Holding

The Court held that the advocate's intemperate, scandalising language constituted criminal contempt, that he enjoyed no special immunity, and affirmed his conviction and sentence.

Summary

Advocate Ajay Kumar Pandey, after his defamation suit and subsequent revision were dismissed, filed a series of contempt petitions against judges of the High Court and subordinate courts, using scurrilous, unparliamentary and abusive language that cast aspersions on their impartiality. The Supreme Court ordered him to delete the objectionable passages, but he refused, sought transfer of the case, failed to appear, and ignored show‑cause notices, displaying a defiant and contemptuous attitude. The Court held that such intemperate language and attempts to intimidate judges constitute criminal contempt under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and that an advocate enjoys no special immunity beyond that of an ordinary citizen. Consequently, Pandey was convicted of contempt, sentenced to four months' simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs.1,000, with the Bar Council of India directed to consider disciplinary action. The judgment also clarified that fair criticism of judgments is permissible only when expressed in dignified, temperate language without malice. The petition was disposed of, and Pandey's bail bonds were cancelled.

Issues considered

Whether the advocate's use of objectionable, scurrilous language in pleadings amounts to criminal contempt under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
Whether an advocate is entitled to any special protection or immunity from contempt when he commits acts of scandalising the court.
Whether the failure to comply with the Court's order to delete contemptuous language and the defiant conduct justify a conviction and punishment.
Whether the punishment of imprisonment and fine is appropriate in the circumstances.
Whether the Bar Council should be directed to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the contemnor.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 129
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971s. 12, s. 2(c), s. 5

Subjects

contempt of courtcriminal contemptscandalising the courtadvocate misconductfreedom of speechjudicial dignityBar Council disciplinary actionSection 2(c) Contempt ActArticle 129 Constitutionintemperate language

Judgment

•

IN RE: AJAY KUMAR PANDEY, ADVOCATE A
SEPTEMBER 25, 1998

[DR. A.S. ANAND AND M.K. MUKHERJEE, JJ.]

B
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971:

Secs. 2(c) and 12-Criminal contempt-Scandalising the Court-
Advocate-Casting unwarranted aspersions on subordinate judiciary and
High Court-Attributing motives to judicial officers in the discharge of their
judicial functions-SLPs and contempt petitions containing objectionable, C
unparliamentary and abusive language-Showing no remorse or regret-
Repeated arrogant defiant and contemptuous attitude-Held, guilty of
contempt of court-Convicted and sentenced to four months simple
imprisonment with fine-Bar Council directed to refer the matter to concerned
committee for taking appropriate action against the contemnor for D
professional misconduct.

Section 5-Fair criticism ofjudgment-Permissibility of-Held, criticism
should be in a dignified, temperate language without any malice-Honest
and objective criticism ofjudgment is permissible if made in a respectful tone.
E
Constitution of India, 1950: Article 129-Supreme Court-Power to
punish for contempt-Held: Such power includes power to punish for contempt
of subordinate judiciary and High Courts.

Contempt of court-Advocate not satisfied with the decision,
scandalising the Court-Whether enjoy!! any protection-Hefd : No, an F
Advocate has no wider protection than a layman.

The contemner, a practising Advocate, filed a defamation case against
an Advocate and an ADJ under sections 499 and 500 IPC, which was
dismissed. The High Court dismissed the revision petition holding that the G
applicant has made palpably scurrilous, indecent and abominable recitals
against respondent, a member of lower judiciary to malign and hold her to
ransom. The contemner thereafter filed a special leave petition before this
court. The contemner has also filed several contempt petitions before this
Court against a High Court Judge, several Judges of subordinate judiciary
87
H
88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A and Advocates, wherein the language used is wholly objectionable,
unparliamentary and abusive. An order was passed by this Court to delete
the said objectionable expressions from the petition, but the contemner
instead of removing the said objectionable expressions insisted on being ,_,...
heard. Noticing his adamant and defiant attitude, Rule against him was
B issued to show cause as to why he should not be punished for contempt of
court. The contemner instead of filing his reply to the said Rule made a
request for transfer of his case to some other Bench as he did not wish to
appear before that Bench. The request was rejected as the prayer itself was
contumacious in character. The contemner even after several adjournments
neither appeared before the court nor filed his reply to the Rule.
c Disposing of the contempt petition, this Court

HELD : l. The contemner is guilty of contempt of court for using
objectionable and intemperate language in the petition. (108-G)

D 2. Scandalising the Judges or the Courts tends to bring the authority
and administration of law into disrepute and is an affront to the majesty and
dignity of law. Such acts constitute criminal contempt of court. The
"publication" contemplated by Section 2(c) of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
includes pleadings, affidavits etc. which are filed in the Court. Abuses,
attribution of motives, vituperative terrorism and scurrilous and indecent
E attacks on the impartiality of the judges in the pleadings, applications or
other documents filed in the Court or otherwise published which have the
tendency to scandalise and undermine the dignity of the Court and the
majes!y of law amounts to criminal contempt of court.
[100-D; 101-A-B; 104-B-C)
F Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat and Ors., (1991)
4 SCC 406; Shri Sanjiv Dutta, JT (1995) 3 SC 538 and Re: R.L. Ahuja,
[1993) Supp. 4 SCC 446, relied on.

3. In the instant case, from a perusal of the memorandum of various
G petitions filed by the contemner in this Court and the language used therein,
it is apparent that he has cast aspersions on each and every judge who in
the discharge of his judicial functions decided the matter not liked to by the
contemner at one stage or the other. The aspersions cast by him undoubtedly
have the tendency to scandalise the Court. The contemner has been attempting
to brow beat the subordinate judges as well as the judge of the High Court
H and cause interference in the administration of justice. Even in this Court,
IN RE: A.K. PANDEY 89
after the Rule was issued to him, he tried to brow beat the court. He filed A
an application stating that since he had filed a contempt petition against the
Judges constituting the Division Bench which had issued Rule against him,
that Bench should transfer the case. It was an obviously motivated action on
his part to intimidate the Bench. The contemner has been making continuous
attempts to subvert the course of justice in whichever Court his case was. B
He has been acting not only as if he is above the law but as if he is law unto
himself. Notwithstanding his own assessment of his 'merit and competence'
as stated by him in the memo of petitions, he appears to be blissfully ignorant
of the role of a lawyer and that law relating to drafting of pleadings-which
must be precise and not scandalous or abusive. It is sad that by filing the
applications, and the petition, as a party in person, couched in very C
objectionable language, he has permitted himself the liberty of indulging in
an action, which does little credit to the noble profession to which he
belongs. (107-D-F; 108-A-C)

