Holding

Section 16 creates a rebuttable presumption that a registered adoption document proves a lawful adoption, and the Supreme Court will not re‑appreciate the evidence as the lower courts' orders were not perverse.

Summary

Shakuntala, the natural daughter of the deceased Sunda Ram, sued to be declared owner of his property, challenging a registered adoption deed that named Jai Singh as an adopted son. The trial court and two appellate courts held that the adoption was invalid and decreed in favour of Shakuntala. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether Section 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 creates an irrebuttable presumption that a registered adoption document proves a lawful adoption. The Court held that the statutory presumption is expressly rebuttable, as the provision includes the words "unless and until it is disproved". It further ruled that the Supreme Court could not re‑appreciate the evidential record because the lower courts' orders were not perverse. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, leaving the lower courts' decisions intact.

Issues considered

Whether the presumption under Section 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, in respect of a registered adoption document is irrebuttable or rebuttable.
Whether the Supreme Court, under Article 136, may re‑appreciate evidence in a second appeal in the absence of perversity.
Whether the adoption of Jai Singh complied with the statutory requirements of the Act.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedures. 100
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 125
Constitution of Indias. Article 136
Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956s. 16

Subjects

adoptionstatutory presumptionrebuttable presumptionHindu Adoption and Maintenance Actproperty successionspecial leave jurisdictionevidence reappreciationperverse order

Judgment

JAi SINGH A
v.
SHAKUNTALA

MARCH 14, 2002

[UMESH C. BANERJEE AND BRIJESH KUMAR, JJ.] B

Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956-Section 16-Registered
document relating to adoption-Statutory presumption that adoption made in
accordance with law-Whether such,presumption rebuttable-Held, such C
presumption arising.from adoption deed can be rebutted by evidence available
on record-On fact, no specific ceremonies of adoption nor any evidence
tendered pertaining to adoption-Thus presumption is rebuttable.

Constitution of India-Article I 36-Special leave jurisdiction-
Reappreciation ofevidence-Scope of-Held. is permissible in very exceptional D
cases and on extreme perversity.

Respondent-natural daughter of deceased filed suit for declaration that
she was the owner of the property left by her father. She alleged that the
decree passed in civil suit instituted earlier and registered will alleged to have
been executed by her father together with the Adoption Deed recording that E
appellant had been adopted by her father were illegal and thus not binding
on her. Trial Court decreed the suit. Aggrieved, appellant filed appeal which
was dismissed. High Court also dismissed the appeal thus negating the
adoption.

Hence the present appeal. F
The question that arose for consideration is whether presumption
envisaged under Section 16 of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956
in respect of a registered document pertaining to adoption that the adoption
has been made in accordance with law is irrebuttable.
G
" Dismissing the appeal, the Court

- HELD: 1.1. Section 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act,
1956 envisages a statutory presumption that in the event of there being a
registered document pertaining to adoption there would be a presumption H
431
432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.

A that adoption has been made in accordance with law. Mandate of the Statute
is rather definite since the Legislature has used "shall" instead of any other
word of lesser significance. Incidentally, however, the in.clusion of the words
"unless and until it is disproved" appearing at the end of the statutory
provision has made the situation not that rigid but flexible enough to depend
B upon the evidence available on record in support of adoption. It is a matter
of grave significance by reason of the factum of adoption and displacement
of the person adopted from the natural succession thus onus of proof is rather
heavy. Statute has allowed some amount of flexibility, lest it turns out to be
solely dependent on a registered adoption deed. The reason for inclusion of
the words "unless and until it is disproved" shall have to be ascertained in its
C proper perspective and as such the presumption cannot but be said to be a
rebuttable presumption Statutory intent thus stands out to be rather
expressive depicting therein that the presumption cannot be an irrebuttable
presumption by reason of the inclusion of the words. [433-G-H; 434-A-C]

Madan Singh v. Mst. Sham Kaur and Ors., AIR (1973) P & H 122,
D approved.

