Holding

The dying declaration was not reliable due to procedural infirmities and the deceased's unfit condition, and therefore could not form the sole basis for conviction under Section 302 IPC.

Summary

The appellant, Jai Karan, was convicted under Section 302 IPC for allegedly burning his wife, Wanti Devi, based solely on her dying declaration recorded by a doctor in a hospital. The trial and High Courts held the declaration reliable, but the Supreme Court examined the circumstances surrounding its recording, noting that the doctor who took the statement was not on duty in the burns ward, the declaration was made in Hindi and transcribed in English without being read back or signed, and medical endorsements indicated the deceased was not in a fit condition to make such a statement. The Court reiterated the principles governing the admissibility and reliability of dying declarations under Section 32 of the Evidence Act, emphasizing the need for the declarant to be conscious, voluntary, and capable of identifying the accused. Given the procedural infirmities and lack of corroborative evidence, the Court found the dying declaration unreliable. Consequently, the conviction could not stand, and the appellant was acquitted.

Issues considered

Whether the dying declaration of the deceased is reliable and admissible under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act.
Whether a conviction under Section 302 IPC can be based solely on a dying declaration that lacks corroboration and exhibits procedural defects.
Whether the medical testimony regarding the deceased's condition and the doctor's duty status affect the credibility of the dying declaration.

Legislation cited

Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 32
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302

Subjects

dying declarationreliabilitySection 302 IPCSection 32 Evidence Actconviction without corroborationmedical testimonyhearsay exceptioncriminal law

Judgment

A JAi KARAN
v.
STATE OF (N.C.T. OF DELHI)

SEPTEMBER 27, 1999

B [K.T. THOMAS AND D.P. MOHAPATRA, JJ.]

Indian Penal Code, 1860 : Section 302.

Murder---Accused--<:ausing death of wife by burning her-Conviction
C based on dying declaration of wife-Validity of.
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 : Section 32.

Dying declaration-Evidentiary value of-Accused-Allegation of wife
burning-Dying declaration by deceased wife before Doctor-Evidence dis-
D closing that Doctor before whom declaration was made was not on duty in
the ward in which deceased was admitted-Statement made by deceased in
Hindi recorded in English and also not read over to her-Signature of
deceased not obtained-No endorsement that deceased was in a fircondition
to make statement-Held, dying declaration made in such circumstances was
E not reliable-Conviction based on such a declaration held not valid.
The appellant was prosecuted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860. The prosecution case was that he burnt his wife by pouring
kerosene oil on her after a fight between the two. The evidence rested
solely on the dying declaration made by the deceased before a Doctor in
F the hospital. However, it was evident from the record that the Doctor
before whom the dying declaration was claimed to have been made was
not allotted duty in the unit in which deceased was admitted. In his
evidence the said doctor stated that the injured person made the state-
ment in Hindi while he recorded it in English; that he had not read over
G and explained the contents of the documents to the injured and had also
not taken signature or thumb impression of the deceased on the docu-
ment. Relying upon the said dying declaration the Trial Court convicted
the appellant and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for life. On
appeal the High Court held that the dying declaration was a reliable piece
of evidence on which the order of conviction could be based and accord-
H ingly confirmed the conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court.
200
JAI KARAN v. ST_ATE OF (N.C.T. OF DELHI) 201

In appeal to this Court ·on the question whether the dying declara- A
tion made by the deceased was reliable and conviction can be based on
the same:

Allowing the appeal and setting aside the impugned judgment, this
Court
B
HELD : 1. The Courts below erred in passing the judgment and
order of conviction against the appellant on the basis of dying declaration.
In the facts and circumstances of the case emerging from the evidence on
record it is difficult to rely on the alleged dying declaration as the sole
basis for conviction. [210-A] C

