INDRAVADAN SHAHversusSTATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.

    926
                                                                       :•-.
A                         . INDRAVADl,ll H. SHAH
                                   v•
                      . STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.

                             MARCH 19, 1986

           [A.P, SEN, E.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND B.C. RAY, JJ.]
B                                                                      }-     ...
           Constitution of India, 1950, Articles 14 and. 16 - No
    discriminstion in appointment either by promotion or direct
    recruitment - Necessity for.

          Gujarat· Judicial Service Recruitment (Amendment) Rules,
c   1979 - Rules 6(4)(i) and 6(4)(iii)(a) - Promotion to Assistant
    Judge from - category of Civil Judge Junior /Senior Di vision -
    Imposition of age restriction - Whether ultra vires Articles
    14 and 16 •.

            The Gujarat Judicial Service Recruitment Hules 1961 as
D   1111ended upto 1979 lay down the mode of recruitment to and
    coutitution of the Gujarat Judicial Service. The Service
    ahall conatitute of two branches, namely, (1) Junior Branch
    and (2) Senior Branch. 111t1ea 6(4)(i) and 6(4)(iii)(a) provide
    that a Civil Judge (Senior Division) after completing 48 years
    of age will not be eligible for conaideration for proetion to
E   the post of Assistant Judge and bis nsme appearing in the
    select liet will be struck out theref roa on bis completion of
    48 yeare.

           The appellant va found llUitable for appointment by
    pr01110tion to the post of Assistant Judge and his name appeared
F   in the Select List prepared for the year 1982-83. His turn did
    not C01lle up and the select list lapsed on 30.4.1983. On that
    date as he had already c09Pleted 48 years, his name was not
    put on the select li•t for the year 1983-84.

          The appellant filed a writ petition under Art.226
G   ueailing the validity of Bulee 6(4)(i) and 6(4)(Ui)(a)
    alleging     that    they   were   unreasonable, arbitrary,
    discrillinatory and violatin of Arta. 14 and 16.

         The High Court dialliased the petition holding that the
    age restriction provi<led lly the recruiting authorities for
H
                      INDRAVADAN v. STATE                 927
                                                                 A

different cadres of post is not repugnsnt to Arti~le 14 of the
Constitution; that this system was in vogue for many decades,
even in the bilingual State of Bombay; that though there was
no restriction regarding age for selection from the members of
the Bar to the post of District Judge, there was age limit for   B
selection and appointment by promotion from the members of
Junior Branch to the post of Assistant Judges; that members of
the Bar have got free atmosphere to work and there was enough
scope for them to better develop their mental faculty. If for
an important post like that of a District Judge, a member of
the Bar is to be recruited in order to enthuae fresh blood at
that important position of the service cadre, it can be said     c
to be a different class altogether; that there was no discri-
mination by introducing age bar in the recruitment rules so
far as the appointment to the post of Assistant Judges by
promotion is concerned and that the class of Assistant Judges
and the class of District Judges for this purpose constitute
two different classes.                            ·              D

      In the appeal to this Court on behalf of the appellant,
the contentions raised in the High Court were reiterated. On
behalf of the respondent-High Court, it was cont.ended: (1)
that the age restriction for proi.otioa . to .·the. post of
Assistant Judge was in vogue since 1924 or so     even in the    E
erstwhile State of Bombay, though there was no age limit for
selection to the post of District Judge from the Bar; (2) that
the rationale underlying the age restriction for recruitment
to the post of Assistant Judge is that they should have
sufficient number of years left before they reach the age of
superannuation so that their services can be utilised as         F
District Judges; (3) that the pay scale of Civil Judges
(Senior Division) and that of the Assistant Judges is . the
same; if an incumbent is taken as an Assistant Judge af an
advanced stage, he may have to retire as an Assisi:a11t ·Judge
and he will not have a"Y pecumary gain; aDd (4) that a Civil
Judge (Senior Division) or Civil Judge (Junor Division) who      G
completes 48 years of age may not be fully equipped with the
physical and mental calibre for that higher post calling for
essentially different type of duties, n911ely, conducting of
Sessions cases, appeals etc.

      Allowing the appeal,                                       H
    928               SUPREME COURT REPORTS        [1986] 1 s.c.R.