1.2. While scrutiny of evidence does not stand out to be totally prohibited
in the matter of exercise of jurisdiction in the second appeal and that would
be too broad a proposition and too rigid an interpretation of law not worthy
of acceptance but that does not also clothe the superior courts within
E jurisdiction to intervene and interferes in any and every matter-it is only in
very exceptional cases and on extreme perversity that the authority to examine
the same in extenso stands permissible-it is a rarity rather than a regularity
and thus it can be safely concluded that while there is no prohibition as such,
but the power to scrutiny can only be had in very exceptional circumstances
p and upon proper circumspection. This is, however, without expression of any
opinion pertaining to Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 1435-A-C]

1.3. Presumption is a rebuttable presumption. While it is true that the
registered instrument of adoption presumably stands out to be taken to be
correct but the Court is not precluded from looking into it upon production
G of some evidence contra the adoption. Evidence, which is made available to
the Court for rebutting the presumption, can always be looked into and it is
on production of that evidence that the High Court has recorded a finding_of
non-availability of the presumption to the Appellant [435-G-H; 436-Al ....

1.4. It is on this factual backdrop that no specific ceremonies have been
H noted neither any evidence has been tendered pertaining to the adoption, High
JAi SINGH v. SHAKUNTALA [BANERJEE, J.] 433

Court upon, recording the fact of the presumption being rebuttable, came to A
a conclusion negating the adoption, Thus, there is no reason to lend
concurrence to the submissions of appellant that the statutory presumption
should give way to all other instances available on record. The presumption
as the Statute prescribes and on the state of evidence available on record
question of decrying the order of the trial court as also of the two appellate B
courts on the fact situation of the matter in issue cannot be termed to be so
perverse so as to authorise this Court to scan the evidence and reappreciate
the same, (438-B-C)

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 9469 of
1996.
c
From the Judgment and Order dated 5.2.96 of the Punjab and Haryana
High Court in R.S.A.S. No. 285 of 1996.

• P.C. Jain Balbir Singh Gupta for the Appellant.

Raju Ramachandran, R.S. Rao and Ms. lndu Malhotra for the D
Respondent.

• The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

BANERJEE, J. The matter under consideration pertains to the effect
of statutory presumption as envisaged under Section 16 of the Hindu Adoption E
and Maintenance Act, 1956. For convenience sake it would be worthwhile to
note the provision for its true purport. Section 16 reads as below:

"16. Presunlption as'to registered docu111ents relating to adoption.-
.......
Whenever any document registered under any law for the time being
F
in force is produced before any Court purporting to record an adoption
made and is signed by the person giving and the person taking the
child in adoption, the Court shall presume that the adoption has been
made in compliance with the provisions of this Act unless and until
it is disproved."
G
I ... The Section thus envisages a statutory presumption that in the event of

~
there being a registered document pertaining to adoptior. there would be a
presumption that adoption has been made in accordance with law. Mandate
of the Statute is rather definite since the Legislature has used "shall" in stead
of any other word of lesser significance. Incidentally, however the inclusion
of the words "unless and until it is disproved" appearing at the end of the H
434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) 2 S.C.R.

A statutory provision has made the situation not that rigid but flexible enough
to depend upon the evidence available on record in support of adoption. It
is a matter of grave significance by reason of the factum of adoption and
displacement of the person adopted from the natural succession - thus onus
of proof is rather heavy. Statute has allowed some amount of flexibility, lest
it turns out to be solely dependent on a registered adoption deed. The reason
B for inclusion of the words "unless and until it is disproved" shall have to be
ascertained in its proper perspective and as such the presumption cannot but
be said to be a rebuttable presumption. Sta'tµtory intent thus stands out to be
rather expressive depicting therein that the presumption cannot be an
irrebuttable presumption by reason of the inclusion of the words just noticed
C above. On the wake of the aforesaid the observations of the learned single
Judge in Madan Singh v. Mst. Sham Kaur and Ors., AIR (1973) P&H 122)
stands confirmed and we record our concurrence therewith.

In the contextual facts a Deed of Adoption dated 1.6.1973 came into
existence and stands registered in the Sub Registrar's office at Charkhi, Dadri
D in the State of Punjab.

Adverting to the factual backdrop briefly at this juncture it is to be
noted that the dispute relates to the estate of one Sunda Ram and the contest
stands out to be between one Shakuntala being the daughter of Sunda Ram
and Jai Singh, who claims to be the adopted son.
E
Record depicts that the plaintiff (respondent herein) filed a suit for
declaration that she was the owner in possession of the suit land and that the
decree dated August I, 1986 passed in Civil Suit instituted on July 23, 1986
and registered will dated February 14, 1974 alleged to have been executed by
her father together with the Adoption Deed dated June I, 1973 recording that
F Jai Singh had been adopted by Sunda Ram were illegal and result of
misrepresentation of facts and thus not binding on her. The trial Court decreed
the suit. Appeal therefrom filed by the defendant/appellant was dismissed
and even the second appeal also stands dismissed.