2. From the statement of Doctor, who was the head of the unit of
the hospital in which deceased was admitted, it is clear that the Doctor
before·whom the dying declaration was said to have been made, was not
allotted duty in the unit in which the deceased was admitted. This state-
ment by the head of the unit is very important. It raises a serious doubt D
whether the Doctor before whom the dying delcaration was said to have
been made was at all on duty in the burns ward at the time when the
injured was admitted. Further, from the endorsement made by another
Doctor who was the medical officer in charge of the ward it is clear that
the deceased was not in a fit condition for making a statement. There was
no statement as to when her condition improved and she became fit for
E
making the statement. Consequently, it will not be safe to convict the
appellant solely on the basis of the dying declaration made by the
deceased. [209-E·F-G; 210-A]

3. A dying declaration is admissible in evidence on the pl'inciple of F
necessity and can form the basis for conviction if it is found to be reliable.
While it is in the nature of an exception to the general rule forbidding
hearsay evidence, it is admitted on the premise that ordinarily a dying
person will not falsely implicate an innocent person in the commission of
a serious crime. It is this premise which is considered strong enough to
set off the need that the maker of the statement should state so on oath G
and be cross examined by the person who is sought to be implicated. Jn
order that a dying declaration may form the sole basis for conviction
without the need for independent corroboration it must be shown that the
person making it had the opportunity of identifying the person implicated
and is thoroughly reliable and free from blemish. If, in the facts and H
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A circumstances of the case, it is found that the maker of the statement was
in a fit state of mind and had voluntarily made the statement on the basis
of personal knowledge without being influenced by others and the court
on strict scrutiny finds it to be reliable, there is no rule of law or even of
prudence that such a reliable piece of evidence cannot be acted upon
B unless it is corroborated. A dying declaratrion is an independent piece of
evidence like any other piece of evidence - neither extra strong nor weak
• and can be acted upon without corroboration if it is found to be other·
wise true and reliable. [204-D·E·F·G·H]

Padmaben Shamalbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, [1991) 1 SCC 744;
C Jayaraj v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR (1976) SC 1519; Khushal Rao v. State
of Bombay, AIR (1958) SC 22 and Paniben v. State of Gujarat, [1992] 2
sec 474, relied on.
Munnu Raja v. State of M.P., [1976] 3 SCC 104; State of U.P. v. Ram
Sagar Yadav, [1985] 1 SCC 552; Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar, [1983]
D 1 SCC 211; K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor, [1976] 3 SCC
618; Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P., [1974] 4 SCC 264; Kake Singh v. State
of M.P., [1981] Supp. SCC 25; Ram Manorath v. State of U.P., [1981] 2
SCC 654; State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu, [1980]
Supp. SCC 455; Surajdeo Oza v. State of Bihar, [1980] Supp. SCC 769;
E Nanahau Ram v. State of M.P., [1988] Supp. SCC 152 and State of U.P.
v. Madan Mohan, [1989] 3 SCC 390, referred to.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
930 of 1998.

p From the Judgment and Order dated 19.11.97 of the Delhi High
Court in Cr!. A. No. 91 of 1994.

Ms. Manjeet Chawla for the Appellant.

P.P.Malhotra, (Y.P. Mahajan) for Mrs. Anil Katiyar for the Respon-
G dent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

D.P. MOHAPATRA, J.: In this appeal filed by the accused Jai Karan
the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi in Sessions
H case No. 16/91 holding him guilty of the charge under Section 302 IPC for
JAi KARAN v. STATE OF (N.C.T. OF DELHI) [D.P. MOHAPATRA, J.] 203

the murder of his wife Wanti Devi (hereinafter referred. to as 'deceased') A
· and the order sentencing him to R.I. for life which was confirmed by the
High Court of Delhi in Criminal Appeal No.91/94, is under challenge.

The genesis of the case is that the relationship between the appellant
and the deceased was not cordial. The deceased had gone to the Court
with a claim for maintenance against the appellant. On the intervention of B
their relations and well-wishers the differences were patched-up and he
withdrew the case. Thereafter the deceased returned to her marital home
I
and started living with the appellant. This happened about 7-8 months
before the fateful incident.

On the intervening night of 25/26.9 .90 the deceased was admitted to
c
the Jai Prakash Narain Hospital, Delhi (LNJPN) with extensive burn
. injuries on her body. On being informed about it by the duty constable, S.I.
Baltej Singh (PW 19) arrived at the hospital and obtained the medico-legal
certificate of .the deceased in which it was stated inter-alia that the story
given by the patient was to the effect that she was burnt by her husband D
by pouring kerosene oil after a fight between the two. On such information
a formal FIR under Section 307 IPC was registered. Later in the day at
about 9 .45 a.m. on receiving the information that Wanti Devi expired at
8.35 a.m. the case was converted into one under Section 302 IPC. After
investigation charge-sheet under Section 302 IPC was ·filed against the E
appellant.

Having denied the charge the appellant faced trial. It was his case
that the injuries sustained by the deceased were accidental and the incident
occurred when she was trying to light the kerosene stove.
F
The prosecution examined in all 19 witnesses including three Doc-
tors, Dr. Anil Kumar Aggarwal (PW 2), who conducted the post mortem
. examination of the deceased; Dr. P.S. Bhandari (PW 3), who was the head
of the unit of the LNJPN Hospital, Delhi in which injured Wanti Devi was
admitted; Dr. Gaurav Nijhara (PW 11), who is said to have recorded the
dying declaration of the deceased (Ex.PW 11/A); Munshi Ram (PW 4) and G
Joginder Singh (PW 5) neighbours of the parties; Hari Singh (PW 10)
father of the deceased; Chhano Devi (PW 17) mother cif the deceased;
Prem Singh (PW 16) a nephew of the deceased and Baltej Singh (PW 19),
Sub-Inspector of Police, the Investigating Officer. Neither the neighbours
nor the relations of the deceased supported the prosecution case and they H
..

204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A were cross-examined by the public prosecutor with permission of the
Court.

Beena (DW 1) daughter of the deceased was the sole witness for the
defence ..

B The learned trial judge, as appears from the discussion in the judg-
ment, believed the prosecution case that it was the accused who poured
kerosene on his wife· and lit the match-stick on account of which she
suffered the fatal injuries, relying mainly on the dying declaration (Exh.
11/A) and accordingly passed the order of conviction and sentence.
c The High Court on perusal of the oral and documentary evidence
came to the conclusion that the dying declaration was a reliable piece of
evidence on which the order of conviction could be based and accordingly
confirmed the judgment and order of the trial court.

D The short Question that arises is whether the dying declaration said
to have been made by the deceased (Exh. 11/A) is believable and accept-
able and conviction can be based on the same.

A dying declaration is admissible in evidence on the principle of
E necessity and can form the basis for conviction if it is found to be reliable.
While it is in the nature of an exception to the general rule forbidding
hearsay evidence, it is admitted on the premise that ordinarily a dying
person will not falsely implicate an innocent person in the commission of
a serious crime. It is this premise which is considered strong enough to set
off the need that the maker of the statement should state so on oath and
F be cross examined by the person who is sought to be implicated. In order
that a dying declaration may form the sole basis for conviction without the
need for independent corroboration it must be shown that the person
making it had the opportunity of identifying the person implicated and is
thoroughly reliable and free from blemish. If, in the facts and circumstances
G of the case, it is found that the maker of the statement was in a fit state of
mind and had voluntarily made the statement on the basis of personal
knowledge without being influenced by others and the Court on strict
scrutiny finds it to be reliable, there is no rule of law or even of prudence
that such a reliable piece of evidence cannot be acted upon unless it is
corroborated. A dying declaration is an independent piece of evidence like
H any other piece of evidence - neither extra strong nor weak-and can be
JAlKARANv. SfATEoF(N.C.T.OFDELHI) (D.P. MOHAPA1RA,J.j 205

-
acted upon without corroboration if it is found to be otherwise true and . A
reliable. (1991) 1SCC744 Padmaben ShamalbhaiPatel v.State of Gujarat,
Para 8.

In A.IR (1976) SC1519 (Iayaraj v. State of Tamil Nadu) this Court
made the following observations :
B
.·"When the deponent (while making his dying declaration)was in
severe bodily pain (because of stabbing injuries in abdomen), and
words were scarce, his natural impulse would be to ten _the .
Magistrate, without wasting his breath on details, as to who had
· stabbed him. The very brevity of dying declaration, in the cir-
.. · cllmstances of the· case, far from being a suspicious circumstance, c
was an index of its being tiue arid free from the taint of tut()ring,
more so when the substratum of the dyingdeclaration was fully
consistent with the ocular account given by the eye-witnesses."

In case of Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay, AIR (1958) SC 22 this D
.Court laid down the. following· propositions of law relating to the test of
reliability of dying declaration :

(1) That it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a
dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction ·
unless it is corroborated; E

(2) That each case must be determined_ on its own facts keeping
in view the circumstances in which the dying declaration was
made;

(3) · That. it cannot. be laid down as a general proposition. that· a F
dying declaration is a. weaker kind of evidence than other
piece of evidence;

· (4) That a dying .declaration stallds on the same footing as
another .piece of evidence and has to be judged in the light G
of surrounding circumstances and with reference to the prin·
ciples go".eming the weighi!lg of evidence;

(5) · That a dying declaration which has been retarded by a
. competent· Ma!iistrate in the proper manner, that is to say, in
the form of questions and answers, and, as-far as practicabte, H
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A in the words of the maker of the declaration which depends-

(6)
upon oral testimony which may suffer from all the infirmities
of human memory and human character; and

That in order to test the reliability of a dying declaration, the
-
Court has to keep in view, the circumstances like the oppor-
B tunity of the dying man for observation, for example, whether
there was sufficient light if the crime was committed at night;
whether the capacity of the man to remember the facts stated, ....
had not been impaired at the time he was making the state-
ment, by circumstances beyond his control; that the statement
c has been consistent throughout if he had several opportunities
of making a dying declaration apart from the official record
of it; and that the statement had been made at the earliest
opportunity and was not the result of tutoring by interested
parties.

D
In the case of Paniben v. State of Gujarat, [1992] 2 SCC 474 this Court
summed up the principles of dying declaration with the following observa-
tion (para 18):

"Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is
E worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross examina-
tion. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation
of oath could be. This is the reason the Court also insists that the
dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full
confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court has to be on
F guard that the statement of deceased was not as a result of either
tutoring, prompting or a product of imagination. The Court must
·be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind
. 'after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailants.
Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and
voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any
G further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule
of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of
conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corrobora-
tion is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in
several judgments the principles governing dying declaration,
H which could be summed up as under :
JAi KARAN v. SfATE OF (N.C.T. OF DELHI) [D.P. MOHAPATRA, J.] 207

"(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying A
declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration (Munnu
Raja V. State of M.P., [1976] 3 sec 104;

(ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and
voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (State
of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav, [1985] 1 SCC 552 and Ramawati Devi B
v. State of Bihar, [1983] 1 SCC 211).

(iii) This Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully
and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring,
prompting or imagination. The deceased had opportunity to ob- c
serve and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the
declaration (K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutors, [1976]
3 sec 618);

(iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted
D
upon without corroborative evidence Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P.,
.... [1974] 4 sec 264;

(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make
any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be
rejected. (Kake Singh v. State of M.P., [1981] Supp SCC 25); E

(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form
the basis of conviction (Ram Manorath v. State of U.P., [1981] 2
sec 654);
F
(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the
details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (State of
Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu, [1980] Supp. SCC
455);

(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be G
discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself
guarantees truth, Surajdeo Oza v. State of Bihar, [1980] Supp. SCC
769;

(ix) Normally the Court in order to satisfy whether deceased was H
208 . SUPREMECOURTREPORTS (1999)SUPP.3S.C.R.

A in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to
the"medical ·opinion. But where the eye witness has:said that the
. deceased was in a fit . and conscious.· state to make this dying
declaration, .the medical opinion cannot prevail. (Nanahau Ram v.
State of M.P.; [1988] Supp. SCC 152);
B
(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given
in the dying declaration, the-said declaration cannot be acted upon.
(State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan, [1989) 3 SCC 390).'"

Testing the case in hand on the tou.chstone of the principles laid
C down in the decisions noted above the position thai -emerges is that the
prosecution evidence rests solely on the dying declaration said to have been
made by the deceased since the parents, other relations and neighbours
did not support its case. From the evidence of Dr. Bhandari (PW 3), it·
appears that he had produced the case sheets pertaining to injured Wanti
D Devi
.
in tne
I
Court and with reference to those papers he stated that the
injured was admitted in the burns ward of the hospital on 26.9.90 at 1.00
a.m. with 95% burns; that she was seen by Dr. Rajencier Prasad Singh, the
then medical officer on duty in the ward and that the case sheets were
written by Dr. Rajender Prasad Singh. From the evidence of this witness
E it is clear th~t though. he was the head of the unit in which the patient ~s
admitted he had not personally. attended the patient nor had any
knowledge.about the.statement made by her. The .witness could not say
where- Dr. Gaurav Nijhara was on duty' on that day, even after seeing
records.

F .Dr. Gaurav Nijhara (PWU) in his testimony has stated that he was
posted as medical officer in L.NJ.P. hospital on 26.9.90 and on that day·
injured Wanti Devi wife of Jai Karan was brought to the hospital by her
husband. It is also in his evidence that the injured told the witness that
after a fight with her husband he (husband) poured kerosene on her and
G lit the fire; that on examining the injured he found her having 90% burns;
that she was conscious, cooperative and oriented regarding tim~, place and
person. The witness claims that he admitted her in the· burns ward and
prepared her MLC No. 897(;6 and he signed the document Ex.PW 11/A.
The witness also examined the accused when he brought his wife and gave
H the ·history of burning both his hands whil.e "burning his wife with
JAi KARAN v. STATE OF (N.C.T. OF DELHI) [D.P. MOHAPATRA, J.J 209

kerosene". This history was also written by the witness (Ex.PW 11/B). The A
.
witness has also stated that
.
the injured persons (deceased and accused)
made the statement in Hindi while he recorded it in English, that he had
not read over and explained the contents of the document to the injured.
He had also not taken her signature or thumb impression on the document.
No other pe_!:son had attested the statement alleged to have been made by
B
the injured Wanti Devi before the witness.

A look <ft the document Ex. PW 11/A clearly brings out that an
endorsement had been made by Dr. Rajender Prasad Singh at 1.10 a.m.
that the injured Wanti Devi was not in a fit condition for making statement.
This endorsement also gains support from the evidence of the Police C
Officer (PW 19) who stated that on getting the information·. about the
incident when he reached the. hospital he was told that. the. injured is .not
in a fit condition for making any statement and he returned without
recording any statement.
D
· . A closer look at the document also shows that a portion of it stating
"after fight between the two" was written in a different manner (words
written in smaller letters) giving an impression that it was not written at
the time of making the rest of the endorsements.
E
From the statement of Dr. Bhandari it is clear that Dr. Gaurav
Nijhara was not allotted duty in the unit in which the deceased Wanti Devi
was admitte~L It is his categorical statement that he could not say where
Dr. Nijhara .was allotted duty in the hospital. This statement by the head
ofthe unit is very important. The statement raises a serious doubt whether
Dr. Gaurav Nijhara was at· all on duty in the burns yvard at the time when
F
· the injured was admitted. Further, from the endorsement made by Dr.
Rajender Prasad Singh who was the medical officer in charge of the ward
the injured was not· in a· fit condition for making a statement: There is no
statement made by Dr. Nijhara or any other witness when her condition
improved and she b~callie fit for making the statement. Unfortunately, Dr. G
Rajender Prasad Singh has not been examined by the prosecution.

In the fads and circumstances of the case e~etging from the
evidence on record as discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, we find it · ·
difficult to rely ~n the alleged dying declaration as sole basis for conviction. H
210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A On perusal of the records and on giving our anxious considerations
to the entire matter we are of the view that it will not be safe to convict
the appellant solely on the basis of the dying declaration made by the
deceased. The learned Courts below erred in passing the judgment and
order of conviction against the appellant on that basis.
B The appeal is allowed. The impugned Judgment of the High Court
of Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 91 of 1994 confirming the .judgment of
the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi in Sessions Case No .16 of 1991 is set
aside and the appellant is acquitted of the charges framed against him.

T.N.A. Appeal allowed.

' .