Holding

The dying declarations were admissible, reliable, and sufficient to uphold the conviction under Section 302 IPC.

Summary

The victim Aruna suffered severe burns after the appellant Jaishree allegedly poured kerosene on her and set her alight; Aruna died fifteen days later. During her dying period she gave five dying declarations, which were recorded by medical staff and police. The trial court convicted Jaishree of murder under Section 302 IPC based primarily on these declarations, and the High Court affirmed the conviction. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the dying declarations were admissible under Section 32 of the Evidence Act and whether they were reliable enough to sustain a conviction without corroboration. The Court held that the declarations were free of material infirmities, were corroborated by other evidence, and satisfied the doctrinal requirements of necessity and the maxim "nemo moriturus mentiri". Consequently, the conviction was upheld and the appeal dismissed.

Issues considered

The admissibility of the victim's dying declarations under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act.
Whether the dying declarations in this case were reliable, free of infirmities, and could form the sole basis of conviction under Section 302 IPC.
Whether the trial court and High Court erred in relying on the dying declarations to convict the appellant.

Legislation cited

Subjects

dying declarationSection 32 Evidence ActSection 302 IPChearsay rulecorroborationmurder convictionIndian Supreme Court

Judgment

[2009) 4 S.C.R. 992

A JAISHREE ANANT KHANDEKAR
v
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
Criminal Appeal No. 1094 of 2006
MARCH 23, 2009
B
[5.8. SINHA AND ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, JJ.]
Evidence: Dying declaration - Admissibility of - ~

~
Conviction under s.302 /PC based on dying declarations -
Justification of - On facts, held: There were no infirmities in
c the dying declarations - Facts in all the declarations matched
in essential particulars - Evidence in declaration was
corroborated - There was a/so endorsement that it was read
over and explained to the declarant - Even doctor opined that
she was conscious enough to make the declaration -
D Conviction based on dying declarations was justified - Maxim *-
- "nemo moriturus paesumitur mentire - Penal Code, 1860 -
s.302.
The question which arose for consideration in the
instant appeal was whether the courts below were justified
E in convicting the appellant under s.302 IPC on the basis
of dying declaration of the victim.
t- -
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The law relating to dying declaration is an
F exception to the hearsay rule. Admissibility of dying
declaration is based on the doctrine of necessity, apart
from an implicit faith in the intrinsic truthfulness of human
character at the dying moments of one's life. In many
cases, victim is the only eye witness to a crime on him/
G her and in such situation exclusion of the dying
,...,.~

declaration, on hearsay principle, would tend to defeat
ends of justice. American Law on dying declaration also
proceeds on the twin postulates of certainty of death
leading to an intrinsic faith in truthfulness of human
H 992
JAISHREE ANANT KHANDEKAR V. 993
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

\ character and the necessity principle. On certainty of A
death, the same strict test of English Law is applied in
American Jurisprudence. The core concept is that the ex-
pectation of death must be absolute and not susceptible
to doubts and there should be no chance of operation of
worldly motives. [Paras 33, 34] (1003-E-H; 1004-A] B
R. v. Woodcock (1789) 1 Lea. 502 and Nembhard v. The
Queen 1982 (1) The ·All England Law Reports 183 (Privy
'"' .+ Council) - referred to .

Wigmore on Evidence, page 233-234 -:- referred to. c
2.1. Under Indian Law, the declaration is relevant
even if it is made by a person, who may or may not be
under expectation of death, at the time of declaration.
__ ._ However, the declaration must relate to any of the
circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his D
death. Going by the wider test and considering the facts
of case, the dying declarations on which High Court
placed reliance were admissible. The dying declarations
in this case can be relied upon, on the maxim of "nemo
moriturus paesumitur mentire - which means "a man will E
not meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth." [Paras 35, 37 ,44,
-- ~ 45] (1004-B-C; 1004-F-G; 1007-A-B]
Sanjay v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 9 SCC 148 - held
inapplicable.
F
Mohan Lal and Ors v. State of Haryana (2007) 9 SCC
151.,- distinguished.
Ravikumar alias Kutti Ravi v. State of Tamil Nadu (2006)
9 sec 240 - relied on.
G
Manibe'n wlo Danabhai Tulshibai Maheria v. State of
Gujarat (2007) 10 SCC 362 - referred to.
Sham Shankar Kankaria v. State of Maharashtra (2006)
13 sec 165 - relied on.
H
994 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 4 S.C.R.

