Holding

The principle of res judicata applies to writ proceedings and to subsequent stages, rendering the High Court’s alteration of the interest award untenable.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined a dispute arising from the acquisition of land for a road project in Himachal Pradesh, where possession was taken in 1968 but formal acquisition under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was delayed. A 1985 public‑interest writ directed the State to complete acquisition and to pay the landowners interest at 12% per annum as equitable compensation. The Land Acquisition Collector incorporated this interest in its 1991 award. On appeal, the High Court set aside the interest component, but the Supreme Court held that the earlier writ order and the Collector’s award had attained finality and were therefore barred by the principle of res judicata, which also applies to writ proceedings. Consequently, the High Court could not revisit the interest award, and the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court’s judgment and affirming the reference court’s award.

Issues considered

The applicability of the principle of res judicata to writ proceedings and to subsequent stages of the same proceeding.
Whether the High Court could entertain a question of interest under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act after an earlier writ order directing such interest.
Whether the interest awarded as equitable compensation is barred by res judicata.
The scope of appellate powers under Section 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 107, s. 11
Constitution of Indias. Article 226
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 18, s. 4, s. 54

Subjects

Res judicataWrit of mandamusLand acquisitionEquitable compensationInterestSection 4 Land Acquisition ActSection 18 Land Acquisition ActSection 107 CPCArticle 226Public interest litigation

Judgment

ISHWARDUTT A
v.
LAND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR AND ANR.

AUGUST 2, 2005

[ASH OK BHAN AND S.B. SINHA, JJ.] B

Land Acquisition:

Land Acquisition Act, 1894:
c
Sections 4 and 18-Compensation amount-Interest on-Res judiCata-
Estoppel-Road construction plan-Possession of lands of large number of
villages taken over for construction of road-No steps taken to formally
acquire the land-Public interest petition filed-High Court directed
completion of the acquisition proceedings and pay the petitioners interest @ D
I 2% per annum from the date of taking over of possession till the date of
payment of interim compensation and of final compensation, if there was
enhancement-ft was also held that the aforesaid interest payable was in the
nature of equitable compensation and such interest shall be in addition to
the compensation, solatium and interest at the statutory rate-Thereafter,
notification issued under S. 4-Land Acquisition Collector fixed the market E
value of the land at a certain rate-Apart from the statut01y benefits of
solatium etc. landowners were also awarded interest @ 12% from the date
of taking over of possession till the date of payment-Landowners filed
application under S. 18 for reference-District Judge awarded enhanced
compensation-On appeal, High Court, while upholding the amount of
compensation, set aside the claim of interest @ 12% per annum granted by F
the earlier order of the same High Court-Correctness of-Held: The award
of the Land Acquisition Officer directing payment of additional interest had
attained finality-Therefore, the principle a/res judicata/ul/y applied to the
facts of the instant case-Hence, High Court judgment set aside-Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908, S. 11. G
Constitution of India, 1950:

Article 226-Writ petition-Res judicata-Principle-Applicability-
Held: ls applicable to writ proceedings.
903 I-I
904 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:

Section 107-Power of appellate court-Scope-Held: Although High
Court has wide power under S 107, it could not go outside the pleadings
and make out a new case.

B The possession of land owned by the appellants along with lands of a
large number of villages was taken over in the year 1968 for a Road
Construction Plan but no steps were taken to formally acquire the land by
issuing a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
Therefore, a public interest writ petition was filed before the High Court ~hich
by a judgment dated 9.9.1985 directed the respondents to complete the
C acquisition proceedings within a time frame and further directed them to pay
to the writ petitioners interest@ 12% per annum from the date of taking
over of possession till the date of payment of interim compensation and of final
compensation, ifthere was enhancement. It was als'o held that the aforesaid
interest payable was in the nature of equitable compensation and such interest
D shall be in addition to the compensation, solatium and interest at the statutory
rate. Thereafter, the respondents issued the notification under Section 4 of
the Act.

The Land Acquisition Collector passed an award on 31.1.1991 filing
the market value of the land at a certain rate. Apart from the statutory benefits
E of solatium etc. the landowners were also awarded interest@ 12% per annum
from the date of taking over of possession till the date of payment as directed
by the High Court. Being aggrieved against the market value fixed by the
Land Acquisition Collector, the appellants filed an application seeking
reference under Section 18 of the Act to the District Judge. The District
Judge enhanced the market value. On appeal, the High Court, while upholding
F
the enhanced market value, set aside the claim of the appellants for interest
@ 12% per annum granted by the earlier order of the Division Bench of the
same High Court. Hence the appeal.

Allowing the appeal, the Court
G
HELD: 1. It is not in dispute that the High Court issued a writ of
mandamus. It is also not in dispute that the direction of the High Court was
acted upon. The principle of resjudicata would not only apply in different
proceedings arising out of the same cause of action but would also apply in
different stages of the same proceedings. As the judgment and order dated
H 9.9.1985 passed by the High Court attained finality, the respondents could
ISHWAR DUTT v. LAND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR 905
~ ... not have raised any contention contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith in A
any subsequent proceedings. In fact the Land Acquisition Officer while passing
the award took into consideration the said judgment dated 9.9.1985 and
awarded 12% additional compensation at the market value. The said order of
the Land Acquisition Officer never came to be questioned and, thus, attained
finality. (911-D-E]
B
2.1. The respondents could have filed a reference application under
Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 but it did not choose to do so.
Only the appellant took recourse to the said provision culminating in passing
' of the impugned judgment of the High Court (911-G]

2.2. Thus, the award of the Land Acquisition Officer directing payment c
of additional interest has also attained finality. [911-H]

3. The Reference Court or for that matter the High Court exercising
its appellate jurisdiction under Section 54 of the Act could not have dealt with
the said question. The principle of res judicata is species of the principle of
D
estoppel. When a proceeding based on a particular cause of action has attained
finality, the principle ofresjudicata shall fully apply. (912-A)

Gufabchand Chhotalal Parikh v. State of Gujarat, AIR (1965) SC 1t53,
followed.
E
Hope Plantations Ltd. v. Taluk Land Board, [1999] 5 SCC 590, Ram
Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi, JT (2005) I I SC 439, Swamy Atmananda v.
Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam, JT (2005) 4 SC 472 and lshwardas v. State of
MP., AIR (1979) SC 55I, relied on.

State ofHP. v. Dharam Das, AIR (1996) SC 127, RL. Jain v. DDA, [2004] F
4 SCC 79 and Arnold v. National Westminster Bank Pie. (1991) 3 All ER 41,
referred to.

Wade and Forsyth: "Administrative Law", 9th Edn., p. 243 and George
Spencer Bower and Turner: "The Doctrine of Res judicata" 2nd Edn., referred
to. G
4. It is trite that principle of res judicata is also applicable to the writ
proceedings. (914-D-E]

Himachal Pradesh Road Transport Corporation v. Ba/want Singh,
~
[1993] Supp. 1 SCC 552 and Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar, (2005) 1 H
906 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A sec 787, relied on. .~

Satyadhan Ghosa/ v. Smt Deorajin Debi, AIR (1960) SC 941 and
Praha/ad Singh v. Col. Sukhdev Singh, [1987) l SCC 727, cited.

5. A writ of mandamus is required to be obeyed unless a judgment is
B overruled or legislation by way of a validating statute is brought into force.
[915-G)

Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India, (1978) 2 SCC 50, followed.

6. In any event, the directions issued by the court stood complied with.
C Having regard to Section 18 of the Act or otherwise the wheel cannot be turned
back. (916-D)

7. The High Court although has a wide power in terms of Section 107
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 but it could not have gone outside the
pleadings and make out a new case. (916-F)
D
Siddu Venkappa Devadiga v. Smt. Rangu S. Devadiga, (1977) 3 SCC
532, relied on.

CIVIL AP PELLA TE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 443 of 200 I.

E From the Judgment and Order dated 20.12.99 of the Himachal Pradesh
High Court in R.F.A. No. 104of1993.

WITH

C.A. Nos. 490, 493, 492, 494, 489, 483, 484, 495, 485, 486, 491, 487 and
F 488 of2001.

Chandra Prakash Pandey, for the Appellant.

J.S. Attri Addi. Advocate General for State of H.P. Anil Nag for the
Respondent.
G
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

BHAN, J. Claimants/appellants aggrieved against the common/similar
judgments and orders dated 20.12.1999 passed by the High Court ofHimachal
Pradesh dismissing their claim for interest@ 12% granted by an earlier order
H of the Division Bench of the same High Court in C. W.P. No. 510/85 dated
ISHWAR DUTT v. LAND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR [BHAN, J.] 907
9.9.1985 on equitable consideration for depriving them of their lands without A
taking proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act and payment of
compensation have come up in these batch of appeals.

Facts being common and similar it would be sufficient to refer to the
facts of CA No. 443 of 2001 for the purposes of deciding the controversy
involved in these appeals. B
Some areas of Himachal Pradesh before re-organisation of the State of
Punjab on 1.11.1966 fonned part of the erstwhile State ofPunjab. Public Works
Department, Government of Punjab in the year 1966 took up the construction
of Solan-Jawanji-Dharja Road. After the re-organisation of the States on
l.l l.1966 the PWD Department of H.P. took over the construction. The road C
was finally commissioned in the year 1968. Possession of the land owned by
the appellants comprising ofKhasra No. 102/1 situated in Village Bagur, Tehsil
and District Solan, along with the lands of large number of villages that came
under the said road construction plan was taken over in the year 1968.
Though the possession of the land was taken over from the Land-owners in D
December, 1968 no steps were taken to formally acquire the land by issuing
notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [hereinafter
referred to as "the Act"].

Having failed to secure justice to get any compensation or even step
being taken by the Government for acquiring the land of nearly 17 years, a E
public interest writ petition No. 510 of 1985 titled Chander Kant Sharma and
Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh, was filed. The State ofHimachal Pradesh
failed to justify any valid reasons for not taking steps to get the land acquired
and for not paying any compensation to the Land-owners. Finding grievance
of the writ petitioners to be genuine the High Court vide its judgment and
order dated 9. 9.1985 directed the respondents to complete the acquisition F
proceedings within a time frame and further directed them to pay to the writ
petitioners interest@ 12% per annum from the date of taking over of possession
till the date of payment of interim compensation and of final compensation,
if there is enhancement. It was observed that the aforesaid interest payable
was in the nature of equitable compensation and such interest shall be in G
addition to the compensation, solatium and interest at the statutory rate
which would be paid to the writ petitioners under the law whether awarded
by the Collector or enhanced by the Court and such interest shall not be
taken into consideration in any proceeding under the Act while awarding the
statutory compensation (direction No. 3). The Division Bench gave the
H
908 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. I S.C.R.

A following directions for expeditious relief to the writ petitioners:

"l. The acquisition proceedings in respect of villages Ser Chirag,
Tawa Talara and Gatool shall be completed on or before January 31,
1986 and those in respect of land situate in village Deon Dhar shall
be completed on or before June 30, 1986.
B 2. The petitioners shall be paid as and by way of interim compensation,
without prejudice to their rights and contentions to claim the
compensation due to them in accordance with law in the course of
the proceedings under the Act, a sum determined on the basis of the
tentative market value set out in column No. 9 of the statements in
c a tabular form annexed to the affidavits of the Superintending Engineer
and the Land Acquisition Officer. The interim compensation will ])e
paid to the petitioners after explaining the aforesaid position to them
against a receipt to be executed by them acknowledging the payment
towards the ultimate compensation to which they become entitled in
accordance with law. The payment will be made within a period of four
D weeks from today.

3. On the amount of compensation payable to the petitioners, interest
at the rate of 12 per cent per annum shall be paid from the date ofthe.
taking over of possession till the date of payment of interim
compensation and of final compensation, ifthere is enhancement. The
E interest payable accordingly is in the nature of an equitable
compensation and such interest will be in addition to the compensation,
solatium and interest at the statutory rate which will be paid to the
petitioners under the law, whether awarded by the Collector of
enhanced by the Court, and such interest will not be taken into
F consideration in any proceeding under the Act, while awarding the
statutory compensation.

4. The tabular statement appended to the affidavits of the ·
Superintending Engineer and the Land Acquisition Collector gives the.1
requisite information relating to the land situate in other eleven villages
G which has been taken possession of for the purposes of tli7f ·
construction of the road in question. The land-owners, whose land in
those villages has been taken possession of, will also be entitled to
similar treatment. Under the circumstances, in order to ensure similar ·-
treatment being accorded to persons identically situate as the
petitioners and in order to avoid proliferation of limitation, it appears
H
ISHWAR DUTT v. LAND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR [BHAN, J.] 909

to be just and proper to direct that the land-owners, whose land A
situate in those eleven villages has also been taken possession of for
the purposes of the coootruction of the road in question, will also be
entitled to the payment of interim compensation and equitable
compensation on the same basis as the petitioners herein and that in
those cases also, the acquisition proceedings shall be completed on B
or before January 31, 1986 and June 30, 1986, as the case may be,
depending upon whether or not the acquisition proceedings have
been initiated under Section 4 of the Act."

As the writ petition had been filed in public interest, in the direction No.
4 it was ordered by the Court that all the Land-owners whose land had been C
taken possession of in either of the awards would be entitled to the similar
relief.

Some other petitioners filed CWP No. 125of1986 and CWP No. 147 of
1988 which were also disposed of with the similar directions.

As a result of the directions issued by the High Court in its order dated D
9. 9.1985 the respondents issued the notification under Section 4 of the Act
for Village Bagure vide Notification No. Lok-Nirmn (Kha) - 7 (1)/62/88 dated
25.2.1989 published in the H.P. Gazette dated 15.4.1989. The Land Acquisition
Collector completed the formalities of acquiring the land and ultimately by its
award No. 2711990 dated 31.1.1991 fixed the market value of the land at Rs. E
9, 727 per bigha. Apart from the statutory benefits of solatium etc. the land-
owners were also awarded the interest @ 12% p.a. from the date of taking
over of possession till the date of payment as directed by the Division Bench
in its order dated 9.9.1985 on equitable grounds.

Being aggrieved against the market value fixed by the Land Acquisition F
Collector the appellants filed an application seeking reference under Section
18 of the Act to the District Judge. The District Judge, Solan vide its award
dated 1.9.1992 enhanced the compensation to Rs. 45,000 per bigha. It was held
that the land-owners were entitled to compensation at the rate of Rs. 45,000
per bigha and that they shall be further entitled to : G
"(a) Compulsory acquisition charges at the rate of 30% on the market
value assessed above;

(b) Additional compulsory acquisition charges at the rate of 12% per
annum on the market value assessed above with effect from the
H
910 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A date of notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894, that is,
7.5.1989, till the date of the award, that is, 31.1.1991,.

(c) Interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the compensation
assessed above with effect from 18.12.1968 till the date of payment
of compensation in terms of the orders of the Hon 'ble High Court
B in CWP No. 147/ 1988;
(d) Interest at the rate of 9% per annum on the enhanced
compensation from the date of possession, that is, 18.12.68 till
the date of expiry of one year thereafter, that is, 17 .12.1969;
(e) Interest at the rate of 15% per annum of the enhanced amount
c with effect from 18.12.1969 till the date of payment of the amount
in Court."

The Respondents being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said
award preferred a First Appeal under Section 54 of the Act before the High
Court which was marked as Regular First Appeal No. 104 of 1993. By reason
D of the impugned judgment, a Division Bench of the High Court while upholding
the amount of compensation payable to the Appellant herein for acquisition
of the land set aside that part of the award, purported to be relying on or on
the basis of the decision of this Court in State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors
v. Dharam Das, AIR (1996) SC 127, complying the payment of interest only
E with effect from 7.5.1989 or with effect from the date of publication of the
notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and not from 18.12.1968 ..

In Dharam Das, (supra) the State of Himachal Pradesh had filed an
appeal against the judgment rendered in C. W.P. No.125 of 1986, [State of
Himachal Pradesh and Ors. v. Dharam Das], in which a direction similar to
F the one which had been given by the High Court in C. W.P. No.510 of 1985,
[Chander Kant Sharma and Ors. v. The State of Himachal Pradesh through
the Secretary and Anr.] was given. This Court did not approve of the view
taken by the High Court and a contra view was taken by holding that the
amount other than the one envisaged either under Section 23 (I-A) of the Act
G or under any of the provisions of the Act could not be granted on equitable
grounds.

SUBMISSIONS :

The learned counsel. appearing on behalf of the Appellant submitted
H that having regard to the fact that the appeal preferred by the Respondents
ISHWAR DUTT v. LAND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR [BHAN, J.] 911
_... herein was confined to the quantum of compensation and as they did not A
question the order of the High Court dated 9.9.1985 passed in C. W.P. 510 of
1985, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained.

The learned counsel would contend that in any view of the matter the
decision of this Court in Dharam Das, (supra) could not have been relied
upon as the principles of res judicata would be attracted to the fact of the B
present case and furthennore in view of the fact that the said order has been
acted upon.

The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent, however,
supported the judgment and submitted that no interest can be granted on the
date of possession. Reliance in this behalf has been placed on R.L. Jain (D)
c
By LRs. v. DDA and Ors., [2004] 4 SCC 79.

FINDINGS:

It is not in dispute that the High Court issued a writ of mandamus. It
D
is also not in dispute that the direction of the High Court was acted upon.
The principle of res judicata, as is well-known, would apply in different
proceedings arising out of the same course of action but would also apply
in different stages of the same proceedings. As the judgment and order
passed in C.W.P. No. 510of1985 attained finality, we are of the opinion that
the Respondents herein could not have raised any contention contrary thereto E
or inconsistent therewith in any subsequent proceedings. Jn fact the Land
Acquisition Officer while passing the award on 31.1.1991 took into
consideration the said direction and awarded 12% additional compensation at
< the market value. The said order of the Land Acquisition Officer never came
to be questioned and, thus, attained finality.
F
Section 18 of the Act provides that any person who has not accepted
the award may file an application for referring the dispute for determination
of the court inter alia as regard the amount of compensation.

The State could have filed such an application under Section 18. It did G
not choose to do so. Only the Appellant herein took recourse to the said
provision culminating in passing of the impugned judgment of the High
Court.

Thus, the award of the Land Acquisition Officer directing payment of
additional interest has also attained finality. H
912 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A In the Reference Court or for that matter the High Court exercising its
appellate jurisdiction under Section 54 of the Act could not have dealt with
the said question. The principle of res judicata is species of the principle of
estoppel. When a proceeding based on a particular cause of action has
attained finality, the principle of res judicata shall fully apply.

B Reference in this regard may be made to Wade and Forsyth on
Administrative Law, 9th Ed., pg. 243, wherein it is stated:

"One special variety of estoppel is res judicata. This results from the
rule which prevents the parties to a judicial determination from litigating
the same question over again even though the determination is
c demonstrably wrong. Except in proceedings by way of appeal, the
parties bound by the judgment are estopped from questioning it. As
between one another they may neither pursue the same cause of
action again, nor may they again litigate any issue which was an
essential element in the decision. These two aspects are sometimes
D distinguished as 'cause of action estoppel' and 'issue estoppel.'

In Hope Plantations Ltd. v. Taluk Land Board, Peermade and Anr.,
. (1999] 5 SCC 590, this Court observed:

"Law on res judicata and estoppel is well understood in India and
E there are ample authoritative pronouncements by various courts on
these subjects. As noted above, the plea of res judicata, though
technical, is based on public policy in order to put an end to litigation.
It is, however, different if an issue which had been decided in an
earlier litigation again arises for determination between the same parties
in a suit based on a fresh cause of action or where there is continuous
F cause of action. The parties then may not be bound by the determination
made earlier if in the meanwhile, law has changed or has been
interpreted differently by a higher forum ... "

In 'The Doctrine of Res Judicata' 2nd Edition by George Spencer Bower
G and Turner, it is stated :

"A judicial decision is deemed final, when it leaves nothing to be
judicially determined or ascertained thereafter, in order to render it
effective and capable of execution, and is absolute, complete, and
certain, and when it is not lawfully subject to subsequent rescission,
H. review, or modification by the tribunal which pronounced it. ... "
ISHWAR DUTT v. LAND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR [BHAN, J.] 913

Reference, in this connection, may also be made to Ram Chandra Singh A
' v. Savitri Devi and Ors., JT (2005) 11 SC 439.

Yet recently in Swamy Atmananda and Ors. V. Sri Ramakrishna
Tapovanam and Ors., JT (2005) 4 SC 472 in which one of us was a party,
this Court observed:
B
"The object and purport of principle of res judicata as contained in
Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is to uphold the rule of
conclusiveness of judgment, as to the points decided earlier of fact,
or of law, or of fact and law, in every subsequent suit between the
same parties. Once the matter which was the subject-matter of !is
stood determined by a competent court, no party thereafter can be C
permitted to reopen it in a subsequent litigation. Such a rule was
brought into the statute book with a view to bring the litigation to an
end so that the other side may not be put to harassment.

The principle of res judicata envisages that a judgment of a court
of concurrent jurisdiction directly upon a point would create a bar as D
regards a plea, between the same parties in some other matter, in
another court, where the said plea seeks to raise afresh the very point
that was determined in the earlier judgment."

It was further noticed:
E
"In Ishwardas v. the State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors., AIR (1979)
SC 551, this Court held:

" ... In order to sustain the plea of res judicata it is not necessary that
all the parties to the two litigations must be common. All that is
necessary is that the issue should be between the same parties or F
between parties under whom they or any of them claim ... "

Yet again in Arnold v. National Westminster Bank Pie., (1991] 3 ALL
ER 41, the House of Lords noticed the distinction between cause of action
estoppel and issue estoppel. Cause of action estoppel arises where the cause G
of action in the later proceedings is identical to that in the earlier proceedings,
the latter having been between the same parties or their privies and having
involved the same subject-matter. In such a case, the bar is absolute in relation
to all points decided unless fraud or collusion is alleged, such as to justify
setting aside the earlier judgment. The discovery of new factual matter which
could not have been found out by reasonable diligence for use in the earlier H
914 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
L
A proceedings does not, according to the law of England, permit the latter to
r-'
be reopened. Issue estoppel may arise where a particular issue forming a
necessary ingredient in a cause of action has been litigated and decided and
'
in subsequent proceedings between the same parties involving a different ~
cause of action to which the same issue is relevant, one of the parties seeks
to reopen that issue. Here also bar is complete to relitigation but its operation
B can be thwarted under certain circumstances. The House then finally observed:
but there is room for the view that the underlying principles upon which
estoppel is based, public policy .and justice have greater force in cause of
action estoppel, the subject-matter of the two proceedings being identical,
than they do in issue estoppel, where the subject-matter is different. Once it
c is accepted that different considerations apply to issue estoppel, it is hard to
perceive any logical distinction between a point which was previously raised
and decided and one which might have been but was not. Given that the
further material which would have put an entirely different complexion on
the point was at the earlier stage unknown to the party and could not by
reasonable diligence have been discovered by him, it is hard to see why there
D should be a different result according to whether he decided not to take the
point, thinking it hopeless, or argue it faintly without any real hope of success.

In Gulabchand Chhota/a/ Parikh v. State of Gujarat, AIR (1965) SC "
1153 the Constitution Bench held that the principle of res judicata is also
applicable to subsequent suits where the same issues between the same parties
E
had been decided in an earlier proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution.

It is trite that the principle of res judicata is also applicable to the writ
proceedings. [See Himacha/ Pradesh Road Transport Corporation v. Ba/want
Singh, [1993) Supp 1 SCC 552).
F
In Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar and Anr., [2005] I SCC 787,
it was held:

"It is now well-settled that principles of res judicata applies in different
stages of the same proceedings. [See Satyadhyan Ghosal and Ors. v. L
I

G Smt. Deorajin Debi and Anr., AIR (1960) SC 941 and Prahlad Singh
v. Col. Sukhdev Singh, [1987) I SCC 727). f"
~

In YB. Patil (supra) it was held:

"4 ... It is well settled that principles of res judicata can be invoked
not only in separate subsequent proceedings, they also get attracted
H ,!M
ISHWAR DUTT v. LAND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR [BHAN, J.] 915
_... in subsequent stage of the same proceedings. Once an order made in A
the course of a proceeding becomes final, it would be binding at the
subsequent state of that proceeding ..."

. It was further observed:

"In a case of this nature, however, the doctrine of 'issue estoppel' as B
also 'cause of action estoppel' may arise. In Thoday (supra) Lord
Diplock held :

" ... cause of action estoppel" is that which prevents a party to an
action from asserting or denying, as against the other party, the
existence of a particular cause of action, the non-existence or existence c
of which has been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in
previous litigation between the same parties. If the cause of action
was determined to exist, i.e., judgment was given on it, it is said to
be merged in the judgment....If it was determined not to exist, the
unsuccessful plaintiff can no longer assert that it does; he is estopped
per rem judicatam." D
The said dicta was followed in Barber v. Staffordshire Country
Council, [1996] 2 All ER 748. A cause of action estoppel arises
where in two different proceedings identical issues are raised, in which

- event, the latter proceedings between the same parties shall be dealt
with similarly as was done in the previous proceedings. In such an
event the bar is absolute in relation to all points decided save and
except allegation of fraud and collusion. [See C. (a minor) v. Hackney
E

London Borough Council, [1996) 1 All ER 973).

[See 'The Doctrine of Res judicata', 2nd Edn. by Spencer Bower and
Turner p. 149)
F

In this view of the matter, the High C~urt, in our opinion, had no
jurisdiction to go into the aforementioned question.

Furthermore, a writ of mandamus is required to be obeyed unless a G
judgment is overruled or a legislation by way of validating statute is brought
into force.

In Madan Mohan Pathak and Anr v. Union of India and Ors., [1978]
2 SCC 50 : AIR (1978) SC 803), the Constitution Bench observed:
H
916 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A "Here, the judgment given by the Calcutta High Court, which is
relied upon by the petitioners, is not a mere declaratory judgment
holding an impost or tax to be invalid, so that a validation statute can
remove the defect pointed out by the judgment amending the law
with retrospective effect and validate such impost or tax. But it is a
judgment giving effect to the right of the petitioners to annual cash
B bonus under the Settlement by issuing a writ of mandamus directing
the Life Insurance Corporation to pay the amount of such bonus. If
by reason of retrospective alteration of the factual or legal situation,
the judgment is rendered erroneous, the remedy may be by way of
appeal or review, but so long as the judgment stands, it cannot be
C disregarded or ignored and it must be obeyed by the Life Insurance
Corporation. We are, therefore, of the view that, in any event,
irrespective of whether the impugned Act is constitutionally valid or
not, the Life Insurance Corporation is bound to obey the writ of
mandamus issued by the Calcutta High Court and to pay annual cash
bonus for the year April I, I 975 to March 31, 1976 to Class III and
D Class IV employees."

In any e_vent, the directions issued by the court stood complied with.
Having regard to Section 18 of the Act or otherwise the wheel cannot be
turned back.

E We must also note th1t the question raised by the learned Judges of the
High Court was not raised by the Respondents although having regard to the
decision of this Court in Dharam Das (supra) it was available.

The High Court, in our opinion, although has a wide power in terms of
F Section I 07 of the Code of Civil Procedure but it could not have gone
outside the pleadings and make out a new case.

In Siddu Venkappa Devadiga v. Smt. Rangu S. Devadiga and Ors.,
[1977] 3 sec 532, it was held:

"8 ... As has been stated, the defendant traversed that claim in his
G written statement and pleaded that the business always belonged to
him as owner. There was thus no plea that the business was "benami"
for Shivanna. We also find that the parties did not join issue on the
question that the business was "benami". On the other hand, the point
at issue was whether Shivanna was the owner of the business and the
H
ISHWAR DUTT v. LAND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR [BHAN, J.1 917

tenancy rights of the premises where it was being carried on. It is A
well-settled, having been laid down by this Court in Trojan and Co.
Ltd. v. RM N.N. Nagappa Chettiar and Raruha Singh v. Achal Singh
that the decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the
plea of Hie parties, and that it is the case pleaded which has to be
found. The High Court therefore went wrong in ignoring this basic
principle of law, and in making out an entirely new case which was B
not pleaded and was not the subject-matter of the trial."

For the reasons stated above, the appeals are accepted, the impugned
judgments under appeals are set aside and that of the Reference Court are
affirmed. No costs.

V.S.S. Appeal allowed.