Holding

The Calcutta City Civil Court Act is intra vires; the State Legislature may legislate on the jurisdiction of courts under the constitutional entries on administration of justice.

Summary

Indu Bhusan De and others challenged the Calcutta City Civil Court Act, 1953, which empowered the West Bengal State Government to create a City Civil Court with a pecuniary jurisdiction up to Rs. 1 lakh, arguing that only Parliament could legislate on the jurisdiction of the High Court. The Calcutta High Court dismissed the petition, holding the Act intra vires. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the legislative competence of the State under the Constitution, focusing on entries in List II (now List III) concerning "administration of justice" and "jurisdiction and powers of all courts". Relying on the precedent set in State of Bombay v. Narothamdas (1951), the Court held that these entries grant State Legislatures authority to define and alter the jurisdiction of courts below the Supreme Court. Consequently, the Act was declared constitutional and the appeal dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the Calcutta City Civil Court Act, 1953 is ultra vires the legislative competence of the West Bengal State Legislature.
Whether the power to define the jurisdiction of a civil court falls within the State's authority under the Constitution.

Legislation cited

Calcutta City Civil Court Act, 1953s. 5(2)
Constitution of Indias. Article 141
Government of India Act, 1935

Subjects

jurisdictionadministration of justicelegislative competencestate legislaturecity civil courtconstitutional lawSupreme Court precedentArticle 141

Judgment

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A

INDU BHUSAN DE & ORS.
v.
THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL
B
AUGUST 12, 1986

[E.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND RANGANATH MISRA, JJ.]

." Calcutta City Civil Court Act (21of1953) section 5(2) fixing local
limits and pecuniary jurisdiction of City Civil Courts-Whether the Act
c
is ultra vires the Constitution for want of legislative competence of the
State Legislature-Entry 53 of List I, Entries 1 and 2 of List II and
Entry 15 of List Ill of the Government of India Act, 1935 (of Entry llA
of List III of Schedule VII of the Constitution)-Binding nature of the
Supreme Court decision-Constitution of India, 1950 Article 141.
- •.._ D
The Calcutta City Civil Court Act empowered the State Govern-
ment to establish a civil court to be called the City Civil Court and
under section 5(2) thereof the local limits and the jurisdiction of the City
Civil Court was tu be the city of Calcutta. Section 5(2)·as it stands now
f1Xed the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court at Rupees one lakh and
excluded the High Court's jurisdiction up to that limit. E

The appellant moved the Calcutta High Court for a declaration
that the Act was ultra vires the jurisdiction of the State Legislature and
contended that Parliament alone had the legislative competence to make
law affecting the jurisdiction of the High 'Court. The learned Single
'( Judge and also the Division Bench negatived the appellant's plea and F
held that the Act was intra vires the Constitution. Hence the appeal by
certificate.

Dismissing the appeal, the"Court,

HELD: I. Entries I and 2 of List II of the Government of India G
Act, 1935 (now Entry llA of List ·m of the Seventh Schedule of the
Constitution) authorised law making on subject of administration of
justice, constitution and organisation of courts and jurisdiction and
powers thereof excepting in regard to the Supreme Court. The Calcutta
City Civil Court Act received the Presidential assent and was therefore,
competent to bring about a change in the prevailing position obtaining H

547
548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 3 S.C.R.

A under the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court. [551E-G]

2. In Narotham Das's case, the Supreme Court took the view
namely, "administration of justice" authorised making of law confer-
ring on, or taking away from, courts, jurisdiction to entertain cases.
Inasmuch as the provisions of the Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948
B considered in Narotham Das's case and the provisions of the Calcutta
Act, are in pari materia, the High Court correctly held that the Act was
intra vires the Constitution. The decision of the Constitution Bench in
Narotham Das's case is clear and binding precedent under Article 14 l
of the Constitution, against the appellant's stand. [55JE-F; H)

c State of Bombay v. Narothamdas Jethabhai & Anr., [1951)
S.C.R. SJ, followed.

Amarendra Nath Roy Chowdhury v. Bikash Chandra Chose &
Anr., A.LR. 1957 Calcutta 534, approved.
D CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2065
of 1971 ·

From the Judgment and Order dated 28.7.1970 of the Calcutta
High Court in Original Order No. 125 of 1970.

E B.P. Maheshwari, S.N. Aggarwal and B.M. Bagaria for the
Appellants.

D.N. Mukarjee and G.S. Chatterjee forthe Respondents.

The,Judgment of the Court was delivered by
F
RANGANATH MISRA, J. This appeal by certificate from the
Calcutta High Court assails the affirming judgment of the Division
Bench upholding the dismissal of a writ petition challenging the vires
of the Calcutta City Civil Court Act (21of1953) and its later amend-
ment on the ground of want of legislative competence of the State
G Legislature. The City Civil Court Act ('Act' for short), empowered the
State Government to establish a civil court to be called the City Civil
Court and under section 5 thereof the local limits and the jurisdiction
of the City Civil Court was to be the city gf Calcutta. Sub-section (2) of
s. 5 ptovided:
H "Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (4), the
INDU Bf!'USAN v. STATE OF W.B. [MISRA. J.] 549

City Civil Court shall have jurisdiction and the High·Court A
shall not have jurisdiction to try suits and proceedings of a
·civil nature not exceeding Rs.10,000-in value."

