Holding

The RBI has the statutory authority to regulate and even prohibit banking services to virtual currency entities, but the 2018 circular was disproportionate and therefore ultra vires, leading to its set‑aside.

Summary

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) issued a Statement and a Circular in April 2018 directing banks and other regulated entities to cease dealing with persons or entities dealing in virtual currencies (VCs) and to exit existing relationships within three months. The petitioners – a trade association and several cryptocurrency exchanges – challenged the measures, arguing that the RBI lacked statutory authority, that the circular amounted to an ultra‑violet prohibition, violated the freedom to trade under Article 19(1)(g), and was disproportionate. The Court examined the RBI's powers under the RBI Act, 1934, the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 and the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007, concluding that the RBI does possess wide regulatory and even prohibitory powers over banking entities. However, the Court held that the circular, in effect, imposed a total ban on VC exchanges without sufficient justification and failed the proportionality test. Consequently, the circular was set aside, the writ petitions were allowed, and the RBI was ordered to unfreeze the account of Discidium Internet Labs Ltd.

Issues considered

Whether the RBI has statutory power under the RBI Act, 1934, the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 and the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007 to direct banks to cease dealing with virtual currency entities.
Whether the circular constitutes an ultra vires prohibition or a valid regulatory direction.
Whether the circular infringes the right to carry on trade, business or profession under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and, if so, whether it satisfies the test of proportionality.
Whether the circular amounts to a colourable exercise of power or is vitiated by malice in law.
Whether the doctrine of judicial deference applies to the RBI's economic policy decisions.

Legislation cited

Banking Regulation Act, 1949s. 21, s. 22, s. 27, s. 29A, s. 30(1B), s. 35A(1), s. 35AA, s. 35AB, s. 36(1)(a), s. 5(ca), s. 8
Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017s. 2(75)
Coinage Act, 2011
Constitution of Indias. Art.19(1)(g), s. Art.19(6)
Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999s. 2(h), s. 2(q)
Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007s. 10, s. 11, s. 17, s. 18, s. 2(1)(i), s. 2(1)(p), s. 2(1)(q)
Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934s. 3(1), s. 45JA, s. 45L(1), s. 45Z-45ZO
Sale of Goods Act, 1930

Subjects

virtual currencycryptocurrencyReserve Bank of Indiabanking regulationArticle 19(1)(g)proportionalityultra virespayment systemsregulatory power

Judgment

[2020] 2 S.C.R. 297 297

INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA A
v.
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA
(Writ Petition (Civil) No. 528 of 2018)
B
MARCH 04, 2020
[R. F. NARIMAN, ANIRUDDHA BOSE AND
V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, JJ.]
Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 – ss.17, 20-22, 26, 38, 45JA,
45L, 45U, 45W, 45Z-45ZO – Reserve Bank of India (RBI) issued a C
“Statement on Developmental and Regulatory Policies” dtd.
05.04.18 and circular dtd. 06.04.18 respectively, which directed
the entities it regulated (i) not to deal with or provide services to
any individual/business entities dealing with/settling virtual
currencies (VCs) and (ii) to exit the relationship, if they already
D
have one, with such individuals/business entities – Challenged by
petitioners (a specialized industry body representing interests of
online & digital services industry; companies running online crypto
assets exchange platforms; shareholders/founders thereof and
individual crypto assets traders) inter alia on the ground that RBI has
no power to prohibit the activity of trading in VCs through Virtual E
Currency Exchanges (VCEs) since they are not legal tender but
tradable commodities/digital goods, not falling within the regulatory
framework of 1934 Act or 1949 Act and that VCs do not even fall
within the credit system of the country to enable RBI under the
Preamble to 1934 Act giving it a mandate to operate the currency & F
credit system of the country to its advantage – Held: After 2016
Amendment Act, RBI is now vested with the obligation to operate
the monetary policy framework in India – 1934 Act, 1949 Act and
the 2007 Act cumulatively confer very wide powers upon RBI inter
alia to operate the currency and credit system of the country to its
advantage; regulate financial system of the country to its advantage; G
to issue directions to a payment system or a system participant which
in RBI’s opinion is engaging in any act that is likely to result in
systemic risk being inadequately controlled or is likely to affect the

H
297
298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A payment system, monetary policy or the credit policy of the country
and to issue directions to system providers or system participants or
any other person generally, to regulate the payment systems or in
the interest of management or operation of any of the payment
systems or in public interest – Depending on the text of the statute
B involved in the case and the context, various courts in different
jurisdictions have identified virtual currencies to belong to different
categories ranging from property to commodity to non-traditional
currency to payment instrument to money to funds – Petitioners’
contention that VCs are just goods/commodities and can never be
regarded as real money and that they are carrying on an activity
C over which RBI has no power statutorily, not accepted – Petitioners’
contention that the impugned decision is ultra vires is rejected –
Impugned Circular does not impose a prohibition on the use of/
trading in VCs, the prohibition is not per se against the trading in
VCs – It is against banking companies, with respect to a class of
D transactions – Further, RBI cannot be held guilty of non-application
of mind when the sequence of events from June 2013 up to 02-04-
2018 show that RBI was brooding over the issue for almost five
years – Also, the contention that the impugned Circular is vitiated
by malice in law and is a colorable exercise of power cannot be
sustained – Impugned Circular cannot be assailed on the basis of
E
M. S. Gill test either – It is no doubt true that RBI has very wide
powers however, the availability of power is different from the
manner and extent to which it can be exercised – RBI has not so far
found, the activities of VCEs to have actually impacted adversely,
the way the entities regulated by RBI function – When the consistent
F stand of RBI is that they have not banned VCs and when the
Government of India is unable to take a call despite several
committees coming up with several proposals including two draft
bills, both of which advocated exactly opposite positions, it is not
possible to hold that the impugned measure is proportionate –
G Impugned Circular dtd. 06.04.18 is set aside on the ground of
proportionality – Statement dtd. 05.04.18, though challenged, is
not in the nature of a statutory direction and hence the question of
setting aside the same does not arise – Finance Act, 2016 – Banking
Regulation Act, 1949 – ss.5, 8, 21, 22, 27, 29A, 30(1B), 35AA, 35AB,
35A(1)(a), 36(1)(a), 36AA – Payment and Settlement Systems Act,
H 2007 – ss.2(1); 2(1)(g), (h), (i), (p) and ss.3, 4(1), 10(2), 11, 17, 18
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 299
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA

– Administrative Law – Subordinate Legislation – Doctrine of A
Proportionality – Doctrine of Deference – Foreign Exchange
Management Act, 1999 – ss.2(h), (i), (q) – Coinage Act, 2011 –
Finance Act, 1994 – Finance Act, 2012 – Sales of Goods Act, 1930
– Central Foods and Services Tax Act, 2017 – s.2(75) – Constitution
of India – Art.19(1)(g). B
Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 – Establishment of Reserve
Bank of India – Object of – Discussed.
Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 – Preamble to; s.45L(1) –
Held: Phrase “credit system of the country to its advantage”, as
found in paragraph 1 of the Preamble, is repeated in sub-sec. (1) C
of s.45L – Only difference between the two is that paragraph 1 of
the Preamble speaks about the operation of the credit system, while
s.45L (1) speaks about regulation of the credit system.
Banking Regulation Act, 1949 – Power of Reserve Bank of
India under – Discussed. D
Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 – s.3(1) – Held:
“management of the currency” appearing in s.3(1) need not
necessarily be confined to the management of what is recognized in
law to be currency but would also include what is capable of faking
or playing the role of a currency. E
Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007 – Object of –
Discussed.
Administrative Law – Colourable exercise of power & malice
in law – Reserve Bank of India (RBI) issued circular directing the
entities it regulated to not to deal with or provide services to any F
individual/business entities dealing with/settling virtual currencies
(VCs) and to exit the relationship, if they have one, with such
individuals/business entities – Petitioners contended that the
invocation by RBI, of ‘public interest’ as a weapon, purportedly for
the benefit of users, consumers or traders of virtual currencies is a G
colourable exercise of power – Held: Not tenable – Once it is
conceded that RBI has powers to issue directions in public interest,
it is impossible to exclude users, consumers or traders of virtual
currencies from the coverage – To constitute colourable exercise of
power, the act must have been done in bad faith and the power must
have been exercised not with the object of protecting the regulated H
300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A entities or the public in general, but with the object of hitting those
who form the target – To constitute malice in law, the act must have
been done wrongfully and willfully without reasonable or probable
cause – Impugned Circular does not fall under the category of either
of them.
B Administrative Law – Statutory Authority – Power of RBI and
difference between other statutory creatures & RBI – Discussed.
Banking Regulation Act, 1949 – s.35A(1) – Reserve Bank of
India (RBI) issued circular directing the entities it regulated to not
to deal with or provide services to any individual/business entities
C dealing with/settling virtual currencies (VCs) and to exit the
relationship, if they have one, with such individuals/business entities
– Plea of the petitioners that expression ‘public interest’ appearing
in s.35A(1)(a) cannot be given an expansive meaning – Held: Power
u/s.35A to issue directions is to be exercised under four
contingencies- (i) public interest (ii) interest of banking policy (iii)
D interest of the depositors & (iv) interest of the banking company –
Expression “banking policy” is defined in s.5(ca) to mean any policy
specified by RBI (i) in the interest of the banking system (ii) in the
interest of monetary stability and (iii) sound economic growth –
Public interest permeates all these three areas – This is why
E s.35A(1)(a) is invoked in the impugned Circular.
Constitution of India – Art.19(1)(g) – Reserve Bank of India
(RBI) issued circular directing the entities it regulated to not to deal
with or provide services to any individual/business entities dealing
with/settling virtual currencies (VCs) and to exit the relationship, if
F they have one, with such individuals/business entities – Plea of the
petitioners (a specialized industry body representing interests of
online & digital services industry; companies running online crypto
assets exchange platforms; shareholders/founders thereof and
crypto assets traders) that a total prohibition, especially through a
subordinate legislation such as a directive from RBI, of an activity
G not declared by law to be unlawful, is violative of Art.19(1)(g) –
Held: Buying and selling of crypto currencies through VC
Exchanges can be by way of hobby or as a trade/business – Persons
who engage in buying and selling virtual currencies, just as a matter
of hobby cannot pitch their claim on Art.19(1)(g), for what is covered
H therein are only profession, occupation, trade or business –
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 301
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA

Therefore hobbyists, who are one among the three categories of A
citizens (hobbyists, traders in VCs and VC Exchanges), straightaway
go out of the challenge u/Art.19(1)(g) – Second and third categories
of citizens namely, those who have made the purchase and sale of
VCs as their occupation or trade, and those who are running online
platforms and VC exchanges can certainly pitch their claim on the
B
basis of Art.19(1)(g).
Words & Phrases - “currency”, “currency notes”, “Indian
currency” “money”, “regulate” - Definition & Meaning of –
Discussed.
Allowing the writ petitions, the Court C
HELD: 1.1 Role assigned to, functions entrusted to and
the powers conferred upon RBI as a Central Bank
Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is now vested with the
obligation to operate the monetary policy framework in India.
After the amendment under Act 28 of 2016, the very task of D
operating the monetary policy framework has been conferred
exclusively upon RBI. The phrase “credit system of the country
to its advantage”, as found in paragraph 1 of the Preamble, is
repeated in sub-section (1) of Section 45L. The only difference
between the two is that paragraph 1 of the Preamble speaks about E
the operation of the credit system, while Section 45L (1) speaks
about regulation of the credit system. While exercising the power
to issue directions conferred by clause (b) of sub-section (1) of
Section 45L, RBI is obliged under sub-section (3) of Section 45L to
have due regard to certain things, one of them being “the effect the
business of such financial institution is likely to have on trends in F
the money and capital markets”. A careful scan of the RBI Act,
1934 in its entirety would show that the operation/regulation of
the credit/financial system of the country to its advantage, is a
thread that connects all the provisions which confer powers upon
RBI, both to determine policy and to issue directions. [Paras G
6.15, 6.16, 6.26 and 6.30][352-C,E; 355-F-G; 356-G-H]
1.2 The RBI Act, 1934, the Banking Regulation Act, 1949
and the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007 cumulatively
recognize and also confer very wide powers upon RBI (i) to
operate the currency and credit system of the country to its
H
302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A advantage (ii) to take over the management of the currency from
central government (iii) to have the sole right to make and issue
bank notes that would constitute legal tender at any place in India
(iv) regulate the financial system of the country to its advantage
(v) to have a say in the determination of inflation target in terms
of the consumer price index (vi) to have complete control over
B
banking companies (vii) to regulate and supervise the payment
systems (viii) to prescribe standards and guidelines for the
proper and efficient management of the payment systems (ix) to
issue directions to a payment system or a system participant which
in RBI’s opinion is engaging in any act that is likely to result in
C systemic risk being inadequately controlled or is likely to affect
the payment system, the monetary policy or the credit policy of
the country and (x) to issue directions to system providers or
the system participants or any other person generally, to regulate
the payment systems or in the interest of management or
operation of any of the payment systems or in public interest.
D
[Para 6.50][364-D-H]
1.3 Fixing the identity of VCs
There is unanimity of opinion among all the regulators and
the governments of various countries that though virtual
E currencies have not acquired the status of a legal tender, they
nevertheless constitute digital representations of value and that
they are capable of functioning as (i) a medium of exchange and/
or (ii) a unit of account and/or (iii) a store of value. The
governments and money market regulators throughout the world
have come to terms with the reality that virtual currencies are
F capable of being used as real money, but all of them have gone
into the denial mode (like the proverbial cat closing its eyes and
thinking that there is complete darkness) by claiming that VCs
do not have the status of a legal tender, as they are not backed by
a central authority. But what an article of merchandise is capable
G of functioning as, is different from how it is recognized in law to
be. It is as much true that VCs are not recognized as legal tender,
as it is true that they are capable of performing some or most of
the functions of real currency. [Paras 6.59, 6.62][381D-E,
382E-G]

H
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 303
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA

1.4 The Court does not think that RBI’s role and power A
can come into play only if something has actually acquired the
status of a legal tender. The Court does not also think that for
RBI to invoke its power, something should have all the four
characteristics or functions of money. [Para 6.65][384A-B]
1.5 Depending upon the text of the statute involved in the B
case and (ii) depending upon the context, various courts in different
jurisdictions have identified virtual currencies to belong to different
categories ranging from property to commodity to non-traditional
currency to payment instrument to money to funds. While each of
these descriptions is true, none of these constitute the whole
truth. Every court which attempted to fix the identity of virtual C
currencies, merely acted as the 4 blind men in the Anekantavada
philosophy of Jainism, (theory of non-absolutism that encourages
acceptance of relativism and pluralism) who attempt to describe
an elephant, but end up describing only one physical feature of
the elephant. RBI was also caught in this dilemma. Nothing D
prevented RBI from adopting a short circuit by notifying VCs
under the category of “other similar instruments” indicated in
Section 2(h) of FEMA, 1999 which defines ‘currency’ to mean
“all currency notes, postal notes, postal orders, money orders,
cheques, drafts, travelers’ cheque, letters of credit, bills of exchange
and promissory notes, credit cards or such other similar instruments E
as may be notified by the Reserve Bank.” After all, promissory
notes, cheques, bills of exchange etc. are also not exactly
currencies but operate as valid discharge (or the creation) of a
debt only between 2 persons or peer-to-peer. Therefore, it is not
possible to accept the contention of the petitioners that VCs are F
just goods/commodities and can never be regarded as real money.
Once it is accepted that some institutions accept virtual
currencies as valid payments for the purchase of goods and
services, there is no escape from the conclusion that the users
and traders of virtual currencies carry on an activity that falls
squarely within the purview of the Reserve Bank of India. The G
statutory obligation that RBI has, as a central bank, (i) to operate
the currency and credit system, (ii) to regulate the financial system
and (iii) to ensure the payment system of the country to be on track,
would compel them naturally to address all issues that are perceived
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304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A as potential risks to the monetary, currency, payment, credit and
financial systems of the country. If an intangible property can act
under certain circumstances as money (even without faking a
currency) then RBI can definitely take note of it and deal with it.
Hence it is not possible to accept the contention of the petitioners
that they are carrying on an activity over which RBI has no power
B
statutorily. [Paras 6.85-6.87][393G, 394A-G]
1.6 RBI is the sole repository of power for the management
of the currency, under Section 3 of the RBI Act. RBI is also vested
with the sole right to issue bank notes under Section 22(1) and
to issue currency notes supplied to it by the Government of India
C and has an important role to play in evolving the monetary policy
of the country, by participation in the Monetary Policy Committee
which is empowered to determine the policy rate required to
achieve the inflation target, in terms of the consumer price index.
Therefore, anything that may pose a threat to or have an impact
D on the financial system of the country, can be regulated or
prohibited by RBI, despite the said activity not forming part of
the credit system or payment system. The expression
“management of the currency” appearing in Section 3(1) need
not necessarily be confined to the management of what is
recognized in law to be currency but would also include what is
E capable of faking or playing the role of a currency. It is ironical
that virtual currencies which took avatar (according to its creator
Satoshi) to kill the demon of a central authority (such as RBI),
seek from the very same central authority, access to banking
services so that the purpose of the avatar is accomplished. The
F very creation of digital currency/ Bitcoin was to liberate the
monetary system from being a slave to the central authority and
from being operated in a manner prejudicial to private interests.
Therefore, the ultra vires argument cannot be accepted when
the provision of access to banking services without any
interference from the central authority over a long period of time
G is perceived as a threat to the very existence of the central
authority. Hence, it is held that RBI has the requisite power to
regulate or prohibit an activity of this nature. [Paras 6.90,
6.91][395D-G; 396A-B]

H
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 305
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA

1.7 If at all, the power is only to regulate, not prohibit A
The projection of the impugned decisions of RBI as a total
prohibition of an activity altogether, may not be correct. The
impugned Circular does not impose a prohibition on the use of
or the trading in VCs. It merely directs the entities regulated by
RBI not to provide banking services to those engaged in the B
trading or facilitating the trading in VCs. Section 36(1)(a) of the
Banking Regulation Act, 1949 very clearly empowers RBI to
caution or prohibit banking companies against entering into
certain types of transactions or class of transactions. The
prohibition is not per se against the trading in VCs. It is against
banking companies, with respect to a class of transactions. The C
fact that the functioning of VCEs automatically gets paralyzed or
crippled because of the impugned Circular, is no ground to hold
that it tantamount to total prohibition. So long as those trading in
VCs do not wish to convert them into fiat currency in India and
so long as the VCEs do not seek to collect their service charges D
or commission in fiat currency through banking channels, they
will not be affected by this Circular. Admittedly, peer-to-peer
transactions are still taking place, without the involvement of
the banking channel. In fact, those actually buying and selling
VCs without seeking to convert fiat currency into VCs or vice-
versa, are not affected by this Circular. It is only the online E
platforms which provide a space or medium for the traders to
buy and sell VCs, that are seriously affected by the Circular, since
the commission that they earn by facilitating the trade is required
to be converted into fiat currency. Interestingly, the petitioners
argue on the one hand that there is total prohibition and argue on F
the other hand that the Circular does not achieve its original
object of curtailing the actual trading, though it cripples the
exchanges. If the first part of this submission is right, the latter
cannot be and if the latter part is right, the former cannot be.
When RBI exercises the powers conferred upon it, both to frame
a policy and to issue directions for its enforcement, such directions G
become supplemental to the Act itself. The impugned Circular is
intended to prohibit banking companies from entering into certain
territories. The Circular is actually addressed to entities
regulated by RBI and not to those who do not come within the
purview of RBI’s net. But the exercise of such a power by RBI, H
306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A over the entities regulated by it, has caused a collateral damage
to some establishments like the petitioners’, who do not come
within the reach of RBI’s net. The power of a statutory authority
to do something has to be tested normally with reference to the
persons/entities qua whom the power is exercised. The question
to be addressed in such cases is whether the authority had the
B
power to do that act or issue such a directive, qua the person to
whom it is addressed. While persons who suffer a collateral
damage can certainly challenge the action, such challenge will be
a very weak challenge qua the availability of power. [Paras 6.94,
6.99 and 6.104, 6.105][397C-G, 398A, 401-F-G, 403 A-B]
C 1.8 Section 18 of the Payment and Settlement Systems Act
indicates (i) what RBI can do (ii) the persons qua whom it can be
done and (iii) the object for which it can be done. In other words,
Section 18 empowers RBI (i) to lay down policies relating to the
regulation of payment systems including electronic, non-
D electronic, domestic and international payment systems affecting
domestic transactions and (ii) to give such directions as it may
consider necessary. These are what RBI can do under Section
18. Coming to the second aspect, the persons qua whom the
powers under Section 18 can be exercised are (i) system providers
(ii) system participants and (iii) any other person generally or
E any such agency. The expression “system provider” is defined
under Section 2(1)(q) to mean a person who operates an authorized
payment system. The expression “system participant” is defined
in Section 2(1)(p) to mean a bank or any other person participating
in a payment system, including the system provider. Other than
F the expressions ‘system provider’ and ‘system participant’,
Section 18 also uses the expressions ‘any other person’ and ‘any
such agency’. The purposes for which the power under Section
18 can be exercised, are also indicated in Section 18. They are (i)
regulation of the payment systems (ii) the interest of the
management and operation of any payment system and (iii) public
G interest. The impugned Circular is primarily addressed to banks
who are “system participants” within the meaning of Section
2(1)(p). The banks certainly have a system of payment to be
effected between a payer and a beneficiary, falling thereby within
the meaning of the expression payment system. Therefore, in
H the overall scheme of the Payment and Settlement Systems Act,
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 307
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA

2007, it is impossible to say that RBI does not have the power to A
frame policies and issue directions to banks who are system
participants, with respect to transactions that will fall under the
category of payment obligation or payment instruction, if not a
payment system. Hence, the argument revolving around Section
18 should fail. [Paras 6.106-6.109, 6.111][402B, D-G, G-H,
B
403-A, D-E]
2. Mode of exercise of power:
Satisfaction/Application of mind/relevant and irrelevant
considerations
In the facts of the present case, RBI could not be held guilty C
of non-application of mind. As a matter of fact, the issue as to how
to deal with virtual currencies has been lingering with RBI from
June 2013 onwards. The sequence of events from June 2013 up
to 02-04-2018 would show that RBI had been brooding over the
issue for almost five years, without taking the extreme step. D
Therefore, RBI can hardly be held guilty of non-application of
mind. If an issue had come up again and again before a statutory
authority and such an authority had also issued warnings to those
who are likely to be impacted, it can hardly be said that there was
no application of mind. For arriving at a “satisfaction” as required
by Section 35A(1) of Banking Regulation Act, 1949 and Section E
45JA and 45L of RBI Act, 1934, it was not required of RBI either
to write a thesis or to write a judgement. In fact, RBI cannot
even be accused of not taking note of relevant considerations or
taking into account irrelevant considerations. RBI has taken into
account only those considerations which multinational bodies and F
regulators of various countries such as FATF, BIS, etc., have
taken into account. This can be seen even from the earliest press
release dated 24-12-2013, which is more elaborate than the
impugned Circular dated 06-04-2018. When a series of steps
taken by a statutory authority over a period of about five years
disclose in detail what triggered their action, it is not possible to G
see the last of the orders in the series in isolation and conclude
that the satisfaction arrived at by the authority is not reflected
appropriately. In any case, pursuant to an order passed by this
court on 21-08-2019, RBI gave a detailed point-wise reply to the
representations of the petitioners. In these representations, the H
308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A petitioners have highlighted all considerations that they thought
as relevant. RBI has given its detailed responses on 04-09-2019
and 18-09-2019. Therefore, the contention that there was no
application of mind and that relevant considerations were omitted
to be taken note of, loses its vigour in view of the subsequent
developments. [Paras 6.113, 6.116-6.118][404B, 405A-D, 406G-
B
H, 407A-B]
3. Malice In Law/Colorable Exercise
The impugned Circular does not order either the freezing
or the closing of any particular account of a particular customer.
C All that the impugned Circular says is that RBI regulated entities
shall exit the relationship that they have with any person or entity
dealing with or settling VCs, within three months of the date of
the Circular. The regulated entities are directed not to provide
services for facilitating any person or entity in dealing with or
settling VCs. Some of the petitioners herein are individuals and
D companies who run virtual currency exchanges. In case they have
other businesses, the impugned Circular does not order the
closure of their bank accounts relating to other businesses. The
prohibition under paragraph 2 of the impugned Circular is with
respect to the provision of services for facilitating any person or
E entity in dealing with or settling VCs. This prohibition does not
extend either to the closing or the freezing of the accounts of the
petitioners in relation to their other ventures. There can be no
quarrel with the proposition that RBI has sufficient power to issue
directions to its regulated entities in the interest of depositors,
in the interest of banking policy or in the interest of the banking
F company or in public interest. If the exercise of power by RBI
with a view to achieve one of these objectives incidentally causes
a collateral damage to one of the several activities of an entity
which does not come within the purview of the statutory authority,
the same cannot be assailed as a colourable exercise of power or
G being vitiated by malice in law. To constitute colourable exercise
of power, the act must have been done in bad faith and the power
must have been exercised not with the object of protecting the
regulated entities or the public in general, but with the object of
hitting those who form the target. To constitute malice in law, the
act must have been done wrongfully and willfully without reasonable
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or probable cause. The impugned Circular does not fall under A
the category of either of them. The argument that the invocation
by RBI, of ‘public interest’ as a weapon, purportedly for the benefit
of users, consumers or traders of virtual currencies is a colourable
exercise of power also does not hold water. Once it is conceded
that RBI has powers to issue directions in public interest, it is
B
impossible to exclude users, consumers or traders of virtual
currencies from the coverage. In fact, the repeated press releases
issued by RBI from 2013 onwards indicate that RBI did not want
the members of the public, which include users, consumers and
traders of VCs, even to remotely think that virtual currencies
have a legal tender status or are backed by a central authority. C
Irrespective of what VCs actually do or do not do, it is an accepted
fact that they are capable of performing some of the functions of
real currencies. Therefore, if RBI takes steps to prevent the
gullible public from having an illusion as though VCs may
constitute a valid legal tender, the steps so taken, are actually
D
taken in good faith. The repeated warnings through press releases
from December 2013 onwards indicate a genuine attempt on the
part of RBI to safeguard the interests of the public. Therefore,
the contention that the impugned Circular is vitiated by malice in
law and that it is a colorable exercise of power, cannot be
sustained. The power under Section 35A to issue directions is to E
be exercised under four contingencies namely (i) public interest
(ii) interest of banking policy (iii) interest of the depositors and
(iv) interest of the banking company. The expression “banking
policy” is defined in Section 5(ca) to mean any policy specified by
RBI (i) in the interest of the banking system (ii) in the interest of
F
monetary stability and (iii) sound economic growth. Public interest
permeates all these three areas. This is why Section 35A(1)(a) is
invoked in the impugned Circular. Therefore, the argument that
the impugned decision is a colorable exercise of power and it is
vitiated by malice in law is rejected. [Paras 6.120, 6.122, 6.123
and 6.125][407E-G; 408C-G; 409A-B; F-G] G
4. M. S. Gill Reasoning
The impugned Circular cannot be assailed on the basis of
M. S. Gill test, for two reasons. First is that in Chairman, All
India Railway Recruitment Board v. K. Shyam Kumar & Ors,
H
310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A this court held that MS Gill test may not always be applicable
where larger public interest is involved and that in such situations,
additional grounds can be looked into for examining the validity
of an order. In Moons Technologies ltd. case this court clarified
that though there is no broad proposition that MS Gill test will
not apply where larger public interest is involved, subsequent
B
materials in the form of facts that have taken place after the order
in question is passed, can always be looked at in the larger public
interest, in order to support an administrative order. The second
reason why the weapon of MS Gill will get blunted in this case, is
that during the pendency of this case, this court passed an interim
C order on 21-08-2019 directing RBI to give a point-wise reply to
the detailed representation made by the writ petitioners. Pursuant
to the said order, RBI gave detailed responses on 04-09-2019
and 18-09-2019. Therefore, the argument based on MS Gill test
has lost its potency. [Para 6.126][410A-D]
D 5. Wait and watch approach of the other stakeholders
Every one of these stakeholders has a different function to
perform and are entitled to have an approach depending upon
the prism through which they are obliged to look at the issue.
Therefore, RBI cannot be faulted for not adopting the very same
E approach as that of others. [Para 6.128][411B-C]
6. Light-touch approach of the other countries
The judicial decision of the Court cannot be colored by what
other countries have done or not done. Comparative perspective
helps only in relation to principles of judicial decision making
F and not for testing the validity of an action taken based on the
existing statutory scheme. [Para 6.129][411E]
7. Precautionary steps taken by petitioners
The fact of the matter is that enhanced KYC norms may
remove anonymity of the customer, but not that of the VC. The
G
Court is not expert to say whether the safety valves put in place
could have addressed all issues raised by RBI. [Para 6.131][412A-
C]
8. Different types of VCs require different treatments
H The very same virtual currency can have a unidirectional
or bidirectional flow depending upon the scheme with which the
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entities come up. Moreover, the question whether anonymous A
VCs alone could have been banned leaving the pseudo-
anonymous, is for experts and not for this Court to decide. In any
case, the stand taken by RBI is that they have not banned VCs.
Hence, the question whether RBI should have adopted different
approaches tow ards different VCs does not arise. [Para B
6.135][413E-F]
9. Acceptance of DLT and rejection of VCs is a paradox
There is nothing irrational about the acceptance of a
technological advancement/innovation, but the rejection of a by-
product of such innovation. There is nothing like a “take it or C
leave it” option. [Para 6.137][413H, A]
10. RBI’s decisions do not qualify for Judicial deference
RBI is not just like any other statutory body created by an
Act of legislature. It is a creature, created with a mandate to get
D
liberated even from its creator. This is why it is given a mandate
– (i) under the Preamble of the RBI Act 1934, to operate the
currency and credit system of the country to its advantage and to
operate the monetary policy framework in the country (ii) under
Section 3(1), to take over the management of the currency from
the central government (iii) under Section 20, to undertake to E
accept monies for account of the central government, to make
payments up to the amount standing to the credit of its account
and to carry out its exchange, remittance and other banking
operations, including the management of the public debt of the
Union (iv) under Section 21(1), to have all the money, remittance, F
exchange and banking transactions in India of the central
government entrusted with it (v) under Section 22(1), to have
the sole right to issue bank notes in India and (vi) under Section
38, to get rupees into circulation only through it, to the exclusion
of the central government. Therefore, RBI cannot be equated to
any other statutory body that merely serves its master. It is G
specifically empowered to do certain things to the exclusion of
even the central government. Therefore, to place its decisions
at a pedestal lower than that of even an executive decision, would
do violence to the scheme of the Act. The RBI Act, 1934 is a
pre-constitutional legislation, which survived the Constitution by H
312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A virtue of Article 372(1) of the Constitution. The difference
between other statutory creatures and RBI is that what the
statutory creatures can do, could as well be done by the executive.
The power conferred upon the delegate in other statutes can be
tinkered with, amended or even withdrawn. But the power
B conferred upon RBI under Section 3(1) of the RBI Act, 1934 to
take over the management of the currency from the central
government, cannot be taken away. The sole right to issue bank
notes in India, conferred by Section 22(1) cannot also be taken
away and conferred upon any other bank or authority. RBI by
virtue of its authority, is a member of the Bank of International
C Settlements, which position cannot be taken over by the central
government and conferred upon any other authority. Therefore,
to say that it is just like any other statutory authority whose
decisions cannot invite due deference, is to do violence to the
scheme of the Act. In fact, all countries have central banks/
D authorities, which, technically have independence from the
government of the country. To ensure such independence, a fixed
tenure is granted to the Board of Governors, so that they are not
bogged down by political expediencies. Therefore, the argument
that a policy decision taken by RBI does not warrant any deference
cannot be accepted. [Paras 6.139, 6.141][414-D-G; 416-B-E, H]
E
11.1 Article 19(1)(g) challenge & Proportionality
The buying and selling of crypto currencies through VC
Exchanges can be by way of hobby or as a trade/business. The
distinction between the two is that there may or may not exist a
F profit motive in the former, while it would, in the latter. Persons
who engage in buying and selling virtual currencies, just as a
matter of hobby cannot pitch their claim on Article 19(1)(g), for
what is covered therein are only profession, occupation, trade or
business. Therefore hobbyists, who are one among the three
categories of citizens (hobbyists, traders in VCs and VC
G Exchanges), straightaway go out of the challenge under Article
19(1)(g). The second and third categories of citizens namely, those
who have made the purchase and sale of VCs as their occupation
or trade, and those who are running online platforms and VC
exchanges can certainly pitch their claim on the basis of Article
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19(1)(g). Technically speaking, the second category of citizens A
cannot claim that the impugned decision of RBI has the effect of
completely shutting down their trade or occupation. Citizens who
have taken up the trade of buying and selling virtual currencies
are not prohibited by the impugned Circular (i) either from trading
in crypto-to-crypto pairs (ii) or in using the currencies stored in
B
their wallets, to make payments for purchase of goods and
services to those who are prepared to accept them, within India
or abroad. Virtual currencies cannot be stored anywhere, in the
real sense of the term, as they do not exist in any physical shape
or form. What is actually stored is the private keys, which can be
used to access the public address and transaction signatures. C
The software program in which the private and public keys of
those who own virtual currencies is stored, is called a digital wallet.
There are different types of wallets namely (i) paper wallet which
is essentially a document that contains a public address for
receiving the currency and a private key which allows the owner
D
to spend or transfer the virtual currencies stored in the address
(ii) mobile wallet, which is a tool which runs as an app on the
smartphone, where the private keys are stored, enabling the
owner to make payments in crypto currencies directly from the
phone (iii) web wallet, in which the private keys are stored on a
server which is constantly online (iv) desktop wallet, in which E
private keys are stored in the hard drive and (v) hardware wallet,
where the private keys are stored in a hardware device such as
pen drive. All the above types of wallets except the desktop wallet
allow a great degree of flexibility, in that they can be accessed
from anywhere in the world. Most of the wallets except perhaps
F
desktop wallet, have great mobility and have transcended
borders. Therefore, despite the fact that the users and traders of
virtual currencies are also prevented by the impugned Circular
from accessing the banking services, the impugned Circular has
not paralyzed many of the other ways in which crypto currencies
can still find their way to or through the market. Persons who G
have suffered a deadly blow from the impugned Circular are only
those running VC exchanges and not even those who are trading
in VCs. [Paras 6.147– 6.154][419-F-H; 420-A-H; 421-A-D]

