INSPECTOR, RAILWAY PROTECTION FORCE, KOTTAYAMversusMATHEW K CHERIAN & ANR.

                  [2025] 1 S.C.R. 498 : 2025 INSC 51

            Inspector, Railway Protection Force, Kottayam
                                  v.
                       Mathew K Cherian & Anr.
                     (Criminal Appeal No. 4169 of 2024)
                               09 January 2025
           [Dipankar Datta* and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.]


                            Issue for Consideration
       Whether the act of creating fake/multiple user IDs by an individual,
       who may or may not be an authorized railway agent, with the intention
       to procure and supply online tickets through IRCTC portal would
       constitute an offence under Section 143 of the Railways Act, 1989.

                                   Headnotes†
       Railways Act, 1989 – s.143 – In the first of the appeal (lead
       appeal), M was accused of creating fraudulent user IDs with
       the Indian Railway Catering and Tourism Corporation web
       portal to procure and peddle railway tickets for profit, without
       being an agent authorised to procure and supply railway
       tickets and, therefore, operating an unauthorised business for
       procurement and supply of railway tickets – Crime case u/s.143
       of the 1989 Act was registered – M filed application u/s.482
       CrPC – The High Court, vide the impugned order, quashed the
       criminal proceedings – In the another connected appeal, the
       offence alleged against R, an authorised agent, was that he
       has been supplying e-tickets to various customers, and that
       these e-tickets had been booked through multiple user IDs –
       Crime case u/s.143 of the 1989 Act was registered – R filed
       application u/s.482 before the High Court – The High Court
       refused to quash the criminal proceedings – Correctness:
       Held: S.143, on its plain language, prohibits any person, other than
       a railway servant or an authorised agent, to conduct the business
       of procurement and supply of railway tickets – The provision
       does not specify the modalities of the procurement and supply –
       Hence, if the natural and ordinary meaning is given to the section,
       keeping in mind the objective and purpose of the legislation, it
       admits of no doubt that this provision criminalises unauthorised
       procurement and supply, irrespective of the mode of procurement
* Author
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                                499

            Inspector, Railway Protection Force, Kottayam v.
                        Mathew K Cherian & Anr.

     and supply – The mere fact of the system of e-reservation and
     e-tickets being introduced after the enactment of the Act does not
     render the provision in s.143 toothless to combat the illegal sale
     of e-tickets – S.143, importantly, makes no distinction between
     physical and online sale of tickets – The mischief that the provision
     seeks to remedy is that there should not be illegal and unauthorised
     procurement and sale of tickets, whatever be the mode-physical
     or online – In the lead appeal, the facts of the case prima facie
     reveal the commission of an offence u/s.143 of the Act – M, without
     the authorisation of the railways, was carrying on a business of
     procurement and supply of railway tickets – The allegations against
     M taken at face value fulfil the elements required u/s.143(1)(a) of
     the Act – In the connected appeals, R was an authorised agent of
     the railways carrying on the business of procurement and supply of
     railway tickets – S.143 only deals with the actions of unauthorised
     persons and does not mandate a procedure to be followed by
     the authorised agents for procuring or supplying tickets to its
     customers – The nature of allegations against R in the connected
     appeal, though serious, s.143 would not be attracted insofar as he
     is concerned – To sum up, M not being an authorised agent has
     to face the proceedings against him while R, being an authorised
     agent, cannot be proceeded against u/s.143 of the Act for alleged
     breach of any of the terms and conditions of the contract – Thus,
     criminal proceedings against M are restored and the proceedings
     against R are hereby quashed. [Paras 27, 28, 34, 35, 37, 38, 40]

     Interpretation of Statutes – Statutory provision – Subsequent
     developments:
     Held: Statutory interpretation has to follow certain principles which
     have been formulated through legal precedents – No court can
     refuse to enforce a provision on the sole basis of the provision
     predating any subsequent development regarding the ticketing
     process – If it can be demonstrated that a statutory provision is
     broad enough to envelop the subsequent developments, even
     if the developments were not envisioned by the legislature, the
     provision would stay operational. [Para 21]

