JHUMMAMAL ALIAS DEVANDASversusSTATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS.

A                 JHUMMAMAL ALIAS DEVANDAS
                              v.
                STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS.

                               AUGUST 25, 1988

B        [M.H. KANIA AND K. JAGANNATHA SHETIY, JJ.J

         Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s. 145-An order under-
  Deals only with factum of possessi'!n on a particular day-Confers no
  title to remain in possession of disputed property-Civil court has
  jurisdiction to give finding.different from that of Magistrare-Unsuccess-
C fu/ party approaching civil court does not warrant~etting aside of conc-
  luded order.

        The mortgagee in possession leased out the shop to the appellant
  and delivered possession. His entering of possession became a subject
  matter of dispute with respondent No. 2, in which the appellant w.as
D dispossessed.

         In the proceedings initiated under s. 145 Cr. P.C. the Magistrate
  found that the appellant was entitled to restoration of possession since
   he .was dispossessed forcibly and wrongfully within the terms of proviso
  t.o s. 145(4) Cr. P.C. The respondent tiled a suit and obtained tempo-
E rnry injunction against the appellant. That injunction was vacated by
  Lhe Additional District Judge who found that the appellant was in pos-
  session of the shop on the date of occurrence of incident. The respon-
  dent's revision application challenging the final order under s. 145(6)
  .Cr. P.C. was dismissed by the Sessions Judge. Accepting resp.ondent's
  petition under s. 482 Cr. P.C., for quashing the proceedings under s.
F 145 the High Court, following the judgment in Ram Sumer Puri Mahant
   v. State of U.P., [1985] I SCC 427, took the view that since the civil
  proceedings in respect of the disputed premises were pending before the
  competent civil court where interim reliefs have been prayed for and
  obtained, there was no justification for continuing the proceedings
   under s. 145 Cr. P.C. pending before the SDM.
G
         Allowing the appeal by special leave,

           IJELD: The High Court was in error mquashing the proceedings under
    s. 145 Cr. P.C. pending before the Sub-Divisional Magi.irate. [589F, 587EiF]
H         An .order made under s. 145 Cr. P.C. deals only with the factum
                                        584
             ' JHUMMAMAL v. STATE OF M.P. ISHETTY, J.]              585

of possession of the party as on a particular day, It confers no title to A
remain in possession of the disputed property, The order is subject to
decision of the civil court, The unsuccessfui party therefore must. get
relief only in the civil court, He may move the civii court with properly
constituted suit, He may file a suit for declaration and prove a better
right to possession, The. civil court has jurisdiction, to give a !inding
different from that which the Magistrate has reached·, (5890-E]           ·B

      The ratio of the decision in Ram Sumer Puri Mahant v, State of
U. P. is that a party should not be permitted to litigate before .the
criminal court when the civil snit is pending in respect of the same
subject matter, That does not mean that a concluded.order under s, 145
Cr,P.C. made by the Magistrate of com~tent jurisdiction, as in the· C
instant case, should he set at naught mer~ly because the unsuccessfnl
party has approached the civil court. [589C-D]

     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 139 of 1987.
                                                                           0
     From the Judgment and Order -dated 25 .4.. 1986 of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court in Misc. Criminal Case No. 1135 of 1985.

      Shanti Bhushan, R.M. Tiwari, L.P. Gaur and Ms. Rani Jethma-
lani for the Appellant.
                                                                           E
       U.R. Lalit (not present), P.S. Poti, S.K. Gambhir, Sanj.ay Sarin,
. S.N. Khare and T.C. Sharma for the Respondents.

      Tbe Judgment of the Court was delivered by

      JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J, We grant special leave and pro-                F
ceed to dispose of the appeal.

      The appeal is directed against the order of the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh dated April 25, 1986 quashing the final order made
under sec. 145 of Cr. P.C..in respect of a shop premises. The shop was
in possession of one Asgarali son of Akbar Ali as mortgagee since G
October 17, 1969. On August 7, 1982, Asgarali was said to have leased
out the shop to the petitioner and also .delivered possession thereof.
The entering.of possession by the petitioner became a subject matter
of dispute. Apprehending breach of peace, the police initiated pro-
ceedings under sec. 145 Cr. P.C. before the Additional Oistrict Magis-
trate, Ujjain. In that proceedings, the petitioner was party no. 2 and H'
    586        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

    r.espondent no. 2 was party no. I. On August 13, 1982 the Magistrate
A
    made a preliminary order. The proceedings continued for about three
    years. On May 17, 1985, the Magistrate made the final order in the
    following terms:

               "Hence I believe that the party no. 2, Jhummamal alias
B              Devandass S/o Jethanand had the occupation within two
               months from 13.8.1982 on which summons were issued by
               the court under sec. 145 sub-sec. ( 1).

                     Hence I or.der that party no. 2 Jhummamal is entitled
               for the occupation of the shop unless he is evicted by proce-
               dure established by law. And I issue injunction that there
               should not be any obstacle in handing over the possession
               to Jhummamal. And if there are locks placed by Motilal or
               his accomplices, the same should be broken open. And the
               goods, if any, found in the shop should be handed over to a
               responsible person after making a panchnama."

    It will be seen from the above order that the petitioner is entitled to
    restoration of possession since he was dispossessed forcibly and wrong-
    fully within the terms of proviso to sec. 145(4) of Cr.1'.C. But unfor-
    tunately, the petitioner could not be put into possession.

E         On July 15, 1985, the respondent filed a suit for injunction. On
    August 14, 1985, he obtained temporary injunction against the appel-
    lant. But upon appeal that temporary injunction was vacated. The
    learned first Additional District Judge, who delivered the judgment in
    that appeal, has recorded the following findings:

F              "Consequently it is clear from the above analysis that
               Asgar Ali was in possession of the disputed shop till 7 .8.82.
               It seems to be his prima facie right to rent out the shop.
               That it seems that he received the rent in advance,
               executed the rent deed and transferred the possession to
               appellant/Jhummamal. As it is mentioned above the First
G              Information Report lodged by Kanhayalal on behalf of
               Jhummamal in which it is .stated that Jhummamal obtained
               possession on 9.8.82, does riot seem right, when only re-
               spondent has demanded possession in his petition dated
               13.8.82. Hence I believe that Jhummamal obtained the
               possession of the disputed shop ·in his capacity as tenant.
H              Respondent and his brothers put their locks later on. And
             JHUMMAMAL v. STATE OF M.P. [SHETIY, J.]                    587

           as in my opinion on the date of occurrence of incident, A
           Jhummamal was in possession of the shop, respondent/
           plaintiff .does not have a prima facie case in his favour

            ...... •.• .................· ............... •'• ........ .
           Hence, I believe that the temporary injunction order pas-           B
           sed by the lower court is not just and as per law. Conse-
           quently while disagreeing with the order passed by the
           lower court, I accept the appeal and quash the order passed
           by thelower court."

      In. between the parties, there were also certain criminal proceed-
ings regarding the theft from and house trespass on the same premises. C
A couple of days before the preliminary order was made under sec.
145 Cr.P.C., a relation of the appellant filed report before the Police
complaining against the respondent. On that report the respondent
was prosecuted under secs. 380 and 454 of the IPC. On February 22,
1984, he was convicted of the said offences. But upon appeal, he was D
acquitted by the Additional District Judge. The revision against the
order of acquittal was also dismissed by the High Court.

       It may also be relevant to state that the respondent challenged
the final order under sec. 145(6) of the Cr.P.C. in a revision before
the Sessions Judge. On September 27, 1985, that revision was dismis-           E
sect, After becoming unsuccessful in the proceedings under sec. 145
Cr.P.C. and also before civil court in the suit for injunction, the
respondent moved the High Court under sec. 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash
the proceedings under sec. 145 Cr.P.C. The High Court accepted the
petition and quashed the proceedings by following the judgment of
this Court in Ram Sumer Puri Mahant v. State of U.P., [1985] 1 SCC             F
42 7. The operative portion of the High Court order is as follows:

                  ··Jn view of the fact that civil proceedings in respect ot
           the disputed premises is pending before the competent
           civil court, where interim reliefs have been prayed for and
           obtained, the reappears to be no justification for continuing       G
           with the proceedings u/s 145 Cr.P .C. pending before the
           S.D.M.                                                              ,
                 Shri Tiwari learned counsel submitted that in case the
           plaintiff's suit is either withdrawn or dismissed, he would be
           left with no remedy. This submission cannot be accepted             H
    588         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

