JARNAIL SINGHversusSTATE OF HARYANA

                       (2013] 8 S.C.R. 1044


A                         JARNAIL SINGH
                                  V.
                       STATE OF HARYANA
                (Criminal Appeal No. 1209 of 2010)
                            JULY 1, 2013
B
     [P. SATHASIVAM AND JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, JJ.]

          Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 366, 376(g) & 120-8 - A/legation
    that prosecurtix was forcefully taken away, and subjected to
C   rape by the appellant and his three accomplices - Conviction
    of appellant - Justification - Held: Justified, in view of the
    statement of the prosecutrix uls. 164 CrPC, as a/so, the
    statement made by her before the trial court, and the manner
    in which she was subjected to cross-examination -
D   Substantial material corroborating the statement of the
    prosecutrix for unequivocal determination of the guilt of the
    appellant - Prosecutrix was recovered from the custody of
    appellant and thereafter, subjected to medico-legal
    examination by PW1 - PW1, in her independent testimony,
E   affirmed that she had been subjected to sexual intercourse,
    inasmuch as her hymen was found ruptured - Deposition of
    prosecutrix scientifically substantiated by report of FSL and
    of the Serologist - Defence plea that prosecutrix had
    accompanied the appellant, and had sexual intercourse with
F   him consensually completely ruled out, because as per the
    substantiated prosecution version, prosecutrix was not taken
    away by the appellant alone, but also, by his three
    accomplices - Alf four of them had similarly violated her
    person - PWB, the father of the prosecutrix, a/so in material
G   particulars corroborated the testimony of the prosecutrix -
    Further, the prosecutrix was a minor on the date of occurrence
    - Even if she had accompanied the appellant of her own free
    will, and had had consensual sex with him, the same would
    have been clearly inconsequential, as she was a minor.

H                               1044
       JARNAIL SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA                   1045


      Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, A
2007 - r. 12 - Rape - Age of prosecutrix - Determination -
Held: It would be just and· appropriate to apply r. 12 to
determine the age of the prosecutrix - Even though r. 12 is
strictly applicable only to determine the age of a child in
conflict with law, it should be the basis for determining age, B
even for a child who is a victim of crime - The manner of
determining age conclusively, has been expressed in sub-rule
(3) of r. 12 - Age of a child is ascertained, by adopting the first
available basis, out of a number of options postulated in
r. 12(3) - Matriculation (or equivalent) certificate of the c
concerned child, is the highest rated option - Only in absence
of the said certificate, r. 12(3), envisages consideration of the
date of birth entered in the school first attended by the child
- In absence of such entry, r.12(3) postulates reliance on birth
certificatfJ issued by a corporation or a municipal authority or
                                                                    0
a panchayat - In absence of any of the aforesaid, r.12(3)
postulates determination of age of the concerned child, on the
basis of medical opinion - Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act, 2000-s.68(1)- Penal Code, 1860
- s.376(g).
                                                                    E
     .The prosecution case was that when the prosecutrix
had gone out of her house to urinate in the street, the
appellant and his three accomplices kidnapped her and
thereafter they committed rape on her, one after the other.
The trial court convicted the appellant under Sections F
366, 376(g) and 120-B IPC. The conviction was upheld by
the High Court.

     In the instant appeal, it was contended by the
appellant that the prosecutrix had voluntarily and with her       G
free consent, accompanied the appellant and had sexual
intercourse with him consensually; and in support of this
contention the appellant pointed out that the prosecutrix
had taken Rs.3,000/- from her father's house to make
good her escape in the company of the appellant. The
                                                                   H
    1046   SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A appellant also contested the determination of the High
  Court in the impugned judgment, wherein it had
  concluded, that the prosecutrix was a minor.

        Dismissing the appeal, the Court

B        HELD: 1.1. In her statement before the Trial Court,
    where she appeared as PW6, the prosecutrix had
    reiterated clearly the position of having been taken away
    by the appellant, and his three accomplices. She affirmed,
    that she was taken away in a tanker to Uttar Pradesh and
C   then all the accused had committed rape on her in a small
    room. On the aforestated aspect of the matter, she was
    not subjected to cross-examination at the behest of the
    accused. Only a suggestion was put to her, that she had
    persuaded the appellant to take her away, in order to
D   perform marriage with her, and for the said purpose had
    taken away cash, clothes and jewellery from her own
    residence. The aforestated suggestion was denied by the
    prosecutrix. Keeping in view the statement of the
    prosecutrix under Section 164 CrPC before the Judicial
E   Magistrate, First Class, as also, the statement made by
    her while appearing before the trial court, and the manner
    in which she was subjected to cross-examination, there
    is no room for any doubt, that the prosecutrix was
    forcefully taken away, and that, she was subjected to
F   rape at the hands of the appellant and his three
    accomplices. It may still have been understandable, if the
    case had been, that she had consensual sex with the
    appellant alone. But consensual sex with four boys at the
    same time, is just not comprehensible. [Para 15] [1060-
G   E-H; 1061-A-B]
       1.2. In regard to the contention advanced by the
  appellant, that while leaving her house on 25.3.1993, the
  prosecutrix had taken away a sum of Rs.3,000/-, whilst it
  is true that in the complaint, PW8, the father of the
H prosecutrix had categorically mentioned that a sum of
      JARNAIL SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA               1047


Rs.3,000/- was missing from his residence, and the said       A
fact was duly mentioned in his complaint to the police
dated 27.3.1993, yet he had not accused the prosecutrix
for having taken it away. The instant aspect pales into
insignificance, on account of the statement made by PWS
before the Trial Court that though he had mentioned that      B
a sum of Rs.3,000/- was missing from his residence, but
his wife had found the aforesaid money from the
residence itself, a few days later. Accordingly, the
assertion made by the appellant to the effect that the
prosecutrix had taken away a sum of Rs.3,000/-, when          c
she left the house of her father on 25.3.1993, cannot be
stated to have been duly proved. Besides, it is apparent
from the cross-examination of the prosecutrix, that a
suggestion was put to her that besides cash, she had
taken away clothes and jewellery at the time of leaving       0
her father's house on 25.3.1993. The prosecutrix
expressly denied the suggestion. There is no material on
the record of the case to substantiate the said allegation.
Therefore, it is not possible to accept the accusation
levelled by the appellant against the prosecutrix, either     E
on the issue of having taken away a sum of Rs.3,000/-
while leaving her house, or that she left her house on
25.3.1993 along with clothes and jewellery. Accordingly,
the inference drawn by assuming the said factual position
as true, simply does not arise. [Para 16) [1061-D-H; 1062-
A-C]                                                          F

    2.1. Further, the prosecutrix was a minor on the date
of occurrence. Even if she had accompanied the
appellant of her own free will, and had had consensual
sex with him, the same would have been clearly                G
inconsequential, as she was a minor. On the issue of
determination of age of a minor, it would be just and
appropriate to apply Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care
and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (framed under
Section 68(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection    H
    1048   SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A of Children) Act, 2000), to determine the age of the
  prosecutrix. Even tho!lgh Rule 12 is strictly applicable
  only to determine the age of a child in conflict with law,
  the aforesaid statutory provision should be the basis for
  determining age, even for a child who is a victim of crime.
B For, there is hardly any difference insofar as the issue of
  minority is concerned, between a child in conflict with
  law, and a child who is a victim of crime. The manner of
  determining age conclusi'!_ely, has been expressed in
  sub-rule (3) of Rule 12. Under the aforesaid provision, the.
c age of a child is ascertained, by adopting the first
  available basis, out of a number of options postulated in
  Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule 12(3),
  an option is expressed in a preceding clause, it has
  overriding effect over an option expressed in a
  subsequent clause. The highest rated option available,
0
  would conclusively determine the age of a minor. In the
  scheme of Rule 12(3), matriculation (or equivalent)
  certificate of the concerned child, is the highest rated
  option. In case, the said certificate is available, no other
  evidence can be relied upon. Only in the absence of the
E said certificate, Rule 12(3), envisages consideration of the
  date of birth entered, in the school first attended by the
  child. In case such an entry of date of birth is available,
  the date of birth depicted therein is liable to be treated as
  final and conclusive, and no other material is to be relied
F upon. Only in the absence of such entry, Rule 12(3)
  postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by a
  corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Yet
  again, if such a certificate is available, then no other
  material whatsoever is to be taken into consideration, for
G determining the age of the child concerned, as the said
  certificate would conclusively determine the age of the
  child. It is only in the absence of any of the aforesaid, that
  Rule 12(3) postulates the determination of age of the
  concerned child, on the basis of medical opinion. [Paras
H 20, 21) [1063-E; 1065-E-H; 1066-A-E; 1067-D-E]
       JARNAIL SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA                1049


     2.2. In the instant case, following the scheme of Rule     A
12 of the 2007 Rules, it is apparent that the age of the
prosecutrix could not be determined on the basis of the
matriculation (or ,equivalent) certificate as she had herself
deposed, that she had studied upto class 3 only, and
thereafter, had left her school and had started to do           B
household work. The prosecution in the facts and
circumstances of this case, had endeavoured to establish
the age of the prosecutrix, on the next available basis, in
the sequence of options expressed in Rule 12(3) of the
2007-Rules. The prosecution produced PW4, to prove the          c
age of the prosecutrix. PW4 was the Head Master of the
Government High School where the prosecutrix had
studied upto class 3. PW4 had proved the certificate
Exhibit-PG, as having been made on the basis of the
school records indicating, that the prosecutrix, was born       0
on 15.5.1977. In the scheme contemplated under Rule
12(~) of the 2007 Rules, it is not permissible to determine
age in any other manner, and certainly not on the basis
of an option mentioned i_!I a subsequent clause.
Therefore, the High Court was fully justified in relying on     E
the aforesaid basis for establishing the age of the
prosecutrix. Further, under the scheme of Rule 12 of the
2007 Rules, it would have been improper for the High
Court to rely on any other material including the
ossification test, for determining the age of the
prosecutrix. The deposition of PW4 has not been                 F
contested. Therefore, the date of birth of the prosecutrix
(indicated in Exhibit P.G., as 15.7.1977) assumes finality.
Accordingly it is clear, that the prosecutrix, was less than
15 years old on the date of occurrence, i.e., on 25.3.1993.
[Para 21] [1066-E-H; 1067-A-D]                                  G

    3. The prosecution version is not entirely based on
the statement of the prosecutrix. After she was found
missing from her father's residence on 25.3.1993, and after
her father PWS had made a complaint to the police on            H
   1050    SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A 27.3.1993, she was recovered from the custody of the
  appellant. Thereafter, the prosecutrix was subjected to
  medico-legal examination by PW1 on 29.3.1993 itself at
  3.00 p.m. PW1, in her independent testimony, affirmed that
  she had been subjected to sexual intercourse, inasmuch
B as her hymen was found ruptured. Even though the visual
  examination of the prosecutrix, during the course of her
  medico-legal examination did not reveal the presence of
  semen or blood, yet the report of the forensic science
  laboratory (Exhibit PL) and of the Serologist (Exhibit PU
c 1) clearly establish the presence of semen on her salwar,
  underwear and pubic hair. The serologist's report also
  disclose, medium and small blood stains on her "salwar".
  In her own deposition, she had mentioned that, when she
  was raped by the appellant and his accomplices, bleeding
0 had taken place and she had felt pain, and her clothes
  were stained with blood. Her deposition stands
  scientifically substantiated by Exhibits PL and PU1. The
  suggestion put to the prosecutrix at the behest of the
  appellant, during the course of her cross-examination, that
E she had accompanied the appellant, of her own free will
  and had had sexual intercourse with him consensually,
  leaves no room for any doubt, that she was in his
  company, and that, he had had sexual intercourse with
  her. The assertion that the prosecutrix had accompanied
  the appellant, and had had sexual intercourse with him
F consensually is completely ruled out, because as per the
  substantiated prosecution version, the prosecutrix was
  not taken away by the appellant alone, but also, by his
  three accomplices. All the four of them had similarly
  violated her person. Additionally, in her statement under
G Section 164 of the Code of Criminal procedure, the
  prosecutrix had asserted, that in the first instance, after
  having caught hold of her, the accused had made her
  inhale something from a cloth which had made her
  unconscious. Thereafter, when the appellant attempted
H to commit intercourse with her, she had slapped him. He
        JARNAIL SINGH v. STAT~ OF HARYAN,AL                 1051


had then put a cloth in her mouth, to st0p her frO'ltl ·raising      A
an alarm. Thereafter, each one of the accomplices had
committed forcible intercourse with her in turns. The
factum of commission of forcible intercourse by the
appellant, as also, his accomplices was reiterated by her
during her testimony before the Trial Court as PW6.                  B
Besides the aforesaid, there is a statement of her own
father PW8 who also in material particulars had
corroborated the testimony of the prosecutrix. The
prosecutrix was not subjected to cross-examination on
any of these issues. Nor was the prosecutrix confronted              c
with either the statements made by her under Section 161
or Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, so as
to enable her to explain discrepancies, if any. Therefore,
there was substantial material corroborating the statement
of the prosecutrix for an unequivocal determination of the           D
guilt of the appellant. [Para 24] [1068-C, D-H; 1069-A-H;
1070-A]

    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No: 1209 of 2010.
                                                                     E
    From the Judgment and Order dated 04.11.2008 of the
High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal
Appeal No. 247-SB of 1995.

     H.P.S: lshar, Dr. Kailash Chand for the Appellant.
                                                                     F
     Meera Bhatia, Kamal Mohan Gupta for the Respondent.

     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
      JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J. 1. The factual position on
which the prosecution version is founded, commences with the         G
passing of information by Savitri Devi (the mother of the
prosecutrix VW - PW6), to her husband Jagdish Chander-PW8,
on 26.3.1993, at about' 6 am. She informed her husband, that
the prosecutrix VW - PW6 was missing from their residence.
In this behalf it would be pertinent to mention, that on 25.3.1993   H
    1052    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A at about 10 pm; Jagdish Chander went to sleep in the "baithak"
  (drawing room) of their residence. Savitri Devi, the mother of
  the prosecutrix·vw - PW6, along with the prosecutrix VW -
  PW6, and the other children (comprising of three sons, the
  prosecutrix VW - PW6 and one other daughter), went to sleep
B in the other rooms of the house. Savitri Devi, told her husband,
  that she suspected the accused~appellant Jarnail Singh, may
  be responsible for having taken away their daughter.

       2. Jagdish Chander-PW8, commenced to search for his
  daughter. During the course of the aforesaid search, the
C accused-appellant Jarnail Singh, who had his residence in the
  neighbourhood (of Jagdish Chander-PW8), was also found
  missing from his residence. The search for the prosecutrix VW
  - PW6 by her father, proved futile. It is therefore, that Jagdish
  Chander-PW8, made a complaint Exhibit PO on 27.3.1993 to
D the Sub-Inspector lncharge, Police Post, Jathlana. In his
  complaint, he described VW - PW6, as the elder of his two
  daughters. He gave out her age as about 16 years. He also
  alleged, that his daughter VW - PW6 had gone missing from
  their residence in the night intervening 25th and 26th March,
E 1993. He also alleged, that an amount of Rs.3,000/- was
  missing from his house, which he assumed may have been
  taken away by his daughter VW - PW6, while leaving the house.
  In the complaint Exhibit PO, the needle of suspicion was
  pointed at the accused-appellant Jarnail Singh.
F
       3. After the registration of the complaint of Jagdish
  Chander-PW8, the prosecutrix VW - PW6 was recovered on
  29.3.1983, from the custody of the accused-appellant Jarnail
  Singh, from the house of Shashi Bhan at Raipur in district
G Haridwar. The accused-appellant simultaneously came to be
  arrested, on 29.3.1993.

       4. The statement of the prosecutrix VW - PW6 was got
  recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  before O.P. Verma, Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jagadhri
H on 6.4.1993. It is necessary in the facts and circumstances of
       JARNAIL SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA                   1053
           [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.)

this case to extract herein her short statement recorded under     A
Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which is being
reproduced hereunder:

    "Stated that on the night of 25.3.1993 at around 11 pm, I
    went to a street near my house to answer nature's call.
                                                                   B
    Accused Jarnail Singh and his three accomplices were
    hiding there. When I got up after answering nature's call,
    then they caught hold of me and inhaled me something by
    cloth, due to which, I got unconscious. They took me to
    some unknown place in U.P. by putting me in some vehicle.      C
    There they took me to a room.

    Jarnail Singh, forcibly committed wrong (intercourse) with
    me. I slapped on his face, then he put cloth in my mouth.
    Therefore, I could not raise noise. Thereafter, everyone
    committed forcible intercourse with me, turn by turn. Huge     D
    blood came out of my vagina, and I felt a lot of pain.
    Thereafter, police caught us and handed over me to my
    parents."

      5. On completion of investigation, a challan was presented
                                                                   E
under Sections 366, 376 and 120 of the Indian Penal Code.
The matter was committed to the Court of Sessions, Jagadhri,
whereupon, it was marked to the Additional Sessions Judge,
Jagadhri. The Additional Sessions Judge, Jagadhri framed
charges on 20.12.1993. The accused-appellant pleaded not
guilty, and claimed trial.
                                                                   F

     6. In order to bring home the charges levelled against the
accused-appellant, the prosecution examined 9 witnesses.
Thereafter, the prosecution evidence was closed. The
statement of the accused-appellant Jarnail Singh, was then         G
recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
He denied the allegations levelled against him, and pleaded
false implication. Despite opportunity having been afforded to
him, the accused-appellant did not lead any evidence, in his
defence.                                                           H
    1054    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A       7. It is necessary to record, that on the culmination of the
  trial, the Additional Sessions Judge, Jagadhri arrived at the
  conclusion, that the prosecution had been able to bring home
  the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond any shadow of
  reasonable doubt, under Sections 366, 376(g) and 120-B of
B the Indian Penal Code. The accused-appellant Jarnail Singh
  was accordingly held guilty of the charges levelled against him.
  The Additional Sessions Judge, Jagadhri gave an opportunity
  of hearing to the accused-appellant Jarnail Singh on the
  question of sentence. Thereupon, for the offence under Section
c 376(g) of the Indian Penal Code the accused-appellant was
  awarded rigorous imprisonment for 10 years, he was also
  required to pay a fine of Rs.200/- (in case of default in payment
  of fine, the accused-appellant was to undergo further rigorous
  imprisonment for 3 months). For the offence under Section 366
  of the Indian Penal Code, the accused-appellant was awarded
0
  rigorous imprisonment for 7 years, and was required to pay a
  fine of Rs.150/- (in case of default in payment of fine, the
  accused-appellant was- to undergo further rigorous
  imprisonment for 3 months). And for the offence under Section
  120-B of the Indian Penal Code, the accused-appellant was
E awarded rigorous imprisonment for 7 years, and was required
  to pay a fine of Rs.150/- (in case of default in payment of fine,
  the accused-appellant was to undergo further rigorous
  imprisonment for 3 months). The aforesaid sentences were
  ordered to run concurrently.
F
       8. Dissatisfied with the judgment dated 14.3.1995,
  rendered by the trial Court, the accused-appellant Jarnail Singh
  preferred Criminal Appeal no. 247-SB of 1995 before the
  Punjab & Haryana High Court at Chandigarh (hereinafter
G referred to as, the High Court). The High Court dismissed the
  appeal preferred by the accused-appellant on 4.11.2008. The
  judgment of conviction dated 14.3.1995 and the order of
  sentence dated 15.3.1995 (rendered by the trial Court i.e., the
  Additional Sessions Judge, Jagadhri) were upheld.
H
       JARNAIL SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA                    1055
           [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

     9. Dissatisfied with the judgment of the trial Court dated      A
14.3.1995 and that of the appellate Court dated 4.11.2008, the
accused-appellant Jarnail Singh approached this Court. On
7.7.2010, this Court granted leave, in the Petition for Special
Leave to Appeal (Crl.) no. 7836 of 2009, filed by the accused-
appellant. Having traversed the aforesaid course, the instant        B
criminal appeal has finally been placed before us, for
adjudication.

      10. Before dealing with the issues canvassed at the hands
of the learned counsel for the accused-appellant Jarnail Singh,      C
it is considered expedient to have a bird's eye view of the
relevant prosecution witnesses. It is, therefore, that we shall
endeavour to deal with the testimony of some of the
prosecution witnesses hereunder:

     (i)   Dr. Kanta Dhankar was produced by the                     D
           prosecution as PW1. She had medico-legally
           examined the prosecutrix VW - PW6 on 29.3.1993
           at 3 pm. According to her testimony, no blood or
           seminal stain was visible to the naked eye, during
           the course of examination of the prosecutrix VW -         E
           PW6. Pubic hairs were present. There was no
           visible injury on the external genitalia or vagina. The
           hymen of the prosecutrix VW - PW6 was found
           ruptured. Her vagina admitted 2/3 fingers easily.
           The clothes of the prosecutrix VW - PW6, a swab           F
           taken from her vagina and her pubic hair, were sent
           to the forensic science laboratory for examination,
           so as to determine whether there was any semen
           or blood thereon. Along with the testimony of Dr.
           Kanta Dhankar- PW1, it is necessary to record, that       G
           as per the report of the forensic science laboratory
           (Exhibit PL), human semen was detected on the
           prosecutrix's "salwar" (female trouser), her
           underwear, as also, on her pubic hair. The report
           of the serologist (Exhibit PL/1) further revealed
                                                                     H
    1056         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 8 SC R


A                  medium and small sized blood stains on the
                   "salwar''. The report of the serolog1st also disclosed,
                   that the stains on the "salwar" were of human blood.

           (ii)    Dr. Satnam Singh-PW2, was the second witness
                   to be examined by the prosecution. He had
B
                   medico-legally examined the accused-appellant
                   Jarnail Singh. Dr. Satnam Singh-PW2, while
                   deposing before the trial Court affirmed, that the
                   accused-appellant was capable of sexual
                   intercourse.
c
           (iii)   The prosecution then examined Moti Ram as PW3.
                   Moti Ram testified, that he was present when the
                   prosecutrix VW - PW6, was recovered whilst in
                   custody of the accused-appellant, from the house
D                  of Shashi Bhan at Raipur, in district Haridwar. Moti
                   Ram also affirmed the presence of Om Prakash,
                   Jagrnal and Sumer Chand, along with the police
                   party, at the time of recovery of the prosecutrix VW
                   - PW6, on 29.3.1993. Moti Ram had identified the
E                  prosecutrix VW - PW6, at the time of her said
                   recovery.

           (iv)    Satpal was produced by the prosecution as its
                   fourth witness. Satpal-PW4 was the Headmaster of
                   the Government High School, Jathlana, i.e. the
F                  school which the prosecutrix VW - PW6, had first
                   attended. Satpal-PW4 proved the certificate Exhibit
                   PG, as having been prepared on the basis of the
                   school records. As per the certificate, Exhibit P4,
                   the prosecutrix VW - PW6 was born on 15.5.1977.
G
           (v)     The prosecutrix appeared as PW6 before the trial
                   Court. She affirmed the factual position expressed
                   by her father Jagdish Chander-PW8 in his
                   complaint dated 27 .3.1993 (Exhibit PO). She also
H                  reiterated the factual position expressed by her, in
JARNAIL SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA              1057
    [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

   her statement, recorded under Section 164 of the A
   Code of Criminal Procedure, on 6.4.1993. In sum
   and substance she asserted, that she had studied
   upto class 3 at the Government High School,
   Jathlana, whereafter, she started to do household
   work at home. On 25.3.1993 at about 11 pm, she B
   had gone out of her house to urinate in the street.
   The accused-appellant Jarnail Singh and three
   other persons had caught hold of her, and had
   taken her in a tanker towards Raipur side in Uttar
   Pradesh. The accused-appellant Jarnail Singh nnd c
   his three accomplices, had then raped her in a
   small room. She also testified, that she had been
   recovered by the police from Raipur, and at the time
   of her recovery, Moti Ram-PW3 and her uncle
   Omilal (Om Prakash) and Jagmal were present with D
   the police party. Thereafter, she claims to have been
   brought to police post Jathlana, and was got
   medico-legally examined by a lady doctor at Civil
   Hospital, Radaur. Since the prosecutrix VW - PW6,
   was not disclosing the entire factual position, and E
   seemed to be changing the version of her
   statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code
   of Criminal Procedure, the Public Prosecutor
   sought permission to cross-examine her.
   Consequent upon being permitted to cross-
   examine the prosecutrix VW - PW6, she affirmed, F
   that the accused-appellant had been alluring her for
   marriage, with the promise of giving her ornaments
   and clothes, and a further commitment to move her
   to the city, after their marriage. During these
   allurements, the accused-appellant Jarnail Singh G
   used to also impress upon her, that her parents
   were poor and would marry her to some poor
   person, who would never be able to provide her
   such facilities. During her cross-examination, she
   expressly denied the suggestion, that she herself H
    1058      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2013) 8 S.C.R.


A                  had allured the accused-appellant Jarnail Singh, to
                   take her away, in order to marry him.

           (vi)    O.P. Verma, Judicial Magistrate First Class,
                   Jagadhri, appeared as PW7. He proved the
                   statement, recorded before him under Section 164
B
                   of the Code of Criminal Procedure, by the
                   prosecutrix VW - PW6, on 6.4.1993.

           (vii)   Jagdish Chander-PW8, the father of the prosecutrix
                   VW - PW6 during the course of his deposition,
C                  affirmed the factual position depicted in his
                   complaint dated 27 .3.1993 (Exhibit PO). He also
                   corroborated the testimony of his daughter (i.e., the
                   prosecutrix VW - PW6) in all material particulars.

0         The conviction of the accused-appellant at the hands of the
    trial Court (on 14.3.1995) and by the High Court (on 4.11.2008)
    was primarily based on the statements of the prosecution
    witnesses summarised above.

      11. We shall now endeavour to deal with the submissions
E advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the accused-
  appellant.

        12. The first and foremost contention advanced at the
  hands of the learned counsel for the accused-appellant was,
F that the prosecutrix VW - PW6, had voluntarily and with her free
  consent, accompanied the accused-appellant Jarnail Singh. It
  was contended, that in actuality, it was the prosecutrix VW -
  PW6 who had allured the accused-appellant to marry her, and
  had persuaded him to take her away during the night intervening
G 25th and 26th March, 1993. In order to substantiate the instant
  submission, it was pointed out that the prosecutrix VW - PW6
  has remained with the accused Jarnail Singh for four days
  without any protestation. During the course of the aforesaid four
  days in the company of the accused-appellant Jarnail Singh,
H they had travelled from one place to another, and had finally
       JARNAIL SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA                     1059
           [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

reached the house of Shashi Bhan at Raipur (from where the            A
police recovered her on 29.3.1993). It was submitted, that there
was ample opportunity with her, to raise an alarm during the
aforestated four days. The fact that she did not raise any alarm
shows, that she had voluntarily remained with the accused-
appellant Jarnail Singh. Therefore, sexual intercourse with the       B
accused-appellant Jarnail Singh, according to learned counsel,
was also consensual. Thus viewed, it was asserted, that the
accused-appellant Jarnail Singh could not be accused of either
having kidnapped her, and/or having committed rape on her.

      13. On the same issue, learned counsel for the accused-         C
appellant also invited our attention to the fact, that in the
complaint lodged by Jagdish Chandra (PW8), dated
27 .3.1993, he had expressly mentioned that the prosecutrix had
taken away a sum of Rs.3,000/-. In this behalf it was submitted
that the instant act of the prosecutrix exhibits that she had taken   D
money from her father's house to make good her escape in the
company of the accused-appellant Jarnail Singh. It is sought
to be inferred from the above, that the prosecutrix VW - PW6
had gone with the accused-appellant Jarnail Singh, of her own
free will. And, that she had sexual intercourse with him              E
consensually. For the reasons indicated hereinabove, it was the
vehement contention of the learned counsel for the accused-
appellant Jarnail Singh, that the courts below had seriously
erred in recording the appellant's conviction under Sections
366, 376 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code.                          F

    14. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the first
contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the
accused-appellant. We shall venture to determine the factual
aspects taken into consideration by the learned counsel for the       G
appellant, to substantiate the alleged free will and consent of
the prosecutrix VW - PW6 individually ,so as to effectively
determine the veracity of the submissions noticed above.

    15. In so far as the issue of having gone with the accused-
appellant Jarnail Singh of her own free will, and of having had       H
    1060    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A sexual intercourse with him consensually, it is necessary only
  to examine the uncontested deposition of the prosecutrix VW
  - PW6. In this behalf, it may be pointed out. that in her statement
   recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Jagadhari on
B 6.4.1993, the prosecutrix VW - PW6 had expressly asserted,
   that she was forcibly taken away on 25.3.1993, when she had
   gone out of her house to urinate in the street, by Jarnail Singh
   and his three accomplices. She had clearly and categorically
   testified, that all the four had caught hold of her. They had made
c  her inhale something, which rendered her unconscious. She
   had further stated, that the accused-appellant Jarnail Singh and
   his accomplices. had then taken her to some unknown place
   in Uttar Pradesh in a vehicle where Jarnail Singh forcibly
   attempted to commit intercourse with her. At that juncture, she
  had slapped Jarnail Singh on his face, but in order to subjugate
0
  her, he had put a cloth in her mouth to prevent her from raising
  an alarm. Thereafter, the accused-appellant Jarnail Singh and
  his accomplices had committed forcible intercourse with her,
  one after the other. In her statement before the Trial Court, where
E she appeared as PW6, she had reiterated clearly the position
  of having been taken away by the accused-appellant Jarnail
  Singh, and his three accomplices. She affirmed, that she was
  taken away in a tanker to Uttar Pradesh and then all the
  accused had committed rape on her in a small room. On the
  aforestated aspect of the matter, she was not subjected to
F cross-examination at the behest of the accused. Only a
  suggestion was put to her, that she had persuaded the accused-
  appellant Jarnail Singh to take her away, in order to perform
  marriage with her, and for the said purpose had taken away
  cash, clothes and jewellery from her own residence. The
G aforestated suggestion was denied by the prosecutrix VW -
  PW6. Keeping in view the statement of the prosecutrix VW -
  PW6 under Section 164 of the code of Criminal procedure
  before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Jagadhri, as also,
  the statement made by her while appearing before the trial court,
H and the manner in which she was subjected to cross-
       JARNAIL SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA                    1061
           [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

examination, there is no room for any doubt, that the prosecutrix    A
was forcefully taken away, and that, she was subjected to rape
at the hands of the accused-appellant Jarnail Singh and his
three accomplices. It may still have been understandable, if the
case had been, that she had consensual sex with the accused-
appellant alone. But consensual sex with four boys at the same       B
time, is just not comprehensible. Since the fact, that the
accused-appellate Jarnail Singh and the prosecutrix VW -
PW6 had eloped together is not disputed. And furthermore,
since the accused-appellant having had sexual intercourse with
the prosecutrix is also the disputed. It is just not possible to     c
accept the proposition canvassed on behalf of the accused-
appellant. We, therefore, find no merit in the instant submission.

     16. The contention advanced at the hands of the learned
counsel for the accused-appellant Jarnail Singh, that while
leaving her house on 25.3.1993, the prosecutrix VW - PW6,            D
had taken away a sum of Rs.3,000/-, needs a holistic
examination. Whilst it is true that in the complaint, Jagdish
Chandra (PW8), the father of the prosecutrix VW - PW6, had
categorically mentioned that a sum of Rs.3,000/- was missing
from his residence, and the said fact was duly mentioned in his      E
complaint to the police dated 27.3.1993, yet he had not accuse
the prosecutrix VW - PW6 for having taken it away. The instant
aspect, in our considered view pales into insignificance, on
account of the statement made by Jagdish Chandra (PW8)
before the Trial Court. During the course of his deposition          F
before the Trial Court, he had asserted, that he had mentioned
that a sum of Rs.3,000/- was missing from his residence, but
his wife Savitri Devi had found the aforesaid money from the
residence itself, a few days later. Accordingly, the assertion
made by the learned counsel representing the accuseq-                G
appellant to the effect that the prosecutrix VW - PW6 had taken
away a sum of Rs.3,000/-, when she left the house of her father
on 25.3.1993, cannot be stated to have been duly proved.
Besides the aforesaid, it is apparent from the cross-
examination of the prosecutrix VW - PW6, that a suggestion           H
    1062    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A was put to her that besides cash, she had taken away clothes
  and jewellery at the time of leaving her father's house on
  25.3.1993. The prosecutrix VW - PW6 expressly denied the
  suggestion. There is no material on the record of the case to
  substantiate the said allegation. Therefore, it is not possible for
B us to accept the accusation levelled by the accused-appellant
  Jarnail Singh against the prosecutrix VW - PW6, either on the
  issue of having taken away a sum of Rs.3,000/- while leaving
  her house, or that she left her house on 25.3.1993 along with
  clothes and jewellery. Accordingly, the inference drawn by
c assuming the said factual position as true, simply does not
  arise.

      17. The first contention advanced at the hands of the
  learned counsel for the appellant can be conveniently
  determined from another perspective. The High Court in the
D impugned order arrived at the conclusion that the prosecutrix
  VW - PW6. was a minor at the time of occurrence on 25.3.1993,
  and had concluded, that even if she had accompanied the
  accused-appellant Jarnail Singh on 25.3.1993 of her own free
  consent, and even if she had.had sexual intercourse with the
E accused consensually, the same would be immaterial. For,
  consent of a minor is inconsequential.

       18. During the course of hearing of the present appeal,
  learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contested the
F determination of the High Court in the impugned judgment,
  wherein it had concluded, that the prosecutrix VW - PW6 was
  a minor. Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned,
  it was pointed out, that the sexual organs of the prosecutrix VW
  - PW6 were found to be fully developed by Dr. Kanta Dhankar-
  PW1. Her hymen was found to be ruptured. It was also seen
G daring the medico-legal examination of the prosecutrix VW -
  PW6, that the vagina admitted two/three fingers easily. Learned
  counsel for the appellant-accused Jarnail Singb, also invited our
  attention to the cross-examination of Dr. Kanta Dhankar-
  (PW1), wherein she acknowledged having mentioned the age
H
       JARNAIL SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA                   1063
           [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

of the prosecutrix VW - PW6 as 15 years, on the basis of the        A
statement made by the prosecutrix to her. Dr. Kanta Dhankar-
PW1 had also acknowledged, that she had not got the
ossification test conducted on the prosecutrix VW - PW6 to
scientifically determine the age of the prosecutrix. Based on the
aforesaid, it was averred that there was no concrete material       B
on the record of the case, on the basis of which it could have
been concluded by the High Court, that the prosecutrix was a
minor on the date of occurrence.

     19. In order to support his contention, that the prosecutrix   C
was not a minor at the time of occurrence, learned counsel for
the appellant placed reliance on the judgment rendered in Sunil
vs. State of Haryana, AIR 2010 SC 392. Ordinarily, we would
have extracted the observations on which reliance was placed,
but for reasons that would emerge from our conclusion, we
consider it inappropriate to do so.                                 D

    20. On the issue of determination of age of a minor, one
only needs to make a reference to Rule 12 of the Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007
(hereinafter referred to as the 2007 Rules). The aforestated        E
2007 Rules have been framed under Section 68(1) of the
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000.
Rule 12 referred to hereinabove reads as under:

    "12. Procedure to be followed in determination of F
    Age.? (1) In every case concerning a child or a juvenile in
    conflict with law, the court or the Board or as the case may
    be the Committee referred to in rule 19 of these rules shall
    determine the age of such juvenile or child or a juvenile in
    conflict with law within a period of thirty days from the date
    of making of the application for that purpose.                 G

    (2) The court or the Board or as the case may be the
    Committee shall decide the juvenility or otherwise of the
    juvenile or the child or as the case may be the juvenile in
    conflict with law, prima facie on the basis of physical         H
    1064     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    (2013] 8 S.C.R.


A      appearance or documents. if available. and send him to
       the observation home or in jail.

       (3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict
       with law. the age determination inquiry shall be conducted
       by the court or the Board or, as the case may be, the
B
       Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining -

           (a)   (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if
                 available; and in the absence whereof;

c                (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school
                 (other than a play school) first attended; and in the
                 absence whereof;

                 (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or
                 a municipal authority or a panchayat:
D
           (b)   and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of
                 clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be
                 sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which
                 will declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case
E                exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the
                 Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the
                 Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them,
                 may, if considered necessary, give benefit to the
                 child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower
F                side within the margin of one year.

       and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking
       into consideration such evidence as may be available, or
       the medical opinion, as the case may be, record a finding
       in respect of his age and either of the evidence specified
G      in any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence
       whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof of the age
       as regards such child or the juvenile in conflict with law.

       (4) If the age of a juvenile or child or the juvenile in conflict
H      with law is found to be below 18 years on the date of
       JARNAIL SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA                     1065
           [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

     offence, on the basis of any of the conclusive proof             A
     specified in sub-rule (3), the court or the Board or as the
     case may be the Committee shall in writing pass an order
     stating the age and declaring the status of juvenility or
     otherwise, for the purpose of the Act and these rules and
     a copy of the order shall be given to such juvenile or the       B
     person concerned.

     (5) Save and except where, further inquiry or otherwise is
     required, inter alia, in terms of section 7A, section 64 of
     the Act and these rules, no further inquiry shall be
     conducted by the court or the Board after examining and          C
     obtaining the certificate or any other documentary proof
     referred to in sub-rule (3) of this rule.

     (6) The provisions contained in this rule shall also apply
     to those disposed off cases, where the status of juvenility D
     has not been determined in accordance with the
     provisions contained in sub- rule(3) and the Act, requiring
     dispensation of the sentence under the Act for passing
     appropriate order in the interest of the juvenile in conflict .
     with law."                                                      E

Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only to determine the
age of a child in conflict with law, we are of the view that the
aforesaid statutory provision should be the basis for determining
age, even for a child who is a victim of crime. For, in our view,
there is hardly any difference in so far as the issue of minority     F
is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and a child
who is a victim of crime. Therefore, in our considered opinion,
it would be just and appropriate to apply Rule 12 of the 2007
Rules, to determine the age of the prosecutrix VW-PW6. The
manner of determining age conclusively, has been expressed            G
in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 extracted above. Under the aforesaid
provision, the age of a child is ascertained, by adopting the first
available basis, out of a number of options postulated in Rule
12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule 12(3), an option
is expressed in a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over     H
    1066    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A an option expressed in a subsequent clause. The highest rated
  option available, would conclusively determine the age of a
  minor. In the scheme of Rule 12(3), matriculation (or equivalent)
  certificate of the concerned child, is the highest rated option.
  In case, the said certificate is available, no other evidence can
B be relied upon. Only in the absence of the said certificate, Rule
  12(3), envisages consideration of the date of birth entered, in
  the school first attended by the child. In case such an entry of
  date of birth is available, the date of birth depicted therein is
  liable to be treated as final and conclusive, and no other
c material is to be relied upon. Only in the absence of such entry,
  Rule 12(3) postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by
  a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Yet again,
  if such a certificate is available, then no other material
  whatsoever is to be taken into consideration, for determining
  the age of the child concerned, as the said certificate would
0
  conclusively determine the age of the child. It is only in the
  absence of any of the aforesaid, that Rule 12(3) postulates the
  determination of age of the concerned child, on the basis of
  medical opinion.

E       21. Following the scheme of Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, it
  is apparent that the age of the prosecutrix VW - PW6 could not
  be determined on the basis of the matriculation (or equivalent)
  certificate as she had herself deposed, that she had studied
  upto class 3 only, and thereafter, had left her school and had
F started to do household work. The prosecution in the facts and
  circumstances of this case, had endeavoured to establish the
  age of the prosecutrix VW-PW6, on the next available basis,
  in the sequence of options expressed in Rule 12(3) of the 2007
  Rules. The prosecution produced Satpal (PW4), to prove the
G age of the prosecutrix VW - PW6. Satpal (PW4) was the Head
  Master of the Government High School, Jathlana, where the
  prosecutrix VW - PW6 had studied upto class 3. Satpal (PW4)
  had proved the certificate Exhibit-PG, as having been made
  on the basis of the school records indicating, that the
H prosecutrixVW- PW6, was born on 15.5.1977. In the scheme
       JARNAIL SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA                     1067
           [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
contemplated under Rule 12(3) of the 2007 Rules, it is not            A
permissible to determine age in any other manner, and certainly
not on the basis of an option mentioned in a subsequent clause.
We are therefore of the view, that the High Court was fully
justified in relying on the aforesaid basis for establishing the
age of the prosecutrix VW - PW6. It would also be relevant to         B
mention, that under the scheme of Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules,
it would have been improper for the High Court to rely on any
other material including the ossification test, for determining the
age of the prosecutrix VW-PW6. The deposition of Satpal-PW4
has not been contested. Therefore, the date of birth of the           c
prosecutrix VW- PW6 (indicated in Exhibit P.G., as 15.7.1977)
assumes finality. Accordingly it is clear, that the prosecutrix
VW-PW6, was less than 15 years old on the date of
occurrence, i.e., on 25.3.1993. In the said view of the matter,
there is no room for any doubt that the prosecutrix VW - PW6          D
was a minor on the date of occurrence. Accordingly, we hereby
endorse the conclusions recorded by the High Court, that even
if the prosecutrix VW-PW6 had accompanied the accused-
appellant Jarnail Singh of her own free will, and had had
consensual sex with him, the same would have been clearly             E
inconsequential, as she was a minor.

      22. Since the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel
for the appellant is distinguishable on facts. And since the
judgment relied upon, had not made any reference to the 2007
Rules, we are of the view that the same would not be relevant         F
for the purposes of determining the age of the prosecutrix VW
- PW6, specially in the background of the evidence led by the
prosecution through Satpal (PW4) to establish.

     23. The next contention advanced at the hands of the             G
learned counsel for the accused-appellant Jarnail Singh was,
that the oral testimony of the prosecutrix VW - PW6 ought not
to be accepted as sufficient to return a finding of guilt against
the accused-appellant Jarnail Singh. Insofar as the testimony
of the prosecutrix VW - PW6 is concerned, it is pointed that          H
    1068    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 8 S C.R.


A there were a number of discrepancies and contradictions
  therein. It was submitted, that such discrepancies can be seen
  on a comparison of her deposition before the trial Court, with
  the statement of the prosecutrix recorded under Section 164
  of the Code of Criminal Procedure on 6.4.1993, as also, the
B statement of the prosecutrix recorded by the Investigating
  Officer under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  on 29.3.1993.

         24. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the
    above noted submission, advanced at the hands of the learned
C   counsel for the appellant. We, however, find no merit therein. It
    is not as if the prosecution version is entirely based on the
    statement of the prosecutrix VW - PW6. It would be relevant to
    mention, that her recovery from the custody of the accused-
    appellant Jarnail Singh from the house of Shashi Bhan, at
D   Raipur, is sought to be established from the statement of Moti
    Ram-PW3. There can therefore be no room for any doubt, that
    after she was found missing from her father's residence on
    25.3.1993, and after her father Jagdish Chandra-PW8 had
    made a complaint to the police on 27.3.1993, she was
E   recovered from the custody of the accused-appellant Jarnail
    Singh. Thereafter, the prosecutrix VW - PW6 was subjected to
    medico-legal examination by Dr. Kanta Dhankar-PW1 on
    29.3.1993 itself at 3.00 p.m. Dr. Kanta Dhankar-PW1, in her
    independent testimony, affirmed that she had been subjected
F   to sexual intercourse, inasmuch as her hymen was found
    ruptured. Even though the visual examination of the prosecutrix
    VW - PW6, during the course of her medico-legal examination
    did not reveal the presence of semen or blood, yet the report
    of the forensic science laboratory (Exhibit PL) and of the
G   Serologist (Exhibit PL/1) clearly establish the presence of
    semen on her salwar, underwear and pubic hair. The
    serologist's report also disclose, medium and small blood
    stains on her "salwar". In her own deposition, she had mentioned
    that, when she was raped by the accused-appellant Jarnail
H   Singh and his accomplices, bleeding had taken place and she
        JARNAIL SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA                  1069
            [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

 had felt pain, and her clothes were stained with blood. Her        A
 deposition stands scientifically substantiated by Exhibits PL
 and PL/1. The suggestion put to the prosecutrix VW - PW6 at
 the behest of the accused-appellant Jarnail Singh, during the
 course of her cross-examination, that she had accompanied
 the accused-appellant Jarnail Singh, of her own free will and      B
 had had sexual intercourse with him consensually, leaves no
 room for any doubt, that she was in his company, and that, he
 had had sexual intercourse with her. The assertion that the
 prosecutrix VW - PW6 had accompanied the accused-
 appellant Jarnail Singh, and had had ~exual intercourse with       c
 him consensually is completely ruled out, because as per the
substantiated prosecution version, the prosecutrix VW - PW6
was not taken away by the accused-appellant Jarnail Singh
 alone, but also, by his three accomplices. All the four of them
had similarly violated her person. Additionally, in her statement
                                                                    0
under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal procedure, the
prosecutrix VW - PW6 had asserted, that in the first instance,
after having caught hold of her, the accused had made her
inhale something from a cloth which had made her unconscious.
Thereafter, when the accused-appellant Jarnail Singh attempted
to commit intercourse with her, she had slapped him. He had         E
then put a cloth in her mouth, to stop her from raising an alarm.
Thereafter, each one of the accomplices had committed forcible
intercourse with her in turns. The factum of commission of
forcible intercourse by the accused-appellant, as also, his
accomplices was reiterated by her during her testimony before       F
the Trial Court as PW6. Besides the aforesaid, there is a
statement of her own father, Jagdish Chandra (PW8) who also
in material particulars had corroborated the testimony of the
prosecutrix VW - PW6. The prosecutrix VW - PW6, was not
subjected to cross-examination on any of these issues. Nor was      G
the prosecutrix confronted with either the statements made by
her under Section 161 or Section 164 of the Code of Criminal
Prosecution, so as to enable her to explain discrepancies, if
any. Therefore, we find no merit at all, in the submission
advanced by the learned counsel. In the above view of the           H
    1070 · SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A matter, we are satisfied that there was substantial material
  corroborating the statement of the prosecutrix VW - PW6, for
  an unequivocal determination of the guilt of I.he accused-
  appellant Jarnail Singh.

          25. No other submission besides those dealt with
8
    hereinabove. was advanced at the hands of the learned counsel
    for the appellant. For the reasons recorded above, we find no
    merit in the instant appeal and the same is accordingly
    dismissed.

C B.B.B.                                     Appeal dismissed.