     Interpretation of Statutes – Language of statute – Addition or
     deletion of words:
     Held: It is settled that if the language of the particular statute under
     consideration is clear and unambiguous, it is not for the courts
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       to add to or delete any words from the statute in the guise of
       ascertaining what could have been the legislative intent. [Para 26]

                               Case Law Cited
       Senior Electric Inspector v. Laxminarayan Chopra [1962] SCR 3
       146 : AIR 1962 SC 159; Dharani Sugars and Chemicals Ltd. v.
       Union of India [2019] 6 SCR 307 : (2019) 5 SCC 480; Jugalkishore
       Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd. [1955] 1 SCR 1369 : AIR 1955 SC
       376; Ansal Properties & Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana [2009]
       1 SCR 553 : (2009) 3 SCC 553 – relied on.
       R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [1960] 3 SCR 311 : 1960 SCC
       OnLine SC 21; State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha [1982] 3 SCR
       121 : (1982) 1 SCC 561; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992]
       Supp. 3 SCR 735 : (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335; Pepsi Foods Ltd.
       v. Special Judicial Magistrate [1997] Supp. 5 SCR 12 : (1998) 5
       SCC 749; Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [2012] 7 SCR 988 :
       (2012) 9 SCC 460 – referred to.
       Comdel Commodities Ltd. v. Siporex Trade S.A. (No. 2) (1990) 2
       All ER 552 (HL) – referred to.

                                  List of Acts
       Railways Act, 1989; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

                               List of Keywords
       Unauthorized Business; Procure; Supply; Railway e-tickets;
       Fraudulent Activity; Fake and Multiple User-Ids; Interpretation of
       Statutes; Authorized Agents; Statutory Interpretation; Disciplinary
       Control; Modalities of Procurement and Supply; Sale of Valueless
       Tickets.

                              Case Arising From
       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
       4169 of 2024
       From the Judgment and Order dated 22.09.2016 of the High Court
       of Kerala at Ernakulam in CRLMC No. 1991 of 2016
       With
       Criminal Appeal Nos. 139-140 of 2025
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                                      501

                Inspector, Railway Protection Force, Kottayam v.
                            Mathew K Cherian & Anr.

                                 Appearances for Parties
      Mrs. Aishwarya Bhati, A.S.G., P. N. Prakash, Sr. Adv., Namit
      Saxena, Amrish Kumar, Mrs. Shivika Mehra, Mrs. Sonia Mathur,
      Merusagar Samantray, Sushil Kumar Dubey, Ms. Priyanka Terdal,
      Ms. Riddhi Jad, Advs. for the Appellant.
      Amrish Kumar, A. Raghunath, Alim Anvar, Nishe Rajen Shonker,
      Mrs. Anu K. Joy, Ajith Anto Perumbully, Advs. for the Respondents.

                       Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                           Judgment

      Dipankar Datta, J.

      Introduction
1.    Common question of law touching interpretation of Section 143 of the
      Railways Act, 19891 is involved in these appeals by special leave;
      hence, we propose to decide the same by this common judgment.
2.    In the first of the two sets of appeals,2 the judgment and order3 of
      the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulum4 is assailed whereby criminal
      proceedings under Section 143 of the Act launched against the first
      respondent – Mathew K. Cheriian5 – was quashed.
3.    In the connected appeals, the appellant - J. Ramesh6 – has assailed
      the judgment and order7 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras8
      refusing to quash the criminal proceedings launched against Ramesh
      under Section 143 of the Act.

      Factual Matrix
4.    The factual scenario of the two sets of appeals are not too complicated.
      The facts which are germane are noted as a precursor to our discussion.