The value of Rs.10,000 was later enhanced to Rs.50,000 and
again to Rs. 1 lakh. The appellant moved the Calcutta High Court for
B
a declaration that the Act was ultra vires the ~tate legislature. It was

.... 'contended that Parliament alone had the legislative competence to
make law affecting the jurisdiction of the High Court. The learned
single judge as also the Division Bench negatived the appellant's plea
and have held that the Act was intra vires the Constitution.

It is appropriate to refer to the relevant legislative entries in the c
three lists-Union, State and Concurrent- as they stood in 1953 when
the Act was enacted. In the Union List entries 77, 78 and 95 are
relevant. They provide:

"77. Constitution, organisation, jurisdiction and powers of
D
the Supreme Court (including contempt of such Court),
and the fees taken therein; persons entitled to practise be-
fore the Supreme Court.

78. Constitution and organisation (including vacations) of
the High Courts except provisions as to officers and ser-
E
vants of High Court; persons entitled to practise before the
High Court.

95. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the
Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in this
list; admiralty jurisdiction."
F
Entry 3, List II at the relevant time provided:

"3. Administration of justice, con~titution ~nd organisa-
tion of all courts except the Supreme Court and the High
Courts; officers and servants of the High Court; procedure
G
in rent and revenue courts; fees taken in all courts except
the Supreme Court."

...._, Entry 65, List II provides:

"65. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the H
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 3 S.C.R.

A Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in this
list." ¥ ~

Entry 46, List III provides:

"46. Jurisdiction and power of all courts, except the
B
Supreme Court, with respect to any. of the matters in this
list."

A Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Bombay v. Naro-
thamdas Jethabhai & Anr., [1951] S.C.R. 51, examined the validity of

c
the Bombay City Civil Court Act of 1948. the provisions of that Act
and the impugned Act are almost similar. The challenge to the vires of
t:.
\
the Bombay Act had to be examined keeping the provisions of
Government of India Act, 1935, in view inasmuch as that was a pre-
Constitution legislation. Each of the learned Judges wrote a separate
judgment but all of them were agreed that the Bombay Act was a law +--
with respect to a matter enumerated in List II and was not ultra vires.
D
Entry 53 of List I was to the following effect: .

"53. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the
Federal Court, with respect to any of the matters in this
list . ..... "
E
Entries 1 and 2 of List II were as under:

"l. ... The administration of justice, constitution and or-
ganisation of all courts, except the Federal Court, and fees
taken therein; ..... .
F 2. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the Federal
Court, with respect to any of the matters in this list; proce-
dure in Rent and Revenue Courts."

Entry 15 of List III was to the following effect:
G "15. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the Fed-
eral Court, with respect to any of the matters in this List."

The two relevant entries in List II of the Seventh Schedule of the
Constitution authorised law making on subject of administration of jus-
tice, constitution and organisation of courts and jurisdiction and pow-
H
INDU BHUSAN v. STATE OF W.B. [MISRA, J.) 551
•
ers thereof exCepting in regard to the Supreme Court. These were the A
two ·expressions with reference to which Fazal Ali, J. i_n Narotham
Das's case observed thl)S'.

' " ... the expressions "administtatiort' of justice" and "con~
stifution and organisation of courts"; which have been used B
therein without any qualification or limitation, are wide
, enough to include the power and jurisdiction of courts, f<H"
how can justice be administered if courts have no power
and jurisdiction to administer it, and how can courts func-
tion without any power of jurisdiction. Once this fact is
clearly grasped, it follows that, by virtue of the words used
in Entry I of List II; the Provincial Legislature can invest c
the courts constituted by it with power and jurisdiction to
try every cause or matter that can be dealt with by a court
. . of civil or criminal jurisdiction and that the expression
"administration of justice" must necessarily include-the
power to try suits and proceedings of a civil as well as D
criminal nature irrespective of who the parties to the suit or
proceeding or what its subject-matter may be. This power
must necessarily include the power of defining, enlarging,
altering, amending and diminishing the jurisdiction of the
courts and defining their jurisdiction tettitotialiy and
pecuniarily.~ ·
E
The other learned Judges constituting the Bench took the same view
n·arnely, "administration of justice" authorised making of law confer-
ring on, or taking away from, courts, jqrisdiction to entertain cases.
This decision of the Constitution Bench clearly negatives t_he claim of
the appellant that the impugned Act was ultra vires the jurisdiction of
F
the West Bengal Legislature. Admittedly the Act received Presidential
assent and was, therefore, competent to bring about a change in the
prevailing position obtaining under the Letters Patent of the Calcutta
High Court.

A similar challenge as in the present dispute had also been raised
G
before the Calcutta High Court in the case of Amarendra Nath Roy
Chowdhury v. Bikiish Chandra Ghose & Anr., AIR 1957 Calcutta 534
and a learned single Judge relying on the decision of the Constitution
Bench referred to above had held that the Act was intra vires the State
legislature. We ate of the view that the decision of the Constitution
Bench_ is a clear and binding precedent against the appellant's stand. i-1
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 3 S.C.R.

A The appeal has no merit and is, therefore, dismissed. There will be no
order as to costs in this Court.

S.R. Appeal dismissed.

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