Holding

The election petition fails because the respondent did not discharge the burden of proving the appellant’s date of birth, and the appellant’s statements do not amount to a clear admission.

Summary

In the 2007 election for Sarpanch of Kulagada Gram Panchayat, the appellant Joshna Gouda was declared elected. The respondent Brundaban Gouda filed an election petition under Sections 31 and 34 of the Orissa Gram Panchayat Act, 1964, alleging that the appellant was ineligible because she had not attained the age of 21, asserting her date of birth as 20‑06‑1986. The trial court and the High Court accepted school admission registers, a transfer certificate and a birth certificate to conclude the appellant was born on 20‑06‑1986 and set aside the election. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the burden of proving the appellant’s date of birth rested on the respondent, which he failed to discharge, and that the appellant’s statements about her age were not a clear, unambiguous admission. Consequently, the election petition failed and the appellant’s election was upheld.

Issues considered

The burden of proof for age qualification in an election petition under the Orissa Gram Panchayat Act.
The admissibility and probative value of school admission registers, transfer certificates, and birth certificates to establish date of birth.
Whether the appellant's statements regarding her age constitute a clear admission of her date of birth.

Legislation cited

Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 101, s. 35
Orissa Gram Panchayat Act, 1964s. 11(b), s. 31, s. 34
Registration of Births and Deaths Act

Subjects

Election lawGram PanchayatAge qualificationBurden of proofAdmissionEvidenceSarpanch

Judgment

[2012] 1 S.C.R. 464

A JOSHNA GOUDA
v.
BRUNDABAN GOUDA & ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 1191 of 2012)
JANUARY 31, 2012
B
[ALTAMAS KABIR AND J. CHELAMESWAR, JJ.]

Orissa Gram Panchayat Act, 1964: s.31 rlw s.34 - Gram
Panchayat elections - Election to the post of Sarpanch -
C Election petition filed u/s.31 rlw s.34 on the ground that the
returning candidate was not qualified to contest the election
- Election petitioner prayed for setting aside the election of
the returning candidate and also prayed that petitioner be
declared duly elected - According to petitioner, the returning
D candidate had not attained the age of 21 years on the relevant
date since the date of birth of the appellant was 20. 6. 1986 and
not 7. 7.1985- Courts below held that date of birth of returning
candidate was 20.6.1986 - On appeal, held: The fact that
returning candidate failed to prove her date of birth to be
E 7. 7.1985 would not automatically lead to conclusion that the
assertion of election petitioner that the actual date of birth of
returning candidate was 20. 6. 1986 was proved - Burden to
prove that returning candidate was born on 20.6.1986 rested
on the election petitioner which he failed to discharge -
F Although there was inconsistency in the evidence of returning
candidate regarding her age, however her statement that she
was 10 years olq on 10.1.1996 could not be treated as an
admission that her date of birth was 20. 6. 1986 - An admission
must be clear and unambiguous in order that such an
admission should relieve the opponent of burden of proof of
G the fact said to have been admitted - Prayer for declaration
in favour of election petitioner, therefore did not survive -
Evidence - Election laws.
The election to the post of Sarpanch was held in
H 464
JOSHNA GOUDA v. BRUNDABAN GOUDA & ANR. 465

2007. The appellant and the first respondent contested A
and the appellant was declared elected. The first
respondent filed election petition under Section 31 read
with Section 34 of the Orissa Gram Panchayat Act, 1964
on the ground that the appellant was not qualified to
contest the election. The first respondent prayed for B
setting aside the election of the appellant and also prayed
that he be declared duly elected. According to the
respondent, the appellant had not attained the age of 21
years on the relevant date since the date of birth of the
appellant was 20.6.1986 and not 7.7.1985. The election c
petition was allowed and on appeal upheld by the District
Court. The appellant filed a writ petition before the High
Court. The High Court dismissed the writ petition on the
ground that the trial court had held that date of birth of
the appellant was 20.6.1986 mainly on the basis of 0
School Admission Register, Ext.5, the relevant entry of
which was Ext.5/A, the Admission Form Ext.6 and the
Transfer Certificate of the appellant Ext. 7; that although
the said documents were admitted in evidence without
any objection before the trial court, however, mere proof E
of the exhibits did not mean that the content of the said
exhibits was also proved and that it was the duty of the
opposite party to prove the contents of those documents.
The instant appeal was filed challenging the order of the
High Court.
F
Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. The High Court did not record any
conclusive finding regarding the probative value of the
contents of exhibits 5, SA or exhibit 7, but went on to G
examine the evidence adduced by the appellant and
found that the said material did not lend support to the
case of the appellant and therefore the entry E.5/A made
in Ext. 5 was true. Exts. A to H were documents
produced by the appellant in support of her claim that her H
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {2012] 1.S.C.R.

