JAN DE NUL DREDGING INDIA PVT. LTD.versusTUTICORIN PORT TRUST

                   [2026] 2 S.C.R. 86 : 2026 INSC 34

                 Jan De Nul Dredging India Pvt. Ltd.
                                 v.
                        Tuticorin Port Trust
                        (Civil Appeal No. 98 of 2026)
                               07 January 2026
   [Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Pankaj Mithal,* JJ.]


                            Issue for Consideration
       Whether the Division Bench of the High Court in exercise of powers
       u/s.37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was justified to
       interfere with the judgment and order of the Single Judge of the
       High Court passed u/s.34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
       1996 upholding the award of the Arbitral Tribunal.

                                   Headnotes†
       Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Major Port Trust
       Act, 1963 – The respondent-Tuticorin Port Trust undertook a
       major dredging project and issued Notice Inviting Tender –
       The appellant-Dredging India was one of the bidders and the
       contract was awarded to it – The appellant-Dredging India
       completed work project much ahead of schedule – Disputes
       arose between the parties relating to alleged non-payment
       and under-payment of dues as raised under the final bill –
       Arbitration clause was invoked by the the appellant-Dredging
       India – The Arbitral Tribunal vide its award dated 18.10.2014
       inter alia awarded an amount of Rs.14,66,04,216/- – The arbitral
       award was challenged by the respondent-Port Trust u/s.34 of
       the 1996 Act – The award of the Arbitral Tribunal was upheld
       by the Single Judge of the High Court – However, the High
       Court directed for the deletion of the claim awarded by the
       Arbitral Tribunal in respect of Claim No.7 i.e. idle charges for
       the Backhoe Dredger (BHD) – Correctness:
       Held: In the instant case, the power to award compensation for
       idle time of the equipment including Backhoe Dredger is traceable
       to Clause 51.1 of the Lease Agreement and therefore the Arbitral
       Tribunal was not wrong in interpreting the clauses so as to make an
       award in favour of the appellant-Dredging India under Claim No.7 –

* Author
[2026] 2 S.C.R.                                                              87

       Jan De Nul Dredging India Pvt. Ltd. v. Tuticorin Port Trust


     In such a situation, the interpretation given by the Arbitral Tribunal
     is apparently a plausible view and was rightly not disturbed by the
     Single Judge in exercise of power u/s.34 of the Act – Therefore, in
     appeal u/s.37 of the Act, the said reasoning could not have been
     disturbed so as to permit a different view – The interpretation given
     by the Arbitral Tribunal had to be accepted by the Appellate Court –
     In the case at hand, the Arbitral Award contains logical reasons in
     construing the various clauses of the License Agreement and the
     view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal had been accepted by the court
     u/s.34 of the Act as a reasonable and a possible view – The License
     Agreement permits deployment of Backhoe Dredger (BHD) without
     specifying whether it is a minor or a major dredger – This Court is
     of the opinion that the Appellate Court manifestly erred in law in
     interfering with the judgment and order of the Single Judge of the
     High Court passed u/s.34 of the Act so as to disturb the arbitral
     award in respect of Claim No.7. [Paras 46, 48, 49, 50]

     Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.34 – Whether the
     Challenge to the award, in the instant case was on any of the
     grounds enumerated u/s.34 or on the ground that the award
     of the Claim No.7 is against the fundamental policy of India
     or the basic notions of morality or justice:
     Held: In the case at hand, a challenge to the award of the Arbitral
     Tribunal before the Single Judge of the High Court would reveal
     that it was confined to Claim No.7 and that too on the merits of
     the same and not on the ground of violation of the public policy of
     India or that it is against the basic notions of morality or justice –
     The Arbitral Tribunal, in making the award, has interpreted the
     various clauses of the License Agreement so as to hold that the
     appellant-Dredging India is entitled for appropriate compensation
     with regard to idling of its Backhoe Dredger (BHD) for want of
     non-supply of site within time – Apparently, the challenge to the
     award of the Arbitral Tribunal was neither on any of the grounds
     enumerated u/s.34, nor even on the ground that the award of
     the Claim No.7 is against the fundamental policy of India or the
     basic notions of morality or justice – That being the position, the
     award of the Arbitral Tribunal was not liable to be disturbed u/s.34
     of the Act and was rightly not disturbed – It is settled in law that
     the appellate powers u/s.37 are limited to the scope of s.34 and
     cannot exceed beyond it – The award of the Arbitral Tribunal is
     not contrary to any substantive provision of law or any provision
     of the Act. [Paras 28, 29, 30, 38]
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      Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.34 – Grounds for
      challenging the arbitral award:
      Held: The Act provides for the challenge of the arbitral award before
      the court on limited grounds as contemplated by s.34 of the Act
      i.e. where one of the party was under some incapacity; or where
      the arbitration agreement itself was not valid; or the parties were
      not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or the
      arbitral proceedings; or was unable, for some reason, to present
      his case before the Arbitrator or Arbitral Tribunal; or if the arbitral
      award deals with the dispute not contemplated or falling within
      the terms of the arbitration or deals with the matters beyond the
      scope of the arbitration; or where the constitution of the Arbitral
      Tribunal was not in accordance with arbitration agreement; and,
      or where the court finds the subject matter of the arbitral dispute
      was incapable of settlement by arbitration or the arbitral award is
      in conflict with the public policy of India. [Para 26]

      Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.37 – Appellate
      Court – Jurisdiction u/s.37:
      Held: The jurisdiction of the court u/s.37 of the Act is akin to
      the jurisdiction of the court u/s.34 of the Act, and, therefore, the
      scope of interference by the court in appeal u/s.37 cannot go
      beyond the grounds on which challenge can be made to the
      award u/s.34 of the Act – Moreover, the courts exercising powers
      u/ss.34 and 37, do not act as a normal court, and therefore, ought
      not to interfere with the arbitral award on a mere possibility of
      an alternative view – In other words, the scope of interference
      of the court with the arbitral matters is virtually prohibited, if not
      absolutely barred – The powers of the Appellate Court are even
      more restricted than the powers conferred by s.34 of the Act – The
      appellate power u/s.37 of the Act is exercisable only to find out
      if the court exercising power u/s.34 of the Act, has acted within
      its limits as prescribed thereunder or has exceeded or failed to
      exercise the power so conferred – The Appellate Court exercising
      powers u/s.37 of the Act has no authority of law to consider the
      matter in dispute before the Arbitral Tribunal on merits so as to
      hold as to whether the award of the Arbitral Tribunal is right or
      wrong – The Appellate Court in exercise of such power cannot
      sit as an ordinary court of appeal and reappraise the evidence to
      record a contrary finding – The award of the Arbitral Tribunal cannot
[2026] 2 S.C.R.                                                              89

       Jan De Nul Dredging India Pvt. Ltd. v. Tuticorin Port Trust


     be touched by the court unless it is contrary to the substantive
     provision of law or any provision of the Act or the terms of the
     agreement. [Paras 36, 37]

     Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Purpose of the Act –
     Minimum intervention of the Court:
     Held: The Act is a special enactment which aims to resolve
     contractual/commercial disputes through arbitration with the
     minimum intervention of the court, if not without the intervention
     of the court – In the event, the courts are allowed to step in at
     every stage and the arbitral awards are subjected to challenge
     before the courts in hierarchy before court of first instance, through
     regular appeals and finally by means of SLP/Civil Appeal before
     the Supreme Court, it would obviate/frustrate and defeat the very
     purpose of the Act – It is therefore, necessary to accept the arbitral
     award if it is not patently illegal or does not fall within the scope
     of intervention u/s.34 of the Act – The appeal thereof has a much
     narrower scope of intervention particularly when the arbitral award
     has been upheld u/s.34 of the Act – The appellate jurisdiction
     acquires little significance only when the arbitral award has been
     erroneously upheld or set aside by the court in exercise of its power
     u/s.34 of the Act as discussed earlier, but has no authority of law
     to consider the matter which was before the Arbitral Tribunal on
     merits. [Para 51]

                              Case Law Cited
     MMTC Limited v. Vedanta Limited [2019] 3 SCR 1023 : (2019) 4
     SCC 163; Konkan Railway Corpn. Ltd. v. Chenab Bridge Project
     [2023] 11 SCR 215 : (2023) 9 SCC 85; Punjab State Civil Supplies
     Corpn. Ltd. v. Sanman Rice Mills, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2632;
     UHL Power Company Limited v. State of Himachal Pradesh [2022]
     1 SCR 1 : (2022) 4 SCC 116; National Highways Authority of
     India v. M/s Hindustan Construction Company Ltd., 2024 INSC
     388 – relied on.
     Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corporation Private Limited v.
     Samir Narain Bhojwani [2024] 7 SCR 136 : (2024) 7 SCC 218;
     Ssangyong Engineering and Construction Company Limited v.
     National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) [2019] 7 SCR 522 :
     (2019) 15 SCC 131; Larsen Air Conditioning and Refrigeration
     Company v. Union of India & Ors. [2023] 11 SCR 86 : (2023) 15
     SCC 472 – referred to.
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                                              List of Acts
       Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Major Port Trust Act, 1963.

                                          List of Keywords
       Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 37
       of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Mininum intervention of
       Court; Non-payment of dues; Under-payment of dues; Backhoe
       Dredger; Interpretation by Arbitral Tribunal; Patent Illegality; Public
       Policy of India; Idling Charges; Plausible View; Deference; Merits
       of the Case; Re-appreciation of Evidence.

                                         Case Arising From
       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 98 of 2026
       From the Judgment and Order dated 15.03.2021 of the High Court
       of Judicature at Madras in OSA No. 101 of 2020

                                    Appearances for Parties
       Advs. for the Appellant(s):
       Chander U. Singh, Sr. Adv., Ms. Surekha Raman, Amarjit Singh
       Bedi, Shreyash Kumar, Yashwant Sanjenbam, M/S. K J John
       And Co.
       Advs. for the Respondent(s):
       S. Nagamuthu, Sr. Adv., Mohan Raj A, Ms. Charulata Chaudhary.

                        Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                               Judgment

       Pankaj Mithal, J.

1.     Leave granted.
2.     The appellant-Jan De Nul Dredging India Private Limited1 is a
       company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1956 with an
       expertise in executing complex dredging operations.