A 2.2. If there are serious infirmities in the dying I
declaration, namely, discrepancy as to the place of
occurrence, as to the burn marks and also discrepancy
as to how the deceased was brought to the hospital,
conviction on the basis of such a dying declaration is not
B sustainable. In the instant case, there are no such discre-
pancies. Facts in all the five dying declarations matched
in their essential particulars. In some of the dying declara-
tions given by the victim, the required rule of caution was +
followed and the statement given in the dying declaration
c was fairly consistent. The victim was physically in a
position to give the declaration. Doctors also opined that
the declarant was conscious enough to make the
declaration. There was also endorsement that the same
was read over and explained to the declarant. Besides,
D the evidence of PW-4 in substantial part corroborates the
-of, -

facts stated in the dying declaration. Therefore, the
statement in dying declaration is not uncorroborated.
[Paras 22, 46, 47, 55, 56) [1000-A-B; 1007-A-E; 1011-B-D]
Shaikh Bakshu & Ors v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 11
E sec 269 - relied on.
State of Rajasthan v. Parthu (2007) 12 754; Paparambaka
t-- -
Rosamma and others v. State of A.P (1999) 7 SCC 695; Vithal
v. State of Maharashtra (2006)13 SCC 54 and Ranjit Singh &
Ors v. State of Punjab (2006) 13 SCC 130 - referred to.
F
Paniben (Smt) v. State of Gujarat (1992) 2 SCC 474 and
Shakunta/a (Smt) v. State of Haryana (2007) 10 SCC 168 -
relied on,
3. In the circumstances, there was no error on the ,........
G part of the trial Court and High Court in finding the
appellant guilty and convicting her under Section 302 IPC.
[Para 56) [1011-D-E]
Paramjit Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors. AIR
1997 SC 1614 - relied on.
H
JAISHREE ANANT KHANDEKAR V. 995
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

Case Law Reference A

(1789) 1 Lea. 502 referred to Para 26

1982 (1) The All England
Law Reports 183
(Privy Council) referred to Para 32 B

AIR 1999 SC 3062 referred to Para 35
-"' _. (1860) 2 F. & F. 21 referred to Para 35

(1909) 2 KB 697 referred to Para 35 c
AIR 2000 SC 2602 referred to Para 36

(2001) 9 sec 148 held inapplicable Para 39

(2007) 9 sec 151 distinguished Para 41
__.,_ D
(2006) 9 sec 240 relied on Para 42
(2007) 1o sec 362 referred to Para 42
(2006) 13 sec 165 relied on Para 44
(2001) 11 sec 269 relied on Para 46 E

(2007) 12 754 referred to Para 48
....... -4
(1999) 1 sec 695 referred to Para 48
(2006) 13 sec 54 referred to Para 49 F
(2006) 13 sec 130 referred to Para 50
(1992) 2 sec 474 relied on Para 51
(2007) 1o sec 168 relied on Para 53
G
AIR 1997 SC 1614 relied on Para 54
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 1094 of 2006

From the Judgement and Order dated 09.09.2005 of the H
996 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 4 S.C.R.

A Hon'ble High Court of Judicature of Bombay, Bench at
Aurangabad in Crl. Appeal No. 408 of 2004.
M.Y. Deshmukh, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, for the
Appellants.
B Madhuri Diwan, Ravindra Keshavrao Adsure, for the
Respondent.
The Judgement of the Court was delivered by 4
t
GANGULY, J.
c 1. The tragic incident happened over spilled milk.
2. On 15.12.2000, Aruna, w/o Nagnath- accused No.4,
received severe burn injuries in an incident which took place
around 2.30 p.m. Aruna, the victim, was staying in her house at .
D Dhangar, Moha, District Parbhani with her three children aged ~-
about 6 years, 3 years and 8 months respectively. The
appellant's husband was the nephew of Aruna and they were
having the relations as cousin mother-in-law and daughter-in-
law. Admittedly the relation was far from cordial. Nagnath,
E husband of Aruna, was serving in SRP and not at the place of
occurrence at the time of the alleged incident. The appellant
and her husband, who was serving as a teacher, were staying
in another part of the same house as a tenant and the house
was owned by Aruna. There was easy access from one house
... -
to the other. The incident is said to have occurred in the kitchen
F
of Aruna. The appellant did not dispute her presence in the place
of occurrence.
3. The prosecution allegation as unfolded is that on
15.12.2000, in the afternoon, Aruna kept a pot of milk on an
G electric hot plate in the kitchen, and at that time electricity supply ,.... ....
was not there but the switch was on. Keeping the pot in that
position, Aruna went to the terrace but when she got the smell of
burnt milk, she rushed to the kitchen to find that electric supply
had resumed and boiling milk had spilled over the pot. Seeing
H this, Aruna got annoyed and asked the appellant why did she
JAISHREE ANANT KHANDEKAR V. 997
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [GANGULY, J.]
'.~

not inform
- Aruna about
. resumption of electric
. . currer:it
. :
.and . the A
'

spilling of milk. To that question ·Of Aruna, appellant became
annoyed and responded in words which were rather offensive.

4. Further allegation is that the appellant did not stop at
her harsh reply but entered the kitchen of Aruna, took the 8
kerosene container and poured it on her shoulder and, thereafter,
. ignited the flame and ran to the terrace and deelared thatAruna
had received burns from electric current.

5: The victim sustained severe burn injuries which were
estimated at 100% and was rushed to the Rural Hospital at C
• Gangakhed and, thereafter, shifted to S.R.T.R Medical College
'
Hospital atAmbajogai.Jn the course of receiving treatment, she
succumbed to her burn injuries on 1.1.2001.

6. She was thus alive for 15 days after the incident. The
0
statement of Aruna which was recorded by API Sk. Abdul Rauf
at Rural Hospital, Gangakhed was tegistered as Fl.R. and on
completion of investigation chargesheet was filed .

. T In all seven witnesses ·were examined tiY the prosecution
and the Court also examined three· I-hare witnesses. Several E
dying declarations were given by the deceased~Aruna.

_. ..J .
.
8:'• In this matter six persons had to face
•
the
... 1
trial
.
for .Gharges
under Section 498A read with Section 34of1.P.C. · .

9. The. present appellant was charged for an offence of F
murder under Section 302 and the other five accused persons
were tried for having abetted commission of offence of murder
by the-appellant.

....... 10. The learned Sessions Judge acquitted ail the ~ccused G
persons of the charges under Section 498-A read with Section
34' EP.C. The accused Nos. 2 to 6 were also acquitted of the
charges under Section 302 read with Section 109 l.P.C.
. <"

11. The appellant was held guilty of the oft:ence of murder
punishable under Section 302 I.PC. and sentenced to suffer H
998 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 4 S.C.R.

A imprisonment for life and also to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/-, in ~ ·
default, to suffer further simple imprisonment for four months.
12. It is an appeal by the sole appellant.
13. On 15.12.2000, Aruna made five dying declarations
B at different hours and the prosecution relied on them and it
appears that both the Trial Court and the High Court sustained
the prosecution case primarily on the basis of those dying
declarations. Those declarations are as follows:
(1) Exhibit 48 - Case history recorded by Dr. Sangram
c (P.W. 2) upon admission at Gangakhed Hospital.
(2) Exhibit 58 - Dying declaration recorded by ASI Sk.
Abdul Rauf and treated as FIR.
(3) Exhibit 52 - Dying declaration recorded by Executive
D Magistrate Shivaji (P.W.3).
(4) Exhibit 87 - Dying declaration recorded by Executive
Magistrate Smt. Bilkis at Ambajogai at 7 p.m.
(5) Exhibit 79 - Dying declaration recorded by CW1
E Head Constable Lamture at 10:25 p.m. at
Ambajogai.
14. The High Court found that though there is some
deviation in the narration of facts in these five dying declarations
F but they are consistent in material particulars in the sense that
certain facts are common in all of them. They are that after a
brief exchange of hot words, the appellant poured kerosene over
the shoulder of Aruna and ignited her. It is also clear that nobody
came to help the victim to extinguish the flames and the victim
was trying to do that with water. The appellant came to the terrace
G and declared that the victim has got burnt through electric current.
15. The defence version is that Aruna is hot tempered and
did not approve the stay of the appellant in her house even though
the appellant and her husband were staying by paying rent. Aruna
H used to pick up quarrels with the appellant on flimsy pretexts
JAISHREE ANANT KHANDEKAR V. 999
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [GANGULY, J]

