appellant-accused modified conviction u/s. 302 to one
       u/s. 304 (Part II) on the ground that the case fell under Exception 4
       to s. 300 IPC – Remaining judgment of trial Court was upheld –
 D
       Appeal to Supreme Court – Held: The evidence against the
       appellant-accused is consistent with the depositions in Court being
       in line with the complaint and statements made before the police –
       The appellant-accused has not been able to point out any infirmity
       in the findings of High Court – Impugned order is upheld.
 E
             Criminal Trial:
             Rule of parity – Convicted accused seeking parity with
       acquitted co-accused – Held: There is no such principle of law that
       requires automatic acquittal of an accused because of the acquittal
       of the co-accused.
 F
             Evidence:
             Related witness – Evidentiary value – Held: The testimony of
       a related or interested witness can be taken into consideration with
       the additional burden on the Court to carefully scrutinize such
 G     evidence.
             Maxims:
             ‘Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus’ – Nature and applicability of.


 H
                                       1132
 ILANGOVAN v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU REP. BY INSPECTOR                   1133
                     OF POLICE

      Dismissing the appeal, the Court                                A
      HELD: 1. The testimony of a related or an interested
witness can be taken into consideration, with the additional burden
on the Court in such cases to carefully scrutinize such evidence.
As such, the mere plea that the testimonies of the witnesses in
the case should be disregarded because they were related,             B
without bringing to the attention of the Court any reason to
disbelieve the same, cannot be countenanced. [Para 7][1136-C-
D]
      Sudhakar v. State (2018) 5 SCC 435 : [2018] 4 SCR
      612 – relied on.                                                C
      2. There is no such principle of law, that requires automatic
acquittal of an accused because of the acquittal of the co-accused.
The nature and quality of evidence against the appellant-accused
was distinct from that which was adduced against his co- accused.
The Trial Court noted that the other co-accused were the aunt         D
(accused No. 2), mother (accused No. 3) and grandfather (accused
No. 4) of the present appellant. The Court noted that accused
No. 4 was 70 years old, and could not even stand straight, let
alone presumed to have caused any injury to one of the witnesses.
Further, with respect to the actions attributed to accused Nos. 2
and 3, the Trial Court held that they appear to be exaggerations      E
and an after thought, as they were not even included in the
complaint. The Court ultimately held that apart from the fact that
accused Nos. 2 to 4 were present at the scene of the occurrence,
there was no concrete evidence in the depositions of the
eyewitnesses to indicate that they caused injuries to the             F
witnesses. When it comes to the appellant, the evidence against
him is consistent, with the depositions in Court being in line with
the complaint and statements made before the police. The
appellant is the main accused, who is stated to have attacked the
complainant and caused him injuries as well as hit the deceased
on her head with an iron rod, resulting in her death. The             G
allegations against the appellant are in line with the chargesheet,
the wound certificate regarding the complainant and the post
mortem report of the deceased. [Paras 8, 9 and 10][1137-A-E]
      Yanob Sheikh v. State of West Bengal (2013) 6 SCC
      428 : [2012] 13 SCR 1150 – relied on.                           H
1134           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2020] 6 S.C.R.


 A           3. It cannot be accepted that once the witnesses had been
       disbelieved with respect to the co-accused, their testimonies with
       respect to the present accused must also be discarded. The Indian
       Courts have always been reluctant to apply the legal maxim “falsus
       in uno, falsus in omnibus”. This maxim has not come to occupy
       the status of a rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. The
 B
       doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which
       a court may apply in a given set of circumstances but it is not
       what may be called "a mandatory rule of evidence". The Trial
       Court has given specific reasons for disbelieving the testimony
       of the witnesses with respect to the co-accused, and extending
 C     the benefit of doubt to them, while convicting the appellant on
       the strength of the evidence against him. There is no infirmity in
       the approach of the Trial Court. [Paras 11-12][1137-F; 1138-B-C;
       E-G]
             Nisar Ali v. The State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1957 SC
 D           366 : [1957] SCR 657; Rohtas v. State of Haryana
             (2019) 10 SCC 554 – relied on.
             4. The High Court, in the impugned judgment, has taken
       into account the submissions of the Counsel for the appellant,
       and has considered the entire evidence, in order to come to the
 E     finding that there was a free fight as the appellant also sustained
       injuries and had even attempted to make a complaint. On the
       basis of the above, the High Court modified the conviction and
       sentence imposed on the appellant. The appellant has not been
       able to point out any infirmity in the findings of the High Court.
       Therefore there is no reason to interfere with the impugned
 F     Judgment passed by the High Court. [Paras 13-14][1138-G-H;
       1139-A]
                             Case Law Reference
       [2018] 4 SCR 612           relied on                      Para 7
 G     [2012] 13 SCR 1150         relied on                      Para 8
       [1957] SCR 657             relied on                      Para 11
       (2019) 10 SCC 554          relied on                      Para 11


 H
 ILANGOVAN v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU REP. BY INSPECTOR                            1135
                     OF POLICE

      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal                         A
No. 1285 of 2010.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 06.01.2010 of the Madurai
Bench of Madras High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1822 of 2003.
      Jayant Muthuraj, AAG, (Tamil Nadu), K. V. Vijayakumar,
M. Yogesh Kanna, Advs., for the appearing parties.                             B
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
      N. V. RAMANA, J.
      1. The present appeal is directed against the Judgment dated
06.01.2010 passed by the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court
whereby the appellant-accused’s appeal was partly allowed and his              C
conviction under Section 302, IPC was modified into one under Section
304 Part II, IPC and sentence was reduced to 5 years’ rigorous
imprisonment along with fine. The conviction and sentence imposed upon
the appellant under Section 324, IPC was confirmed by the High Court
and both the sentences were ordered to run concurrently.
                                                                               D
       2. The facts necessary for the disposal of the appeal are as follows:
the brother of the complainant allegedly had an illicit relationship with
the daughter of accused no. 4, which resulted in enmity between the
two families. On 26.01.2002, the accused persons allegedly came in
front of the house of the complainant and a fight took place between the
two groups. The present appellant attacked the complainant with an iron        E
rod, while the other 3 accused allegedly attacked other members of the
family with sticks. The deceased, on hearing the noise, attempted to
intervene, and was attacked by the present appellant on the head with
the iron rod, which ultimately resulted in her death.
       3. The Trial Court convicted the appellant under Sections 324 and       F
302, IPC and sentenced him to 2 years rigorous imprisonment and
imprisonment for life, respectively. The other accused were acquitted
as the charges against them were not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
On appeal, as mentioned above, the High Court modified the conviction
under Section 302, IPC, and sentence imposed thereunder, to one under
Section 304 Part II, IPC, on the ground that the case of the appellant fell    G
under Exception 4 to Section 300, IPC, that is, there was a free fight
between the two parties.
       4. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant – accused
and the learned counsel appearing for the State of Tamil Nadu at length
today.                                                                         H
1136             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 6 S.C.R.


 A            5. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that
       the High Court erred in convicting the appellant by solely relying upon
       the testimonies of the relatives of the deceased. The learned counsel
       further submitted that the appellant should have been acquitted by giving
       him the benefit of doubt, particularly when the Trial Court disbelieved
       the prosecution’s case and acquitted the co-accused.
 B
              6. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the State submitted
       that the High Court has considered all the evidence on record and rendered
       a well-reasoned judgment which does not merit any interference by this
       Court.
 C            7. With respect to the first submission of the counsel for the
       appellant, regarding the testimonies of related witnesses, it is settled law
       that the testimony of a related or an interested witness can be taken into
       consideration, with the additional burden on the Court in such cases to
       carefully scrutinize such evidence [See Sudhakar v. State, (2018) 5
       SCC 435]. As such, the mere submission of the counsel for the appellant,
 D     that the testimonies of the witnesses in the case should be disregarded
       because they were related, without bringing to the attention of the Court
       any reason to disbelieve the same, cannot be countenanced.
             8. The counsel for the appellant next submitted that the benefit of
       doubt extended to his co-accused should also have been extended to
 E     him. According to him, once the co-accused were acquitted, the appellant
       should also have been acquitted. However, there is no such principle of
       law, that requires automatic acquittal of an accused because of the
       acquittal of the co-accused. The same is a settled position of law, which
       has been reiterated by this Court in numerous judgments, including the
 F     case of Yanob Sheikh v. State of West Bengal, (2013) 6 SCC 428,
       wherein it was held-
             “24. … Where the prosecution is able to establish the guilt
             of the accused by cogent, reliable and trustworthy evidence,
             mere acquittal of one accused would not automatically lead
 G           to acquittal of another accused. It is only where the entire
             case of the prosecution suffers from infirmities, discrepancies and
             where the prosecution is not able to establish its case, the acquittal
             of the co-accused would be of some relevancy for deciding the
             case of the other.”
                                                           (emphasis supplied)
 H
 ILANGOVAN v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU REP. BY INSPECTOR                            1137
             OF POLICE [N. V. RAMANA, J.]

       9. The question therefore is what the nature of the evidence against    A
the co-accused that were acquitted was, in comparison with the evidence
against the present appellant. A bare perusal of the judgment of the Trial
Court indicates that the nature and quality of evidence against the
appellant-accused was distinct from that which was adduced against his
co-accused. The Trial Court noted that the other co-accused were the
                                                                               B
aunt (accused no. 2), mother (accused no. 3) and grandfather (accused
no. 4) of the present appellant. The Court noted that accused no. 4 was
70 years old, and could not even stand straight, let alone presumed to
have caused any injury to one of the witnesses. Further, with respect to
the actions attributed to the accused no. 2 and 3, the Trial Court held that
they appear to be exaggerations and an after thought, as they were not         C
even included in the complaint. The Court ultimately held that apart from
the fact that the accused no. 2 to 4 were present at the scene of the
occurrence, there was no concrete evidence in the depositions of the
eye witnesses to indicate that they caused injuries to the witnesses.
       10. On the other hand, when it comes to the appellant, the evidence     D
against him is consistent, with the depositions in Court being in line with
the complaint and statements made before the police. The appellant is
the main accused, who is stated to have attacked the complainant and
caused him injuries as well as hit the deceased on her head with an iron
rod, resulting in her death.The allegations against the appellant are in
line with the chargesheet, the wound certificate regarding the complainant     E
and the post mortem report of the deceased. It is for the above reasons
that the Trial Court distinguished between the prosecution’s case against
the appellant and the co-accused and we see no reason to interfere with
the same.
       11. The counsel for the appellant lastly argued that once the           F
witnesses had been disbelieved with respect to the co-accused, their
testimonies with respect to the present accused must also be discarded.
The counsel is, in effect, relying on the legal maxim “falsus in uno,
falsus in omnibus”, which Indian Courts have always been reluctant to
apply. A three Judge Bench of this Court, as far back as in 1957, in           G
Nisar Ali v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1957 SC 366 held on
this point as follows:
      “9. It was next contended that the witnesses had falsely implicated
      Qudrat Ullah and because of that the court should have rejected
      the testimony of these witnesses as against the appellant also.          H
1138            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2020] 6 S.C.R.


 A           The well-known maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus was
             relied upon by the appellant. The argument raised was that because
             the witnesses who had also deposed against Qudrat Ullah by saying
             that he had handed over the knife to the appellant had not been
             believed by the courts below as against him, the High Court should
             not have accepted the evidence of these witnesses to convict the
 B
             appellant. This maxim has not received general acceptance
             in different jurisdictions in India nor has this maxim come
             to occupy the status of a rule of law. It is merely a rule of
             caution. All that it amounts to is that in such cases the
             testimony may be disregarded and not that it must be
 C           disregarded. One American author has stated:
                 “…the maxim is in itself worthless; first in point of validity
                 … and secondly, in point of utility because it merely tells
                 the jury what they may do in any event, not what they must
                 do or must not do, and therefore, it is a superfluous form
 D               of words. It is also in practice pernicious….” [Wigmore on
                 Evidence, Vol. III, para 1008]
             10. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of
             evidence which a court may apply in a given set of
             circumstances but it is not what may be called “a mandatory
 E           rule of evidence”.”
                                                          (emphasis supplied)
              This principle has been consistently followed by this Court, most
       recently in Rohtas v. State of Haryana, (2019) 10 SCC 554 and needs
       no reiteration.
 F
              12. The Trial Court, as mentioned above, has given specific reasons
       for disbelieving the testimony of the witnesses with respect to the co-
       accused, and extending the benefit of doubt to them, while convicting
       the appellant on the strength of the evidence against him. We find no
       infirmity in the approach of the Trial Court.
 G
              13. We also find that the High Court, in the impugned judgment,
       has taken into account the submissions of the counsel for the appellant,
       and considered the entire evidence, in order to come to the finding that
       there was a free fight as the appellant also sustained injuries and had
       even attempted to make a complaint. On the basis of the above, the
 H     High Court modified the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant.
 ILANGOVAN v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU REP. BY INSPECTOR                          1139
             OF POLICE [N. V. RAMANA, J.]

      14. The counsel for the appellant has not been able to point out       A
any infirmity in the findings of the High Court. We therefore see no
reason to interfere with the impugned Judgment passed by the High
Court.We find no merit in the appeal and the same is, accordingly,
dismissed.
       15. Consequent upon the dismissal of the appeal, the bail granted     B
to the appellant by this Court on 19-7-2010 stands cancelled and he is
directed to surrender before the concerned Trial Court to serve out the
remaining period of sentence, failing which the concerned Police
Authority shall take him into custody for the purpose.
                                                                             C
Kalpana K. Tripathy                                      Appeal dismissed.




                                                                             D




                                                                             E




                                                                             F




                                                                             G




                                                                             H