1    the Act
2    the lead appeal
3    in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 1991/2016 dt. 22.09.2016
4    Kerala High Court
5    Mathew
6    Ramesh
7    In CRL. O.P. No.18701/2020 18703/2020 and Crl. MP. Nos.7328/2020 and 7329/2020
8    Madras High Court
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5.     The prosecution case in the lead appeal is that on 11.03.2016,
       on reliable information being disclosed to the Inspector, Railway
       Protection Force,9 that unauthorised business of procuring and
       supplying railway e-tickets was being carried out in the office
       of Mathew, Crime Case No. 524/2016 under Section 143 of the
       Act was registered and a search conducted thereat. During the
       search and seizure operation, one employee named Joby Jose of
       Kosamattam Finance, a non-banking finance company (of which
       Mathew happened to be the managing director) was arrested and
       17 pieces of evidence were seized. In his confessional statement,
       Joby Jose stated he was working under the supervision of Mathew.
       On the basis of this statement, Mathew was made co-accused in
       Crime Case No. 524/2016. He was accused of creating fraudulent
       user IDs with the Indian Railway Catering and Tourism Corporation10
       web portal to procure and peddle railway tickets for profit, without
       being an agent authorised to procure and supply railway tickets
       and, therefore, operating an unauthorised business for procurement
       and supply of railway tickets. Aggrieved, Mathew moved the Kerala
       High Court under Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, 197311
       seeking quashing of the proceedings. The Kerala High Court, vide
       the impugned order, quashed the criminal proceedings emanating
       from Crime Case No. 524/2016. Dissatisfied thereby, the Inspector,
       RPF is in appeal.
6.     The connected appeals arise out of Case Crime No. 3116/2019
       and Case Crime No. 600/2020. The case of the prosecution is that
       Ramesh and his son are the owners of “Big Top Travels” which
       is an authorised agent for railway e-tickets. On 05.12.2019, Case
       Crime No. 3116/2019 came to be registered against Ramesh under
       Section 143 of the Act on the basis of a search and seizure operation
       conducted by a special team of the RPF in the shop premises of
       Ramesh. The offence alleged against him is that he has been
       supplying e-tickets to various customers, and that these e-tickets had
       been booked through multiple user IDs. Case Crime No. 600/2020
       was registered against Ramesh, also under Section 143(1)(a) of
       the Act for his involvement in fraudulent activities such as supply of


9    RPF
10   IRCTC
11   Cr.PC
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                            503

             Inspector, Railway Protection Force, Kottayam v.
                         Mathew K Cherian & Anr.

     Tatkal e-tickets by creating multiple personal-user IDs and issuing
     unauthorised e-tickets procured through IRCTC website, contrary
     to IRCTC Rules. Ramesh, feeling aggrieved by initiation of criminal
     action by the respondent-authorities, approached the Madras High
     Court under Section 482, Cr. PC with a prayer to quash the criminal
     proceedings. The Madras High Court, however, refused to quash
     the criminal proceedings. Dissatisfied with the impugned order of
     the Madras High Court, Ramesh has questioned the same in the
     connected appeals.