A. actual date of birth was 7.7.1985 but not 20.$.1.986, as
contended by the first rel!'pondent. Exts. A and H were
voters lists of the year 2007 an.d 2_Q08 respectively. The
High Court had observed that both the documents were
prepared later in point of time tQ the filing of the
B nomination papers in the election in qU'1$tion and also
they did not reflect the date of birth o! the appellant.
Sir:nilarly, Ext. 0 was a horoscope aUeged to be that.of: ttie I
appellant The High.Court Qpined that the said d0cumeot
was righUy not re,Ued upon. ~t. E was a ~ertificate of diilte
c o~,birth issued under the provisions otttae Regi$tratjon
of ~irths and Deaths Act showing the date of birtll ofthe .
appellant as 7.·7.1985 but suet'! an pntry came to be .ma,de -
pursuant to an application made .by the appellant::.
subsequent to tbe n~.r:nination!l in the election in ·
question. The tligh court had refu~d .tq place ·any
0
reliance on the said document on the ·gr,9un~ that it y.1as
issued by an executive magistr!lte, who according to tl\91 .
High Court did not have. the jurisdiction to is!jue the sa1119.
The Hjgh Court. rightly r.efused. to belipve those. ·
documents and, therefore, the appellant failed to prove .
E her ·date of birth to be 7.7.1~85., But that waul~ oot, 0
automatically lead to the conclus;ion that tile assertion· of·
the .respondent No.1 that the .11ctuaL~te of bi® of .the--,
appellant was 20.6.1986 was proved, ..,;ven accor.~io.g to
the High Court, the content of the Exs. 5, 5/A and 7 had , .
F no probative value. Ex. 5 was proved by PW.2, an
assistant teacher of the Basudev High School. ·Ex.· 6 and
7 were proved by PW.2, the headmaster of Basudev Hijlh
School. PW.2 stated that Exhibit S/A entry showing the
date of birth of'the appellant as 20.&.1986 was made on' '
G the basis of Ex. 7 which was a transfer certificate issued '
by'the headmaster of Paiiehayat Upper Primary Sehot>I
where the appellant studied before jolnihg Basudev High: '
School. Ext.6 was an applicafion,dated 11.7.1998 for
admission of the appelrant in Basudev High School nlacfe
H by'a cousin bf the appellant's father who was admittedly
JOSHNA GOUDA v. BRUNDABAN GOUDA & ANR. 467

not examined. There was nothing ih the said evidence to A·
indicate that the date of birth of the appellant was zoth
June, 1986. At the worst, the said evidence failed to
establisll that the appellant's date of birth was 7.7.1.985.
[Paras 8, 12-14) [470-G-H; 472-A-H; 473-A-B, F]
B
. 2. The burden to proof the fact that the appellant was
born on 20.6.1986 rested squarely on ·the first
respondent. Since the first respondent failed to discharge
the burden cast upon him, the election petition must fail.
It can be seen from the evidence of the appellant that the
appellant stated that she was 13 year old when she took c
admission in the High School (obviously Basudev High
School) and the admission from the evidence of PW.2,
was on 11.7.1998. Deducting 13 years.from that date
would place the year of birth of the appellant in 1985. It
is not clear as .to the material on the basts 'df'which the D
High Court recorded that the admission -of the appelfant'r
in the Panchayat Upper Primary School was on
10.1.,996.-There was some basis on record for the finding
that tile appellant took .admission in the Upper Primary
Scbooi on 10.1.1996. On her"own ai:lmissiOn
·" ~ ' - ' - -·i-.
".-<_ -- ' '
she
'•
was.10
-;
. EI
_. ~·,

yecirs old on,that date. Then there is .an inconsistency in
her evid~11ce ·. regarclf~g he.r age with• refe.rence tc) .her
admission
·';' •
·.iJito
'
the Upper
' 11 _ . - .
Primary . School and B.a$udev
·_Jib'• - ' . ~

High Schoof. In such a case, her statement that .she was ,
10 year old on 10.1.1996 cannot be.treated as an 'F'
admission that her date of birth.is 20th June, 1986. An
' . ' ' - - . ,, '-, •, •' ' - ... 1 ' "

admis!>ion musi be clear Cll!d ·unambiguou~ in. order that . ,
such atJ admission sho_uld relieve the opp.onent of tile .
burden of proof of the fac~ said to have been admitte.,d. "
Thus, the second question regarding the declaration in G .·
favour of the first respondent did not survive. [Paras 15,
16118, 19) [473-H;. 474~A, E; 475-E-H; 476~A-B] ,,
' ' _-' . '' - -·. ..11 ' ·• .
·. · Robins"' v.,Nationaf "'Trust &;qo~.Llfl., 19Z,7: A.q. ,~15 - ,0
referred to. H
468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 1 S.C.R.

