Holding

The prime accused is liable and his conviction under s.302 IPC stands, but the co‑accused are acquitted as Section 34 IPC does not apply due to lack of common intention.

Summary

The case concerns the murder of a college student, Ku Preeti, who was run over by a jeep driven by Samar Vijay Singh on a college campus. The driver (prime accused) and three co‑accused were convicted by the trial court and the High Court; the driver under s.302 IPC and the co‑accused under s.302 read with s.34 IPC. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the credibility of eyewitnesses, many of whom turned hostile, and considered whether their statements qualified as res gestae under Section 6 of the Evidence Act. The Court held that the driver’s conviction under s.302 was justified, but found no evidence of a common intention among the co‑accused, rendering Section 34 inapplicable. Consequently, the convictions of the co‑accused were set aside. The judgment also highlighted the need for witness protection in criminal proceedings.

Issues considered

The adequacy of evidence to sustain the conviction of the prime accused under s.302 IPC.
Whether the co‑accused can be convicted under s.302 read with s.34 IPC, i.e., whether a common intention existed.
The applicability of Section 6 of the Evidence Act (res gestae) to the witnesses' statements.
The impact of witness intimidation on the evidentiary assessment.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 313
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 6
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 201, s. 302, s. 34

Subjects

murderculpable homicideSection 302 IPCSection 34 IPCcommon intentionres gestaewitness protectionevidencecriminal appeal

Judgment

A
[2009] 8 S.C.R. 398

JAVED ALAM
v.
..... -
STATE OF CHHATTISGARH AND ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1240 of 2006)
MAY 8, 2009
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND ASOK KUMAR
GANGULY, JJ.] • ..
Penal code, 1860:
c
ss. 302 and 302134 - Conviction under - Of four accused
- Eye-witnesses to the incident - Witnesses turning hostile -
conviction uls. 302 of prime accused and of co-accused u/s.
302134 by courts below - On appeal, held: conviction of prime
D accused justified - The co-accused are liable to be acquitted
* ..
as s.34 is not applicable in the facts of the case.

s.34 - Nature and applicability of - Discussed.

Administration of justice - Administration of Criminal
E Justice - Protection of witnesses - Need for.

Evidence Act, 1872 - s. 6 - Rule of Res Gestae -
applicability of - Discussed - Doctrine I Principle - Rule of )' .
Res Gestae.
F Appellants-Accused were prosecuted for causing
death of a girl by crushing her under the jeep they were
driving I boarding. Father of the prime accused was also
prosecuted u/s. 201 IPC. Trial court convicted the prime
accused (who was driving the jeep) u/s. 302 IPC and
G convicted the three co-accused (who were boarding on .. )
the jeep) u/s. 302/34 IPC. Father of prime accused was
acquitted. High Court confirmed the conviction order.
Hence, the present appeal.

H 398
JAVED ALAM v. STATE OF CHHATIISGARH AND 399
ANR.
Dismissing the appeal of the prime accused, while A
allowing that of the co-accused, the Court

HELD: 1.1. Prime accused is liable to be convicted.
Instant case is a classic case of deficiency in the criminal
justice system to protect the witnesses from heing
8
threatened by accused. As appears from the record, the
witnesses are the classmates of the deceased who were
~ there with her. They backed out from what was stated
during investigation. The statement made before the
Police during investigation is no evidence. Unfortunately,
in cases involving influential people the common C
experience is that witnesses do not come forward
because of fear and pressure. In a brutal manner, the
prime accused who was driving the vehicle run over the
girl and she lost her life. The trial Court and the High
• Court have highlighted certain aspects which clearly D
bring out his guilt. Significant is the evidence of PWs 7
and 8. PW-7 was the girl who accompanied the injured
to the hospital and told about the incident to PW-3, the
doctor which was recorded in report Ex.P-4 containing
the name of PW-7 as the person told about the incident. E
The evidence of PW-6 shows that PW-7 was sitting with
the deceased when the jeep entered the campus. As
~ rightly noted by the High Court something transpired
~ later on which led to the witnesses giving a complete go
bye to her earlier version. [Paras 8 and 15] [407-C-G] F

1.2. More important is the evidence of PW-8 who
blurted out during cross-examination some traces of truth
which was labeled as unfair and dishonest cross-
examination by the appellants. At the end of the ordeal G
of her evidence she cried and requested the Court not
• ~ to call her again for evidence since they were disturbed
for the entire year. The plight of the girls who were under
pressure depicts the tremendous need for witness

H
400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 8 S.C.R.