H
314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A 11.2 Though at the time when the impugned Circular was
issued, RBI has not obviously addressed many of the issues
flagged by the writ petitioners, RBI did in fact consider the issues
raised by the petitioners, pursuant to the order passed by this
court on 21-08-2019. RBI has also analyzed in Annexure B to
the reply dated 18-09-2019 extracted above, the additional
B
safeguards suggested by the petitioners, to see if the purpose of
the impugned measure can be achieved through less intrusive
measures. While exercising the power of judicial review the Court
may not scan the response of RBI in greater detail to find out if
the response to the additional safeguards suggested by the
C petitioners was just imaginary. But at the same time the Court
cannot lose sight of three important aspects namely, (i) that RBI
has not so far found, in the past 5 years or more, the activities of
VC exchanges to have actually impacted adversely, the way the
entities regulated by RBI function (ii) that the consistent stand
taken by RBI up to and including in their reply dated 04-09-2019
D
is that RBI has not prohibited VCs in the country and (iii) that
even the Inter-Ministerial Committee constituted on 02-11-2017,
which initially recommended a specific legal framework including
the introduction of a new law namely, Crypto-token Regulation
Bill 2018, was of the opinion that a ban might be an extreme tool
E and that the same objectives can be achieved through regulatory
measures. The Crypto-token Regulation Bill, 2018 initially
recommended by the Inter-Ministerial Committee contained a
proposal (i) to prohibit persons dealing with activities related to
crypto tokens from falsely posing these products as not being
securities or investment schemes or offering investment schemes
F
due to gaps in the existing regulatory framework and (ii) to
regulate VC exchanges and brokers where sale and purchase
may be permitted. The key aspects of the Crypto-token
Regulation Bill, 2018, found in paragraph 13 of the ‘Note-
precursor to report’ shows that the Inter-Ministerial Committee
G was fine with the idea of allowing the sale and purchase of digital
crypto asset at recognized exchanges. But within a year, there
was a volte-face and the final report of the very same Inter-
Ministerial Committee, submitted in February 2019
recommended the imposition of a total ban on private crypto
currencies through a legislation to be known as “Banning of
H
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Cryptocurrency and Regulation of Official Digital Currency Act, A
2019”. The draft of the bill contained a proposal to ban the mining,
generation, holding, selling, dealing in, issuing, transferring,
disposing of or using crypto currency in the territory of India. At
the same time, the bill contemplated (i) the creation of a digital
rupee as a legal tender, by the central government in consultation
B
with RBI and (ii) the recognition of any official foreign digital
currency, as foreign currency in India. In case the said enactment
(2019) had come through, there would have been an official digital
currency, for the creation and circulation of which, RBI/central
government would have had a monopoly. But that situation had
not arisen. The position as on date is that VCs are not banned, C
but the trading in VCs and the functioning of VC exchanges are
sent to comatose by the impugned Circular by disconnecting their
lifeline namely, the interface with the regular banking sector. What
is worse is that this has been done (i) despite RBI not finding
anything wrong about the way in which these exchanges function
D
and (ii) despite the fact that VCs are not banned. The concern of
RBI is and it ought to be, about the entities regulated by it. Till
date, RBI has not come out with a stand that any of the entities
regulated by it namely, the nationalized banks/scheduled
commercial banks/co-operative banks/NBFCs has suffered any
loss or adverse effect directly or indirectly, on account of the E
interface that the VC exchanges had with any of them. It is not
the case of RBI that any of the entities regulated by it has suffered
on account of the provision of banking services to the online
platforms running VC exchanges. It is no doubt true that RBI
has very wide powers not only in view of the statutory scheme of
F
the 3 enactments indicated earlier, but also in view of the special
place and role that it has in the economy of the country. These
powers can be exercised both in the form of preventive as well
as curative measures. But the availability of power is different
from the manner and extent to which it can be exercised. When
the consistent stand of RBI is that they have not banned VCs G
and when the Government of India is unable to take a call despite
several committees coming up with several proposals including
two draft bills, both of which advocated exactly opposite positions,
it is not possible for us to hold that the impugned measure is
proportionate. [Paras 6.166 – 6.173][439-A-E; 440-E-F; 441-C-
G; 442-A-D] H
316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A 12. Therefore, the petitioners are entitled to succeed and
the impugned Circular dated 06-04-2018 is liable to be set aside
on the ground of proportionality. Accordingly, the writ petitions
are allowed and the Circular dated 06-04-2018 is set aside. The
Statement dated 05-04-2018, though challenged in one writ
petition, is not in the nature of a statutory direction and hence
B
the question of setting aside the same does not arise. There is
still one more issue left. It is the freezing of the account of
Discidium Internet Labs Pvt. Ltd., which is petitioner no. 6 in
WP (C) No. 373 of 2018. Admittedly, the activities carried on by
the said petitioner were not declared as unlawful. It is the positive
C case of RBI that they did not in fact freeze the accounts of
petitioner no.6. Therefore, RBI is obliged to direct the Central
Bank of India to defreeze the account and release the funds.
Hence, RBI is directed to issue instructions forthwith to the
Central Bank of India, Worli branch, to defreeze the current
account no. 3677101984 of petitioner no. 6 in WP (C) No. 373 of
D
2018 and to release the funds lying in the account to the company
together with interest at the rate applicable. [Paras 7.1 –
7.4][442E-H, 443A-C]
Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. & Anr v. Union of India &
Ors. (1990) 3 SCC 223 : [1990] 1 SCR 909;
E Jayantilal Amrit Lal Shodhan v. F.N. Rana AIR 1964
SC 648 : [1964] SCR 294 – followed.
M S Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner (1978) 1
SCC 405 : [1978] 2 SCR 272; State of Rajasthan v.
Basant Nahata (2005) 12 SCC 77 : [2005] 3 Suppl.
F SCR 1 – held inapplicable.
CIT v. Kasturi & Sons Ltd. (1999) 3 SCC 346 : [1999]
1 SCR 1207; Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. v.
Commissioner of Trade Tax (2006) 5 SCC 624 : [2006]
2 Suppl. SCR 673; Keshavlal Khemchand & Sons Pvt.
G Ltd. v. Union of India (2015) 4 SCC 770 : [2015] 2
SCR 51; Star India Pvt. ltd. v. Dept. of Industrial Policy
and Promotion and Ors. (2019) 2 SCC 104 : [2018] 14
SCR 128; Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka
(1995) 1 SCC 574 : [1994] 4 Suppl. SCR 477; St.
H Johns Teachers Training Institute v. Regional Director,
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 317
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA

NCTE (2003) 3 SCC 321 : [2003] 1 SCR 975; Udai A
Singh Dagar v. Union of India (2007) 10 SCC 306 :
[2007] 6 SCR 707; Peerless General Finance and
Investment Co. Ltd. v. Reserve Bank of India (1992) 2
SCC 343 [1992] 1 SCR 406; ICICI Bank Ltd v. Official
Liquidator of APS Star Industries Ltd (2010) 10 SCC 1
B
: [2010] 12 SCR 644; Ganesh Bank of Kurunwad Ltd.
& Ors v. Union of India & Ors. (2006) 10 SCC 645 :
[2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 437; Chairman, All India Railway
Recruitment Board v. K. Shyam Kumar & Ors. (2010) 6
SCC 614 : [2010] 6 SCR 291; PRP Exports & Ors v.
Chief Secretary, Government of Tamil Nadu & Ors. C
(2014) 13 SCC 692 : [2013] 16 SCR 1107; Moons
Technologies Ltd. & Ors v. Union of India & Ors. (2019)
SCC Online SC 624; State of Maharashtra v. Indian
Hotel and Restaurants Association (2013) 8 SCC 519 :
[2013] 7 SCR 654 – relied on.
D
K. Ramanathan v. State of Tamil Nadu 1985 (2) SCC
116 : [1985] 2 SCR 1028; Godawat Pan Masala
Products IP Ltd. & Anr v. Union of India (2004) 7 SCC
68 : [2004] 3 Suppl. SCR 239; Union of India & Anr v.
Cynamide India Ltd. & Anr (1987) 2 SCC 720 : [1987]
2 SCR 841; State of U.P. and Ors v. Babu Ram Upadhya E
AIR 1961 SC 751 : [1961] SCR 679; D.K.V. Prasada
Rao v. Govt. of A.P. AIR 1984 AP 75; State of Punjab
& Anr v. Gurdial Singh & Ors. (1980) 2 SCC 471 :
[1980] 1 SCR 1071; Collector (District Magistrate)
Allahabad & Anr v. Raja Ram Jaiswal (1985) 3 SCC 1 F
: [1985] 3 SCR 995; Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant
Vimalnath Narichania & Ors (2010) 9 SCC 437 : [2010]
10 SCR 971; Meerut Development Authority v. Assn.
Management Studies & Anr. (2009) 6 SCC 171 : [2009]
6 SCR 663; Bihar Public Service Commission v. Saiyed
Hussain Abbas Rizwi & Anr. (2012) 13 SCC 61 : [2012] G
11 SCR 1032; Utkal Contractors & Joinery (P) Ltd. &
Ors v. State of Orissa & Ors. (1987) 3 SCC 279 : [1987]
3 SCR 317; Empress Mills v. Municipal Committee,
Wardha (1958) SCR 1102; R.K. Garg v. Union of India
(1981) 4 SCC 675 : [1982] 1 SCR 947; BALCO H
318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A Employees’ Union (Regd.) v. Union of India & Ors,
(2002) 2 SCC 333 : [2001] 5 Suppl. SCR 511; Swiss
Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. & Anr v. Union of India & Ors, (2019)
4 SCC 17 : [2019] 3 SCR 535; State of Gujarat & Anr
v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd. & Anr. (1974) 4 SCC 656 :
[1974] 3 SCR 760; G.K.Krishnan v. Tamil Nadu (1975)
B
1 SCC 375 : [1975] 2 SCR 715; State of M.P. v. Nandlal
Jaiswal (1986) 4 SCC 566 : [1987] 1 SCR 1; P.M.
Ashwathanarayana Setty v. State of Karnataka (1989)
Supp (1) SCC 696 : [1988] 3 Suppl. SCR 155; T.
Velayudhan v. Union of India (1993) 2 SCC 582 :
C [1993] 1 SCR 832; Delhi Science Forum v. Union of
India (1996) 2 SCC 405 : [1996] 2 SCR 767; Bhavesh
D. Parish v. Union of India (2000) 5 SCC 471 : [2000]
1 Suppl. SCR 291; Ugar Sugar Works Ltd. v. Delhi
Administration & Ors. (2001) 3 SCC 635 : [2001] 2
SCR 630; Govt. of Andhra Pradesh & Ors v. P. Laxmi
D
Devi (2008) 4 SCC 720 : [2008] 3 SCR 330; Villianur
Iyarkkai Padukappu Maiyam v. Union of India (2009)
7 SCC 561 : [2009] 9 SCR 225; D.G. of Foreign Trade
v. Kanak Exports (2016) 2 SCC 226 : [2015] 15 SCR
287; State of J & K v. Trikuta Roller Flour Mills Pvt.
E Ltd. (2018) 11 SCC 260 : [2017] 9 SCR 642; Pioneer
Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India
(2019) 8 SCC 416; Md. Yasin v. Town Area Committee
(1952) SCR 572; Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of
India (1972) 2 SCC 788 : [1973] 2 SCR 757; Md.
Faruk v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors (1969) 1 SCC
F
853 : [1970] 1 SCR 156; Modern Dental College and
Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh. (2016) 7
SCC 353 : [2016] 3 SCR 579– referred to.
Moss v. Hancock (1899) 2 QB 111; Wisconsin Central
Ltd v. United States 585 US 2018, 138 S. Ct. 2067
G (2018); SEC v. Trendon Shavers Case No. 4: 13-Cv-
416 (August 6, 2013) United States v. Ulbricht 31F.
Supp. 3D 540 (2014); United States v. Faiella 39F. Supp.
3D 544 (2014); In re Coinflip Inc CFTC Docket No.
15-29 dated 17-09-2015; In the matter of TeraExchange
H
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LLC. CFTC Docket No. 15-33 dated 24-09-2015; In A
the matter of BFXNA Inc, d/b/a BITFINEX CFTC
Docket No. 16-19 dated 02-06-2016; United States v.
Murgio 209 F. Supp. 3D 698 (2016); Commodity
Futures Trading Commission v. Patrick McDonnell 18-
Cv-361 dated 03-06-2018; Commodity Futures Trading
B
Commission v. My Big Coin Pay, Inc. et al. 18-Cv-10077-
RWZ dated 26-09-2018; State of Florida v. Michell
Abner Espinoza F 14-2923 decided on 22-07-2016 ;
State of Florida v. Michell Abner Espinoza 264 So. 3D
1055 (2019); B2C2 Ltd. v. Quoine Pte Ltd. [2019] SGHC
(I) 3; National Provincial Bank v. Ainsworth [1965] 1 C
AC 1175 at 1248; Quoine Pte Ltd v. B2C2 Ltd [2020]
SGCA (I) 02; AA v. Persons Unknown & others Re
Bitcoin [2019] EWHC 3556 (Comm); Colonial Bank
v. Whinney [1885] 30 ChD; Skatteverket v. David
Hedqvist Case C-264/14 dated 22-10-2015; Elloy de
D
Freitas v. Permanent Secretary of Ministry of
Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing [1999] 1
AC 69; Huang v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2007] UKHL 11; Bank Mellat v. HM
Treasury (No. 2) [2013] UKSC 39; Illinois Elections
Bd v. Socialist Workers Party (1979) 440 US 173 – E
referred to.
“Digital Gold: Bitcoin and the inside story of the Misfits and
Millionaires Trying to Reinvent Money”- Book by Nathaniel
Popper; and Virtual Currency, Treasury Update published by the
Tax Policy Division, Michigan Department of Treasury (Vol. 1(1), F
November 2015) – referred to.
Case Law Reference
[1999] 1 SCR 1207 relied on Para 6.69
[2006] 2 Suppl. SCR 673 relied on Para 6.70 G
[2015] 2 SCR 51 relied on Para 6.88
[2018] 14 SCR 128 relied on Para 6.92
[1985] 2 SCR 1028 referred to Para 6.92
[2004] 3 Suppl. SCR 239 referred to Para 6.93 H
320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A [1994] 4 Suppl. SCR 477 relied on Para 6.93
[2005] 3 Suppl. SCR 1 held inapplicable Para 6.95
[1987] 2 SCR 841 referred to Par 6.97
[2003] 1 SCR 975 relied on Para 6.98
B [2007] 6 SCR 707 relied on Para 6.98
[1992] 1 SCR 406 relied on Para 6.99
[1961] SCR 679 referred to Para 6.99
AIR 1984 AP 75 referred to Para 6.99
C
[2010] 12 SCR 644 relied on Para 6.99
[1964] SCR 294 followed Para 6.101
[1990] 1 SCR 909 followed Para 6.102
[2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 437 relied on Para 6.103
D
[1980] 1 SCR 1071 referred to Para 6.121
[1985] 3 SCR 995 referred to Para 6.121
[2010] 10 SCR 971 referred to Para 6.121
[2009] 6 SCR 663 referred to Para 6.124
E
[2012] 11 SCR 1032 referred to Para 6.124
[1987] 3 SCR 317 referred to Para 6.124
[1958] SCR 1102 referred to Para 6.124

F [1978] 2 SCR 272 held inapplicable Para 6.126
[2010] 6 SCR 291 relied on Para 6.126
[2013] 16 SCR 1107 relied on Para 6.126
[1982] 1 SCR 947 referred to Para 6.138
G [2001] 5 Suppl. SCR 511 referred to Para 6.138
[2019] 3 SCR 535 referred to Para 6.138
[1974] 3 SCR 760 referred to Para 6.140
[1975] 2 SCR 715 referred to Para 6.140
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[1987] 1 SCR 1 referred to Para 6.140 A
[1988] 3 Suppl. SCR 155 referred to Para 6.140
[1993] 1 SCR 832 referred to Para 6.140
[1996] 2 SCR 767 referred to Para 6.140
[2000] 1 Suppl. SCR 291 referred to Para 6.140 B
[2001] 2 SCR 630 referred to Para 6.140
[2008] 3 SCR 330 referred to Para 6.140
[2009] 9 SCR 225 referred to Para 6.140
C
[2015] 15 SCR 287 referred to Para 6.140
[2017] 9 SCR 642 referred to Para 6.140
(2019) 8 SCC 416 referred to Para 6.140
[1952] SCR 572 referred to Para 6.142
D
[1973] 2 SCR 757 referred to Para 6.142
[1970] 1 SCR 156 referred to Para 6.142
[2016] 3 SCR 579 referred to Para 6.156
[2013] 7 SCR 654 relied on Para 6.172
E
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No.
528 of 2018.
[UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA]
With
F
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 373 of 2018.
Nakul Dewan, Shyam Divan, Sr. Advs., Ashim Sood, Jaideep
Reddy, Alipak Banerjee, Pradhuman Gohil, Mrs. Taruna Singh Gohil,
Ms. Ranu Purohit, Ms. Senu Nizar, Arman Pratap Singh, Aditya Kumar,
Brijesh Ujjainwal, Rhythm Buaria, Ms. Payal Chanda, Mayank Pandey,
G
Avinash Menon, Ms. Tanya Dayal, Rohan Andrew Naik, V. P. Singh,
Raghav Seth, Ms. Sayobani Banu, Shivam, Bharat Makker, Harpreet
Singh Ajmani, Ms. Shraddha Deshmukh, Rajat Nair, Mrs. Anil Katiyar,
Advs. for the appearing parties.

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322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.
1. THE STORY LINE:
1.1. Reserve Bank of India (hereinafter, “RBI”) issued a
“Statement on Developmental and Regulatory Policies” on April 5,
B 2018, paragraph 13 of which directed the entities regulated by RBI (i)
not to deal with or provide services to any individual or business entities
dealing with or settling virtual currencies and (ii) to exit the relationship,
if they already have one, with such individuals/ business entities, dealing
with or settling virtual currencies (VCs).
C 1.2. Following the said Statement, RBI also issued a circular dated
April 6, 2018, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 35A read
with Section 36(1)(a) and Section 56 of the Banking Regulation Act,
1949 and Section 45JA and 45L of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934
(hereinafter, “RBI Act, 1934”) and Section 10(2) read with Section 18
of the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007, directing the entities
D
regulated by RBI (i) not to deal in virtual currencies nor to provide services
for facilitating any person or entity in dealing with or settling virtual
currencies and (ii) to exit the relationship with such persons or entities, if
they were already providing such services to them.
1.3. Challenging the said Statement and Circular and seeking a
E direction to the respondents not to restrict or restrain banks and financial
institutions regulated by RBI, from providing access to the banking
services, to those engaged in transactions in crypto assets, the petitioners
have come up with these writ petitions. The petitioner in the first writ
petition is a specialized industry body known as ‘Internet and Mobile
F Association of India’ which represents the interests of online and digital
services industry. The petitioners in the second writ petition comprise of
a few companies which run online crypto assets exchange platforms,
the shareholders/founders of these companies and a few individual crypto
assets traders. It must be stated here that the individuals who are some
of the petitioners in the second writ petition are young high-tech
G entrepreneurs who have graduated from premier educational institutions
of technology in the country.
Contents of the impugned Statement and Circular of RBI:
1.4. The Statement dated 05-04-2018 issued by RBI, impugned in
these writ petitions, sets out various developmental and regulatory policy
H measures for the purpose of (i) strengthening regulation and supervision
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(ii) broadening and deepening financial markets (iii) improving currency A
management (iv) promoting financial inclusion and literacy and (v)
facilitating data management. Paragraph 13 of the said statement which
falls under the caption “currency management” deals directly with
virtual currencies and the same constitutes the offending portion of the
impugned Statement. Therefore, paragraph 13 of the impugned Statement
B
alone is extracted as follows:
13. Ring-fencing regulated entities from virtual currencies
Technological innovations, including those underlying virtual
currencies, have the potential to improve the efficiency and
inclusiveness of the financial system. However, Virtual C
Currencies (VCs), also variously referred to as crypto
currencies and crypto assets, raise concerns of consumer
protection, market integrity and money laundering, among
others.
Reserve Bank has repeatedly cautioned users, holders and D
traders of virtual currencies, including Bitcoins, regarding
various risks associated in dealing with such virtual
currencies. In view of the associated risks, it has been decided
that, with immediate effect, entities regulated by RBI shall not
deal with or provide services to any individual or business
entities dealing with or settling VCs. Regulated entities which E
already provide such services shall exit the relationship within
a specified time. A circular in this regard is being issued
separately.
1.5. The Circular dated 06-04-2018 deals entirely with virtual
currencies and the prohibition on dealing with the same. This Circular is F
statutory in character, issued in exercise of the powers conferred by (i)
the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 (ii) the Banking Regulation Act,
1949 and (iii) the Payment Settlement Systems Act, 2007. This Circular
in its enirety is reproduced as follows:
Prohibition on dealing in Virtual Currencies (VCs) G
Reserve Bank has repeatedly through its public notices on
December 24, 2013, February 01, 2017 and December 05,
2017, cautioned users, holders and traders of virtual
currencies, including Bitcoins, regarding various risks
associated in dealing with such virtual currencies. H
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A 2. In view of the associated risks, it has been decided that,
with immediate effect, entities regulated by the Reserve Bank
shall not deal in VCs or provide services for facilitating any
person or entity in dealing with or settling VCs. Such services
include maintaining accounts, registering, trading, settling,
clearing, giving loans against virtual tokens, accepting them
B
as collateral, opening accounts of exchanges dealing with
them and transfer/receipt of money in accounts relating to
purchase/sale of VCs.
3. Regulated entities which already provide such services shall
exit the relationship within three months from the date of this
C circular.
4. These instructions are issued in exercise of powers
conferred by section 35A read with section 36(1)(a) of
Banking Regulation Act, 1949, section 35A read with section
36(1)(a) and section 56 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949,
D section 45JA and 45L of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934
and Section 10(2) read with Section 18 of Payment and
Settlement Systems Act, 2007.
2. THE SETTING

E 2.1. The Statement dated 05-04-2018 and the Circular dated
06-04-2018 of RBI, impugned in these writ petitions, were a culmination
of a flurry of activities by different stakeholders, nationally and globally,
over a period of about 5 years. Therefore, it is necessary to see the
setting in which (or the backdrop against which) the impugned decisions
of RBI were posited. While doing so, it will also be necessary to take
F note of the developments that have taken place during the pendency of
these writ petitions, so that we have a close-up as well as aerial view of
the setting.
2.2. It was probably for the first time that RBI took note of
technology risks in changing business environment, in their Financial
G Stability Report of June 2013. Paragraph 3.60 of this report noted that
globally, the use of online and mobile technologies was driving the
proliferation of virtual currencies. Therefore, the report stated that those
developments pose challenges in the form of regulatory, legal and
operational risks. Box 3.4 of the said report dealt specifically with virtual
currency schemes and it started by defining virtual currency as a
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type of unregulated digital money, issued and controlled by its A
developers and used and accepted by the members of a specific
virtual community. It was declared in Box 3.4 of the said report that
“the regulators are studying the impact of online payment options
and virtual currencies to determine potential risks associated with
them”.
B
2.3. In June 2013, the Financial Action Task Force (hereinafter,
“FATF”), also known by its French name, Groupe d’action financière,
which is an inter-governmental organization founded in 1989 on the
initiative of G-7 to develop policies to combat money laundering, came
up with what came to be known as “New Payment Products and
Services Guidance” (NPPS Guidance, 2013). It was actually a Guidance C
for a Risk Based Approach to Pre-paid cards, Mobile Payments and
Internet-based Payment Services. But this Guidance did not define the
expressions ‘digital currency’, ‘virtual currency’, or ‘electronic money’,
nor did it focus on virtual currencies, as distinct from internet based
payment systems that facilitate transactions denominated in real money D
(such as Paypal, Alipay, Google Checkout etc.). Therefore, a short-term
typologies project was initiated by FATF for promoting fuller
understanding of the parties involved in convertible virtual currency
systems and for developing a risk matrix.
2.4. On 24-12-2013, a Press Release was issued by RBI cautioning E
the users, holders and traders of virtual currencies about the potential
financial, operational, legal and customer protection and security related
risks that they are exposing themselves to. The Press Release noted
that the creation, trading or usage of VCs, as a medium of payment is
not authorized by any central bank or monetary authority and hence
may pose several risks narrated in the Press Release. F

2.5. On 27-12-2013, newspapers reported the first ever raid in
India by the Enforcement Directorate, of 2 Bitcoin trading firms in
Ahmedabad, by name, rBitco.in and buysellbitco.in. This was stated
to be India’s first raid on a Bitcoin trading firm and the second globally,
after Federal Bureau of Investigation of the United States of America G
conducted a raid in October of the same year.
2.6. Thereafter, a report titled “Virtual Currencies – Key
Definitions and Potential AML/CFT Risks” was issued in June 2014 by
FATF, highlighting, both legitimate uses and potential risks associated
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A with virtual currencies. What is of great significance about this FATF
report is that it defined 2 important words. The FATF report defined
‘Virtual currency’ as a digital representation of value that can be
traded digitally and functioning as (1) a medium of exchange; and/
or (2) a unit of account; and/or (3) a store of value, but not having
a legal tender status. The FATF report also defined ‘Cryptocurrency’
B
to mean a math-based, decentralised convertible virtual currency
protected by cryptography by relying on public and private keys to
transfer value from one person to another and signed
cryptographically each time it is transferred.
2.7. Again, in June 2015, FATF came up with a “Guidance for a
C Risk Based Approach to Virtual Currencies”, which suggested certain
recommendations, as follows:
A. Countries to identify, assess and understand risks and to take
action aimed at mitigating such risks. National authorities to undertake a
coordinated risk assessment of VC products and services that:
D
(1) enables all relevant authorities to understand how specific virtual
currency products and services function and impact regulatory
jurisdictions for Anti Money Laundering (‘AML’ for short)/Combating
the Financing of Terrorism (‘CFT’ for short) treatment purposes;

E (2) promote similar AML/CFT treatment for similar products and
services having same risk profiles.
B. Where countries are prohibiting virtual currency products and
services, they should take into account among other things, the impact a
prohibition would have on local and global level of money laundering/
F terrorism financing risks, including whether prohibition would drive such
payment activities underground, where they will operate without AML/
CFT controls.
2.8. The FATF submitted a report in October 2015 on "Emerging
Terrorist Financing Risks". The report was divided into four parts, under
the captions (i) introduction (ii) financial management of terrorist
G
organisations (iii) traditional terrorist financing methods and techniques
and (iv) emerging terrorist financing threats and vulnerabilities. Even
while acknowledging in part 3 of the report that the traditional methods
of moving funds through the banking sector happens to be the most
efficient way of movement of funds for terrorist organisations, the report
H acknowledged the emergence of new payment products and services in
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part 4 of the report. The report took note of different methods of terrorist A
financing, such as self-funding, crowd funding, social network fund raising
with prepaid cards etc. Coming to virtual currencies, the report noted
the following:
"Virtual currencies have emerged and attracted investment in
payment infrastructure built on their software protocols. These B
payment mechanisms seek to provide a new method for
transmitting value over the internet. At the same time, virtual
currency payment products and services (VCPPS) present ML/
TF risks. The FATF made a preliminary assessment of these
ML/TF risks in the report Virtual Currencies Key Definitions
and Potential AML/CFT Risks. As part of a staged approach, C
the FATF has also developed Guidance focusing on the points
of intersection that provide gateways to the regulated financial
system, in particular convertible virtual currency exchangers.
Virtual currencies such as bitcoin, while representing a great
opportunity for financial innovation, have attracted the D
attention of various criminal groups, and may pose a risk for
TF (terrorist financing). This technology allows for anonymous
transfer of funds internationally. While the original purchase
of the currency may be visible (e.g., through the banking
system), all following transfers of the virtual currency are E
difficult to detect. The US Secret Service has observed that
criminals are looking for and finding virtual currencies that
offer: anonymity for both users and transactions; the ability
to move illicit proceeds from one country to another quickly;
low volatility, which results in lower exchange risk; widespread
adoption in the criminal underground; and reliability. F

Law enforcement agencies are also concerned about the use
of virtual currencies (VC) by terrorist organisations. They have
seen the use of websites affiliated with terrorist organisations
to promote the collection of bitcoin donations. In addition,
law enforcement has identified internet discussions among G
extremists regarding the use of VC to purchase arms and
education of less technical extremists on use of VC. For
example, a posting on a blog linked to ISIL proposed using
bitcoin to fund global extremist efforts." (emphasis supplied)
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A In support of the above conclusions, the report also indicated a
case study, which concerned the arrest of one Ali Shukri Ameen, who
admitted to have had a Twitter account with 4000 followers. He claimed
to have used his Twitter handle to provide instructions on how to use a
virtual currency to mask the provision of funds to ISIL. In an article, the
link to which he tweeted to his followers, it was elaborated how jihadists
B could utilize the virtual currency to fund their efforts. (It must be noted
that the report also took note of how prepaid cards and other internet-
based payment services could also be used for terror financing).
2.9. The Bank of International Settlements (hereinafter, “BIS”)
which is a body corporate established under the laws of Switzerland,
C way back in the year 1930 pursuant to an agreement signed at Hague on
22-01-1930 and owned by 60 Central Banks of different countries including
RBI, has several committees, one of which is “Committee on Payments
and Market Infrastructure” (CPMI). This committee started taking note
of digital currencies, while dealing with innovations in retail payments.
This committee formed a sub-group within the CPMI Working Group on
D
Retail Payments, to undertake an analysis of digital currencies. On the
basis of the findings of the sub-group, CPMI of BIS submitted a report
in November 2015 on Digital currencies. The sub-group identified three
key aspects relating to the development of digital currencies one of
which was that the assets featured in digital currency schemes,
E typically have some monetary characteristics such as being used
as a means of payment, but are not backed by any authority. In
Note 1 under the Executive Summary of the said report, it was stated as
follows: “although digital currencies typically do have some, but not
all the characteristics of a currency, they may also have
characteristics of a commodity or other asset. Their legal treatment
F can vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.” (emphasis supplied)
Paragraph 4 of the said report dealt with the “implications for central
banks, of digital currencies and their underlying decentralized payment
mechanisms”. In the said paragraph, the report indicated that “digital
currencies represent a technology for settling peer to peer payments
G without trusted third parties and may involve a non-sovereign
currency”. Though the report stated that the impact of digital
currencies on the mainstream financial system is negligible as at
that time, some of the implications indicated in the report may
actually materialize if there was widespread adoption of digital
currencies. Two risks were noted in the report and they were consumer
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protection and operational risks. But in so far as distributed ledger A
technology is concerned, the report was positive. However, the report
cautioned that a widespread substitution of bank notes with digital
currencies could lead to a decline in central banks’ non-interest
paying liabilities and that if the adoption and use of digital currencies
were to increase significantly, the demand for existing monetary
aggregates and the conduct of monetary policy could be affected. B
Nevertheless, the report stated that at present, the use of private digital
currencies is too low for these risks to materialize.
2.10. In December 2015, the Financial Stability Report of RBI
was issued, and it included a chapter on “Financial Sector Regulation”.
The same dealt with the challenges posed by technology-based innovations C
such as virtual currency schemes. In Box 3.1 of the said report, it was
indicated that though the initial concerns over the emergence of
virtual currency schemes were about the underlying design, episodes
of excessive volatility in their value and their anonymous nature
which goes against global money laundering rules rendered their
D
very existence questionable. However, the report noted that the
regulators and authorities need to keep pace with developments, as many
of the world’s largest banks started supporting a joint effort for setting
up of private blockchain and building an industry-wide platform for
standardizing the use of technology.
2.11. In December 2016, the Financial Stability Report of RBI E
came. It took note of the rapid developments taking place in Fin Tech
(financial technology) globally and exhorted the regulators to gear up to
adopt technology (christened as RegTech). Paragraph 3.22 of the said
report identified the establishment of regulatory sandboxes1 and innovation
hubs for testing new products and services and providing support/guidance F
to regulated as well as unregulated entities. The report also noted that
fast paced innovations such as virtual currencies have brought risks and
concerns about data security and consumer protection on one hand and
far reaching potential impact on the effectiveness of monetary policy
itself on the other hand. The report took note of the fact that many
central banks around the world, had already started examining the G
feasibility of creating their own digital currencies, after fretting over
them initially.

1
Regulatory sandbox refers to live testing of new products/services in a controlled/test
regulatory environment.
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A 2.12. In January 2017, the Institute for Development and Research
in Banking Technology (IDRBT) established by RBI in 1996 as an
institution to work at the intersection of banking and technology submitted
a Whitepaper on “Applications of blockchain technology to banking and
financial sector in India”. While dealing with the applications of blockchain
technology in chapter 3, the whitepaper also enlisted the advantages and
B disadvantages of digital currency. While the advantages indicated were
(i) control and security, (ii) transparency and (iii) very low transaction
cost, the disadvantages indicated were risk and volatility.
2.13. On 01-02-2017, RBI again issued a Press Release cautioning
users, holders and traders of virtual currencies. Closely on the heels of
C this Press Release, the Government of India, Ministry of Finance,
constituted, in April 2017, an Inter-Disciplinary Committee comprising of
the Special Secretary (Economic Affairs) and representatives of the
Departments of Economic Affairs, Financial Services, Revenue, Home
Affairs, Electronics and Information Technology, RBI, NITI Aayog, and
State Bank of India. The task of the Committee was to (i) take stock of
D
the status of VCs in India and globally, (ii) examine the existing global
regulatory and legal structures and (iii) suggest measures for dealing
with VCs. The Committee was mandated to submit a report within 3
months.
2.14. The report of the Inter-Disciplinary Committee was submitted
E on 25-07-2017 and it contained certain recommendations which are as
follows:
(i) A very visible and clear warning should be issued through
public media informing the general public that the
Government does not consider crypto-currencies such as
F bitcoins as either coins or currencies. These are neither a
legally valid medium of exchange nor a desirable way to store
value. The Government also does not consider it desirable
for people to use or invest in something which has no real
underlying asset value.
G (ii) A very visible and clear warning should be issued, through
public media, advising all those who have been offering to
buy or sell these currencies, or offering a platform to exchange
these currencies, to stop this forthwith.

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(iii) Those who have bought these currencies in good faith A
and are holding these should be advised to offload these in
any jurisdiction where it is not illegal to do so.
(iv) All consumer protection and enforcement agencies should
be advised to take action against all those who, despite these
warnings, indulge in buying/selling or offering platform for B
trading of these currencies, since the presumption would be
that it is being done with illegal, fraudulent or tax evading
intent.
(v) If the Government agrees with the above recommendations,
a committee should be constituted with members from DEA, C
RBI, SEBI, DoR, DoLA, Consumer Affairs, and MeitY, to
suggest whether any further actions, including legislative
changes, are required to make possession, trade and use of
crypto-currencies expressly illegal and punishable.
(vi) Finally, it is clarified that none of the above
recommendations are meant to restrict the use of blockchain D
technology for purposes other than that of creating or trading
in crypto-currencies.
2.15. In August 2017, Securities and Exchange Board of India
(SEBI) established a 10-member advisory panel to examine global fintech
developments and report on opportunities for the Indian securities market. E
The goal of the new Committee on Financial and Regulatory Technologies
was to help prepare India to adopt fintech solutions and foster innovations
within the country.
2.16. On 02-11-2017, the Government of India constituted a
committee chaired by the Secretary (Department of Economic Affairs) F
and comprising of Secretary, Ministry of Electronic and Information
Technology, Chairman, SEBI and Deputy Governor, RBI (Inter-Ministerial
Committee) to propose specific actions to be taken in relation to VCs.
2.17. At that stage, two persons, by name, Siddharth Dalmia and
Vijay Pal Dalmia came up with a writ petition in WP (C) No.1071 of G
2017 under Article 32 of the Constitution of India seeking the issue of a
writ of mandamus directing the respondents to declare as illegal and ban

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A all virtual currencies as well as ban all websites and mobile applications
which facilitate the dealing in virtual currencies. Similarly, another person,
by name, Dwaipayan Bhowmick came up with a writ petition in WP (C)
No.1076 of 2017, seeking the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the
respondents to regulate the flow of Bitcoin (crypto money) and to
constitute a committee of experts to consider the prohibition/regulation
B of Bitcoin and other crypto currencies. On 13.11.2017, this Court ordered
notice in both the writ petitions.
2.18. Around the same time, namely, November 2017, the Inter-
Regulatory Working Group on Fintech and Digital Banking, set up by
RBI, pursuant to a decision taken by the Financial Stability and
C Development Council Sub-Committee way back in April 2016, submitted
a report. This report, in paragraph 2.1.3.2, dealt with Digital Currencies.
It defined ‘digital currencies’ to mean digital representations of
value, issued by private developers and denominated in their own
unit of account. The Report also stated that “digital currencies are
not necessarily attached to a fiat currency, but are accepted by
D
natural or legal persons as a means of exchange.”
2.19. Thereafter, RBI issued another Press Release dated 05-12-
2017 reiterating the concerns expressed in earlier press releases. The
Government of India, Ministry of Finance also issued a statement on 29-
12-2017 cautioning the users, holders and traders of VCs that they are
E not recognized as legal tender and that the investors should avoid
participating in them.
2.20. On 01-02-2018, the Minister of Finance, in his budget speech
said that the Government did not consider crypto currencies as legal
tender or coin and that all measures to eliminate the use of these
F currencies in financing illegitimate activities or as part of the payment
system, will be taken by the Government. However, he also said that the
Government will explore the use of blockchain technology proactively
for ushering in digital economy.
2.21. The Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT), by an Office
G Memorandum dated 05-03-2018, submitted to the Department of
Economic Affairs, a draft scheme proposing a ban on cryptocurrencies.
But the draft scheme advocated a step-by-step approach, as many persons
had already invested in cryptocurrencies. The scheme also contained an
advice to carry out legislative amendments before banning them.

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2.22. In the wake of a meeting of G-20 Finance Ministers and A
Central Bank Governors that was scheduled to be held in mid-March
2018, the Financial Stability Board2 (FSB) sent out a communication
dated 13-03-2018. It was indicated in the said communication that as
per the initial assessment of FSB, crypto assets did not pose risks to
global financial stability, as their combined global market value even at
their peak, was less than 1% of global GDP. But the report also noted B
that the initial assessment was likely to change and that crypto assets
raised a host of issues around consumer and investor protection as well
as their use to shield illicit activity and for money laundering and terrorist
financing.
2.23. The communique issued by G-20, after the meeting of its C
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors on March 19-20, 2018
also acknowledged that technological innovation including that
underlying crypto assets, has the potential to improve the efficiency
and inclusiveness of the financial system and the economy more
broadly. But it also noted that crypto assets do raise issues with respect D
to consumer and investor protection, market integrity, tax evasion,
money laundering and terrorist financing. Though crypto assets
lacked the key attributes of sovereign currencies, they could, at
some point, have financial stability implications. Therefore, the
communique resolved to implement FATF standards and to call on
international standard-setting bodies to continue their monitoring of crypto E
assets and their risks.
2.24. On 02-04-2018, RBI sent an e-mail to the Government,
enclosing a note on regulating crypto assets. It was with reference to
the record of discussions of the last meeting of the Inter-Ministerial
F
Committee on virtual currency. This note examined the pros and cons of
banning and regulating cryptocurrencies and suggested that it had to be
done, backed by suitable legal provisions.
2.25. Immediately thereafter, the Statement dated 05-04-2018 and
the Circular dated 06-04-2018, impugned in these writ petitions came to
G
be issued by RBI. It appears that at around the same time (April 2018),
the Inter-Ministerial Committee submitted its initial report, (or a precursor

2
FSB was established by G-20 in April 2009, as a successor to the Financial Stability
Forum founded in 1999 by G-7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors. H
334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A to the report) along with a draft bill known as Crypto Token and Crypto
Asset (Banning, Control and Regulation) Bill, 2018.3
2.26. But in the meantime, a few companies which run online
crypto assets exchange platforms together with the shareholders/
founders of those companies and a few individual crypto assets traders
B came up with the first of the writ petitions on hand, namely WP (C) No.
373 of 2018, challenging the aforesaid Statement dated 05-04-2018 and
Circular dated 06-04-2018. On 01-05-2018 this writ petition was directed
to be tagged along with the writ petitions WP (C) Nos. 1071 and 1076 of
2017 which sought a ban on or regulation of cryptocurrencies.
C 2.27. On 11-05-2018, all the three writ petitions, namely WP (C)
Nos. 1071 and 1076 of 2017 and 373 of 2018, came up for hearing. At
that time, it was pointed out that a few High Courts were also seized of
writ petitions concerning cryptocurrencies. Therefore, this Court gave
liberty to RBI to move appropriate applications for transfer of all those
cases to this Court.
D
2.28. Accordingly, RBI came up with transfer petitions and the
transfer petitions were taken on Board on 17-05-2018 and a direction
was issued that no High Court shall entertain any writ petition relating to
the impugned Circular dated 06-04-2018. This Court also passed an
interim order on 17-05-2018 permitting the petitioners in WP (C) No.
E 1071 of 2017 to submit a representation to RBI with a further direction
to RBI to deal with the same in accordance with law.
2.29. In the meantime, the Internet and Mobile Association of
India came up with the second of the writ petitions on hand, namely WP
(C) No. 528 of 2018 and notice was ordered in the said writ petition on
F 03-07-2018. While doing so, this Court issued a direction to RBI to
dispose of the representation, if any, already submitted by the Association.
Accordingly, RBI considered the representation and issued two
communications dated 06-07-2018 and 09-07-2018.
2.30. On 23-07-2018, SEBI sent its comments on the 2018 Bill,
G to the Department of Economic Affairs. Their primary objection to the
Bill was that they are not best suited to be the regulators of crypto
assets and tokens.
3
The fate of the 2018 Bill is not known but a fresh bill called ‘Banning of
Cryptocurrency and Regulation of Official Digital Currency Bill, 2019’ has been
H submitted.
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2.31. Next came the Annual Report of RBI for the year 2017- A
2018. It contained a separate Box II.3.2 on “Cryptocurrency: Evolving
challenges”. The relevant portion of the same reads as follows:
“Though cryptocurrency may not currently pose systemic
risks, its increasing popularity leading to price bubbles raises
serious concerns for consumer and investor protection, and B
market integrity. Notably, Bitcoins lost nearly US$200 billion
in market capitalisation in about two months from the peak
value in December 2017. As per the CoinMarketCap, the
overall cryptocurrency market had nearly touched US$800
billion in January 2018.
C
The cryptocurrency eco-system may affect the existing
payment and settlement system which could, in turn, influence
the transmission of monetary policy. Furthermore, being stored
in digital/electronic media – electronic wallets – it is prone to
hacking and operational risks, a few instances of which have
already been observed globally. There is no established D
framework for recourse to customer problems/disputes
resolution as payments by cryptocurrencies take place on a
peer-to-peer basis without an authorised central agency which
regulates such payments. There exists a high possibility of its
usage for illicit activities, including tax avoidance. The E
absence of information on counterparties in such peer-to-
peer anonymous/ pseudonymous systems could subject users
to unintentional breaches of anti-money laundering laws
(AML) as well as laws for combating the financing of terrorism
(CFT) (Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures –
CPMI, 2015). The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) F
has recently warned that the emergence of cryptocurrencies
has become a combination of a bubble, a Ponzi scheme and
an environmental disaster, and calls for policy responses (BIS,
2018). The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has also
observed that cryptoassets are being used for money G
laundering and terrorist financing. A globally coordinated
approach is necessary to prevent abuses and to strictly limit
interconnections with regulated financial institutions.
On a global level, regulatory responses to cryptocurrency
have ranged from a complete clamp down in some jurisdictions H
336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A to a comparatively ‘light touch regulatory approach’. The
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) have emerged
as the primary regulators of cryptocurrencies in the United
States, where these assets like most other jurisdictions, do
not enjoy the legal tender status. Asian countries have
B
experienced oversized concentration of crypto players –
Japan and South Korea account for the biggest shares of
crypto asset markets in the world. In the case of Bitcoins,
half of transactions worldwide are carried out in Japan. In
September 2017, Japan approved transactions by its
C exchanges in cryptocurrencies. China’s exchanges hosted a
disproportionately large volumes of global Bitcoin trading
until their ban recently. […]
Developments on this front need to be monitored as some
trading may shift from exchanges to peer-to-peer mode, which
D may also involve increased usage of cash. Possibilities of
migration of crypto exchange houses to dark pools/cash and
to offshore locations, thus raising concerns on AML/CFT and
taxation issues, require close watch.” (emphasis supplied)
2.32. In this background, all the four writ petitions namely WP
E (C) Nos. 1071 and 1076 of 2017 (seeking a ban) and WP (C) Nos. 373
and 528 of 2018 (challenging the indirect ban) came up for hearing,
along with the transfer petitions, on 25-10-2018, when this Court was
informed that the Union of India had already constituted a committee
and that this Inter-Ministerial Committee was deliberating on the issue.
Therefore, the writ petitions were adjourned to enable the Committee to
F come up with their recommendations.
2.33. It appears that the Committee so constituted, submitted a
report on 28-02-2019 indicating the action to be taken in relation to virtual
currencies. A bill known as “Banning of Cryptocurrency and Regulation
of Official Digital Currency Bill, 2019” had also been prepared by then
G to be introduced in the Lok Sabha. To this report of the Committee, is
appended, the minutes of the discussions of the Committee in the meetings
held on 27-11-2017, 22-02-2018, and 09-01-2019. The contents of the
report of the Inter-Ministerial Committee dated 28-02-2019, can be well
understood only if we look at the Record of Discussions of the meetings
H of the Committee. The Record of Discussions held on 27-11-2017 shows
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that the Inter-Ministerial Committee was of the initial view that the A
banning option was difficult to implement and that it can also drive
some operators underground, encouraging the use of such
currencies for illegitimate purposes. But it was generally agreed in
the said meeting that VCs cannot be treated as currency. However, in
the meeting held on 22-02-2018, the Deputy Governor, RBI made
B
an initial intervention and argued in favour of using the banning
option. Eventually, the other members of the Committee agreed, and it
was resolved in the said meeting that a detailed paper on the option of
banning VCs, including a draft law could be prepared and submitted by
RBI and CBDT. It was also resolved to prepare a detailed paper within
Department of Economic Affairs on options of regulating crypto assets. C
Following the same, it was resolved in the next meeting held on 09-01-
2019 that a Standing Committee should be constituted to revisit certain
issues. Eventually, the Inter-Ministerial Committee submitted the aforesaid
report dated 28-02-2019. The key aspects of this report are:
i. Virtual currency is a digital representation of value that can be D
digitally traded and it can function as a medium of exchange and/or a
unit of account and/or a store of value, though it does not have the status
of a legal tender.
ii. Initial Coin Offerings (hereinafter, “ICO”) are a way for
companies to raise money by issuing digital tokens in exchange for fiat E
currency or cryptocurrency, but there is a clear risk with the issuance of
ICOs as many of the companies are looking to raise money without
having any tangible products. In the year 2018, as many as 983 ICOs
were issued, through which funds to the tune of USD 20 billion were
raised.
F
iii. Virtual currencies are accorded different legal treatment by
different countries, which range from barter transactions to mode of
payment to legal tender. Countries like China have imposed a complete
ban.
iv. The mining of non-official virtual currencies is very resource- G
intensive requiring enormous amounts of electricity which may prove to
be an environmental disaster.
v. They may also affect the ability of the Central Banks to carry
out their mandates.
H
338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A vi. China has not only banned trading in cryptocurrencies but also
used its firewall to ban crypto currency exchanges. China even blocked
crypto currency focused accounts from WeChat and crypto-currency
related content from Baidu. However, Chinese traders use VPNs to
circumvent these bans.
B The report dated 28-02-2019 of the Inter-Ministerial Committee
finally made certain recommendations which included a complete ban
on private cryptocurrencies.
2.34. It is important to note here that the report of the Inter-
Ministerial Committee dated 28-02-2019 not only recommended a
C ban, but also specifically endorsed the stand taken by RBI to eliminate
the interface of institutions regulated by RBI from crypto currencies.
2.35. As a matter of fact, the issue of the impugned Circular by
RBI was even taken note of by the Financial Stability Board (of G-20),
in a document titled ‘Crypto Assets Regulators Directory’, submitted to
D G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in April 2019. While
acknowledging the fact that RBI does not have a legal mandate to directly
regulate crypto assets, this Directory indicated that with a view to ring
fence its regulated entities from the risks associated with VCs, RBI has
issued the impugned Circular.

E 2.36. In a report released in June 2019 under the caption
‘Guidance for a risk-based approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual
Asset Service Providers’, FATF reiterated a risk-based approach
advocated in FATF 2012 and 2015 recommendations. At the same time,
this Guidance recognized that a jurisdiction has the discretion to
prohibit VA activities and VASPs in order to support other policy
F goals not addressed in the Guidance such as consumer protection,
safety and soundness or monetary policy. But the Guidance also
suggested that countries which prohibit VA activities or VASPs should
also assess the effect that such prohibition may have on their money
laundering and terrorist financing risks.
G 2.37. It is also relevant to note here that the Government was
conscious of the impugned Circular issued by RBI. This can be seen
from the answer provided by the Minister of State in the Ministry of
Finance, on 16-07-2019 in response to a question raised in the Rajya
Sabha (Unstarred question no. 2591). While answering in the negative,
the question whether the Government had banned cryptocurrencies in
H
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the country, the Minister of State added that RBI has been issuing A
advisories, press releases and circulars.
2.38. On 22-07-2019, the Report of the Inter-Ministerial Committee,
recommending a ban, along with the draft of the Bill “Banning of Crypto
currency and Regulation of Official Digital Currency Bill 2019”, was
hosted in the website of the Department of Economic Affairs. Therefore, B
on 08-08-2019, the first two writ petitions namely WP (C) Nos. 1071
and 1076 of 2017 were delinked and adjourned to January 2020, since,
the prayers made in these two writ petitions (seeking a ban) appeared
substantially answered.
2.39. Thereafter, the present writ petitions were taken up for C
hearing and this Court passed an interim direction on 21-08-2019, directing
the Reserve Bank of India to give a detailed point-wise reply to the
representations dated 29-05-2018 and 30-05-2018. The reply already
given by RBI to the representations dated 29-05-2018 and 30-05-2018
was found by this Court to be inadequate and hence this direction.
Accordingly, RBI gave a detailed point-wise reply on 04-09-2019 and D
18-09-2019. Thereafter, the present writ petitions were taken up for
hearing.
3. FLASHBACK
3.1. The archeological excavations carried out at the (world wide E
web) sites, reveal that this digital currency civilization is just 12 years old
(at the most, 37 years). But these excavations became necessary since
virtual currencies, known by different names such as crypto assets, crypto
currencies, digital assets, electronic currency, digital currency etc., elude
an exact and precise definition, making it impossible to identify them as
belonging either to the category of legal tender solely or to the category F
of commodity/good or stock solely.
3.2. Any attempt to define what a virtual currency is, it appears,
should follow the Vedic analysis of negation namely “neti, neti”.
Avadhuta Gita of Dattatreya says, “by such sentences as ‘that thou
are’, our own self or that which is untrue and composed of the 5 G
elements, is affirmed, but the sruti says ‘not this not that’.” 4 The
concept of Neti Neti is an expression of something inexpressible, but

4
tattvamasyādivākyena svātmā hi pratipādita%
neti neti śrutirbrūyād anrtam pāñcabhautikam- H
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A which seeks to capture the essence of that to which no other definition
applies. This conundrum will squarely apply to crypto currencies and
hence this flashback, into its genesis, so that its DNA is sequenced.
3.3. Though the idea of digital cash appears to have been first
introduced by David Lee Chaum, an American Computer Scientist and
B Cryptographer way back in 1983 in a research paper and was actually
launched by him in 1990 through a company by name Digicash, the
company filed for bankruptcy in 1998, with Digicash becoming Digi-
crash. But the actual story of creation of cryptocurrencies began, in a
more scientific way, according to Nathaniel Popper, the New York Times
journalist,5 in 1997, when a British Cypherpunk6 by name Adam Back
C released a plan called hashcash, which claimed to have solved some of
the problems that stalled the digital cash project. But this program had
its shortcomings. Another Cypherpunk by name Nick Szabo, came up
with a concept called bitgold, which attempted to solve hashcash’s
shortcomings. Soon, an American by name Wei Dai came up with
D something called b-money. Hal Finney, another American created his
own option. But all of them had a common goal, which, as revealed by
Adam Back was as follows:
“What we want is fully anonymous, ultra low transaction cost,
transferable units of exchange. If we get that going… the
E banks will become the obsolete dinosaurs they deserve to
become.”
3.4. But all these experiments continued to hit roadblocks, until
the emergence of Satoshi Nakamoto (who still remains anonymous) in
the world of netizens. It appears that Satoshi sent an e-mail in August
F 2008 to Adam Back attaching a white paper prepared by him on what
was called ‘Bitcoin’. The gist of what Satoshi stated in his paper is
indicated in simple terms, for the understanding of the common man, by
Nathaniel Popper, in his book as follows:
“Rather than relying on a central bank or company to issue
G and keep track of the money – as the existing financial system
and Chaum’s DigiCash did – this system was set up so that
5
From his book “Digital Gold: Bitcoin and the inside story of the Misfits and Millionaires
Trying to Reinvent Money”.
6
Cypherpunk is an activist advocating widespread use of strong cryptography and
privacy enhancing technologies, as a route to social and political change. This word was
H added to the Oxford English Dictionary in November 2006.
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every Bitcoin transaction, and the holdings of every user, A
would be tracked and recorded by the computers of all the
people using the digital money, on a communally maintained
database that would come to be known as the blockchain.
The process by which this all happened had many layers, and
it would take even experts, months to understand how they B
all worked together. But the basic elements of the system can
be sketched out in rough terms, and were in Satoshi’s paper,
which would become known as the Bitcoin white paper.
According to the paper, each user of the system could have
one or more public Bitcoin addresses – sort of like bank C
account numbers – and a private key for each address. The
coins attached to a given address could be spent only by a
person with the private key corresponding to the address.
The private key was slightly different from a traditional
password, which has to be kept by some central authority to
check that the user is entering the correct password. In Bitcoin, D
Satoshi harnessed the wonders of public-key cryptography
to make it possible for a user – let’s call her Alice again – to
sign off on a transaction, and prove she has the private key,
without anyone else ever needing to see or know her private
key. E
Once Alice signed off on a transaction with her private key
she would broadcast it out to all the other computers on the
Bitcoin network. Those computers would check that Alice had
the coins she was trying to spend. They could do this by
consulting the public record of all Bitcoin transactions, which F
computers on the network kept a copy of. Once the computers
confirmed that Alice’s address did indeed have the money she
was trying to spend, the information about Alice’s transaction
was recorded in a list of all recent transactions, referred to as
a block, on the blockchain. […]
G
The result of this complicated process was something that was
deceptively simple but never previously possible: a financial
network that could create and move money without a central
authority. No bank, no credit card company, no regulators.
The system was designed so that no one other than the holder
of a private key could spend or take the money associated H
342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A with a particular Bitcoin address. What’s more, each user of
the system could be confident that, at every moment in time,
there would be only one public, unalterable record of what
everyone in the system owned. To believe in this, the users
didn’t have to trust Satoshi, as the users of DigiCash had to
trust David Chaum, or users of the dollar had to trust the
B
Federal Reserve. They just had to trust their own computers
running the Bitcoin software, and the code Satoshi wrote,
which was open source, and therefore available for everyone
to review. If the users didn’t like something about the rules set
down by Satoshi’s software, they could change the rules.
C People who joined the Bitcoin network were, quite literally,
both customers and owners of both the bank and the mint.”
3.5. That Satoshi and the Cypherpunks who participated in
the initial experiments developed Bitcoin as an alternative to
conventional currency, to counter the problems of debasement of
D currency by central agencies, was made clear by Satoshi himself
when he said: “The root problem with conventional currency is all
the trust that’s required to make it work. The Central Bank must be
trusted not to debase the currency but the history of fiat currencies
is full of breaches of that trust.”
E 3.6. What attracted people to Satoshi’s proposal, was the fact
that while Central Banks had no restraints in unlimited printing of money,
thereby devaluing all savings and holdings, the Bitcoin software had rules
to ensure that the process of creating new coins would stop after 21
million were out in the world. When Martti Malmi, a student at the
Helsinki University of Technology, joined hands with Satoshi to improvise
F the project and to market it, he formulated the philosophy in the following
words:
“Be safe from the unfair monetary policies of the monopolistic
Central Banks and the other risks of centralized power over
a money supply. The limited inflation of Bitcoin system’s
G money supply is distributed evenly (by CPU power) throughout
the network, not monopolized to a banking elite.”
3.7. Therefore, it is beyond any pale of doubt that irrespective of
the metamorphosis (or gene mutation) it has undergone over the years,
bitcoin, the Adam or Manu of the race of cryptocurrencies, was
H developed as an alternative to fiat currency. Keeping this birth chart of
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virtual currencies in mind, let us now see how the petitioners are aggrieved A
by the impugned decisions of RBI, the grounds on which they challenge
the same and the justification sought to be provided by RBI.
4. BACKGROUND SCORE (of the petitioners)
4.1. The theme of the song of the petitioners in one of the writ
petitions, as fine-tuned by Shri Ashim Sood, learned Counsel, can be B
summarized as follows:
I. RBI has no power to prohibit the activity of trading in virtual
currencies through VC exchanges since:
(i) Virtual currencies are not legal tender but tradable commodities/ C
digital goods, not falling within the regulatory framework of the
RBI Act, 1934 or the Banking Regulation Act, 1949.
(ii) Virtual currencies do not even fall within the credit system of
the country, so as to enable RBI to fall back upon the Preamble to
the RBI Act 1934, which gives a mandate to RBI to operate the D
currency and credit system of the country to its advantage.
(iii) Neither the power to regulate the financial system of the
country to its advantage conferred under Section 45JA, nor the
power to regulate the credit system of the country conferred under
Section 45L of the RBI Act, 1934 exercisable in public interest
E
and upon arriving at a satisfaction, is so elastic as to cover goods
that do not fall within the purview of the financial system or credit
system of the country.
(iv) The power to issue directions “in the public interest” conferred
under Section 35A(1)(a) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949
F
and the power to caution or prohibit banking companies against
entering into any particular transaction conferred under Section
36(1)(a) do not extend to the issue of blanket directions that would
deny access by virtual currency exchanges, to the banking services
of the country, as the expression “public interest” appearing in a
particular provision in a statute should take its colour from the G
context of the statute.
(v) The power conferred upon RBI under Section 10(2) of the
Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007 to issue guidelines
for proper and efficient management of payment systems and
under Section 18 of the said Act to lay down policies relating to H
344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A the regulation of payment systems and to give directions pertaining
to the conduct of business relating to payments systems,
exercisable in public interest upon being satisfied, is also not
applicable to virtual currency exchanges, as the services rendered
by them do not fall within the definition of the expression “payment
system” under Section 2(1)(i) of the said Act.
B
II. Assuming but not admitting that RBI has the power to deal
with the activities carried on by VCEs, the mode of exercise of such
power can be tested on certain well established parameters. They are –
(i) application of mind/satisfaction/relevant and irrelevant
C considerations
(ii) Malice in law/colorable exercise of power
(iii) M.S. Gill reasoning
(iv) Calibration/Proportionality
D III. All other stake holders such as the Department of Economic
Affairs of the Government of India, Securities and Exchange Board of
India, Central Board of Direct Taxes, etc., have actually recognized the
positive and beneficial aspects of cryptocurrencies as digital assets and
the Distributed Ledger Technology from which crypto currencies emanate
and hence have recommended only a regulatory regime, but RBI has
E
taken a contra position without any rational basis.
IV. Many of the developed and developing economies of the world,
multinational and international bodies and the courts of various countries
have scanned crypto currencies, but found nothing pernicious about them
and even the attempt of the Government of India to bring a legislation
F
banning crypto currencies, is yet to reach its logical end.
V. RBI should have taken into account the fact that the members
of Petitioner association have taken necessary precautions including
avoiding cash transactions, ensuring compliance with KYC norms, of
their own accord and allowing peer-to-peer transactions only within the
G country.
VI. RBI has not applied its mind to the fact that not every crypto
currency is anonymous. The report of the European Parliament also
classified VCs into anonymous and pseudo-anonymous. Therefore, if
the problem sought to be addressed is anonymity of transactions, the
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same could have been achieved by resorting to the least invasive option A
of prohibiting only anonymous VCs.
VII. It is a paradox that blockchain technology is acceptable to
RBI, but crypto currency is not.
VIII. The benefit of the rule of judicial deference to economic
policies of the state is not available to RBI, as the impugned Circular is B
an exercise of power by a statutory body corporate and is neither a
legislation nor an exercise of executive power. In any case, there is no
deference in law to process but only to opinion emanating from the
process. No study was undertaken by RBI before the impugned measure
was taken and hence, the impugned decisions are not even based upon C
knowledge or expertise.
IX. While regulation of a trade or business through reasonable
restrictions imposed under a law made in the interests of the general
public is saved by Article 19(6) of the Constitution, a total prohibition,
especially through a subordinate legislation such as a directive from RBI, D
of an activity not declared by law to be unlawful, is violative of Article
19(1)(g). Whether a directive would tantamount to “regulation” or
“prohibition”, depends upon the impact of the directive.
4.2. The contentions of the petitioners in the other writ petition
(WP (C) No. 373 of 2018), as set to tune by Shri Nakul Dewan, learned E
Senior Counsel, are:
I. The immediate effect of the impugned Circular is to completely
severe the ties between the virtual currency market and the formal Indian
economy, without actually a legislative ban on the trading of VCs, thereby
promoting cash and black-market transactions. F
II. The impugned Circular fails to take note of the difference
between various VC schemes such as closed VC schemes, unidirectional
flow VC schemes and bidirectional flow VC schemes and unreasonably
differentiates between unidirectional flow schemes and bidirectional flow
schemes, by targeting only bidirectional flow schemes.
G
III. VCs do not qualify as money, as they do not fulfill the four
characteristics of money namely medium of exchange, unit of account,
store of value and constituting a final discharge of debt and since RBI
has accepted this position, they have no power to regulate it.
H
346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A IV. Considering the fact that historically, money as understood in
the social sense and money as understood in the legal sense, are different,
the courts in different jurisdictions such as USA and Singapore have
understood VCs to be akin to money or funds at times or as commodities/
intangible properties at other times.
B V. The impugned Circular is manifestly arbitrary, based on non-
reasonable classification and it imposes disproportionate restrictions.
VI. A decision to prohibit an article as res extra commercium is a
matter of legislative policy and must arise out of an Act of legislature
and not by a notification issued by an executive authority.
C 4.3. In addition to the aforementioned legal contentions, Shri Nakul
Dewan learned Senior Counsel also submitted that as a result of the
impugned Circular, the virtual currency exchange (VCE) run by one of
the petitioners in one writ petition was shut down on 30-03-2019, the
VCE run by another petitioner became non-operational, though their
D website still opens and the VCE run by yet another petitioner by name
Discidium Internet Labs Pvt. Ltd., not only became non-operational, but
an amount of Rs. 12 crores lying in their account also got frozen.
However, one VCE by name CoinDCX alone survives, by operating on
a peer-to-peer (P2P) basis.

E 4.4. In support of their respective contentions, Shri Ashim Sood
and Shri Nakul Dewan, the learned counsels, relied upon a number of
decisions of this court and other courts. We shall refer to them when we
take up their contentions for analysis.
5. SCRIPT (of RBI)
F 5.1. RBI has filed counter-affidavit in one of these writ petitions,
covering the entire gamut. But the response of RBI to the contentions of
the petitioners is available not only in the counter-affidavit, but also in
some communications issued by them pursuant to certain interim
directions issued by this court.
G 5.2. For instance, this Court passed an interim direction on 21-08-
2019, after hearing lengthy arguments, directing the Reserve Bank of
India to give a detailed point-wise reply to the representations dated 29-
05-2018 and 30-05-2018. Pursuant to the said interim direction, RBI
gave a detailed point-wise reply on 04-09-2019 and 18-09-2019.
Therefore, RBI’s stand in these cases has to be culled out not only from
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the counter-affidavit but also from the orders passed/replies issued to A
the representations of the writ petitioners, during the pendency of these
writ petitions.
5.3. In brief, the response of RBI to the issues raised by the
petitioners, as articulated by Shri Shyam Divan, learned Senior Counsel,
can be summarized as follows: B
(i) Virtual currencies do not satisfy the criteria such as store of
value, medium of payment and unit of account, required for being
acknowledged as currency.
(ii) Virtual currency exchanges do not have any formal or
structured mechanism for handling consumer disputes/ grievances. C

(iii) Virtual currencies are capable of being used for illegal activities
due to their anonymity/pseudo-anonymity.
(iv) Increased use of virtual currencies would eventually erode
the monetary stability of the Indian currency and the credit system. D
(v) The impugned decision of RBI is legislative in character and
is in the realm of an economic policy decision taken by an expert body
warranting a hands-off approach from the Court.
(vi) The impugned decision is within the range of wide powers
conferred upon RBI under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, the Reserve E
Bank of India Act, 1934 and the Payment and Settlement Systems Act,
2007.
(vii) No one has an unfettered fundamental right to do business
on the network of the entities regulated by RBI.
(viii) The impugned decisions do not violate any of the rights F
guaranteed by Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
(ix) The impugned decisions are not excessive, confiscatory or
disproportionate in as much as RBI has given three months’ time to the
affected parties to sever their relationships with the banks. This is apart
from the repeated cautions issued to the stakeholders by RBI through G
Press Releases from the year 2013.
(x) The ambit of the 2013 press release was much wider than just
consumer protection. RBI cautioned users, holders and traders of VCs
about the potential financial, operational, legal, customer protection and
security related risks they were exposing themselves to. H
348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A (xi) The host of material taken note of by RBI in their reports, the
reports of the committees to which RBI was a party and the cautions
repeatedly issued by RBI over a period of 5 years, would demonstrate
the application of mind on the part of RBI. They also demonstrate that
RBI did not proceed in haste but proceeded with great care and caution.
Therefore, the satisfaction arrived at by them was too loud and clear to
B
be ignored. The standard for considering the impugned Circular, is the
existence of material and not the adequacy or sufficiency of such
material.
(xii) In any case, there is no complete ban on virtual currencies or
on the use of distributed ledger technology by the regulated entities.
C
(xiii) The impugned decisions were necessitated in public interest
to protect the interest of consumers, the interest of the payment and
settlement systems of the country and for protection of regulated entities
against exposure to high volatility of the virtual currencies. RBI is
empowered and duty bound to take such pre-emptive measures in public
D interest and the power to regulate includes the power to prohibit.
(xiv) The impugned decisions were necessitated because in the
opinion of RBI, VC transactions cannot be termed as a payment system,
but only peer-to-peer transactions which do not involve a system provider
under the Payments and Settlement Systems Act. Despite this, VC
E transactions have the potential to develop as a parallel system of payment.
(xv) The KYC norms followed by the VCEs are far below what
other participants in the payments and monetary system follow. In any
case, KYC norms are ineffective, as the inherent characteristic of
anonymity of VCs does not get remedied.
F
(xvi) Cross-border nature of the trade in VCs, coupled with the
lack of accountability, has the potential to impact the regulated payments
system managed by RBI. A large constituent of the VC universe does
not hold membership of the Petitioner association or is not even
accountable for their acts but is material and instrumental in driving the
G VC trade.
(xvii) RBI or any other Government authority would not be able
to curtail, limit, regulate or control the generation of VCs and their
transactions, resulting in ever-present and inevitable financial risks.

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6. UNFOLDING OF THE PLOT A
6.1. In the light of the above factual matrix and the rival
contentions, let us now see how the plot before us, unfolds.
I. No Power at all for RBI (Ultra vires)
6.2. The first ground of attack revolves around the power of RBI B
to deal with, regulate or even ban VCs and VCEs. The entire foundation
of this contention rests on the stand taken by the petitioners that VCs
are not money or other legal tender, but only goods/commodities, falling
outside the purview of the RBI Act, 1934, Banking Regulation Act, 1949
and the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007. In fact, the impugned
Circular of RBI dated 06-04-2018 was issued in exercise of the powers C
conferred upon RBI by all these three enactments. Therefore, if virtual
currencies do not fall within subject matter covered by any or all of
these three enactments and over which RBI has a statutory control,
then the petitioners will be right in contending that the Circular is ultra
vires. D
6.3. Hence it is necessary (i) first to see the role historically
assigned to a central bank such as RBI, the powers and functions
conferred upon and entrusted to RBI and the statutory scheme of all the
above three enactments and (ii) then to investigate what these virtual
currencies really are. Therefore, we shall divide our discussion in this E
regard into two parts, the first concerning the role, powers and functions
of RBI and the second concerning the identity of virtual currencies.
Role assigned to, functions entrusted to and the powers
conferred upon RBI as a Central Bank
6.4. The Reserve Bank of India was established under Act 2 of F
1934 for the purpose of (i) regulating the issue of bank notes, (ii) keeping
of reserves with a view to securing monetary stability in the country and
(iii) operating the currency and credit system of the country to its
advantage. The role of a central bank such as the Reserve Bank in an
economy is to manage (i) the currency (ii) the money supply and (iii)
G
interest rates. The unique feature of a central bank is the monopoly that
it has on increasing the monetary base in the state and the control it has
in the printing of the national currency. The central bank virtually functions
as “a lender of last resort” to banks suffering a liquidity crisis.

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A 6.5. Historians trace the rise of modern central banks to the
establishment of the Bank of England under a Royal Charter granted on
27-07-1694 through the Tunnage Act, 1694. The establishment of this
bank in 1694 was not actually for stimulating the economy but for
financing the war that England had with France. The currency crisis of
1797 and the creation of a ratio between the gold reserves held by the
B
Bank of England and the notes that the bank could issue, under the Bank
Charter Act, 1844 brought huge changes in the way the central bank
was supposed to function.
6.6. In so far as India is concerned, the functions of a central
bank were originally conferred upon the Imperial Bank of India, established
C in the year 1921, under the Imperial Bank of India Act, 1920. The reason
why and the manner in which the Imperial Bank was established, is
quite interesting to see. At the time when the British Crown took over
the control of the territories in India, after the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857,
there were three Presidency Banks, one in Calcutta, another in Bombay
D and the third in Madras. All these three banks established respectively in
1809, 1840 and 1843, were authorized to issue notes up to certain specified
limits. But this privilege was withdrawn in 1862 under the Paper Currency
Act, which vested the sole right to issue notes with the Government of
India.
E 6.7. The question of absorption of the three Presidency Banks
into a central bank came up for consideration on and off. Though the
Chamberlain Commission, known as the Royal Commission on Indian
Finance and Currency, appointed in 1913, felt the need for setting up a
central bank, the proposal did not materialize. But after the First World
War, the Presidency Banks themselves favoured an amalgamation.
F Therefore, the Imperial Bank of India Bill providing for the amalgamation
of all the three Presidency Banks was passed in September 1920 and
came into effect in January 1921. The trend of setting up central banks
gained momentum internationally, after the International Financial
Conferences held at Brussels in 1920 and at Genoa in 1922.
G 6.8. But the maintenance of an overvalued exchange rate to help
British exporters, gave rise to a clash between the colonial administration
and Indian business interests. The Congress sought devaluation and hence
a Royal Commission was set up in 1925 to examine the matter. This
Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance, also known as Hilton
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Young Commission (to which Dr. B. R. Ambedkar also contributed a A
statement), recommended the creation of a strong Central Bank for
India in 1926. Though a bill known as the Gold Standard and Reserve
Bank of India Bill, 1927 to give effect to the recommendations was
introduced in the Legislative Assembly, it was withdrawn on 10-02-1928.
From 1930 onwards, the question of establishing a Reserve Bank
B
received fresh impetus, when Constitutional reforms for the country were
undertaken.
6.9. The White Paper on Indian Constitutional Reforms, presented
in March 1933, assumed that a Reserve Bank, free from political influence,
would have to be set up and should already be successfully operating
before the first Federal Ministry was installed. C

6.10. Subsequently, a Departmental Committee (hereinafter
referred to, as “the India Office Committee”) was appointed in London
by the India Office, which submitted a report dated 14-03-1933. This
report was followed up by the appointment of the “London Committee”,
which endorsed the India Office Committee’s view that the Reserve D
Bank should be free from any political influence.
6.11. Therefore, a Bill drafted on the basis of the recommendations
of the London Committee was introduced in September 1933. In 1934,
the Bill was passed. The Reserve Bank of India commenced operations
as the country’s central bank on 01-04-1935. Under the Reserve Bank E
(Transfer of Public Ownership) Act, 1948, the bank was nationalized.
6.12. Once the historical background of the creation of RBI is
understood, it will be easy to appreciate its role in the economy of the
country and the functions and powers exercised by it statutorily.
F
6.13. As the Preamble of the RBI Act suggests, the object of
constitution of RBI was threefold namely (i) regulating the issue of bank
notes (ii) keeping of reserves with a view to securing monetary stability
in the country and (iii) operating the currency and credit system of the
country to its advantage.
G
6.14. In fact, the original Preamble of the Act contained only three
paragraphs. But paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Preamble were substituted
with 3 new paragraphs by Act 28 of 2016. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the
original Preamble and paragraphs 2 to 4 substituted in 2016, are presented
in a tabular column as follows:
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A Paragraphs 2 and 3 as they original ly stood Paragraphs 2 to 4 now substituted

AND WHEREAS in the present AND WHEREAS it is essential to have a modern
disorganisati on of the monetary systems of monetary policy framework to meet the challenge
the world it is not possible to determine what of an increasingly complex economy;
will be suitable as a permanent basis for the
Indian monet ary system; AND WHEREAS the primary objective of the
monetary policy is to maintain price stability
BUT WHEREAS it is expedient to make while keeping in mind the objective of growth;
B temporary provision on the basis of the
existing monetary system, and to leave the AND WHEREAS the monetary policy
question of the monetary standard best suited framework in India shall be operated by the
to India to be considered when the Reserve Bank of India;
international monetary position has become
sufficiently clear and stable to make it
possible to frame permanent measures;

C 6.15. It may be observed from the newly substituted paragraphs
that RBI is now vested with the obligation to operate the monetary
policy framework in India. An indication of the primary objective of
the monetary policy is provided in paragraph 3 which says that the
maintenance of price stability is the prime objective even while the
D objective of growth is to be kept in mind. Paragraph 2 recognizes the
necessity to have a modern monetary policy framework to meet the
challenge of an increasingly complex economy.
6.16. Therefore, it is clear that after the amendment under Act 28
of 2016, the very task of operating the monetary policy framework has
been conferred exclusively upon RBI.
E
6.17. Though the expression “monetary policy” is not defined in
the Act, an entire chapter under the title “Monetary Policy” containing
Sections 45Z to 45ZO was inserted as Chapter IIIF. The provisions of
this chapter are given overriding effect upon the other provisions of the
Act, under Section 45Z. Under Section 45ZA(1), the central government
F is empowered to determine the inflation target in terms of the consumer
price index, once in every 5 years, in consultation with RBI. The policy
rate required to achieve the inflation target is to be determined by a
Monetary Policy Committee, constituted under Section 45ZB.
6.18. The object of establishment of RBI is also spelt out in Section
G 3(1). It says that “a bank to be called the Reserve Bank of India
shall be constituted for the purpose of taking over the management
of the currency from the Central Government and of carrying on
the business of banking in accordance with the provisions of this
Act”.
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6.19. Chapter III of the Act enlists the central banking functions A
of RBI. Section 17 authorizes RBI to carry on and transact several
kinds of businesses listed therein, one of which, referred in sub-section
(15) is the making and issue of bank notes. Section 20 which forms part
of Chapter III, obliges RBI (i) to accept monies for account of the central
government (ii) to make payments up to the amount standing to the
B
credit of its account and (iii) to carry out its exchange, remittance and
other banking operations including the management of the public debt
of the Union. Under Section 21, the central government is obliged to
entrust all its money, remittance, exchange and banking transactions in
India with RBI. Under Section 22(1), RBI has the sole right to issue
bank notes in India (however, the central government has the power C
under Section 28A(2) to issue Government of India notes of the
denominational value of Rs. 1/-). It may also issue currency notes of the
Government of India, on the recommendations of the Central Board, for
a period fixed by the central government. Sub-section (2) of Section 22
goes one step further by stipulating that on and from the date on
D
which Chapter III comes into force, the central government shall
not issue any currency notes.
6.20. Section 26(1) makes every bank note a legal tender at any
place in India in payment, which is guaranteed by the central government.
Since a bank note issued by RBI is a legal tender guaranteed by the
central government, the central government is also vested with the power E
under sub-section (2) of Section 26 to declare any series of bank notes
of any denomination, to cease to be legal tender. But this can be done
only on the recommendation of the Central Board of Directors of RBI.
6.21. Under Section 38, the central government is prohibited from
putting into circulation any rupees, except through RBI. Similarly, RBI is F
also prohibited from disposing of rupee coin otherwise than for the purpose
of circulation.
6.22. Chapter IIIB which contains provisions relating to non-banking
institutions (NBFCs) receiving deposits and financial institutions, contains
two important provisions, one in Section 45JA and another in Section G
45L. Sub section (1) of Section 45JA reads as follows:
45JA. Power of Bank to determine policy and issue
directions.— (1) If the Bank is satisfied that, in the public
interest or to regulate the financial system of the country to
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354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A its advantage or to prevent the affairs of any non-banking
financial company being conducted in a manner detrimental
to the interest of the depositors or in a manner prejudicial to
the interest of the non-banking financial company, it is
necessary or expedient so to do, it may determine the policy
and give directions to all or any of the non-banking financial
B
companies relating to income recognition, accounting
standards, making of proper provision for bad and doubtful
debts, capital adequacy based on risk weights for assets and
credit conversion factors for off balance-sheet items and also
relating to deployment of funds by a non-banking financial
C company or a class of non-banking financial companies or
non-banking financial companies generally, as the case
maybe, and such non-banking financial companies shall be
bound to follow the policy so determined and the direction so
issued.
D 6.23. It may be seen that the aforesaid provision uses certain
words similar to those found in paragraph 1 of the Preamble. While
paragraph 1 of the Preamble speaks about the power of RBI to operate
the currency and credit system of the country to its advantage, Section
45JA speaks about the power of RBI to regulate the financial system of
the country to its advantage.
E
6.24. The salient feature of Section 45JA is that it empowers
RBI, both (i) to determine the policy and (ii) to give directions to all
NBFCs in respect of certain matters. The concerns sought to be
addressed by Section 45JA(1) are (i) public interest (ii) financial
system of the country (iii) interests of the depositors and (iv) interests
F of NBFCs.
6.25. Section 45L addresses yet another concern namely, the
regulation of the credit system of the country to its advantage. Section
45L reads as follows:

G 45L. Power of Bank to call for information from financial
institutions and to give directions.—
(1) If the Bank is satisfied for the purpose of enabling it to
regulate the credit system of the country to its advantage it is
necessary so to do, it may—
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(a) require financial institutions either generally or any group A
of financial institutions or financial institution in particular,
to furnish to the Bank in such form, at such intervals and
within such time, such statements, information or particulars
relating to the business of such financial institutions or
institution, as may be specified by the Bank by general or
B
special order;
(b) give to such institutions either generally or to any such
institution in particular, directions relating to the conduct of
business by them or by it as financial institutions or institution.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the power vested in C
the Bank under clause (a) of sub-section (1), the statements,
information or particulars to be furnished by a financial
institution may relate to all or any of the following matters,
namely, the paid-up capital, reserves or other liabilities, the
investments whether in Government securities or otherwise,
the persons to whom, and the purposes and periods for which, D
finance is provided and the terms and conditions, including
the rates of interest, on which it is provided.
(3) In issuing directions to any financial institution under
clause (b) of sub-section (1), the Bank shall have due regard
to the conditions in which, and the objects for which, the E
institution has been established, its statutory responsibilities,
if any, and the effect the business of such financial institution
is likely to have on trends in the money and capital markets.
6.26. It may be seen that the phrase “credit system of the country
to its advantage”, as found in paragraph 1 of the Preamble, is repeated F
in sub-section (1) of Section 45L. The only difference between the two
is that paragraph 1 of the Preamble speaks about the operation of
the credit system, while Section 45L (1) speaks about regulation of
the credit system. While exercising the power to issue directions
conferred by clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 45L, RBI is obliged G
under sub-section (3) of Section 45L to have due regard to certain
things, one of them being “the effect the business of such financial
institution is likely to have on trends in the money and capital
markets”.

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A 6.27. Chapter IIID of the Act contains provisions for the regulation
of transactions in derivatives, money markets or securities, etc. The
expression “money market instruments” is defined in clause (b) of Section
45U as follows:
45U(b) “money market instruments” include call or notice
B money, term money, repo, reverse repo, certificate of deposit,
commercial usance bill, commercial paper and such other debt
instrument of original or initial maturity up to one year as the
Bank may specify from time to time;
6.28. Section 45W empowers RBI to determine the policy relating
C to interest rates or interest rate products and to give directions in that
behalf to all or any of the agencies dealing in securities, money market
instruments, etc., for the purpose of regulating the financial system of
the country to its advantage. Section 45W(1) reads as follows:
45W. Power to regulate transactions in derivatives, money
D market instruments, etc.—(1) The Bank may, in public interest,
or to regulate the financial system of the country to its
advantage, determine the policy relating to interest rates or
interest rate products and give directions in that behalf to all
agencies or any of them, dealing in securities, money market
instruments, foreign exchange, derivatives, or other
E instruments of like nature as the Bank may specify from time
to time:
Provided that the directions issued under this sub-section
shall not relate to the procedure for execution or settlement
of the trades in respect of the transactions mentioned therein,
F on the Stock Exchanges recognised under section 4 of the
Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 (42 of 1956).
6.29. It is important to note that Section 45W(1) contains merely
an illustrative list of transactions. This is seen by the use of the expression
“other instruments of like nature” appearing in the above provision.
G
6.30. A careful scan of the RBI Act, 1934 in its entirety would
show that the operation/regulation of the credit/financial system of
the country to its advantage, is a thread that connects all the
provisions which confer powers upon RBI, both to determine policy
and to issue directions.
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6.31. RBI Act, 1934 is not the only Act from which RBI derives A
its powers. The Banking Regulation Act, 1949 is also a source of power
for RBI to do certain things. This can be seen from the Statement of
Objects and Reasons for the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. One of the
main features of the Bill as indicated in the Statement of Objects and
Reasons was “widening the powers of RBI so as to enable it to come to
B
the aid of the banking companies in times of emergency”.
6.32. Section 5 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 which contains
the interpretation clause defines the expression “banking policy” under
clause (ca) of Section 5. This definition reads as follows:
5(ca) “banking policy” means any policy which is specified C
from time to time by the Reserve Bank in the interest of the
banking system or in the interest of monetary stability or sound
economic growth, having due regard to the interests of the
depositors, the volume of deposits and other resources of the
bank and the need for equitable allocation and the efficient
use of these deposits and resources; D

6.33. Since Banking Regulation Act, 1949 was issued after the
RBI Act, 1934 and the nationalization of RBI, Section 5(ca) borrows
certain words such as “interest of the banking system” and “interest of
the monetary stability” and “economic growth” from the RBI Act, 1934.
E
6.34. Section 8 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 prohibits a
banking company from directly or indirectly dealing in the buying or
selling or bartering of goods. The Explanation to Section 8 also defines
the word “goods”, for the purposes of Section 8. Section 8 reads as
follows:
F
8 - Prohibition of trading –
Notwithstanding anything contained in section 6 or in any
contract, no banking company shall directly or indirectly deal
in the buying or selling or bartering of goods, except in
connection with the realisation of security given to or held by
G
it, or engage in any trade, or buy, sell or barter goods for
others otherwise than in connection with bills of exchange
received for collection or negotiation or with such of its
business as is referred to in clause (i) of sub-section (1) of
section 6:
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A PROVIDED that this section shall not apply to any such
business as is specified in pursuance of clause (o) of sub-
section (1) of section 6.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “goods”
means every kind of movable property, other than actionable
B claims, stocks, shares, money, bullion and specie, and all
instruments referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of
section 6.
6.35. Section 21 empowers RBI to determine the policy in
relation to advances to be followed by banking companies. The
C determination of policy may be in (i) public interest (ii) interests of
depositors or (iii) interests of the banking policy. Once a policy is
determined by RBI under Section 21(1), all banking companies are bound
to follow the policy.
6.36. No company can carry on banking business in India unless
D it holds a license issued by RBI. Under Section 22(1), RBI has power to
issue license, subject to certain terms and conditions as it may think fit to
impose.
6.37. Every banking company is obliged under Section 27(1) of
the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 to submit to RBI, monthly returns in
E the prescribed form, showing its assets and liabilities. RBI is conferred
with powers under Section 29A even to call for information about the
affairs of any associate enterprise of a banking company. Under sub-
section (2) of Section 29A, RBI can even cause an inspection of any
associate enterprise of a banking company. A power to conduct special
audit of a banking company’s accounts is also conferred upon RBI under
F Section 30(1B).
6.38. Section 35A of Banking Regulation Act, 1949 empowers
RBI to issue directions to banking companies. Such directions are binding
on the banking companies. The directions under Section 35A may be
issued (i) in public interest (ii) in the interest of banking policy (iii) to
G prevent the affairs of the banking company from being conducted in a
manner prejudicial to the interests of the depositors or of the banking
company itself and (iv) to secure the proper management of the banking
company. Section 35A(1) reads as follows:
35A. Power of the Reserve Bank to give directions.—(1)
H Where the Reserve Bank is satisfied that—
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 359
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

(a) in the public interest; or A
(aa) in the interest of banking policy; or
(b) to prevent the affairs of any banking company being
conducted in a manner detrimental to the interests of the
depositors or in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the
banking company; or B

(c) to secure the proper management of any banking company
generally, it is necessary to issue directions to banking
companies generally or to any banking company in
particular, it may, from time to time, issue such directions as it
deems fit, and the banking companies or the banking company, C
as the case may be, shall be bound to comply with such
directions.
6.39. Section 35AA and Section 35AB, inserted by the Amendment
Act 30 of 2017 (pursuant to the enactment of Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Code, 2016), empowers RBI respectively (i) to issue directions to any D
banking company to initiate insolvency resolution process, if so authorized
by the central government and (ii) to issue directions to any banking
company for the resolution of stressed assets.
6.40. Section 36(1)(a) empowers RBI to caution or prohibit banking
companies against entering into any particular transaction or class of E
transactions. Section 36(1)(a) reads follows:
36. Further powers and functions of Reserve Bank.—(1) The
Reserve Bank may—(a) caution or prohibit banking
companies generally or any banking company in
particular against entering into any particular transaction F
or class of transactions, and generally give advice to any
banking company;
Part IIA and IIAB of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 confers
powers upon the Reserve Bank (i) under Section 36AA to remove
managerial or other persons from office (ii) under Section 36AB to appoint G
additional directors and (iii) under Section 36ACA to order the
supersession of the board of directors.
6.41. For a long time, RBI drew its powers only from the aforesaid
2 enactments, namely RBI Act, 1934 and the Banking Regulation Act,
1949. But with the passage of time, as the industrial economy grew and H
360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A several banking companies came into existence and a need to fast track
paper-based cheque processing increased, the banks came together to
set up clearing houses. The clearing houses developed the procedure of
netting (arriving at the multilateral net settlement). But with the advent
of technology, new payment systems such as MICR clearing, Electronic
Funds Transfer Systems, cash-based payment systems, RTGS (real time
B
gross settlement) etc. became popular. The development of multiple
payment systems, which operated only in the realm of contracts among
various stakeholders, did not have a legislative sanction. Therefore, an
Act known as the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007 was
enacted with the object of providing for the regulation and supervision of
C payment systems in India and to designate RBI as the authority for that
purpose.
6.42. It is seen from the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
Bill that RBI is empowered to regulate and supervise various payment
and settlement systems in India including those operated by non-banks,
D card companies, other payment system providers and the proposed
umbrella organization for retail payments. The Act further empowers
RBI to (i) lay down the procedure for authorization of payment systems
(ii) lay down the operation and technical standards for payment systems
(iii) issue directions and guidelines to system providers (iv) call for
information and furnish returns and documents from the service providers
E (v) audit and inspect the systems and premises of the system providers
(vi) lay down the duties of the system providers and (vii) make regulations
for carrying out the provisions of the Act.
6.43. Section 2(1)(i) defines a “payment system”. The Section
reads as follows:
F
2(1)(i) “payment system” means a system that enables payment
to be effected between a payer and a beneficiary, involving
clearing, payment or settlement service or all of them, but
does not include a stock exchange;

G Explanation.- For the purposes of this clause, “payment
system” includes the systems enabling credit card operations,
debit card operations, smart card operations, money transfer
operations or similar operations;
6.44. Under Section 3 of the Payment and Settlement Systems
Act, 2007 RBI is the designated authority for the regulation and
H
supervision of payment systems under the Act.
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6.45. Chapter III of the Act deals with “authorisation of payment A
systems”. Section 4(1) of the Payment and Settlement Systems Act,
2007 provides that any person other than RBI seeking to commence or
operate a payment system shall take authorization from the Reserve
Bank in that regard. Section 4(1) reads as follows:
4. Payment system not to operate without authorisation.—(1) B
No person, other than the Reserve Bank, shall commence or
operate a payment system except under and in accordance
with an authorisation issued by the Reserve Bank under the
provisions of this Act:
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply C
to—
(a) the continued operation of an existing payment system on
commencement of this Act for a period not exceeding six
months from such commencement, unless within such period,
the operator of such payment system obtains an authorisation D
under this Act or the application for authorisation made under
section 7 of this Act is refused by the Reserve Bank;
(b) any person acting as the duly appointed agent of another
person to whom the payment is due;
(c) a company accepting payments either from its holding E
company or any of its subsidiary companies or from any other
company which is also a subsidiary of the same holding
company;
(d) any other person whom the Reserve Bank may, after
considering the interests of monetary policy or efficient F
operation of payment systems, the size of any payment system
or for any other reason, by notification, exempt from the
provisions of this section.
6.46. Chapter IV of the Act specifies the regulatory and
supervisory powers of RBI. Under Section 10, RBI is empowered to G
prescribe certain standards and guidelines for the proper and efficient
management of the payment systems. The Section reads as follows:
10. Power to determine standards.—(1) The Reserve Bank
may, from time to time, prescribe—
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362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A (a) the format of payment instructions and the size and shape
of such instructions;
(b) the timings to be maintained by payment systems;
(c) the manner of transfer of funds within the payment system,
either through paper, electronic means or in any other manner,
B between banks or between banks and other system
participants;
(d) such other standards to be complied with the payment
systems generally;

C (e) the criteria for membership of payment systems including
continuation, termination and rejection of membership;
(f) the conditions subject to which the system participants
shall participate in such fund transfers and the rights and
obligations of the system participants in such funds.
D (2) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (1), the
Reserve Bank may, from time to time, issue such guidelines,
as it may consider necessary for the proper and efficient
management of the payment systems generally or with
reference to any particular payment system.
E 6.47. Section 11 of the Act provides that any change in the system
which would affect the structure or the operation of the payment system
would require prior approval from the Reserve Bank. Section 11 reads
as follows:
11. Notice of change in the payment system.—(1) No system
F provider shall cause any change in the system which would
affect the structure or the operation of the payment system
without—
(a) the prior approval of the Reserve Bank; and
(b) giving notice of not less than thirty days to the system
G participants after the approval of the Reserve Bank:
Provided that in the interest of monetary policy of the country
or in public interest, the Reserve Bank may permit the system
provider to make any changes in a payment system without
giving notice to the system participants under clause (b) or
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requiring the system provider to give notice for a period longer A
than thirty days.
(2) Where the Reserve Bank has any objection, to the proposed
change for any reason, it shall communicate such objection
to the systems provider within two weeks of receipt of the
intimation of the proposed changes from the system provider. B
(3) The system provider shall, within a period of two weeks of
the receipt of the objections from the Reserve Bank forward
his comments to the Reserve Bank and the proposed changes
may be effected only after the receipt of approval from the
Reserve Bank. C
6.48. Section 17 empowers RBI to issue directions to a payment
system or a system participant, which, in RBI’s opinion is engaging
in any act that is likely to result in systemic risk being inadequately
controlled or is likely to affect the payment system, the monetary
policy or the credit policy of the country. The Section reads as follows: D
17. Power to issue directions.—Where the Reserve Bank is of
the opinion that,—
(a) a payment system or a system participant is engaging in,
or is about to engage in, any act, omission or course of
conduct that results, or is likely to result, in systemic risk being E
inadequately controlled; or
(b) any action under clause (a) is likely to affect the payment
system, the monetary policy or the credit policy of the country,
the Reserve Bank may issue directions in writing to such
F
payment system or system participant requiring it, within such
time as the Reserve Bank may specify –
(i) to cease and desist from engaging in the act, omission or
course of conduct or to ensure the system participants to cease
and desist from the act, omission or course of conduct; or
G
(ii) to perform such acts as may be necessary, in the opinion
of the Reserve Bank, to remedy the situation.
6.49. Section 18 of the Payment and Settlement Systems Act,
2007 further empowers RBI to issue directions to system providers
or the system participants or any other person generally, to H
364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A regulate the payment systems or in the interest of management
or operation of any of the payment systems or in public interest.
The Section reads as follows:
18. Power of Reserve Bank to give directions generally.—
Without prejudice to the provisions of the foregoing, the
B Reserve Bank may, if it is satisfied that for the purpose of
enabling it to regulate the payment systems or in the interest
of management or operation of any of the payment systems
or in public interest, it is necessary so to do, lay down policies
relating to the regulation of payment systems including
electronic, non-electronic, domestic and international payment
C systems affecting domestic transactions and give such
directions in writing as it may consider necessary to system
providers or the system participants or any other person either
generally or to any such agency and in particular, pertaining
to the conduct of business relating to payment systems.
D 6.50. Thus, the RBI Act, 1934, the Banking Regulation Act, 1949
and the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007 cumulatively
recognize and also confer very wide powers upon RBI (i) to operate
the currency and credit system of the country to its advantage (ii) to
take over the management of the currency from central government
E (iii) to have the sole right to make and issue bank notes that would
constitute legal tender at any place in India (iv) regulate the financial
system of the country to its advantage (v) to have a say in the
determination of inflation target in terms of the consumer price
index (vi) to have complete control over banking companies (vii) to
regulate and supervise the payment systems (viii) to prescribe
F standards and guidelines for the proper and efficient management
of the payment systems (ix) to issue directions to a payment system
or a system participant which in RBI’s opinion is engaging in any
act that is likely to result in systemic risk being inadequately
controlled or is likely to affect the payment system, the monetary
G policy or the credit policy of the country and (x) to issue directions
to system providers or the system participants or any other person
generally, to regulate the payment systems or in the interest of
management or operation of any of the payment systems or in public
interest.

H
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 365
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

6.51. Having taken note of the role of RBI as a central bank in A
the economy of the country, the functions entrusted to them and the
powers conferred upon them under various statutes, let us undertake
the exercise of fixing the identity of virtual currencies.
Fixing the identity of VCs
6.52. As we have stated in Part 3 of this judgment, the exact B
identity of virtual currencies eludes precision. Some call it an exchange
of value, some call it a stock and some call it a good/commodity. There
may be no difficulty in accepting the divergence of views, if those views
are not driven by fear of regulation. But if someone presents it as
currency to a regulator of stock market and presents it as a commodity C
to a regulator of money market and so on and so forth, the definition will
not merely elude a proper molecular structure but also elude regulation.
This is where the problem of law lies. George Friedman, the founder
and Chairman of Geopolitical Futures LLC, an online publication, aptly
summarized this dilemma as follows: “Bitcoin is neither fish nor
fowl…But both pricing it as a commodity when no commodity exists D
and trying to make it behave as a currency, seem problematic. The
problem is not that it is not issued by the Government nor that it is
unregulated. The problem is that it is hard to see what it is.”
6.53. It is now universally accepted that Satoshi envisioned a
digital analog to old-fashioned gold, a new kind of universal money E
that could be owned by everyone and spent anywhere. It was designed
to live with a cleverly constructed de-centralized network without central
authority. Satoshi himself defined it as “a new electronic cash system
that’s fully peer-to-peer, with no trusted third party.”
6.54. It is true that though, at its birth, it was conceived of only as F
an alternative to money, crypto currencies assumed different shapes,
different shades and different utility values over the past decade and
more. Several international monetary agencies/watchdogs are dabbling
to find out what these are and they are also divided in their opinion. For
instance, in a report submitted on 22-01-2019 to the International G
Monetary Fund (IMF), by Jeffrey Franks, Director of its Europe Office,
under the title ‘Cryptocurrencies and Monetary Policy’, it is pointed out
as follows:-

H
366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A 1. Money has evolved over time, to meet customary demands,
but its basic functions such as (A) retaining a store of value;
(B) acting as means of payment and (C) acting as a unit of
account, have all remained the same.
2. There are four basic characteristics of a crypto currency
B like bitcoin, they are (A) digital in nature (B) private (C) global
and (D) run on an autonomous and de-centralized algorithm.
6.55. According to the said report, there are four factors which lie
behind the rise of crypto currencies. They are: (1) the development of
blockchain technology (2) concerns about conventional money and
C banking, that arose out of the sub-prime mortgage crisis in 2008 and the
unconventional monetary policies/quantitative easing (3) privacy concerns
and (4) political views about the role of the Government.
6.56. The IMF report says that crypto currencies perform poorly
in terms of the three basic functions of currencies. While the store of
D value increased 2000% from January 2017 to December 2017, there
was also a fall during the year 2018. As means of payment, the acceptance
of crypto currencies, according to the IMF report is very low and a few
companies such as Microsoft, Dish network etc. have begun to accept
crypto currencies for limited transactions. As a unit of account, so far,
no goods or services are priced in crypto currencies.
E
6.57. On its potential impact on the monetary policies of
governments, the IMF report says the following:-
“But in the future, large crypto currencies holdings could
complicate monetary policy management”
F Eventually the conclusions reached in the report are as follows:-
• Crypto currencies today do not do a good job at
fulfilling the main functions of money.
• They may be favored by some for ideological,
technological or monetary policy reasons.
G
• The blockchain technology they use does have some
important advantages in controlling fraud and
maintaining privacy.
• But they also open up avenues for tax evasion and
H criminal activity.
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 367
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

6.58. The petitioners claim that today virtual currency is not money A
or other legal tender, but good/tradable commodity and hence RBI has
no role in regulating/banning the same. RBI has also taken a stand that
VCs are not recognized as legal tender, but they seek to justify the
impugned decisions, on the ground that VCs are capable of being used
as a medium of exchange. Therefore, it is necessary to see how VCs
were defined (i) by regulators in different jurisdictions and (ii) by the B
governments and other statutory authorities of various countries, through
statutory instruments and non-statutory directives and (iii) by courts of
different jurisdictions.
DEFINITION OF VCs – BY REGULATORS
C
S.No. Regulator Definition of Virtual Currency

1. International Monetary VCs are digital representations of value, issued
Fund 7 by private developers and denominated in their
own unit of account.8

VCs can be obtained, stored, accessed, and D
transacted electronically, and can be used for a
variety of purposes, as long as the transacting
parties agree to use them.

The concept of VCs covers a wider array of
“currencies,” ranging from simple IOUs (I owe
you) of issuers (such as Internet or mobile E
coupons and airline miles), to VCs backed by
assets such as gold,9 and “cryptocurrencies” such
as Bitcoin.

As digital representation of value, VCs fall within
the broader category of digital currencies.
However, they differ from other digital
currencies, such as e-money, which is a digital
F
payment mechanism for (and denominated in)
fiat currency. VCs, on the other hand, are not
denominated in fiat currency and have their own
unit of account.

VCs fall short of the legal concept of currency or
money. G
7
Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations, IMF Staff Discussion Note, Dong He et al., page
7, 16, 17 (January 2016) (available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdn1603.pdf, last
accessed on 27-02-2020) – presented by IMF Managing Director, Christine Lagarde, presented at the World
Economic Forum (https://www.ccn.com/imf-director-talks-up-virtual-currencies-and-blockchain-tech/, last
accessed on 27-02-2020).
8
Given the fast evolving nature of the industry, a universal definition has yet to emerge and could quickly
change as the VC ecosystem continues to transform.
9
H
This type of VCs is backed by the combination of existing tangible assets or national currencies and the
creditworthiness of the issuer.
368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A At present, VCs do not completely fulfill the three
economic roles associated with money: high price
volatility of VCs limits their ability to serve as a
reliable store of value; the current small size and
limited acceptance network of VCs significantly
restrics their use as a medium of exchange; as of
now, there is little evidence that VCs are used as
B an independent unit of account.

2. Financial Action Task June 2015:10
Force Virtual currency is a digital representation of value
that can be digitally traded and functions as (1) a
medium of exchange; and/or (2) a unit of account;
and/or (3) a store of value, but does not have legal
C tender status (i.e., when tendered to a creditor, is a
valid and legal offer of payment) in any jurisdiction.
It is not issued nor guranteed by any jurisdiction,
and fulfils the above functions only by agreement
within the community of users of the virtual
currency.
D
October 2018:11
Virtual Asset — A virtual asset is a digital
representation of value that can be digitally traded,
or transferred, and can be used for payment or
investment purposes. Virtual assets do not include
digital representations of flat currencies, securities
E and other financial assets that are already covered
elsewhere in the FATF Recommendations.
For the purposes of applying the FATF
Recommendations, countries should consider
virutal assets as "property," "proceeds," "funds,"
"funds or other assets," or other "corresponding
value."
F
3. European Central Bank 2012:12
A virutal currency is a type of unregulated, digital
money, which is issued and usually controlled by
its developers, and used and accepted among the
members of a specific virutal community. This
definition may need to be adapted to future if
G fundamental characteristics change.
10
Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach – Virtual Currencies, FATF, page 26 (June 2015) available at http:/
/www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Guidance-RBA-Virtual-Currencies.pdf (Last accessed on 27-
02-2020).
11
Glossary of the FATF Recommendations (updated on October 2018) available at https://www.fatf-gafi.org/
glossary/u-z/ (Last accessed on 27-02-2020).
12
Virtual Currency Schemes, European Central Bank, page 13 (October 2012) available at http://
H www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes201210en.pdf (Last accessed on 27-02-2020).
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 369
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

2017:13 A
Absent a university accepted definition, 'virual
currencies' can be defined as digital
representation of value which, despite not
being issued by a central bank or another
comparable public authority, nor being
'attached', subject to certain exceptions, to a
flat currency, are voluntarily accepted, by B
natural or legal persons, as a means of
exchange, and which are stored, transferred
and traded electronically, without a tangible,
real-world representation.

This definition of ‘virutal currencies’ captures
decentralised, peer-to-peer VCs – as distinct C
from E-money or Internet (software)-based
schemes, which merely facilitate transactions
denominated in fiat money or in central bank-
issued digital currencies – which, while devoid
of legal tender status, fulfil, at least to some
extent, all three traditional functions of money
by way of agreement within their user D
community. This definition does not, however,
extend to centrally-issued digital currencies,
such as the central bank digital currencies under
consideration, at the time of writing, in several
jurisdictions.

European Banking Authority in 2014:14 E
VCs are defined as a digital representation of
value that is neither issued by a central bank
or public authority nor necessarily attached
to a FC, but is used by natural or legal persons
as a means of exchange and can be transferred,
stored or traded electronically.
F
4. European Securities and Crypto-asset: A type of private asset that
Markets Authority15 depends primarily on cryptography and
Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) or
similar technology as part of their perceived
or inherent value...Crypto-asset additionally
means an asset that is not issued by a central
bank. G
13
Phoebus Athanassiou, Impact of Digital Innovation on the Processing of Electronic Payments and
Contracting: An Overview of Legal Risks, Legal Working Paper Series, No. 16, European Central Bank
(October 2017) available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scplps/ecb.lwp16.en.pdf?344b9327fec
917bd7a8fd70864a94f6e (Last accessed on 27-02-2020).
14
EBA Opinion on ‘virtual currencies’, page 11, 13 (July 2014) available at https://eba.europa.eu/sites/
default/documents/files/documents/10180/657547/81409b94-4222-45d7-ba3b-7deb5863ab57/EBA-Op-
2014-08%20Opinion%20on%20Virtual%20Currencies.pdf (Last accessed on 27-02-2020). H
15
Advice - Initial Coin Offerings and Crypto-Assets (January 2019) available at https://www.esma.europa.eu/
sites/default/files/library/esma50-157-1391_crypto_advice.pdf (Last accessed on 27-02-2020).
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A 5. Financial Conduct Cryptoassets are a cryptographically secured
Authority United digital representation of value or contractual
Kingdom16 rights that is powered by forms of DLT and
can be stored, transferred or traded
electronically.

While cryptoassets can be used as a means of
B exchange, they are not considered to be a
currency or money, as both the Bank of England
and the G20 Finance Ministers and Central
Bank Governors have previously set out. They
are too volatile to be a good store of value,
they are not widely accepted as a means of
C exchange, and they are not used as a unit of
account.

6. Internal Revenue 2014:17
Service, Department of "virutal currency" may be used to pay for goods
Treasury, USA or services, or held for investment. Virtual
currency is a digital representation of value
D that functions as a medium of exchage, a unit
of account, and/or a store of value.

Convertible VC is treated as property for U.S.
federal tax purposes. General tax principles
that the apply to property transactions apply
to transactions using virtual currency. VC is
E not treated as currency that could generate
foreign currency gain or loss for U.S. federal
tax purposes.

2018:18
Virutal currency, as generally defined, is a digital
representation of value that function in the
F same manner as a country's traditional
currency.

16
Guidance on Cryptoassets, Consultation Paper, CP 19/3, Financial Conduct Authority, page 7 (January
2019) available at https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/consultation/cp19-03.pdf (Last accessed on 27-02-
2020) and Guidance on Cryptoassets, Feedback and Final Guidance to CP 19/3, Policy Statement, PS19/22
G (July 2019) available at https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/ps19-22.pdf (Last accessed on 27-02-
2020).
17
IRS Virtual Currency Guidance: Virtual Currency is Treated as Property for U.S. Federal Tax Purposes;
General Rules for Property Transactions Apply (March 2014) available at https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/
irs-virtual-currency-guidance (Last accessed on 27-02-2020) and https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-
21.pdf (Last accessed on 27-02-2020).
18
IRS reminds taxpayers to report virtual currency transactions (March 2018) available at https://
www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-reminds-taxpayers-to-report-virtual-currency-transactions (Last accessed on 27-
H 02-2020).
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 371
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

7. Securities and Exchange Bitcoin has been described as a decentralized, A
Commission, USA peer-to-peer virutal currency that is used like
money – it can be exchanged for traditional
currencies such as the U.S. dollar, or used to
purchase goods or services, usually online.
Unlike traditional currencies, Bitcoin operates
without central authority or banks and is not
backed by any government.19 B

Speaking broadly, crypto currencies purport
to be items of inherent value (similar, for
instance, to cash or gold) that are designed to
enable purchases, sales and other financial
transactions. They are intended to provide C
many of the same functions as long-established
currencies such as the U.S. dollar, euro or
Japanese yen but do not have the backing of a
government or other body.20

8. Commodity Futures Section 1a(9) of the Act (US Commodity
Trading Commission, Exchange Act) defines "commodity" to include, D
USA among other things, "all services, rights, and
interests in which contracts for future delivery
are presently or in the future dealt in." 7 U.S.C.
§ 1a(9). The definition of a “commodity” is
broad. See, e.g., Board of Trade of City of
Chicago v. SEC, 677 F. 2d 1137, 1142 (7th
Cir. 1982). Bitcoin and other virtual currencies E
are encompassed in the definition and
properly defined as commodities. 21

9. Financial Crimes Virtual currency is a medium of exchange that
Enforcement operates like a currency in some environments,
Network, Department but does not have all the attributes of real
of Treasury, USA22 currency. In particular, virtual currency does
F
not have legal tender status in any jurisdiction.

19
Investor Alert: Bitcoin and Other Virtual Currency-Related Investments (May 2014) available at https:/
/www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/investoralertsia_bitcoin.html (Last accessed on 27-02-2020).
20
Chairman Jay Clayton, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings (December 2017) available
at https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-2017-12-11 (Last accessed on 27-02-
G
2020).
21
In the Matter of: Coinflip, Inc., d/b/a Derivabit, and Francisco Riordan, CFTC Docket No. 15-29. 2015
WL 5535736 (September 17, 2015) available at https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/
@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfcoinfliprorder09172015.pdf (Last accessed on 27-02-
2020).
22
Guidance - Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using
Virtual Currencies (March 2013) available at https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FIN-2013-
G001.pdf (Last accessed on 27-02-2020). H
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A This guidance addresses “convertible” virtual
currency. This type of virtual currency either
has an equivalent value in real currency, or
acts as a substitute for real currency.

10. Canada Revenue Cryptocurrency is a digital representation of
Agency (CRA)23 value that is not legal tender. It is a digital
B asset…that works as a medium of exchange
for goods and services between the parties
who agree to use it.

CRA generally treats cryptocurrency like a
commodity for purposes of Income Tax Act.
C Any income from transactions involving
cryptocurrency is generally treated as business
income or as a capital gain, depending on the
circumstances.

Virtual currency is digital asset that can be
used to buy and sell goods or services.
D Cryptocurrency is a blockchain-based, virtual
currency. When cryptocurrency is used to pay
for goods or services, the rules for barter
transactions apply for income tax purposes.
A barter transaction occurs when any two
persons agree to exchange good or services
and carry out that exchange without legal
E currency. Virtual currency can also be bought
or sold like commodity. 24

F

G

23
Guide for cryptocurrency users and tax professionals (Last modified on 27 June 2019) available at https:/
/www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/programs/about-canada-revenue-agency-cra/compliance/digital-
currency/cryptocurrency-guide.html (Last accessed on 27-02-2020).
24
Virtual Currency (Last modified on 26 June 2019) available at https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/
H programs/about-canada-revenue-agency-cra/compliance/digital-currency.html (Last accessed on 27-02-2020).
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 373
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

DEFINITIONS UNDER STATUTORY ENACTMENTS AND A
NON-STATUTORY DIRECTIVES OF GOVERNMENTS
S.No. Country Statutory Section/ Article defininng VC
Enactment/
Non-Statutory
Directive
B
1. Japan Payment Article 2(5): The term “Virtual Currency”
Services Act, as used in this Act means any of the following:
2009
(i) property value (limited to that which is
recorded on an electronic device or any other
object by electronic means, and excluding the
Japanese currency, foreign currencies, and C
Currency-Denominated Assets; the same
applies in the following item) which can be
used in relation to unspecified persons for the
purpose of paying consideration for the
purchase or leasing of goods or the receipt of
provision of services and can also be purchased
from and sold to unspecified persons acting as D
counterparties, and which can be transferred
by means of an electronic data processing
system; and

(ii) property value which can be mutually
exchanged with what is set forth in the
preceding item with unspecified persons acting E
as counterparties, and which can be transferred
by means of an electronic data processing
system.

2019 amendment to this Act (to come into
force from April 2020) uses the term “crypto
assets (angoshisan)” in place of the term
F
“virtual currency”.

The 2019 Amendment added crypto assets to
the term “financial instruments” for the
purposes of defining underlying assets of the
derivative transactions subject to derivative
G
regulations under the FIEA (Financial
Instruments and Exchange Act), and therefore
the same regulations applicable to other
derivative transactions under the FIEA will
apply to crypto asset derivative transactions.
These regulations include certain conduct
regulations, such as the notice requirement
H
374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A prior to trading, and prohibitions on making
false statements, providing conclusive
judgements, and engaging in uninvited
solicitation.
2. Malta Virutal Article 2(2): “virtual financial asset” or “VFA”
Financial means any form of digital medium recordation
Asset Act, that is used as a digital medium of exchange,
B 2018 unit of account, or store of value and that is
not -
(a) electronic money;
(b) a financial instrument; or
(c) a virtual token;
“virtual token” means a form of digital medium
recordation whose utility, value or application
C is restricted solely to the acquisition of goods
or services, either solely within the DLT
platform on or in relation to which it was issued
or within a limited network of DLT platforms.
3. Canada Proceeds of Section 1(2): virtual currency means
Crime (Money (a) a digital representation of value that can be
D Laundering) used for payment or investment purposes that
and Terrorist is not a fiat currency and that can be readily
Financing exchanged for funds or for another virtual
Regulations, currency that can be readily exchanged for
200225 funds; or
(b) a private key of a cryptographic system
that enables a person or entity to have access
E to a digital representation of value referred to
in paragraph (a).

4. Bahamas Payment No specific legislation for crypto currencies.
Instruments But according to Central Bank, Bahamas the
(Oversight) regulations which provide a framework for a
Regulations, system of national electronic payment services,
F 2017 apply to crypto currencies.
Article 2(1): electronic money or e-money
means electronically stored monetary value as
represented by a claim on the issuer, which is
issued on receipt of funds for the purpose of
making payment transactions and which is
G accepted as a means of payment by persons
other than the issuer, and includes monetary
value stored magnetically or in any other
tangible or intangible device (such as SIM card
or software).

25
H As amended in June 2019, which amendment is yet to come into force.
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 375
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

A Bill is under consideration that would bring A
virtual currencies within the ambit of proceeds
of crime legislation (Proceeds of Crime Bill,
2018). Clause (2) of the Bill defines:
“virtual currency” as a digital representation of
value which can be digitally traded and func-
tions as – (a) a medium of exchange; (b) a unit
of account; or (c) a store of value, that does not B
have legal tender status or carry any security
or guarantee in any jurisdiction.

“currency or money” means coin and paper
money of any jurisdiction that is designated as
legal tender or is customarily used and accepted
as a medium of exchange, including virtual cur- C
rency as a means of payment.

5. Estonia Money Section 3(9): cryptocurrencies (virtual
Laundering currencies) are value represented in digital
and Terrorist form that is digitally transferable, preservable,
Financing or tradable and that which natural persons or
Prevention legal persons accept as a payment instrument, D
Act, 2017 but that is not the legal tender of any country
or funds (banknotes or coins, scriptural
money held by banks, or electronic money).

6. Latvia Law on Section 1 (22): virtual currency - a digital
Prevention of representation of value which can be
Money transferred, stored or traded digitally and E
Laundering operate as a means of exchange, but has not
and Terroristm been recognised as a legal means of payment,
and cannot be recognised as a banknote and coin,
Proliferation non-cash money and electronic money, and is
Financing, as not a monetary value accrued in the payment
amended in instrument which is used in the cases referred
2017 to in Section 3, Clauses 10 and 11 of the Law F
on the Payment Services and Electronic
Money;

7. Liechtenstein Due Diligence Article 2(1)(l): Virtual currencies shall be
Act, 2019 understood to be digital monetary units, which
can be exchanged for legal tender, used to G
purchase goods or services or to preserve value
and thus assume the function of legal tender.

H
376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A 8. Israel Supervision of Section 11A (7) defines financial asset.
Financial Financial asset includes virtual currency.26
Services Law,
5776-2016

9. Jersey Proceeds of Article 4(4): ‘Virtual currency’ means any
B Crime currency which (whilst not itself being issued
(Miscellaneous by, or legal tender in, any jurisdiction) –
Amendments) (a) digitally represents value;
(Crown (Jersey) (b) is a unit of account;
dependency) Regulations (c) functions as a medium of exchange; and
2016 (d) is capable of being digitally exchanged for
money in any form.
C Article 4(5): For the avoidance of doubt,
virtual currency does not include any
instrument which represents or stores
(whether digitally or otherwise) value that can
be used only to acquire goods and services in
or on the premises of, or under a commercial
agreement with, the issuer of the instrument.
D
10. Mexico Financial It defines virtual assets as representations of
Technology value electronically registered and utilized by
Institutions the public as a means of payment for all types
Law, 2018 of legal transactions, which may only be
(Chapter on transferred electronically. 27
Virtual Assets)
E
11. Austria Ministry of Treats virtual currency as ‘other intangible
Finance commodity’. 28

12. Czech Vice Governor Treats virtual currency as ‘commodity’. 29
Republic Czech
F National Bank

26
Regulation of Cryptocurrency Around the World – Israel, Report of The Law Library of Congress, Global
Legal Research Center (June 2018) available at https://www.loc.gov/law/help/cryptocurrency/world-
survey.php#israel (Last accessed on 27-02-2020).
G 27
Regulation of Cryptocurrency Around the World – Mexico, Report of The Law Library of Congress, Global
Legal Research Center (June 2018) available at https://www.loc.gov/law/help/cryptocurrency/world-
survey.php#mexico (Last accessed on 27-02-2020).
28
Regulation of Cryptocurrency Around the World – Austria, Report of The Law Library of Congress, Global
Legal Research Center (June 2018) available at https://www.loc.gov/law/help/cryptocurrency/world-
survey.php#austria (Last accessed on 27-02-2020).
29
Regulation of Cryptocurrency Around the World – Czech Republic, Report of The Law Library of Congress,
Global Legal Research Center (June 2018) available at https://www.loc.gov/law/help/cryptocurrency/
H world-survey.php#czech (Last accessed on 27-02-2020).
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 377
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

13. Germany German The Authority qualifies virtual currencies as A
Federal “units of account” and therefore, “financial
Financial instruments”.
Supervisory But bitcoin is considered to be crypto token
Authority by German Bundesbank (because it does not
fulfil the typical functions of a currency).30

Recognized before the Parliament that crypto
B
14. Luxembourg Minister of
Finance currencies are actual currencies.31

15. Slovakia Ministry of Virtual currencies must be treated as “short
Finance, term financial assets other than money”. 32
Slovakia
published C
guidance

16. European European Article 3(18): ‘Virtual Currencies’ means a
Union Union's digital representation of value that is not
Directive issued or guaranteed by a central bank or a
2018/843 of public authority, is not necessarily attached
30 May 2018 to a legally established currency and does not D
(5th Anti- possess a legal status of currency or money,
Money but is accepted by natural or legal persons as
Laundering a means of exchange and which can be
Directive) transferred, stored and traded electronically.

17. United HM Revenue Cryptoassets (or ‘cryptocurrency’ as they
Kingdom & Customs, are also known) are cryptographically secured E
UK 34 digital representation of value or contractual
rights that can be :
• transferred
• stored
• traded electronically
HMRC does not consider cryptoassets to be F
currency or money.

30
Regulation of Cryptocurrency Around the World – Germany, Report of The Law Library of Congress, Global
Legal Research Center (June 2018) available at https://www.loc.gov/law/help/cryptocurrency/world-
survey.php#germany (Last accessed on 27-02-2020).
31
Regulation of Cryptocurrency Around the World – Luxembourg, Report of The Law Library of Congress, G
Global Legal Research Center (June 2018) available at https://www.loc.gov/law/help/cryptocurrency/
world-survey.php#luxembourg (Last accessed on 27-02-2020).
32
Regulation of Cryptocurrency Around the World – Slovakia, Report of The Law Library of Congress,
Global Legal Research Center (June 2018) available at https://www.loc.gov/law/help/cryptocurrency/
world-survey.php#slovakia (Last accessed on 27-02-2020).
33
European Union’s Directive 2018/843 available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/
?uri=CELEX:32018L0843&from=EN (Last accessed on 27-02-2020).
34
Policy paper, Cryptoassets: Tax for Individuals (December 2019) available at https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/tax-on-cryptoassets/cryptoassets-for-individuals (Last accessed on 27-02-2020). H
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A Cryptocurrencies have a unique identity
and cannot therefore be directly compared
to any other form of investment activity or
payment mechanism. 35

Bank of The first part of the word ‘crypto’, means
B England36 ‘hidden’ or ‘secret’ reflecting the secure
technology used to record who owns what,
and for making payments between users.

The second part of the word, ‘currency’, tells
us the reason cryptocurrencies were designed
in the first place: a type of electronic cash.
C
But cryptocurrencies aren't like the cash we
carry. They exist electronically and use a peer-
to-peer system. There is no central bank or
government to manage the system or step in
if something goes wrong.

D 18. United New York Section 2(p): virtual currency means any type
States of of digital unit that is used as a medium of
America [BitLicence exchange or a form of digitally stored value.
Regulation (23 Virtual currency shall be broadly construed
CRR-NY to include digital units of exchange that: have
200)] a centralized repository or administrator; and
decentralized and have no centralized
E repository or administratory; or may be
created or obtained by computing or
manufacturing effort. Virtual currency shall
not be construed to include any of the
following:
(1) digitals units that:
F (i) are used solely within online gaming
platforms;
(ii) have no market or application outside
of those gaming platforms;
(iii) cannot be converted into, or redeemed
for, fiat currency or virtual currencyl and
(iv) may or may not be redeemable for
G real-world goods, services, discounts, or
purchases;

35
Policy paper on Revenue and Customs Brief 9 (2014): Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, HM Revenue &
Customs (March 3, 2014) available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/revenue-and-customs-
brief-9-2014-bitcoin-and-other-cryptocurrencies/revenue-and-customs-brief-9-2014-bitcoin-and-other-
cryptocurrencies (Last accessed on 27-02-2020).
36
What are cr yptoassets (cr yptocurrencies )? av ailable at https://www.ba nkofe ngla nd.co. uk/
H knowledgebank/what-are-cryptocurrencies (Last accessed on 27-02-2020).
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 379
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

(2) digital units that can be redeemed for A
goods, services, discounts, or purchases as
part of a customer affinity or rewards program
with the issuer and/or other designated
merchants or can be redeemed for digital units
in another customer affinity or rewards
program, but cannot be converted into, or
redeemed for, fiat currency or virtual currency; B
or

(3) digital units used as part of prepaid cards;

North Carolina Virtual currency– A digital representation of
value that can be digitally traded and functions
[Money as a medium of exchange, a unit of account, or C
Transmitters a store of value but only to the extent defined
Act § (53- as stored value under subdivision (19) of this
208.42)] section, but does not have legal tender status
as recognized by the United States
Government.
Connecticut “Virtual currency” means any type of digital
unit that is used as a medium of exchange or a D
[General form of digitally stored value or that is
Statues of incorportated into payment system
Connecticut, technology.
Sec. 36a-596]
Virtual currency shall be construed to include
digital units of exchange that (A) have a
centralized repository or administratory; (B) E
are decentralized and have no centralized
repository or administrator; or (C) may be
created or obtained by computing or
manufacturing effort.

Virtual currency shall not be construed to
include digital units that are used (i) solely
F
within online gaming platforms with no market
or application outside such gaming platforms,
or (ii) exclusively as part of a consumer affinity
or rewards program, and can be applied solely
as payment for purchases with the issuer or
other designated merchants, but cannot be
G
converted into or redeemed for fiat currency.

Florida (2) (i) “Virtual currency” means a medium of
exchange in electronic or digital format that is
[Florida not a coin or currency of the United States or
Money any other country.
H
380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A Laundering
Act (Fla. Stat.
§ 896.101)]

Illinois A digital currency is an electronic medium of
exchange used to purchase goods and services.
[Digital A digital currency may also be exchanged for
B Currency money. A digital currency, by nature of its
Regulatory properties detailed below, is distinct from
Guidance money.
(2017)] 37

Louisiana Virtual currency is an electronic medium of
C exchange that does not have all the attributes
[Consumer of real or fiat currencies. Virtual currencies
and Invester include cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin and
Advisory on Litecoin, which are not legal tender and are
Virtual not issued or backed by any central bank or
Currency by governmental authority. Virtual currencies are
Office of :
D Financial • not backed by the United States or any
Institute other national government.
(2014)] 38 • not insured by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corp oration or any
governmental agency;
• not backed by any physical commodity,
such as gold or silver; and
E • not legal tender for debts.
Virtual currencies have legitimate purposes
and can be purchased, sold, and exchanged
with other types of virtual currencies or real
currencies like the U.S. dollar. This can happen
through various mechanisms such as
exchangers, administrators, or merchants that
F are willing to accept virtual currencies in lieu
of real currency.
Michigan Convertible virtual currency is a digital
representation of value that has an equivalent
[Michigan value in real currency, such as the United
Department of States Dollar (USD), and/or acts as a
G Treasury substitute for real currency.
Guidance
37
Digital Currency Regulatory Guidance, Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation
(June 13, 2017) av ailable at https:// www.id fpr. com/Forms/ DFI/CCD/IDFPR%20-
%20Digital%20Currency%20Regulatory%20Guidance.pdf (Last accessed on 27-02-2020).
38
Office of Financial Institutions, State of Louisiana, Consumer and Investor Advisory on Virtual
Currency (August 2014) available at http://www.ofi.state.la.us/SOCGuidanceVirtualCurrency.pdf (Last
H accessed on 27-02-2020).
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 381
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

(January A prominent example of convertible virtual A
2015)]39 currency is Bitcoin, a form of e-currency that
has been around since 2008.

Washington “Virtual currency” means a digital
representation of value used as a medium of
Uniform exchange, a unit of account, or a store of value,
Money but does not have legal tender status as B
Services Act recognized by the United States government.
(RCW “Virtual currency” does not include the
19.230.010) software or protocols governing the transfer
of the digital representation of value or other
uses of virtual distributed leger systems to
verify ownership or authenticity in a digital C
capacity when the virtual currency is not used
as a medium of exchange.

Wyoming (xxii) “Virtual currency” means any type of
digital representation of value that:
Wyoming (A) Is used as a medium of exchange, unit of
Money account or store of value; and D
Transmitter (B) Is not recognized as legal tender by the
Act [W.S. 40- United States government.
22-102(a)]

6.59. It may be seen from the contents of the tables given above
that there is unanimity of opinion among all the regulators and the
E
governments of various countries that though virtual currencies have
not acquired the status of a legal tender, they nevertheless constitute
digital representations of value and that they are capable of functioning
as (i) a medium of exchange and/or (ii) a unit of account and/or (iii) a
store of value. The IMF, the FATF, the European Central Bank, the
Financial Conduct Authority of the United Kingdom, the Internal Revenue F
Service of the United States, Department of Treasury and the Canadian
Revenue Authority treat virtual currencies as digital representations of
value. The European Central Bank went a step further by describing a
virtual currency as a type of unregulated digital money. The Internal
Revenue Service of the United States, Department of Treasury has
G
recognized that a virtual currency can function in the same manner as a
country’s traditional currency. The Securities and Exchange Commission,
USA also recognizes that virtual currencies are intended to perform
39
Virtual Currency, Treasury Update published by the Tax Policy Division, Michigan Department of
Treasury (Vol. 1(1), November 2015) available at https://www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/Tax-Policy-
November2015-Newsletter_504036_7.pdf (Last accessed on 27-02-2020). H
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A many of the same functions as long-established currencies such as US
dollar, Euro or Japanese Yen. Yet another wing of the United States
Department of Treasury namely Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
calls virtual currency as a medium of exchange that operates like a
currency in some environments, though it may not have all the attributes
of a real currency.
B
6.60. The Bank of International Settlements, as pointed out in
Part 2 of this judgment, got a sub-group within the Committee on
Payments and Market Infrastructure (CPMI) to undertake an analysis
of digital currencies. In a report submitted by them in November 2015,
this sub-group recognized that though the use of private digital currencies
C was too low at that time for certain risks to materialize, the widespread
substitution of bank notes over a period of time, with digital currencies,
could lead to a decline in non-interest paying liabilities of central banks
and that the conduct of the monetary policy could be affected.
6.61. Similarly, the state of Liechtenstein considers virtual
D currencies as digital monetary units which can be exchanged for legal
tender and also be used to purchase goods or services, thereby assuming
the character of a legal tender. The German Federal Financial Supervisory
Authority treats virtual currencies as units of account and consequently
as financial instruments. Luxembourg has taken an official position that
E crypto currencies are actual currencies. Some of the states in the Unites
States of America have passed laws recognizing virtual currencies as
electronic medium of exchange.
6.62. It is clear from the above that the governments and money
market regulators throughout the world have come to terms with the
F reality that virtual currencies are capable of being used as real money,
but all of them have gone into the denial mode (like the proverbial cat
closing its eyes and thinking that there is complete darkness) by claiming
that VCs do not have the status of a legal tender, as they are not backed
by a central authority. But what an article of merchandise is capable
of functioning as, is different from how it is recognized in law to be.
G It is as much true that VCs are not recognized as legal tender, as it
is true that they are capable of performing some or most of the
functions of real currency.
6.63. The word “currency” is defined in Section 2(h) of the Foreign
Exchange Management Act, 1999 (hereinafter, “FEMA”) to include
H
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 383
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

“all currency notes, postal notes, postal orders, money orders, A
cheques, drafts, travelers’ cheques, letters of credit, bills of exchange
and promissory notes, credit cards or such other similar instruments
as may be notified by the Reserve Bank.” The expression “currency
notes” is also defined in Section 2(i) of FEMA to mean and include cash
in the form of coins and bank notes. Again, FEMA defines “Indian
B
currency” under Section 2(q) to mean currency which is expressed or
drawn in Indian rupees, but which would not include special bank notes
and special one rupee notes issued under Section 28A of the RBI Act.
But RBI has taken a stand in paragraph 24 of its counter-affidavit that
VCs do not fit into the definition of the expression “currency” under
Section 2(h) of FEMA, despite the fact that FATF, in its report on June C
2014 on “Virtual Currencies: Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT
Risks” defined virtual currency to mean “digital representation of value
that can be digitally traded and functions as (1) a medium of
exchange; and/or (2) a unit of account; and/or (3) a store of value,
but does not have legal tender status.” According to the report, legal
D
tender status is acquired only when it is accepted as a valid and
legal offer of payment when tendered to a creditor.
6.64. Traditionally ‘money’ has always been defined in terms of
the 3 functions or services that it provides namely (1) a medium of
exchange (2) a unit of account and (3) a store of value. But in course of
time, a fourth function namely that of being a final discharge of debt or E
standard of deferred payment was also added. This fourth function is
acquired by money through the conferment of the legal tender status by
a Government/central authority. Therefore, capitalizing on this fourth
dimension/function and drawing a distinction between money as
understood in the social sense and money as understood in the legal F
sense, it was contended by Shri Nakul Dewan, learned Senior Counsel,
with particular reference to the book ‘Property Rights in Money’ by
David Fox and the decision of the Queen’s Bench in Moss v. Hancock40
and the decision of the US Supreme Court in Wisconsin Central Ltd v.
United States,41 that so long as VCs do not qualify as money either in
the legal sense (not having a legal tender status) or in the social sense G
(not being widely accepted by a huge population as a medium of
exchange), they cannot be treated as currencies within the meaning of

40
(1899) 2 QB 111
41
585 US ___ 2018, 138 S. Ct. 2067 (2018) H
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A any of the statutory enactments from which RBI draws its energy and
power.
6.65. But we do not think that RBI’s role and power can
come into play only if something has actually acquired the status of
a legal tender. We do not also think that for RBI to invoke its power,
B something should have all the four characteristics or functions of
money. Moss v. Hancock (supra), itself a century old decision (1899),
relies upon the definition of ‘money’ as given by F. A. Walker in his
treatise ‘Money, Trade and Industry’ (actual title of the book appears to
be ‘Money in its relation to Trade and Industry’), published in 1879 to
the effect that “money is that which passes freely from hand to hand
C throughout the community in final discharge of debts and full
payment for commodities, being accepted equally without reference
to the character or the credit of the person who offers it and without
the intention of the person who receives it to consume it or apply it
to any other use than in turn to tender it to others in discharge of
D debts or payment for commodities.”
6.66. But that 1879 definition cannot be accepted as perfect, final
and everlasting, in modern times. Cross border transactions and
technological advancements have removed many shackles created by
old concepts (except perhaps those created by law courts). This fact
E has been recognized in the dissent of Breyer, J., in Wisconsin Central
(supra) when he says “…what we view as money has changed over
time. Cowrie shells once were such a medium but no longer are…
our currency originally included gold, coins and bullion, but after
1934, gold could not be used as a medium of exchange… perhaps
one day employees will be paid in Bitcoin or some other type of
F currency”. In the linguistic sense, Oxford English Dictionary has already
included “property or possessions of any kind viewed as convertible
into money” within the definition of money. Therefore, Breyer, J.,
points out in his dissent “So, where does this duel of definitions lead
us? Some seem too narrow; some seem too broad; some seem
G indeterminate. The result is ambiguity”. He therefore concluded that
stock options given to employees constitute money remuneration for the
services rendered. But the majority proceeded on the basis that when
the law was enacted, the term ‘money’ was not used in an expansive
sense.

H
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 385
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

6.67. Neither the RBI Act, 1934 nor the Banking Regulation Act, A
1949 nor the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007 nor the Coinage
Act, 2011 define the words ‘currency’ or ‘money’. But FEMA defines
the words ‘currency’, ‘currency notes’, ‘Indian currency’ and ‘Foreign
currency’. We have taken note of these definitions. Interestingly, Section
2(b) of Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act, 1978
B
defines money to include a cheque, postal order, demand draft,
telegraphic transfer or money order. Clause (33) of Section 65B of
the Finance Act, 1994, inserted by way of Finance Act, 2012 defines
‘money’ to mean “legal tender, cheque, promissory note, bill of
exchange, letter of credit, draft, pay order, traveler cheque, money
order, postal or electronic remittance or any other similar instrument, C
but shall not include any currency that is held for its numismatic
value”. This definition is important, for it identifies many instruments
other than legal tender, which could come within the definition of
money.
6.68. The Sale of Goods Act, 1930 does not define ‘money’ or D
‘currency’ but excludes money from the definition of the word ‘goods’.
The Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 defines ‘money’ under
Section 2(75) to mean “the Indian legal tender or any foreign
currency, cheque, promissory note, bill of exchange, letter of credit,
draft, pay order, traveler cheque, money order, postal or electronic
remittance or any other instrument recognised by RBI, when used E
as a consideration to settle an obligation or exchange with Indian
legal tender of another denomination but shall not include any
currency that is held for its numismatic value.”
6.69 In CIT v. Kasturi & Sons Ltd.,42 a question arose as to
whether the replacement by the insurer, of an article destroyed by one F
of the perils as against which coverage is provided, would be taken to be
“money” within the meaning of Section 41(2) of the Income Tax Act,
1961. This court held that the word “money” used in Section 41(2) has
to be interpreted only as actual money or cash and not as any other thing
or benefit which could be evaluated in terms of money. G
6.70. In Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Trade
Tax,43 this court was concerned with the question whether the adjustment
of price of molasses from the amount of license fee would amount to
42
(1999) 3 SCC 346
43
(2006) 5 SCC 624 H
386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A sale within the meaning of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948. The argument
advanced was that an exchange or barter cannot be said to be a sale.
After referring to the phrase “cash, deferred payment or other valuable
consideration”, this court pointed out that “money is a legal tender, but
cash is narrower than money.” This is for the reason that in
contradistinction to cash, deferred payment or other valuable
B
consideration would also come within the meaning of money, for the
purpose of the Act.
6.71. Just as the very concept of ‘money’ or ‘currency’ has
changed over the years, and different jurisdictions and different statutes
have adopted different definitions of ‘money’ and ‘currency’, depending
C upon the issue sought to be addressed, the concept of VCs have also
undergone a sea of change, with different regulators and statutory
authorities adopting different definitions, leading to diametrically opposite
views emerging from courts across the spectrum. Let us now see how
courts in other jurisdictions have grappled with the definition of the word
D ‘virtual currency’.
6.72. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of the
United States of America prosecuted a person by name Trendon Shavers,
who was the founder and operator of Bitcoin Savings and Trust (BTCST),
for soliciting illicit investments in Bitcoin related opportunities from a
E number of lenders, defrauding them to the tune of 700,000 BTC in funds.
While SEC contended that Bitcoin investments were securities, Shavers
contended that Bitcoin is not money and hence, not ‘securities’. But the
Sherman Division Eastern District Court of Texas opined in SEC v.
Trendon Shavers,44 that: “It is clear that bitcoin can be used as
money. It can be used to purchase goods or services and as Shavers
F stated, used to pay for individual living expenses. The only limitation
of bitcoin is that it is limited to those places that accept it as currency.
However, it can also be exchanged for conventional currencies such
as the US dollar, euro, yen and Yuan. Therefore, bitcoin is a currency
or form of money…”
G 6.73. In United States v. Ulbricht,45 the United States District
Court, Southern District, New York was concerned with the defendant’s
motion to dismiss four counts namely (i) participation in a narcotics
trafficking conspiracy (ii) a continuing criminal enterprise (iii) computer
44
Case No. 4: 13-Cv-416 (August 6, 2013)
H 45
31F. Supp. 3d 540 (2014)
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 387
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

hacking conspiracy and (iv) money laundering conspiracy, for which the A
Grand jury returned indictment. The allegation against the defendant
was that Ulbricht engaged in these offences by designing, launching and
administering a website called Silk Road, as an online marketplace for
illicit goods and services. According to the prosecution, Bitcoin was used
to launder the proceeds. The website was available only to those using
B
Tor (abbreviation for ‘The Onion Router’), a free and open source
software and a network that allows anonymous, untraceable internet
browsing. Payments were allowed only through Bitcoin. Opposing the
money laundering charge, Ulbricht contended that the use of Bitcoin did
not involve a legally cognizable financial transaction. But the court held
“Bitcoins carry value-that is their purpose and function-and act as C
a medium of exchange. Bitcoins may be exchanged for legal tender,
be it US dollars, euros or some other currency”.
6.74. The decision in Ulbricht (supra) was closely followed by
another decision of the same court in United States v. Faiella.46 This
was also a case where the defendants were charged with the operation D
of an underground market in the virtual currency bitcoin via the website
Silk Road. Faiella moved the District court to dismiss count one of the
indictments namely that of operating an unlicensed money transmitting
business in violation of a particular statute. The contention of the defendant
was (i) that Bitcoin does not qualify as money (ii) that operating a Bitcoin
exchange does not constitute “transmitting” of money and (iii) that he is E
not a money transmitter. While rejecting the motion, the court held
“bitcoin clearly qualifies as money or funds under the plain meaning
definitions. Bitcoin can be easily purchased in exchange for
ordinary currency, acts as a denominator of value and is used to
conduct financial transactions.” The decision in Trendon Shavers F
(supra) was relied upon.
6.75. While the district courts of USA took the view that virtual
currency can be used as money, the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) took a view in In re Coinflip, Inc,47 that virtual
currencies are “commodities”. This was in relation to the initiation of G
public administrative proceedings to determine whether the defendant
was engaged in violation of the provisions of Commodity Exchange Act
and the Commission’s Regulations by operating an online facility named
46
39F. Supp. 3d 544 (2014)
47
CFTC Docket No. 15-29 dated 17-09-2015 H
388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A Derivabit offering to connect buyers and sellers of Bitcoin option
contracts. Interestingly, the defendant admitted an offer of settlement in
anticipation of administrative proceedings.
6.76. Within a week, another entity, by name, TeraExchange LLC
also submitted an offer of settlement before CFTC In the matter of
B TeraExchange LLC.48 CFTC reiterated even in that case that Bitcoin
is a commodity under the relevant statute. Another Bitcoin exchange, by
name Bitfinex, also conceded the position, before the CFTC when public
administrative proceedings were sought to be initiated against them. In
the order accepting the offer of settlement, delivered on 02-06-2016 In
the matter of BFXNA Inc, d/b/a BITFINEX,49 CFTC recorded that
C Bitcoin and other virtual currencies are commodities under the relevant
provisions of the statute.
6.77. In United States v. Murgio,50 which was also before the
US District Court, S.D. New York, the defendant was charged with
operating Coin.mx, as an unlicensed money transmitting business. The
D government alleged that Murgio and his co-conspirators attempted to
shield the true nature of his Bitcoin exchange business by operating
through several front companies, to convince financial institutions that
Coin.mx was just a members-only association of individuals interested
in collectable items. Count one of the indictments was the alleged
E conspiracy in the operation of an unlicensed money transmitting business,
punishable under 18 U. S. C. § 1960. Under Section 1960, a business
must (i) transfer on behalf of public, (ii) funds and (iii) in violation of
licensing and registration requirements, to qualify as an unlicensed money
transmitting business. The court concluded that Bitcoins are funds within
the plain meaning of the term, as the word “funds” would mean pecuniary
F resources, generally accepted as a medium of exchange or means of
payment. Interestingly, the defendant’s contention that Bitcoin is a
commodity as held by CFTC was rejected by the court.
6.78. However, despite the opinion of other District courts in four
previous cases, the United States District Court, Eastern district of New
G York held in a preliminary hearing for injunctive relief, in Commodity
Futures Trading Commission v. Patrick McDonnell 51 (Memorandum
48
CFTC Docket No. 15-33 dated 24-09-2015
49
CFTC Docket No. 16-19 dated 02-06-2016
50
209 F. Supp. 3d 698 (2016)
51
H 18-Cv-361 dated 03-06-2018
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 389
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

and order), that virtual currencies are commodities within the meaning A
of the Commodity Exchange Act. But it is seen from the order that there
was no ‘currency versus commodity’ debate in the entire order.
6.79. A similar view was taken by United States District Court,
District of Massachusetts in Commodity Futures Trading Commission
v. My Big Coin Pay, Inc. et al.,52 holding that since there is futures B
trading in virtual currencies, they constitute ‘commodity’ within the
meaning of the Statute.
6.80. State of Florida v. Michell Abner Espinoza, 53 is an
interesting case which came up before the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in
and for Miami-Dade County, Florida. In that case, a Detective of the C
Miami Police department teamed up with a Special Agent of the Miami
Electronic Crimes Task Force of the United States Secret Service to
initiate an investigation into virtual currencies. After getting in touch with
a person who advertised the sale of Bitcoins in an online platform run by
a peer-to-peer Bitcoin exchange by name Localbitcoins.com, the team
organized an undercover operation in December 2013/January 2014. D
The Detective offered to pay for the Bitcoins through stolen credit cards
and when the transaction was about to take place, the offeror was
arrested. He was charged with one count of unlawfully engaging in
money services business and 2 counts of money laundering. The
defendant filed motions for dismissal and the State filed motions for E
striking out those motions. While allowing the defendant’s motion to
dismiss all the 3 counts on the ground that the court will be unwilling to
punish a man for selling his property to another, when his action falls
under a statute that is so vaguely written that even legal professionals
have difficulty finding a singular meaning, the court ruled as follows:
F
“Nothing in our frame of references allows us to accurately
define or describe Bitcoin……. Bitcoin may have some
attributes in common with what we commonly refer to as money,
but differ in many important aspects. While Bitcoins can be
exchanged for items of value, they are not a commonly used
means of exchange. They are accepted by some but not by all G
merchants or service providers. …. With such volatility they
have a limited ability to act as a store of value, another
important attribute of money. This court is not an expert in
52
18-Cv-10077-RWZ dated 26-09-2018
53
F 14-2923 decided on 22-07-2016 H
390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A economics, however it is very clear, even to someone with
limited knowledge in the area, that Bitcoin has a long way to
go before it is equivalent of money. The Florida Legislature
may choose to adopt statutes regulating virtual currency in
future. At this time, however, attempting to fit the sale of Bitcoin
into a statutory scheme regulating money services businesses
B
is like fitting a square peg in a round hole”
6.81. But the decision of the Circuit Court was appealed to the
Third District Court of Appeal, State of Florida. By an opinion rendered
on 30-01-2019, reported as State of Florida v. Michell Abner Espinoza54
the Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the Circuit Court and held,
C after referring to the June 2014 Report of FATF titled “Virtual currencies:
key definitions and potential AML/CFT risks” that given the plain
language of the Florida statutes governing money service businesses
and the nature of bitcoin and how it functions, Espinoza was acting
both as a payment instrument seller and engaging in the business
D of a money transmitter. The Court of Appeal pointed out that the
definition of a “payment instrument” included “a cheque, draft, warrant,
money order, travelers’ cheque, electronic instrument or other
instrument, payment of money or monetary value, whether or not
negotiable”. The phrase “money services business” was defined in the
statute to include any person who acts as a payment instrument seller.
E Since the expression monetary value means a medium of exchange,
whether or not redeemable in currency, the court concluded that VCs
are payment instruments and hence a person dealing with the same is in
money services business. Though Bitcoin does not expressly fall within
the definition of “currency” found in the statute, the court concluded
F that Bitcoin would certainly fall under the definition of a payment
instrument. The Court of Appeal took note of the fact that several
restaurants in the Miami area accepted Bitcoins as a form of payment
and hence Bitcoin functions as a medium of exchange. (What is important
to note about this decision is that it dealt with a penal statute. This is why
the Circuit court followed the cautionary approach, not to allow a citizen
G to be prosecuted on the basis of conjectures about what is a money
services business. But the Court of Appeal found on fundamentals that
the business concerned a payment instrument and that therefore, there
was no ambiguity.)
54
H 264 So. 3d 1055 (2019)
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 391
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

6.82. In a completely different context, the Singapore International A
Commercial Court ruled in B2C2 Ltd. v. Quoine Pte Ltd.,55 that virtual
currency can be considered as property which is capable of being held
on trust. The case arose out of a dispute between a person who traded
in virtual currencies and the VC Exchange platform on which he traded.
The dispute revolved more around the breach of contract and breach of
B
trust than around the identity of virtual currencies. It was in that context
that the court opined that crypto currencies satisfied the definition of
‘property’ as provided by the House of Lords in National Provincial
Bank v. Ainsworth56 to the effect that it must be “definable, identifiable
by third parties, capable in its nature of assumption by third parties,
and have some degree of permanence or stability”. The court further C
noted that “crypto currencies are not legal tender in the sense of
being a regulated currency issued by a government but do have the
fundamental characteristic of intangible property as being an
identifiable thing of value”. The decision of the Commercial Court
was appealed to the Court of Appeal. While dismissing Quoine’s appeal
D
on breach of contract claim, but allowing it on breach of trust claim, the
Court of Appeal held in Quoine Pte Ltd v. B2C2 Ltd57 that though
crypto currencies are capable of assimilation into the general concepts
of property, there are difficult questions as to the type of property that is
involved. Therefore, the Court of Appeal did not take a final position on
the question, since it felt that the precise nature of the property right E
involved, was not clear.
6.83. In a very recent decision, in AA v. Persons Unknown &
others Re Bitcoin,58 the English High Court ruled that Bitcoin is property.
But this decision was on the basis of the definition adopted by UK
Jurisdictional Taskforce of the Law Tech Delivery Panel, in its “Legal F
Statement on the Status of Cryptoassets and Smart Contracts”, that
crypto assets constitute property under English law. The facts out of
which this decision arose, were peculiar. The IT system of a Canadian
insurance company was hacked through a malware called Bitpaymer,
which encrypted all the data of the company. A ransom equivalent of
G
US $ 950,000 in Bitcoin was demanded by the hackers for decryption.

55
[2019] SGHC (I) 3
56
[1965] 1 AC 1175 at 1248
57
[2020] SGCA (I) 02
58
[2019] EWHC 3556 (Comm) H
392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A After negotiations through a specialist intermediary by name Incident
Response Company, the insurance company paid the ransom into a wallet
and retrieved the data with the decryption tools provided by the hackers.
Thereafter the insurance company engaged the services of a blockchain
investigation outfit known as Chainalysis Inc., which found that of the
B total of 109.25 Bitcoins transferred as ransom, 13.25 Bitcoins (worth
approximately US $ 120,000 at the time) had been converted into an
untraceable fiat currency. The remaining 96 Bitcoins had been transferred
to a “wallet” linked to a Virtual Currency exchange known as Bitfinex
(registered in the British Virgin Islands). The insurance company then
sued the VC Exchange before the High Court and sought ancillary
C disclosure orders to know the identity of persons who held the Bitcoins
in the wallet of the exchange. The company also sought a proprietary
injunction. Interestingly, the Court agreed to hear the application in private
and protect the identity of the insurer which got hacked, for they feared
retaliatory copycat attacks. The core issue before the court was whether
D crypto currencies constituted a form of property capable of being the
subject matter of a proprietary injunction. After referring to Fry L.J’s
statement in Colonial Bank v. Whinney,59 that all things personal are
either in possession or in action and that the law knows no third category
between the two and also after referring to the four classic criteria for
property, [namely they are (i) definable; (ii) identifiable by third parties;
E
(iii) capable in their nature of assumption by third parties; and (iv) capable
of some degree of permanence] set out by Lord Wilberforce in National
Provincial Bank v. Ainsworth (supra), Bryan, J held in AA v. Persons
Unknown that virtual currencies are neither choses in action (not
embodying a right capable of being enforced in action) nor choses in
F possession (being virtual and incapable of being possessed). However,
the court ruled that VCs can still be treated as property, by applying the
4 criteria laid down in National Provincial Bank and Law Tech Delivery
Panel’s Legal Statement, though it did not constitute a statement of the
law. Bryan J. was convinced that the statement’s detailed legal analysis
G of the proprietary status of cryptocurrencies was “compelling” and should
be adopted by the court. Thus, what prevailed with the court was the
definition provided by Law Tech Delivery Panel’s UK Jurisdiction
Task Force, which, unlike RBI, did not enjoy a statutory status, but
was only an industry-led government backed initiative.
59
H [1885] 30 ChD
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 393
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

6.84. The ruling of the European Court of Justice in Skatteverket A
v. David Hedqvist,60 was with particular reference to the identity of
virtual currencies. ECJ was in this case asked to decide a reference
from Supreme Administrative Court, Sweden on whether transactions
to exchange a traditional currency for the ‘Bitcoin’ virtual currency or
vice versa, which Mr. Hedqvist wished to perform through a company,
B
were subject to value added tax. The opinion of the court was to the
effect that:
(i) Bitcoin with bidirectional flow which will be exchanged for
traditional currencies in the context of exchange transactions cannot be
categorized as tangible property since virtual currency has no purpose
other than to be a means of payment. C

(ii) VC transactions do not fall within the concept of the supply of
goods as they consist of exchange of different means of payment and
hence, they constitute supply of services.
(iii) Bitcoin virtual currency being a contractual means of payment D
could not be regarded as a current account or a deposit account, a
payment or a transfer, and unlike debt, cheques and other negotiable
instruments (referred to in Article 135(1)(d) of the EU VAT Directive),
Bitcoin is a direct means of payment between the operators that accept.
(iv) Bitcoin virtual currency is neither a security conferring a E
property right nor a security of a comparable nature.
(v) The transactions in issue were entitled to exemption from
payment of VAT as they fell under the category of transactions involving
‘currency [and] bank notes and coins used as legal tender’.
(vi) Article 135(1)(e) EU Council VAT Directive 2006/112/ F
EC is applicable to non-traditional currencies i.e., to currencies
other than those that are legal tender in one or more countries in so
far as those currencies have been accepted by the parties to a
transaction as an alternative to legal tender and have no purpose
other than to be a means of payment.
G
The court accordingly concluded that virtual currencies would
fall under this definition of non-traditional currencies.
6.85. Thus (i) depending upon the text of the statute involved in
the case and (ii) depending upon the context, various courts in different
60
Case C-264/14 dated 22-10-2015 H
394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A jurisdictions have identified virtual currencies to belong to different
categories ranging from property to commodity to non-traditional
currency to payment instrument to money to funds. While each of
these descriptions is true, none of these constitute the whole truth. Every
court which attempted to fix the identity of virtual currencies, merely
acted as the 4 blind men in the Anekantavada philosophy of Jainism,61
B
(theory of non-absolutism that encourages acceptance of relativism and
pluralism) who attempt to describe an elephant, but end up describing
only one physical feature of the elephant.
6.86. RBI was also caught in this dilemma. Nothing prevented
RBI from adopting a short circuit by notifying VCs under the category
C of “other similar instruments” indicated in Section 2(h) of FEMA,
1999 which defines ‘currency’ to mean “all currency notes, postal
notes, postal orders, money orders, cheques, drafts, travelers’
cheque, letters of credit, bills of exchange and promissory notes,
credit cards or such other similar instruments as may be notified by
D the Reserve Bank.” After all, promissory notes, cheques, bills of exchange
etc. are also not exactly currencies but operate as valid discharge (or
the creation) of a debt only between 2 persons or peer-to-peer. Therefore,
it is not possible to accept the contention of the petitioners that VCs are
just goods/commodities and can never be regarded as real money.
E 6.87. Once we are clear about the above confusion, and once it is
accepted that some institutions accept virtual currencies as valid payments
for the purchase of goods and services, there is no escape from the
conclusion that the users and traders of virtual currencies carry on an
activity that falls squarely within the purview of the Reserve Bank of
India. The statutory obligation that RBI has, as a central bank, (i) to
F operate the currency and credit system, (ii) to regulate the financial
system and (iii) to ensure the payment system of the country to be
on track, would compel them naturally to address all issues that
are perceived as potential risks to the monetary, currency, payment,
credit and financial systems of the country. If an intangible property
G can act under certain circumstances as money (even without faking a
currency) then RBI can definitely take note of it and deal with it. Hence
it is not possible to accept the contention of the petitioners that they are
carrying on an activity over which RBI has no power statutorily.
61
According to this doctrine, truth and reality are perceived differently from different
H points of view and no single point is the complete truth.
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 395
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

6.88. In Keshavlal Khemchand & Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of A
India,62 this court pointed out that “Reserve Bank of India is an expert
body to which the responsibility of monitoring the economic system
of the country is entrusted, under various enactments like the RBI
Act, 1934, the Banking Regulation Act, 1949.” Therefore, (i) in the
teeth of the statutory scheme of these enactments (ii) from the way
B
different courts and regulators of different jurisdictions have treated VCs
and (iii) from the very characteristics of VCs, it is clear that they have
the potential to interfere with the matters that RBI has the power to
restrict or regulate. Hence, we have no hesitation in rejecting the first
contention of the petitioners that the impugned decision is ultra vires.
6.89. It was argued that the Preamble of the RBI Act speaks C
only about the role of RBI in operating the currency and credit system
of the country to its advantage and that since virtual currencies may not
form part of the credit system of the country as they are not recognized
as currency, the invocation of the provisions of RBI Act was out of
context. D
6.90. But as pointed out elsewhere, RBI is the sole repository of
power for the management of the currency, under Section 3 of the RBI
Act. RBI is also vested with the sole right to issue bank notes under
Section 22(1) and to issue currency notes supplied to it by the Government
of India and has an important role to play in evolving the monetary policy E
of the country, by participation in the Monetary Policy Committee which
is empowered to determine the policy rate required to achieve the inflation
target, in terms of the consumer price index. Therefore, anything that
may pose a threat to or have an impact on the financial system of
the country, can be regulated or prohibited by RBI, despite the said
activity not forming part of the credit system or payment system. F
The expression “management of the currency” appearing in Section
3(1) need not necessarily be confined to the management of what is
recognized in law to be currency but would also include what is capable
of faking or playing the role of a currency.
6.91. It is ironical that virtual currencies which took avatar G
(according to its creator Satoshi) to kill the demon of a central authority
(such as RBI), seek from the very same central authority, access to
banking services so that the purpose of the avatar is accomplished. As
we have pointed out elsewhere, the very creation of digital currency/
62
(2015) 4 SCC 770 H
396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A Bitcoin was to liberate the monetary system from being a slave to the
central authority and from being operated in a manner prejudicial to
private interests. Therefore, the ultra vires argument cannot be accepted
when the provision of access to banking services without any interference
from the central authority over a long period of time is perceived as a
threat to the very existence of the central authority. Hence, we hold that
B
RBI has the requisite power to regulate or prohibit an activity of this
nature.
If at all, the power is only to regulate, not prohibit
6.92. The next contention that if at all, RBI is conferred only with
C the power to regulate, but not to prohibit, as seen from the express
language of Section 45JA of the RBI Act, does not appeal to us. In Star
India Pvt. ltd. v. Dept. of Industrial Policy and Promotion and Ors.,63
this court opined that the word “regulate” has a very broad meaning
including the power to prohibit. The following passage from K.
Ramanathan v. State of Tamil Nadu64 was quoted in Star India (supra):
D
19. It has often been said that the power to regulate does not
necessarily include the power to prohibit, and ordinarily the
word “regulate” is not synonymous with the word “prohibit”.
This is true in a general sense and in the sense that mere
regulation is not the same as absolute prohibition. At the same
E time, the power to regulate carries with it full power over the
thing subject to regulation and in absence of restrictive words,
the power must be regarded as plenary over the entire subject.
It implies the power to rule, direct and control, and involves
the adoption of a rule or guiding principle to be followed, or
the making of a rule with respect to the subject to be regulated.
F The power to regulate implies the power to check and may
imply the power to prohibit under certain circumstances, as
where the best or only efficacious regulation consists of
suppression. It would therefore appear that the word
“regulation” cannot have any inflexible meaning as to exclude
G “prohibition”. It has different shades of meaning and must
take its colour from the context in which it is used having
regard to the purpose and object of the legislation, and the
Court must necessarily keep in view the mischief which the
legislature seeks to remedy.
63
(2019) 2 SCC 104
H 64
1985 (2) SCC 116
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 397
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

6.93. The contention that the power to prohibit something as res A
extra commercium is always a legislative policy and that therefore the
same cannot be done through an executive fiat, omits to take note of the
crucial role assigned to RBI in the economic sphere. It is true that in
Godawat Pan Masala Products IP Ltd. & Anr v. Union of India,65 it
was held that whether an article is to be prohibited as res extra
B
commercium, is a matter of Legislative policy and must arise out of
an Act of legislature and not by a mere executive notification. But
we must remember that in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. State of
Karnataka,66 while dealing with prohibitions on alcohol it was held that
what articles and goods should be allowed to be produced, possessed,
sold and consumed is to be left to the judgment of legislative and C
executive wisdom.
6.94. In any case, the projection of the impugned decisions of
RBI as a total prohibition of an activity altogether, may not be correct.
The impugned Circular does not impose a prohibition on the use of or the
trading in VCs. It merely directs the entities regulated by RBI not to D
provide banking services to those engaged in the trading or facilitating
the trading in VCs. Section 36(1)(a) of the Banking Regulation Act,
1949 very clearly empowers RBI to caution or prohibit banking companies
against entering into certain types of transactions or class of transactions.
The prohibition is not per se against the trading in VCs. It is against
banking companies, with respect to a class of transactions. The fact that E
the functioning of VCEs automatically gets paralyzed or crippled because
of the impugned Circular, is no ground to hold that it tantamount to total
prohibition. So long as those trading in VCs do not wish to convert them
into fiat currency in India and so long as the VCEs do not seek to collect
their service charges or commission in fiat currency through banking F
channels, they will not be affected by this Circular. Admittedly, peer-to-
peer transactions are still taking place, without the involvement of the
banking channel. In fact, those actually buying and selling VCs without
seeking to convert fiat currency into VCs or vice-versa, are not affected
by this Circular. It is only the online platforms which provide a space or
medium for the traders to buy and sell VCs, that are seriously affected G
by the Circular, since the commission that they earn by facilitating the
trade is required to be converted into fiat currency. Interestingly, the
petitioners argue on the one hand that there is total prohibition and argue
65
(2004) 7 SCC 68
66
(1995) 1 SCC 574 H
398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A on the other hand that the Circular does not achieve its original object of
curtailing the actual trading, though it cripples the exchanges. If the first
part of this submission is right, the latter cannot be and if the latter part
is right, the former cannot be.
6.95. The reliance placed in this regard by the petitioners on the
B decision of this court in State of Rajasthan v. Basant Nahata67 may
not be appropriate. The said decision arose out of a challenge to the
constitutional validity of Section 22A of the Registration Act, 1908 inserted
by way of State Amendment by the State of Rajasthan. By the said
amendment, the state government was conferred with unbridled powers
to declare by notification in the official gazette, the registration of any
C document or class of documents as opposed to public policy. In exercise
of the power so conferred, the state government issued notifications
declaring the registration of an irrevocable power of attorney or a power
of attorney to be in force for more than a certain period, authorizing the
attorney to transfer any immovable property, as opposed to public policy.
D This court found that the delegation made by Section 22A was uncanalised
and unguided. In addition, the court found that a transaction between
two persons capable of entering into contract, which does not contravene
any statute, would be valid in law and that when the State of Rajasthan
did not make such transactions illegal, it cannot strike at the documents
recording such transactions. The court held that Section 22A cannot
E control the transactions which fall outside the scope of the Act, through
a subordinate legislation.
6.96. But the said decision is of no assistance to the petitioners,
since none of the provisions of the RBI Act or the Banking Regulation
Act are under challenge before us. The delegation itself is not in question
F before us. Unlike the Registration Act, Section 36(1)(a) of the Banking
Regulation Act, 1949 empowers RBI to specifically target transactions.
Moreover, RBI’s role in the economy of the country is not akin to the
power of any other delegate.
6.97. While holding that price fixation may normally be a legislative
G act, this court pointed out in Union of India & Anr v. Cynamide India
ltd. & Anr:68

67
(2005) 12 SCC 77
68
H (1987) 2 SCC 720
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 399
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

“…with the proliferation of delegated legislation, there is a A
tendency for the line between legislation and administration
to vanish into an illusion. Administrative, quasi-judicial
decisions tend to merge in legislative activity and, conversely,
legislative activity tends to fade into and present an
appearance of an administrative or quasi-judicial activity.
B
Any attempt to draw a distinct line between legislative and
administrative functions, it has been said, is ‘difficult in theory
and impossible in practice’. ... The distinction between the
two has usually been expressed as ‘one between the general
and the particular’. ‘A legislative act is the creation and
promulgation of a general rule of conduct without reference C
to particular cases; an administrative act is the making and
issue of a specific direction or the application of a general
rule to a particular case in accordance with the requirements
of policy’. ‘Legislation is the process of formulating a general
rule of conduct without reference to particular cases and
D
usually operating in future; administration is the process of
performing particular acts, of issuing particular orders or of
making decisions which apply general rules to particular
cases’.” (emphasis supplied)
6.98. On the effect and force of delegated legislation, this court
held in St. Johns Teachers Training Institute v. Regional Director, E
NCTE:69
“The regulations made under power conferred by the statute
are supporting legislation and have the force and effect, if
validly made, as an Act passed by the competent legislature.”.
F
Similar views were expressed in Udai Singh Dagar v. Union of
India,70 when the court held:”...a legislative Act must be read with
the regulations framed. A subordinate legislation, as is well known,
when validly framed, becomes a part of the Act.”
6.99. Law is well settled that when RBI exercises the powers
conferred upon it, both to frame a policy and to issue directions for its G
enforcement, such directions become supplemental to the Act itself. In
Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. v. Reserve Bank

69
(2003) 3 SCC 321
70
(2007) 10 SCC 306 H
400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A of India,71 this court followed the decisions in State of U.P. and Ors v.
Babu Ram Upadhya72 and D.K.V. Prasada Rao v. Govt. of A.P.73 to
hold that Rules made under a statute must be treated as if they were
contained in the Act and that therefore they must be governed by the
same principles as the statute itself. Useful reference can also be made
in this regard to the following observations in ICICI Bank Ltd v. Official
B Liquidator of APS Star Industries Ltd:74
“40. When a delegate is empowered by Parliament to enact a
policy and to issue directions which have a statutory force
and when the delegatee (RBI) issues such guidelines (policy)
having statutory force, such guidelines have got to be read
C as supplement to the provisions of the BR Act, 1949. The
“banking policy” is enunciated by RBI. Such policy cannot
be said to be ultra vires the Act.” (emphasis supplied)
6.100. In his treatise on Administrative Law, Durga Das Basu75
states:
D The scope of judicial review is narrowed down when a statute
confers discretionary power upon an executive authority to
make such rules or regulations or orders ‘as appear to him to
be necessary’ or ‘expedient’, for carrying out the purposes
of the statute or any other specified purpose. In such a case,
E the check of ultra vires vanishes for all practical purposes
inasmuch as the determination of the necessity or expediency
is taken out of the hands of the Courts and the only ground
upon which Courts may interfere is that the authority acted
mala fide or never applied his mind to the matter, or applied
an irrelevant principle in making a statutory order. (emphasis
F supplied)
6.101. In Jayantilal Amrit Lal Shodhan v. F.N. Rana,76 the
majority pointed out that there can be no assumption that the legislative
functions are exclusively performed by the legislature, executive functions
by the executive and judicial functions by the judiciary alone. The court
G indicated that the Constitution has not made an absolute or rigid division
71
(1992) 2 SCC 343
72
AIR 1961 SC 751
73
AIR 1984 AP 75
74
(2010) 10 SCC 1
75
Ch. 4, Pg. 121, 6th Edition, 2004
76
H AIR 1964 SC 648
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 401
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

of functions between the three agencies of the state and that at times A
the exercise of legislative or judicial functions are entrusted to the
executive. A very important observation made by the Constitution Bench
in Jayantilal (supra) was as follows:
“…..in addition to these quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative
functions, the executive has also been empowered by statute B
to exercise functions which are legislative and judicial in
character and in certain instances, powers are exercised
which appear to partake at the same moment of legislative,
executive and judicial characteristics.”
6.102. In Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. & Anr v. Union of India C
& Ors,77 the Constitution bench of this court held that whether an order
is characterized as legislative or administrative or quasi-judicial or whether
it is a determination of law or fact, the judgment of the expert body
entrusted with power is generally treated as final and the judicial function
is exhausted when it is found to have “warrant in the record” and a
rational basis in law. D

6.103. It must be pointed out that the power of RBI is not merely
curative but also preventive. This is acknowledged by this court in Ganesh
Bank of Kurunwad Ltd. & Ors v. Union of India & Ors.,78 where it
was held that RBI has a right to take pre-emptive action taking into
account the totality of the circumstances. E

“It is not that when there is a run on the bank then only RBI
must intervene or that it must intervene only when there are a
good number of court proceedings against the bank
concerned. RBI has to take into account the totality of the
circumstances and has to form its opinion accordingly.” F
6.104. The impugned Circular is intended to prohibit banking
companies from entering into certain territories. The Circular is actually
addressed to entities regulated by RBI and not to those who do not
come within the purview of RBI’s net. But the exercise of such a power
by RBI, over the entities regulated by it, has caused a collateral damage G
to some establishments like the petitioners’, who do not come within the
reach of RBI’s net.

77
(1990) 3 SCC 223
78
(2006) 10 SCC 645 H
402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A 6.105. The power of a statutory authority to do something has to
be tested normally with reference to the persons/entities qua whom the
power is exercised. The question to be addressed in such cases is whether
the authority had the power to do that act or issue such a directive, qua
the person to whom it is addressed. While persons who suffer a collateral
damage can certainly challenge the action, such challenge will be a very
B
weak challenge qua the availability of power.
6.106. Apart from the provisions of the RBI Act, 1934 and the
Banking Regulation Act, 1949, the impugned Circular also refers to the
power under Section 18 of the Payment and Settlement Systems Act,
2007. In order to buttress their contention regarding the availability of
C power to regulate, the petitioners refer to the definition of the expression
“payment system” under Section 2(1)(i) of the said Act and contend
that VCEs do not operate any payment system and that since the power
to issue directions under Section 18 is only to regulate the payment
systems, the invocation of the said power to something that does not fall
D within the purview of payment system, is arbitrary.
6.107. But Section 18 of the Payment and Settlement Systems
Act indicates (i) what RBI can do (ii) the persons qua whom it can be
done and (iii) the object for which it can be done. In other words, Section
18 empowers RBI (i) to lay down policies relating to the regulation of
E payment systems including electronic, non-electronic, domestic and
international payment systems affecting domestic transactions and (ii)
to give such directions as it may consider necessary. These are what
RBI can do under Section 18. Coming to the second aspect, the persons
qua whom the powers under Section 18 can be exercised are (i) system
providers (ii) system participants and (iii) any other person generally or
F any such agency. The expression “system provider” is defined under
Section 2(1)(q) to mean a person who operates an authorized payment
system. The expression “system participant” is defined in Section 2(1)(p)
to mean a bank or any other person participating in a payment system,
including the system provider. Other than the expressions ‘system
G provider’ and ‘system participant’, Section 18 also uses the expressions
‘any other person’ and ‘any such agency’.
6.108. It is true that the purposes for which the power under
Section 18 can be exercised, are also indicated in Section 18. They are
(i) regulation of the payment systems (ii) the interest of the management
H and operation of any payment system and (iii) public interest.
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 403
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

6.109. As we have pointed out elsewhere, the impugned Circular A
is primarily addressed to banks who are “system participants” within the
meaning of Section 2(1)(p). The banks certainly have a system of
payment to be effected between a payer and a beneficiary, falling thereby
within the meaning of the expression payment system.
6.110. It may also be relevant to take note of the definition of the B
expressions “payment instruction” and “payment obligation” appearing
in clauses (g) and (h) of subsection (1) of Section 2 which read as follows:
2(1)(g) “payment instruction” means any instrument,
authorisation or order in any form, including electronic means,
to effect a payment,— C
(i) by a person to a system participant; or
(ii) by a system participant to another system participant;
2(1)(h) “payment obligation” means an indebtedness that is
owned by one system participant to another system participant D
as a result of clearing or settlement of one or more payment
instructions relating to funds, securities or foreign exchange
or derivatives or other transactions;
6.111. Therefore, in the overall scheme of the Payment and
Settlement Systems Act, 2007, it is impossible to say that RBI does not
E
have the power to frame policies and issue directions to banks who are
system participants, with respect to transactions that will fall under the
category of payment obligation or payment instruction, if not a payment
system. Hence, the argument revolving around Section 18 should fail.
II. Mode of exercise of power:
F
Satisfaction/Application of mind/relevant and irrelevant
considerations
6.112. That takes us to the next question whether the power was
exercised properly in a manner prescribed by law. The argument of Shri
Ashim Sood, learned Counsel for the petitioner is that assuming that G
RBI has the requisite power under Section 35A(1) of Banking Regulation
Act, 1949 to do what it has done, the necessary sine qua non is the
“satisfaction”. Section 35A(1) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 as
well as Section 45JA and 45L of the RBI Act, 1934 empower RBI to
issue directions “if it is satisfied” about the existence of certain
H
404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A parameters. Satisfaction can be arrived at only by (i) gathering facts (ii)
sifting relevant material from those which are irrelevant and (iii) forming
an opinion about the cause and connection between relevant material
and the decision proposed to be taken. In respect of each of these
requirements, the learned Counsel relied upon certain judicial precedents.
B 6.113. But we do not think that in the facts of the present case,
we could hold RBI guilty of non-application of mind. As a matter of fact,
the issue as to how to deal with virtual currencies has been lingering
with RBI from June 2013 onwards, when the Financial Stability Report
took note of the challenges posed by virtual currencies in the form of
regulatory, legal and operational risks. The Financial Stability Report of
C June 2013 led to a press release dated 24-12-2013 cautioning the users,
holders and traders of virtual currencies about the potential financial,
operational, legal and consumer protection and security related risks
associated with virtual currencies. Then came the Financial Stability
Report of December 2015 which raised concerns about excessive
D volatility in the value of VCs and their anonymous nature which went
against global money laundering rules rendering their very existence
questionable. The Financial Stability Report of December 2016 also took
note of the risks associated with virtual currencies qua data security and
consumer protection. The report also recorded concerns about far
reaching potential impact of the effectiveness of monetary policy itself.
E Therefore, the report suggested RegTech to deal with FinTech.
6.114. IDRBT, established by RBI to work at the intersection of
banking and technology submitted a white paper in January 2017, which
enlisted the advantages as well as disadvantages of digital currencies.
This white paper was taken note of by RBI in the Financial Stability
F Report of June 2017. In the meantime, RBI issued a press release on
01-02-2017 once again cautioning the users, holders and traders of virtual
currencies.
6.115. The sub-committee of the Financial Stability and
Development Council took a decision in April 2016, pursuant to which
G RBI set up an Inter-Regulatory Working Group on FinTech and Digital
Banking. This Working Group submitted a report in November 2017,
after which RBI issued a third press release on 05-12-2017. Thereafter
RBI also sent a mail on 02-04-2018 to the central government, enclosing
a note on regulating crypto assets. To be fair to RBI, even this note
H examined the pros and cons of banning and regulating crypto currencies.
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 405
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

6.116. All the above sequence of events from June 2013 up to 02- A
04-2018 would show that RBI had been brooding over the issue for
almost five years, without taking the extreme step. Therefore, RBI can
hardly be held guilty of non-application of mind. If an issue had come up
again and again before a statutory authority and such an authority had
also issued warnings to those who are likely to be impacted, it can hardly
B
be said that there was no application of mind. For arriving at a
“satisfaction” as required by Section 35A(1) of Banking Regulation Act,
1949 and Section 45JA and 45L of RBI Act, 1934, it was not required of
RBI either to write a thesis or to write a judgement.
6.117. In fact, RBI cannot even be accused of not taking note of
relevant considerations or taking into account irrelevant considerations. C
RBI has taken into account only those considerations which multinational
bodies and regulators of various countries such as FATF, BIS, etc., have
taken into account. This can be seen even from the earliest press release
dated 24-12-2013, which is more elaborate than the impugned Circular
dated 06-04-2018. The press release dated 24-12-2013 reads as follows: D
RBI cautions users of Virtual Currencies against Risks
The Reserve Bank of India has today cautioned the users,
holders and traders of Virtual currencies (VCs), including
Bitcoins, about the potential financial, operational, legal,
customer protection and security related risks that they are E
exposing themselves to.
The Reserve Bank has mentioned that it has been looking at
the developments relating to certain electronic records claimed
to be “Decentralised Digital Currency” or “Virtual Currency”
(VCs), such as, Bitcoins, litecoins, bbqcoins, dogecoins etc., F
their usage or trading in the country and the various media
reports in this regard.
The creation, trading or usage of VCs including Bitcoins, as
a medium for payment are not authorised by any central bank
or monetary authority. No regulatory approvals, registration G
or authorisation is stated to have been obtained by the entities
concerned for carrying on such activities. As such, they may
pose several risks to their users, including the following:
• VCs being in digital form are stored in digital/electronic
media that are called electronic wallets. Therefore, they are H
406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A prone to losses arising out of hacking, loss of password,
compromise of access credentials, malware attack etc. Since
they are not created by or traded through any authorised
central registry or agency, the loss of the e-wallet could result
in the permanent loss of the VCs held in them.
B • Payments by VCs, such as Bitcoins, take place on a peer-
to-peer basis without an authorised central agency which
regulates such payments. As such, there is no established
framework for recourse to customer problems / disputes /
charge backs etc.
C • There is no underlying or backing of any asset for VCs. As
such, their value seems to be a matter of speculation. Huge
volatility in the value of VCs has been noticed in the recent
past. Thus, the users are exposed to potential losses on account
of such volatility in value.
D • It is reported that VCs, such as Bitcoins, are being traded
on exchange platforms set up in various jurisdictions whose
legal status is also unclear. Hence, the traders of VCs on
such platforms are exposed to legal as well as financial risks.
• There have been several media reports of the usage of VCs,
E including Bitcoins, for illicit and illegal activities in several
jurisdictions. The absence of information of counterparties
in such peer-to-peer anonymous/ pseudonymous systems
could subject the users to unintentional breaches of anti-
money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism
(AML/CFT) laws.
F
The Reserve Bank has also stated that it is presently examining
the issues associated with the usage, holding and trading of
VCs under the extant legal and regulatory framework of the
country, including Foreign Exchange and Payment Systems
laws and regulations.
G
6.118. When a series of steps taken by a statutory authority over
a period of about five years disclose in detail what triggered their action,
it is not possible to see the last of the orders in the series in isolation and
conclude that the satisfaction arrived at by the authority is not reflected
appropriately. In any case, pursuant to an order passed by this court on
H 21-08-2019, RBI has given a detailed point-wise reply to the
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 407
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

representations of the petitioners. In these representations, the petitioners A
have highlighted all considerations that they thought as relevant. RBI
has given its detailed responses on 04-09-2019 and 18-09-2019.
Therefore, the contention that there was no application of mind and that
relevant considerations were omitted to be taken note of, loses its vigour
in view of the subsequent developments.
B
Malice in law/colorable exercise
6.119. Drawing our attention to a reply given by RBI dated 26-
04-2017 to a query under the Right to Information Act, and the reply
given by Minister of State for Finance in response to a question raised in
the Lok Sabha (Unstarred Question No. 2113) on 28-07-2017, wherein C
RBI took a position that they had no power to freeze the accounts either
of defaulting companies or of shell companies, it was contended by Shri
Ashim Sood, that the impugned Circular goes contrary to the position so
taken officially, as the Circular has the effect of closing the accounts of
VCEs and that therefore it was hit by arbitrariness and caprice.
D
6.120. But the above argument arises out of a misconception about
the purport of the impugned Circular. The impugned Circular does not
order either the freezing or the closing of any particular account of a
particular customer. All that the impugned Circular says is that RBI
regulated entities shall exit the relationship that they have with any person
or entity dealing with or settling VCs, within three months of the date of E
the Circular. The regulated entities are directed not to provide services
for facilitating any person or entity in dealing with or settling VCs. Some
of the petitioners herein are individuals and companies who run virtual
currency exchanges. In case they have other businesses, the impugned
Circular does not order the closure of their bank accounts relating to F
other businesses. The prohibition under paragraph 2 of the impugned
Circular is with respect to the provision of services for facilitating any
person or entity in dealing with or settling VCs. This prohibition does not
extend either to the closing or the freezing of the accounts of the
petitioners in relation to their other ventures.
G
6.121. Taking clue from the averment contained in the counter-
affidavit of RBI to the effect that “VCs are outside the ambit of the
central authority’s effective sphere of control and management” and
also referring to the stand taken by RBI in their letter dated 04-09-2019
to the effect that “neither VCs nor the businesses involved in providing
VC based services come under the regulatory purview of RBI”, it was H
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A contended by Shri Ashim Sood that the impugned Circular is a colourable
exercise of power and tainted by malice in law, in as much as it seeks to
achieve an object completely different from the one for which the power
is entrusted. State of Punjab & Anr v. Gurdial Singh & Ors,79 Collector
(District Magistrate) Allahabad & Anr v. Raja Ram Jaiswal,80 and
Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania & Ors81
B
are relied upon in this regard.
6.122. But the above contention is completely misconceived. There
can be no quarrel with the proposition that RBI has sufficient power to
issue directions to its regulated entities in the interest of depositors, in
the interest of banking policy or in the interest of the banking company
C or in public interest. If the exercise of power by RBI with a view to
achieve one of these objectives incidentally causes a collateral damage
to one of the several activities of an entity which does not come within
the purview of the statutory authority, the same cannot be assailed as a
colourable exercise of power or being vitiated by malice in law. To
D constitute colourable exercise of power, the act must have been done in
bad faith and the power must have been exercised not with the object of
protecting the regulated entities or the public in general, but with the
object of hitting those who form the target. To constitute malice in law,
the act must have been done wrongfully and willfully without reasonable
or probable cause. The impugned Circular does not fall under the category
E of either of them.
6.123. The argument that the invocation by RBI, of ‘public interest’
as a weapon, purportedly for the benefit of users, consumers or traders
of virtual currencies is a colourable exercise of power also does not hold
water. Once it is conceded that RBI has powers to issue directions in
F public interest, it is impossible to exclude users, consumers or traders of
virtual currencies from the coverage. In fact, the repeated press releases
issued by RBI from 2013 onwards indicate that RBI did not want the
members of the public, which include users, consumers and traders of
VCs, even to remotely think that virtual currencies have a legal tender
G status or are backed by a central authority. Irrespective of what VCs
actually do or do not do, it is an accepted fact that they are capable of
performing some of the functions of real currencies. Therefore, if RBI
79
(1980) 2 SCC 471
80
(1985) 3 SCC 1
81
H (2010) 9 SCC 437
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 409
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

takes steps to prevent the gullible public from having an illusion as though A
VCs may constitute a valid legal tender, the steps so taken, are actually
taken in good faith. The repeated warnings through press releases from
December 2013 onwards indicate a genuine attempt on the part of RBI
to safeguard the interests of the public. Therefore, the contention that
the impugned Circular is vitiated by malice in law and that it is a colorable
B
exercise of power, cannot be sustained.
6.124. Relying upon (i) the decision in Meerut Development
Authority v. Assn. Management Studies & Anr,82 wherein it was held
that the term “public interest” must be understood and interpreted in the
light of the entire scheme, purpose and object of the enactment (ii) the
decision in Bihar Public Service Commission v. Saiyed Hussain Abbas C
Rizwi & Anr,83 wherein it was held that the term “public interest” does
not have a rigid meaning and takes its colour from the statute in which it
occurs (iii) the decision in Utkal Contractors & Joinery (P) Ltd. &
Ors v. State of Orissa & Ors,84 wherein it was held that the words of a
statute take their colour from the reason for it and (iv) the decision in D
Empress Mills v. Municipal Committee, Wardha,85 wherein it was
held that general words and phrases must usually be construed as being
limited to the actual object of the Act, it was contended that the expression
‘public interest’ appearing in Section 35A(1)(a) of the Banking Regulation
Act, 1949, cannot be given an expansive meaning.
E
6.125. But the said argument does not take the petitioners
anywhere. As we have indicated elsewhere, the power under Section
35A to issue directions is to be exercised under four contingencies namely
(i) public interest (ii) interest of banking policy (iii) interest of the depositors
and (iv) interest of the banking company. The expression “banking
policy” is defined in Section 5(ca) to mean any policy specified by F
RBI (i) in the interest of the banking system (ii) in the interest of
monetary stability and (iii) sound economic growth. Public interest
permeates all these three areas. This is why Section 35A(1)(a) is
invoked in the impugned Circular. Therefore, we reject the argument
that the impugned decision is a colorable exercise of power and it is G
vitiated by malice in law.

82
(2009) 6 SCC 171
83
(2012) 13 SCC 61
84
(1987) 3 SCC 279
85
(1958) SCR 1102 H
410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A M. S. Gill Reasoning
6.126. The impugned Circular cannot be assailed on the basis of
M. S. Gill86 test, for two reasons. First is that in Chairman, All India
Railway Recruitment Board v. K. Shyam Kumar & Ors,87 this court
held that MS Gill test may not always be applicable where larger public
B interest is involved and that in such situations, additional grounds can be
looked into for examining the validity of an order. This was followed in
PRP Exports & Ors v. Chief Secretary, Government of Tamil Nadu
& Ors.88 In 63 Moons Technologies ltd. & Ors v. Union of India &
Ors,89 this court clarified that though there is no broad proposition that
MS Gill test will not apply where larger public interest is involved,
C subsequent materials in the form of facts that have taken place after the
order in question is passed, can always be looked at in the larger public
interest, in order to support an administrative order. The second reason
why the weapon of MS Gill will get blunted in this case, is that during the
pendency of this case, this court passed an interim order on 21-08-2019
D directing RBI to give a point-wise reply to the detailed representation
made by the writ petitioners. Pursuant to the said order, RBI gave detailed
responses on 04-09-2019 and 18-09-2019. Therefore, the argument based
on MS Gill test has lost its potency.
Calibration/Proportionality
E 6.127. The next argument is that the impugned measure is extreme
and that it will not pass the test of proportionality. For the purpose of
convenience, we shall take up this argument together with the argument
revolving around Article 19(1)(g) while dealing with the reasonableness
of the restriction.
F III. Wait and watch approach of the other stakeholders
6.128. The argument that other stakeholders such as the
Enforcement Directorate which is concerned with money laundering,
the Department of Economic Affairs which is concerned with the
economic policies of the State, SEBI which is concerned with security
G contracts and CBDT which is concerned with the tax regime relating to
goods and services, did not see any grave threat and that therefore RBI’s
reaction is knee-jerk, is not acceptable. Enforcement Directorate can
86
M S Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405
87
(2010) 6 SCC 614
88
(2014) 13 SCC 692
H 89
(2019) SCC Online SC 624
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 411
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

step in only when actual money laundering takes place, since the statutory A
scheme of Prevention of Money Laundering Act deals with a procedure
which is quasi-criminal. SEBI can step in only when the transactions
involve securities within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the Securities
Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956. CBDT will come into the picture only
when the transaction related to the sale and purchase of taxable goods/
B
commodities. Every one of these stakeholders has a different function
to perform and are entitled to have an approach depending upon the
prism through which they are obliged to look at the issue. Therefore,
RBI cannot be faulted for not adopting the very same approach as that
of others.
IV. Light-touch approach of the other countries C

6.129. The argument that most of the countries except very few
like China, Vietnam, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, UAE, have not imposed
a ban (total or partial) may not take the petitioners anywhere. The list of
countries where a ban similar to the one on hand and much more has
been imposed discloses a commonality. Almost all countries in the D
neighborhood of India have adopted the same or similar approach (in
essence India is ring fenced). In any case, our judicial decision cannot
be colored by what other countries have done or not done. Comparative
perspective helps only in relation to principles of judicial decision making
and not for testing the validity of an action taken based on the existing E
statutory scheme.
6.130. There can also be no comparison with the approach adopted
by countries such as UK, US, Japan, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand,
Canada etc., as they have developed economies capable of absorbing
greater shocks. Indian economic conditions cannot be placed on par. F
Therefore, we will not test the correctness of the measure taken by RBI
on the basis of the approach adopted by other countries, though we
have, for better understanding of the complexities of the issues involved,
undertaken a survey of how the regulators and courts of other countries
have treated VCs.
G
V. Precautionary steps taken by petitioners
6.131. The next contention of the petitioners is that the VC
exchanges run by them have already put in place certain best practices
such as (i) avoidance of cash transactions (ii) enhanced KYC norms
and (iii) confining their services only to persons within India. Therefore,
H
412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A it is contended that all the issues flagged by RBI have already been
addressed and that therefore, there was no necessity to disconnect the
trade from the regular banking channels. But the fact of the matter is
that enhanced KYC norms may remove anonymity of the customer, but
not that of the VC. Even the European Parliament, in the portion of its
report relied upon by Shri Ashim Sood accepts that the adequacy of
B
mandatory registration of users (as a less invasive measure),
whether or not of fully anonymous or pseudo anonymous crypto
currencies depends on the users’ compliance with the registration
requirement. After pointing out that compliance will partly depend on
an adequate sanctioning toolbox in the event of breach, the report wonders
C whether it is at all possible outside of the context of randomly bumping
into it, at least when fully anonymous VCs are concerned. In any case,
we are not experts to say whether the safety valves put in place could
have addressed all issues raised by RBI.
VI. Different types of VCs require different treatments
D 6.132. Drawing our attention to a Report by the European
Parliament under the caption ‘Cryptocurrencies and Blockchain’, released
in July 2018, it is contended by Shri Ashim Sood, learned Counsel for the
petitioners that all virtual currencies are not fully anonymous. While some,
such as Dash and Monero are fully anonymous, others such as Bitcoin
E are pseudo-anonymous. Therefore, it is contended that banning
transactions only in fully anonymous VCs could have been a better and
less intrusive measure. An identical argument is advanced by Shri Nakul
Dewan learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, with reference to a
report of October 2012 of the European Central Bank on “Virtual
Currency Schemes”. According to the said Report, Virtual Currency
F schemes can be classified into three types, depending upon their interaction
with traditional real money and real economy. They are (i) closed virtual
currency schemes basically used in an online game (ii) virtual currency
schemes having a unidirectional flow (usually an inflow), with a
conversion rate for purchasing the virtual currency which can
G subsequently be used to buy virtual goods and services, but exceptionally
also to buy real goods and services and (iii) virtual currency schemes
having a bidirectional flow, where they act like any other convertible
currency with two exchange rates (buy and sell) which can subsequently
be used to buy virtual goods and services as well as real goods and
services.
H
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 413
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

6.133. Let us first deal with Shri Nakul Dewan’s submission. In A
the very same October 2012 Report of the European Central Bank,
it is accepted that virtual currencies (i) resemble money and (ii)
necessarily come with their own dedicated retail payment systems.
These two aspects are indicated in the Report to be covered by the term
“Virtual Currency Scheme”.
B
6.134. But the entire premise on which the petitioners have
developed their case is that they are neither money nor constitute a
payment system. Therefore, if the Report of the European Central Bank
is to be accepted, it should be accepted in total and cannot be selectively
taken.
C
6.135. The examples provided in the October 2012 Report of the
European Central Bank show that there are VC Schemes set up by
entities such as Nintendo, in which consumers can purchase points online
by using a credit card or in retail stores by purchasing a Nintendo points
card which cannot be converted back to real money. The Report also
shows that one VC by name Linden Dollars is issued in a virtual world D
called “Second life”, where users create avatars (digital characters),
which can be customized. Second life has its own economy where users
can buy and sell goods and services from and to each other. But they
first need to purchase Linden dollars using fiat currency. Later they can
also sell Linden dollars in return for fiat currency. Therefore, it is clear E
that the very same virtual currency can have a unidirectional or
bidirectional flow depending upon the scheme with which the entities
come up. Moreover, the question whether anonymous VCs alone could
have been banned leaving the pseudo-anonymous, is for experts and not
for this Court to decide. In any case, the stand taken by RBI is that they
have not banned VCs. Hence, the question whether RBI should have F
adopted different approaches towards different VCs does not arise.
VII. Acceptance of DLT and rejection of VCs is a paradox
6.136. It was argued that the acceptance of the Distributed Ledger
Technology and the rejection of VCs is actually a contradiction in terms. G
This argument is based upon the various reports, both of RBI and of the
Inter-Ministerial Group, to the effect that DLT is part of FinTech.
6.137. The above contention, in legal terms, is about the irrationality
of the impugned decision. But there is nothing irrational about the
acceptance of a technological advancement/innovation, but the rejection
H
414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A of a by-product of such innovation. There is nothing like a “take it or
leave it” option.
VIII. RBI’s decisions do not qualify for Judicial deference
6.138. It is contended by Shri Ashim Sood, learned Counsel for
the petitioners that the impugned Circular does not have either the status
B of a legislation or the status of an executive action, but is only the exercise
of a power conferred by statute upon a statutory body corporate.
Therefore, it is his contention that the judicial rule of deference as
articulated in R.K. Garg v. Union of India,90 BALCO Employees’
Union (Regd.) v. Union of India & Ors,91 and Swiss Ribbons Pvt.
C Ltd. & Anr v. Union of India & Ors,92 will not apply to the decision
taken by a statutory body like RBI. If, a legislation relating to economic
matters is placed at the highest pedestal, an executive decision with
regard to similar matters will be placed only at a lower pedestal and the
decision taken by a statutory body may not even be entitled to any such
deference or reverence.
D
6.139. But given the scheme of the RBI Act, 1934 and the Banking
Regulation Act, 1949, the above argument appears only to belittle the
role of RBI. RBI is not just like any other statutory body created by an
Act of legislature. It is a creature, created with a mandate to get liberated
even from its creator. This is why it is given a mandate – (i) under the
E Preamble of the RBI Act 1934, to operate the currency and credit system
of the country to its advantage and to operate the monetary policy
framework in the country (ii) under Section 3(1), to take over the
management of the currency from the central government (iii) under
Section 20, to undertake to accept monies for account of the central
F government, to make payments up to the amount standing to the credit
of its account and to carry out its exchange, remittance and other banking
operations, including the management of the public debt of the Union
(iv) under Section 21(1), to have all the money, remittance, exchange
and banking transactions in India of the central government entrusted
with it (v) under Section 22(1), to have the sole right to issue bank notes
G in India and (vi) under Section 38, to get rupees into circulation only
through it, to the exclusion of the central government. Therefore, RBI
cannot be equated to any other statutory body that merely serves its
90
(1981) 4 SCC 675
91
(2002) 2 SCC 333
92
H (2019) 4 SCC 17
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 415
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

master. It is specifically empowered to do certain things to the exclusion A
of even the central government. Therefore, to place its decisions at a
pedestal lower than that of even an executive decision, would do violence
to the scheme of the Act.
6.140. On the primary question of switching over to judicial “silent
mode” or “hands off mode”, qua economic legislation, it is not necessary B
to catalogue all the decisions of this court such as State of Gujarat &
Anr v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd. & Anr,93 G.K.Krishnan v. Tamil Nadu,94
R. K. Garg v. Union of India (supra), State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal,95
P.M. Ashwathanarayana Setty v. State of Karnataka, 96 Peerless
General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. v. Reserve Bank of India
(supra), T. Velayudhan v. Union of India,97 Delhi Science Forum v. C
Union of India,98 Bhavesh D. Parish v. Union of India,99 Ugar Sugar
Works ltd. v. Delhi Administration & Ors,100 BALCO Employees’
Union (Regd.) v. Union of India (supra), Govt. of Andhra Pradesh
& Ors v. P. Laxmi Devi,101 Villianur Iyarkkai Padukappu Maiyam v.
Union of India,102 D.G. of Foreign Trade v. Kanak Exports,103 State D
of J & K v. Trikuta Roller Flour Mills Pvt. Ltd.,104 and Pioneer Urban
Land and Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India,105 as the entire history
of the doctrine of deference from Lochner Era has been summarized
by this court in Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (supra). In
fact, even the learned Counsel for the petitioners is ad idem with the
learned Senior Counsel for RBI that economic regulations require due E
judicial deference. The actual argument of the learned Counsel for the
petitioners is that such deference may differ in degree from being very
weak in respect of the decision of a statutory authority, to being very
strong in respect of a legislative enactment.
F
93
(1974) 4 SCC 656
94
(1975) 1 SCC 375
95
(1986) 4 SCC 566
96
(1989) Supp (1) SCC 696
97
(1993) 2 SCC 582
98
(1996) 2 SCC 405 G
99
(2000) 5 SCC 471
100
(2001) 3 SCC 635
101
(2008) 4 SCC 720
102
(2009) 7 SCC 561
103
(2016) 2 SCC 226
104
(2018) 11 SCC 260
105
(2019) 8 SCC 416 H
416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A 6.141. But as we have pointed out above, RBI is not just any
other statutory authority. It is not like a stream which cannot be greater
than the source. The RBI Act, 1934 is a pre-constitutional legislation,
which survived the Constitution by virtue of Article 372(1) of the
Constitution. The difference between other statutory creatures and
RBI is that what the statutory creatures can do, could as well be
B done by the executive. The power conferred upon the delegate in
other statutes can be tinkered with, amended or even withdrawn.
But the power conferred upon RBI under Section 3(1) of the RBI
Act, 1934 to take over the management of the currency from the
central government, cannot be taken away. The sole right to issue
C bank notes in India, conferred by Section 22(1) cannot also be taken
away and conferred upon any other bank or authority. RBI by virtue of
its authority, is a member of the Bank of International Settlements, which
position cannot be taken over by the central government and conferred
upon any other authority. Therefore, to say that it is just like any other
statutory authority whose decisions cannot invite due deference, is to do
D violence to the scheme of the Act. In fact, all countries have central
banks/authorities, which, technically have independence from the
government of the country. To ensure such independence, a fixed tenure
is granted to the Board of Governors, so that they are not bogged down
by political expediencies. In the United States of America, the Chairman
of the Federal Reserve is the second most powerful person next only to
E the President. Though the President appoints the seven-member Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve, in consultation with the Senate,
each of them is appointed for a fixed tenure of fourteen years. Only one
among those seven is appointed as Chairman for a period of four years.
As a result of the fixed tenure of 14 years, all the members of Board of
F Governors survive in office more than three governments. Even the
European Central Bank headquartered in Frankfurt has a President, Vice-
President and four members, appointed for a period of eight years in
consultation with the European Parliament. World-wide, central
authorities/banks are ensured an independence, but unfortunately Section
8(4) of the RBI Act, 1934 gives a tenure not exceeding five years, as the
G central government may fix at the time of appointment. Though the shorter
tenure and the choice given to the central government to fix the tenure,
to some extent, undermines the ability of the incumbents of office to be
absolutely independent, the statutory scheme nevertheless provides for
independence to the institution as such. Therefore, we do not accept the
argument that a policy decision taken by RBI does not warrant any
H
deference.
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 417
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

IX. Article 19(1)(g) challenge & Proportionality A
6.142. The next ground of attack is on the basis of Article 19(1)(g).
Any restriction to the freedom guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) should
pass the test of reasonableness in terms of Article 19(6). It is contended
by the petitioners that since access to banking is the equivalent of the
supply of oxygen in any modern economy, the denial of such access to B
those who carry on a trade which is not prohibited by law, is not a
reasonable restriction and that it is also extremely disproportionate. It is
further contended that the right to access the banking system is actually
integral to the right to carry on any trade or profession and that therefore
a legislation, subordinate or otherwise whose effect or impact severely
impairs the right to carry on a trade or business, not prohibited by law, C
would be violative of Article 19(1)(g). Reliance is placed in this regard
on the decisions of this court in (i) Md. Yasin v. Town Area Committee,1
where it was held that the right under Article 19(1)(g) is affected when
“in effect and in substance”, the impugned measures brought about a
total stoppage of business, both, in a commercial sense and from a D
practical point of view, even though there was no prohibition in form and
(ii) Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India,2 where this court held
that the impact and not the object of the measure will determine whether
or not, a fundamental right is violated. It is further contended, on the
strength of the decision in Md. Faruk v. State of Madhya Pradesh &
Ors,3 that the imposition of restriction on the exercise of a fundamental E
right may be in the form of control or prohibition and that when the
exercise of a fundamental right is prohibited, the burden of proving that
a total ban on the exercise of the right alone may ensure the maintenance
of the general public interest, lies heavily upon the state. It was held in
the said decision that a law which directly infringes the right guaranteed F
under Article 19(1)(g) may be upheld only if it is established that it seeks
to impose reasonable restrictions in the interest of the general public and
a less drastic restriction will not ensure the interest of the general public.
6.143. The parameters laid down in Md. Faruk are
unimpeachable. While testing the validity of a law imposing a restriction G
on the carrying on of a business or a profession, the court must, as

106
(1952) SCR 572
107
(1972) 2 SCC 788
108
(1969) 1 SCC 853 H
418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A formulated in Md. Faruk, attempt an evaluation of (i) its direct and
immediate impact upon of the fundamental rights of the citizens affected
thereby (ii) the larger public interest sought to be ensured in the light of
the object sought to be achieved (iii) the necessity to restrict the citizens’
freedom (iv) the inherent pernicious nature of the act prohibited or its
capacity or tendency to be harmful to the general public and (v) the
B
possibility of achieving the same object by imposing a less drastic restraint.
6.144. There can also be no quarrel with the proposition that
banking channels provide the lifeline of any business, trade or profession.
This is especially so in the light of the restrictions on cash transactions
contained in Sections 269SS and 269T of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
C When currency itself has undergone a metamorphosis over the centuries,
from stone to metal to paper to paperless and we have ushered into the
digital age, cashless transactions (not penniless transactions) require
banking channels. Therefore, the moment a person is deprived of the
facility of operating a bank account, the lifeline of his trade or business is
D severed, resulting in the trade or business getting automatically shut down.
Hence, the burden of showing that larger public interest warranted such
a serious restriction bordering on prohibition, is heavily on RBI.
6.145. In the counter-affidavit filed in WP (C) No. 528 of 2018,
RBI has raised 2 fundamental objections in this regard. The first is that
E corporate bodies/entities who have come up with the challenge are not
‘citizens’ and hence, not entitled to maintain a challenge under Article
19(1)(g). This objection may hold good in respect of the writ petition
filed by Internet and Mobile Association of India, which is described by
them as a not-for-profit association of corporate entities who are in the
trade. But this objection may not hold good in respect of the other writ
F petition, as the companies running VC exchanges have not come up
alone. The shareholders and promoters have come up with the second
writ petition along with those entities and hence the challenge under
Article 19(1)(g) cannot be said to be not maintainable.
6.146. The second objection of RBI is that there is no fundamental
G right to purchase, sell, transact and/or invest in VCs and that therefore,
the petitioners cannot invoke Article 19(1)(g). But this contention is liable
to be rejected outright for two reasons namely, (i) that at least some of
the petitioners are not claiming any right to purchase, sell or transact in
VCs, but claiming a right to provide a platform for facilitating an activity
H (of trading in VCs between individuals/entities who want to buy and sell
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 419
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

VCs) which is not yet prohibited by law and (ii) that in any case the A
impugned Circular does not per se prohibit the purchase or sale of VCs.
This is why it is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners,
that what is hit by the impugned Circular is not the actual target. The
actual target of the impugned Circular, as seen from various
communications and committee reports that preceded the same, is the
B
trade in VCs. The object of hitting at trading in VCs, is to ensure (i)
consumer protection (ii) prevention of violation of money laundering laws
(iii) curbing the menace of financing of terrorism and (iv) safeguarding
of the existing monetary/payment/credit system from being polluted. But
hitting the target directly, is not within the domain of RBI and hence the
impugned Circular purportedly seeks to protect only the regulated entities, C
by ring-fencing them. In the process, it has hit VC Exchanges and not
the actual trading of VCs, though as a consequence, the volume of
transactions in VCs (perhaps through VCEs alone) is stated to have
come down. People who wish to buy and sell VCs can still do so merrily,
without using the medium of a VC Exchange and without seeking to
D
convert the virtual currencies into fiat currency. It is in this context that
the contention revolving around Article 19(1)(g) has to be examined.
6.147. In order to test the validity of the impugned action on the
touchstone of Article 19(1)(g), we may have to understand the
fundamental distinction between (i) the purchase and sale of virtual
currencies by and between two individuals or entities and (ii) the business E
of online exchanges that provide certain services such as the facility of
buying and selling of virtual currencies, the storing or securing of the
virtual currencies in what are known as wallets and the conversion of
virtual currencies into fiat currency and vice versa. The buying and selling
of crypto currencies through VC Exchanges can be by way of hobby or F
as a trade/business. The distinction between the two is that there may or
may not exist a profit motive in the former, while it would, in the latter.
6.148. Persons who engage in buying and selling virtual currencies,
just as a matter of hobby cannot pitch their claim on Article 19(1)(g), for
what is covered therein are only profession, occupation, trade or business. G
Therefore hobbyists, who are one among the three categories of citizens
(hobbyists, traders in VCs and VC Exchanges), straightaway go out of
the challenge under Article 19(1)(g).
6.149. The second and third categories of citizens namely, those
who have made the purchase and sale of VCs as their occupation or H
420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A trade, and those who are running online platforms and VC exchanges
can certainly pitch their claim on the basis of Article 19(1)(g). Technically
speaking, the second category of citizens cannot claim that the impugned
decision of RBI has the effect of completely shutting down their trade
or occupation. Citizens who have taken up the trade of buying and selling
virtual currencies are not prohibited by the impugned Circular (i) either
B
from trading in crypto-to-crypto pairs (ii) or in using the currencies stored
in their wallets, to make payments for purchase of goods and services to
those who are prepared to accept them, within India or abroad. As a
matter of fact, reports/articles in online journals suggest (i) that a few
eateries such as Kolonial, a vintage themed pizzeria in Mumbai’s Worli
C area, Suryawanshi restaurant in Indiranagar, Bengaluru and Suri Andhra
Mess in Taramani, Chennai were accepting payments in virtual
currencies (Mumbai and Chennai eateries are now closed and the one
in Bangalore has stopped accepting) and (ii) that there are few
intermediaries which accept payments in Bitcoins for gift cards which in
turn facilitate online shopping from popular sites.
D
6.150. An important aspect to be taken note of is that virtual
currencies cannot be stored anywhere, in the real sense of the term, as
they do not exist in any physical shape or form. What is actually stored
is the private keys, which can be used to access the public address and
transaction signatures.
E
6.151. The software program in which the private and public keys
of those who own virtual currencies is stored, is called a digital wallet.
There are different types of wallets namely (i) paper wallet which is
essentially a document that contains a public address for receiving the
currency and a private key which allows the owner to spend or transfer
F the virtual currencies stored in the address (ii) mobile wallet, which is
a tool which runs as an app on the smartphone, where the private keys
are stored, enabling the owner to make payments in crypto currencies
directly from the phone (iii) web wallet, in which the private keys are
stored on a server which is constantly online (iv) desktop wallet, in
G which private keys are stored in the hard drive and (v) hardware wallet,
where the private keys are stored in a hardware device such as pen
drive.
6.152. All the above types of wallets except the desktop wallet
allow a great degree of flexibility, in that they can be accessed from
H anywhere in the world. For instance, paper wallets are printed in the
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 421
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

form of QR codes that can be scanned, and a transaction completed by A
using the private keys. Similarly, mobile wallets run as an app on the
smartphone and hence they allow a person to use the crypto currency
stored in the wallet for buying anything, even while travelling abroad,
provided the vendor accepts payments in crypto currencies. Paper wallets
and mobile wallets can also be used to draw fiat currency from virtual
B
currency ATMs available in countries like USA, Canada, Switzerland,
etc.
6.153. In other words, most of the wallets except perhaps desktop
wallet, have great mobility and have transcended borders. Therefore,
despite the fact that the users and traders of virtual currencies are also
prevented by the impugned Circular from accessing the banking services, C
the impugned Circular has not paralyzed many of the other ways in
which crypto currencies can still find their way to or through the market.
6.154. Persons who have suffered a deadly blow from the
impugned Circular are only those running VC exchanges and not even
those who are trading in VCs. Persons trading in VCs, even now have D
different options, some of which we have discussed above (wizards
may have many more options). But the VC exchanges do not appear to
have found out any other means of survival (at least as of now) if they
are disconnected from the banking channels.
6.155. In all cases where legislative/executive action infringing E
the right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) were set at naught by this
court, this court was concerned with a ban/prohibition of an activity. The
question of the prohibited/banned activities having the potential to
destabilize an existing system, did not arise in those cases. The pleadings
contained in the first writ petition filed by the Association, would show F
that three companies who are members of the Internet and Mobile
Association of India, had a combined total of approximately 17 lakhs
verified users throughout India. These companies held a combined total
of approximately Rs. 1365 crores of user funds in trust. The approximate
monthly transaction volume of just these three companies was around
Rs. 5000 crores. Even according to the petitioner, the crypto asset industry G
is estimated to have a market capitalization of approximately 430 billion
US dollars globally. India is estimated to contribute between 2 and 10%
based on varied estimates. It is admitted in WP (C) No. 373 of 2018 that
the total number of investors in Indian crypto market was approximately
20 lakhs and the average daily trade volume was at least Rs. 150 crores, H
422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A at the time when the writ petition was filed. Therefore, if a central
authority like RBI, on a conspectus of various factors perceive the trend
as the growth of a parallel economy and severs the umbilical cord that
virtual currency has with fiat currency, the same cannot be very lightly
nullified as offending Article 19(1)(g).
B 6.156. But nevertheless, the measure taken by RBI should pass
the test of proportionality, since the impugned Circular has almost wiped
the VC exchanges out of the industrial map of the country, thereby
infringing Article 19(1)(g). On the question of proportionality, the learned
Counsel for the petitioners relies upon the four-pronged test summed up
in the opinion of the majority in Modern Dental College and Research
C Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh.109 These four tests are (i) that the
measure is designated for a proper purpose (ii) that the measures are
rationally connected to the fulfillment of the purpose (iii) that there are
no alternative less invasive measures and (iv) that there is a proper
relation between the importance of achieving the aim and the importance
D of limiting the right. The court in the said case held that a mere ritualistic
incantation of “money laundering” or “black money” does not satisfy
the first test and that alternative methods should have been explored.
6.157. Let us now see whether the impugned Circular would fail
the four-pronged test. In fact, the Privy Council originally set forth in
E Elloy de Freitas v. Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture,
Fisheries, Lands and Housing,110 only a three-fold test namely (i)
whether the legislative policy is sufficiently important to justify limiting a
fundamental right (ii) whether the measures designed to meet the
legislative objective are rationally connected to it and (iii) whether the
means used to impair the right or freedom are no more than is necessary
F to accomplish the objective. These three tests came to be known as De
Freitas test. But a fourth test namely “the need to balance the interests
of society with those of individuals and groups” was added by the House
of Lords in Huang v. Secretary of State for the Home Department.111
These four tests were more elaborately articulated by the Supreme Court
G of United Kingdom in Bank Mellat v. HM Treasury (No. 2).112

109
(2016) 7 SCC 353
110
[1999] 1 AC 69
111
[2007] UKHL 11
112
H [2013] UKSC 39
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 423
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

6.158. Bank Mellat (supra) is an important decision to be taken A
note of, as it concerned almost an identical measure by which Her
Majesty’s Treasury restricted access to the UK’s financial markets by a
major Iranian commercial bank on account of its alleged connection
with Iran’s nuclear program. This was done by the Treasury by way of
a direction under Schedule 7 of the Counter Terrorism Act, 2008, requiring
B
all persons operating in the financial sector not to have any commercial
dealings with Bank Mellat. Schedule 7 of the Act dealt with “terrorist
financing and money laundering”. This Schedule 7 has several parts,
Part 1 providing “conditions for giving a direction”, Part 2 indicating the
“persons to whom a direction may be given”, Part 3 laying down the
requirements that may be imposed by a direction, Part 4 containing C
“procedural provisions and licensing”, Part 5 dealing with enforcement
and information powers, Part 6 dealing with civil penalties, Part 7 listing
out the offences and Part 8 containing supplemental provisions. Paragraph
14 of Schedule 7 of the said Act enables the Treasury to issue general
directions, to all persons or a description of persons operating in the
D
financial sector. But certain procedural safeguards are provided in
paragraph 14(2) as well as paragraph 9(6). Under paragraph 14(2), a
general direction issued to persons operating in the financial sector, must
be laid before the Parliament and will cease to have effect if not approved
by a resolution of each House of Parliament before the end of 28 days.
Under paragraph 9(6), the requirements imposed by a direction, either in E
the form of customer due diligence or in the form of ongoing monitoring
or in the form of systematic reporting or in the form of limiting or ceasing
business, should be proportionate, having regard to the advice given by
the Financial Action Task Force or having regard to the reasonable belief
that the Treasury has about the risks of terrorist financing or money
F
laundering activities or the development of radiological, biological, nuclear
or chemical weapons. In addition to these procedural safeguards, Section
63 of the aforesaid Act provided for a remedy to a person affected by
any such decision of the Treasury, to apply to the High Court or in
Scotland, to the Court of Session. Section 63(3) specifically recognized
the application of the principles of judicial review, to the applications G
filed against such measures.
6.159. It is in the context of those specific statutory prescriptions
for judicial review available in UK (unlike in India) that Bank Mellat
challenged the Treasury’s decision. The challenge was both on procedural
and substantive grounds. By a majority of 6 to 3, the Supreme Court of H
424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A the United Kingdom allowed the appeal of the Bank on procedural
grounds. On the substantive grounds, the appeal of the Bank was allowed
by a majority of 5 to 4.

6.160. Lord Reed who wrote a dissent both on the procedural
grounds and the substantive grounds, traced the history of the doctrine
B
of proportionality as follows:

68. The idea that proportionality is an aspect of justice can
be traced back via Aquinas to the Nicomachean Ethics and
beyond. The development of the concept in modern times as a
C standard in public law derives from the Enlightenment, when
the relationship between citizens and their rulers came to be
considered in a new way, reflected in the concepts of the social
contract and of natural rights. As Blackstone wrote in his
Commentaries on the Laws of England, 9 th (1783), Vol 1, p
125, the concept of civil liberty comprises “natural liberty so
D
far restrained by human laws (and not farther) as is necessary
and expedient for the general advantage of the public”. The
idea that the state should limit natural rights only to the
minimum extent necessary developed in Germany into a public
law standard known as Verhältnismäßigkeit, or
E proportionality. From its origins in German administrative law,
where it forms the basis of a rigorously structured analysis of
the validity of legislative and administrative acts, the concept
of proportionality came to be adopted in the case law of the
European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human
F Rights. From the latter, it migrated to Canada, where it has
received a particularly careful and influential analysis, and
from Canada it spread to a number of other common law
jurisdictions.
69. Proportionality has become one of the general principles
G of EU law, and appears in article 5(4) of the Treaty on
European Union (“TEU”). The test is expressed in more
compressed and general terms than in German or Canadian
law, and the relevant jurisprudence is not always clear, at
least to a reader from a common law tradition. In R v Ministry

H
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 425
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex p Fedesa and others A
(Case C-331/88) [1990] ECR I-4023, the European Court of
Justice stated (para 13):
“The Court has consistently held that the principle of
proportionality is one of the general principles of Community
law. By virtue of that principle, the lawfulness of the B
prohibition of an economic activity is subject to the condition
that the prohibitory measures are appropriate and necessary
in order to achieve the objectives legitimately pursued by the
legislation in question; when there is a choice between several
appropriate measures recourse must be had to the least
onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be C
disproportionate to the aims pursued.”
The intensity with which the test is applied – that is to say, the
degree of weight or respect given to the assessment of the
primary decision-maker - depends upon the context.
D
70. As I have mentioned, proportionality is also a concept
applied by the European Court of Human Rights. As the court
has often stated, inherent in the whole of the Convention is a
search for a fair balance between the demands of the general
interest of the community and the requirements of the protection
of the individual’s fundamental rights (see eg Sporrong and E
Lönnroth v Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 35, para 69). The court
has described its approach to striking such a balance in
different ways in different contexts, and in practice often
approaches the matter in a relatively broad-brush way. In
cases concerned with A1P1, for example, the court has often F
asked whether the person concerned had to bear an individual
and excessive burden (see eg James v United Kingdom (1986)
8 EHRR 123, para 50). The intensity of review varies
considerably according to the right in issue and the context
in which the question arises. Unsurprisingly, given that it is
an international court, its approach to proportionality does G
not correspond precisely to the various approaches adopted
in contracting states.
71. An assessment of proportionality inevitably involves a
value judgment at the stage at which a balance has to be
H
426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A struck between the importance of the objective pursued and
the value of the right intruded upon. The principle does not
however entitle the courts simply to substitute their own
assessment for that of the decision-maker. As I have noted,
the intensity of review under EU law and the Convention varies
according to the nature of the right at stake and the context
B in which the interference occurs. Those are not however the
only relevant factors. One important factor in relation to the
Convention is that the Strasbourg court recognises that it may
be less well placed than a national court to decide whether
an appropriate balance has been struck in the particular
C national context. For that reason, in the Convention case law
the principle of proportionality is indissolubly linked to the
concept of the margin of appreciation. That concept does not
apply in the same way at the national level, where the degree
of restraint practised by courts in applying the principle of
proportionality, and the extent to which they will respect the
D judgment of the primary decision maker, will depend upon
the context, and will in part reflect national traditions and
institutional culture. For these reasons, the approach adopted
to proportionality at the national level cannot simply mirror
that of the Strasbourg court.
E 72. The approach to proportionality adopted in our domestic
case law under the Human Rights Act has not generally
mirrored that of the Strasbourg court. In accordance with the
analytical approach to legal reasoning characteristic of the
common law, a more clearly structured approach has generally
been adopted, derived from case law under Commonwealth
F constitutions and Bills of Rights, including in particular the
Canadian Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of
1982. The three-limb test set out by Lord Clyde in De Freitas
v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries,
Lands and Housing [1999] 1 AC 69, 80 has been influential:
G “whether: (i) the legislative objective is sufficiently important
to justify limiting a fundamental right; (ii) the measures
designed to meet the legislative objective are rationally
connected to it; and (iii) the means used to impair the right or
freedom are no more than is necessary to accomplish the
H objective.”
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 427
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

De Freitas was a Privy Council case concerned with A
fundamental rights under the constitution of Antigua and
Barbuda, and the dictum drew on South African, Canadian
and Zimbabwean authority. The three criteria have however
an affinity to those formulated by the Strasbourg court in
cases concerned with the requirement under articles 8 to 11
B
that an interference with the protected right should be
necessary in a democratic society (eg Jersild v Denmark
(1994) Publications of the ECtHR Series A No 298, para 31),
provided the third limb of the test is understood as permitting
the primary decision-maker an area within which its judgment
will be respected. C
73. The De Freitas formulation has been applied by the House
of Lords and the Supreme Court as a test of proportionality
in a number of cases under the Human Rights Act. It was
however observed in Huang v Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2007] UKHL 11; [2007] 2 AC 167, para 19 D
that the formulation was derived from the judgment of Dickson
CJ in R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103, and that a further element
mentioned in that judgment was the need to balance the
interests of society with those of individuals and groups. That,
it was said, was an aspect which should never be overlooked
or discounted. That this aspect constituted a fourth criterion E
was noted by Lord Wilson, with whom Lord Phillips and Lord
Clarke agreed, in R (Aguilar Quila) v Secretary of State for
the Home Department [2011] UKSC 45; [2012] 1 AC 621,
para 45.
74. The judgment of Dickson CJ in Oakes provides the clearest F
and most influential judicial analysis of proportionality within
the common law tradition of legal reasoning. Its attraction as
a heuristic tool is that, by breaking down an assessment of
proportionality into distinct elements, it can clarify different
aspects of such an assessment, and make value judgments G
more explicit. The approach adopted in Oakes can be
summarised by saying that it is necessary to determine (1)
whether the objective of the measure is sufficiently important
to justify the limitation of a protected right, (2) whether the
measure is rationally connected to the objective, (3) whether
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428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A a less intrusive measure could have been used without
unacceptably compromising the achievement of the objective,
and (4) whether, balancing the severity of the measure’s effects
on the rights of the persons to whom it applies against the
importance of the objective, to the extent that the measure
will contribute to its achievement, the former outweighs the
B latter. The first three of these are the criteria listed by Lord
Clyde in De Freitas, and the fourth reflects the additional
observation made in Huang. I have formulated the fourth
criterion in greater detail than Lord Sumption, but there is no
difference of substance. In essence, the question at step four
C is whether the impact of the rights infringement is
disproportionate to the likely benefit of the impugned measure.
75. In relation to the third of these criteria, Dickson CJ made
clear in R v Edwards Books and Art Ltd [1986] 2 SCR 713,
781-782 that the limitation of the protected right must be “one
that it was reasonable for the legislature to impose”, and that
D
the courts were “not called upon to substitute judicial opinions
for legislative ones as to the place at which to draw a precise
line”. This approach is unavoidable, if there is to be any real
prospect of a limitation on rights being justified: as Blackmun
J once observed, a judge would be unimaginative indeed if
E he could not come up with something a little less drastic or a
little less restrictive in almost any situation, and thereby enable
himself to vote to strike legislation down (Illinois Elections
Bd v Socialist Workers Party (1979) 440 US 173, 188- 189);
especially, one might add, if he is unaware of the relevant
practicalities and indifferent to considerations of cost. To allow
F the legislature a margin of appreciation is also essential if a
federal system such as that of Canada, or a devolved system
such as that of the United Kingdom, is to work, since a strict
application of a “least restrictive means” test would allow
only one legislative response to an objective that involved
G limiting a protected right.
76. In relation to the fourth criterion, there is a meaningful
distinction to be drawn (as was explained by McLachlin CJ
in Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony [2009] 2
SCR 567, para 76) between the question whether a particular
objective is in principle sufficiently important to justify limiting
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RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

a particular right (step one), and the question whether, having A
determined that no less drastic means of achieving the
objective are available, the impact of the rights infringement
is disproportionate to the likely benefits of the impugned
measure (step four).
6.161. Despite the fact that the Iranian bank succeeded by a greater B
majority on procedural grounds and by a thin majority on the substantive
grounds, a common thread is seen, both, in the opinion of the majority
and in the opinion of the minority. Firstly, it was agreed even by the
majority that cases which lay in the areas of foreign policy and national
security were once regarded as unsuitable for judicial scrutiny, but they
have been opened up by the express terms of the 2008 Act, because C
they may engage the rights of designated persons or others under the
European Convention on Human Rights. Therefore, there was unanimity
of opinion that any assessment of rationality and proportionality
must recognize that the nature of the issue required the Treasury to
be allowed a large margin of judgment. Even Lord Sumption who D
wrote the lead judgment for the majority agreed that “the making of
Government and legislative policy cannot be turned into a judicial
process”. An interesting statement made by Blackmun J in Illinois
Elections Bd v. Socialist Workers Party113 was quoted by Lord Reed
in his dissent which reads “a judge would be unimaginative indeed if
he could come up with something a little less drastic or a little less E
restrictive in almost any situation and thereby enable himself to
vote to strike legislation down”. In essence, there was unanimity of
opinion on the fact that a margin of appreciation should certainly be
allowed to the decision-maker. But on the ground of proportionality, the
majority struck down the ban imposed by the UK Treasury. The highlights F
of the decision, as formulated by the court itself, read as follows:
(i) The essential question before the court was whether the
interruption of Bank Mellat’s commercial dealings in the UK bore some
rational and proportionate relationship to the statutory purpose of hindering
the pursuit by Iran of its nuclear weapons programmes. G
(ii) For the majority, there were two particular difficulties with the
direction, namely (a) it did not explain or justify the singling out Bank
Mellat; and (b) the justification was not one which Ministers advanced
before Parliament, and was in some respects inconsistent with it.
113
(1979) 440 US 173 H
430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A (iii) The risk, according to the majority, was not specific to Bank
Mellat but an inherent risk of banking, and the risk posed by Bank Mellat’s
access to those markets was no different from that posed by other
comparable banks.
(iv) Singling out Bank Mellat, according to the court, was arbitrary
B and irrational, and disproportionate to any contribution which it could
rationally be expected to make to the direction’s objective.
(v) By contrast, the minority were satisfied that, in view of the
wide margin of appreciation given to the Treasury in these matters, the
direction was rationally connected to the objective and was proportionate.
C 6.162. We cannot and need not go as far as the majority had gone
in Bank Mellat. U.K. has a statute where standards of procedure for
judicial review are set out and the majority decision was on the application
of those standards. But even by our own standards, we are obliged to
see if there were less intrusive measures available and whether RBI
D has at least considered these alternatives. On the question of availability
of alternatives, the July 2018 report of the European Union Parliament
(titled ‘Cryptocurrencies and Blockchain’) is relied upon by Shri Ashim
Sood. The relevant portion (in paragraph 5.4) reads as follows:
“In this respect we also note that some cryptocurrencies that
E are now on the market, such as Dash and Monero, are fully
anonymous, whereas others, such as Bitcoin and the like are
pseudo-anonymous, basically meaning that if great effort is
made and complex techniques are deployed, it is possible for
authorities to find out users’ identities. These fully anonymous
cryptocurrencies are designed to stay in the dark and outside
F of the scope of authorities. After AMLD5 (Fifth Anti-Money
Laundering Directive of the European union) this will no
longer be possible to the fullest extent: the cryptocurrency
users that want to convert their cryptocurrency into fiat
currency via a virtual currency exchange or hold their
G portfolio via a custodian wallet provider, will be subject to
customer due diligence. But, as aforementioned, there is still
a whole world outside of these new obliged entities under
AMLD5. It goes without saying that this may sound
particularly interesting for criminals seeking for new ways to
launder money, finance terrorists or evade taxes. If a
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RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

legislator does not want to outright ban these cryptocurrencies A
- and for not imposing such a ban a good argument is that
cash is also fully anonymous and lawful - the only way to
find out who uses them is to require users to register
mandatorily. For reasons of proportionality it could then be
considered to make the registration subject to a materiality
B
threshold.” (emphasis supplied)
6.163. The discussion in paragraph 5.7 of the July 2018 Report of
the European Union Parliament also addresses the issue as to whether it
is best to introduce an outright ban for some aspects linked to some
crypto currencies. This paragraph reads as follows:
C
5.7. “Is it not best to introduce an outright ban for some aspects
linked to some cryptocurrencies?
The question arises whether some aspects relating to some
cryptocurrencies should not just be banned and criminally
sanctioned. To mind come the mixing process attached to D
Dash’s feature PrivateSend and Monero’s RingCT, stealth
addresses and Kovri-project. In essence, these features are
designed to make cryptocurrency users untraceable. But why
is such degree of anonymity truly necessary? Would allowing
this not veer too far towards criminals? Imposing a ban for
E
such aspects surrounding cryptocurrencies that are aimed at
making it impossible to verify their users and criminally
sanctioning these aspects seems to be in line with the Council’s
conclusions of April 2018 on how to respond to malicious
cyber activities, under which that the use of ICT for malicious
purposes is unacceptable. Whatever the answer may be, we F
must again avoid being naive: even if a ban would be imposed,
how do we detect a breach, given that the purpose of the
object of the ban just is to obscure identities? Nevertheless,
it would be worthwhile to consider introducing a ban. If
authorities then bump into the prohibited activities, they have G
a legal basis for prosecution, insofar not yet available.
Possibly, imposing a ban could also have a deterrent effect.
Of course, again there is the tension with data protection, but
arguably in the balance of things the interest of authorities
and society to more effectively combat money laundering,
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432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A terrorist financing and tax evasion via well-defined specific
bans outweighs the interest of persons desiring to hide their
identities completely. In any event, imposing a ban should
always be focused on specific aspects facilitating the illicit
use of cryptocurrency too much. We are not in favour of
B general bans on cryptocurrencies or barring the interaction
between cryptocurrency business and the formal financial
sector as a whole, such as is the case in China for example.
That would go too far in our opinion. As long as good
safeguards are in place protecting the formal financial sector
and more in general society as a whole, such as rules
C combating money laundering, terrorist financing, tax evasion
and maybe a more comprehensive set of rules aiming at
protecting legitimate users (such as ordinary consumers and
investors), that should be sufficient.” (emphasis supplied)
6.164. Thus, the ultimate recommendation made by the
D European Union Parliament in the paragraph extracted above, is
not to go for a total ban of the interaction between crypto currency
business and the formal financial sector as a whole. Obviously, RBI
did not consider the availability of alternatives before issuing the impugned
circular. But by an interim direction, issued on 21-08-2019 this court
E directed RBI to give a detailed point-wise reply to the representations of
the petitioners. Pursuant to the said order, RBI gave a reply dated 04-
09-2019. In the reply, RBI has dealt with every one of the contentions of
the petitioners. The relevant portion reads as follows:
“Firstly, the RBI has not prohibited VCs in the country. The
F RBI has directed the entities regulated by it to not provide services
to those persons or entities dealing in or settling VCs. The risks
associated with VCs that are highlighted by the RBI stands
mitigated so far as the entities regulated by it are concerned. Thus,
the RBI been able to ring fence the entities regulated by it from
being involved in activities that pose reputational and financial
G
risks along with other legal and operational risks. For example,
VCs have been used to defraud consumers in a Rs. 2000 crore
scam in India whereby users were assured returns upon their
investment in GainBitcoin and were paid their return in another
form of VC, whose value was much lower than that of GainBitcoin.
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We do not agree that the Circular has the effect of forcing A
members to do deal in cash. The Circular neither directs nor
encourages any dealing with respect to VCs at all. After the
issuance of the Circular, some of the IAMAI member VC
exchanges have been operating peer to peer VC exchanges. In
P2P transfers, while the exchange provides a portal to match the
B
orders of a seller and buyer, the consideration would flow directly
from the buyer to the seller without the exchanges being an
intermediary for this leg of the trade. The exchanges would only
act as the intermediary for the storing the VCs till the time the
transfer of the consideration from the buyer to the seller is
complete. In other words, the exchanges act as an escrow agent C
for the transaction between the buyer and the seller. The buyers
in the P2P transaction transfer the consideration directly to the
seller’s bank account. In any case, the capital flight problem
mentioned by the petitioner is not new and existed even before
the issuance of the Circular. As mentioned earlier, the IAMAI
D
VC exchanges allowed their customers to transfer VCs to foreign
wallet addresses, even before the issuance of the Circular,
exposing the customers to the risks of violating FEMA, AML/
CFT guidelines.
The issues highlighted by IAMAI have been considered by the
RBI. The RBI, as the banking and financial regulator of Indian E
markets, assessed the risks and benefits arising from the
exponential and increasing use of VCs. The potential adverse
impact of VCs on the banking sector and the digitization of the
Indian payments industry, on account of the inherent nature of
VCs, is lowered as a result of the Circular. The RBI stepped in as F
part of its duty to carryout preventive oversight to ensure that the
banking system was not a casualty on account of the growth in
VC trading. The Circular became all the more necessary as the
use and trade through VCs continued to grow despite multiple
cautions issued by the RBI. Further, the public should not lose
faith in the Indian digital payments ecosystem as a consequence G
of any impact of VCs given its intrinsic nature. The focus of the
digital payments in India will be defeated should the usage of
VCs result in implications. Any unpleasant experience in using
VCs can affect the public’s trust in electronic payment systems
in general. H
434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A It is in this context that the RBI had highlighted some of the
possible ways to enforce the prohibition on VCs in the RBI
Representation, which are as follows:
(i) Initial Coin Offerings (“ICOs”) ought to be prohibited
and VC asset funds may to be allowed to be set-up and/
B or operated within the legal jurisdiction of India as also
perform such transactions in India. ICOs that were in
the nature of multi -level marketing or pyramid schemes
can be banned;
(ii) The FEMA and its regulations can be enhanced to
C prevent and track remittances for the purpose of
investing in VCs which are flowing out of the country
under the LRS;
(iii) Enforcement agencies can take punitive action against
entities/establishments that accept VCs as a medium of
D payment, as and when these agencies are faced with
such instances; and
(iv) Regulators can issue warnings to the public and
educated the public to the extent possible.
One must also be alive to the issue faced by the country. India
E is not a safe haven free from any external intrusions and terror
attacks. India is plagued by the menace of cross border terror
financing and money laundering. While laws have been enacted to
counter terror financing and money laundering activities, the
Government cannot permit anything which would facilitate or have
F the potential to facilitate such nefarious and illegal acts to incubate
in the country. Any possible avenues which facilitate anonymous
cross border fund transfer have to be acted upon swiftly and
stringently dealt with. It is an admitted fact that VCs have been
used to purchase illegal and illicit goods ranging from guns and
ammunition to drugs. Therefore, the RBI’s measures under the
G Circular become all the more necessary. With the Circular coming
into effect, the banking system and the RBI’s regulated entities would
not be facilitating persons looking to obtain VCs for illegal trades.
Th additional measures taken by the RBI by way of the Circular
were necessary as, despite multiple cautions, 5 million Indian users
engaged in VC trades of INR 1 billion daily.” (emphasis supplied)
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RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

6.165. In Annexure B to their second response dated 18-09-2019, A
RBI has also dealt with every one of the additional safeguards proposed
by one of the writ petitioners, by name, Discidium Internet Labs Pvt,
Ltd. and demonstrated as to how these safeguards may not be sufficient
to ring fence the regulated entities:
B
Safeguards proposed by Response of RBI
petititoners

Development of a dashboard The technology and concept of a dashboard that is
and central repository accessible by all the relevant government authorities
is yet to be tested in India and cannot guarantee that C
the same will enable authorities to mitigate risks in
relation to VCs, particularly the ones arising out of
cross border transactions or illegal and nefarious
activities. Such a development would require the
association of various government authorities at
different levels with implications on the roles and
responsibilities of other regulatory/enforcement D
agencies and cannot be implemented by the RBI alone.
Therefore, even assuming that the proposed structure
is adequate enough, its implementation will entail
other authorities to formulate the appropriate rules
or directions in their jurisdictions, which is beyond
the RBI's control. In any case, for such a development
to come into existence, the Government will need to E
formulate and establish appropriate rules governing
the nitty gritty of the same.
In addition, VCs are difficult to monitor as their
opaque nature makes it difficult to gather information
and monitor their operations. Moreover, asserting
jurisdiction over a particular VC transaction or market
participant may prove challenging for national F
regulators in the light of the cross-border reach of the
technology.

Formation of a self- Issuance and management have been a function solely
regulatory organization and of the sovereign/central bank and a collection of
Restricting trade of crypto- private entitites cannot be trusted to perform this
assets to white listed role. Moreover, when such VCs become widely used, G
addresses the central bank's ability to control the money supply
in the economy could get adversely impacted. In fact,
implications of VCs vis-a-vis consumer protection,
data privacy and security were also highlighted. It
was also acknowledged that there are several

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436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A uncertainties around the VC, particularly with respect
to how the VC is secured, the extent to which there
are measures to prevent and respond to the dramatic
shifts of value; and the characterization of the sellers
of such a VC. Additionally, it was recognized that
there can be implications on the US monetary policy
as another ‘currency’ not under the government
B control can adversely impact the Federal Reserve's
monetary policy as the Federal Reserve would lose
its monopoly on controlling inflation and inflation
targeting though manipulating cash in the system.

Adoption of Aadhar based Electronic KYC is currently permitted only for banks
electronic KYC for individuals desirous of receiving any benefit or
C subsidy under any scheme notified under Section 7
of the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and
Other Subsidies Benefits and Services) Act, 2016 or
if an individual voluntarily uses his/her Aadhaar
number for identification purpose.

Moreover, the adoption of Aadhaar based electronic
D KYC may not be sufficient to address the risks stated
by the RBI in the Press Releases. This is because for
the RBI to issue norms/measures that sufficiently
resolves and/or mitigated the stated risks of dealing
in VCs, it has to be privy to the technicalities of the
various types of VCs, their characteristics and
difficulties and drawbacks. There is still a high level
E of uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding VCs.
Regulators around the world are still in fact
contemplating how to regulate initial coin offerings
and how to tax them. The RBI is keeping a close tab
on all such developments including the regulatory
stand taken by each jurisdictions across the world
and will consider implementing the same to the extent
F of its jurisdiction and in line with the policy
framework that will be adopted by the Government
of India in relation to VCs.

Mandatory DILPL has failed to set out the benefit or security
capitalisation provided by the proposed mandatory capitalisation
requirement requirements. In the absence of any benefits
G
prescribed by DILPL, the RBI has to rely upon
conjecture and surmises to assume the purported
benefits of this suggestion. Notably, the fact that
certain jurisdictions prescribe mandatory
capitalisation requirements does not necessarily
make the suggestion beneficial or implementable in
India.
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RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

The only benefit which a reasonable person may A
assume is that the VC exchanges will have to be of
a minimum prescribed size and value. However,
the mandatory capitalisation requirement of VC
exchanges would not reduce the inherent risks
involved in VCs. VCs transactions would continue
to be anonymous and untraceable. The mandatory
capitalisation requirement does not reduce the use B
of VCs in nefarious activities and illegal cross-
border transactions. Further, the mandatory
capitalisation requirement does not provide any
security or benefit to the monetary and banking
system from the risks associated with VCs.

Pertinently, the suggestion includes prescribing a C
mandatory capitalisation requirement in VCs itself.
Given the instability and price fluctuations of VCs,
the RBI rejects any suggestion of providing a
security or capitalisation requirement in VC itself.
Additionally, the suggested mandatory
capitalisation requirement would also not reduce
the risks to consumers arising not only from fraud D
but also from the possible loss of value given the
fluctuations and manipulation VCs' value.

Insurance of crypto-assets Firstly, Indian Insurance service providers are not
governed by the RBI. Insurance providers come
within the regulatory jurisdiction of the Insurance E
Regulatory and Development Agency (“IRDA”).
Therefore, the RBI cannot assume jurisdiction over
insurance providers by directing them to formulate
tailored insurance policies for VC exchanges. It is
for the purpose of such regulatory aspects, that
the Inter-Ministerial Committee was constitued
to study VCs. Accordingly, the RBI had, at that F
time, forwarded a copy of the Representation to
the Inter-Ministerial Committee for their due
consideration.

Secondly, Indian insurance providers, as mandated
by the IRDA, take a cautious approach to the G
insurance policies offered by them. Therefore, the
insurance providers may not, either suo moto or
on account of IRDA's directions, offer insurance
policies to protect VCs. Further, this cautious
approach includes various limitation or exclusion
of liability clauses. Therefore, the insurance policies
may not provide adequate cover in the event of
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438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A any value degradation, loss or theft of VCs. Moreover,
the highly speculative and fluctuating value of VCs is
a risk which ought not to be borne by the insurance
providers, who are already suffering from the various
financial frauds in the Indian monetary and banking
system.

B Formation of an investor DILPL suggests setting up an investor protection and
protection and education education fund, for which the VC exchanges would
fund transfer all proceeds earmarked towards their
corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) obligations
under the Companies Act, 2013. This suggestion, as
per the RBI, would not protect the customers as
claimed by Discidium as the steps would be
C insufficient to provide adequate cover to customers.
Notably, Discidium has not suggested that it create
any additional buffer for the education and protection
of its customers but instead, has merely suggested
that VC exchanges transfer its existing legal obligations
to create a fund which would purportedly benefit
customers.
D
Despite best efforts made to educate customers, the
inherent risks in VCs would still remain. It is reiterated
that VCs transactions would remain anonymous and
open to facilitating illegal activities. It is unlikely that
the education of customers would change the intent
of nefarious customers, who would continue to
E conduct illicit transactions through VCs. The
anonymous nature of VCs cannot be disputed. The
transactions in VCs are anonymous due to the
pseudonymous address or user handle. For instance,
the reportedly largest transfer of Bitcoins, worth nearly
USD 1 billion,114 took place as recently as September
2019, was between anonymous accounts. Even if the
F exchanges try to mitigate the risks of cyber-attacks
by subscribing to insurance products, the risks are
likely to spread to sectors other than banking.

Further, the utilisation of CSR funds is not regulated
or governed by the RBI. Therefore, implementation
of this suggestion would require other authorities to
G formulate necessary rules or directions, which is
beyond the RBI's control and would depend on the
final law passed by the Parliament based on the
currently pending draft Banning of Cryptocurrency
and Regulation of Official Digital Currency Bill, 2019.

114
https://www.vice.com/en_in/article/bjwjpd/someone-just-moved-a-billion-dollars-in-bitcoin-and-no-
H one-knows-whywhich; last accessed on September 12, 2019.
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 439
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

6.166. Though at the time when the impugned Circular was issued, A
RBI has not obviously addressed many of the issues flagged by the writ
petitioners, RBI did in fact consider the issues raised by the petitioners,
pursuant to the order passed by this court on 21-08-2019. RBI has also
analyzed in Annexure B to the reply dated 18-09-2019 extracted above,
the additional safeguards suggested by the petitioners, to see if the purpose
B
of the impugned measure can be achieved through less intrusive
measures. While exercising the power of judicial review we may not
scan the response of RBI in greater detail to find out if the response to
the additional safeguards suggested by the petitioners was just imaginary.
6.167. But at the same time we cannot lose sight of three important
aspects namely, (i) that RBI has not so far found, in the past 5 years or C
more, the activities of VC exchanges to have actually impacted adversely,
the way the entities regulated by RBI function (ii) that the consistent
stand taken by RBI up to and including in their reply dated 04-09-2019 is
that RBI has not prohibited VCs in the country and (iii) that even the
Inter-Ministerial Committee constituted on 02-11-2017, which initially D
recommended a specific legal framework including the introduction of a
new law namely, Crypto-token Regulation Bill 2018, was of the opinion
that a ban might be an extreme tool and that the same objectives can be
achieved through regulatory measures. Paragraph 7 of the ‘Note-
precursor to report’ throws light on the same and hence it is reproduced
as follows: E

“Options
7. The Committee has considered various approaches to
achieve the objectives and notes:
Achieving the objectives by doing nothing F
i. Issuing warnings may prevent unsophisticated consumers
from dealing in VCs but it would not deter VC service providers
or those raising funds through Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs),
mis-sell or run Ponzi schemes.
G
ii. The recourse available to customers would be inadequate.
iii. Persons who provide VC services without necessary fit
and proper criteria including capital and technology would
continue to pose a heightened risk.
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440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A Achieving the objectives through banning
i. Consumer protection is a key concern but a ban might be
an extreme too to address this. There are many things/activities
that may be harmful but they are not all banned. Problems
related to information asymmetry, concerns around market
B risks, law enforcement or threat to financial system cannot
be adequately addressed through a ban.
ii. A ban would make dealing in VCs illegal but simultaneously
it might decrease the ability of the law enforcement agencies
and regulators to track and stop illegal activities.
C iii. Ver few countries have actually banned VCs. A ban might
not be in-step with India’s position as an important centre of
Information Technology services.
Achieving the objectives by regulating

D i. Penalizing entities or persons who do not opt for regulation
under this Act and may choose to operate illegally may
continue to be difficult.”
6.168. The Crypto-token Regulation Bill, 2018 initially
recommended by the Inter-Ministerial Committee contained a proposal
(i) to prohibit persons dealing with activities related to crypto tokens
E
from falsely posing these products as not being securities or investment
schemes or offering investment schemes due to gaps in the existing
regulatory framework and (ii) to regulate VC exchanges and brokers
where sale and purchase may be permitted.
6.169. The key aspects of the Crypto-token Regulation Bill, 2018,
F
found in paragraph 13 of the ‘Note-precursor to report’ shows that the
Inter-Ministerial Committee was fine with the idea of allowing the sale
and purchase of digital crypto asset at recognized exchanges. Paragraph
13 (iii) & (vii) of the ‘Note-precursor to the report’ reads as follows:
13. Key aspects are summarised below:
G
(i)…
(ii)…
(iii) The sale and purchase of digital crypto asset shall only be
permitted at recognised exchanges.
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INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 441
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

(iv)… A
(v)…
(vi)…
(vii) The registry of all holdings and transactions on the
recognised exchanges shall be maintained at recognised B
depositories.
6.170. But within a year, there was a volte-face and the final
report of the very same Inter-Ministerial Committee, submitted in
February 2019 recommended the imposition of a total ban on private
crypto currencies through a legislation to be known as “Banning of C
Cryptocurrency and Regulation of Official Digital Currency Act, 2019”.
The draft of the bill contained a proposal to ban the mining, generation,
holding, selling, dealing in, issuing, transferring, disposing of or using crypto
currency in the territory of India. At the same time, the bill contemplated
(i) the creation of a digital rupee as a legal tender, by the central
government in consultation with RBI and (ii) the recognition of any official D
foreign digital currency, as foreign currency in India.
6.171. In case the said enactment (2019) had come through, there
would have been an official digital currency, for the creation and
circulation of which, RBI/central government would have had a monopoly.
But that situation had not arisen. The position as on date is that VCs are E
not banned, but the trading in VCs and the functioning of VC exchanges
are sent to comatose by the impugned Circular by disconnecting their
lifeline namely, the interface with the regular banking sector. What is
worse is that this has been done (i) despite RBI not finding anything
wrong about the way in which these exchanges function and (ii) despite F
the fact that VCs are not banned.
6.172. As we have pointed out earlier, the concern of RBI is and
it ought to be, about the entities regulated by it. Till date, RBI has not
come out with a stand that any of the entities regulated by it namely, the
nationalized banks/scheduled commercial banks/co-operative banks/
G
NBFCs has suffered any loss or adverse effect directly or indirectly, on
account of the interface that the VC exchanges had with any of them.
As held by this court in State of Maharashtra v. Indian Hotel and
Restaurants Association, 115 there must have been at least some

115
(2013) 8 SCC 519 H
442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R.

A empirical data about the degree of harm suffered by the regulated entities
(after establishing that they were harmed). It is not the case of RBI that
any of the entities regulated by it has suffered on account of the provision
of banking services to the online platforms running VC exchanges.
6.173. It is no doubt true that RBI has very wide powers not only
B in view of the statutory scheme of the 3 enactments indicated earlier,
but also in view of the special place and role that it has in the economy
of the country. These powers can be exercised both in the form of
preventive as well as curative measures. But the availability of power is
different from the manner and extent to which it can be exercised. While
we have recognized elsewhere in this order, the power of RBI to take a
C pre-emptive action, we are testing in this part of the order the
proportionality of such measure, for the determination of which RBI
needs to show at least some semblance of any damage suffered by its
regulated entities. But there is none. When the consistent stand of RBI
is that they have not banned VCs and when the Government of India is
D unable to take a call despite several committees coming up with several
proposals including two draft bills, both of which advocated exactly
opposite positions, it is not possible for us to hold that the impugned
measure is proportionate.
7. CLIMAX
E 7.1. Therefore, in the light of the above discussion, the petitioners
are entitled to succeed and the impugned Circular dated 06-04-2018 is
liable to be set aside on the ground of proportionality. Accordingly, the
writ petitions are allowed and the Circular dated 06-04-2018 is set aside.
The Statement dated 05-04-2018, though challenged in one writ petition,
F is not in the nature of a statutory direction and hence the question of
setting aside the same does not arise.
7.2. There is still one more issue left. It is the freezing of the
account of Discidium Internet Labs Pvt. Ltd., which is petitioner no. 6 in
WP (C) No. 373 of 2018. This company seems to have had an amount
G of Rs. 12,05,36,667.83/- in current account no. 3677101984 with the
Central Bank of India, Worli, Mumbai. When the petitioner made a
request on 21-05-2018 to close the account and issue a demand draft,
the Central Bank replied that they had referred the matter to their higher
authorities/regulators. Therefore, petitioner no. 6 has come up with an
application in I.A. No. 110424 of 2019 for appropriate directions.
H
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v. 443
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

7.3. RBI has filed a reply to this application conceding that it had A
not directed the bank to freeze the account. It is specifically stated in
paragraph 12 of the affidavit-in-reply of RBI that they did not issue any
direction to the Central Bank of India to freeze the account. However,
RBI has taken a stand that the prayer for release of the amount does not
arise out of or incidental to the main writ petition.
B
7.4. But we think that the lukewarm response of RBI in this regard
is wholly unjustified. Admittedly, the activities carried on by the petitioner
no. 6 were not declared as unlawful. It is the positive case of RBI that
they did not in fact freeze the accounts of petitioner no. 6. Therefore,
RBI is obliged to direct the Central Bank of India to defreeze the account
and release the funds. Hence, RBI is directed to issue instructions C
forthwith to the Central Bank of India, Worli branch, to defreeze the
current account no. 3677101984 of petitioner no. 6 in WP (C) No. 373
of 2018 and to release the funds lying in the account to the company
together with interest at the rate applicable. There will be no order as to
costs. D
7.5. Before drawing the curtains down, we are bound to record,
as in every artistic display, our appreciation for the skillful manner in
which Shri Ashim Sood, learned Counsel, led the attack on the impugned
Circular, but for which, the climax could not have had a nail biting finish.
E

Divya Pandey Petitions allowed.

F

G

H