1     Hereinafter referred to as ‘appellant-Dredging India’
[2026] 2 S.C.R.                                                                 91

          Jan De Nul Dredging India Pvt. Ltd. v. Tuticorin Port Trust


3.     The respondent-Tuticorin Port Trust2 is a statutory authority constituted
       under the Major Port Trust Act, 1963. It undertook a major dredging
       project titled “Deepening of the Channel and Basin to Cater to 12.80
       meter Draught Vessels at Tuticorin Port”. In context with the above
       project to enhance the navigational depth of the port to accommodate
       larger sea vessels, the Port Trust on 15.07.2009 issued Notice
       Inviting Tender3.
4.     The appellant-Dredging India was one of the bidders. After the
       evaluation of the bids, the contract was awarded to it. A formal
       work order was issued to it on 28.10.2010. Consequently, a License
       Agreement incorporating the tender conditions was formally executed
       between the parties on 27.12.2010 which involved the monetary
       value of Rs.465,47,56,517/- (Rupees Four Hundred Sixty Five Crore
       Forty Seven Lakhs Fifty Six Thousand Five Hundred and Seventeen
       only). It was stipulated that the work would be completed within 14
       months from the commencement i.e. by 28.06.2012.
5.     The equipment to be deployed for the execution of the project
       under the License Agreement included one Cutter Suction Dredger
       (CSD) with a cutter power of 3,000 HP or more, three Self-Propelled
       Barges with hopper capacity of 16,000 cubic meters each, Floating/
       Submersible Pipelines of 800-900 mm diameter and one Backhoe
       Dredger (BHD) Jerommeke with a bucket capacity of 3 to 4 cubic
       meters along with supporting and survey vessels.
6.     Clause ‘C’ of the tender conditions which was part of the NIT
       stipulated as under :-
               “(C) Plant and Equipment – Dredgers and ancillary
               equipments:
               The intending Tenderers should own or hire suitable plant
               and equipment if it is on hiring, proof of availability of the
               plant and equipment on lease/charter for the entire duration
               of the work at short notice specifically for this project shall
               also be attached. It will be incumbent on the intending
               Tenderers to describe fully the equipment and plant which
               they propose to utilize for completing the work within the


2    Hereinafter referred to as ‘respondent-Port Trust’
3    In short ‘NIT’
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           prescribed period. The choice of technology and plant
           and equipment proposed to be deployed will be left to the
           choice of the intending tenderers, subject to satisfying the
           Port Trust and the adequacy of the proposed technology
           and plant and equipment.
           The Port Trust has assessed and average daily output
           of 12000 cubic meters for the scenario of deployment of
           Heavy Duty CSD to complete the work within the specified
           period of Fourteen Months for which the following indicative
           plant & equipment could be required.
           1. Cutter Suction Dredger having cutter power 3000 HP
           or more -1 No.
           2. Self-propelled barges having hopper capacity 1600
           Cubic Meters - 3 Nos.
           3. Sufficient length of Floating/Submersible Pipe lines
           with and without ball joints 800 mm to 900 mm diameter.
           4. Backhoe Dredger having bucket capacity 3 to 4 Cubic
           Meters - 1 No.
           5. Supporting vessels
           6. Survey Vessels etc.,
           The tender document is open to firms/ companies/voluntary
           formed Joint Ventures/ Consortia meeting all the Minimum
           Eligibility Criteria as stipulated herein above.”
7.    In view of the above clause, it was open for the appellant-Dredging
      India to deploy such equipment as may be necessary for the dredging
      purposes including major/minor dredgers. It was also free to deploy as
      many dredgers as may be felt necessary by it, subject to satisfaction
      of the respondent-Port Trust. It included one Backhoe Dredger (BHD)
      having bucket capacity of 3 to 4 cubic meter.
8.    The appellant-Dredging India commenced operations under the
      aforesaid project on 28.12.2010. It deployed sufficient equipment
      more than what was agreed upon in the License Agreement, including
      two major Cutter Suction Dredger (CSD) as well as a Backhoe
      Dredger (BHD). The dredging work of the project was completed
      much ahead of schedule on 30.08.2011 i.e. eight months before
      the stipulated deadline.
[2026] 2 S.C.R.                                                         93

          Jan De Nul Dredging India Pvt. Ltd. v. Tuticorin Port Trust


9.     Upon the completion of the work, a joint survey was conducted by
       the respondent-Port Trust and the National Institute of Oceanography,
       Goa. The work was found to have been completed satisfactorily.
       Accordingly, the port was commissioned at a new depth on 19.11.2011.
       A Completion Certificate/Taking Over Certificate was issued to the
       appellant-Dredging India on 02.04.2012, much before the deadline
       of 28.06.2012, for the completion of the work.
10. The appellant-Dredging India submitted a final bill on 29.05.2012
    but it was not settled in full. Consequently, disputes arose between
    the parties relating to alleged non-payment and under-payment of
    dues as raised under the final bill.
11. In the above scenario, the appellant-Dredging India was left with no
    option but to invoke the arbitration clause as contained in the License
    Agreement. The dispute was referred on 20.09.2012 to an Arbitral
    Tribunal consisting of three members. The appellant-Dredging India
    raised as many as eleven claims, one of which was Claim No.7
    regarding idle time due to respondent-Port Trust’s failure to provide
    possession of and access to site.
12. The Arbitral Tribunal dealt with all the eleven claims and with the
    agreement of the parties decided Claim Nos.5, 6 and 7 together.
    The Arbitral Tribunal vide its award dated 18.10.2014 inter alia
    awarded an amount of Rs.14,66,04,216/-(Rupees Fourteen Crore
    Sixty Six Lakh Four Thousand Two Hundred and Sixteen only) to
    the appellant-Dredging India in respect of Claim No.7 i.e. regarding
    idling charges of Backhoe Dredger (BHD).
13. The aforesaid arbitral award was challenged by the respondent- Port
    Trust before the Learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court
    under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 19964, by
    means of O.P. No.152/2015. Though, the respondent-Port Trust
    assailed the amounts awarded under Claim Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9
    and 10 but at the time of hearing restricted its challenge only to the
    amount awarded under Claim No.7 with regard to idling charges for
    Backhoe Dredger (BHD).
14. The respondent-Port Trust contended before the Learned Single
    Judge of the High Court that under Clause 38 of the License


4    Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’
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      Agreement, the idle time charges were to be paid only in respect of
      idling of the major dredgers and that Backhoe Dredger (BHD) did
      not fall in that category. The Tribunal as such was not justified in
      accepting any claim in respect of idling of the Backhoe Dredger (BHD).
15. The Learned Single Judge of the High Court on 10.09.2019 dismissed
    the petition filed under Section 34 of the Act upholding the findings
    of the Arbitral Tribunal and that Clause 38 of the License Agreement
    did not confine the payment of idle time compensation in respect of
    major dredgers only inasmuch as under Clause 51 of the License
    Agreement, it was open for the appellant-Dredging India to deploy
    dredgers without specifying whether major or minor dredgers. The
    Learned Single Judge further noted that the Tribunal had adequately
    considered the material on record and had interpreted the relevant
    clauses in the proper perspective and as such, there was no occasion
    for him to interfere with the award in exercise of limited jurisdiction
    under Section 34 of the Act.
16. Even after the award of the Arbitral Tribunal was upheld by the Learned
    Single Judge of the High Court, the respondent-Port Trust was not
    satisfied. It went in appeal under Section 37 of the Act before the
    Division Bench of the High Court by means of OSA No.101/2020.
    The appeal was restricted to the claim made and awarded under
    Claim No.7.
17. It was argued that idle time compensation applicable in respect of
    major dredgers, could not have been awarded in respect of a minor
    dredger i.e. Backhoe Dredger (BHD). It was also contended that the
    Arbitral Tribunal had erroneously awarded idle time charges for a
    non-major dredger. The Backhoe Dredger (BHD) was not a major
    dredger therefore no idle time compensation could have been claimed
    or awarded if it had remained idle for any reason.
18. The Division Bench of the High Court vide judgment and order dated
    15.03.2021 allowed the appeal of the respondent-Port Trust and
    directed for the deletion of the claim awarded by the Arbitral Tribunal
    as upheld by the Learned Single Judge of the High Court in respect
    of Claim No.7 i.e. idle charges for the Backhoe Dredger (BHD).
19. The aforesaid judgment and order of the Division Bench, passed in
    exercise of powers under Section 37 of the Act, has been assailed
    by the appellant-Dredging India in this appeal.
[2026] 2 S.C.R.                                                         95

       Jan De Nul Dredging India Pvt. Ltd. v. Tuticorin Port Trust


20. Shri Chander U. Singh, learned senior counsel for the appellant-
    Dredging India, at the threshold argued that the scope of Section
    37 of the Act is very limited and cannot extend beyond the ambit of
    Section 34 of the Act. Therefore, the Division Bench of the High Court
    manifestly erred in law in disturbing the judgment and order of the
    Learned Single Judge of the High Court upholding the arbitral award.
    Since the arbitral award had interpreted the various clauses of the
    License Agreement and had recorded a definite finding thereon in
    passing the award and as it was found that there was no scope for
    interference with it under Section 34 of the Act, the Appellate Court
    ought not to have varied or reversed the same. The interpretation
    of the clauses of the License Agreement, as made by the Arbitral
    Tribunal had to be accepted and that the appellate court had no
    jurisdiction to interpret those clauses in a different manner.
21. In defence, Shri S. Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel for the
    respondent-Port Trust, argued that the Division Bench had rightly
    set aside the arbitral award in respect of Claim No.7 as the claim
    of the appellant-Dredging India for the delay in handing over the
    site was under Clauses 41.1 and 41.2 of the License Agreement
    and, therefore, the Tribunal could not have awarded compensation
    under Clause 51.1 which deals with the interruption of work due to
    port traffic etc. Secondly, the Arbitral Tribunal could not have relied
    upon Claim Nos.5 and 6 which were based on delays due to traffic
    in and outside port channel to award any compensation under Claim
    No.7 which was independent and the delay was not on account
    of port traffic. The award of the claim by the Arbitral Tribunal for
    Claim No.7 was patently illegal. The claim for compensation due to
    idling of the Backhoe Dredger (BHD) which was admittedly a minor
    dredger, was not covered under Clause 38 which only provided for
    the compensation for the idling of the major dredgers.
22. Apart from other things, the broad question which falls for our
    consideration is whether the Division Bench in exercise of powers
    under Section 37 of the Act was justified to interfere with the judgment
    and order of the Learned Single Judge passed under Section 34 of
    the Act upholding the award of the Arbitral Tribunal.
23. The ancillary issues which may arise are: whether the Backhoe
    Dredger (BHD) can be categorized as a minor dredger or is a major
    dredger; or whether deployment of a minor dredger was not stipulated
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      under the License Agreement; and whether on the conjoint reading
      of Clauses 38, 41.1, 41.2 and 51.1, the appellant-Dredging India
      is entitled to any compensation for the idling of the said Backhoe
      Dredger (BHD).
24. The primary object of the Act is to provide speedy and inexpensive
    mode of resolution of disputes through the process of arbitration
    with the minimum intervention of the law courts. In this context, it
    would be beneficial to refer and quote Section 5 of the Act which
    reads as under:-
           “5. Extent of judicial intervention-Notwithstanding
           anything contained in any other law for the time being in
           force, in matters governed by this Part, no judicial authority
           shall intervene except where so provided in this Part.”
25. The above Section 5 of the Act contemplates that in matters of
    arbitration governed by Part-I i.e. in relation to domestic arbitration,
    minimum intervention of the judicial authority is acceptable unless
    it is otherwise provided under Part-I of the Act. In other words, in
    order to speed up the remedial measures under the Act in relation
    to domestic arbitration, there has to be minimum intervention of the
    court and, if necessary, it has to be only in strict compliance with
    the provisions of the Act.
26. The Act provides for the challenge of the arbitral award before the
    court on limited grounds as contemplated by Section 34 of the Act
    i.e. where one of the party was under some incapacity; or where
    the arbitration agreement itself was not valid; or the parties were
    not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or the
    arbitral proceedings; or was unable, for some reason, to present
    his case before the Arbitrator or Arbitral Tribunal; or if the arbitral
    award deals with the dispute not contemplated or falling within the
    terms of the arbitration or deals with the matters beyond the scope
    of the arbitration; or where the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal
    was not in accordance with arbitration agreement; and, or where the
    court finds the subject matter of the arbitral dispute was incapable
    of settlement by arbitration or the arbitral award is in conflict with
    the public policy of India.
27. In short, apart from the above grounds, the arbitral award is not
    open for challenge under Section 34 of the Act on any other ground.
[2026] 2 S.C.R.                                                          97