G Mr. Jain, the learned senior Advocate appearing in support of the appeal
contended that in the event of due compliance with the four requirements as
envisaged under Section 16 of the Act of 1956 question of there being any
further requirement depicting acceptance thereof does not and cannot arise.
The submissions undoubtedly at the first blush seem to be rather attractive
and it is on this particular issue which prompted this Court to have the matter
H argued in detail irrespective of the technicality as raised before this Court
JAi SINGH v. SHAKUNTALA [BANERJEE, J.] 435

pertaining to the maintainability issue vis-a-vis the appeal. While scrutiny of A
' evidence does not stand out to be totally prohibited in the matter of exercise
of jurisdiction in the second appeal and that would in our view be too broad
a proposition and too rigid an interpretation of law not worthy of acceptance
but that does not also clothe the superior courts within jurisdiction to intervene
and interfere in any and every matter - It is only in very exceptional cases
and on extreme perversity that the authority to examine the same in extenso B
stands permissible - it is a rarity rather than a regularity and thus in fine it
can thus be safely concluded that while there is no prohibition as such, but
the power to scrutiny can only be had in very exceptional circumstances and

- upon proper circumspection. This is, however, without expression of any
opinion pertaining to Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. c
Needless to record that the trial Court decreed the suit and the first

... Appellate Court as also the High Court were pleased to dismiss the appeals .
It is in this context the recording of the High Court may be looked into for
proper appreciation of the matter.
D
The High Court observed:

"It also deserves notice that on July 22, 1986 the appellant had filed
a suit claiming the property of Sunda Ram. Surprisingly, the suit was
decreed within less than 10 days on August l, 1986. It is also the day
when Sunda Ram had expired. It is correct that Mr.Mittal has not E
raised any plea .on the basis of this decree. The fact, however, remains
that the appellant tried to usurp the property by even getting a decree
in his favour. The proceedings do reflect upon his conduct. In fact,
~ he did not rest contended with the adoption deed and the decree. He
had even propounded a Will. The courts below have found that the
will is shrounded by suspicious circumstances and have not accepted
F
its authenticity. No argument has been addressed by the learned counsel
in this behalf. In view of the above, the conclusions recorded by both
the courts below. do not call any interference."

The issue thus arises as to whether High Court was justified in laying
.., G
emphasis on the conduct of the adopted son. As noticed herein before the
presumption is a rebuttable presumption. While it is true that the registered
instrument of adoption presumably stands out to be taken to be correct but
the Court is not precluded from looking in to it upon production of some
evidence contra the adoption. Evidence, which is made available to the Court
for rebutting the presumption, can always be looked into and it is on production H
436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002] 2 S.C.R.

.A of that evidence that the High court has recorded a finding non-availability
of the presumption to the Appellant. A brief reference to the available evidence
..._ --
may be convenient at this juncture. The following documents were placed on
record:

(i) Voters list prepared in the year 1991;
B (ii) Receipts of chulha tax said to have been paid by the appellant;
(iii) Mutation proceedings dated August 23, 1986;
(iv) Jamabandi for the year 1988-89.

As regards (i) no fault can be ascribed on rejection of this piece of
c evidence by reason of the fact that the suit was instituted on September 24,
'i"

1986 and being aware of the pendency of the dispute the appellant described
himself as son of Sunda Ram. Incidentally in the voters list prepared in 1984,
the appellant has been described as the son of his natural father i.e. Jage Ram ....
and accordingly the High Court came to a definite conclusion that D-8 being
D the document, which came into existence after the institution of the suit can
be of no consequence whatsoever.

Similar is the situation as regards the next set of evidence, namely, ~

payment of chulha tax - receipts admittedly relate to a period after the
institution of the suit (period between October 7, 1986 and July 21, 1991 ).
E The mutation proceedings being the third set of evidence noticed herein
before stood initiated by the appellant immediately after the death of Sunda
Ram, who admittedly expired on 1st August, 1986 and the appellant had got
the mutation entries without any notice as such the same cannot possibly be
taken recourse to and similar is the situation with regard to the Jamabandi for
the years 1988-89.
•
F
It is also on record that in the reply filed by the appellant in proceedings
under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code initiated by his wife, the
appellant described himself as a son of his natural father as also the voters
list prepared in the year 1984 - it has thus been stated that these two documents
G on the face of it militates against the proof of adoption .,
It is at this juncture, a brief look at the Deed of Adoption would be of "l

some interest. Relevant extracts of the Deed of Adoption are as below:

"...... I have no son. According to Hindu Dharam Shastra, every
H Hindu should have one son so that he may give pind water. There is
JAi SINGH v. SHAKUNTALA [BANERJEE ,J.] 437

.• one boy of age of 10 years son of Jage Ram, Resident of village
Rassiwas, who is Jat by caste and who has been brought up by me.
A
"
I have fatherly love for him. In the month of March, parents of Jai
Singh gave him to me in adoption, in the presence of the relatives of
Rassiwas, at the occasion of Holly, and I had taken. Jai Singh in my
lap, I adopted him. Now, I as well as parents of Jai Singh want that
a deed of adoption should be prepared. Jai Singh is living with me
B
for the last five years. Now with sound disposition of mind, I adopt
Jai Singh willingly as my adopted son and he shall be my son in the
eyes of others. Jai Singh, my adopted son shall have.same rights as
a natural son has.
c
This deed of adoption has been written on 31.5.1973, (IO Jaith, 1895
Shudi)."

The Deed records that the parents of Jai Singh have given him in
adoption to Sunda Ram in the month of March and he had taken him on his
lap. No specific ceremonies have been noted neither any evidence has been D
i tendered pertaining to the adoption in March, 1973. It is on this Deed that
Mr. Ramchandran, the learned senior Advocate appearing for the respondent
contended that the document even on the face of it does not justify any
consideration by reason of the recording that 'the adopted son shall have the
same rights as a natural son has' - this insertion of preservation of his right
E
as a natural son is rather significant and ought to be read along with the Will
dated 14th February, 1974 wherein it has been recorded that 'entire property
will be inherited by the adopted son, Jai Singh and no one else shall have any
share in it' : whereas the recording of the Will that the testator being not
...... desirous of giving any share to the daughter cannot but be termed to be
otherwise in accordance with the normal human conduct under certain F
circumstances but recording to the effect "in case after my death my daughter
Shakuntla claims any property that should be rejected" together with the
recording that "this Will has been written in favour of my adopted son Jai
Singh so that it may be used at the time of need" depict the true nature of
the claim of the appellant which it has been argued for the Respondent
tantamounts to be utterly false. Mr. Ramchandran also placed reliance on
G
"'· Section I !(vi) of the Act, which records that the child to be adopted must be
actually given and taken in adoption by the parents or guardian concerned
with intent to transfer the child from the family of its birth to the family of
its adoption. The give and take in adoption is a requirement, which stands as
a sine-qua-non for a valid adoption and it is in this context that Mr. H

=1
,_

438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.

A Ramchandran contended that the rebuttable presumption has thus been duly ..,
)._
rebutted by the evidence put forth by the respondent and stands reinforced by
the appellant's own evidence.

It is on this factual backdrop, the High Court upon, recording the fact
of the presumption being rebuttable, came to a conclusion negating the
B adoption. On the wake of the aforesaid, we do not see any reason to lend •
concurrence to the submissions of Mr. Jain that the statutory presumption
should give way to all other instances available on record. The presumption
under Section 16 being a rebuttable presumption as the statute prescribes and
on the state of evidence available on record question of decrying the order
c of the trial court as also of the two appellate courts on the fact situation of
the matter in issue cannot be termed to be so perverse so as to authorise this
Court to scan the evidence and reappreciate the same. This is where Mr.
Ramachandran contended that scope of Article 136 being limited and by
reason of definite allegation of fraud in the matter of bringing forth the
document of adoption interference with the orders of three different forums
D would not arise. We do find a great deal of substance thereon sinc;e the
appreciation of evidence as noticed above cannot be had at this stage of the
proceedings unless the order can be ascribed to be totally perverse.
..J._

In the present fact situation of the matter we do feel it expedient to
record our concurrence to the statement of Mr. Ramachandran that perversity
E is a far cry in the matter and the order of the High Court does not call for
any interference in the contextual facts.

In that view of the matter, we do not find any merit in the appeal. The '
~

appeal thus stands dismissed without, however, any order as to costs. ~- r

F N.J. Appeal dismissed.