Supreme Court of India
INSTITUTE OF LAW & ORS.versusNEERAJ SHARMA & ORS.
- Citation
- 2014 INSC 652
- Decided
- 19 September 2014
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- S MUKHOPADHAYA
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the writ petition is maintainable, the land allotment is arbitrary, illegal and violative of Article 14, and the High Court’s orders are valid, leading to dismissal of the appeal.
Summary
The Institute of Law was allotted 5.75 acres of land in Chandigarh at a nominal rate, prompting Neeraj Sharma to file a public‑interest writ petition challenging the allotment as arbitrary and violative of Article 14. The Punjab & Haryana High Court Division Bench cancelled the allotment in two separate but concurring orders, though the puisne judge noted differences in certain paragraphs. The Institute sought referral of the matter to a larger bench, arguing that the orders were conflicting. The Supreme Court examined the maintainability and locus standi of the writ petition, the validity of the High Court’s separate orders, and whether the land allotment breached Article 14 and the 1996 Chandigarh Scheme rules. It held that the petition was bona‑fide public‑interest litigation, the allotment was illegal and unreasonable, and the High Court’s orders were legally valid with no real divergence. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the stay order vacated.
Issues considered
- Whether the writ petition filed by the respondent is maintainable as a public‑interest litigation and whether the petitioner has locus standi.
- Whether the separate but concurring orders of the High Court Division Bench, as concurred by the nominated judge, are legally valid or require interference.
- Whether the allotment of land to the Institute of Law violates Article 14 of the Constitution and the provisions of the Allotment of Land to Educational Institutions (Schools) Rules, 1996 (Chandigarh Scheme).
Legislation cited
Subjects
Public Interest LitigationArticle 14Land AllotmentAdministrative DiscretionLease‑HoldEducational InstitutionLocus StandiChandigarhConstitutional Law
Judgment
(2014] 11 S.C.R. 1096 •
A
INSTITUTE OF LAW & ORS.
v.1
NEERAJ SHARMA & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No.12143 of 2007)
'
B SEPTEMBER 19, 2014
[SUOHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA AND
V. GOPALA GOWDA, JJ.]
"
c Constitution of India, 1950,- ' Arts. 14, 226- Allotment of
5. 75 acres of land in Chandigarh to the appellant-Law Institute,
at Rs. 9001- per square yard only - Writ petition challenging
the allotment ..., Di.vision Bench' of the .High Court, consisting
of the then Chief Justice and a puisne Judge, by two separate
but concumng orders dispose<J of the writ petition cancelling
0
the allotment of land, however, the puisne Judge, did not
agree on certain paragraph ..:. Applic.ations thereagainst -
Nominated judge held that 'though the Bench recorded
different reasons, the conclusion was same - On appeal,
held: Petitioner filed a bonafide writ petition and had the
E necessary locus - Writ petition was maintainable in public
interest as the allotment of the land made in favour of Institute
was arbitrary, illegal and violative of Art. 14 - Administration
of the Union Territory of Chandigarh conferred largesse on
the appellant-Institute by allotting land in its favour for
F inadequate· consideration without following procedure -
Allottee cannot be ailowed to make· money or profiteer with
the aid of the public property - Impugned order passed by
the puisne Judge, which was concurred by the then Chief
Justice by his separate order and the order of the third
G nominated Judge holding that there is no difference of opinion
in the orders of the Division Bench are legal and valid - Thus,
there is no reason to if.lterfere with the impugned orders in
exercise of this Court's appellate jurisdiction - Allotment of
Land to Educational Institutions (Schools)Rules Etc. on
H 1096
• INSTITUTE OF LAW v. NEERAJ SHARMA 1097
Lease Hold basis in Chandigarh Scheme, 1996 - cl. 18. A
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. The settlement of the land in favour of the
appellant-Institute was done within a few days without
following the mandatory procedure for the allotment of 8
land. The intention of the appellants to set up the law
institute, however, their private interest is pitted against
the public interest The loss to the public exchequer could
have been easily .;ivoided had the land been settled by
way of public auction inviting applications from eligible C
persons. [Para 23] [1106-B, C]
1.2. The respondent No.1-writ petitioner has filed a
bonafide writ petition and he has the necessary locus.
There is an apparent favour shown by the Union Territory o
of Chandigarh in favour of the appellant-Institute which
is a profit making company. Hence, there is a strong
reason to hold that the writ petition is maintainable in
public interest. The High Court rightly held that the writ
petition is a Public Interest Litigation and not a Private E
Interest Litigation. [Para 25] [1110-C-E]
1.3. The appellants have miserably failed to show the
malafide intention on the part of the respondent No. 1 in
filing writ petition and he is a public spirited person. The
record of the AAO (Audit) submitted to the Chandigarh F
Administration proves the allegations made by him. The
Administration of the Union Territory of Chandigarh has
conferred largesse on the appellant-Institute by allotting
land in its favour for inadequate consideration without
following procedure. Therefore, the writ petition filed by G
the fir5t respondent is maintainable as the allotment of the
land in question made in favour of the first appellant-
Institute was arbitrary, illegal and the same was in
violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. [Para 26] [1110-
F-H; 1111-A, B] H
1098 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 11 S.C.R. •
A Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (Regd.) Sindri &
Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. .1981 (2 ) SCR 52 : AIR 1981
SC 344, (1981) 1 SCC 568; S.P. Gupta v. Union of India and
Anr. 1982 SCR 365: (1981) Supp SCC 87; Dattaraj Nathuji
Thaware v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 2004 (6) Suppl. SCR
B 900: (2005) t sec 590 "'." referred to.