A
          HELD: '1, Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution ensure
    that there should not be any discrimination in the matter of
    appointment in service, nor there will be any arbitrariness or
    unreasonableness in the rules of recruitment providing for
    appointment to the service either by promtion or by direct
    recruitment. [935 B-C]
B
          E.P. Royappa v. State of Taal.lmdu & Anr. [1974] 2
    S.C.R. p. 348 at p.386, Kanelta Gandhi v. Union of India [1978]
    2 s.c.R. p.621 and LD. Sbetty v. International Airport Autho-
    rity of India &Ora. [1979] 3 s.c.R. p. 1014 referred to.

c         2. The provisions of Rule 6(4)(i) read with Rule
    6(4)(iii)(a) of the Gujarat Judicial Service Recruitment
    (Amended Rules)     1979 are     irrational,   arbitrary and
    unreasonable inasnuch as there is no nexus to the object
    sought to be achieved by introducing the age restriction in
    regard to appointment of Assistant Judge by prorotion from
D   arongst members holding post of Civil Judges (Junior Division)
    and those in the cadre of Civil Judges (Senior Division) whose
    names have been entered in the select list. [937 B-C]

           3. The posts of Assistant Judge as well as of District
    Judge are included in the Senior Branch of Gujarat Judicial
E   Service. It is incomprehensible how these two cadres of
    Assistant Judges and District Judges can be treated as two
    different    classes   altogether   thereby    justifying the
    introduction of age restriction in regard to selection and
    appointment by prorotion to the post of Assistant Judge, while
    doing away with any such sort of age limit or restriction in
F   respect of appointment to the post of District Judge by
    prolkltion arongst the members of the Junior Branch who have
    served as Assistant Judges. The reasoning given by the High
    Court is totally unsustainable. With the coming of age and
    experience, a Judicial Officer becOlll!S rore suited and well
    equipped to perform and discharge the higher duties and
G   responsibilities attached to the higher post of Assistant
    Judge or District Judge. [935 A-B; 934 E, G-H]

          4. The rule regarding age restriction which was
    originally introduced in the recruitment rules of Judicial
    Service in bilingual State of Bombay has subsequently been
H   deleted in the Recruitment Rules of Maharashtra Judicial
                     IN!lRAVADAN v. STATE [B.C. RAY, J.]              929   A


       Service. This archaic, unreasonable and irrational rule which
       is ex facie arbitrary and discriminatory has been allowed to
       continue in the Gujarat Judicial Service Recruitment Rules
       1961 as amended upto 1979, (937 D-E]                                 B

             5. The provisions of Rule 6(4)(i) and Rule 6(4)(iii)(a)'
       of the Gujarat Judicial Recruitment (Amended Rules) 1979 are
       invalid and bad as they are unreasonable, irrational,
       arbitrary and discriminatory and violate equality clause
       envisaged in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. These
       rules in so far as they impose age restriction in the matter         C
       of promotion to the post of Assistant Judge are liable to be
       quashed and set aside. (936 G-11; 938 A-Bl

             6. The name of the appellant shall be deemed to have
       been continued in the select list of 1983-84 and his case for
       appointment to the post of Assistant Judge shall be considered       D
       on that basis by the authorities concerned. If he is appointed
       to the post of Assistant Judge, he shall get his due seniority
       and all retiral benefits reckoning the service on that basis.
       (938 B-C)

              CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION     Civil Appeal No. 2588 of     E
       1985

             From the Judgment and Order dated 17.12.84 of the
       Gujarat High Court in Speciil Civil Application No. 2332 of
       1984.
                                                                            F
              P.H. Parekh and C.B. Singh for the Appellant.

"' y        T,U. Mehta,    Girish   Chandra   and M.N. Shroff   for   the
       Respondents.