A Case Law Reference:
1927 A.C. 515 referred to Para 16
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
1191 of2012.
B
From the & Order dated 25.03.2011 of the High Court of
Orrisa at Cuttack in Writ Appeal No. 114 of 2011.

Raj Kumar Mehta for the Appellant.

C Debasis Misra for the Respondenys.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

CHELAMESWAR, J. 1. Leave granted.
D 2. This appeal arises out of a judgment dated 25.03.2011
of the High Court of Orissa in Writ Appeal No.114 of 2011.

3. The factual background of the litigation is as follows:-

E (A) Election to the post of Sarpanch of Kulagada Gram
Panchayat in the District of Ganjam, Orissa were held in the
year 2007. The appellant, the first respondent and two others
filed their nominations. The scrutiny of the nominations took
place on 16th January, 2007. The returning officer held all the
F four nominations valid.

(B) Subsequently, except the appellant and the first
respondent, the other two candidates withdrew from contest.
Election took place on 17th February, 2007, wherein the
appellant herein was declared elected.
G
(C) The first respondent, filed an Election Petition under
Section 31 read with Section 34 of the Orissa Gram Panchayat
Act, 1964 (for the sake of convenience it is called "the Act"),
on the ground that the appellant herein was not eligible to
H
JOSHNA GOUDA v. BRUNDABAN GOUDA & ANR. 469
[J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]
contest the election in view of Section 11 (b) of the Act which A
declares that no member of 'Gram Sasan' (a defined
expression under Section 2(h) of the Act') shall be eligible to
contest for the post of Sarpanch if he has not attained the age
of 21 years. It is the specific case of the first respondent that
the appellant herein was born on 20.06.1986 and had not B
attained the age of 21 years by the relevant date. The 1st
respondent, therefore, sought two reliefs in the election petition
that the election of the appellant herein be set aside and also
that the 1st respondent be declared to have been duly elected:
The appellant contested the election petition. By the judgment C
dated 29.11.2008 the election petition was allowed. Aggrieved
by the decision of the trial Court, the appellant herein carried
the matter in an appeal under Section 38(4) of the Act to the
District Court, Ganjam. The appeal was dismissed by a
judgment dated 14th September, 2009. o
(D) Aggrieved by the same, the appellant herein carried
the matter by way of a Writ Petition (Civil) No. 14356 of 2009
to the High Court of Orissa which was also dismissed by a
Judgment dated 18.2.2011, and the same was challenged in E
an Intra Court appeal in appeal No. 114 of 2011 without any
success. By the Judgment under appeal, the writ appeal was
dismissed. ·

4. It is argued by learned counsel for the appellant that the
judgment under appeal cannot be sustained as there is no F
legally admissible evidence on record to enable the Courts
below to reach the conclusion that the appellant was born on
20th June, 1986.

5. It is recorded in the judgment rendered in the writ G
petition:-
"The trial court held that the date of birth of the petitioner
was 20.6.1986 mainly on the basis of School Admission
1. "Gram Sasan" means a Grama Sasan established under Section 4'. H
470 SUPREME COURT REPOR'rs . f2012] 1 S.C.R.
i .

A Register, Ext.5, the re!evarll entry of which is E"1.5/A, the
Admission FormExt.6 and the Transfer Certificate oUhe
petitioner Ext. 7, P. W.2, one Asst Teacher of BaSL!dev High
School, Ohaugaon .produced the School Admission
,.,Register and proved, it whic;h was marked ,as Ext.5:.
B
6. The question of,admissibility of the exhibits 5. 5A and
7 was rai&ed in the writ petition but rej.ected oi1 the grovnd fhat
the ~ai~ documents were adm(tted in evi<;len~ without any ,
objection before the Trial ColJ{i~ fiowever, the learned Jud.ge
c.. opioed that m~re proof ?f the above-meinti?qed ~xhibits does •
not mean that the. content
. of. t)1e said exhibits w~ also pr,9vecl.
' - ~

"Of course, ontibeoause thosedocumer11s·were admitted ·1
WithOut ob]eciion, it'carinbt be sclid that the contents th@feof ·
Were also: admitted. It ·was fhe duty of the ofilY:party to · ·
D· prove the contents ofihose documerits' pcirtiettlaHy, the
1
d!ite of birth o{ the petitioner entereq in Ext.5 .and the
. .'transfer ' certlfic~te
t ' '
~xt.7: · - : .' ·'1 .
· . ,

• _7. However at para 1, it wa'S held:: I ·
~:

E" I w
i ' ..

i•i<ilt1 thepresent ca~thejlntry as per Elc.51,A wasmad~<>n, ,
'- the Qaf!is qf .transfer ~ifir;:ate Ext. 7:anc;I tl\e appli~tion .
made by Maheswar Gouda, cousin brother of petitioner:'s .
father. The trial court held that Maheswar Gouda, being the
eousin br~ttier of petitioner's fatherttad special me11ns of
F · · knowtedge'0f the dllte of birth oUhe petitioner. Admittedly:, '
:.~said Maheswar Gc>uda has not:beell· examined".
- J ' ' . ., .. . - -
8. Unfortunately, the learned judge did nptrecor~ ;:iny
conclusive finding regarding the probative value of the contents
G of exhibits 5, 5A or·exhibit 7, but went on to examine the
evidence adduced by the appellant herein and found that the ..
said material does not lend support to the .case of the appellant
here.In and therefore the entry E.S/A in .E~. 5 is true. Amatte
strange procedure indeetl! Only mat~hed b}'th~_strai'l9e -·
H · decision of the, appellantto addMP6 evk:leoce. .,.
JOSHNA GOUDA v. BRUNDABAN GOUDA:& ANR. 411;.
[J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]
"But father ofthe petitioner has been examined as O.P.W. A .
, No.3 .. As per the affidavit evidence the date of birth of the
. _PetitioneFwas incorrectly recorded in the school r~gister
and schQol certificate by the teachers" which ·appears
improb_able; Furthermore, ~t transpires from the evjden.ee
_9f the pt'!titioner herself, that when she took admission in .B
Panchayat U.P .- SchooL sl;le,was 10 years pld. she too~
admission in the said.school on 10.1.96. ,If 10,year:sis
·deducted from that date it would come _to 9..7 .1986. So,
. ,the evidence~oi .the petitioner almost .allies ~h the case
" '.of opp. 'pafty JJo.1 Jhat the. date of birth of the petitioner C'J
~a~ ,20~6-1986."' . · :, •. . r- • ~;;
'L ~."inereafterthe learned judge elaborately dl~cussed fhe
evitle_nee_ df the ~ppella'ilt' h"ereiri and c:Oncluded that:- • ltWduld
not improve the case bltlie petitioner as dis6ussed- eariiei"~)::O -
• '":1~,_.7_ :'.' '-' ---·_11-"~- ~ · 1 ,.,·· t;":f: -:.~·: __ r-,1-·o-··
i-

t: 1 o. ,The Division Ben.ell noted the'•objectibn to the
admissibilitr··in evidenc'e of the exhibits Si.•5A and 7 in the i
following words:- ·- · · · \j 1 ... , ' "
., : · ~The ground bf attack of the impugned ordetis that E .i
· 1he-leamed Single Judge having held that the ddcuments ,,
• telied upon by respondent No:1, namely Exts:5,5/Aand7 1 ~'
which arethe onlydocutnentstrom.the side ofrespontlent' . -
i'ono;:\1-to·establish the:date.t)f;birth of;the appellant are tiof •
,,adrnissibl~ In evid~nee under seciio.n .35 of the E~ide~ce -~ F .:i
. Act, ~the learned Single Judge erred;m further .probrng..mto -".
,.the matteranct·disrnissingJhe;writpetition: Ihe aforesaid _·
documents on the bas.is of which: the;;respondent no.t J .
• soyght to establish that tbe appellant was not qualified to , .
.file nomina~on having been found inadmissible/the only,,iG
. alt~mative wa~ to allow the writ petition,}"•'= :. . - .);:, <)
~~ ! . . .,'.~r,..,.: ··~(:-~..,,,,,.-:-~;'~s '- '., -·.--·-. · __ , ·· 1 x.) ~1.i·~·-:

'l.i.
11 ._ The'D.iVi~ioiillenc~. did not. record any clear finding -•
-~ - . <, • , , t . , - ' - , ,_, -~• - ! , .' ' '. ' " I < - . -· •

either on the admissibil1tY or tt:te J>rqbative, value Ofthe content
of the ~boye~ilientione~. exhibits but s~ddenty ~w~tChed oy,er to'
the'ex~minafiori. oflhe evidence of the appellant. . .. - H •
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 1 S.C.R.

A 12. Exts. A to H are documents produced by the appellant
herein in support of her claim that her actual date of birth is
7. 7.1985 but not 20.6.1986, as contended by the first
respondent. Exts. A and H are voters lists of the year 2007 and
2008 respectively. The Division Bench observed that both the
B documents were prepared later in point of time to the filing of
the nomination papers in the election in question and also they
do not reflect the date of birth of the appellant herein. Similarly,
Ext. D is a horoscope alleged to be that of the appellant herein.
The Division Bench opined that the said document was rightly
c not relied upon. Ext. E is a certificate of date of birth issued
under the provisions of the Registration of Births and Deaths
Act showing the date of birth of the appellant as 7. 7.1985 but
such an entry came to be made pursuant to an application
made by the appellant herein subsequent to the nominations
D in the election in question. The High Court refused to place any
reliance on the said document on the ground that it was issued
by an executive magistrate, who according to the High Court
did not have the jurisdiction to issue the same.

13. We do not propose to examine the correctness of the
E reasoning adopted by the High Court for refusing to place any
reliance on the above-mentioned documents produced by the
appellant herein in her bid to prove her actual date of birth as
7.7.1985. For the purpose of the present appeal, we will
proceed on the basis that the High Court rightly refused to
F believe those documents and, therefore, the appellant herein
failed to prove her date of birth to be 7.7.1985. But that does
not automatically lead to the conclusion that the assertion of the
respondent No.1 that the actual date of birth of the appellant
G herein is 20.6.1986 is proved. Even according to the High
Court, the content of the Exs. 5, 5/A and 7 has no probative
value. Ex. 5 was proved by PW.2, an assistant teacher of the
Basudev High School. Ex. 6 and 7 were proved by PW.2, the
headmaster of Basudev High School. It appears from the
H record that PW.2 stated that Exhibit 5/A entry showing the date
JOSHNA GOUDA v. BRUNDABAN GOUDA & ANR. 473
[J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]
I

of birth of the appellant herein as 20.6.1986 was made on the A
basis of Ex. 7 which is a transfer certificate issued by the
headmaster of Panchayat Upper Primary School where the
appellant herein studied before joining Basudev High School.
Ext.6 is an application dated 11.7.1998 for admission of the
appellant in Basudev High School made by one Maheswar B
Gouda, who is said to be a cousin of the appellant's father. The
said Maheswar Gouda was admittedly not examined. By the
judgment under appeal, the Division Bench rightly held -

" ........ it was the duty of the opposite party (the first c
respondent herein) to prove the contents of those
documents, particularly the date of birth of the petitioner
(the appellant herein) entered in Ext.5 and the transfer
certificate Ext. 7"

[Parenthesis supplied] D
Having held so, the Division Bench reached the conclusion -

"the evidence of the petitioner (the appellant herein) almost
allies With the case of the opposite party No.1 (the first E
respondent) that the date of birth of the petitioner was
20.6.1986."

14. We have already examined the evidence of the
appellant herein. There is nothing in the said evidence to
indicate that the date of birth of the appellant was 20th June, F
1986. At the worst, th.e said evidence failed to establish that
the appellant's date of birth was 7.7.1985.
15. The election of the appellant was challenged on the
ground that the appellant was not eliQ,ible to contest the election G
on the ground that~he appellant was not 21 years of age on
the relevant date because according to the election petition, the
appellant was born on 20.6.1986. The burden to proof the fact
thfilithe appellant.was born on 20.6.1986 rests squarely on the
H
474 SCJPREMEi COURT REPORTS' .· [2012} f$,C.R.

A first resp0J1dent. Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Ad. makes
it abundantly:clear. ' r

u . r; i
, "S.11)1. Burden of proof - Whoever cle$ires .any.Court
- to give judgmeot Cl$. to any legal right or..liiibility dependent
B on ttie existence of facts. whicli,l;le asserts, must prove that
~bose facts exis!S: · · · · ·· · ··
~_.' ,_. . ' . 'S ~ I 'L

') Wilen a pers~ is bounct to prove the existence· of
ariy liict, it is said thafthe burden of proof lies cin that
""'Cson." "
.c "'"' ,.
J·.. 16. ·11was held in Robins Vs: National Trust & Co. Ltd.,
1927 A.C. 51 S- I ' • '•' • . ;
- . ·n •. ·
"To assert that a man who is alive wa~· botn requires no
n proof. The onus is not on the person making an assertion,
· betause it is self-evident that he had been born. But to
.cassert tl)at he had been born po a certi¥n date, if ihe daje
is material, requires proof; the onus is on the person
• -tnaking the aSSfilrtion;•, ·.· . _
·1 • ,. I ~"'_ ~• , _ , '. •' I - ' •

E Since the first respondent-fa.ii.eel, to discha~ge the l»Jrden. cast
upon him, the election petition must fail. , .' . ,

17. t:lowever, the learned .co,uosel for the firsti:espondent,
§!irLPebasis Mjsra,,very vehemently sl.fbrnittecl that fa~
F a_drnitted need n~ be proved a11d,~he appeuant h~d adrniUed.
th~J~ that the.apBElllank on-her, <>wn aQn;lission, ~ 1Oyears
old when she took admission in the Pancnayat l;Jpper Primary
School on 10.1.1996. Learned counsel relied upon para 7 of
the judgment under appeal (which is already extracted in para
G 6 of this judgment bUt .for the sake· df convenience, -we
repr.oduce the .same}: ' ~,, ,
•' ·. ·- .· . . . •. ~

- ~---· ......i! tr~spires from th~ eviqi;w~ of the. petitioner
___ s: ,he.r~~f. that wtiea,s,he tqok admission in Banch~yat U.P ·•
School she was 10 years old. She took admission in the
H
JOSHNA GOUDA v.· BRUNDABAN GOUDA. & ANR. 475
'.. [J. CH.ELAMESWAR, J.] . . , ·.

, said school on 10.1.96. If 10 years is deducted from that A
·. ciafoitviciu1d.-comefo'9.1.19a5:, . . ·.:.:· ·:··.· ..
• ... '. ' • - _- • ' .... : f. • \

· 18. Learned counsel for the appellant; on the other hand,
. submitted that such a cqnclusion 'came to' tie recorded on'
incorrect reading of the evidence of the appellant. Acopy of 8
the, deposition made by the appellant is placed before· us. In
the cross examination,
. . . . . . -. . ,. '·'··· .-
the
'"
appellant
--
stated as follow$: . ;. : ' ,
···--~·"41•···~---·-~-·•'''-"'

"When I ~as five'years' ~fold'. I.joined in the schooi
'
' , " Y
for the 1st time when I took admission in Dhougan 0.P:·
/ school, I was ten yeas of old. I left that school in the year .c .
· 1998. My father Apurba Gouda is an educated m'an. l can
•; \ not recollect who had taken me to Dhougan SchoolJor
admission. · •
'
. I ,
1 ·
One outsider brought my T.C. from the Dhougan U.P. D
\ School and get me admitted in Dhougan High School. I
! cannot say his name. I was thirteen years of old, when I
took admission in Dhougan High School in Class VIII." ·

It can be seen from the above-extracted portion of the evidence E
of the appellant that the appellant stated that she was 13 year
old when she took ,admission in the_ High School-(obviously
Basudev High School) and the admission, as we have already
noticed from the evidence of PW .2, was on 11. 7 .1998.
Deducting 13 years from that date would place the year of birth
of the appellant in 1985. It is not clear as to the material on the F
basis of which the Division Bench recorded that the admission .
of the_ appellant in the Panchayat Upper Primary School was
on 10.1.1996. We assume for the sake of argument that there
is some basis ori record for the finding that the appellant took
admission in theUpper Primary School on 10.1.1996: On her G
own admission she was 10 years old on that date. Then there
is an inconsistency in her evidence regarding her age with
reference to her admission into the Upper Primary School and
Basudev ttigh. School. In such a case, her statement that she
was 10 year old on 10.1.1996, in our opinion, cannot be treated H

,

l
476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012) 1 S.C.R.

A as an admission that her date of birth is 20th June, 1986. An
admission must be clear and unambiguous in order that such
an admission should relieve the opponent of the burden of
proof of the fact said to have been admitted.
19. For all the above mentioned reasons, we are of the
8
opinion that the judgment under appeal cannot be sustained
and the same is set aside. In view of our conclusion, the second
<v:Jestion regarding the declaration in favour of the first
respondent does not survive.

C 20. Appeal is allowed.
D.G. Appeal allowed.