2.1. The discretionary power conferred upon the
public authorities to carry out the necessary Regulations
for allotting land for the purpose of constructing a public
educational institution should not be 'misused. The plea
· C of charitable intentiOn or philanthropic goal behind the
establishment of the appellant educational institution is
discarded as the establishment of the same does not
serve any public interest and the allottee cannot be
allowed to make money or profitf:er with the aid of the
D public property. [Para 29, 32j [1116-B, G] _:
'
2.2. The reasoning of the High Court in the impugned
orders that the Screening Committee allotted the
institutional sites in favour of the allottee without
E following any objective criteria and policy is concurred
with. The High Court rightly held that the policy followed
by the Chandigarh Administration where tf:le allotment of
land was done in favour of the appellant~lnstitute without
giving any public notice and in the absence of a
F transparent policy based upon objective criteria and
without even examining the fact that the Union Territory
of Chandigarh is al~eady under extreme pressure of over
population and even in the case of allotment of school .
sites by making no attempt to enforce clause 18 of the
Allotment of La:nd to Educational Institutions
G (Schools)Rules Etc. on Lease Hold basis in Chandigarh
Scheme, 1996, thereby confining the provision merely to
the statute book, is arbitra,.Y, unreasonable and unjust
and is opposed to the provisions of Article 14 of the
H Constitution.[Para 33] [~ 117-B-E]
• INSTITUTE OF LAW v. NEERAJ SHARMA 1099
2.3. lhe order passed by the then Chief Justice A
cann.ot be said to have rendered a different opinion 'SO
as to attract the applicability of Rule 31 of Chapter 4, para
F, of the High Court Rules and Orders, r/w clause 26 of
the Letters Patent. A perusal of the directions contained
in the orders of the High Court reveals a common effect, s
i.e. the allotment of the institutional plot made in favour
of the appellant-Institute stands cancelled as it did not
conform to the constitutional philosophy enshrined in
Art.14 of the Constitution. Nominated Judge while
conceding the same rightly pointed out that there may c
apparently seem to be a difference in the thought process
and also the· relative rigour of the expressions used by
both the Judges, yet, it has not been possible to conclude
that there was any divergence in the directions recorded
in their separate views.[Para 34,35] [1117-G, H; 1118-A-D]
0
2.4. The impugned order passed by the puisne
Judge, which was concurred by the then Chief Justice
by his separate order and the order of the third nominated
Judge holding that there is no difference of opinion in the
orders of the Division Bench are legal and valid and do E
not require any interference by this Court. There is no
reason to interfere with the impugned orders in exercise
of this Court's appellate jurisdiction. [Para 36, 37, 38]
[1118-E-G]
F
Union of India & Anr. v. Jain Sabha, New Delhi & Anr.
1996 (9) Suppl. SCR 1:(1997) 1SCC164; New India Public
School & Ors. v. HUDA and Ors.1996 (3) Suppl. SCR
597:(1996) 5 SCC 510; Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress
v. State of M.P. & Ors. 2011 (5) SCR 77: (2011) 5 SCC 29; G
Modem School v. Union of India and Others 2004 (1) Suppl.
SCR 668:(2004) 5 SCC 583- referred to.
Case Law Reference:
1981 (2) SCR 52 Referred to Para 23
H
1100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 11 S.C.R.
•
A 1982 SCR 365 Referred to Para 23
2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 900 Referred to Para 23
I
1996 (9) Suppl. SCR 1 Referred to Para 27
1996 (3) Suppl.SCR 597. Referred to Para 28
B
2011 (5) SCR 77 Referred to Para 29
2004 (1)Suppl. SCR 668 Referred tO Para 32
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
c 2143 of 2007.
From the judgment and order dated 14.02.2005 passed
in C.W.P. No. 6916 of 2004 and order dated 26.04.2006
passed in CM No. 5016 of 2005 and CM No. 6.173 of 2005-by
o the High Court for the States of Punjab & Haryana at
Chandigarh.
Nidhesh Gupta, Tarun Gupta, Mohan K. Ghos, Ashok
Mathur, E.C. Agrawala for the appellants.