              The Judgment of .the Court was delivered by                   G

            B.C.RAY, J. This appeal raises a very short       though
       important question as to the validity and vires of the provi-
       sions of Rule 6(4)(i) and Rule 6(4)(iii)(a) of .the Gujarat
       Judicial Service Recruitment (Amendment Rules) 1979. The
       relevant rules are quoted     hereinbelow:-                          H
    930                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS     [1986 J 1 s.c.R.


               i) Appointment to the post of an Assistant Judge
               shall be made by the Governor in conaultation with
               the High Court by proootion of a person from
               amongst such persons comprising of those holding
               the posts of Civil Judges (Junior Division) and
               those in the cadre of Civil Judges (Senior
B              Division) whose names have been entered in the
               Select List referred to in Clause (ii) before they
               have reached the age of 48 years and continue in
               that list on the date of appointment;

               Provided that no person shall be eligible for such
c              appointment unless he has :-

               (a) served for a period of not less than seven
               years as a Civil Judge (Junior Division) ; or

               worked on Civil side for a period of not less than
D              three years if he belongs to the cadre of Civil
               Judge (Senior Division).

               (11) A Select List of members who are considered
               fit for appointment by promotion to posts of
               Assistant Judges shall be prepared annually by
E              Government in consultation with the High Court. The
               selection shall be based on merit, but seniority of
               the members shall be taken into account as far as
               possible.

               (iii) (a) The name of a candidate entered in the
F              Select List shall be struck out of it on his
               reaching the age of 49 years if during the
               interval, he is not appointed as an Assistant
                                                                      t -
               Judge.

         The appellant was born on 6.4.1934 and in accordance with
G   the provisions of Gujarat Judicial Service Recruitment Rules
    1961 as amended in 1964 to 1969, the appellant being in the
    cadre of Civil Judge (Senior Division} was considered for
    selection for inclusion in the select list to be considered
    for appointment by promotion to the post of Assistant Judge in
    the year 1980--81 and 1981-82, but he was not found suitable.
H   He was, however, found suitable and his name appeared in th•
              INDRAVADAN v. STATE [B.C. RAY, J,]           931

                                                                  A
Selection List prepared for the year 1982-83, His turn did not
come up and the Select List lapsed with the expiry of
30.4.1983. On that date as he had already completed 48 years,
his name was not put on the Select List for the following
year, namely 1983-84. It is against this non-appearance of his
name in the Select List of 1983-84, the appellant assailed the    B
validity of the aforesaid provisions of rules 6(4)(1) and
6(4)(iii)(a) of the Gujarat Judicial Service Recruitment
Rules, 1961 as amended upto 1979 on the ground that it was
unreasonable, arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India by a Writ
Petition in.the High Court of Gujarat being Civil Application
No. 2332 of 1984, whereon a rule was issued on December 17,       C
1984. 'nle said rule after notice to the parties was discharged
and it was held that the impugned rules were not arbitrary,
unreasonable or irrationale and they ar·e not also discrimi-
natory.

     U\e Governor of Gujarat framed the Gujarat Judicial          D
Service Recruitment Rules 1961 under proviso to Article 309 of
the Constitution of India read with Article 234 of the
Constitution laying down the mode of recruitment to the
Gujarat Judicial Service. U\ese rules as amended upto 1979
provide that the Gujarat Judicial Service shall consist of two
branches namely (i) Junior Branch and (ii) Senior Branch. U\e     E
junior branch shall consist of two classes, i.e. (a) Class I
comprising the cadre of Civil Judges (Senior Division) (b) the
Judges of the Courts of Small causes and (c) Class II compris-
ing Civil Judges (Junior Division) and Judicial Magistrate of
First Class. In accordance with the amended recruitment rules
1979 the cadre of Civil Judge (Senior Division) shall consist     F
of :-

           (a) all Judicial Officers holding on the said date,
           the post of :-

           (i) Civil Judge (Senior Division)                      G

           (ii) Chief Judicial Magistrate, and

           (iii) Metropolitan Magistrate

           (b) Officers recruited to the said cadre under sub     H
           rule (i) of Rule 4.
    932                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS       [1986] 1 s.c.R.
A                                                                         ...
         The Senior Branch shall consist of District Judges
    Principal Judge and Judges of Ahmedabad City Civil Court, the
    Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, the Chief Judge of Small Causes
    Court,   Ahmedabad,   the Additional Chief Metropolitan
    Magistrate, Ahmedabad and the Assistant Judges. Rules 6(4)(i)
    and 6(4)(iii)(a) clearly provide that a Civil Judge (Senior
B   Division) after completing 48 ,years of age will not be
    eligible for consideration for promotion to the post of
    Assistant Judge and his name appearing in select list will be
    struck out from the select list on his c°""letion of 48 years
    i.e. on reaching 49 years of age.
c        The only question for consideration is whether the
    provisions of aforesaid rules 6(4)(i) and 6(4)(iii)(a) of the
    Gujarat Judicial Service Recruitment Rules 1961 as amended
    upto 1979 are invalid being arbitrary, irrationale,
    unreasonable and in contravention of the equality clause
    envisaged in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
D   To decide properly this question, it is relevant to consider
    in this connection rule 6(2)(i), which provides for
    appointment    to the post of     District Judge.    The   relevant
    excerpt of the said rule is quoted hereinbelow