4. While a litigant as also his lawyer have the freedom of expression
and liberty to project their case forcefully it must be remembered that they D
must while exercising that liberty maintain dignity, decorum and order in

.. the Court proceeding. Liberty of free expression cannot be permitted to be
treated as a licence to make reckless imputations against the impartiality
of the judges deciding the case. Even criticism of the judgment has to be in
a dignified and temperate language and without any malice. Everybody is E
entitled to express his honest opinion about the correctness or legality of a
judgment or sentence or an order of a Court. Objective criticism is permissible
provided it is made with detachment in a dignified language and respectful
tone. The liberty of expression cannot be treated as licence to scandalise the
court, instead ol criticising the judgment to criticise the judge who delivered
it. [104-D; 100-E-F] F

D.C. Saxena v. Hon 'b/e the Chief Justice of India, [1996] 5 SCC 216;
La/it Mohan Das v. Advocate General, Orissa, (1957] SCR 167; MB. Sanghi,
Advocate v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana, (1991] 3 SCC 600 and Re:
Vinay Chandra Mishra, (1995] 2 SCC 584, relied on.
G
5. An Advocate has no wider protection than a layman when he commits
an act which amounts to contempt of court. He does not enjoy any special
immunity under the Contempt of Courts Act, where he is found to have
committed gross contempt of court. It is most on befitting for an Advocate to
make imputations against a Judge only because he does not get the expected H
90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A result, which according to him is the fair and reasonable result available to
him. Judges cannot be intimidated to seek favourable orders. Only because
a lawyer appears as a party in person, he does not get a license to commit
contempt of the court by intimidating the judges or scandalising the courts.
He cannot use language, either in the pleadings or during arguments, which
B is either intemperate or unparliamentary and which has the tendency to
interfere in the administration of justice and undermine the dignity of the
court and the majesty of law. [108-C-E]

L.D. Jaikwa/ v. State of U.P., [1984] 3 SCC 405, referred to.

C 6. The subordinate judiciary forms the very backbone of administration
of justice. This Court has not only the right to protect itself from being
scandalised or denigrated but it also has the right, jurisdiction and obligation
to protect the High Courts and the subordinate Courts in the country from
being insulted, abused or in any other way denigrated. This Court would
come down with a heavy hand for preventing the judges of the subordinate
D judiciary or the High Court from being subjected to scurrilous and indecent
attacks, which scandalise or have the tendency. to scandalise, or lower or
have the tendency to lower the authority of any court as also all such actions
which interfere or tend to interfere with the due course of any judicial
..
proceedings or obstruct or tend to obstruct the administration of justice in
E any other manner. No affront to the majesty of law can be permitted. The
fountain of justice cannot be allowed to be polluted by disgruntled litigants.
Protection is necessary for the courts to enable them to discharge their
judicial functions without fear. It is for this reason that the Courts are
entrusted with the extraordinary power of punishing those for contempt of
court who indulge in acts whether inside or outside the courts, which tends
F to undermine the authority of the courts and bring them in disrepute and
disrespect thereby obstructing them from discharging their judicial duties,
without fear or favour. This power is exercised by the Courts not to vindicate
the dignity and honour of any individual judge who is personally attacked or
scandalised but with a view to uphold the majesty of law and the administration
G of justice. [99-A-G]

7. In the instant case, the contemner has been reckless, persistent and
guilty of undermining the dignity of the courts and his action are motivated,
deliberate and designed. The contemner, let alone showing any remorse or
regret adopted an arrogant, defiant and contemptuous attitude. The action of
H the contemner calls for a deterrent punishment so that it also serves as an
IN RE: A.K. PANDEY [DR. A.S. ANAND, J.] 91
example to others and there is no repetition of such a contempt by anyone A
else. Thus, the contemner is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for
a period of four months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000. (109-E-F]
-_,
8. The contemner has abused professional privileges while practising
as an Advocate. Thus, it is directed that a copy of this judgment alongwith
the relevant record be forwarded to the Chairman, Bar Council of India, who B
may refer the case to the concerned committee for appropriate action as is
considered fit and proper. (110-H; Ill-Al

Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India and Anr., JT (1998)
3 SC 184, relied on.
c
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Contempt Petition (Cr!.) No.
2of1996 In Special Leave Petition (CRL.) No. 4114of1995.

(Under Article 129 of the Constitution of India.)

From the Judgment and Order dated 20.7.95 of the Court ofVl A.C.J.M., D
Lucknow in C.C. No. 101of1995.

- Santosh N. Hegde, Solicitor General,

In-person for the Respondent (NP).

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
E

DR. A.S. ANAND, J. The alleged contemner-Ajay Kumar Pandey, a
practising advocate, filed a criminal complaint against an Advocate Mr. Mahesh
Giri and an Additional District Judge, Ms. Saroj Bala, then posted as VII
Additional District Judge, Lucknow, under Sections 499 and 500 !PC, after first F
serving them with a notice demanding compensation for defaming him. The
allegations made in that complaint are not relevant for our purpose. That
complaint was dismissed on 16. l l. l 994. He thereafter filed a Criminal Revision
in the High Court which was also dismissed by a learned single Judge of the
High Court (Virendra Saran, J) on 15.2.1995. While dismissing the revision
petition, the learned single Judge inter alia observed :- G
"It is well settled that if the veiled object of a lame prosecution is to
disgrace, humiliate or cause harassment to the accused, the High
Court must put an end to the mischief by quashing such criminal
proceedings. The facts on the record of the instant case give a
horrendous account of a framed-up case against a responsible member H
92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A of the lower judiciary holding the post of an Additional Sessions
Judge at Lucknow ............ .

It appears that the aim of the applicant is to malign the learned judge
(Smt. Saroj Bala) and hold her at ranson. The applicant emphatically
and repeatedly read out the lewd passages from his deposition while
B arguing the revision, but the palpably scurrilous, indecent and
abominable recitals are not worth reproduction in the judgment. Suffice
it to observe that the arguments of the applicant, so vehement and
pungent, marked with sarcasm and sneer, do not impart any strength
to his case which is inherently unbelievable. They are submissions
directed more towards vilification than substantiation of the pivotal
c points of the case. I was constrained to ask the applicant not to make
savage additions to the evidence and show restraint in his colloquy."