        Jan De Nul Dredging India Pvt. Ltd. v. Tuticorin Port Trust


     So, the intervention of the court is limited. Therefore, technicalities
     apart, the main ground for challenge of the arbitral award in the
     instant case, which survives is that of the award being in conflict
     with the public policy of India i.e. whether it is in contravention with
     the fundamental policy of India or is in conflict with the most basic
     notions of morality or justice.
28. In the case at hand, a challenge to the award of the Arbitral Tribunal
    before the Learned Single Judge of the High Court would reveal
    that it was confined to Claim No.7 and that too on the merits of the
    same and not on the ground of violation of the public policy of India
    or that it is against the basic notions of morality or justice.
29. The Arbitral Tribunal, in making the award, has interpreted the
    various clauses of the License Agreement so as to hold that the
    appellant-Dredging India is entitled for appropriate compensation
    with regard to idling of its Backhoe Dredger (BHD) for want of non-
    supply of site within time. Apparently, the challenge to the award of
    the Arbitral Tribunal was neither on any of the grounds enumerated
    under Section 34, nor even on the ground that the award of the
    Claim No.7 is against the fundamental policy of India or the basic
    notions of morality or justice.
30. That being the position, the award of the Arbitral Tribunal was not
    liable to be disturbed under Section 34 of the Act and was rightly not
    disturbed. It is settled in law that the appellate powers under Section
    37 are limited to the scope of Section 34 and cannot exceed beyond
    it. Certainly, therefore, if an award is not liable to be disturbed under
    Section 34 of the Act, the same could not have been interfered with
    in exercise of powers under Section 37 of the Act.
31. In MMTC Limited vs. Vedanta Limited5, this Court has very
    succinctly laid down the powers of Appellate Court under the Act.
    It held as under :-
            “14. As far as interference with an order made under
            Section 34, as per Section 37, is concerned, it cannot be
            disputed that such interference under Section 37 cannot
            travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34.
            In other words, the court cannot undertake an independent


5   (2019) 4 SCC 163
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              assessment of the merits of the award, and must only
              ascertain that the exercise of power by the court under
              Section 34 has not exceeded the scope of the provision.
              Thus, it is evident that in case an arbitral award has been
              confirmed by the court under Section 34 and by the court in
              an appeal under Section 37, this Court must be extremely
              cautious and slow to disturb such concurrent findings.”
32. In Konkan Railway Corpn. Ltd. v. Chenab Bridge Project6, a
    three-judge bench of this Hon’ble Court has extensively dealt with
    the jurisprudence around Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act.
    This Court has held that:
              “18. At the outset, we may state that the jurisdiction of the
              court under Section 37 of the Act, as clarified by this Court
              in MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd.7, is akin to the jurisdiction of
              the court under Section 34 of the Act. Scope of interference
              by a court in an appeal under Section 37 of the Act, in
              examining an order, setting aside or refusing to set aside
              an award, is restricted and subject to the same grounds
              as the challenge under Section 34 of the Act.
              19. Therefore, the scope of jurisdiction under Section 34
              and Section 37 of the Act is not akin to normal appellate
              jurisdiction. It is well-settled that courts ought not to interfere
              with the arbitral award in a casual and cavalier manner.
              The mere possibility of an alternative view on facts or
              interpretation of the contract does not entitle courts to
              reverse the findings of the Arbitral Tribunal.”
33. In Punjab State Civil Supplies Corpn. Ltd. v. Sanman Rice Mills8,
    this Hon’ble Court, while examining the scope of Section 34 and
    Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, has held that:
              “20. In view of the above position in law on the subject,
              the scope of the intervention of the court in arbitral matters
              is virtually prohibited, if not absolutely barred and that the
              interference is confined only to the extent envisaged under