              ·jn view of the Supreme Court judgment as reported -in
A
               Ram Sumer f'uri v. State of U: P.,
               AIR 1985 SC 472.
                     Section 145 is intended to provide a special remedy
               for the prevention of breach of peace arising out of a dis-
               pute relating to immovable .property. Its primary object is
B
               to maintain the public peace and not to decide disputes
               between the contending parties or adjudicate upon the
               rights of the parties to possession. Now, that the civil court
               is seized of the matter, it is desirable that such parallel
               propeedings in respect of the same subject matter and dis-
               pute should not be allowed to continue in the criminal
c              comt as it amounts to an abuse of the process of the court
               which is one of the grounds for invoking section 482 Cr. P.C:
                     For the foregoing reasons, this petition deserves to be
                allowed. It is accordingly allowed. The proceedings u/s 145
                Cr.P.C. pending before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate
D               Ujjain, along with the orders passed therein is; thorefore,
                quashed."

           The validity of the aforesaid order has been called into question
    in this appeal.

E         It will be obvious from the order of the High Court that the
    decision of this Court in Ram Sumer's case has been totally misunder-
    stood. In that case, a title suit for possession and injunction in respect
    of certain property was instituted before the civil court. The suit was
    dismissed on February 28, 1981. The matter was taken up in appeal.
    When the appeal was pending for disposal, proceedings under sec. 145
                                                                                 ~I
F   Cr.P.C. were initiated with regard to the same property. In that
    proceedings, the Magistrate passed a preliminary order under sec.
    145(1) of the Cr.P.C. and also attached the property. The aggrieved
    party challenged that order in.a revision petition before the Allahabad
    High Court. The Hig~ Court refused to interfere with that order. But
    this Court quashed the proceedings under sec. 145 Cr.P.C. observfog:
G
                      "There is no scope to doubt or dispute the position
                that the decree of the civil court is binding on the criminal
                court in a matter like the one before us. Counsel for
                respondents 2-5 was not in a position to challenge the pro-           •
                position that parallel-proceedings should not be permitted
                to continue and in the event of a decree of the civil court,
              JHUMMAMAL v. STATE OF M.P. [SHETTY. J.)                 589

            the criminal court should not be allowed to invoke its juris- ·A
            diction particularly when possession is being examined by
            the civil court and parties are in a position to approach the
            civil court for interim orders such as injunction or appoint-
            ment of receiver for adequate protection of the property
            during pendency of the dispute. Multiplicity of litigation is
                                                                           B
            not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be
            allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation. We are,
            therefore, satisfied that parallel proceedings should not
            continue and the order of the learned Magistrate should be
            quashed.''

      We fail to understand how the High Court rn this case took             c
advantage of the decision of this Court in Ram Sumer's case. The ratio
of the said decision is that a party should not be permitted to litigate
before the criminal court when the civil suit is pending in respect of the
same subject matter. That does not mean that a concluded order under
sec. 145 Cr.P.C. made by the Magistrate of compeient jurisdiction
should be set at naught merely because the unsuccessful party has            D
approached the civil court. An orde! made under sec. 145 Cr.P.C.
deals only with the factum of possession of the party as on a particular
day. It confers no title to remain in possession of the disputed pro-
perty. The order is subject to decision of the civil court. The unsuc-
cessful party therefore must get relief only in the civil court. He may
move the civil court with properly constituted suit. He may file a suit      E
for declaration and prove a better right to possession. The civil court
has jurisdiction to give a finding different from that which the Magis-
trate has reached.

      Counsel for the respondent, however, suggested that having re-
gard to the nature of dispute and the rights of parties relating to the F
property in question, we should not exercise our extrnordinary jurisdic-
tion under Art. 136 of the Constitution. We do not think that the_
contention could be accepted in view of the patently erroneous order
of the High Court.

      In the result, we allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High    G
Court and restore that of the Magistrate. The parties may work out
their rights as per law.

P.S.S.                                                  Appeal allowed.