Supreme Court of India
INDER SINGH AND ANR.versusTHE FINANCIAL COMMISSIONER, PUNJAB AND ORS.
- Citation
- 1996 INSC 1178
- Decided
- 10 October 1996
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- K RAMASWAMY
Holding
Res judicata does not apply to summary proceedings absent a statutory provision, and the appellants met all conditions of Section 22, thereby entitling them to purchase proprietary rights and shielding them from ejectment under Section 7A.
Summary
The appellants, tenants of agricultural land, applied under Section 22 of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955 in 1960 but were rejected for not having twelve years' continuous possession. A second application in 1965 was allowed, and the Financial Commissioner confirmed the order. The Punjab and Haryana High Court set aside the authorities' orders on the ground that the earlier proceedings barred the second application by res judicata. The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of res judicata under Section 11 of the CPC does not apply to summary proceedings unless expressly provided by statute, and that the revenue authorities are not civil courts. It further found that the tenants satisfied the conditions of Section 22 – they were tenants as defined under the Punjab Tenancy Act, were in possession as of 3 December 1953, and had twelve years' continuous possession – and were therefore not liable to ejectment under Section 7A. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court judgment and restored the authorities' order.
Issues considered
- The applicability of the doctrine of res judicata under Section 11 CPC to summary proceedings before revenue authorities under the Pepsu Tenancy Act.
- Whether the appellants satisfied the statutory requirements of Section 22 of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955 to acquire proprietary rights.
- Whether the appellants were liable to ejectment under the provisions of Section 7A of the Act.
Legislation cited
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 11
- Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955s. 20, s. 22, s. 2(k), s. 7, s. 7A
Subjects
res judicatasummary proceedingstenancyproprietary rightsSection 22Section 7ACivil Procedure Codeappealeviction
Judgment
INDER SINGH AND ANR. A
v.
THE FINANCIAL COMMISSIONER, PUNJAB AND ORS.
OCTOBER 19, 1996
[K. RAMASWAMY ANJ? G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.) B
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 :
S.11-Res judicat~Tenants' application made u/s.22 of Pepsu Tenan-
cy Agricultµral Lands Act, 1955 rejected in 1960 on the ground that he did C
not have possession for 12 years-Tenants' second application u/s.22 filed in
1965 allowed and the decision upheld upto the stage of revision before
Financial Commissioner-High cdurt set aside the orders of revenue
authorities on the ground that second application u/s.22 was bamd by the
principle of res judicata-'--Held the order passed by the authorities is without D
any elaborate trial like in a suit but in a summary manner-Doctrine of of
res judicata envisaged in Section 11 has no application to summary proceed-
ings unless the statute expressly applies to such orders-The authorities are
not civil court nor the petition a plaint, no issues are framed nor tried as a
civil suit-High Court erred in concluding that the earlier proceedings operated
as' res judicat~Judgment of High Court set aside and that of the authorities E
restored.
Patiala Punjab State Union Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act,
1953/Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Ac~ 1955.
F
. S.7A!Ss.2(k), 20 and 22-Tenant-Right to purchase proprietary rights
over the land in tenancy-Landlord's application for reservation of land for
personal cultivation rejected-Held, in order to exercise the right under s.22
the claimant must be a tenant under the Punjab Tenancy Act, he was in
possession of land as on predecessor in title and he must have continuous
possession for 12 years before exercising the right to purchase proprietary G
rights-Appellants have satisfied the requirements and have acquired the right
to purchase the proprietary interests of the land held by them as tenant~They
are not liable to ejectment.
Jajsi Ram v. Financial Commissioner, Revenue, Punjab & Ors., AIR H
421
422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.
A (1972) Punjab and Haryana 72, cited.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1920 of
1980.
From the Judgment and Order dated 5.3.80 of the Punjab & Haryana
B High Court, in C.W.P. No. 1592 of 1967.
· Ujagar Singh, Davender Verma, Girish Sharma and Naresh Bakshi
for the Appellants.
C A.B. Rohtagi and Uma Datta for the Respondents.
The following Order of the Court was delivered :
. This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the Punjab _
and Haryana High Court dated March 5, 1980 made in Civil Writ Petition
:D No. 1592 of 1967.
The admitted facts ar1< that the appellants/tenants were in possession
of the land bearing specified Khasra numbers mentioned in the appellate
order {the details of which are not in dispute), admeasuring 190 kanals, 6
E marlas in Village Kotrani in Kapurthala District of Punjab. His applicatior1
made under Section 22 of the PepsU Tenancy Agricultural Lands Act, 1955
{for short, the 'Act') was rejected by order dated April 25, 1960 on the
ground that they did not have possession for 12 years which was confirmed
by all the authorities including the High Court in the Writ Petition Oii.