and she was keen to ensure that the appellant d$)~S not stay in A
• the house at Gangakhed .
+ 16. Further, defence version is that the appellant tried to
extinguish the fire of Aruna and during the process, she suffered
burn injuries. The appellant's stand in her statement under
8
Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 is thatAruna herself set her on
fire and appellant tried to extinguish the flames and in the process
sustained certain burn irijuries and she has been falsely
implicated out of the victim's grudge towards her.

17. It appears that the injuries on the appellant are very c
insignificant. She sustained only4-5% burn injuries that too not"
on her palm but near her elbow. ·

18. Neither the Trial Court nor the High Court accepted
the defence plea and it is also difficult for us to accept the same.
D
19. We find that the High Court has made a detailed
analysis of all the dying declarations which are marked ?IS Exhibit
Nos. 48, 52, 58, 79 and 87 and out of these dying declarations,
the High Court found that Exhibit Nos. 48, 52, 79 and 87 are not
without defects. The High Court fpund, Exhibit 58, whi.ch is
treated as F.l.R., had an endorsementto the effect that the p~tient
E;
was fully conscious at the time of making the statement. In it an
endorsement was made by the Medical Officer that the dying
declaration (Exhibit 58) was read over to Aruna and she had
admitted that the same has been correctly recorded.
F
20. Learned Judges of the High Court found that Exhibit
58 was recorded within 15-20 minutes prior to 3:45 p.m. and
on the basis of the same, F.l.R. was registered at 4 p.m.
21. Learned Counsel for the appellant assailed the dying
declarations pointing out certain defects in their recording, but G
the learned Judges of the Trial Court and the High Court rightly
did not attach much importance to that inasmuch as they are
consistent in material particulars. Learned Judges of the High
Court found that the two dying declarations (Exhibits 58 and
87) are acceptable and reliable. Learned Judges also found H
1000 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 4 S.C.R.

A that the dying declaration (Exhibit 48), which records the history
by the Medical Officer, is also reliable.
+
22. We also find that the evidence of P.W.4 (Bhaskar) in
substantial part corroborates the facts stated in the dying
declaration. Therefore, the statement in dying declaration is not
B
uncorroborated.
23. The law relating to dying declaration is an exception to
the hearsay rule.
24. The rationale behind admissibility of a dying declaration ~
c was best expressed, not in any judgment, but in one of the
soliloquies in Shakespeare's King John, when fatally wounded
Melun wails:
'Have I met hideous
D death within my view,
Retaining but a quantity of life, .. -
Which bleeds away

E even as a form of wax,
Resolveth from his figure
'gainst the fire?
What in the world should ;. -··..
F
make me now deceive,
Since I must lose the use of all deceit?
Why should I then be false
G since it is true
,,,.. ,.
That I must die here '(

and live hence by truth?'
(See King John, Act V, Scene iv.)
H
JAISHREE ANANT KHANDEKAR V. 1001
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [GANGULY, J.]

25. Both Taylor and Wigmore in their treatise on Evidence A
' took refuge to the magic of Shakespeare to illustrate the
t principles behind admissibility of dying declaration by quoting
the above passage.
26. Among the judicial fraternity this has been best
B
expressed, possibly by Lord Chief Justice Baron Eyre (See. R.
Vs. Woodcock, (1789) 1 Lea. 502, and which I quote: -
"... That such declarations are made in extremity, when the
... party is at the point of death, and when every hope of this
-<i world is gone; when every motive to falsehood is silenced, c
and the mind is induced by the most powerful
considerations to speak the truth; a situation so solemn
and so awful is considered by the law as creating an
obligation, equal to that which is imposed by a positive
oath in a court of justice ... " D
__ .._ 27. The test of admissibility of dying declaration is stricter
in English Law than in Indian Law.
28. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen in 1876 brought out a
'Digest of the Law of Evidence' and its introduction is of E
considerable interest even today. The author wrote that English
Code of Evidence is modelled on the Indian Evidence Act of
1872.
,•- 4 29. In the words of the author:
F
"In the autumn of 1872 Lord Coleridge (then Attorney
General) employed me to draw a similar code for England:
I did so in the course of the winter, and we settled it in
frequent consultations. It was ready to be introduced early
in the Session of 1873. Lord Coleridge made various
attempts to bring it forward, but he could not succeed till G
the very last day of the Session. He said a few words on
the subject on the 5th August, 1873, just before Parliament
was prorogued. The Bill wa~ thus never made public, though
I believe it was ordered to be printed.
H
1002 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 4 S.C.R.

A It was drawn on the model of the Indian Evidence Act and
contained a complete system of law upon the subject of
evidence." 1

30. In that book, Article 26 sums up the English law relating
to dying declaration as under:-
B
"Article 26. Dying Declaration as to Cause of Death

A declaration made by the declarant as to the cause of his
death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction

c which resulted in his death, is deemed to be relevant only
in trials for the murder or manslaughter of the declarant;
..
and only when the declarant is shown, to the satisfaction
of the judge, to have been in actual danger of death, and
to have given up all hope of recovery at the time when
his declaration was made.
D
Such a declaration is not irrelevant merely because it was
intended to be made as a deposition before a magistrate, ~ .
but is irregular."
(emphasis supplied)
E
31. In Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act the
underlined portion is not there. Instead Section 32(1) is worded
differently and which is set out:

"32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by • -·
F person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is
relevant - Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts
made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found,
or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or
whose attendance cannot be procured, without an amount
G of delay or expense which under the circumstances of the
case appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves
relevant facts in the following cases:-
(1) when it relates to cause of death - \JI/hen the
statement is made by a person as to the cause of his
H death, or to any of the circumstances of the transaction
JAISHREE ANANT KHANDEKAR V. 1003
•
'~ STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [GANGULY, J.)

which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of A
that person's death comes into question.

Such statements are relevant whether the person who
made them was or was not, at the time when they were
made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be
B
the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his
"' ~ death comes into question."

(emphasis supplied)

32. The Privy Council in the case of Nembhard Vs: The
c
Queen, 1982 (1) The All England Law Reports 183 (Privy
Council), while hearing an appeal from the Court of Appeal of
Jamaica, made a comparison of the English Law and Indian
-l Law by referring to the underlined portions of Section 32(1) of
the Indian Evidence Act at page 187 of the report. Sir Owen
D
Woodhouse, speaking for the Privy Council, pointed out the
different statutory dispensation in Indian Law prescribing a test
of admissibility of dying declaration which is distinct from a
common law test in English Law.

33. Apart from an implicit faith in the intrinsic truthfulness E
....... -+
of human character at the dying moments of one's life,
admissibility of dying declaration is also based on the doctrine
of necessity. In many cases victim is the only eye witness to a
crime on him/her and in such situations exclusion of the dying
declaration, on hearsay principle, would tend to defeat the ends F
of justice. American Law on dying declaration also proceeds
on the twin postulates of certainty of death leading to an intrinsic
;.._ ~ faith in truthfulness of human character and the necessity
principle.
G
34. On certainty of death, the same strict test of English
Law has been applied in American Jurisprudence. The test has
been variously expressed as 'no hope of recovery', 'a settled
expectation of death'. The core concept is that the expectation
of death must be absolute and not susceptible to doubts and
H
1004 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 4 S.C.R.
•'
1 ~

A there should be no chance of operation of worldly motives. (See
Wigmore on Evidence page 233-234).
35. This Court in Kishan Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR
199'9 SC 3062, held that under English Law the credence and
·e the relevance of the dying declaration is admissible only when
the person making such statement is in hopeless condition and
expecting imminent death. Justice Willes coined it as a "settled
~
· hopeless expectation of death" (R Vs. Peel, (1860) 2 F. & F.
21, which was approved by the Court of Criminal Appeal in R
Vs. Perry, (1909) 2 KB 697). Under our Law, the declaration is
c relevant even if it is made by a person, who may or may not be
under expectation of death, at the time of declaration. (See para
18, page 3066). However, the declaration must relate to any of
the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death.
36. Again in Sudhakar and Another Vs. State of
. ~

D
Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2602, a three-Judge Bench of this
Court noted that Indian Law has made a departure from English
Law relating to admissibility of dying declaration. This Court
has "held in para 7 as follows:-
E "(1) Section 32 is an exception of the rule of hearsay and
makes admissible the statement of a person who dies,
whether the death is a homicide or a suicide, provided the
~
-
statement relates to the cause of death, or exhibits
circumstances leading to the death. In this respect, as
F indicated above, the Indian Evidence Act, in view of the
peculiar conditions of our society and the diverse nature
and character of our people, has thought it necessary to
widen the sphere of Section 32 to avoid injustice."
l"
37. Going by the wider test and considering the facts of
G this case, we have no hesitation that the dying declarations on
which High Court has placed reliance are admissible.
38. Certain cases have been cited at the Bar by the learned
counsel for the parties which lay down the same principles and
H are discussed below.
JAISHREE ANANT KHANDEKAR V. 1005
... STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [GANGULY, J.]
-+
39. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the A
appellant on the decision of this Court in Sanjay Vs. State of
Maharashtra, (2007) 9 SCC 148. In that case, this Court held
that the husband is entitled to the benefit of doubt in view of the
fact that the first dying declaration and the subsequent one
substantially vary in essential particulars. B
... 40. In the instant case the factual position is not the same,
~
so the decision in Sanjay (supra) has no application.
41 . Reliance was also placed by the learned counsel on
the decision in Mohan Lal and Ors Vs. State of Haryana, (2007) c
9 SCC 151, wherein the Court found that before the dying
declaration was recorded, the relatives of the deceased
including father and mother of the deceased were present with
~ ~ her and were subsequently asked to leave the room. In the facts
of that case, learned Judges opined that the dying declaration D
was clearly the result of tutoring and was not a free and voluntary
one. The same is not the factual position in this case.
42. Reliance was also placed on Maniben wlo Danabhai
Tulshibai Maheria Vs. State of Gujarat,(2007) 10 SCC 362,
where S.B. Sinha, J. delivering the judgment held that minor E
_, _. discrepancies in dying declaration would not be material. The
learned Judge also held that a dying declaration does not cease
to be one just because death took place 25 days after the
incident. This view of His Lordship is, if I may so with respect,
consistent with Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act. In support F
of this, the learned Judge relied on a decision of this Court in
Ravikumar alias Kutti Ravi Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2006) 9
sec 240, in which case this Court gave certain guidelines on
).. """: the basis of which dying declaration has to be appreciated.
Relevant excerpts from the judgment in Ravikumaralias Kutti G
Ravi (supra) would show that the principles laid down therein
are applicable in the facts of the present case. Those excerpts
are extracted hereunder:
"5. Section 32 of the Evidence Act, 1872 is an exception
to the general rule against hearsay. Sub-section (1) of H
1006 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 4 S.C.R.
•
+ ~

A Section 32 makes the statement of the deceased
admissible which is generally described as "dying
declaration". The dying declaration essentially means
statements made by the person as to the cause of his
death or as to the circumstances of the transaction resulting
B in his death. The admissibility of the dying declaration is
based upon the principle that the sense of impending death ,..
produces in man's mind the same feeling as that of a ,,.
conscientious and virtuous man under oath. The dying
declaration is admissible upon consideration that the
c declarant has made it in extremity, when the maker is at
the point of death and when every hope of this world is

.
gone, when every motive to the falsehood is silenced and
the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to
speak the truth. Notwithstanding the same, care and ~

D caution must be exercised in considering the weight to be
given to these species of evidence on account of the
existence of many circumstances which may affect their
truth. The court has always to be on guard to see that the
statement of the deceased was not the result of either
tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The
E
court has also to see and ensure that the deceased was
in a fit state of mind and had the opportunity to observe
._ ...
and identify the assailant. Normally, therefore, the court in
order to satisfy itself that the deceased was in fit mental
condition to make the dying declaration, has to look for
F the medical opinion. Once the court is satisfied that the
declaration was true and voluntary, it undoubtedly, can base
its conviction on the dying declaration without any further
corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule
of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis
.. ....
G of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring
corroboration is merely the rule of prudence ..... "
43. Applying the aforesaid principle, this Court finds that
in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the dying
declaration has to be accepted.
H
JAISHREE ANANT KHANDEKAR V. 1007
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [GANGULY, J.]
\
44. Reliance was also placed on Sham Shankar Kankaria A
Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 13 SCC 165, where the
learned Judge referred to the issue of admissibility of the
evidence recorded in dying declaration, on the maxim of "nemo
moriturus paesumitur mentire - which means "a man will not
meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth." B

.... 45. Therefore, if the aforesaid principles are applied in
.JI
the instant case, the Court finds that the dying declarations in
this case can be relied upon.

46. In the case of Shaikh Bakshu & Ors Vs. State of c
Maharashtra, (2007) 11 SCC 269, the Court held that if there
are serious infirmities in the dying declaration, namely,
discrepancy as to the place of occurrence, as to the burn marks
~ J. and also discrepancy as to how the deceased was brought to
the hospital, conviction on the basis of such a dying declaration D
is not sustainable.
47. In the instant case, there are no such discrepancies.
Facts in all the five dying declarations match in their essential
particulars. Therefore, the case of Shaikh Bakshu (supra) is
distinguishable from the present case . E
... ... 48. In the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Parthu, (2007)
12 754, where the State came up in appeal against the order of
acquittal granted by the High Court, this Court while reversing
the High Court judgment of acquittal held that non issuance of
certificate in the dying declaration to the effect that the statement
F
of the deceased was recorded correctly before the Investigating
Officer will not vitiate the same. Learned Judge held by referring
to several judgments that the hypertechnical view should not be
" "<j
taken. The Bench also held that the view of this Court in
Paparambaka Rosamma and others Vs. State of A.P, (1999) G
7 sec 695, has not been correctly decided and is not the correct
enunciation of law. On this judgment reliance was also placed.
by the learned counselfor the State and we are of the view that
the ratio of this judgment delivered by S.B. Sinha, J. supports
the State in the present case also. H
1008 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 4 $.C.R.

I
A 49. In the decision in the case of Vithal Vs. State of
Maharashtra, (2006) 13 SCC 54 the same principles have been
reiterated. In a case of multiple dying declarations, ifthere is no
inconsistency, the same are reliable. Learned Judge also held
that the mere fact that the accused who is alleged to have poured
B kerosene on the deceased was inimically disposed towards
the deceased cannot by itself be a fact to disbelieve the dying
declaration or to throw out the prosecution case.
50. In Ranjit Singh & Ors Vs. State of Punjab, (2006) 13
SCC 130, S.B. Sinha, J. speaking for the Bench laid down, if
C there is an inconsistency between the two dying declarations,
the Court should apply caution but the consistent part can be
taken note of. His Lordship has also held that corroboration is
required in the event of suspicion as regards correctness or
otherwise of the dying declaration.
. -
D
51. In Sham Shankar Kankaria (supra), a Two-Judge
Bench of this Court pointed out the rationale for relying on dying
declaration on the principles laid down in Paniben (Smt) Vs.
State of Gujarat, (1992) 2 SCC 474. Learned Judge further held
E that the rule of corroboration on the facts stated in the declaration
is only one of prudence and nothing else.
52. Various other judgments have been cited but they have
discussed almost Identical principles.
53. The judicially evolved rules of caution for acceptance
F of dying declaration have been stated by this Court in Paniben
(Smt) (supra), and in para Nos. 18 and 19 of the said report,
this Court has formulated several principles for accepting dying
declaration, which have been laid down in various judgments of
this Court in the last few decades. The principles stated in
G Paniben (Smt) (supra) have been again repeated by this Court
in Shakuntala (Smt) Vs. State of Haryana, (2007) 10 SCC 168.
The said principles are so salutary and cardinal in nature that
they deserve to be reiterated and this Court does so herein
below:
H
JAISHREE ANANT KHANDEKAR V. 1009
.-~
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [GANGULY, J.]