6     (2023) 9 SCC 85
7     (2019) 4 SCC 163
8     2024 SCC OnLine SC 2632
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        Jan De Nul Dredging India Pvt. Ltd. v. Tuticorin Port Trust


            Section 34 of the Act. The appellate power of Section 37
            of the Act is limited within the domain of Section 34 of the
            Act. It is exercisable only to find out if the court, exercising
            power under Section 34 of the Act, has acted within its
            limits as prescribed thereunder or has exceeded or failed
            to exercise the power so conferred. The Appellate Court
            has no authority of law to consider the matter in dispute
            before the arbitral tribunal on merits so as to find out as
            to whether the decision of the arbitral tribunal is right or
            wrong upon reappraisal of evidence as if it is sitting in
            an ordinary court of appeal. It is only where the court
            exercising power under Section 34 has failed to exercise
            its jurisdiction vested in it by Section 34 or has travelled
            beyond its jurisdiction that the appellate court can step in
            and set aside the order passed under Section 34 of the
            Act. Its power is more akin to that superintendence as is
            vested in civil courts while exercising revisionary powers.
            The arbitral award is not liable to be interfered unless a
            case for interference as set out in the earlier part of the
            decision, is made out. It cannot be disturbed only for
            the reason that instead of the view taken by the arbitral
            tribunal, the other view which is also a possible view is a
            better view according to the appellate court.
            21. It must also be remembered that proceedings under
            Section 34 of the Act are summary in nature and are not
            like a full-fledged regular civil suit. Therefore, the scope
            of Section 37 of the Act is much more summary in nature
            and not like an ordinary civil appeal. The award as such
            cannot be touched unless it is contrary to the substantive
            provision of law; any provision of the Act or the terms of
            the agreement.”
34. In UHL Power Company Limited vs. State of Himachal Pradesh9,
    a three judges Bench of this Court observed as under:-
            “The jurisdiction conferred on the courts under Section
            34 of the Arbitration Act is fairly narrow, when it comes to
            the scope of an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration


9   (2022) 4 SCC 116
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             Act, the jurisdiction of the Appellate Court in examining
             an order, setting aside or refusing to set aside an order,
             is all the more circumscribed.”
35. In a recent case of Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corporation
    Private Limited vs. Samir Narain Bhojwani10, a Bench of this
    Court, of which one of us (P. Mithal, J.) was a member, had held
    that the jurisdiction of the Appellate Court dealing with an appeal
    under Section 37 of the Act against the judgment in a petition under
    Section 34 of the Act is more constrained than the jurisdiction of the
    court dealing with a petition under Section 34 of the Act.
36. The gist of the aforesaid decisions is that the jurisdiction of the court
    under Section 37 of the Act is akin to the jurisdiction of the court under
    Section 34 of the Act, and, therefore, the scope of interference by the
    court in appeal under Section 37 cannot go beyond the grounds on
    which challenge can be made to the award under Section 34 of the
    Act. Moreover, the courts exercising powers under Sections 34 and
    37, do not act as a normal court, and therefore, ought not to interfere
    with the arbitral award on a mere possibility of an alternative view.
37. In other words, the scope of interference of the court with the arbitral
    matters is virtually prohibited, if not absolutely barred. The powers
    of the Appellate Court are even more restricted than the powers
    conferred by Section 34 of the Act. The appellate power under Section
    37 of the Act is exercisable only to find out if the court exercising
    power under Section 34 of the Act, has acted within its limits as
    prescribed thereunder or has exceeded or failed to exercise the
    power so conferred. The Appellate Court exercising powers under
    Section 37 of the Act has no authority of law to consider the matter
    in dispute before the Arbitral Tribunal on merits so as to hold as
    to whether the award of the Arbitral Tribunal is right or wrong. The
    Appellate Court in exercise of such power cannot sit as an ordinary
    court of appeal and reappraise the evidence to record a contrary
    finding. The award of the Arbitral Tribunal cannot be touched by the
    court unless it is contrary to the substantive provision of law or any
    provision of the Act or the terms of the agreement.
38. Undoubtedly, in the case at hand, the award of the Arbitral Tribunal
    is not contrary to any substantive provision of law or any provision of


10   (2024) 7 SCC 218
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         Jan De Nul Dredging India Pvt. Ltd. v. Tuticorin Port Trust