                  The appointment to the post of a District Judge
E                 shall be made by the Governor :-

                  (a) in consultation with the High Court from
                  amongst the members of the Junior Branch who have
                  ordinarily served as Assistant Judges; or
F                 (b) on the recommendation of the High Court from
                  amongst members of the Bar who have practised as
                  Advocates or Pleaders for not less than seven years
                  in the High Court or Court subordinate thereto :-

                  Provided that a person recruited at the age of not
G                 more than 45 years (except in the case of a person
                  belonging to a coDD111nity recognised as Backward by
                  Government for the purpose of recruitment in whose
                  case at the age of not more than 48 years) shall
                  before he is appointed as a District Judge, be
                  appointed in the first instance to be an Assistant
H                 Judge for such period as may, on the recommendation
              INDRAVADAN v. STATE [B.C. RAY, J.]            933

                                                                   A
           of the High Court, be decided by Govern..,nt on the
           merits of his case.

      It appears that regarding appointment to the posts of
District Judges by promotion from amongst members of the
Junior Branch who have ordinarily served as an Assistant           B
Judge, there is no limit or bar of age unlike that of the
appointment of an Assistant Judge by promotion from the
..,mbers of Civil Judges (Senior Division) or from members of
Civil Judges (Junior Division). It is only in the case of
direct recruitment from amongst the members of the Bar to the
post of District Judges there is an age limit of 45 years
which is relaxed to 48 years in the case of .recruitment of        c
persons belonging to the colllllllnity recognised as backward by
the Government. It was tried to be justified on behalf of the
respondents particularly by the High Court of Gujarat by
filing Counter that this age restriction for promotion to the
post of Assistant Judge was in vogue since 1924 or so even in
the erst-while State of Bombay, though there was no age limit      D
for selection to the post of District Judge from the Bar. It
has been further stated that the rationale under lying the age
restriction for recruitment to the post of Assistant Judge is
that such Assistant Judges should have sufficient number of
years left before they reach the age of superannuation, so
that their service can be utilized as District Judges. There       E
would be no point in selecting them as Assistant Judges if
they have to retire only as Assistant Judges. It has been
further stated therein that the present pay scale of Civil
Judges (Senior·Division) is Rs.1300-1700 p.m. and the same is
the scale for the post of an Assistant Judge. So if an incum-
bent is taken as an Assistant Judge at an advanced stage he        F
may have to retire only as an Assistant Judge with the result
that he will not have any pecuniary gain by being promoted as
an Assistant Judge from the post of Civil Judge (Senior
Division). It has been further stated that the law making
authority might have considered ·that a Civil Judge (Senior
Division) or Civil Judge (Junior Division) who completes 48        G
years of age may not be fully equipped with the physical and
mental calibre for that higher post calling for essentially
different type of duties, namely conducting Sessions cases,
 appeals, etc. The High Court duly considered this aspect of
the case and thereafter the rules in question were framed. No
rejoinder has 1 however, been filed on behalf of the State.        H
'



        934                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS    [1986] l s.c.R.
    A
              Similar contentions were made before us by the learned
        counsel who appeared on behalf of the High Court to support
        the rationale behind the laying down of the age bar for the
        pul-pose of promotion to the post of Assistant Judge in case of
        persons already in service.
    B        The Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court held that
        this system was in vogue for many decades, even in the
        bilingual State of Bombay. Though there was no restriction
        regarding age for selection from the members of the Bar to the
        post of District Judge, there was age limit for selection and
        appointment by promotion from the members of Junior Branch to
    c   the posts of Assistant Judges. This age restriction provided
        by the recruiting authorities for different cadres of posts is
        not repugnant to Article 14 of the Constitution. It was also
        observed that members of the Bar have got free atmosphere to
        work and there was enough scope for them to better develop
        their mental faculty. If in the interest of an important post
    D   like that of a District Judge, a member of the Bar is to be
        recruited in order to enthuse fresh blood at that important
        position of the service cadre, it can be said to be a
        different class altogether. As such there was no discrimi-
        nation by introducing age bar in the recruitment rules so far
        as appointment to the post of Assistant Judges by promotion is
    E   concerned. The Class of Assistant Judges and the Class of
        District Judges for this purpose constitute two different
        classes.