The alleged contemner, thereafter, filed Special Leave Petition (Cr!.)
Nos.819-820of1996 against the judgment ofVirendra Saran, J dated 15.2.1995.
D It appears that the alleged contemner had filed another complaint on
12.9.1994 under Sections 500 and 504 !PC against seven advocates namely (1)
Shri Prakash Narayan Awasthi (2) Shri R.P. Misra (3) Shri Vishambhar Singh
(4) Shri T.N. Misra (5) Shri Srikant Verma (6) Shri Pankaj Sinha and (7) Shri
N.C. Pradhan, in which it was alleged that those advocates had made
E defamatory imputations regarding the relationship between him and Ms.Saroj
Bala, Add I. District Judge. In that complaint an application giving a list of
31 advocates for being summoned as witnesses was filed. That application
was rejected by the Trial Court. He, therefore, filed Special Leave Petition
(Cr!.) No. 4114of1995 against that order.

F Ajay Kumar Pandey, the alleged contemner has also filed following
Contempt Petitions (Cr!.) in this Court :

I. Contempt Petition (Cr!.) Dy. No.16199/95 filed on 28th Oct. 1995:

Against Mr. Justice Virendra Saran, Judge, High Court of Allahabad,
G Lucknow Bench;
2. Contempt Petition (Cr!.) Dy. No. 17021/95 filed on 8th November
1995. The respondents in the petition are :

I. Ms. Saroj Bala, IV Addi. District Judge, Lucknow.
H II. Shri Udai L Raj, V.A.C J., Lucknow.
INRE: A.K. PANDEY [DR. A.S. ANAND, J.] 93
III. Shri R.P. Misra, VI Addi. C.J.M. A
3. Contempt Petition (Cr/.) Dy. No.17922/95 filed on 9th November
1995 against the following respondents :

I. Shri J.C. Mishra, Distt. Judge, Lucknow.

II. Shri K.N. Ojha, II A DJ., Lucknow. B
III. Shri Shailendra Saxena, III A.DJ., Lucknow.

N. Shri B.N. Pandey, Special Judge, Lucknow.

When the SLPs and contempt petitions were listed before this bench, it was
noticed that the language used in the memorandum of petitions was wholly C
objectionable, unparliamentary and abusive. By way of illustration, we may
refer to the list of dates, at internal pages 2-3 of S.L.P.(Crl.) No. 4114of1995.
The language used by the petitioner is in the following terms :-

"It will not be out of place to mention here ¢hat another then
Magistrate Sh. Udai Raj had fraudulently, corruptly with the collusion D
of Ms.Saroj Bala and others dismissed the complaint which was filed
on 12.9.94 by passing the order in complaint case No.451/94 the
complaint which had been filed on 19.9.94.

The petitioner filed a criminal revision No. 289/94 in the Hon'ble
High Court, Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow on 14.12.94 and E
challenged the order dated 16.11.94 passed in complaint case No. 451/
94. It is the most important to mention here that in complaint case No.
451/94 an application u/s 202 Cr. P.C. had also been moved and the
same is still pending. The petitioner raised the law point regarding the
summoning of witnesses in enquiry u/s 202 Cr.P.C. in Criminal Revision F
No. 289/94 but the Allahabad High Court never decided the revision
on its merits and Mr. Virendra Saran, the Hon'ble Judge, who heard
the arguments fraudulently, forgedly and maliciously dismissed the
revision."
(underlined by us)
G
In the memo of the petitions, similar expressions in more intemperate language
casting aspersions on the conduct of various judicial officers and attributing
motives to them in the discharge of their judicial functions have been used.
We refrain from reproducing all such passages, although we drew the pointed
attention of the alleged contemn er to the same. He has attacked the impartiality
of the named judges in most indecent and intemperate language. There is H
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A hardly any criticism of the "judgment" and all that the contemner seems to
have done is to criticise and condemn the Judge by attributing motives and
showering abuses on each one of the judges who dealt with his cases at one
stage or the other.

On 15th December, 1996 the following order was made by the Bench :-
B
"In all these petitions, we find that attack in indecent, wild,
intemperate and even abusive language on the named Judges has
been made at various places in each one of the petitions. The petitioner,
who is an advocate, has permitted himself the liberty of using such
expressions, which prima facie tend to scandalize the court in relation
c to judicial matters and thus have the tendency to interfere with the
administration of justice. We are inclined to initiate contempt
proceedings against the petitioner, but on his request grant him six
weeks time to delete all the objectionable expressions used in the
petitions and file fresh petitions. He shall also remove the other
D defects, as pointed out in the office report when he files the fresh
petitions. If the fresh petitions are filed, the same shall be listed after
eiglit weeks. Otherwise, these petitions shall be put up for drawing up
contempt proceedings against the petitioner, after eight weeks.

It was hoped that he would realise the seriousness of the situation and
E remove all the objectionable expressions from the memorandum of petitions
but instead of deleting those objectionable expressions, on the same day, he
filed Crl. M.P.No. 132 of 1996 in which inter alia he stated :-

"4. That today, the matter was listed in court No. 9 alongwith all
petitions at SI .No. 28 and 42 and when the petitioner tried to start his
F argument the Court openly harassed him and compelled him to
withdraw the petition or remove all the facts but the petitioner refased
to do so in view of the fact that he has only written the facts
according to Section 167, 219, 480 and 463 alongwith 120-B of the !PC
and section 44 and 165 of the Evidence Act alongwith Section 2-C and
G Section 16 and 12 and 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act and the
Indian Constitution.

5. That the Court is not allowed the petitioner to submit his argument
and passed an order to remove the all facts from the petition and file
the fresh petitions and also ordered for listing the matter after 8
H weeks. Thereafter, the petitioner mentioned and also tried to give in
IN RE: A.K. PANDEY [DR. A.S. ANAND, J.] 95
writing that he is not in a position to remove anything and file fresh A
petitions in view of the fact that he wrote only truth and the court
is bound to hear the petitions and decide the same according to the
constitution and contempt of Court Acts and other laws as challenged
by the petitioner but the court without saying anything retired to its
chamber.
B
6. That the petitioner is not in a position to remove anything and
the deliberate injustice, fraud, cheating etc. had been done by the
contemnors for concealing their nefarious acts and even they had
gone to this extent to destroy the judicial records and fabricated some
judicial papers.
( under lined by us)
c
Thus, it is seen that instead of removing the objectionable expressions,
which prima facie have the tendency to scandalize the court/courts in relation
to judicial matters and have the tendency to interfere with the due
administration of justice and which expressions per-se are an attack on various D
judges, who had dealt with the complaint filed by him at the original or the
revisional stage, in most indecent, wild, intemperate and abusive language,
he asserted that he was not obliged to remove any of these passages and
that this court was 'bound' to hear him on merits. He declined to remove the
objectionable expressions and insisted on being heard.
E
Noticing this adamant and defiant attitude of Ajay Kumar Pandey, on
20th February, 1996 the Bench directed that a Rule be issued against him
asking him to show cause why he should not be punished for committing
criminal contempt of court for the use of intemperate language and casting
unwarranted aspersions on various judicial officers and attributing motives to
them while discharging their judicial functions. He was directed to file his F
reply within 8 weeks. That is how the contempt proceeding (Contempt Petition
Cr!. No.2/96) came to registered against the alleged contemner in this Court.

The Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 4114 of 1995 and the two other
Special Leave Petitions alongwith some misc. petitions were dismissed by the
Bench both on account of the objectionable language used in the memorandum G
of those petitions as also on merits.

The alleged contemner did not file his objections or reply to the Rule
in the contempt proceedings and instead filed two applications seeking recall/
review of the order dated 20th February, 1996 (supra), dismissing S.L.P.(Crl.)
No. 4114/95, Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 6242-6243/95, and S.L.P. H
96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A (Cr!.) 819-820of1996 as also against the Rule issued to him to show cause
why he should not be punished for committing contempt of court. We
considered the two applications for recall/review and by our order dated 9th
August, 1996 found that there was no merit in those applications and felt
pained to notice that even those applications bristled with scandalous remarks
B and were couched in objectionable language and that the alleged contemner,
was persistent in his attitude to undermine the majesty of law and bring the
administration of justice .into disrepute. The alleged contemner appearing in
person on that date made a request that his cases may be transferred to
another Bench as he did not "wish to appear before this Bench". His prayer
was rejected by us not only on the ground that the prayer itself was
C contumacious in character but also because a litigant can not be permitted
to choose his forum since the case stood assigned to this Bench and we
found no justification to withdraw from the Bench either. Since the alleged
contemner had not filed his reply to the show cause notice, the Bench as a
matter of indulgence, granted him yet another opportunity to file his reply, if •
any, within six weeks and adjourned the proceedings to 27th September, 1996.
D The Bench also requested the Solicitor General of India to assist the Court
in the contempt proceedings either himself or by nominating any other law
officer.
Despite the fact that on 9th August 1996 Ajay Kumar Pandey had been
informed of the date of hearing and was directed to remain present on
E 27.9.1996 and file his reply by that date, he instead of appearing in person
on 27.9.1996, filed yet another application alongwith copies of certain
documents seeking recall of the order dated 9th August 1996. On 27.9.1996,
Mr. K.N. Bhat, learned A.S.G. appeared to assist the Court and asserted that
the application was misconceived and the alleged contemner was trying to
p browbeat the court and misconstruing the indulgence being shown to him.
He emphasised that not only has the attitude of alleged contemner been
totally defiant but that he had lost all sense of propriety in filing the
applications and Special Leave Petitions couched in most objectionable
language and creating an impression that he considered the law as 'subservient'
to him. Mr. Bhat submitted that various applications filed by the contemner
G in this court also had, as a matter of fact, aggravated the contempt committed
by him and he needed to be suitably punished.

On 27.9.1996 while dealing with the applications filed by the contemner,
the following order was made :-

H We have examined the application and found that the prayer for
IN RE: A.K. PANDEY [DR. A.S. ANAND, J.] 97
recall of the order is misconceived for more than one reasons. The A
order dated 9th August 1996 is an order in continuation of the order
dated 20th February, 1996, the prayer to recall which has already been
rejected. By the order dated 9th August 1996 the review petitions filed
by the respondent were also dismissed. The prayer for recall of the
order dated 9th August 1996 under the circumstances has no merit B
and is rejected.

Since the respondent, Ajay Kumar Pandey, despite directions is
not present we direct that his presence be secured by issuance of
bailable warrants in the sum of Rs. 5,000 with one surety of the like
amount for a date to be fixed by the registry, to the satisfaction of the C
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow."
The alleged contemner as already noticed had not appeared in the Court
on 27th September, 1996, but it appears that he was present in the Court
premises as soon after the above order was made, he filed an application on
that very day explaining the reasons for his absence and praying for recall
of the bailable warrants. The application was supported by an affidavit. Since D
on the next date he appeared in the Court, the bailable warrants were recalled.
The case was, thereafter, posted to 2nd December, 1996 but it appears
that the alleged contemner who was appearing in person had no notice of that
date and the Bench therefore directed that fresh notice be issued to him for
his personal appearance as well as for filing his reply, if Rily. It was also E
directed that in the notice it shall be indicated that the alleged contemner
should file reply to the show cause notice within six weeks and that it was
to be considered as the final opportunity granted to him for that purpose. The
case was adjourned to 22.1.1997. In the meantime, it transpires from the record
that the contemner, filed an application addressed to the Hon'ble Chief Justice F
of India, seeking transfer of the case from this Bench to some other Bench.
According to the Office Report dated 22.1.1997, that application was rejected
by the learned Chief Justice of India. The alleged contemner however, despite
notice did not appear in the Court on 22.1.1997. The Bench was, therefore,
left with no other option except to secure his presence by issuance of non-
bailable warrants and accordingly non-bailable warrants returnable on 27.2.1997 G
were directed to be issued. When the case came up for consideration on 3rd
March, 1997, the respondent was produced in custody in Court. The order
dated 3rd March, 1997 inter a/ia records :
"Mr. Pandey was asked if he was making any prayer for release on
bail and he submitted that he cannot provide any surety at Delhi. We, H
98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A therefore, consider it appropriate, in the interest of justice to direct
that respondent, Shri Ajay Kumar Pandey shall be released on bail on
his furnishing personal bail bond in the sum of Rs. 5,000 to the
satisfaction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow, where he may .-
be produced for the said purpose. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Lucknow shall release him on bail on his personal bond of Rs. 5,000
B after obtaining an undertaking from him for his appearance in this
Court on the next date of hearing which is fixed as 25.4.1997, on which
date final arguments in this contempt case shall be heard in this case.
The respondent Ajay Kumar Pandey was asked if he required the
assistance of a counsel, so that the services of the counsel could be
c provided to him but he has stated that he does not need the assistance
of any counsel. He further stated that he does not wish to argue the
matter before this bench. He was apprised that his prayer for transfer
of the case to some other bench has been rejected by the learned
Chief Justice.
D The case, was thereafter, adjourned from time to time and on 22nd
August, 1997, following order was made when the alleged contemner once
again remained absent despite service :
"Despite service respondent, Sh. Ajay Kumar Pandey, is not
present. On 3rd March, 1997 we had granted him final opportunity, in
E the hope that better sense may prevail, to file his reply to the notice
to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court
and to argue the matter either in person or through any counsel in the
contempt matter. He has neither filed the reply nor is he present in
Court personally or through counsel. Mr. K.N.Bhat, learned Additional
Solicitor General submits that this action on the part of Shri Ajay
F Kumar Pandey aggravates his contamacious behaviour.
Learned Additional Solicitor General further by reference to the
record, submits that the respondent has been granted ample
opportunities by this court but he has persisted with his contamacious .
behaviour and, therefore, no further opportunity is required to be
G given to him to appear either in person or through counsel or to file
a reply. We find considerable force in the submission of learned
Additional Solicitor General.
We have heard the learned Additional Solicitor General on merits
in the contempt matter. Orders reserved."
H We have traced the entire sequence of events, as in our opinion,
IN RE: A.K. PANDEY [DR. A.S. ANAND, J.] 99
it would have material bearing on the ultimate order that we make. ·A
_._ At the outset, we wish to emphasise that this Court being the Supreme
Court of the country, has not only the right to protect itself from being
scandalized or denigrated but it also has the right, jurisdiction and the
obligation to protect the High Courts and the Subordinate Courts in the
country from being insulted, abused or in any other way denigrated. Any B
action on the part of a litigant-be he a lawyer appearing in person - which
has the tendency to interfere with or obstruct the due course of justice has
to be dealt with sternly and firmly to uphold the majesty of law. No one can
be permitted to intimidate or terrorise judges by making scandalous
unwarranted and baseless imputations against them in the discharge of their C
judicial functions so as to secure orders which the litigant 'wants'.

The subordinate judiciary forms the very backbone of administration of
justice. This Court would come down with a heavy hand for preventing the
judges of the subordinate judiciary or the High Court from being subjected
to scurrilous and indecent attacks, which scandalise or have the tendency to D
scandalise, or lower or have the tendency to lower the authority of any court
as also all such actions which interfere or tend to interfere with the due course
of any judicial proceedings or obstruct or tend to obstruct the administration
of justice in any other manner. No affront to the majesty of law can be
permitted. The fountain of justice cannot be allowed to be polluted by
disgruntled litigants. The protection is necessary for the courts to enable E
them to discharge their judicial functions without fear.

The rule of law is the foundation of a democratic society. The judiciary
is the guardian of the rule of law and if the judiciary is to perform its duties
and functions effectively and remain true to the spirit with which they are
sacredly entrusted, the dignity and authority of the courts has to be respected F
and protected at all costs. It is for this reason that the courts are entrusted
with the extraordinary power of punishing those for contempt of court who
indulge in acts whether inside or outside the courts, which tend to undermine
the authority of the courts and bring them in disrepute and disrespect thereby
obstructing them from discharging their judicial duties without fear or favour. G
This power is exercised by the courts not to vindicate the dignity and honour
of any individual Judge who is personally attacked or scandalised but with
a view to uphold the majesty of law and the administration of justice. The
foundation of the judiciary is the trust and the confidence of the people in
its ability to deliver fearless and impartial justice and as such no action can
be permitted which may shake the very foundation itself. H
'
100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A 'Criminal Contempt' is defined in Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts
Act, 1971 and reads :

"2(c) "criminal contempt" means the publication (whether by words,
spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or
otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever
B which-

(i) scandalizes or tends to scandalize, or lowers or tends to lower the
authority of, any court; or

(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course
C of any judicial proceeding; or

(iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to
obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner."

The definition is self explanatory. Scandalising the Judges or the Courts tends
D to bring the authority and administration of law into disrepute and is an
affront to the majesty (and dignity) of law. Such acts constitute criminal
contempt of court. No one can be permitted to foul the fountain of justice.
If the authority of the court is undermined or impeded by acts or publications,
the fountain of justice would get sullied creating distrust and disbelief in the
minds of the litigant public and the right thinking public at large. Indeed
E everybody is entitled to express his honest opinion about the correctness or
legality of a judgment or sentence or an order of a Court. Objective criticism
is permissible provided it is made·with detachment in a dignified language and
respectful tone. The liberty of expression cannot be treated as a licence to
scandalise the court and instead of criticising the judgment to criticise the
F judge who delivered it.

In Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat & Ors., [1991]
4 SCC 406, this Court opined :

"The definition of criminal contempt is wide enough to include
any act by a person which would tend to interfere with the
G
administration of justice or which would lower the authority of court.
The public have a vital stake in effective and orderly administration
of justice. The court has the duty of protecting the interest of the
community in the due administration of justice and, so, it is entrusted
with the power to commit for contempt of court, not to protect the
H dignity of the court against insult or injury, but, to protect that to
IN RE: A.K. PANDEY [DR. A.S. ANAND, J.] 101
vindicate the right of the public so that the administration of justice A
is not perverted, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with. •

That the "publication" contemplated by S"ection 2 (c) of Contempt of Courts
Act, 1971 (supra) includes pleadings affidavits etc. which are filed in the
Court, is no longer in doubt.
B
In L.D. Jaikwal v. State of U.P., [1984] 3 SCC 405, an advocate whose
client had been convicted by the learned judge of the Special Court at
Dehradun, was required to appear before the learned Judge to make his
submissions on the question of 'sentence' to be imposed on the accused
upon his being found guilty of an offence under Section 5(2) of the Prevention C
of Corruption Act by the Court. The learned advocate appeared in a sjlirt-and-
trouser-outfit in disregard of the rule requiring him to appear only in court
attire when appearing in his professional capacity. The learned Judge asked
him to appear in the prescribed formal attire for being heard in his professional
capacity. The advocate apparently took exception and left the Court. Some
other advocate appeared on behalf of the accused. The learned Judge of the D
Special Court imposed a sentence of 4 years' RI on the accused. So far as
the Court of the learned Special Judge was concerned, as the judgment had
been pronounced, nothing more remained to be done by that Court. The
appellant, a senior advocate of long standing, however, made a written
application before the learned Judge of the Special Court couched in scurrilous E
language making imputation that the Judge was a "corrupt Judge" and
adding that he was "contaminating the seat of justice". A threat was held out
that a complaint was being lodged to higher authorities that he was corrupt
and did not deserve to be retained in service. The offending portion of the
application inter alia read :
F
"I am making a complaint against you to the highest authorities in the
country, that you are corrupt and do not deserve to be retained in
service. The earlier people like you are bundled out the better for us
all.

As for quantum of sentence, I will never bow down before you. You G
may award the maximum sentence. Anyway, you should feel ashamed
of yourself that you are contaminating the seat of justice."

On Rule being issued in suo motu contempt proceedings, the contemner
was punished and sentenced under the Contempt of Courts Act. Before this
court, questioning his convictioil and sentence, the contemner advocate filed H
102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A an appeal and at the same time tendered his apology. Rejecting the apology,
this Court observed :

"We do not think that merely because the appellant has tendered his
apology we should set aside the sentence and allow him to go
unpunished. Otherwise, all that a person wanting to intimidate a
B Judge by making the grossest imputations against him has to do, is
to go ahead and scandalize him, and later on tender a formal empty
apology which costs him practically nothing. If such an apology were
to be accepted, as a rule, and not as an exception, we would in fact
be virtually issuing a 'licence' to scandalize courts and commit contempt
of court with impunity. It will be rather difficult to persuade members
c of the Bar, who care for their self-respect, to join the judiciary if they
are expected to pay such a price for it. And no sitting Judge will feel
free to decide any matter as per the dictates of his conscience on

D
account of the fear of being scandalized and persecuted by an
advocate who does not mind making reckless allegations if the
Judge goes against his wishes. If this situation were to be
countenanced, advocates who can cow down the Judges, and make
-
them fall in line with their wishes, by threats of character assassination
and persecution, will be preferred by the litigants to the advocates
who are mindful of professional ethics and believe in maintaining the
decorum of courts" and such course cannot be permitted. (Emphasis
E ours)
Again, in Re: Shri Sanjiv Dutta, JT (1995) 3 SC 538, a three Judge Bench of
this Court, while dealing with an affidavit filed by a public functionary
causing aspersions on the Court, which (affidavit) had the tendency to malign
F the Court, while assailing the correctness of an order made in a writ petition
filed in this Court, held the contemner guilty of criminal contempt of court and
observed:

"Abuses, attribution of motives, vituperative terrorism and defiance
are no methods to correct the errors of the courts. In the discharge
of their functions the courts have to be allowed to operate freely and
G
fearlessly but for which impartial acljudication will be an impossibility.
Ours is a Constitutional government based on the rule of law. The
Constitution" entrusts the task of interpreting and administering the
law to the judiciary whose view on the subject is made legally final
and binding on all till it is changed by a higher court or by a permissible
H legislative measure. Those living and functioning under the
IN RE: A.K. PANDEY [DR. A.S. ANAND, J.] 103
Constitution have to accept and submit to this obligation ofrespecting A
the constitutional authority of the courts. Under a Constitutional
government, such final authority has to vest in some institution.
Otheiwise, there will be a chaos. The court's verdict has to be respected
not necessarily by the authority of its reason but always by reason
of its authority. Any conduct designed to or suggestive of challenging B
this crucial balance of power devised by the Constitution is an
attempt to subvert the rule of law and an invitation to anarchy.

The contemner, for reasons which can only be attributed to his
misconception of his role and over-zealousness to assert himself and his side
of the matter intentionally overstepped his limits and conveniently ignored C
the above legal position, and abrogated to himself, in substance, the role of
a judge in his own cause. He has thus in effect not only challenged the
jurisdiction of the Court to discharge its functions but also its authority to
do so." (emphasis supplied)

In Re: R.L. Ahuja, [1993] Supp. 4 sec 446, the respondent-contemner D
cast unfounded and unwarranted aspersions and made scurrilous and indecent
·attacks against some of the Judges of this Court who had earlier dealt with
his case in wild, intemperate and even abusive language in the memorandum
of writ petition and in a representation sent to the President of India. This
Court while convicting and sentencing the contemner for committing criminal
contempt of court observed : E
"The passages in the memorandum of the writ petition and the letter
addressed to the President of India attack the integrity and fairness
of the Judges. The remarks made by the contemner are disparaging in
character and derogatory to the dignity of the Court and besides
scandalizing the Court in relation to judicia: matters have the tendency F
to shake the confidence of the public in the apex court."

The tendency of maligning the reputation ofjudicial officers by
disgruntled elements who fail to secure an order. which they desire
is on the increase and it is high time that serious note is taken of
the same. No latitude can be given to a litigant to brdwlfeal the G
court. Merely because a party chooses to appear in person, it doe5 ·
.,
not give him a licence to indulge in making such aspersions as have
the tendency to scandalise the court in relation to judicial matters.
( Emphasis ours )

The contemner in the present case let alone showing any remorse H
104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A or regret has adopted an arrogant and contemptuous attitude ............. .
Of course, the dignity of the court is not so brittle as to be shattered
by a stone thrown by a mad man, but when the court finds that the
contemner has been reckless, persistent and guilty of undermining
the dignity of the court and his action is, motivated, deliberate and
designed, the law of contempt of court must be activised "
B (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, it is now settled that abuses, attribution of motives, vituperative
terrorism and scurrilous and indecent attacks on the impartiality of the judges
in the pleadings, applications or other documents filed in the Court or otherwise
C published which have the tendency to scandalise and undermine the dignity
of the court and the majesty of law amounts to criminal contempt of court.

While a litigant as also his lawyer have the freedom of expression and
liberty to project their case forcefully, it must be remembered that they must
while exercising that liberty maintain dignity, decorum and order in the court
proceeding. Liberty of free expression cannot be permitted to be treated as
D a licence to make reckless imputations against the impartiality of the judges
deciding the case. Even criticism of the judgment has to be in a dignified and
temperate language and without any malice.

In D.C. Saxena v. Hon'b/e the Chief Justice of India, [1996] 5 SCC 216
this court observed :-
E
"Advocacy touches and asserts the primary value of freedom of
expression. It is a practical manifestation of the principle of freedom
of speech. Freedom of expression in arguments encourages the
development of judicial dignity, forensic skills of advocacy and enables
protection of fraternity, equality and justice. It plays its part in helping
F to secure the protection or other fundamental human rights. Freedom
of expression, therefore, is one ofthe basic conditions for the progress
of advocacy and for the development of every man including legal
fraternity practising the profession of law. Freedom of expression,
therefore, is vital to the maintenance offree society. It is essential to
the rule of law and liberty of the citizens. The advocate or the party
G
appearing in person, therefore, is given liberty of expression. But
they equally owe countervailing duty to maintain dignity, decorum
and order in the court proceedings or judicial process. The liberty
of free expression is not to be confounded or confused with licence
to make unfounded allegations against any institution, much less the
H judiciary.' ................. .
IN RE: A.K. PANDEY [DR. A.S. ANAND, J.] 105
In other words, imputing partiality, corruption, bias, improper A
motives to a judge is scandalisation of the court and would be
contempt of the court. Even imputation of lack of impartiality of
fairness to a judge in the discharge of his official duties amounts to
contempt. The gravamen of the offence is that of lowering his dignity
or authority or an affront to the majesty ofjustice. When the contemner B
challenges the authority of the court, he interferes with the
performance of duties of judge's office or judicial process or
administration of justice or generation or production of tendency
bringing the judge of judiciary into contempt."·
(Emphasis supplied)

Does the law give a lawyer, unsatisfied with the result of a case, any
c
licence to permit himself the liberty of scandalising a court by casting
unwarranted imputations against the judge in discharge of his judicial
functions? Does the lawyer enjoy any special immunity under the Contempt
of Courts Act, where he is found to have committed a gross contempt of
court? The answer has to be an emphatic NO: D
In La/it Mohan Das v. Advocate General, Orissa, [1957] SCR 167, this
court observed :

"A member of the Bar undoubtedly owes a duty to his client and
must place before the Court all that can fairly and reasonably be E
submitted on behalf of his client. He may even submit that a particular
order is not correct and may ask for a review of that order. At the same
time, a member of the Bar is an officer of the Court and owes a duty
to the Court in which he is appearing. He must uphold the dignity
and decorum of the Court and must not do anything to bring the
Court itself into disrepute. The appellant before us grossly overstepped F
the limits of propriety when he made imputations of partiality and
unfairness against the Munsif in open Court. In suggesting that the
Munsif followed no principle in his orders, the appellant was adding
insult to injury, because the Muns if had merely upheld an order of his
predecessor on the preliminary point of jurisdiction and Court fees, G
which order had been upheld by the High Court in revision.
Scandalizing the Court in such manner is really polluting the very
fount of justice; such conduct as the appellant indulged in was not
a matter between an individual member of the Bar and a member of
the judicial service; it brought into disrepute the whole administration
of justice. From that point of view, the conduct of the appellant was H
106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A highly reprehensible."

In MB. Sanghi, Advocate v. High Court oj Punjab & Haryana, [1991]
3 SCC 600, this Court took notice of the growing tendency amongst some of
the Advocates of adopting a defiant attitude and casting aspersions having
failed to persuade the Court to grant an order in the tenns they expect.
B Holding the Advocate guilty of contempt, , \hmadi, J. observed:

"The tendency of maligning the reputation of Judicial Officers by
disgruntled elements who fail to secure the desired order is ever on
the increase and it is high time it is nipped in the bud. And, when a
member of the profession resorts to such cheap gimmicks with a view
c to browbeating the Judge into submission, it is all the more painful.
When there is a deliberate attempt to scandalise which would shake
the confidence of the litigating public in the system the damage
caused is not only to the reputation of the concerned Judge but also
to the fair name of the judiciary. Veiled threats, abrasive behaviour,
use of disrespectful language and at times blatant condemnatory
D
attacks like the present one are often designedly employed with a
view to taming a judge into submission to secure a desired order.
Such cases raise larger issues touching the independence of not only
the concerned Judge but the entire institution. The foundation of our
system which is based on the independence and impartiality of those
E who man it will be shaken if disparaging and derogatory remarks
are made against the Presiding Judicial Officers with impunity. It is
high time that we realise that the much cherished judicial independence
has to be protected not only from the executive or the legislature but
also from those who are an integral part of the system."

F (Emphasis supplied)

Again, in Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra, [1995] 2 SCC 584, this Court observed:

"To resent the questions asked by a Judge, to be disrespectful to
him, to question his authority to ask the questions, to shout at him,
to threaten him with transfer and impeachment, to use insulting
G
language and abuse him, to dictate the order that he should pass, to
create scene in the court, to address him by losing temper are all acts
calculated to interfere with and obstruct the course of justice. Such
acts tend to overawe the court and to prevent it from perfonning its
duty to administer justice. Such conduct brings the authority of the
H court and the administration of justice into disrespect and disrepute
IN RE: A.K. PANDEY [DR. A.S. ANAND, J.] 107
and undermines and erodes the very foundation of the judiciary by A
shaking the confidence of the people in the ability of the court to
deliver free and fair justice.

The stance taken by the contemner is that he was performing his duty
as an outspoken and fearless member of the Bar. He seems to be
labouring under a grave misunderstanding. Brazenness is not B
outspokenness and arrogance is not fearlessness. Use of intemperate
language is not assertion of right nor is a threat an argument.
Humility is not servility and courtesy and politeness are not lack of
dignity. Self-restraint and respectful attitude towards the court,
presentation of correct facts and law with a balanced mind and without C
overstatement, suppression, distortion or embellishment are requisites
of good advocacy. A lawyer has to be a gentleman first. His most
valuable asset is the respect and goodwill he enjoys among his
colleagues and in the Court."

In the instant case, from a perusal of the memorandum of various D
petitions filed by the contemner in this court and the language used therein,
it is apparent that he has cast aspersions on each and every learned Judge
who in the discharge of his judicial functions decided the matter not liked to
by the alleged contemner at one stage or the other. The aspersions cast by
him undoubtedly have the tendency to scandalise the Court. The alleged
contemner has been attempting to brow beat the learned subordinate Judges E
as well as the learned Judge of the High Court and cause interference in the
administration of justice. Even in this Court, after the Rule was issued to him,
he tried to brow beat the court. He filed an application stating that since he
had filed a contempt petition against the Judges constituting the Division
Bench which had issued Rule against him, this Bench should transfer the F
case. It was an obviously motivated action on his part to intimidate the
Bench. He did file the contempt petitions against it both the Judges constituting
the Bench. Those petitions were dismissed by a Bench comprising ofHon'ble
Mr. Justice J.S. Verma (as the Hon'ble Chief Justice then was) and Hon'ble
Mr. Justice B.N. Kirpal by the following order :-
G
"We regret to find that the petitioner who is a practising lawyer
of some standing has chosen to resort to such a proceeding which,
in our view, is misconceived. We find no merit in the same, but before
dictating this order, we have tried to explain this position to the
petitioner with the hope that he will appreciate that as a member of
the Bar, he is expected to utilise his time in a better manner to assist H
108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A in the administration of justice. The contempt petition is dismissed."

The alleged contemner in this case has been making continuous attempts to
subvert the course of justice in whichever court his case was. He has been
acting not only as if he is above the law but as if he is law unto himself.
Notwithstanding his own assessment of his 'merit and 'competence' as stated
B by him in the memo of petitions, the alleged contemner appears to be blissfully
ignorant of the role of a lawyer and the law relating to grafting of pleadings
- which must be precise and not scandalous or abusive. It is sad that by filing
the applications, and the petition, as a party in person, couched in very
objectionable language, he has permitted himself the liberty of indulging in
C an action, which does little credit to the noble profession to which he belongs.
An advocate has no wider protection than a layman when he commits an act
which amounts to contempt of court. It is most unbefitting for an advocate
to make imputations against the Judge only because he does not get the
expected result, which according to him is the fair and reasonable result
available to him. Judges cannot be intimidated to seek favourable orders. Only
D because a lawyer appears as a party in person, he does not get a licence to
commit contempt of the court by intimidating the Judges or scandalising the
courts. He cannot use language, either in the pleadings or during arguments,
which is either intemperate or unparliamentary and which has the tendency
to interfere in the administration of justice and undermine the dignity of the
E court and the majesty of law. These safeguards are not for the protection of
any Judge individually but are essential for maintaining the dignity and
decorum of the courts and for upholding the majesty of law. Judges and
courts are not unduly sensitive or touchy to fair and reasonable criticism of
their judgments. Fair comments, even if, out-spoken, but made without any
malice and without attempting to impair the administration of justice and made
F in good faith in proper language do not attract any punishment for contempt
of court. However, when from the criticism a deliberate, motivated and
calculated attempt is discernible to bring down the image of judiciary in the
estimation of the public or to impair the administration of justice or tend to
bring the administration of justice into disrepute the courts must bitter
G themselves to uphold their dignity and the majesty of law. The alleged
contemner, has undoubtedly committed contempt of the Court by the use of
the objectionable and intemperate language. No system of justice can tolerate
such unbridled licence on the part of a person, be he a lawyer, to permit
himself the liberty of scandalising the Court by casting unwarranted, uncalled
for and unjustified aspersions on the integrity, ability, impartiality or fairness
H of a Judge in the discharge of his judicial functions, as it undoubtedly
IN RE: A.K. PANDEY [DR. A.S. ANAND, J.] 109
amounts to an interference with the due course of administration of justice. A
No litigant, even a lawyer appearing in person in his own cause, can be
permitted to overstep the limits of fair, bona fide and reasonable criticism of
the judgment and bring the courts generally into disrepute or attribute motives
to the Judges rendering the judgment. Perversity, calculated to undermine the
judicial system and the prestige of the court, cannot be permitted for otherwise B
' the very foundation of the judicial system is bound to be undermined and
weakened. Liberty of free expression is not to be confused with a licence to
make unfounded, unwarranted and irresponsible aspersions against the Judges
or the Courts in relation to judicial matters. In the established facts of this
case, we hold that the alleged contemner has committed gross contempt of
court and convict him accordingly. C
The next question before us is with regard to the punishment to be
imposed upon the contemner.

The tendency of maligning the reputation of judicial officers by
disgruntled elements who fail to secure an order which they desire or which D
they expect is on the increase. It is unfortunate that even some disgruntled
lawyers also indulge in the same objectionable activities. No latitude can be
given to a litigant who attempts to browbeat the court. In the instant case,
the contemner, let alone showing any remorse or regret adopted an arrogant,
defiant and contemptuous attitude. The contemner has been reckless, persistent E
and guilty of undermining the dignity of the courts and his action are motivated,
deliberate and designed. Sympathy in a case like this would be totally misplaced.
Mercy has no meaning. The action of the contemner calls for a deterrent
punishment so that it also serves as an example to others and there is no
repetition of such a contempt by anyone else. We, therefore, having found
the contemner guilty of committing contempt of court, sentence him to undergo F
simple imprisonment for a period of four months and to pay a fine of Rs. I 000
(one thousand) and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo simple
imprisonment for a period of 15 days.

In Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India & Anr., JT (1998)
3 SC 184, a Constitution Bench of this Court opined :- G
"An Advocate who is found guilty of contempt of court may also,
as already noticed, be guilty of professional misconduct in a given
case but it is for the Bar Council of the State or Bar Council of India
to punish that Advocate by either debarring him from practice or
suspending his licence, as may be warranted, in the facts and H
110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A circumstances of each case. The learned Solicitor General informed us
that there have been cases where the Bar Council of India taking note
of the contumacious and objectionable conduct of an advocate, had .....,
initiated disciplinary proceedings against him and even punished him
for "professional misconduct", on the basis of his having been found
guilty of committing contempt of court. We do not entertain any
B doubt that the Bar Council of the State or Bar Council of India, as the
case may be, when apprised of the established contumacious conduct
of an advocate by the High Court or by this Court, would rise to the
occasion, and take appropriate action against such an advocate. Under
Article 144 of the Constitution "all authorities, civil and judicial, in the
c territory of India shall act in aid of the Supreme Court". The Bar
Council which performs a public duty and is charged with the
obligation to protect the dignity of the profession and maintain
professional standards and etiquette is also obliged to act "in aid of
the Supreme Court''. It must, whenever, facts warrant rise to the
occasion and discharge its duties uninfluenced by the position of the
D contemner advocate. It must act in accordance with the prescribed
procedure, whenever its attention is drawn by this Court to the
contumacious and unbecoming conduct of an advocate which has the
tendency to interfere with due administration of justice.......... ..

The Bench went on to say :-
E
"There is no justification to assume that the Bar Councils would
not rise to the occasion, as they are equally responsible to uphold the
dignity of the courts and the majesty of law and prevent any
interference in the administration of justice. Learned counsel for the
parties present before us do not dispute and rightly so that whenever
F a court of record, records its findings about the conduct of an Advocate
while finding him guilty of committing contempt of court and desires
or refers the matter to be considered by the concerned Bar Council,

G
appropriate action should be initiated by the concerned Bar Council
in accordance with law with a view to maintain the dignity of the
courts and to uphold the majesty of law and professional standards
c
and etiquette."

Looking to the established facts of this Court, it is apparent that the
conduct of the contemner was highly contumacious and even atrocious. He
has abused professional privileges while practising as an Advocate. We,
H therefore, deem it appropriate, in view of the observations made in Supreme
IN RE: A.K. PANDEY [DR. AS. ANAND, J.] III
Court Bar Association v. Union of India & Anr. (supra), to direct that the A
copy of this judgment together with the relevant record be forwarded to the
Chairman, Bar Council of India, who may refer the case to the concerned
committee for appropriate action as is considered fit and proper.

Since, the contemner absented himself after furnishing bail bonds to the
satisfaction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow pursuant to our order B
dated 3rd March, 1997, his bail bonds are cancelled. The contemner shall be
taken into custody to undergo the sentence.

S.VKL Petition disposed of.