      the Act. Yet, it has been disturbed by the Appellate Court, apparently
      by giving a different interpretation of the clauses of the License
      Agreement which jurisdiction was not vested in it. Ordinarily, the
      interpretation given by the Arbitral Tribunal, as affirmed by the court
      in exercise of powers under Section 34 of the Act ought to have
      been accepted.
39. In regard to the contention that the arbitral award was contrary to
    the terms of the Licence Agreement, it would be trite to state that
    due and proper interpretation of the various clauses of the Licence
    Agreement was given by the Arbitral Tribunal and the same also had
    the approval of the Learned Single Judge by his judgment passed
    in exercise of powers under Section 34 of the Act and as such the
    Appellate Court could not have given a different interpretation to
    the said clauses. The Appellate Court was actually bound by the
    interpretation of the clauses of the Licence Agreement as given by
    the Arbitral Tribunal and accepted by the Court under Section 34.
40. In National Highways Authority of India v. M/s Hindustan
    Construction Company Ltd.11 a Bench of this Court, speaking
    through Justice Oka, of which one of us (Shri P. Mithal, J.) was also
    a member held as under:
             “There cannot be any dispute that as far as the construction
             of the terms of a contract is concerned, it is for the Arbitral
             Tribunal to adjudicate upon. If, after considering the material
             on record, the Arbitral Tribunal takes a particular view on
             the interpretation of the contract, the Court under Section
             34 does not sit in appeal over the findings of the arbitrator.”
      In view of the aforesaid decision, if the interpretation given by the
      Arbitral Tribunal cannot be disturbed under Section 34 of the Act, the
      same cannot also be disturbed by exercising powers under Section
      37 of the Act.
41. Shri S. Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel for the respondent-
    Port Trust, had cited Ssangyong Engineering and Construction
    Company Limited vs. National Highways Authority of India
    (NHAI)12, to contend that when there is patent illegality in the award,


11   2024 INSC 388
12   (2019) 15 SCC 131
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       the same could always be corrected in appeal under Section 37
       of the Act. A close reading of the above decision would reveal
       that in order to apply the same, first, it has to be established that
       there is a patent illegality on the face of the award; secondly, mere
       contravention of substantive laws of India by itself is no longer
       a ground available to set aside the award; and if the Arbitrator
       gives no reason for an award, it would amount to patent illegality.
       In the present case, no patent illegality on the face of the award
       stands established. The Arbitral Award is a speaking award with
       findings and interpretations based upon reasons. Moreover, there
       is apparently no violation of the fundamental policy of any Indian
       law or the basic notions of morality and justice to enable the courts
       to interfere with the award.
42. Insofar as the merits of the case or other ancillary points arising in the
    matter as referred to above, it would be relevant to refer to Clauses
    38, 41.1, 41.2 as well as Clause 51.1 of the License Agreement.
    The aforesaid clauses are being reproduced hereinbelow for the
    sake of convenience :-
            “Clause 38- STOPPAGE OF WORKS
            The Contractor may be instructed to stop the works from
            time to time due to security reasons, moving ships, or any
            other reasons as per the instructions of the Port Authorities.
            The Contractor shall furnish idle time charges for the major
            dredgers proposed to be deployed by him in the BOQ. The
            rate for idle time charges, quoted by the lowest Bidder,
            will be finalized taking into account the lowest idle time
            charges quoted by the other Bidders.
            Clause 41.1- POSSESSION OF SITE AND ACCESS
            THERETO
            Save in so far as the Contract may prescribe:
            a) the extent of portions of the Site of which the Contractor
            is to be given possession from time to time and
            b) the order in which the Works shall be executed as may
            be mutually agreed on and as per the programme,
            c) so much of the Site, and
[2026] 2 S.C.R.                                                             103

       Jan De Nul Dredging India Pvt. Ltd. v. Tuticorin Port Trust


           d) such access as, in accordance with the Contract, is to be
           provided by the Employer as may be required to enable the
           Contractor to commence and proceed with the execution
           of the Works in accordance with the programme referred
           to in Clause 44.1, if any, and otherwise in accordance
           with such reasonable proposals as the Contractor shall,
           by notice to the Engineer. The Engineer will, from time
           to time as the Work proceeds, give to the Contractor
           possession of such further portions of the Site as may
           be required to enable the Contractor to proceed with the
           execution of the Works with due dispatch in accordance
           with such programme or proposals, as the case may be.
           Clause 41.2- FAILURE TO GIVE POSSESSION
           If the Contractor suffers delay and/or incurs costs from
           failure on the part of the Employer to give possession
           in accordance with the terms of Sub-Clause 41.1, the
           Engineer shall, after due consultation with the Employer
           and Contractor, determine any extension of time to which
           the Contractor is entitled under Clause 43.1, and the
           amount of such costs which shall be added to the Contract
           Price and shall notify the Contractor accordingly.
           Clause 51.1- INTERRUPTIONS TO WORK
           The Contractor shall allow in his rates for any loss of
           working time due to weather, surveying, positioning of
           craft, shifting of dredger/equipment during maintenance.
           Idle time of the dredger/equipment exceeding a continuous
           period of 4 (four) hours due to interruption caused by Port
           traffic, berthing, unberthing, or shifting of vessels and other
           operations in the Harbour basin and Approach Channel,
           excluding the specified times under Sub-Clause 6.0 Section
           III shipping operations (i.e., from 07.00 hours to 14.00
           hours) as instructed/agreed by the Engineer, shall be paid
           for at the quoted rates included in the Bill of Quantities,
           subject to the Engineer being notified by the Contractor
           within 12 hours on each occasion of such interruptions.
           The idle time for such payment shall be reckoned as the
           total time in one continuous interruption minus 2 hours.
104                                                        [2026] 2 S.C.R.

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          Berthing programme of vessels will be provided every day
          after berthing meeting at 12.00 hours or when ETAs are
          made available to Port by shipping agencies.
          Notice will be given approximately 1 hour before the sailing
          of vessels, and the Contractor shall contact the Port Marine
          Department for any information in this regard. No claim
          whatsoever for additional payments on account of the
          specified interruption will be entertained.”
43. The aforesaid Clause 38 though speaks about stoppage of work
    and about idle time charges for the major dredger deployed by the
    contractor i.e. the appellant-Dredging India, but it nowhere prohibits
    the appellant-Dredging India to claim compensation in respect of
    any other equipment including Backhoe Dredger, if it remains idle.
    The aforesaid Clause 38 cannot be read so as to mean that since
    it provides for idle time charges for major dredgers, compensation
    in respect of other equipment or minor/special dredgers is not
    permissible.
44. Clauses 41.1 and 41.2 provide for the consequences of failure on
    part of the respondent-Port Trust to give possession of the site in
    time including extension of time and costs. However, this does not
    ipso facto mean that idle time compensation would not be admissible
    if the site is not made available for any other reason covered under
    the terms of the License Agreement.
45. The aforesaid Clauses 41.1 and 41.2 cannot be read in isolation. If
    we read the aforesaid clauses of the Licence Agreement conjointly
    with Clause 51.1, it would be evident that idle time charges or
    compensation are available even if any equipment is kept idle on
    account of delay or non-providing of the site for operation within time.
    In view of Clause 51.1, the argument that since the Claim No. 7 was
    virtually under Clauses 41.1 and 41.2, the Arbitral Tribunal could not
    have awarded claim under Clause 51.1 is misconceived, inasmuch
    as it is settled in law that if the power to grant a relief is available
    under the Act or the terms and conditions of the Licence Agreement,
    it is immaterial as to under which clause the same is claimed.
46. In the instant case, the power to award compensation for idle time of
    the equipment including Backhoe Dredger is traceable to Clause 51.1
    of the Lease Agreement and therefore the Arbitral Tribunal was not
[2026] 2 S.C.R.                                                             105

         Jan De Nul Dredging India Pvt. Ltd. v. Tuticorin Port Trust


      wrong in interpreting the clauses so as to make an award in favour of
      the appellant-Dredging India under Claim No. 7. In such a situation,
      the interpretation given by the Arbitral Tribunal is apparently a plausible
      view and was rightly not disturbed by the Learned Single Judge in
      exercise of power under Section 34 of the Act. Therefore, in appeal
      under Section 37 of the Act, the said reasoning could not have been
      disturbed so as to permit a different view. The interpretation given
      by the Arbitral Tribunal had to be accepted by the Appellate Court.
47. In paragraph 15 of Larsen Air Conditioning and Refrigeration
    Company vs. Union of India & Ors.13, this Court observed that the
    limited and extremely circumscribed jurisdiction of the court under
    Section 34 of the Act, permits the court to interfere with an award,
    sans the grounds of patent illegality but if an arbitrator construes a
    term of a contract in a reasonable manner, it will not mean that the
    award can be set aside on that ground.
48. In the case at hand, the Arbitral Award contains logical reasons
    in construing the various clauses of the License Agreement and
    the view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal had been accepted by the
    court under Section 34 of the Act as a reasonable and a possible
    view. Therefore, in the light of above referred decision of Larsen
    Air Conditioning (supra), the Arbitral Award could not have been
    set aside even if there was a possible second view regarding the
    interpretation of the clauses of the License Agreement.
49. In the light of the above discussion, the ancillary issues, whether
    the Backhoe Dredger (BHD) is a minor or a major dredger or
    whether it could have been deployed for the project work, pales
    into insignificance. The License Agreement permits deployment of
    Backhoe Dredger (BHD) without specifying whether it is a minor or
    a major dredger. Moreover, as discussed earlier, it was open for
    the appellant-Dredging India to deploy the equipment as may be
    felt necessary by it, and, therefore, the deployment of the Backhoe
    Dredger (BHD) was not contrary to any terms of the License
    Agreement.
50. In view of the aforesaid factual and legal position, we are of the
    opinion that the Appellate Court manifestly erred in law in interfering


13   (2023) 15 SCC 472
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       with the judgment and order of the Learned Single Judge of the
       High Court passed under Section 34 of the Act so as to disturb the
       arbitral award in respect of Claim No.7.
51. Before parting, we consider it proper to note that the Act is a special
    enactment which aims to resolve contractual/commercial disputes
    through arbitration with the minimum intervention of the court, if
    not without the intervention of the court. In the event, the courts
    are allowed to step in at every stage and the arbitral awards are
    subjected to challenge before the courts in hierarchy before court of
    first instance, through regular appeals and finally by means of SLP/
    Civil Appeal before the Supreme Court, it would obviate/frustrate
    and defeat the very purpose of the Act. It is therefore, necessary to
    accept the arbitral award if it is not patently illegal or does not fall
    within the scope of intervention under Section 34 of the Act. The
    appeal thereof has a much narrower scope of intervention particularly
    when the arbitral award has been upheld under Section 34 of the Act.
    The appellate jurisdiction acquires little significance only when the
    arbitral award has been erroneously upheld or set aside by the court
    in exercise of its power under Section 34 of the Act as discussed
    earlier, but has no authority of law to consider the matter which was
    before the Arbitral Tribunal on merits.
52. In the light of the above discussion, in our opinion, the impugned
    judgment and order dated 15.03.2021 passed by the Division Bench
    of the High Court under Section 37 of the Act is unsustainable in
    law and is accordingly set aside.
53. The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.

       Result of the case: Appeal allowed.




       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan