Holding

The appellate court may re‑appreciate the evidence and, if convinced, set aside an acquittal; the appellant had conscious possession of the charas, invoking the presumption under Section 54, and the conviction stands with a reduced sentence of ten years.

Summary

The appellant Jeet Ram was charged under Section 20 of the NDPS Act for possession of 13 kg of charas seized from a dhaba he managed. The trial court acquitted him, holding that the prosecution lacked independent witnesses, that Section 50 of the NDPS Act was not complied with, and that the evidence of possession was unreliable. On appeal, the High Court re‑appreciated the evidence, found the prosecution witnesses credible, held that Section 50 applies only to personal searches, and concluded that the appellant had conscious possession, leading to conviction and a 15‑year sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s findings, emphasizing the appellate court’s power to review evidence and the applicability of Section 54’s presumption of possession, but reduced the term of imprisonment to ten years considering the appellant’s age and circumstances. The appeal was therefore partly allowed, modifying the sentence while upholding the conviction.

Issues considered

The trial court's acquittal was based on alleged non‑compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act.
Whether the prosecution proved conscious possession of the seized charas under Section 20 of the NDPS Act.
Whether the appellate court can re‑appreciate evidence and overturn an acquittal.
The applicability of the presumption of possession under Section 54 of the NDPS Act.
The appropriateness of the 15‑year sentence imposed by the High Court.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 313, s. 378
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985s. 20, s. 36-B, s. 50, s. 54

Subjects

NDPS Actpossessionconscious possessionsection 50section 54appellate reviewappeal against acquittalevidence reappreciationsentence reductioncriminal procedure

Judgment

558 [2020]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 7 S.C.R. 558 [2020] 7 S.C.R.

A JEET RAM
v.
THE NARCOTICS CONTROL BUREAU, CHANDIGARH
(Criminal Appeal No.688 of 2013)
B SEPTEMBER 15, 2020
[ASHOK BHUSHAN, R. SUBHASH REDDY AND
M. R. SHAH, JJ.]
Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – ss.20,
C 50 and 54 – Appellant was charged u/s.20 – Acquitted by trial court
– Convicted by High Court – On appeal, held: Findings recorded
by trial court are contrary to the evidence on record – s.50 is
applicable only in case of personal search – No basis for the findings
recorded by trial court that there was non-compliance of provision
u/s.50 – Depositions of prosecution witnesses are trustworthy and
D cannot be said to be unnatural and improbable – No suggestion of
tampering of the samples was put either to PW-1 or PW-2 – It is
always open to the appellate courts to reappreciate the evidence,
on which the order of acquittal is founded and are vested with the
powers to review and come to their own conclusion – Further,
E appellant was on the counter of the dhaba constructed on the land
owned by his wife near the temple and charas was found in the
counter of the dhaba in a gunny bag – He not only had direct
physical control over charas, he had the knowledge of its presence
and character – Onus was on him to explain the possession and in
absence of the same being discharged, presumption u/s.54 also will
F
kick in – Judgment of High Court does not suffer from any infirmity
– However, on facts the sentence is reduced from 15 years to 10
years – Evidence – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.313 .
Criminal Trial – Appeal against acquittal – Power of appellate
G courts – Discussed.
Words & Expressions –”possession” – Meaning of, in the
context of 1985 Act – Discussed – Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic
Substances Act, 1985.

H
558
JEET RAM v. THE NARCOTICS CONTROL BUREAU, 559
CHANDIGARH

Partly allowing the appeal, the Court A
HELD: 1.1 The findings recorded by the trial court are
contrary to evidence on record and view taken by the trial court
was not possible at all, as such the High Court rightly interfered
with the same and recorded its own findings to convict the
appellant. Section 50 of the NDPS Act is applicable only in the B
case of personal search, as such, there is no basis for the findings
recorded by the trial court that there was non-compliance of
provision under Section 50 of the NDPS Act. The depositions of
PW-4; PW-3; PW-1 and PW-2 are consistent and trustworthy and
cannot be said to be unnatural and improbable. There was no
C
suggestion of tampering either put to PW-1 or to PW-2. It is always
open to the appellate court to reappreciate the evidence, on which
the order of acquittal is founded, and appellate courts are vested
with the powers to review and come to their own conclusion. The
appellant was on the counter of the dhaba which was constructed
on the land owned by his wife near the temple and the charas was D
found in the counter of the dhaba in a gunny bag. Accused not
only had direct physical control over charas, he had the knowledge
of its presence and character. In the case of Mohan Lal this Court
had held that a functional and flexible approach in defining and
understanding possession as a concept has to be adopted and
E
the word has to be understood keeping in mind the purpose and
object of the enactment. No defence witness has deposed to the
chain of events, as has been stated by the appellant in the
statement under Section 313, Cr.PC. Where accused offers false
answers in examination under Section 313 Cr.PC, same also can
be used against him. Further onus was on the appellant to explain F
the possession and in absence of the same being discharged,
presumption under Section 54 of the NDPS Act also will kick in.
The judgment of the High Court does not suffer from any infirmity
so as to interfere with the judgment of conviction. Having regard
to peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the
G
fact that the incident occurred in the year 2001 and as the appellant
claimed to be a priest in the temple, who is now aged about 65
years, the sentence awarded on the appellant is reduced to a
period of 10 (ten) years, while maintaining the conviction and the
penalty as imposed by the High Court. [Paras 10-13][567-C-D;
568-C, G; 570-G-H; 571-A-F] H
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 7 S.C.R.

A Sanwat Singh & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan [1961] 3
SCR 120; Damodarprasad Chandrikaprasad v. State
of Maharashtra (1972) 1 SCC 107 : [1972] 2 SCR
622; Vinod Kumar v. State of Haryana (2015) 3 SCC
138 : [2015] 1 SCR 328; Mohan Lal v. State of
Rajasthan (2015) 6 SCC 222 : [2015] 5 SCR 435; State
B
of H.P. v. Pawan Kumar (2005) 4 SCC 350 : [2005] 3
SCR 417 – relied on.
Union of India v. Bal Mukund & Ors. (2009) 12 SCC
161 : [2009] 5 SCR 205; Francis Stanly v. Intelligence
Officer, Narcotic Control Bureau, Thiruvananthapuram
C (2006) 13 SCC 210 : [2006] 10 Suppl. SCR 977;
Rangaiah v. State of Karnataka (2008) 16 SCC 737 :
[2008] 17 SCR 396; Jagdish v. State of M.P. (2003) 9
SCC 159; Gyan Singh v. State of U.P. (1995) Supp. 4
658; Gopal v. State of M.P. (2002) 9 SCC 595; State of
D Punjab v. Balkar Singh & Anr. (2004) 3 SCC 582:
[2004] 3 SCR 25; K. Mohanan v. State of Kerala (2000)
10 SCC 222; Dharampal Singh v. State of Punjab
(2010) 9 SCC 608 : [2010] 10 SCR 1160; Baldev Singh
v. State of Haryana (2015) 17 SCC 554 : [2015] 12
SCR 969; Madan Lal & Anr. v. State of H.P. (2003) 7
E SCC 465 : [2003] 2 Suppl. SCR 716 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2009] 5 SCR 205 referred to Para 7
[2006] 10 Suppl. SCR 977 referred to Para 7
F
[2008] 17 SCR 396 referred to Para 7
(2003) 9 SCC 159 referred to Para 7
(1995) 4 Supp. SCC 658 referred to Para 7
(2002) 9 SCC 595 referred to Para 7
G
[2004] 3 SCR 25 referred to Para 7
(2000) 10 SCC 222 referred to Para 7
(1961) 3 SCR 120 relied on Para 8
[1972] 2 SCR 622 relied on Para 8
H
JEET RAM v. THE NARCOTICS CONTROL BUREAU, 561
CHANDIGARH

[2015] 1 SCR 328 relied on Para 8 A
[2010] 10 SCR 1160 referred to Para 8
[2015] 12 SCR 969 referred to Para 8
[2003] 2 Suppl. SCR 716 referred to Para 8
[2015] 5 SCR 435 relied on Para 8 B
[2005] 3 SCR 417 relied on Para 10
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 688 of 2013.
From the Judgment and Order dated 11.12.2012 and 31.12.2012 C
of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla in Criminal Appeal
No. 493 of 2003.
Aman Lekhi, ASG, K.S. Radhakrishnan, Sr. Adv., Purushottam
Sharma Tripathi, Rajiv Kumar, Ravi Chandra Prakash, Mukesh Kumar
Singh, Amit, Ms. Vani Vyas, Harish Pandey, Nikhil Rohtagi, B. V. D
Balramdas, B. Krishna Prasad, Advs. for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
R. SUBHASH REDDY, J.
1. This appeal is filed by the sole accused, in Sessions Trial No. E
7-5/2002 of 2001 on the file of Sessions Judge, Shimla, aggrieved by the
judgment of conviction dated 11.12.2012 and further order of sentencing
the appellant, dated 31.12.2012, passed by the High Court of Himachal
Pradesh, Shimla in Criminal Appeal No.493 of 2003.
2. The appellant-accused was tried for a charge punishable under F
Section 20 of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985
(for short, ‘NDPS Act’). The Sessions Judge, Shimla by judgment dated
30.06.2003 acquitted the accused by recording a finding that the case of
prosecution was not free from doubt and there were many infirmities in
the case of the prosecution to hold that the accused was found to be in
possession of charas, as alleged by the prosecution. G
3. The case as put forth by the prosecution, briefly stated, is as
under:
On 18.06.2001 the Intelligence Officer in the Narcotics Control
Bureau (NCB), Chandigarh, by name – R.P. Singh (PW-4) was
H
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 7 S.C.R.

A proceeding to Theog from Shimla. He was travelling along with PW-3 –
O.P. Bhatt and other officials. In the transit they stopped at the dhaba
to have meals which was near the Nangala Devi Temple. When they
ordered meals and tea and were waiting for the food to be served, the
Intelligence Officer could smell the odour of charas. In the meanwhile,
the Zonal Director of NCB, Chandigarh, by name – Rakesh Goyal, who
B
was examined as PW-1 also reached the said dhaba. Then they have
questioned the appellant-accused about the smell of charas and on such
questioning he became nervous. As such there was increase of suspicion
of the NCB officials. On asking the owner of the dhaba, he disclosed
his name to be Jeet Ram and on further questioning he tried to run away.
C Then he was apprehended and taken to the counter of the dhaba. Just
below the counter of the dhaba a gunny bag was found. When asked,
appellant has replied – there is nothing in it. Then notice under Section
50 of the NDPS Act was given to the accused and appellant has
consented to search the same by the NCB officials. Thereafter the bag
was searched and the officers have found 13 Kg. of charas. The charas
D
was divided into two portions of 6½ Kg. each and two packets were
made which were marked as ‘X’ and ‘Y’ respectively. From each of
these packets, two samples of 25 grams were drawn. The samples drawn
from the packet – Mark ‘X’ – were marked as ‘X1’ and ‘X2’ and the
samples drawn from packet – Mark ‘Y’ – were marked as ‘Y1’ and
E ‘Y2’. Thereafter all the four samples were sealed in a polythene bag by
heat sealing process and were put in paper envelopes and sealed with
paper seals, signed by NCB officials as well as the appellant-accused
Jeet Ram. On each sample seal no.6 of NCB was affixed on all the four
corners and the bulk charas in packets ‘X’ and ‘Y’ was sealed in paper
parcels with six seals each. The seals were handed over to PW-1 and
F
the all the samples and the parcels were signed by NCB officials and
accused. Further, in the statement recorded as contemplated under Section
67 of the NDPS Act, the appellant has admitted that for various reasons
he was indulged in the trade of charas to increase his income. Thereafter
a Panchnama was drawn which was signed by the appellant and he
G was arrested on 19.06.2001. The two samples of ‘X1’ and ‘Y1’ along
with a letter were sent through PW-2 Hayat Singh to Chemical Analyst
for analysis, who has vide his report opined that both the samples were
of charas. On the said basis, the appellant-accused was charged and
challaned for the offence under Section 20 of the NDPS Act.
H
JEET RAM v. THE NARCOTICS CONTROL BUREAU, 563
CHANDIGARH [R. SUBHASH REDDY, J.]

4. When the charge is denied by the appellant-accused, he was A
tried for the aforesaid offence before the Sessions Judge, Shimla. To
prove the guilt of the appellant, the prosecution has examined four
witnesses in all, in support of its case. On behalf of the accused oral
evidence was let in to show that the dhaba in question was not being
run by him and he was employed as a priest in the nearby temple. After
B
considering the oral and documentary evidence on record, the trial court
by judgment dated 30.06.2003 acquitted the appellant-accused mainly
on the grounds that – the prosecution case was not supported by any
independent witness; the prosecution has failed to show that the seized
charas was recovered from the dhaba of the appellant-accused and
further there is no evidence to show that the appellant-accused was C
found in possession of the charas, as pleaded by the prosecution; there
was non compliance of Section 50 of the NDPS Act; as the samples
were handed over to PW-1 Rakesh Goyal who himself gave the sample
to PW-2 for carrying the same to the Central Laboratory at Delhi and
these seals remained with the Director, as such the chances of tampering
D
could not be ruled out and also on the ground that the case of the
prosecution was unnatural and improbable.
5. Aggrieved by the judgment of the trial court, the NCB,
Chandigarh has filed appeal as contemplated under Section 36-B of the
NDPS Act read with Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
before the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla in Criminal Appeal E
No.493 of 2003. The High Court by reappreciating the evidence on record
has come to conclusion that the prosecution has proved its case beyond
reasonable doubt and also has proved that 13 Kg. of charas was
recovered from the possession of the appellant-accused, who was
managing the dhaba in question, and set aside the judgment of the trial F
court and ordered conviction of the appellant for offence punishable
under Section 20 of the NDPS Act. By further hearing the appellant,
order dated 31.12.2012 was passed sentencing the appellant-accused to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for 15 years and to pay fine of
Rs.2,00,000/- and in default, to undergo further imprisonment of one
year. Aggrieved by the conviction recorded and sentence imposed by G
the High Court, this appeal is filed by the accused.
6. We have heard Sri Purushottam Sharma Tripathi, learned
counsel for the appellant and Sri Aman Lekhi, learned Additional Solicitor
General appearing for the respondent-NCB.
H
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 7 S.C.R.

A 7. It is mainly contended by learned counsel for the appellant that
the well considered judgment of the trial court acquitting the appellant
from the charge, is reversed by the High Court without recording cogent
reasons. It is submitted that having regard to evidence on record, the
view taken by the trial court was possible view, and even assuming that
other view is possible, same is no ground to interfere with the judgment
B
of the trial court. The learned counsel, in support of this argument, has
placed reliance on the judgments of this Court in the case of Union of
India v. Bal Mukund & Ors. 1 ; Francis Stanly v. Intelligence
Officer, Narcotic Control Bureau, Thiruvananthapuram 2; and
Rangaiah v. State of Karnataka3. Further it was contended that the
C story of the prosecution is not supported by independent witnesses though
it is clear from the evidence on record that the houses in the village were
only at a distance of 500 meters from the place of dhaba. He submitted
that the High Court has committed error in relying on the testimony of
official witnesses to hold the appellant-accused guilty of the charge.
While pleading that it is not safe to rely on the testimony of official
D
witnesses, in absence of any independent witness, learned counsel has
placed reliance on the judgments of this Court in the case of Jagdish v.
State of M.P.4 and Gyan Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P.5. It is also the
submission of the learned counsel that there is no acceptable evidence
on record to hold that appellant-accused was in exclusive and conscious
E possession of the seized material /charas as much as same was seized
from the gunny bag lying near the counter of the dhaba. In support of
the said plea, the learned counsel relied upon the judgments of this Court
in the case of Gopal v. State of M.P.6 and State of Punjab v. Balkar
Singh & Anr.7. Further it is also stated that search notice issued to the
appellant was not in accordance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act and
F
placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of K. Mohanan
v. State of Kerala8. Further pleading that the testimony of the defence
witness was not considered in proper perspective by the High Court, the
learned counsel has submitted that it is a fit case to set aside the judgment
1
(2009) 12 SCC 161
G 2
(2006) 13 SCC 210
3
(2008) 16 SCC 737
4
(2003) 9 SCC 159
5
1995 Supp. (4) 658
6
(2002) 9 SCC 595
7
(2004) 3 SCC 582
8
H (2000) 10 SCC 222
JEET RAM v. THE NARCOTICS CONTROL BUREAU, 565
CHANDIGARH [R. SUBHASH REDDY, J.]

of the High Court and acquit the appellant from the charge framed. A
Lastly it is contended by the learned counsel that in any event the
sentence of 15 years’ rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs.2,00,000/-
is excessive and disproportionate to the gravity of the charge having
regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the age of the
appellant. Further it is submitted that he is a pujari in the temple, situated
B
near the dhaba.
8. On the other hand, it is argued by Sri Aman Lekhi, learned
Additional Solicitor General appearing for the respondent-NCB, that the
findings recorded by the trial court are erroneous and contrary to evidence
on record, as such, it is always open to the High Court in appeal to
reappreciate the evidence and set aside such erroneous view taken by C
the trial court. It is submitted that though prosecution has proved its case
beyond reasonable doubt, on mere surmises and presumptions the trial
court has found that the case of the prosecution is unnatural and same is
correctly overturned by the High Court. Further it is submitted that the
incident had happened at about 10:30 p.m. at the dhaba which is away D
from the actual village site, as such, merely because independent witnesses
were not examined, same by itself is no ground to reject the case of the
prosecution. Further it is submitted that it is admitted position that dhaba
was being run by his wife, which is near to the temple. As the appellant
was on the counter during the relevant time, as such, it cannot be said
that the seized material of charas was not seized from his conscious E
possession. To support various contentions learned Additional Solicitor
General relied on the several judgments of this Court.
o To support his contention that appellate courts have full
powers to review the evidence, upon which order of acquittal
is founded and come to their own conclusion, he relied on the F
following judgments :
1. Sanwat Singh & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan9
2. Damodarprasad Chandrikaprasad v. State of
Maharashtra10 G
3. Vinod Kumar v. State of Haryana11

9
(1961) 3 SCR 120
10
(1972) 1 SCC 107
11
(2015) 3 SCC 138 H
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 7 S.C.R.

A o In support of his contention that merely because independent
witnesses are not examined, same is no ground to reject the
case of the prosecution, learned Additional Solicitor General
has relied on the following judgments of this Court :
1. Dharampal Singh v. State of Punjab12
B 2. Baldev Singh v. State of Haryana13
o To support his argument that the charas was seized from the
conscious possession of the appellant, the learned ASG has
placed reliance on the following judgments of this Court :

C 1. Madan Lal & Anr. v. State of H.P.14
2. Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan15
Further, it is submitted that having regard to the nature of offence
which has large repercussions on the society, sentence imposed does
not warrant any interference. Hence, prayed for dismissal of the appeal.
D
9. Having heard the learned counsel on both sides and on perusal
of the record, we do not find any substance in any of the contentions
advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant, except the submission
on the quantum of sentence.
10. It is mainly contended by learned counsel for the appellant
E that the High Court / appellate Court was not justified in interfering with
the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court merely because another
view is possible. As noted earlier, in support of his argument that merely
because another view is possible, same is no ground to interfere with the
judgment of acquittal by the appellate court, the learned counsel has
F relied on judgments of this Court in the case of Bal Mukund1; Francis
Stanly2; and Rangaiah3. To counter the said submission, the learned
Additional Solicitor General Sri Aman Lekhi has submitted that it is always
open to the appellate court to review the evidence on record upon which
order of acquittal is founded and if it comes to conclusion that the order
passed by the trial court is erroneous and unreasonable, it is always
G open for the appellate court to interfere with the order of acquittal. It is
contended that the view taken by the trial court is not a possible view
12
(2010) 9 SCC 608
13
(2015) 17 SCC 554
14
(2003) 7 SCC 465
H 15
(2015) 6 SCC 222
JEET RAM v. THE NARCOTICS CONTROL BUREAU, 567
CHANDIGARH [R. SUBHASH REDDY, J.]

having regard to evidence on record. Such erroneous finding can be A
corrected by the appellate court. In support of his argument, the learned
Additional Solicitor General has placed reliance on the judgments of this
Court in the case of Sanwat Singh 9 ; Damodarprasad
Chandrikaprasad10 and Vinod Kumar11. Though the ratio laid down in
the judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant is that
B
the appellate court would not interfere with the judgment of acquittal
only because another view is possible but at the same time whether the
findings recorded by the trial court in support of acquittal are valid or not
is a matter which is to be considered with reference to facts of each
case and evidence on record. On close scrutiny of the depositions of the
witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution as well as on behalf of C
the accused, we are of the view that the findings recorded by the trial
court are contrary to evidence on record and view taken by the trial
court was not possible at all, as such the High Court rightly interfered
with the same and recorded its own findings to convict the appellant.
The trial court acquitted the appellant mainly on the ground that
D
prosecution case was not supported by independent witnesses; conscious
possession was not proved; non-compliance of Section 50 of the NDPS
Act; proper procedure was not followed in sending the samples for
examination and the case of the prosecution was unnatural and
improbable. As rightly held by the High Court, this Court in the case of
State of H.P. v. Pawan Kumar16 has held that Section 50 of the NDPS E
Act is applicable only in the case of personal search, as such, there is no
basis for the findings recorded by the trial court that there was non-
compliance of provision under Section 50 of the NDPS Act. Even with
regard to the finding of the trial court that the case of the prosecution
was not supported by independent witnesses, it is clear from the evidence
F
on record that the incident had happened at about 10:30 p.m. in a dhaba
which is away from the village site and all other persons who are found
in the dhaba were the servants of the accused. It is also clear from the
evidence on record that Suresh Kumar and Attar Singh examined on
behalf of the appellant are closely related to the accused, as such, they
could not be said to be independent witnesses. Pappu was the only other G
person who is none other than the servant of the dhaba and we cannot
expect such a person to be a witness against his own master. Dealing
with the issue of conscious possession, it is to be noticed that dhaba is
constructed on the land which belongs to Kaushalya Devi who is none
16
(2005) 4 SCC 350 H
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 7 S.C.R.

A other than the wife of the accused. Further in deposition PW-4 has stated
that when the accused was questioned as to who was the owner of the
dhaba, he claimed to be the owner. The case of the prosecution was
found to be unnatural and improbable by the trial court only on the ground
that 13 Kg. of charas was lying in open in a gunny bag. The trial court
found that it is not believable that any person would keep such a huge
B
quantity of charas in open condition. It is clear from the evidence of
prosecution witnesses that the officials of NCB got information that
trafficking of charas was going on in the area in question. Two police
parties had left for Theog – one party headed by PW-4 R.P. Singh started
earlier and second party headed by PW-1 Rakesh Goyal left a little later
C from Shimla. Thus the depositions of PW-4 R.P. Singh; PW-3 O.P. Bhat;
PW-1 Rakesh Goyal and PW-2 Hayat Singh are consistent and
trustworthy and cannot be said to be unnatural and improbable. Further
it is also to be noted that the trial court has held that seal with which
samples and remaining bulk of charas was sealed was handed over to
PW-1 Rakesh Goyal who himself gave the sample to PW-2 for carrying
D
to Central Laboratory at Delhi and since the seals remained with the
Director, the chances of tampering could not be ruled out. In this regard,
it is to be noticed, as rightly held by the High Court, that the trial court
totally lost sight of the fact that on 19.06.2001 JMIC, Theog had also
appended his signatures on the samples as well as bulk parcels and,
E therefore, there was no chance of tampering of the samples. Further,
there was no such suggestion of tampering either put to PW-1 Rakesh
Goyal or to PW-2 Hayat Singh.
11. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the clear view that the
view taken by the trial court was not at all possible, having regard to the
F evidence on record and findings which are erroneously recorded contrary
to evidence on record were rightly set aside by the High Court. As
submitted by the learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the
prosecution, it is always open to the appellate court to reappreciate the
evidence, on which the order of acquittal is founded, and appellate courts
are vested with the powers to review and come to their own conclusion.
G The judgments in the case of Sanwat Singh 9; Damodarprasad
Chandrikaprasad10 and Vinod Kumar11 also support the case of the
respondent. It is relevant to refer to paragraphs 17 and 18 of the judgment
in the case of Vinod Kumar11 which read as under :

H
JEET RAM v. THE NARCOTICS CONTROL BUREAU, 569
CHANDIGARH [R. SUBHASH REDDY, J.]

“17. Before we dwell upon the factual score whether the A
prosecution has proven the case to warrant a conviction, we think
it apt to recapitulate the principles relating to the jurisdiction of the
High Court while deciding the appeal against acquittal. In this
context, reproducing a passage from Jadunath Singh v. State of
U.P. [(1971) 3 SCC 577 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 726] would be profitable:
B
(SCC p. 582, para 22)
“22. This Court has consistently taken the view that in an
appeal against acquittal the High Court has full power to review
at large all the evidence and to reach the conclusion that upon
that evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed. This
power of the appellate court in an appeal against acquittal was C
formulated by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in
Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor [(1933-34) 61 IA 398 : (1934)
40 LW 436 : AIR 1934 PC 227 (2)] and Nur Mohammed v.
King Emperor [(1945) 58 LW 481 : AIR 1945 PC 151] . These
two decisions have been consistently referred to in the judgments D
of this Court as laying down the true scope of the power of an
appellate court in hearing criminal appeals: see Surajpal Singh
v. State [AIR 1952 SC 52 : 1952 Cri LJ 331] and Sanwat
Singh v. State of Rajasthan [AIR 1961 SC 715 : (1961) 1 Cri
LJ 766] .”
E
Similar view has been expressed in Damodarprasad
Chandrikaprasad v. State of Maharashtra [(1972) 1 SCC 107
: 1972 SCC (Cri) 110] , Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of
Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033] , State
of Karnataka v. K. Gopalakrishna [(2005) 9 SCC 291 : 2005
SCC (Cri) 1237], Anil Kumar v. State of U.P. [(2004) 13 SCC F
257 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 178] , Girja Prasad v. State of M.P. [(2007)
7 SCC 625 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 475] and S. Ganesan v. Rama
Raghuraman [(2011) 2 SCC 83 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 607] .
18. In this regard, we may fruitfully remind ourselves the principles
culled out in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka [(2007) 4 SCC G
415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325] : (SCC p. 432, para 42)
“42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the
following general principles regarding powers of the appellate
court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal
emerge: H
570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 7 S.C.R.

A (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate
and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal
is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation,
restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an
B appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own
conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, ‘substantial and compelling
reasons’, ‘good and sufficient grounds’, ‘very strong
circumstances’, ‘distorted conclusions’, ‘glaring mistakes’, etc.
C are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate
court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are
more in the nature of ‘flourishes of language’ to emphasise the
reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than
to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to
come to its own conclusion.
D
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case
of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the
accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to
him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence
that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he
E is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the
accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his
innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened
by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of
F the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb
the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”
For the aforesaid reasons, we reject the submission made by the
learned counsel for the appellant.Even with regard to the plea of the
appellant that the evidence on record on behalf of the prosecution is not
G sufficient enough to hold that the appellant-accused was in conscious
possession of the seized material, also cannot be accepted. It is clear
from the evidence on record that the appellant was on the counter of the
dhaba which was constructed on the land owned by his wife near the
temple and the charas was found in the counter of the dhaba in a
gunny bag. The facts of the case show that accused not only had direct
H
JEET RAM v. THE NARCOTICS CONTROL BUREAU, 571
CHANDIGARH [R. SUBHASH REDDY, J.]

physical control over charas, he had the knowledge of its presence and A
character. As rightly contended by Sri Aman Lekhi, learned Additional
Solicitor General in the case of Mohan Lal15 this Court had held that a
functional and flexible approach in defining and understanding possession
as a concept has to be adopted and the word has to be understood
keeping in mind the purpose and object of the enactment. In the statement
B
recorded under Section 313 of Code of Criminal Procedure, though the
appellant has referred to Brij Lal and Mantu in support of a version,
contrary to that presented by prosecution but he has not chosen to examine
either Brij Lal or Mantu. No defence witness has deposed to the chain
of events, as has been stated by the appellant in the statement under
Section 313, Cr.PC. It is also fairly well settled that where accused C
offers false answers in examination under Section 313 Cr.PC, same
also can be used against him. Further onus was on the appellant to explain
the possession and in absence of the same being discharged, presumption
under Section 54 of the NDPS Act also will kick in.
12. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the judgment D
of the High Court does not suffer from any infirmity so as to interfere
with the judgment of conviction.
13. At the same time we find force in the submission of the learned
counsel for the appellant in sentencing the appellant for 15 years’ rigorous
imprisonment with a fine of Rs.2,00,000/-. Having regard to peculiar E
facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the fact that the
incident occurred in the year 2001 and as the appellant claimed to be a
priest in the temple, who is now aged about 65 years, we deem it
appropriate that it is a fit case to modify the sentence imposed on the
appellant. Accordingly, the sentence awarded on the appellant is reduced
to a period of 10 (ten) years, while maintaining the conviction and the F
penalty as imposed by the High Court. The order of sentence dated
31.12.2012 passed by the High Court stands modified. The appeal is
partly allowed to the extent indicated above.

G
Divya Pandey Appeal partly allowed.

H