+ ...
A protection in our country if criminal justice administretion
has to be a reality. Even close reading of the evidence
shows that how she was under tremendous pressure not
to speak the truth. [Para 8] [407-G-H; 408-A-B]

1.3. Section 6 of the Evidence Act is an exception to
8 the rule of evidence that hearsay evidence is not
admissible. The test for applying the rule of res-gastae is
that the statement should be spontaneous and should
form part of the same transaction ruling out any
possibility of concoction. [Para 9] [408-E-F]
c
Vijayavardhan Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1996
SC 2791, relied on.

D
2.1. Considering the background facts it is clear that
Section 34 IPC has no application. There is no evidence,
muchless credible, which has been salvaged from the
. -
onslaught on the witnesses which suggests that there
was any meeting of minds, because everything appears
to have happened suddenly. The evidence of PW8 on
which the prosecution has placed strong reliance for the
E purpose of attracting Section 34 IPC gave pre-varicating
statements so far as others are concerned, though her
'.
statement is sufficient to fasten guilt on the prime
accused. [Paras 15 and 16] [410-G-H; 411-A-B]

F 2.2. Section 34 has been enacted on the principle of
joint liability in the commission of a criminal act. The
Section is only a rule of evidence and does not create a
substantive offence. The distinctive feature of the Section

.
is the element of participation in action. The liability of
G one person for an offence committed by another in the ..
course of criminal act perpetrated by several persons
arises under Section 34, if such criminal act is done in
furtherance of a common intention of the persons who
join in committing the crime. [Para 12] [409-D-E]
H
JAVED ALAM v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH AND 401
ANR.
JI'. ..,4
2.3. Direct proof of common intention is seldom A
available and, therefore, such intention can only be
inferred from the circumstances appearing from the
proved facts of the case and the proved circumstances.
In order to bring home the charge of common intention,
the prosecution has to establish by evidence, whether B
direct or circumstantial, that there was plan or meeting
of mind of all the accused persons to commit the offence
' • for which they are charged with the aid of Section 34, be
it pre-arranged or on the spur of moment; but it must
"'
.necessarily be before the commission of the crime. [Para c
12] [409-D-G]

2.4. The existence of a common intention amongst
the participants in a crime is the essential element for
application of this Section. It is not necessary that the acts
~. of the several persons charged with commission of an D
offence jointly must be the same or identically similar.
The acts may be different in character, but must have been
actuated by one and the same common intention in order
to attract the provision. [Para 12] [410-A-B]
E
2.5. The provision is intended to meet a case in which
it may be difficult to distinguish between acts of

.. " individual members of a party who act in furtherance of
the common intention of all or to prove exactly what part
was taken by each of them. Section 34 is applicable even F
if no injury has been caused by the particular accused
himself. For applying Section 34 it is not necessary to
show some overt act on the part of the accused. [Para
13] [410-D-F]

Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab AIR 1977 SC 109; Ch. G
;. .. Pu/la Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1993
SC 1899 and Chimanbhaf Jagabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat
and Anr. 2009 (4) SCR 275, relied on.

H
402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 8 S.C.R.

A Case Law Reference: .... .....

AIR 1996 SC 2791 Relied on. Para 9
AIR 1977 SC 109 Relied on. Para 12
AIR 1993 SC 1899 Relied on. Para 13
B
2009 (4) SCR 275 Relied on. Para 14

CRIMINAL AP PELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal •
No. 1240 of 2006. !'
c From the Judgment/Order dated 20.3.2006 passed by the
High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur, in Criminal Appeal No.
716 of 2000.

D
WITH

Crl. No. 1241 of 2006 and 1242 of 2006.

Ranjit Kumar, Surendra Kumar, B.S. Jain, Ajay Veer
~ -
Singh, Nitin Jain and Dr. Vipin Gupta for the Appellant.

E Dr. Manish Singhvi, Atul Jha and Dharmendra Kumar
Sinha for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Challenge in these appeals
~ .
F is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Chhattisgarh High 1
Court, Bilaspur upholding the conviction of the appellants for
offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC'). By the
impugned judgment, the High Court upheld the conviction of
G appellant Samar Vijay Singh for offence punishable under
Section 302 IPC for committing the murder of Ku. Preeti ••
(hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased') on 3.12.1998 in
Government Girls College Campus, Ambikapur by running over
her a jeep. The co-accused appellants Javed, Raj Kumar and
H Ganesh were convicted under Section 302 read with Section
JAVED ALAM v. STATE OF CHHATIISGARH AND 403
ANR. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
~ ·* 34 IPC for causing death of Ku. Preeti in furtherance of their A

- common intention with the appellant Samar Vijay Singh. Co-
accused Ranvijay Singh, father of accused Samar Vijay and
owner of the jeep was acquitted of the charge under Section
201 IPC.
B
2. Prosecution case is that on 3.12.1998 Ku. Preeti
Srivastava, a student of B.A. final in Govt. Girls College,
~
Ambikapur was sitting with Ku. Vijaylaxmi Mishra (PW-7), Ku.
Seema Mishra (PW-8) and Ku. Nisha Thakur (PW-17) in the
campus of the College since the second period was free. Her
bag and tiffin were kept by the side of the road. Many other girls
c
were basking in the sun inside the campus. At about 10:45
A.M., a jeep driven by Samar Vijay Singh suddenly entered the
college campus and crushing the bag and the tiffin of Ku. Preeti

- Shrivastava underneath, went ahead. Accused Rajkumar Tiwari,
Javed Alam and Ganesh Kashyap were accompanying Samar D
Vijay Singh in the jeep. Seeing her tiffin and bag crushed by
the jeep, Ku. Preeti Srivastava decided that she would stop the
jeep on its return and ask the driver to make good the loss
suffered. When the jeep returned, Ku. Preeti stopped the jeep,
stood in front of it and asked accused-appellant Samar Vijay E
'
Singh to repair the tiffin and bag for her. Hearing this, the
occupants of the jeep including the driver started laughing. The
...- ~ girls noticed that the occupants of the jeep were calling each
other by names and thereby learnt that Samar Vijay Singh, the
driver of the jeep was accompanied by Rajkumar Tiwari, Javed F
Alam and Ganesh Kashyap. Appellant Samar Vijay Singh
asked Ku. Preeti to get out of his way failing which, threatened
to crush her under the jeep. However, Ku. Preeti stood firm and
did not budge. Accused Rajkumar Tiwari, Javed & Ganesh

. .
asked Samar Vijay Singh to crush Ku. Preeti if she did not give G
;. way. Upon this, Samar Vijay Singh moved the jeep ahead and
pushed Ku. Preeti who fell down. When the girls were about to
move for picking up Preeti, Samar Vijay Singh reversed and
then accelerated the jeep ahead, crushing Preeti's head under
the jeep in the process and ran away with the co-appellants. H
404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 8 S.C.R.

A Ku. Vijaylaxmi PW-7, threw a stone at the jeep, which hit "'-~
the bumper of the jeep. She noted down the number of the jeep
in her palm as M.P. 27-1962 Lalita Yadav PW-6, attempted to
catch hold of one of the appellants but she was pushed and
fell down. Ku. Vijaylaxmi noticed that the jeep had a sticker
B "Vote for the Congress" on the back number plate.
The girls got frightened and informed Asst. Professor Smt.
Archana Singh (PW-9) and Asst. Professor Smt. Pratibha
Singh PW-10 about the incident who along with Ku. Lalita '
Yadav (PW-6), Ku. Vijaylaxmi (P.W.7), Ku. Kumudini Kerkatta
c (PW 4) & Ku. Urmila Paikra (PW-5) took the injured Ku. Preeti
to the District Hospital, Ambikapur. Clerk Tarachand Sahu PW-
11 of the Girls College reached the spot thereafter and on being
instructed by the Principal lodged the F.l.R. Ex.P-12 at 11.00
a.m. in Police Station, Ambikapur to Assistant Sub-Inspector
D B.N. Singh (PW-31)

After investigation charge sheet was filed.

Since the accused persons abjured guilt the trial was held.
Prosecution examined 39 witnesses. Learned Sessions Judge
E
acquitted Ranvijay Singh for want of evidence and convicted
rest of the accused persons as noted above. The basis of
conviction was as follows:
f "
1. Testimony of Ku. Lalilta Yadav PW-6, Ku. Nisha (PW-
F 17), Ku. Seema Misra (PW-8), Dr. M.L Beatrice (PW-3),
Dr. A. K. Jain (PW-33) proving that Ku. Preeti died a
homicidal death.

2. Statements made by Ku. Lalita Yadav PW-6 and Ku.
Vijaylaxmi PW-7, as forming part of res-gestae under
G
Section-6 of the Evidence Act to Shri R. N. Shrivastava
PW-32 on his reaching the hospital disclosing the names • '
of the driver of the jeep as Samar Vijay Singh and the
occupants of the Jeep as Rajkumar Tiwari, Javed and
Ganesh.
H
JAVED ALAM v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH AND 405
ANR. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

3. Extra Judicial Confession made by the accused Raj A

-, Kumar before Abhaydeep Singh PW-2 soon after the
occurrence, also implicating appellant Samar Vijay Singh
as the driver of the Jeep.

4. Testimony of Ku. Seema PW-8 especially in para 34 8
and 35 showing the three occupants of the Jeep had asked

... ~
the driver Samar Vijay to run the girl over in case she didn't
give way and Samar Vijay surging the jeep ahead crushed
Preeti's head underneath.

5. Testimony of Arvind Gaur, Assistant Professor, P.G. c
College, Ambikapur PW-12 showing that Ganesh
Kashyap, a student of 8.Com 1st year' B' section was
absent from class on 03-12-1998.

-· ~
6. Testimony of Professor Rajesh Srivastava, P .G. D
College, Ambikapur PW-18 showing that on 3.12.1998
Samar Vijay Singh and Raj Kumar Tiwari, students of
B.Com. 1st year Section-'A' were absent from class (10
A.M. to 10:40 A.M.).
... 7. The fact of surrender by accused Javed and Ganesh in E
Police Station Ambikapur on 04-12-1998 vide Ex. P-74
and 75 .
... ~
~Ji.:.·

8. (i) Seizure of Jeep No. M.P.-2.7-8-1068 from, in front of
the house of appellant Samar Vijay. F
(ii) Merg intimation Ex. P-19 by Mariam Tirl<i PW-16
showing the number of the Jeep as M.P. -27-8-1068.

(iii) Testimony of Z.A. Abbasi PW-37 R.T.O. Office

- Ambikapur proving ownership of Ranvijay Singh Tomar G
over Jeep M.P.-278-1068.

(iv) Admission by Ranvijay Singh Tomar of the
seizure of Jeep M. P. 27-8-1068, in reply to Question
No.218 in examination under Section-313 of Cr. P.C." H
406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 8 S.C.R.

-j., .....
A 3. Stand of the appellants before the High Court was that
there was no legal evidence on record to substantiate the
conviction and sentence. No common intention of the
occupants to cause the death of Kr. Preeti was established by
the prosecution. Seema Misra (PW-8) had stated that the driver
-
B of the jeep wanted to get away as fast and, therefore, offence
if any committed by the driver would not travel beyond Section
304 IPC. The act was nothing but a rash and negligent act
without any intention to kill the deceased. The High Court did
not accept the stand and upheld the conviction.
)
....
c 4. In support of the appeals, learned counsel for the
appellants re-iterated the stand taken before the High Court. It
is to be noted that there were purportedly four eye witnesses.
They are PWs 6, 7, 8 and 17. The occurrence took place around

D
10.45 a.m. on 3.12.1998 and the FIR was lodged immediately
by PWs 4 and 5 around 11.00 a.m. The deceased breathed
her last at about 12.10 p.m. The vehicle according to the
prosecution version was being driven by Samar Vijay Singh
.. -
and rest of the occupants were other co-accused persons. It is
stated that identity of the accused persons has not been
E established. There is no Test Identification Parade. Names
were not mentioned in the inquest or in the FIR. The accused
persons were not known earlier and Section 6 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the 'Evidence Act') has no
application. PWs 9 and 10 had not told the names. The role of •
F A-3 was not established. A1, A2 and A4 were the students of
the same college and one of the accused was 18 years on the
date of occurrence. There was no enmity or motive or any
intention to kill Ku. Preeti and in any event place of occurrence
was not established and the occurrence took place, even if the
G prosecution case is accepted, at the spur of moment. There is
.
no evidence to show any meeting of mind.

5. It is pointed out that most of the so called eye witnesses
resiled from their statements made during investigation. The
Court has accepted the identification by PWs 8 and 17 and in
~

-
H
'
JAVED ALAM v. STATE OF CHHATIISGARH AND 407
ANR. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
.. *
answer to the statement recorded under Section 313 of the A
Code there was really no definite answer.

6. The question of res-gestae has no application as the
name given for the first time is proved in the Court. Res Gestae
was not in the police statement. So far as Article D-7 is
B
concerned paint is similar to that of jeep which is scratched.

..;;
.. 7. It is also re-iterated that the evidence on record does
not make out a case under Section 34 IPC.

8. It is a classic case of deficiency in the criminal justice c
system to protect the witnesses from being threatened by
accused. As appears from the record, the witne!sses are the
classmates of the deceased who were there with her. As
appeared from the evidence of witnesses they backed out from
~
what was stated during investigation. The statE~ment made D
before the Police during investigation is no evidence.
Unfortunately, in cases involving influential people the common
experience is that witnesses do not come forward because of
fear and pressure. In a brutal manner, the accused Samarvijay
Singh who was driving the vehicle run over the gi1rl and she lost
E
her life. The trial Court and the High Court have highlighted
certain aspects which clearly bring out the gum of accused
. ~
Samarvijay Singh. Significant is the evidence of PWs 7 and 8.
PW-7 was the girl who accompanied the injured to the hospital
"· and told about the incident to PW-3, the doctor which was
recorded in report Ex.P-4 containing the name of Ku. Vijaylaxmi F
PW-7 as the person told about the incident. The evidence of
PW-6 Lalita Yadav shows that PW-7 was sitting '· with the
deceased when the jeep entered the campus. As rightly noted
by the High Court something transpired later on which led to
the witnesses giving Ci complete go bye to her earlier version . G
• More important is the evidence of PW-8 who blurted out during
cross examination some traces of truth which was labeled as
unfair and dishonest cross examination by learned counsel for
the appellants. At the end of the ordeal of her evidence she
cried and requested the Court not to call her again for evidence H
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 8 S.C.R.

A since they were disturbed for the entire year. The plight of the
girls who were under pressure depicts the tremendous need
for witness protection in our country if criminal justice
administration has to be a reality. Even close reading of the
evidence shows that how she was under tremendous pressure
B not to speak the truth. In rep'y ~o question No.27 she said that
she did not see the occupants. That is nothing, because in
answer to the next question she said that there were four boys
in the jeep. Question No.34 is very significant. It was specifically
asked to the witness as to whether the occupants of the jeep
c were asking Samarvijay Singh, the driver of the jeep to run the
girl over if she did not give way. Answer was that the boys had
said so but afterwards. In answer to question No.35 she said
that Samar surged the jeep ahead, crushed the head of Preeti
and went away. She had admitted that the boys were laughing
in the jeep. and had said to Samar that if the girl did not give
0
way he should run the girl over. She had answered in the
affirmative by stating 'yes' to a specific question No.35 claarly
meaning that crushing Preeti's head Samar had surged the
jeep forward.

E 9. Section 6 of the Evidence Act is an exception to the rule
of evidence that hearsay evidence is not admissible. The test
for applying the rule of res-gastae is that the statement should
be spontaneous and should form part of the same transaction .
ruling out, any possibility of concoction. In Gentele
F Vijayavardhan Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 1996 SC
2791) it was held in para 15 as follows:

"Section 6 of the Evidence Act and some of the
succeeding Sections embody the rule of admission of
evidence relating to what is commonly known as res-
G
gestae. They ar~ in the nature of exception to 'hearsay"
rule. Section-6 permits proof of collateral statements which
are so connected with the facts in issue as to form part of
the same transaction. Whether the statement made by a
witness was a part of the same transaction or not is to be
H
JAVED ALAM v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH AND 409
ANR. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
--1
considered in the light of the circumstances of each case. A
The principle is that it should be so intimately connected
with the fact in issue as to be a spontaneous utterance
inspired by the excitement of the occasion or a
spontaneous reaction thereof, there being no opportunity
for deliberately fabricating the statement. In other words, B
the statement which is a part of res-gestae does not
narrate a past event, but it is the event itself speaking
... through a person thus excluding the possibility of any
design behind it."

10. The reason indicated by the High Court dismissing the
c
appeal before it qua accused Samarvijay Singh has no merit
and is dismissed.

11. The other question is applicability of Section 34 IPC.
r D
12. Section 34 has been enacted on the principle of join{'
liability in the commission of a criminal act. The Section is only
a rule of evidence and does not create a substantive offence.
The distinctive feature of the Section is the element of
participation in action. The liability of one person for an offence
E
committed by another in the course of criminal act perpetrated
by several persons arises under Section 34 if such criminal act
is done in furtherance of a common intention of the persons
I .,
who join in committing the crime. Direct proof of common
intention is seldom available and, therefore, such intention can
F
only be inferred from the circumstances appearing from the
proved facts of the case and the proved circumstances. In order
to bring home the charge of common intention, the prosecution
has to establish by evidence, whether direct or circumstantial,
that there was plan or meeting of mind of all the accused
persons to commit the offence for which they are charged with G
; ~

I. the aid of Section 34, be it pre-arranged or on the spur of
moment; but it must necessarily be before the commission of
the crime. The true contents of the Section are that if two or
more persons intentionally do an act jointly, the position in law
is just the same as if each of them has done it individually by H
410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 8 S.C.R.

A himself. As observed in Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab (AIR ~-
1977 SC 109), the existence of a common intention amongst
the participants in a crime is the essential element for
application of this Section. It is not necessary that the acts of
the several persons charged with commission of an offence
B jointly must be the same or identically similar. The acts may be ..
different in character, but must have been actuated by one and
the same common intention in order to attract the provision.
..
13. The Section does not say "the common intention of all",
c nor does it say "and intention common to all". Under the
provisions of Section 34 the essence of the liability is to be
found In the existence of a common intention animating the
accused leading to the commission of a criminal act in
furtherance of such intention. As a result of the application of
principles enunciated in Section 34, when an accused is
D convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34, in law it --;

means that the accused is liable for the act which caused death
of the deceased in the same manner as if it was done by him
alone. The provision is intended to meet a case in which it may
be difficult to distinguish between acts of individual members
E of a party who act in furtherance of the common intention of all
or to prove exactly what part was taken by each of them. As
was observed in Ch. Pu/la Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra
Pradesh (AIR 1993 SC 1899), Section 34 is applicable even .
if no injury has been caused by the particular accused himself.
F For applying Section 34 it is not necessary to show some overt
act on the part of the accused.
14. The above position has been highlighted in
Chimanbhai Jagabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat & Anr. (SLP
(Crl.) 352 of 2008 disposed of on 16th March, 2009).
G
15. There is no evidence, muchless credible, which has • ~
been salvaged from the onslaught on the witnesses which
suggests that there was any meeting of minds, because
everything appears to have happened suddenly. The evidence
H of PW8 on which the prosecution has placed strong reliance
JAVED ALAM v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH AND 411
ANR. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
for the purpose of attracting Section 34 IPC gave pre-varicating A
statements so far as others are concerned, though her
statement is sufficient to fasten guilt on Samar Vijay Singh.

16. Considering the background facts it is clear that
Section 34 has no application. That being so, while dismissing 8
the appeal filed by Samarvijay Singh, the conviction recorded
qua other accused persons has to be set aside which we
direct. They shall be released from custody forthwith unless
required to be in custody in connection with any other case .
.,.L~

\•

K.K.i. Appeal disposed of. C

. '