     Submissions
7.   For the sake of brevity, the submissions advanced by the parties
     in both sets of the appeals are noted together. Arguments of the
     prosecution can be summarised as follows:
     I.     Section 143 of the Act does not permit authorised agents to carry
            out unauthorised actions under the façade of authorisation. When
            an authorised agent carries out unauthorised transactions using
            the personal IDs of other individuals, the cloak of authorisation
            cannot be used as a ruse. Therefore, to be exempt from the
            application of Section 143, both the status of the person and
            the nature of the action must be considered.
     II.    Section 143 is part of the overall scheme to promote the efficacy
            of the railway system and its operations. Therefore, the Court
            must interpret the provision in line with the object of the statute.
     III.   Mathew, as the Managing Director of a finance company, created
            hundreds of user IDs to sell railway tickets at a premium which
            constitutes an offence under Section 143.
     IV.    Section 143 makes no distinction between physical tickets
            and e-tickets and only contemplates penal action against
            unauthorised carrying on of the business of procuring and
            supplying railway tickets.
     V.     Offence under Section 143 is a social crime. The mischief is
            sought to be addressed by limiting the number of tickets that
            an individual can purchase using his personal ID and, thereby,
            touting of railway tickets is prevented.
     VI.    The Kerala High Court has erred in quashing the criminal
            proceedings at this stage as a bare perusal of the complaint
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              reveals that all the ingredients under Section 143 are prima
              facie attracted.
       VII. The Madras High Court has correctly refrained from following
            the erroneous decision of the Kerala High Court.
       VIII. While upholding the decision of the Madras High Court, the
             decision of the Kerala High Court ought to be reversed and the
             prosecution allowed to lead its evidence before the relevant trial
             courts for the proceedings to be taken to its logical conclusion.
8.     The submissions on behalf of the accused – Mathew and Ramesh –
       in favour of quashing of the proceedings, as advanced before us,
       are these:
       I.     The plain and unambiguous words of Section 143 of the Act
              make it clear that the creation of multiple user IDs is not an
              offence under Section 143, and Section 143 must be construed
              strictly as it is a penal provision.
       II.    The materialisation of e-ticketing scheme could not have been
              conceptualised by the legislature at the time of passing the Act,
              as the scheme as well as the internet did not exist at that time.
       III.   Section 143(1)(a) was intended to penalise the sale of tickets
              by persons other than railway servants and authorized agents.
       IV.    Ramesh is an authorised agent and, thus, could not have been
              proceeded against under Section 143(1), on its own terms;
              and, if at all, there has been a breach or violation of the terms
              and conditions of the contract by Ramesh, the remedy of the
              railways/RPF is to approach the civil court.
       V.     The decision of the Madras High Court ought to be reversed and
              the decision of the Kerala High Court upheld, thereby bringing
              down the curtain on both the criminal proceedings.

       Impugned Orders
9.     Now, let us have a look at the orders impugned before us. A thorough
       examination thereof would enable us to arrive at an appropriate
       conclusion.
10. In the lead appeal, the Kerala High Court has quashed the criminal
    proceedings against the first respondent. The reasons assigned
    therefor are reproduced below:
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                          505

            Inspector, Railway Protection Force, Kottayam v.
                        Mathew K Cherian & Anr.

           “5. The Act was enacted much before the advent of
           e-ticket system. The object of Section 143 is to prevent
           procurement of ticket for travelling on railway or in a
           reserved compartment or journey in a train by any person
           with the ticket not being issued by railway servant or by an
           authorised agent. It appears that Railway wants to ensure
           the authenticity of the tickets issued to the travellers on
           a travel in a railway. It appears that many travellers were
           travelling on railway in a ticket not being issued to them
           and issued in the name of third parties. The Railways Act
           wants to ensure that the ticket is issued by railway servant
           or agent authorised on this behalf as the case may be to
           a genuine travellers (sic, “traveller”).
           6. …The use of internet medium registered in the name
           of a person, to issue tickets to a third party is not one
           contemplated under Section 143 for the purpose of
           considering it as an offence. … There is no sale of ticket
           by the petitioner as even admitted in the counter, the sale
           is being conducted by IRCTC. The use of computer or
           use of printer for printing ticket purchased by a traveller
           cannot be deemed as sale effected by the owner of the
           computer or printer. Procuring tickets has to be understood
           as providing or giving tickets to the travellers. Admittedly
           tickets are procured by the genuine travellers. When
           legislature considered an actionable wrong in a particular
           manner in a brick and mortar business, it cannot be applied
           to an online business unless all elements constituting the
           offence-are present in the online business. The offence is
           not attracted even if one has to assume that action of the
           accused would amount to revision clearly mandates that
           tickets have to be procured by the offender.”
11. The view taken by the Kerala High Court appears to be that
    Section 143 is somewhat outdated in the age of purchasing tickets
    using the internet. It has, in essence, read down Section 143 to
    state that one can conduct a business of procuring and supplying
    tickets without the authorisation of the railways as long as it is done
    through the internet. The order also observes that as the tickets were
    procured in the name of genuine passengers, it cannot be said that
    Mathew had contravened Section 143.
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12. In the connected appeals, the Madras High Court refused to quash
    the criminal appeal and ratiocinated its view in the following words:
           “9. …This Court is of the considered view that the decision
           held by the High Court of Kerala holding that the said
           provision was enacted much prior to the creation of e-tickets
           and the petitioner therein was not carrying a business of
           procuring and supplying of tickets for travel on the Railway
           reserved tickets through internet and therefore online was
           not prohibited, whereas in the case on hand, the offence
           committed by the petitioner is completely different from
           the aforesaid case. The petitioner himself created more
           than 200 user IDs, procured tickets and supplied to the
           passengers. Further, in the said business of procuring
           and purchasing tickets on Railways were for the benefit
           of Rs.150/- for sleeper and Rs.250/- for A/C per head in
           addition to ticket fare as service charge from his customers,
           prohibited by the provisions under Section 143 of the Act.
           In fact, recommendation of the e-tickets scheme no way
           alters the position of purchase of tickets, as agent or the
           customer can book e-tickets by creating ID in their name.
           But the authorized agent cannot create other user IDs for
           the purpose of procuring tickets for illegal gain. Therefore,
           judgement cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner
           is not applicable to the case on hand. That apart, the
           crime is under investigation and only after investigation,
           the respondent can unearth the truth.”
13. The Madras High Court acknowledged that Ramesh was an
    authorised agent under Section 143; however, it refused to quash the
    criminal proceedings on the ground that such authorisation did not
    empower the appellant to create multiple user IDs for the purpose
    of procuring tickets for illegal gain. On the ground that Ramesh was
    only authorised to sell tickets through his own account and was not
    specifically authorised to create multiple user IDs, the Madras High
    Court dismissed Ramesh’s petition seeking quashing of the criminal
    proceedings.

       Analysis
14. The appeals before us, although have different factual matrices,
    involve a common question of law. Having bestowed serious
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                          507

            Inspector, Railway Protection Force, Kottayam v.
                        Mathew K Cherian & Anr.

     consideration and thought, we find ourselves in a curious position
     where our interference seems to be warranted in both sets of
     appeals.
15. In order to settle the controversy in the present lis, the ambit and scope
    of Section 143 of the Act has to be noticed and comprehended. The
    question before us is whether the act of creating fake/multiple user
    IDs by an individual, who may or may not be an authorized railway
    agent, with the intention to procure and supply online tickets through
    IRCTC portal would constitute an offence under Section 143 of the
    Act? In addition to the scope of Section 143, we need to analyse
    whether the two criminal proceedings in question did merit quashing
    by the respective High Court.
16. At this stage, it would be beneficial to read Section 143 of the Act.
    It reads:
           143. Penalty for unauthorised carrying on of business of
           procuring and supplying of railway ticket-
                (1) if any person, not being a railway servant or an
                agent authorised in this behalf,-
                (a) carries on the business of procuring and supplying
                tickets for travel on a railway or from reserved
                accommodation for journey in a train; or
                (b) purchases or sells or attempts to purchase or sell
                tickets with a view to carrying on any such business
                either by himself or by any other person,
                he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term
                which may extend to three years or with fine which
                may extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both,
                and shall also forfeit the tickets which he do so
                procures, supplies, purchases, sells or attempts to
                purchase or sell:
                Provided that in the absence of special and adequate
                reasons to the contrary to be mentioned in judgment
                of the court, such punishment shall not be less than
                imprisonment for a term-of one month or a fine of
                five thousand rupees.
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                (2) Whoever abets any offence punishable under
                this section shall, whether or not such offence is
                committed, be punishable with the same punishment
                as is provided for the offence.
                                                   (emphasis supplied)
17. The purport and objective of Section 143 of the Act is to restrict entities
    which are not under the disciplinary control of or are not authorised
    by the railways to conduct the business of procurement and supply of
    railway tickets. Railway servants and authorised agents stand apart
    since, on its own terms, Section 143 has no application to them.
18. The whole scheme of e-ticketing was introduced for the convenience
    and betterment of the passenger’s experience of travelling on a train,
    due to which the procurement and supply of these e-tickets, rightfully
    so, is highly regulated. In the additional affidavit of the appellant in
    the lead appeal, Rules and Regulations for Reserved Bail e-Ticketing
    Service Providers (PSPs/RSPs) have been annexed which reflect the
    idea of protecting the consumer and strictly prohibit using personal/
    fraudulent IDs to book tickets for commercial purposes. These rules,
    further, bar sharing of the credentials by these authorised agents.
    Also, the perils of hoarding of resources by a select few are widely
    known and has to be kept in mind while adjudicating the present lis.
19. IRCTC has limited the number of tickets which can be reserved on
    one personal user ID at 12 per month (24 per month with a user ID
    which is Aadhaar verified). Mathew, it is alleged, had created hundreds
    of fake user IDs to sell tickets without any authorisation from the
    railways. Although the internet and e-tickets were unknown in India
    when the Act was brought into force, this conduct of Mathew (who
    is neither a railway servant nor an authorised agent) nevertheless
    attracts criminality under Section 143(1)(a) of the Act.
20. The Kerala High Court allowed the quashing petition filed by Mathew
    on the ground that the Act was enacted before the advent of internet
    and e-tickets and the lawmakers could not have envisioned sale of
    tickets, online. We find this line of reasoning of the High Court to
    be plainly erroneous.
21. Statutory interpretation has to follow certain principles which have
    been formulated through legal precedents. No court can refuse to
    enforce a provision on the sole basis of the provision predating any
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                                509