E Jatinder Kumar Bhatia, Sanjay Jain for the respondents.
t
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
V. GO.PALA GOWDA, J,i 1. This appeal is directed -
against the two separate impugned orders dated 14.2.2005
F passed in Civil Writ Petition No. 6916 of 2004 by both the
members of the Division Bench :of the High Court of Punjab &
Haryana at Chandigarh and against the order dated
26.04.2006 passed in Civil Misc. No. 5016 of 2005 and Civil
Misc. No. 6173 of 2005. The brief facts of the case are stated
G hereunder:-
2. The appellant-Institute of law was allotted the land
measuring 28,376.23 sq. yards (5.75 acres) in Sector 38-A in
the Union Territory of Chandigarh at the rate of Rs.900/- per sq.
H yard by the administration of Union Territory of Chandigarh. The
• INSTITUTE OF LAW v. NEERAJ SHARMA
[V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
1101
rate was fixed by the Chandigarh Administration vide its A
Notification No. 31/1/100-UTFI (4-2002/1823) dated 7.3.2002
issued under the Punjab Development Regulation Act, 1952
fixing the land rates for allotment to educational _institutions in
the Union Territory of e.handigarh. The allotment of I. 1d was
made in favour of appellant-Institute for 99 years on lease hold B
basis with the condition that the initial lease period will be 33
years and renewable for two like periods only if the lessee
continues to fulfil all conditions of allotment.
3. The respondent No.1, Neeraj Sharma, filed a Writ
Petition No.6916 of 2004 before the High Court of Punjab and C
Haryana at Chandigarh questioning the legality and validity of
the allotment of land involved in this case urging various grounds.
4. On 14.2.2005, the Division Bench of the High Court,
consisting of the then Chief Justice and a puisne Judge, by two D
separate but concurring orders disposed of the writ petition .
cancelling the allotment of land and directing the Union Territory
of Chandigarh to take necessary corrective steps in the matter
in consonance with the constitutional philosophy of Article 14
of the Constitution of India and further directed the Union E ·
Territory of Chandigarh to take policy decision for allotment.Qf
educational institutional sites in favour of eligible persons so
as to ensure that the allotments are made objectively and in a
transparent manner. After delivering the separate concurring
orders, however, the puisne Judge, on the post judgment script, F
specified that there was no agreement on certain paragraph
Nos. 10, 12, 13, 14 and 15 of the order passed by the then
Chief Justice.
5. Aggrieved by the orders, the appellants filed the
applications being Civil Misc. No. 5016 of 2005 and Civil Misc. G
No. 6173 of 2005 under Rule 31 of Chapter 4(F) of the High
Court Rules and Orders read with Clause 26 of the Letters
Patent, urging that the matter be referred to another Bench or
the full Bench for adjudication on the points of difference.
H
1102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 11 S.C.R.
•
A 6. The learned nominated Judge of the High Court
disposed of the Civil Misc. Application Nos. 5016 of 2005 and
Civil Misc. No. 6173 of 2005 vide order dated 26.4.2006,
holding that there was no point of difference between the ·
. Judges of the Division Bench on the question of maintainability
B of the writ petition and the locus standi of the writ petitioner. It
was held by hini that although different reasons have been -,
recorded by the members of the Division Bench, the conclusion·
. recorded by them on the issue of maintainability of the writ·
petition was the same. It was further held that both the orders
c reveal a common object i.e: the cancellation of the allotment of
land made in favour of the appellant-Institute. The learned .~
Judge has further clarified that a process of auction by,,
necessary implication requires invitation to all eligible·:
prospective allottees through public notice which will be in •
D conformity with the constitutional philosophy under Article 14 of -
the Constitution of India. Having clarified in the aforesaid terms,
·the learned Judge dismissed bo.th the applications. . •
7. The correctness of ·both the separate orders dated
14.02.2005 delivered by the Division Bench and the order
· E dated 26.4.2006 of the learned riominated Judge hearing Civil
Misc. Nos. 5016 and 6173 of 2005 are under challenge in this
appeal filed by the appellant-Institute, raising certain substantial, .
questions.of law.
' '
F 8. It was contended by Mr. Nidhesh Gupta, the learned
senior counsel for the appellant-Institute that the learned •
nominated Judge has erred in not appreciating the separate
orders passed by the iwo learned Judges of the Division Bench
of the High Court, who have given separate and distinct orders,
G which are absolutely conflicting in nature and had no,
commonality at all. The learned Judge has failed to appreciate - .
that even the 'post judgment script', one of the learned judge
has clearly spelt out the differences of opinion between the two;
learned Judges and on this basis alone the matter ought to have
been referred to a larger bench. ·
H
• INSTITUTE OF LAW v. NEERAJ SHARMA
[V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
1103
9. It was further contended _that the High Court ought.to A
have noticed that the land involved in -this appeal had been
allotted to the appellant-Institute after proper scrutiny and on the
published and notified rates of the land with a condition for
specific utilization of the land on lease hold basis and that none
. of the town planning was affected by the allotment of land in B
question in favour of the appellant-Institute since the area of land
in question is situated in the institutional area where educational
institutions are functioning. ·
10. It was further cbntended that the High Court has gravely
erred in not dismissing the writ petition on the basis of lack of C
locus standi of the writ petitioner who has filed the writ petition
for personal interest for the reason that a residential site was
not allotted to him by the Administration of Union Territory of
Chandigarh.