"(1) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying A
declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration.
(See Munnu Raja v. State of M.P.)
(i1) If the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true
and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without
B
corroboration. (See State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav
.( and Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar.)
41
(iit) The court has to scrutinise the dying declaration
carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the
result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased c
had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants
and was in a fit state to make the declaration. (See K.
Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor.)
- Jr.-
(iv) Where a dying declaration is suspicious, it should not
be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (See D
Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P.)
(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never
make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it
is to be rejected. (See Kake Singh v. State of M.P.) E
... •• (v1) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot
form the basis of conviction. (See Ram Manorathv. State
of U.P.)
(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does· not contain
the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected.
F
(See State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati
Naidu.)
~ ~ (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is
not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the G
statement itself guarantees truth. (See Surajdeo Ojha v.
State of Bihar.)
(ix) Normally, the court in order to satisfy whether the
deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying
declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where the H
1010 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 4 S.C.R.

A eyewitness said that the deceased was in a fit and
"
conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medical
opinion cannot prevail. (See Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P)
(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version
as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration
B
cannot be acted upon. (See State of UP v. Madan Mohan.)
(x1) Where there are more than one statements in the
,. ...
nature of dying declaration, the one first in point of time
must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality of the dying
c declaration could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it
has to be accepted. (See Mohan/al Gangaram Gehani
v. State of Maharashtra.)
13. In the light of the above principles, the acceptability of ,. -
the alleged dying declaration in the instant case has to be
D considered. The dying declaration is only a piece of
untested evidence and must, like any other evidence,
satisfy the court that what is stated therein is the unalloyed
truth and that it is absolutely safe to act upon it. If after
careful scrutiny, the court is satisfied that it is true and free
E from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false
1 ~

statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall
be no legal impediment to make it the basis of conviction,
even if there is no corroboration. (See Gangotri Singh v.
State of UP, Goverdhan Raoji Ghyare v. State of
F Maharashtra, Meesala Ramakrishan v. State of A.P and
State of Rajasthan v. Kishore.)
14. There is no material to show that the dying declaration
was the result or product of imagination, tutoring or .....
prompting. On the contrary, the same appears to have
G been made by the deceased voluntarily. It is trustworthy
and has credibility."
54. Just one more may be added to the aforesaid
principles. This Court in Paramjit Singh & Ors. Vs. State of
H Punjab and Ors., AIR 1997 SC 1614, held that if all the details
JAISHREE ANANT KHANDEKAR V. 1011
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [GANGULY, J.]

are given in the dying declaration, the same may not inspire A
confidence of the Court inasmuch as a neatly structured dying
declaration may bring an adverse effect in the mind of the court.
The Court has to appreciate the dying declaration as a whole to
see whether a ring of truth emerges from the same.
B
55. In the facts of this case, it has already been noted that
the evidence in the dying declaration has been corroborated
and in the various dying declarations which have been given by
the victim, in some of them, the required rule of caution has
been followed specially in Exhibits 58, 87 and 48 and the
statement given in the dying declaration is fairly consistent. There C
is also endorsement that the same has been read over and
explained to the declarant.
56. It is also not in dispute that the declarant lived for more
than fifteen days after the aforesaid incident. Therefore, the 0
victim was physically in a position to give the declaration. Doctors
~· 4. have also opined that the declarant was conscious enough to
make the declaration and all the judicially evolved rules of caution
were observed in the instant case. That being the position, this
Court finds no error on the part of the trial Court and High Court E
in finding the appellant guilty and convicting her under Section
302.

57. We find no merit in this appeal. It is dismissed
... i. accordingly.

D.G. Appeal dismissed