September· 7, 1964. Subsequently, they made second application on March
26, 1965 for conferment. of ownership rights based on tenancy from the
res pendents. Similarly, the landlord filed an application for reservation of
the land for personal cultivation. The authorities have dismissed the ap-
plication of the landlord for reservation of the land which order became
final. The applicatio'l ofth.e appellants was allowed on December 15, 1%5.
G On appeal, it was confirmed on June 22, 1996. In revision, the Financial
Commissioner by order dated· June 15, 1967 confirmed the same. In the
writ petition, by the impugned judgment the Division Bench set aside the
. orders of the authorities on the sole ground that the orders passed on the
earlier occasion culminated as res judicata and, therefore the second
H application under Section 22 is not maintainable.
INDER SINGH v. HNANCIAL COMMNR. 423
Shri Ujagar Singh, learned senior counsel for the appellants con- A
tended that the view taken by the High Court is not correct in law. Since
the proceedings before the authorities is of summary nature, the doctrine
of res judicata has no application. The act does not prescribe any prin-
ciple of res judicata as such. The proceedings before the authorities are
of summary nature. It would not be correct to apply the principle of res B
judicata. We find force in the contention. It is not in dispute that the
order passed by the authorities is without any elaborate trial like in a
suit but in a summary manner. It is well settled law that the doctrine of
, res judicata envisaged in Section 11 of C.P.C. has qo application to
summary proceedings unless the statute expressly applies to such orders. C
The authorities are not civil court nor the petition a plaint. No issues
are framed nor tried as a civil suit. Under these circumstances; the
Division Bench of the High Court was clearly in error to conclude that
the earlier proceedings operated as res judicata.
It is then contended by Shri Sehgal, learned Senior counsel for the D
respondents that unless the appellants satisfy the requirements of Section
7A(2) read with Section 22, they are not entitled to claim property rights
to the land or the interest held from the landlord. Therefore, the ap-
plication is not maintainable. Though this contention was not raised
before any of the fora,_ since it trenches upon jurisdiction, we permitted E
the learned counsel to argue the case on this aspect of the matter. In
this behalf, he sought to place reliance on the Division Bench judgment
of the High Court in Jajsi Ram v. Financial Commissioner, Revenue,
Punjab & Ors., AIR (1972) Punjab and Haryana 72. The question is :
whether the appellants are entitled to avail of the benefit of Section 22, F
as ordered by the authorities under the Act? Section 2(k) defines "tenant"
to mean a tenant defined in the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887. The ex1
clusionary clause is not relevant for the purpose of this case; hence
omitted. The "President's Act" has been defined under Section 2(1) to
mean Patiala Punjab State Union Tenancy and ,Agricultural Lands Act,
1953, President Act 8 of 1953, Section 7A deals with the right to addi- G
tional grounds for termination of tenancy in certain cases which are in
addition to grounds specified in Section 7. It is brought by way of
Amendment Act 15 of 1956 which envisages as under :
"7A. Additional grounds for termination of tenancy in certain H
424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.
A cases. - (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3), a
tenancy subsisting at the commencement of the Pepsu Tenancy
and Agricultural Lands (Second Amendment) Act, 1956 may be
terminated on the following grounds in addition to the grounds
specified in section 7, namely :
(a) that thi: land comprising the tenancy has been reserved by
the landowner for his per~onal cultivation in accordance with the
provisions of Chapter II;
(b) that the landowner owns thirty standard acres ~r less of
c land and the land falls within his permissible limit :
Provided that no tenant (other than a tenant of a landowner
who is member of the Armed forces of the Union) shall be ejected
under this sub-section -
D · (i) from any area of land if the area under the personal
cultivation of the tenant does not exceed five standard acres, or
(ii) from an area of five standard acres, if the area under the
personal cultivation of the tenant exceeds five standard acres, until
E ·he is allotted by the State Government alternative land of
equivalent value in standard acres.
(2) No tenant, who immediately preceding the commencement
of the President's Act has held any land continuously for a period
of twelve years or more under the same landowner or. his predeces-
F sor in title, shall be ejected on the grounds specified in sub-section
(1) -
(a) from any area of land, if the area under the personal
· cultivation of the tenant does not exceed fifteen standard acres, or
G (b) from an area of fifteen standard acres, if the area under
the personal cultivation of the tenant exceeds fifteen standard
acres:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to the
H tenant of a landowner who, both, at the commencement of the
INDER SINGH v. FINANCIALCOMMNR. 425
tenancy and the commencement of the President's Act, was a A
widow, a minor, an unmarried woman, a member of the Armed
Forces of the Union or a person incapable of cultivating land by
reason of physical or mental infirmity.
Explanation. - In computing the period of twelve years, the B
period during which any land has been held under same landowner
or his predecessor in title by the father, brother or son of the tenant
shall be included.
(3) For the purpose of computing under sub-sections (1) and
(2) the area of land under the personal cultivation of a tenant, any C
area of land owned by the tenant and under his personal cultivation
shall be included."
'•
Section 20 was brought by the same Amendment Act; it reads as
under:
D
"20. Definition of tenant. - In this Chapter, the expression 'tenant'
means_~ tenant as defined in clause (k) of section 2, who is not
- liable to be ejected -
or
(a) under clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 7-A; E
· (b) under clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 7-A:
Provided that this definition shall not apply to a tenant who is
to be allotted by the State Government land under the proviso to F
sub-section (1) of Section 7-A."
Section 20 defines "tenant". For the purpose of Chapter IV, the
expression "tenant" means a tenant as defined in Clause {k) of Section 2.
In other words, he must be a tenant defined under the Punjab Tenancy
Act, 1887. The exclusionary clause contained in Section 2{k) has no ap- G
plication to the facts in this case. Such a tenant is not liable to be ejected
(a) either under clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 7•A or
(b) under clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section {2) of Section 7-A. Section 20
again excludes from the definition of tenant, for the purpose of Section 20,
a tenant who is to be allotted by the State Government land under the H
426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 7 S.C.R.
A proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 7-A.
Such a tenant, by operation of Section 22 acquires right to purchase
proprietary rights of the landlord. Sub-section (1) thereof postulates that
subject to the other provisions contained in the Act, a tenant defined under
B Section 20, shall be entitled to acquire from his landowner, the proprietary
rights in respect of the land held by him as a tenant in the manner and
subject to the conditions hereinafter provided. The manner and the condi-
tions have been enumerated in sub-section (2) thereof. Such a tenant shall
make an application in writing to the prescribed authority in the prescribed
manner containing the particulars mentioned in clauses (a) to (c) of
C sub-section (2) of Section 22. Under clause (a), the tenant must specify the
area and location of the land in respect of which the application was made;
under clause (b), the name of the landowner from whom proprietary rights
are to be acquired; under clause (c), he is required to specify other
particulars prescribed in the rules. Sub-section (3) deals with and confers
D similar right to a sub-tenant to whom tenant had leased the land. By
operation of sub-section (3) in respect of the land held by the sub-tenant,
the right of the tenant to acquire proprietary rights stood extended. Sub-
tenant also became entitled to purchase the proprietary right of the land-
owner as if he is a tenant under the landlord. This is the necessary corollary
E of sub-section (3) of Section 22.
Since Section 20 and Section 22 envisage that a tenant is not liable
to ejectment and the right to purchase proprietary rights of a land holder
by such a tenant is subject to the other provisions of the Act, as a necessary
F corollary, we have to look as to what are the disabling provisions to which
a tenant would be subjected to before acquiring proprietary rights, i.e.
right, title or interest in the land of the landowner from whom he holds the
land as a tenant. The material provisions in that behalf are Section 7 and
Section 7A. Section 7 speaks of the grounds on which the landlord is
entitled to terminate the tenancy of a tenant. Sub-section (1) thereof, with
G negative language, emphasise~ that no tenancy should be terminated except
in accordance with the provisions of the Act or except on any of the
grounds specified therein.
Clause (a) of sub-section (1) was omitted by Act 15 of 1956. There-
H fore, it is not necessary to refer to the same. Clauses (b) to (t) deal with
r
INDER SINGH v. FINANCIAL COMMNR. 427
the grounds on which the tenancy of a tenant may be terminated by the A
landlord with which we are not concerned and hence it is not necessary to
elaborate the same in this judgment. Section 7A is relevant for the purpose
of this case and it is already reproduced above. It provides additional
grounds for termination of tenancy in certain cases. The operation of sub-
section (1) of Section 7A is su)ject to the operation of sub-sections (2) and B
(3). By operation of sub-section (1), the tenancy must be subsisting at the
commencement of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Land (Second
Amendment) Act, 1956. Such a subsisting tenancy may be terminated on
the grounds mentioned in clauses (a) & (b) of sub-section (1) of Section
7A. Those are the grounds for determination of the tenancy, in addition to C
the grounds specified in Section 7. Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section
7A provides the ground for termination of. the tenancy, namely, that the
land comprising the tenancy, if has been reserved by the landlord for his
personal cultivation, in accordance with the provisions contained in Chap-
ter II, the tenant is liable to be ejected on this ground. Therefore, it is a
condition precedent that the landlord, in accordance with Chapter II of D
the Act, should reserve the land held by the tenant for his personal
cultivation. It is seen that the respondent-landlord had already attempted
-.. though unsuccessfully, to have the land held by the appellants as tenants
reserved for landlord's personal cultivation but his application was rejected
and became final and conclusive between the appellant and the respon- E
dent-landlord. Therefore, clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 7A stood
excluded as against the appellant. Thereby, they are not liable to ejectment
by termination of tenancy held by the appellants by the respondent-
landlord under Section 7A(l)(a). The disabling provision thereby stands
excluded. In other words the appellants acquired right to purchase the F
proprietary rights of the respondent-landlord in respect of the lands held
by the appellants as tenants.
Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 7A is another ground on
which the landlord may be entitled to seek ejectment of the tenant by
terminating the tenancy under Section 7A. It envisages that if the landlord G
owns 30 standard acres or less of land and the land falls within his
permissible limits, the landlord is entitled to the extent of or to make up
the penilissible limits, to terminate the tenancy of the tenant as an addi-
tirlnal ground under Section 7A(l)(b). In this case, the finding recorded by
lfue tribunal and not disputed in the· High Court or before us was that the H
428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 7 S.C.R.
A respondent was in excess of 30 standard acres of land, i.e., 68 standard
acres and that, therefore, the appellants are not liable to ejectment from
the lands held by them as tenants under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of
Section 7A. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 7A gives protection
to a tenant even if clauses (a) and (b) stand attracted, namely, "provided
B that no tenant other than a tenant by a landowner who is a member of the
armed forces of the Union etc. shall be ejected under sub-section (1) from
any area of the land if the area under the personal cultivation of the tenant
does not exceed 5 standard acres. In other words, even if the landlord has
reserved the land for personal cultivation in accordance with the provisions
of Chapter II and even if he holds 30 standard acres or less and the land
C falls within the permissible limits, nonetheless the tenant shall not be
ejected under sub-section (1) provided (i) that the tenant has under his
personal cultivation the land not exceeding 5 standard acres or (ii) if the
area under personal cultivation of the tenant exceeds 5 standard acres until
he is allotted by the State Government alternative land of equivalent value
D in standard acres. In other words, even if he is in possession of an area of
5 standard acres and if the landlord fulfills the conditions enumerated in
clauses (a) and (b) and is sought to be ejected on those grounds, still the
tenant is entitled to resist termination of tenancy of his 5 standard acres of
land until the State Government allots to him and puts him in possession
of the alternative land of equivalent value in standard acres. Thus, allot-
E ment of and putting in possession of the alternative land of equivalent value
in standard acres which is sought to be taken possession of by the landlord
from the tenant for ejectment on the additional grounds mentioned in
sub-section (1) of Section 7A is a condition precedent before eviction of a
tenant.
F
Similarly, no tenant by operation of sub-section (2) of Section 7A
shall be ejected on additional grounds who immediately preceding the
commencement of the President's Act had held any land continuously for
a period of 12 years or more under the same landlord or its predecessor
in title. He shall not be ejected on the grounds specified in sub-section (1)
G from any area of land if the area under the personal cultivation of the
tenant does not exceed 15 standard acres.
In other words, the tenant in possession of the land immediately
preceding the commencement of the President's Act remained in posses-
R sion for a period of 12 years or more under the same landowner or his
INDER SINGH v. HNANCIAL COMMNR. 429
>
predecessor in title or both put together; if he is in possession of an area A
of limd under his personal cultivation not exceeding 15 standard acres, he
shall not ·be ejected on the additional grounds mentioned in Section 7A. It
is not the case of the respondents that the appellants were in possession
of any area of land under their personal cultivation exceeding 15 standard
acres. Therefore, clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 7A does not apply B
to the facts of this case. Clause (b) equally does not apply since it is not
the case of the respondents that the appellants are in personal cultivation
of the land exceeding 15 standard acres belonging to the respondertt-
landlord. Under the proviso to sub-section (2), it further envisages that
nothing in this sub-section shall apply to the tenant of a landlord who both, C
at the commencement of the tenancy and the commencing of the
President's Act was a widow, a minor, an unmarried woman, a member of
the armed forces of the Union or a person incapable of cultivating the land
by region ......, physical or mental infirmity. The proviso gives benefit to a
disabled tenant with which we are not concerned on the facts in this case.
The explanation to sub-section (ii) provides that in computing the period D
of 12 years, the period during which any land has been held under the same
landowner or his predecessor in title by the father, brother, or son of a
tenant shall be included. This would further indicate the beneficial intend-
ment of conferment of title to the tiller of the land to tag on the 12 years'
period for the benefit of acquiring proprietary interest of a landowner. The E
period during which the father, brother or son of a tenant had held the
land under the same· landowner or predecessor in title should also be.
included. Sub-section (3) further envisages that for the purpose of comput-
ing under sub-sections (i) and (ii), the area of land un,der personal cultiva-
tion of the tenant, any area of land owned by the tenant and under his F
personal cultivation, shall be included. In other words, it would indicate
that a tenant also shall not be in excess of the permissible standard acres.
The land owned by the tenant and land personally cultivated by the tenant
either under the same landlord or some other landlord shall all be included
in computing the permissible limit so that the tenant also shall not be in G
excess of the permissible limit while tagging to his ownership the lands held
under tenancy with one or more than one land owners by exercising the
right to purchase the proprietary rights under Section 22 of the Act.
The contention raised is that a tenant who had remained in con- ·
tinuous possession of 12 years prior to the President's Act 8 of 1953 had H
430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.
A come into force, namely, December 3, 1953, alone is entitled to avail the
remedy of Section 22; otherwise he is liable to ejectment by the landlord
under sub-section (2) of Section 7A. Therefore, the benefit to purchase the
proprietary right given under Section 22 is not available to the respondent.
We find no force in the contention. The object appears to be that a tenant
B immediately preceding the commencement of the President Act 8 of 1953
shall continue to remain so for a period of 12 years either under one
landlord or his predecessor so as to tag on the continuous 12 years' period.
It does not appear to be that he should have remained .in possession
continuously for 12 years preceding the commencement of President Act
C 8 of 1953. What is required to be satisfied is that the tenant must be a
"tenant" defined under Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 and be in possession of
the land in his character as a tenant prior to the President's Act 8 of 1953
had come into force. Such a tenant is not liable to be ejected under clauses
(a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 7A. He must have continuous
D possession for 12 years either under one landlord or predecessor in title
or intended in the land leased out to the tenant to exercise the right under
Section 22. No doubt it is true that learned Judges of the Division Bench
of the High Court had interpreted the sections in the manner in which the
learned counsel has placed construction on sub-section (2) of Section 7-A,
i.e., 12 years prior to President Act 8 of 1953 had come into force. But with
.•
E due respect, we find that such interpretation would defeat the very object
of conferment of proprietary right on the tenant in occupation of the land
which was in his· possession. The object of the Act is to confer proprietary
title on the tenant in occupation of the agricultural land so that the tiller
of the soil should get proprietary right over the land in his possession as
F tenant, despite the fact that he came into possession as a tenant at the
commencement of Act 8 of 1953. Three conditions to be satisfied, as §lated
already are- (1) he must be a tenant defined under the Punjab Tenancy
Act; (2) he was in possession of the land as on December 3, 1953; and (3)
he was a tenant under the landowner or pred_!:cessor in title. He must have
G continuous possession for 12 years before exercising the right to purchase
proprietary right. The interpretation put up by the learned Judges, with due
respect, would defeat the object of the provision of the Act. Thus con-
sidered we hold that the appellants have satisfied the requirements men-
tioned in Section 22. They are not liable to ejectment either under
H sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 7A, as the case may be. They
INDER SINGH v. FlNANCIAL COMMNR. 431
were in possession for 12 years. They are tenants under the Punjab Tenancy A
Act. They were in possession prior to December 3, 1953. They, thereby,
acquired the right to purchase the proprietary interest of the land held by
them as a tenant. The appellants had satisfied all the requirements. We are
informed that the compensation determined by the authorities has already
been deposited. B
Under these circumstances, we allow the appeal, set aside the judg-
ment of the High Court and restore that of the authorities under the Act.
The writ petition stands dismissed but, in the circumstances, there is no
order as to costs.
R.P. Appeal allowed.
c
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