D
11. The High Court has further erred in holding that the
appellants are influential persons, therefore, the land was
allotted to them, although no basis whatsoever has been shown
in the impugned judgments.
E
12. The High C'ourt has erred in not appreciating that the
allotment of land in favour of the appellant-Institute was made
as per regular procedure adopted and being followed by
Administration of Union Territory of Chandigarh for the last more
than 50 years and there was no deviation whatsoever from the
said procedure in allotting the land in favour of the appellant- F
Institute which is also non-profitable institute ..
13. It is further contended that the land is not auctioned by
the Chandigarh Administration but it has allotted it to qualified
persons/institutions on the basis of the social and economic G
needs of the city and society. Further, the allotment of land for
the purposes of establishing educational institutions has
restrictions on the tran'sfer as well as usage and therefore, it is
• different from the general land rates (viz. commercial and
H
1104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . (2014] 11 S.C.R.
•·
A residential) which have no such restrictions and are freely
marketable.
14. It is submitted that the land was allotted with certain
conditions, (a) on leasehold basis initially for 33 years (b) non
transferable directly or indirectly and (c) usage was only for law
8
institute. The appellant-Institute deposited 25% of the lease
amount with the administration of Union Territory where upon
the letter of allotment dated 22.01.2004 in respect of the land
in question was issued in favour of the appellant-Institute.
I
C 15. It is further submitted by the learned senior counsel that
the writ petition dubbed as a Public Interest Litigati.on filed by
the respondent No. 1 is frivolous, malicious and illegal as it does
not disclose the source of information. ·
0 16. On the other .hand, it is contended by the learned
counsel on behalf of the first ~espondent that the respondent is
a dedicated social worker having deep concern for the laws of
land.
17. It is further contented that the appellants have
E managed to get the allotment of land whicn is contrary to the
policy of the Union Territory of Chandigarh, the. laws laid down -
by this Court in relation to the management of public property
and is in the teeth of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
F 18. The respondents have further contended that the said
allotted land's market value is worth more than Rs.50/- crores
but, was granted by way of lease to the appellant-Institute for
an amount of Rs.2.55 crores only, which amounts to conferring
largesse upon them which is not permissible in law and has
G caused huge loss to the public exchequer. ·
19. It has been further contended that according to the rules
for allotment of land in favour of schools and other educational
institutions, no land can be allotted to any institute without an
advertisement and inviting applications from the eligible
H persons.
• INSTl'fUTE OF LAW v. NEERAJ SHARMA
[V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
1105
20. On the basis of the aforesaid rival legal contentions A
urged on behalf of both the parties, the following points would
arise for our consideration:
(i) Whether the writ petition filed in the public interest is
maintainable or not and whether the writ petitioner has B
locus standi to file the writ petition?
(ii) Whether the separate but concurring orders passed by
the Division Bench of the High Court which were concurred
by the nominated third Judge are legal and valid or
whether the same requires interference by this Court? c
(iii) Whether the allotment order of land made in favour of
the appellant-Institute is in violation of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India along with the applicability of the
"Allotment of land to Educational Institutions D
(Schools),Rules etc. on a Lease-hold basis in Chandigarh
Scheme, 1996"?
(iv) What Order?
Answer to Point No.1 E
21. We will first cons.ider and answer the question of
maintainability of the Writ Petition and locus standi of the writ
petitioner, the respondent No. 1 herein who has filed the writ
petition.
F
22. The property in question belongs to the Union Territory
of Chandigarh Administration. Under our constitutional
philosophy, it is a public property and therefore, belongs to the
people. Hence, the Union Territory of Chandigarh Administration
is the trustee of the land whose duty is to see that the property G
is allotted in favour of eligible persons by following the
procedure laid down by the Chendigarh Administration, and the
same should not be allowed to be squandered or sold away
by it at a throw away price as it has been done in the instant
case as pointed out by its Audit Department itself that there is H
1106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 11 S.C.R.
•
A a clear loss of about Rs.139 crores to the public exchequer.
23. It has also come to our notice that the settlement of
the land in question in favour of the appellant-Institute was done
within a few days without following the mandatory procedure for
B the allotment of land. We do not doubt the intenticm of the
appellants to set up the law institute, however, their private
interest is pitted against the public interest. The loss to the
public exchequer could have been easily avoided had the land
in question been settled by way of public auction inviting
C applications from eligible persons.
1
·. 24. Further, as stated in the writ petition, the petitioner is
a resident of State of Punjab and is also an Income Tax Payee.