               Inspector, Railway Protection Force, Kottayam v.
                           Mathew K Cherian & Anr.

      subsequent development regarding the ticketing process. If it can be
      demonstrated that a statutory provision is broad enough to envelop
      the subsequent developments, even if the developments were not
      envisioned by the legislature, the provision would stay operational.
      This principle was expounded by this Court in Senior Electric
      Inspector v. Laxminarayan Chopra12 in the following words:
             “…This Court in construing the words ‘sale of goods’ in
             Entry 48, List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government
             of India Act, 1935, accepted the aforesaid principle in
             State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co., (Madras)
             Ltd. [(1959) SCR 379] and restated it at p. 416 thus:
                    ‘The principle of these decisions is that when, after the
                    enactment of a legislation, new facts and situations
                    arise which could not have been in its contemplation,
                    the statutory provisions could properly be applied
                    to them if the words thereof are in a broad sense
                    capable of containing them.’
             The legal position may be summarized thus: The
             maxim contemporanea expositio as laid down by Coke
             was applied to construing ancient statutes, but not
             to interpreting Acts which are comparatively modern.
             There is a good reason for this change in the mode of
             interpretation. The fundamental rule of construction is the
             same whether the Court is asked to construe a provision of
             an ancient statute or that of a modern one, namely, what
             is the expressed intention of the Legislature. It is perhaps
             difficult to attribute to a legislative body functioning in a
             static society that its intention was couched in terms of
             considerable breadth so as to take within its sweep the
             future developments comprehended by the phraseology
             used. It is more reasonable to confine its intention only
             to the circumstances obtaining at the time the law was
             made. But in a modern progressive society it would be
             unreasonable to confine the intention of a Legislature to
             the meaning attributable to the word used at the time the
             law was made, for a modern Legislature making laws to


12   [1962] 3 SCR 146 : AIR 1962 SC 159
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              govern a society which is fast moving must be presumed to
              be aware of an enlarged meaning the same concept might
              attract with the march of time and with the revolutionary
              changes brought about in social, economic, political and
              scientific and other fields of human activity. Indeed, unless
              a contrary intention appears, an interpretation should be
              given to the words used to take in new facts and situations,
              if the words are capable of comprehending them. We
              cannot, therefore, agree with the learned Judges of the High
              Court that the maxim contemporanea expositio could be
              invoked in construing the word ‘telegraph line’ in the Act.”
                                                     (emphasis supplied)
22. The aforenoted decision has been followed in a relatively recent
    decision of this Court in Dharani Sugars and Chemicals Ltd. v.
    Union of India.13 This Court, further, noticed an English decision in
    Comdel Commodities Ltd. v. Siporex Trade S.A. (No. 2)14 distilling
    the principle as follows:
              ‘… When a change in social conditions produces a novel
              situation, which was not in contemplation at the time
              when a statute was first enacted, there can be no a priori
              assumption that the enactment does not apply to the
              new circumstances. If the language of the enactment
              is wide enough to extend to those circumstances,
              there is no reason why it should not apply.’
23. Bearing in mind the above principles, we may now proceed to consider
    a couple of decisions of this Court on the rule of literal interpretation.
24. In Jugalkishore Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd.,15 Hon’ble S.R. Das J.
    (as His Lordship then was), speaking for the Court, held as follows:
              “6…The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read
              the statutes literally, that is, by giving to the words their
              ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however,
              such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are
              susceptible of another meaning, the Court may adopt


13   [2019] 6 SCR 307 : (2019) 5 SCC 480
14   (1990) 2 All E R 552 (HL)
15   [1955] 1 SCR 1369 : AIR 1955 SC 376
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                             511

               Inspector, Railway Protection Force, Kottayam v.
                           Mathew K Cherian & Anr.

             the same. But if no such alternative construction is
             possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal
             interpretation. In the present case, the literal construction
             leads to no apparent absurdity and therefore, there can
             be no compelling reason for departing from that golden
             rule of construction.”
25. A reference can also be made to the decision of not too distant an
    origin. In Ansal Properties & Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana,16
    the rule of literal construction has been reiterated in the following
    words:
             “39. If the legislature had intended that the licensee is
             required to transfer the land and also to construct the
             buildings on it or to make payment for such construction,
             the legislature would have made specific provisions laying
             down such conditions explicitly and in clear words in
             which event the provisions would have been worded in
             altogether different words and terms. It is a well-settled
             principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a
             statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. The
             language employed in a statute is determinative factor of
             legislative intent. If the language of the enactment is clear
             and unambiguous, it would not be proper for the courts to
             add any words thereto and evolve some legislative intent,
             not found in the statute.”
                                                    (emphasis supplied)
26. From the above decisions, it is quite clear that if the language of the
    particular statute under consideration is clear and unambiguous, it is
    not for the courts to add to or delete any words from the statute in
    the guise of ascertaining what could have been the legislative intent.
27. Section 143, on its plain language, prohibits any person, other than
    a railway servant or an authorised agent, to conduct the business
    of procurement and supply of railway tickets. The provision does
    not specify the modalities of the procurement and supply. Hence, if
    we read the section and give its contents the natural and ordinary
    meaning, keeping in mind the objective and purpose of the legislation,


16   [2009] 1 SCR 553 : (2009) 3 SCC 553
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       as discussed above, it admits of no doubt that this provision
       criminalises unauthorised procurement and supply, irrespective of
       the mode of procurement and supply.
28. We are further of the considered opinion that the mere fact of
    the system of e-reservation and e-tickets being introduced after
    the enactment of the Act does not render the provision in Section
    143 toothless to combat the illegal sale of e-tickets. Section 143,
    importantly, makes no distinction between physical and online sale
    of tickets. The mischief that the provision seeks to remedy is that
    there should not be illegal and unauthorised procurement and sale
    of tickets, whatever be the mode – physical or online. The Kerala
    High Court seems to have missed this aspect.
29. There has been a major technological development in the last three
    decades by reason whereof a significant number of services provided
    by the Governments are available online. Electronic and internet
    services have not only become indispensable but offer significant
    advantages to the public. Having regard to the comprehensive
    phraseology employed in Section 143, the net of its coverage is
    wide enough to encompass regulation of the conduct of ticketing
    agents and to protect the public from unscrupulous elements trying
    to defraud them by sale of valueless tickets.
30. The Kerala High Court made the distinction between “procure” and
    “purchase”. It held that the tickets were “purchased” by genuine
    passengers. The tickets were not sold by Mathew, rather, the tickets
    were sold by IRCTC in the names of the passengers. Hence, it cannot
    be said that Mathew was procuring the tickets. This reasoning, in
    our view, is flawed and unsustainable. Travel agents, by and large,
    do not purchase tickets in their own name and then sell it to the
    passengers. Tickets are procured in the name of the passengers
    by these agents in lieu of a commission on the price thereof. Taking
    active steps, however faithfully, in order to acquire and provide
    tickets to third parties but without being a railway servant or an
    authorised agent would attract the expression ‘procure and supply’
    as in Section 143.
31. We agree with the prosecution that Section 143, a penal provision,
    has been enacted to tackle a social crime. The Indian Railways is a
    keystone of our country’s infrastructure. It carries around 673 crore
    passengers annually and has a tremendous impact on the economy
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                           513