              This reasoning given by the High Court is totally
        unsustainable for the simple reason that if a person holding
    F   the post of Civil Judge (Senior Division) who has completed 48
        years of age is considered to be not fully equipped with the
                                                                          .. -
                                                                          I

        physical and mental calibre for being appointed to the higher
        post of Assistant Judge, then on the same analogy how a member
        of the Bar will be conside>ed at the age of 48 years to be
        mst suitable for being appointed to the higher and
    G   responsible post of District Judge and such appointees will
        inf use fresh blood at the important service. On the other hand
        it is well established that with the coming of age and
        experience, a Judicial Officer becomes mre suited and well
        equipped to perform and discharge the higher duties and           ....
        responsibilities attached to the higher posts of Assistant
    H   Judge and that of District Judge.
                           ,
                  INDRAVADAN v. STATE [B.C. RAY, J.]           935
                                                                      A
         The posts of Assistant Judge as well as of District Judge
    are included in Senior Branch of Guj ar.at Judicial Service. It
    ls incomprehensible how these two cadres of Assistant Judges
    and District Judges can be treated as two different classes
    altogether, thereby justifying the introduction of age
    restriction in regard to selection and appointment by             B
    promotion to the post of Assistant Judge while doing away with
    any such sort of age limit or restriction in respect of
    appointment to the post of a "District Judge by promotion from
    amngst the members of the Junior Branch who have served ""
    Assistant Judges.· Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution
    ensure that there should not be any discrimination in the
    matter of appointment in service, nor there will be any           c
    arbitrariness or unreasonableness in the rules of recruitment
    providing for appointment to the service either by promtion
    or by direct recruitment.· There is no nexus to the object
    sought to be achieved by introducing the age restriction as
    regards the promotion by appointment to the post of Assistant
    Judge from amongst the members of the Gujarat Judicial Service    D
    (Junior Branch), as provided in Rules 6(4)(i) and 6(4)(iii)(a)
    of the said rules. But in respect of appointment to the higher
    post of a District Judge by promotion from amongst the members
    of the Junior Branch who have served as Assistant Judges, no
    such restriction of age has been provided in Rule 6(2)(i)(a)
    and (b) of the said rules. There is obviously no rationale,       E
    nor any reasonableness for introduction of this age bar in
    regard to appointment by promotion to the post of an Assistant
    Judge. The rule, is, therefore, arbitrary and it violates the
    salutary principles of equality and want of arbitrariness in
    the matter of public employment as guaranteed by Articles 14
    and 16 of the Constitution. It is pertinent to refer in this      F
    connection to the observations · of this Court in the case of
    E,P. Royappa v. State of Tamilnadu & Anr. [1974] 2 S.C.R. P•
    348 at p. 386 which are in the following terms :-

               "Though enacted as a distinct and independent
               fundamental right because of its great importance      G
               as a principle ensuring equality of opportunity in
               public employment which is so vital to the building
               up of the new classless egalitarian society
               envisaged in the Constitution, Art. 16 is only an
               instance of the application of the concept of
               equality enshrined in Art.14. In other words, Art •    H




•
    936                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS       (19861 i s.c.R.
A

               14 is the genus while Art. 16 is a species, Art. 16
               gives effect to the doctrine of equality in all
               matters relating to public employment. The basic
               principle which, therefore, informs both Arts. 14
               and 16 is equality and inhibition against
B              discrimination ••••••••

               Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and
               dimensions and it cannot be "cribbed, cabined and
               confined" within traditional and doctrinaire
               limits. From a positivistic point of view, equality
c              is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality
               and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to
               the rule of law in a republic while the other, to
               the whim and caprice of an absolute 1110narch. Where
               an act is arbitrary it is implicit in it that it is
               unequal both according to political logic and
D              constitutional law."

          Similar observations have been made in the case of lls1ieka
    Genclbf. Yo Uoioo of India [1978) 2 S.C.R. p. 621. It has been
    observed that :-

E              "Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in · State
               action and ensures fairness and equality of
               treatment. The principle of reasonableness, which
               legally as well as philosophically, is an essential
               element of equality or. non-arbitrariness pervades
               Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence."
F
         The reach and ambit of Article 14 has been very                'f
    succinctly reiterated again by this Court in the case of JL.D.      '    ..
    Sbetty v. International Airport Authority of India & Ors.
    (1979] 3 s.c.R. p.1014 as follows :-

G              "It is now well settled that Article 14 strikes at
               arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness
               and equality of treatment. It requires that State
               action llllSt not be arbitrary but llllst be based on
               some    rational relevant principle which is
               non-discriminatory; it llllst not be guided Ir; any
H               extraneous or irrelevant considerations, because
                that would be denial of equality. The principle of
                   INDRAVADAN v. STATE [B.C. RAY, J.]            937
                                                                         A

               reasonableness and rationality which is legally as
               well aa philosophicaliy an essential element of
               equality or non-arbitrariness is protected by
               Article 14 and it 11118,t characterise every State
               action whether it be under authority of law or in
                                                                         B
               ~ercise of executive power without making of law."

           We have already ~tated hereinbefore that the provisions
     of rules 6(4)(i) read with 6(4)(iii)(a) are irrational,
     arbitrary and unreasonable inaa1111ch as there is no nexus to
     the object sought to be achieved by introducing the age
     restriction in regard to appointment of Assistant Judge by
     promotion from amongst members holding posts of Civil Judges        c
      (Junior Division) and those in the cadre of Civil Judges
      (Senior Division) whose names have been entered in the select
      list. We have also held that though the post of Assistant
     Judge aa well as the post of District Judge belong to the
     Senior Branch of Gujarat Judicial Service, yet in the higher
-f                                                                       D
     cadre of District Judge no such age bar has been introduced.
     Moreover, as has been stated by the learned counsel appearing
     ·on behalf of the High Court ilf Gujarat that this rule
      regarding age restrktion which was originally introduced in
      the recruitment rules of Judicia1 Services in the bilingual
      State of Bombay has subsequently been deleted and discontinued
                                                                         E
      in the relevant· Recruitment Rules of Maharashtra Judicial
      Service, it is curious that this archaic, unreasonable and
      irrational rule which is ex-facie .·arbitrary and discriminatory
     has been allowed to continue in ·.the Gujarat Judicial Service ·
     Recruitment Rules 1961 as amended upto 1979.

          We wish to make it clear that our observations made ·          F
     hereinbefore should not be construed to mean that there cannot
     be any fixation of age of superannuation in different grades
     of other services namely armed forces, air force and naval
     force. In such services the fixation of different age of
     superannuation in different grades may be made in public
     interest in order to ensure excellence in service as well as        G
     merit and efficiency which to a great extent depend on
     physical fitness apart from merit.

          In the premises aforesaid, the provisions of rule 6(4)(i)
     and rule 6(4)'(Ui)(a) of the Gujarat Judicial Service
                                                                         H
     Recruitment (amended rules), 1979 is invalid and bad as it is
    938                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS     [1986 J 1 s.c.R.

A
    unreasonable, irrationale, arbitrary and discriminatory, and
    violating the equality clause envisaged in Articles 14 and 16
    of the Constitution of India.

         These rules in so far as they impose age restriction in
    the matter of prOllk>tion to the post of Assistant Judge are
B   liable to be quashed and set aside and the judgment of the
    High Court of Gujarat is also set aside. We direct that the
    name of this appellant shall be deemed to have been continued
    in the select list of 1983-84 and his case for appointment to
    the post of Assistant Judge shall be considered on that basis
    by the authorities concerned. If he is so appointed to the
c   post of Assistant Judge, he shall get his due seniority and
    all retiral benefits reckoning his service on that basis. The
    appeal is accordingly allowed. There will be no order as to
    costs.




    A.P.J.                                        Appeal allowed.




                                                                     ''