It has neithefbeen shown nor proved ~Y the appellants that he
is a (i) meddlesome interloper (ii) that he is acting under
1
D malafide intention or (iii) that he has been set up by someone
for settling his personal scores with Chandigarh Administration
or the allottee. Dealing with the question of locus standi of the
writ petitioner, we would like to refer
'
to certain decisions
. of this
Court to hold that the writ petition filed by th~ first respondent
E is a public interest litigation to protect public interest. In. the
case of Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (Regd.) Sindri
& Ors. v. Union of India & Ors: 1, the constitutional Bench of
this Court has held as under:-
"29-30 ....... Where does the citizen stand, in the context
F
of the democracy of judicial remedies, absent an
ombudsman? In the face of (rare, yet real) misuse of
administrative power to play ducks and drakes with the
public exchequer, especiahy where developmental
expansion necessarily involves astronomical expenditure
G and concomitant corruption, do public bodies enjoy
immunity from challenge save through the post-mortem of
parliamentary organs. What is-the role of the judicial
H 1. AIR 1981 SC 344, (1981) 1 sec 568.
• INSTITUTE OF LAW v. NEERAJ SHARMA
[V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
1107
process, read in ·the light of the dynamics of legal control A
and corporate autonomy?
xxx xxx· xxx
47 ....... Nevertheless, the broad parameters of fairness in
admiriistration, bona fides in action, and the fundamental B
rules of reasonable management of public business, if
breached, will become justiciable.
48. If a citizen is no more than a wayfarer or officious
intervener without any interest or concern beyond what c
belongs to any one of the 660 million people of this
country, the door of the court will not be ajar for him. But, if
he belongs to an organisation which has special interest
in the subject-matter. if he has some concern deeper than
that of a busybody. he cannot be told off at the gates. 0
although whether the issue raised by him is justiciable may
still remain to be considered. I, therefore. take the view that
the present petition would clearly have been permissible
under Article 226."
(emphasis supplied) E
Similarly, in the case of S.P. Gupta v. Union of India and
Anr. 2, this Court has categorically laid down the law in relation
to locus standi as under :-
F
"18 ...... whenever there is a public wrong or public injury
caused by an act or omission of the State or a public
authority which is contrary to the Constitution or the law.
any member of the public acting bona fide and having
sufficient interest can maintain an action for redressal of
such public wrong or public injury. The strict rule of standing G
which insists that only a person who has suffered a specific
legal injury can maintain an action for judicial redress is
relaxed and a broad rule is evolved which gives standing
2. (1981) Supp sec 87. H
1108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 11 S.C.R. •
A to any member of the public who is not a mere busy body
or a meddlesome interloper but who has sufficient interest
in the proceeding. There can be no .doubt that the risk of
legal action against the State or a public authority by any
Citizen will induce the State or such public authority to act
B with greater responsibility ancj care thereby improving the
administration of justice ...... It is also necessary to point
·out that if no one can have standing to maintain an action
for judicial redress in respect of a public wrong or public
injury, not only will the cause of legality suffer but the people
c not having anyjudicial remedy to redress such public wrong
or public injury may turn to the street and in that process,
the
. .
rule of law will be seriously -
impaired
.
.... .
19. There.is also another reason why the Rule of locus
standi needs to be liberalised. Today we find that law is
D being increasingly used as a device of organised social
action for the purpcise of bringing about socio-economic
change. The task of national reconstruction upon which we
are engaged has brought about enormous increase in
developmental activities and law is being utilised for the
E purpose of development, social and econo'mic. It is
creating more and more a new category of rights in favour
of large sections of people and imposing a new category
of duties on the St<jte and the public officials with a view
to reaching social justice to the common man ..... ;. In other
F words. the duty is one which is not correlative to anv
individual rights. Now if breach of such public duty were
allowed to go unredressed because there is no one who
has received a spei::ific legal injury or who was entitled to
participate in the proceedings pertaining to the decision
G relating to such public duty. the failure to perform such
public duty would go unchecked and it would promote
disrespect for the rule of law. It would also open the door
for corruption and inefficiency because there would be no
check on exercise of public power except what may be
H
• INSTITUTE OF LAW v. NEERAJ SHARMA
[V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
1109
provided by the political machinerv. which at best would A
be able to exercise only a limited control and at worst.
might become a participant in misuse or abuse of power.
It would also make the new social collective rights and
-interests created for the benefit of the deprived sections
of the community meaningless and ineffectual. B
20 .......... If public duties are to be enforced and social
collective "diffused" rights and interests are to be
protected, we have to utilise the initiative and zeal of public-
minded persons and organisations by allowing them to
move the court and act for a general or group interest, even C
though, they may not be directly injured in their own rights.
It is for this reason that in public interest litigation -
litigation undertaken for the purpose of redressing public
injury, enforcing public duty, protecting social, collective,
"diffused" rights and interests or vindicating public interest, D
any citizen who is acting bona fide and who ·has sufficient
interest has to be accorded standing. What is suffident
interest to give standing to a member of the public would
have to be determined by the court in each individual case.
It is not possible for the court to lay down any hard and fast E
rule or any straitjacket formula for the purpose of defining
or delimiting "sufficient interest". It has necessarily to be
left to the discretion of the 'court ........ .
xxx xxx xxx F
23. We would, therefore, hold that any member of the public
having sufficient interest can maintain an action for judicial
redress for public injury arising from breach of public duty
or from violation of some provision of the Constitution or
the law and seek enforcement of such public duty and G
observance of such constitutional or legal provision ...... "
(Emphasis supplied)
•
H
1110. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I
(2014) 11 S.C.R.
•
A Further; in the case of Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State ,
of Maharashtra & Ors.3, this Court held that Public Interest ·
Litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care
and circumspection. It has to. be used as an effective weapon•'
in the armoury of law for delivering social justice to citizens. The
B aim of Public Interest Litigation should be to redress genuine
public wrong or public injury. ·,
25. It is clear to us that the respondent No. 1-the writ
petitioner has filed a bonafide writ petition and he has the
necessary locus. There is an apparent favour shown by the
C Union Territory of Chandigarh in favour of the appellant-Institute·
which is a profit making company and it has not shown to this
Court that the allotment of land in its favour is in accordance
with law. Hence, we are of the view that there is a strong reason
to hold that the writ petition is maintainable in public interest.
D We completely agree with the views takeri by the High Court,
where.in it has rightly held that ·the writ petition is a Public·'
Interest Litigation and not a Private Interest Litigation. The writ ·
petition in question is the first petition filed by the first
respondent and his first endeavor to knock the doors of the
E constitutional court to protect the public interest by issuing a writ
of certiorary.
26. The appellants have miserably failed to show the
malafide intention on the part of ihe respondent No. 1 in filing
F writ petition and we agree with the view of the then Chief Justice
in his order who has held that he is a public spirited person.
The cause ventilated by him is definitely worth consideration
and the record of the AAO (Audit) submitted to the Chandigarh
Administration proves the allegations made by him. Further it
is observed that His Excellency, the Governor of Punjab-cum-
G Administrator, Chandigarh has rightly come to the conclusion
in his decision that the impugned allotment of land in favour of
the first appellant-Institute requires taking up of corrective steps. ~
The Administration of the Union· Territory of Chandigarh has
'
H 3. c2005) 1 sec 59.o.
• INSTITUTE OF LAW v. NEERAJ pHARMA
[V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
1111
conferred largesse on the appellant-Institute by allotting land in A
its favour for inadequate consideration without following
procedure. Therefore, we hold that the writ petition filed by the
first respondent is maintainable as the allotment of the land in
question made in favour of the first appellant-Institute is arbitrary,
illegal and the same is in violation of Article 14 of the B
Constitution.
Answer to Point Nos. 2. 3 and 4
27. We have carefully considered and examined the
question of the legality of the allotment order of the land made C
in favour of the appellant-Institute. It is submitted on behalf of
the first respondent that the allotment of public land at throw
away price or at no price to the private educational institutions
with an avowed object to serve the public interest is contrary
to the theory of "charitable education" that serve the pious cause D
of literacy. The aforementioned legal issue was visualized by
this Court and has lucidly laid down the law in the case of Union
of India & Anr. v. Jain Sabha, New Delhi& Anr4. wherein
the plea of charitable intentions or philanthropic goal behind the
establishment of private educational institution was not E
accepted by this Court, holding that :-
"11 ...... we think it appropriate to observe .that it is high
time the Government reviews the entire policy relating ~o
allotment of land to schools and other charitable
institutions. Where the public prope~ is being given to F
such institutions practically free, stringent conditions have
to be attached with respect to the user of the land and the
manner in which schools or other institutions established
thereon shall function. The conditions imposed should be
consistent with public interest and should always stipulate G
that in case of violation of any of those conditions, the land
shall be resumed by the Government. Not only such
conditions should be stipulated but constant monitoring
should be done to ensure that those conditions are being
4. (1997) 1 sec 164. H
1112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
-- '
[2014] 11 S.C.R. •
A observed in practice. While we cannot say anything about
the particular school run by the respondent, it is common
knowledge that some of the schools are being run cin totally
commercial lines. Huge amounts are being charged by
way of donations and fees. The question is whether there
B is any justification for allotting land at throw-away prices
to such institutions. The allotment of land belonging to the
people at practically no price is meant for serving the public
interest, i.e., spread of education or other charitable
purposes; it is not meant to enable the allottees to make
c money or profiteer with the aid of public property. We are
sure that the Government would take necessary measures
in this behalf in the light of the observations contained
herein." !
28. Further, in another case, this Court set aside the
D allotnients of land made by the allotment committee even though
most of the allottees had constructed the buildings, because,
the allotment Committee had not followed any rational or
reasonable criteria for inviting the applications for the allotment
of land through an open advertisement. Reliance is placed on
E the decision of this Court in New India Public School & Ors.
v. HUDA and 6rs. 5, which states as under:-
- '
'
"4 ......... Therefore, the public authorities are required to
make necessary specific regulations or valid guidelines to
F exercise their discretionary powers; otheiwise, the salutary
procedure wowl~ be by public auction. The Division Bench,
therefore, has rightly pointed out that in the absence of
such statutory regulations exercise of discretionary power
to allot sites· to private institutions or persons was not
correct in law."
G
29. Further, we have to refer to the case of Akhil Bhartiya
Upbhokta Congress v. State of
M.P. & Ors. 6, wherein this
5_ (1996) 5 sec 510.
H 6. c2011i 5 sec 2e.
I
• INSTITUTE OF LAW v. NEERAJ SHARMA
[V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
1113
Court has succinctly laid down the law after considering catena A
of cases of this Court with regard to allotment of public property
as under:
"50. For achieving the goals of justice and equality set out.
in the Preamble, the State and its agencies/ B
instrumentalities have to function through political entities
and officers/officials at different levels. The laws enacted
by Parliament and the State Legislatures bestow upon
them powers for effective implementation of the laws
enacted for creation of an egalitarian society. The exercise
of power by political entities and officers/officials for C
providing different kinds of services and benefits lo the
people always has an element of discretion, which is
required to be used in larger public interest and for public
good ...... In our constitutional structure, no functionary of the
State or public authority has an absolute or unfettered D
discretion. The very idea of unfettered discretion is totally
incompatible with the doctrine of equality enshrined in the
Constitution and is an antithesis to the concept of the rule
of law.
E
xxx xxx xxx
54. In Breen v. Amalgamated Engg. Union, Lord Denning
MR said: (QB p. 190, B-C)
' ... The discretion of a statutory body is never unfettered. F
It is a discretion which is to be exercised according to law.
That means at least this: the statutory body must be guided
by relevant considerations and not by irreleva!'lt. If its
decision is influenced by extraneous considerations which
it ought not to have taken into account, then the decision G
cannot stand. No matter that the statutory body may have
acted in good faith; nevertheless the decision will be set
aside. That is established by Padfield v. Minister of
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food which is a landmark in
modern administrative law.' H
1114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
t
[2014] 11 S.C.R. •
A 55. In Laker Airways Ltd. v. Deptt. of Trade Lord Denning
discussed prerog<itive of the Minister to give directions to
Civil Aviation Authorities overruling the specific provisions
in the statute in the time of war ·and said: (QB p. 705, F-
G)
B
'Seeing that th.e prerogative is a discretionary
power to be exercised for the public good, it follows
that its exercise can be examined by the courts just
as any other discretionary power which is vested
in the executive.'
c 1
56. This Court has long ~go discarded the theory of
unfettered discretion. In S. G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India,
Ramaswami, J. emphasised that absence of arbitrary
power is the foundation of. a system governed by rule of
D law and observed: (AIR p. 1434, para .14)
1
'14. In this context it is important to emphasise that
the abserice of arbitrary power is the first essential
of the rule of law upon which our whole constitutional
system is based. In a system governed by rule of
E
law, discretion, when conferred upon executive
authorities, must be confined within clearly defined
limits. The rule of law from this point of view means
that decisions should be made by the application
of known principles and rules and, in general, such
F decisions should be predictable and the citizen
· should know where he is. If a decision is taken
without any principle or without any rule it is
unpredictable and such a decision is the antithesis
of a decision taken in accordance with the rule of
G law ....... .'·
xxx xxx xxx
59. In Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of J&K,
Bhagwati J. speaking for the Court observed: (SCC pp.
H
• INSTITUTE OF LAW v. NEERAJ SHARMA
[V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
1115
13-14, para 14) A
'14. Where any governmental action fails to satisfy
the test of reasonaqleness and public interest
discussed above and is found to be wanting in the
quality of reasonableness or lacking in the element B
of public interest, it would be liable to be struck
down as invalid ......... .'
61. The Court also referred to the reasons recorded in the
orders passed by the Minister for award of dealership of
petrol pumps and gas agencies and observed: (Common C
Cause case, SCC p. 554, para 24)
· '24 .... While Article 14. permits a reasonable
classification having a rational nexus to the ·
objective sought to be achieved, it does not permit D
the power to pick and choose arbitrarily out of
several persons falling in the same categorv. A
transparent and objective criteria/procedure has to
be evolved so that the choice among the members
belonging to the same class or categorv is based E
on reason, fair play and non-arbitrariness. It is
essential to lay down as a matter of policy as to how
preferences would be assigned between two
persons falling i~ the same category ... .'
62. In Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P. the Court F
unequivocally rejected the argument based on the theory
of absolute discretion of the administrative authorities and
immunity of their action from judicial review and observed:
(SCC pp. 236, 239-40)
.G
'29. It can no longer be doubted at this point of time
that Article 14 of the Constitution of India applies
also to matters of governmental policy and if the
policy or any action of the Government, even in
H
1116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 11 S.C.R.
•
A contractual matters, fails to satisfy the test of
reasonableness, it would be unconstitutional ...... ."
In the light of the abov.e mentioned cases, we have to
record our finding that the discretionary power conferred upon
. the public authorities to carry out the necessary Regulations for
8
allotting land for the purpose of c6nstructing a public educational
institution should not be misused.
30. We further hold that the' fundamental right to establish
and run an educational institution in terms of Article 19 (1 }(g}
C of the Constitution is subject to· reasonable restrictions under
Article 19(6)° of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the State
is within its competence to prohibit "commercialization of
. education".
D 31. In Modern School v. 'Union of India and Others7
(supra), this Court has held thus :-
"72. So far as allotment of land by the Delhi Development
Authority is concerned, suffice it to point out that the same
has no bearing on the enforcement of the provisions·of the·
E Act and the Rl,Jles framed thereunder bufindisputaply the
institutions are bound by 'the terms anc;t conditions of
allotment. In the event such terms and conc;litions of
allotment have been violated by the allottees, the
appropriate statutory authorities would be at liberty to take
F appropriate step as is perrliissible in law."
. '
32. We, therefore, disregard the plea of charitable intention
or philanthropic goal behind the establishment of the appellant
' .
educational institution as the. establishment of the same does
G not serve any public interest and we cannot allow the allottee
· to make mo.ney or profiteer with the aid of the public property.
33. Further, on a careful evaluation of the statutory object
behind clause 18 of the "Allotment of Land to Educational
H 7. (2004) s sec sa3.
• INSTITUTE OF L.AW v. NEERAJ SHARMA
[V. GOPAL.A GOWDA, J.]
1117
Institutions (Schools)Rules Etc. on Lease Hold basis in A
Chandigarh Scheme, 1996" no !?YStematic exercise has been
undertaken by the Administration of Chandigarh to identify the
needs of different kinds of professional institutions required to
be established in Chandigarh. We thus concur with the
reasoning of the High Court in the impugned orders that the 8
Screening Committee comprising of senior and responsible
functionaries allotted the institutional sites in favour of the
allottee without following any objective criteria and policy. The
Screening Committee acted in a manner which is contrary to
the principles laid down by this Court in the judgments cited c
above in allotting the land in question in favour of the first
appellant. We, therefore, conclude that the High Court has rightly
·held that the policy followed by the Chandigarh Administration
where the allotment of land was done in favour of the appellant-
Institute without giving any public notice and in the absence of D
a transparent policy based upon objective criteria and without
even examining the fact that the Union Territory of Chandigarh
is already under extreme pressure of over population and even
in the case of allotment of school sites by making no attempt
to enforce clause 18 of the Scheme, 1996, thereby confining
E
the said provision merely to the statute book, is arbitrary,
unreasonable and unjust and is opposed to the provisions of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
34. We now come to the opinion expressed by the then
Chief justice in his order which was concurred by the nominated F
Judge hearing the Civil Misc. Applications that although
different reasons havabeen recorded by the members of the
Division Bench in their order who have disposed of CWP
No.6916 of 2004, the conclusion arrived at by them was the
same. Therefore, the order passed by the then Chief Justice · G
cannot be said to have rendered a different opinion so as to ·
attract the applicability of Rule 31 of Chapter 4, para F, of the
High Court Rules and Orders, read with clause 26 of the Letters
Patent.
H
\·
1118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 11 S.C.R.
•
A 35. A perusal of the directions contained in the oitters of
the High Court reveals a common effect, i.e. the allotment of
the institutional plot made in 'favour of the appellant-Institute
stands cancelled as ihdid not conform to the constitutional
philosophy enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
B This was also conceded by the learned nominated Judge of
the High Court hearing the Civil Misc. No.5016 of 2005 and Civil
Misc. No. 6173 of 2005. Thus, there appears to be absolutely
no point of difference or dive·rgence between the then Chief
justice and the companion puisne Judge, who have issued..,
c directions to the Administration of the Union Territory of:;
Chandigarh. It has rightly been pointed out by the nominated
Judge that there may apparently seem to ·be a difference in the. 0
thought process and also the relative rigour of the expressions :.
used by both the learned Judges, yet, it has not been possibl~.~
to conclude that there was any divergence in the directions_-
0
recorded in their separate views. . . \:c
. .
36. We thus hold that the impugr:ied order passed by the'~
learned puisne Judge, which was.concurred·by the then Chief
Justice by his separate order and the order of the third.::
E nominated Judge holding that there is no difference of opinion~
in the orders of the Division Bench are legal and valid and do ..
not require any interference by this Court. · ~~-
37. It is needless to state that certain observations made· :i,
F in the impugned orders against some of the appellants and ttie'· ~
respondents are totally unwarranted and the same are'-·
expunged. . 1
~';.b~
38. In view of the foregoing reasons, we do not find any ;
reason to interfere with the impugned orders in exercise of this;;:
G · Court's appellate jurisdiction. The appeal is accordingly "'
- dismissed. The order dated 16.04.2007 granting stay shall
stand vacated. ·
Nidhi Jain Appeal dismissed.
H
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