               Inspector, Railway Protection Force, Kottayam v.
                           Mathew K Cherian & Anr.

      of this country. Any effort to disrupt the integrity and stability of the
      ticketing system has to be stopped on its tracks.
32. The second issue before us is whether these criminal proceedings
    in the two appeals should be quashed. This Court has dealt with the
    issue of quashing numerous times. Reference in this connection may
    be made to the decisions in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab,17 State
    of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha,18 State of Haryana v. Bhajan
    Lal,19 Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate,20 and Amit
    Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander.21
33. The principles which can be extrapolated from these precedents are
    that quashing of a criminal proceeding can take place, inter alia, if the
    first information report does not reveal a crime or if the fact situation
    be such that continuance of the criminal proceedings would result in
    abuse of the process causing injustice to the accused. This power
    of quashing, however, is not unfettered or unlimited and as the old
    adage goes - “judicial discretion has to be exercised judiciously”.
34. In the lead appeal, the facts of the case prima facie reveal the
    commission of an offence under Section 143 of the Act. Mathew,
    without the authorisation of the railways, was carrying on a business
    of procurement and supply of railway tickets. The allegations against
    Mathew taken at face value fulfil the elements required under
    Section 143(1)(a) of the Act; hence, the threshold for quashing has
    not been met in this case.
35. In the connected appeals, Ramesh was an authorised agent of the
    railways carrying on the business of procurement and supply of
    railway tickets. Section 143 only deals with the actions of unauthorised
    persons and does not mandate a procedure to be followed by the
    authorised agents for procuring or supplying tickets to its customers.
    The nature of allegations against Ramesh in the connected appeal,
    though serious, Section 143 would not be attracted insofar as he
    is concerned.



17   [1960] 3 SCR 311 : 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21
18   [1982] 3 SCR 121 : (1982) 1 SCC 561
19   [1992] Supp. 3 SCR 735 : (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335
20   [1997] Supp. 5 SCR 12 : (1998) 5 SCC 749
21   [2012] 7 SCR 988 : (2012) 9 SCC 460
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36. That apart, Section 143 does not criminalise creating multiple user IDs.
    Penal provisions have to be read strictly and narrowly as a general
    rule. Section 143, by being completely silent on creation of multiple
    user IDs, penalises the actions of only the unauthorised agents and
    not unauthorised actions of the authorised agents. Thus, even if the
    facts disclosed in the first information report are taken at face value,
    commission of an offence cannot be attributed to Ramesh. Any
    breach has to be remedied by civil action and not criminal action.
37. To sum up, Mathew not being an authorised agent has to face the
    proceedings against him while Ramesh, being an authorised agent,
    cannot be proceeded against under Section 143 of the Act for alleged
    breach of any of the terms and conditions of the contract. If, at all,
    he would be liable to face civil action.
38. In our view, for the foregoing reasons, the lead appeal deserves
    to be allowed and consequently, the criminal proceedings against
    Mathew need to be restored. It is ordered accordingly.
39. The proceedings against Mathew shall be taken to its logical
    conclusion, in accordance with law. Observations made by us
    hereinabove are for the purpose of a decision on the lead appeal
    and may not be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits
    of the prosecution’s case.
40. The connected appeals are allowed as well, but the criminal
    proceedings against Ramesh are hereby quashed.

       Result of the case: Appeals allowed.



       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan