Holding

The High Court's contempt order was without jurisdiction as it granted substantive relief beyond the specific directions of the original judgment, and therefore the contempt petition was dismissed.

Summary

The petitioners, clerk‑cum‑cash collectors, sought promotion and financial benefits under a 1984 Government Order, arguing that they performed duties similar to lower‑division clerks. The Calcutta High Court, in a contempt proceeding, held that the respondents had not complied with its earlier judgment and, beyond that, directed the preparation of a common gradation list and the admission of the petitioners into the lower‑division cadre. The petitioners appealed, contending that the High Court exceeded its contempt jurisdiction by granting substantive relief not expressly ordered in the original judgment. The Supreme Court held that contempt jurisdiction is limited to determining deliberate disobedience of specific directions and cannot be used to decide matters not adjudicated earlier. Consequently, the High Court's contempt order was declared without jurisdiction, set aside, and the contempt petition dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether a court exercising contempt jurisdiction can issue directions or grant substantive relief not contained in the original judgment or order.
Whether the alleged non‑compliance with the High Court's earlier judgment amounted to contempt when the judgment lacked a specific direction regarding a common seniority list.
What is the proper scope of contempt jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and the Constitution of India.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 215
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971s. 2(b)

Subjects

contempt jurisdictioncontempt of courtscope of contemptjudicial discretiongovernment orderpromotion benefitsseniority listex‑cadre postsjurisdictionsubstantive relief

Judgment

JHARESW AR PRASAD PAUL AND ANR. A

TARAK NATH GANGULY AND ORS.

MAY 08, 2002

[D.P. MOHAPATRA AND K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, JJ.] B

Conle1111Jt of L~ourls , 1c:. I 97 I-Section 2 (b)--Conten1pt jurisdiction-
Exercise and scope o.l--Hc/d, Court should co1?fine to question regarding any
deliberate disobedience in con1plying 1vilh direction in the judg1nent or order C
of court and the contu111acious conduct o.f parties-On facts, f!igh Court in
exercise of conte111pl jurisdiction issuing certain directions l1'hen non-
co111plia11ce of order alleged did not contain such directions-Hence order of
High Court set aside.

Respondents-Clerk-cum-Cash Collectors sought benefits of D
promotion and financial benefits being granted to Lower Division Clerk
(LDC) in terms of a Government Order since the work they have been
doing were similar to those of LDCs. Single Judge of High Court disposed
of the petition. Division Bench granted benefits to the respondents-Clerk-
cum-Cash Collei:tors, in ter1ns of the Government Order. Thereafter, State
extended the benefit of previous Govern1nent Order to the respondents- E
Clerk-cum-Cash Collector. Respondents and other Clerk-cum-Cash
Collectors \\'Crc given promotion. Ho\vevcr, respondents-Clerk-cum-Cash
Collectors filed application alleging that the appellants failed to comply
with the order of Division Bench of High Court in its entirety. Court held
that appellants/contemnors have not complied with the order of the F
"'' Division Bench granting benefits in ter1ns of the Government Order. But
on consideration of the matter it held that no action be taken against
appellants for contumacious act and directed the appellants to introduce
;
a comn1on gradation list of Lo\ver Division Clerical Cadre.

In appeal before this Court appellants contended that the Division G
Bench \Vas in error in issuing the directions in exercise of its contempt
jurisdiction since the judgment of the Division Bench did not contain ·any
specific order or direction for treating the ex-cadre posts of Clerk-cum-
Cash Collectors as posts in the cadre of Lo\vcr Division Clerk/Assistant
and for preparation of a combined seniority list including the holders of H
913
914 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.
....
A· such ex-cadre post in the cadre of Lower Division Clerk/Assistants. In the '
absence of any adjudication on the question and any order or direction
to that effect in the judgment the appellants could not have been held to
have acted in a contumacious manner in not treating the writ petitioners
as members of the cadre of Lower Division Assistant and in not preparing
B a common gradation list.
'-•
Respondents contended that preparation of a common seniority list
was specifically prayed for in the writ petition and when the Division
Bench allowed the appeal and granted the reliefs sought by the writ ~

petitioners it followed as a necessary consequence that the respondents in
c the writ petition were mandated to treat the writ petitioners and other
Clerk-cum-Cash Collectors as part of the cadre of Lower Division
Assistants and give them promotional and other consequential financial
benefits.

Allowing the appeal, the Court
D
HELD : I. The power to punish for contempt of courts is a special
power vested under the Constitution in the courts of record and also under
_,
the statute and needs to be exercised with care and caution. It should be
used sparingly by the courts on being satisfied regarding the true effect
of contemptuous conduct. It is to be kept in mind that the court exercising
E
the jurisdiction to punish for contempt does not function as an original ~

or appellate court for determination of the disputes between the parties.
The contempt jurisdiction should be confined to the question whether there
has been any deliberate disobedience of the order of the court and if the
conduct of the party who is alleged to have committed such disobedience
F is contumacious. The cou.rt exercising contempt jurisdiction is not entitled
r
F
to enter into questions which have not been dealt with and decided in the
judgment or order, violation of which is alleged by the applicant. The court
has to consider the direction issued in the judgment or order and not to ""-
consider the question as to what the judgment or order should have
contained. [922-A-D]
G
2. The court exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned
with the question of contumacious conduct of the party, which alleged to
have committed deliberate default in complying with the directions in the
judgment or order. If the judgment or order does not contain any specific
H direction regarding a matter or ifthere is any ambiguity in the directions
JHARESWAR PRASAD PAUL v. TARAK NATH GANGULY 915
issued therein then it will be better to direct the parties to approach the A
court which disposed of the matter for clarification of the order instead
of the court exercising contempt jurisdiction taking upon itself the power
to decide the original proceeding in a manner not dealt with by the court
passing the judgment or order. If this limitation is borne in mind then
criticisms which are sometimes levelled against the courts exercising
conten1pt of court jurisdiction "that it has exceeded its powers in granting B
substantive relief and issuing a direction regarding the same without
proper adjudication of the dispute" in its entirety can be avoided. This
will also avoid multiplicity of proceedings because the party which is
prejudicially affected by the judgment or order passed in the contempt
proceeding and granting relief and issuing afresh directions is likely to C
challenge that order and that may give rise to another round of litigation
arising from a proceeding which is intended to maintain the majesty and
· image of courts. 1922-D-Gi

3. The directions issued by the Division Bench granted substantive
reliefs not covered by the judgment/order passed in the original D
proceeding. No direction \Vas issued by the High Court that the writ
petitioners will be admitted to the cadre of Upper Division Clerks/
Assistants in the Directorate. They have all along been holding the posts
of Clerk-cum-Cash Collector which are ex-cadre posts. Entry of such
persons into the cadre of Upper Division Clerk-Assistants has to be
E
considered taking into account various aspects of the matter, and is matter
of policy which Government has to decide. It is one thing to say that the
benefits under the Government Order may be extended to the writ
petitioners and directing their entry into the existing cadre of Officer
Assistants is a different thing. Such dispute cannot be and should not be
ordered in the summary proceeding for taking action for contempt of F
court. If the High Court felt that the grievance of the writ petitioners
relating to the question of their entry into the cadre of Upper Division
Clerks\Assistants has not been dealt with by the court and specific
directions have not been issued while disposing of the writ petitions/appeals
then the appropriate course was to leave it to the parties to agitate the G
matter before the competent forum. On consideration of the matter the
High Court held that no action for contempt of court need be taken against
· -~ the respondents in the writ petition for deliberate disobedience of the
judgment or order passed by the High Court. Thereafter it was not open
to the court to pass any order granting substantive relief to the applicants
on the plea that the question raised was also a part of their grievance in H
916 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002] 3 S.C.R.

A the writ petition. The judgment/order passed by the High Court was
without jurisdiction, thus is set aside. The petition filed by the writ
petitioners for taking action for contempt of court against the respondents
is dismissed. 1922-H; 923-A-GI

CRIMINAL APPEL LA TE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
B 110 of 1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated I 1.11. 1992 of the Kolkata High ~
Court in C.R. No. 2197 (W)/88, with F.M.A. No. 561 of 1987.

WITH
c
Crl.°A. No. 171 of 1996.

T.C. Ray, H.K. Puri, S.K. Puri and Rajesh Srivastava, Ujjwal Banerjee,
Ms. Anindita Gupta, for the Appellants.

D Gobind Das, G.S. Chatterjee, Raja Chatterjee, Ms. Aruna Mukherjee
and Rajender Prasad Saxena for the Respondents. ::! .
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

D.P. MOHAPATRA, J. In these appeals filed by special leave the
E appellants have challenged the judgment/order dated 11.11.1992 passed by
the High Court at Calcutta in the contempt proceeding, Civil Rule No.2 I 97(W)/
88, holding inter alia, that the respondents have not complied with the order
dated 29.2.1988 of the Court effectively and in appropriate manner.
,,,_
The relevant facts of the case giving rise to the proceeding may be I
F stated thus :

The respondents, 27 in number, were holding posts of clerk-cum-cash
collector in the Directorate of Dairy Development, Government of West
Bengal. They filed writ petition No.CO 8793(W) of 1984 raising a grievance

G
that though they have been holding the posts since long and have been doing
clerical work similar to those of lower division clerks in the department they
have not been given the benefit provided under the Government Order No.
...
3868-F dated 31.3.1984. In the said Government Order it was ordered, inter
alia, that members of the Lower Division Clerical cadre will be entitled to
promotion to the Upper Division Clerical cadre on the ratio of I: I and the
--
H order was applicable to Lower Division Clerks/Assistants in all Government
JHARESWAR PRASAD PAUL v TARAK NATH GANGULY [ D.P_ MOHAPATRA, J.] 917

Departments and Directorates including the Directorate of Dairy Development. A
The further grievance of the writ petitioners was that they were denied the
benefit of promotion and consequent financial benefits envisaged under the
afore1nentioned Government order nierely for the reason that designation of
the posts held by them was clerk-cum-cash collector and not Lower Division
.... Clerk/Assistant. It was the case of the petitioners that the duties discharged
B
by the1n are si1nilar to those of the Lower Division Assistants and in addition
to such duties they also do the work of collection of cash. Therefore, there
was no justification, to deny them the benefits of the aforementioned
... Government order. The petitioners sought the following reliefs in the writ
petition:

"(a) A wnt m the nature of Mandamus do issue directing the c
respondents and each one of them to show cause as to why the
incumbents in the post of Clerk-cum-Cash Collector including
the petitioners under the Directorate of Dairy Development,
Government of West Bengal should not be taken into account in
the preparation of common seniority List amongst the Lower D
Division Clerical Cadre under the said Directorate.
(b) A writ in the nature of Mandamus do issue directing the
respondents and each one of them to act in accordance with law
and to promote the Lower Division Clerical Cadre to the Upper
Division Clerical Cadre in terms of the Government order dated E
31.3.1984 being No. 3868-F in terms of ihe common seniority
list prepared in accordance with law taking the petitioners into
account.

(c) A writ in the nature of Mandamus do issue directing the
respondents and each one of them to sho\> cause as to why the p
posts of Clerk-cum-Cash Collectors should not be considered as

- (d)
belonging to the Lower Division Clerical Cadre under the
Directorate of Dairy Development, Goverm1ent of West Bengal.

Rule Nisi be made absolute if the respo1dents fail to show
adequate cause. G
(e) An order of injunction do issue restrammg the respondents,
particularly the respondents nos. 2 and 3 from giving effect or
any further effect to the Government order dated 31.3.1984 being
No. 3868-F issued by the Assistant Secretary, Department of
Finance till a common seniority list in the Lower Division Clerical H
-)-- -

918 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.
~-
A Cadre under the Directorate of Dairy Development, Government
of West Bengal is prepared taking the posts of Clerk-cum-Cash
Collector as constituent of the said Cadre.
(t) Direction be given upon the respondents to prepare the Common
seniority and/or Gradation List in the Lower Division Clerical
B Cadre under the Directorate of Dairy Development taking the
posts of Clerks-cum-Cash Collectors as belong to the said cadre
and thereafter to promote the Lower Division Clerical Cadre to
·the Upper Division Clerical Cadre at the ratio of 1:1 in terms of
Government order dated 3 I .3.1984 being No. 3868-F.
....

..
c (g) Ad-interim order in terms of prayers(e) and (t) above.
(h) Costs of this application be paid by the respondents."

The gist of the case of the respondents was that the writ petitioners
were not members of the Cadre of Lower Division Assistants; that they were
holding ex-cadre posts; that the duties and responsibilities discharged by the
D writ petitioners were not similar to those performed by Lower Division
Assistants, and therefore, they were not entitled to the benefits of promotion ' ..._
and consequential financial benefits as envisaged in the Government order
No. 3868-F dated 31.3.1984.

A learned single Judge of the High Court by the judgment dated 15th
..-
E
May, 1986 disposed of the writ petition holding, inter alia, that : "Channel
'of promotion, method of recruitment, and the nature of duties and mode of
creation of the Clerk-cum-Cash Collectors being different from Lower Division
Cler~s, the ratio of l: l in the matters of promotion could not be conferred
upon the <;lerk-cum-Cash Collectors." #
F
In the writ appeal filed by the writ petitioners assailing the judgment
of the single Judge, a Division Bench of the High Court by judgment rendered
on 29.2.1988 set aside the judgment and or_dered that the petitioners should
be given the benefits due in terms of the order being order No. 3868-F dated
-
31.3.1984. The operative portion of the judgment runs as follows:
G
"Thus on the basis of the ratio of the judgments of the Supreme
Court or the observations as made, we are inclined to hold that in this
case, the said petitioners have been deprived of the protection of
equal pay for equal work and that has caused a grave failure of
justice by the State Government and that too, in not following the
H
-~-

JHARESWAR PRASAlJ PAUL\'. TARAK NATH GANGULY [D.P. MOHAPATRA, J.] 919
--'I
ratio of I: I as indicated above. We hold further that in the case of the A
said petitioners, the Finance Department Memo No. 3868-F dated
31st March, 1984 should have been applied in its entirety and not in
part, as has been done in this case and the said petitioners, as its
appeared, are not getting the necessary benefits under the same, since
they have not been designated or declared and considered as clerks.
In fact, the said Me1no was intended to give or provide for 1nore B

. benefits to the said petitioners. Really the said petitioners have been
denied of the due and necessary benefits under the said memo, since
they have been shown or mentioned to be holding ex-cadre posts.

Such being the position, we feel that this appeal should be allowed
and accordingly, we allow the same, set aside the judgment and order
c
of the learned trial Judge and keep it on record furth'er that the said
petitioners should now be given the due benefits in terms of the order
being order No. 3868-F dated 31st March, 1984 and on giving such
effect, they be paid their due and necessary emoluments in accordance
with law. We also hold and observe that the Rule of Automatic D
promotion as indicated hereinbefore, shou Id also be adhered to and
followed in appropriate cases."

The respondents in the appeal challenged the judgment of the Division
Bench by filing a Special Leave Petition (being SLP No. 14123 of 1988) in
this Court which was dismissed by the order passed on 24.4.1989. The review E
petition filed against the said order was also dismissed.

Thereafter the State Government issued the order be_ing G.0.No.264-

.,,
MK/3M-56/84-I dated 3 I.1.1991 extending the benefit of G.O. No. 3868-F
dated 31.3. I 984 to the Clerk-cum-Cash Collectors in the Directorate of Dairy
Development. The said Government order was implemented and the F
Respondents and some other Clerk-cum-Cash Collectors in the Directorate
were given promotion to the higher post like Senior Clerk-cum-Cash
Collectors, Supervisors, etc. Not satisfied with the Government Order issued
in January 199 I and the consequential benefits of promotion given to them
by implementing the said order the writ petitioners filed an application under G
Article 215 of the Constitution of India alleging, inter alia that the respondents
in the writ petition have failed to comply with the judgment/order of the High
-.... Court in its entirety and in its letter and spirit. The petitioners made the
following prayers in the petition :

"(a) Rule NISI do issue calling upon the respondents to show cause H
920 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.

A as to why they should not be committed to prison or to suitably
be dealt with for committing the acts of contempt as enumerated
in paragraph 7 in the foregoing petition;

(b) If the respondents fail to show adequate cause the Rule NJSI be
made absolute;
B (c) Order be passed directing the respondents and each one of them
to act in terms of the order passed by this Hon 'ble Court on 29th
February, 1988 in Appeal from Original order being No. 561 of
1987 and to prepare a common gradation list of Lower Division
Clerical Cadre taking into account the post of Clerk-cum-Cash
c Collector and to give due benefits to the petitioners in terms of
the order being order No. 3868 F dated 31st March 1984.

(d) Ad-interim order in terms of prayers (b);

(e) Costs."

D Considering the application filed by the writ petitioners the Division
Bench of the High Court passed the judgment/order dated 11.11.1992, the
operative portion of which reads as follows:

"From the facts and circumstances, we hold that respondents
contemners have not complied with the order dated 29.2.88 effectively
E and in appropriate manner but there is some doubts whether the
disobedience to the Judgment or neglect to comply with the Judgment
or order was willful or not and accordingly the respondent/contemners
are entitled to benefit of doubt and hence, we do not propose to
inflict any punishment to the respondent/contemners. At the same
time we cannot be •mmindfo.I to the trend of contumacious act of the
F respondents for which petitioners had suffered immensely and have
been suffering till now. In order to mitigate the situation, without
inflicting any punishment, we direct respondents/contemners to
introduce a common gradation list of Lower Division Clerical cadres
so that Cashier-cum-Cash Collector gets promotion by virtue of their
G seniority and consequential pay protection with that of Lower Division
Clerk.

We believe that by adopting such steps, it will be complete and _.,,,_
effective compliance of the order passed by this court. on 29th
February, 1988. Such effect should be given within 31st December,
H 1992 and respondents shall release consequential benefits including
JHARESWAR PRASAD PAUL v TARAK NATH GANliULY fD P_ MOHAPATRA, J.J 921

arrears, if any by 31st March, 1993. After co111putation, if any arrear A
is payable to the petitioners, they will be entitled to interest@ 12%p.a.
which shall be computed from the date of expiry of two months from
the date of the order i.e. dated 29.2.88.

Considering the facts and circun1stances, we direct the respondents/
contemners nos. I, 3, 4 and 5 to pay Rs. 2,000 to each of the petitioners B
individually towards cost of litigation."

Shri T.C. Ray, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants,
raised the contention that the High Court was in error in issuing the directions
in the i1npugned judg1nent/ order in exercise of its contempt jurisdiction
inasmuch as the judgment of the Division Bench, non-compliance of which C
was alleged by the writ petitioners, did not contain any specific order or
direction for treating the ex-cadre posts of Clerk-cum-Cash Collector as posts
in the cadre of Lower Division Clerk/Assistant and for preparation of a
combined seniority list including the holders (writ petitioners and others) of
such ex-cadre post, in the cadre of Lower Division Clerk/Assistants. It was D
the further submission of the learned counsel that not only the ordering
portion of the judgment but also in the entire judgment the question of common
gradation list has neither been discussed nor any finding recorded. In the
absence of any adjudication on the question and any order or direction to that
effect in the judgment the appellants could not have been held to have acted
in a contumacious manner in not treating the writ petitioners as members of E
the cadre of Lower Division Assistant and in not preparing a common gradation
list.

Shri Gobind Das, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents supporting the judgment/order under challenge strenuously
contended that preparation of a common seniority list was specifically prayed F
for in the writ petition and when the Division Bench allowed the appeal and
granted the reliefs sought by the writ petitioners it followed as a necessary
consequence that the respondents in the writ petition were mandated to treat
the writ petitioners and other Clerk-cum-Cash Collectors as part of the cadre
of Lower Division Assistants and give them promotional benefits of I: l ratio G
and other consequential financial benefits.

The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and
dignity of the courts of law. Since the respect and authority commanded by
the courts of law are the greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizen and the
democratic fabric of society will suffer if respect for the juidiciary is H
922 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.

A undermined. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 has been introduced under
the statute for the purpose of securing the feeling of confidence of the people
in general for true and proper administration of justice in the country. The
power to punish for contempt of courts is a special power vested under the
Constitution in the courts of record and also under the statute. The power is
special and needs to be exercised with care and caution. It should be used
B sparingly by the courts on being satisfied regarding the true effect of
contemptuous conduct. It is to be kept in mind that the court exercising the
jurisdiction to punish for contempt does not function as an original or appellate
court for determination of the disputes between the parties. The contempt
jurisdiction should be confined to the question whether there has been any
C deliberate disobedience of the order of the court and if the conduct of the
party who is alleged to have committed such disobedience is contumacious.
The court exercising contempt jurisdiction is not entitled to enter into questions
which have not been dealt with and decided in the judgment or order, violation
of which is alleged by the applicant. The court has to consider the direction
issued in the judgment or order and not to consider the question as to what
D the judgment or order should have contained. At the cost of repetition be it
stated here that the court exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily
concerned with the question of contumacious conduct of the party, which
alleged to have committed deliberate default in complying with the directions
in the judgment or order. If the judgment or order does not contain any
E specific direction regarding a matter or if there is any ambiguity in the
directions issued therein then it will be better to direct the parties to approach
the court which disposed of the matter for clarification of the order instead
of the court exercising contempt jurisdiction taking upon itself the power to
decide the original proceeding in a manner not dealt with by the court passing
the judgment or order. If this limitation is borne in mind th~n criticisms <
F which are sometimes levelled against the courts exercising contempt of court "
jurisdiction "that it has exceeded its powers in granting substantive relief and
issuing a direction regarding the same without proper adjudication of the
dispute" in its entirety can be avoided. This will also avoid multiplicity of
proceedings because the party which is prejudicially affected by the judgment
G or order passed in the contempt proceeding and granting relief and issuing
fresh directions is likely to challenge that order and that may give rise to
another round of litigation arising from a proceeding which is intended to
maintain the majesty and image of courts.

Judging the case in hand on the touchstone of the principles noted
H above, we find that the directions issued by the Division Bench in the impugned
I

.lllARES\VAR PRASAD PAUL r TARAK NATIJ GANGULY ID.P MOHAPATRA, 1] 923
judg1nent in effect granted substantive reliefs not covered by the judgment/ A
order passed in the original proceeding. In the judgment no direction was
issued by the High Court that the writ petitioners will be admitted to the
cadre of Upper Division Clerks/Assistants in the Directorate. As noted earlier,
they have all along been holding the posts of Clerk-cum-Cash Collector
which are ex-cadre posts. Entry of such persons into the cadre of Upper
Division Clerk/Assistants has to be considered taking into account various B
aspects of the matter. It is one thing to say that the benefits under the
Government Order may be extended to the writ petitioners also and extending
benefits of the Govern111ent Order to the writ petitioners is one thing and
directing their entry into the existing cadre of Office Assistants is a different
thing. Such a dispute can only be detennined on consideration of all relevant C
aspects of the n1aaer and cannot be and should not be ordered in the summary
proceeding for taking action for conten1pt of cou11. If the High Court felt that
the grievance of the \Vrit petitioners relating to the question of their entry into
the cadre of Upper Division Clerks/Assistants has not been dealt with by the
court and specific direction has not been issued while disposing of the writ
petitions/appeals then the appropriate course was to leave it to the parties D
(writ petitioners) to agitate the matter before the competent forum. Further
the question of entry of holders of ex-cadre posts, like the writ petitioners,
into an existing cadre is a 1natter of policy which the Government has to
decide. Be it noted here that on consideration of the matter the High Court
held that no action for contempt of court need be taken against the respondents E
in the \Vrit petition for deliberate disobedience of the judgment or order
passed by the High Court. Thereafter it was not open to the court to pass any
order granting substantive relief to the applicants (writ petitioners) on the
plea that the question raised was also a part of their grievance in the writ
petition.
F
In the facts and circu1nstances of the case, we are constrained to hold
that the judgment/order passer by the High Court was without jurisdiction.
In the result, the appeals are allowed. The judgment/order under challenge is
set aside. The petition filed by the writ petitioners for takin.i; action for
contempt of court against the respondents is dismissed.
G
N.J. Appeals allowed.