K.C. SAREENversusC.B.I., CHANDIGARH

A                                    K.C. SAREEN
                                           v.
                                 C.B.I., CHANDIGARH

                                   AUGUST 2, 2001

B                     [K.T. THOMAS AND S.N. VARIAVA, JJ.)


           Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Sections 389 and 401.

           Sentence-Power of Court to suspend-Power of court to suspend
C conviction-Held not alien to Section 389(1)-But should be exercised in
    exceptional cases-Mere filing ofappeal is no ground to suspend conviction-
    public servant-Conviction on corruption charges-Appellate court should
    not suspend conviction even if sentence is suspended

           Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988: Section 13(2)
D
          Corruption-Conviction ofpublic servant-Appeal-Appellate court should
    not suspend conviction even if sentence is suspended-Corruption amongst
    public servants-Deprecation of-Need for control of corruption emphasised.

E          The appellant, an officer of the Punjab National Bank, was convicted
    under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Sections
    120, 201and420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Consequently, the authorities
    of the Bank dismissed him from service. During the pendency of appeal the
    High Court suspended sentence of the appellant The appellant unsuccessfully
    moved the High Court for suspension of his conviction also on the grounds
F   that (i) his appeal in the High Court was not likely to be heard for ten years
    which would defeat the ends of justice; and (ii) his conviction was based on
    very slender reasoning and consequently there was a fair chance of his
    acquittal. The High Court held that it was not a fit case to invoke the powers
    under Section 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to stay the
G   operation of the impugned order of conviction. Hence this appeal.

          Dismissing the appeal, the Court

          HELD: 1. When conviction is on a corruption charge against a public
    servant the appellate court or the revisional court should not suspend the order .
    of conviction during the pendency of the appeal even if the sentence of
H                                        224
                             K.C. SAREEN v. C.B.I.                           225
imprisonment is suspended. It would be a sublime public policy that the              A
convicted public servant is kept under disability of the conviction in spite of
keeping the sentence of imprisonment in abeyance till the disposal of the appeal
or revision. [231-F-Gl

      2. Section 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 deals with
the powers of the appellate court regarding suspension of execution of the           B
sentence or order appealed against during the pendency of the appeal. The
same powers are invokable by the revisional court also during the pendency
of the revision, under Section 401 of the Code. That is obviously not a reason
for holding that the trial of the case could reach its culmination only when
the revisional proceedings end. [229-C-DI                                            C

      3. Though the power to suspend an order of conviction apart from the
order of sentence, is not al:en to Section 389(1) of the Code, its exercise should
be limited to very exceptional cases. Merely because the convicted person files
an appeal in challenge of the conviction court should not suspend the operation
of the order of conviction. The court has a duty to look at all aspects including    D
the ramifications of keeping such conviction in abeyance. [230-D-El

       4. No doubt when the appellate court admits the appeal filed in challenge
of the convictioh and sentence for the offence under the Prevention of
Corruption Act, the superior court should normally suspend the sentence of           E
imprisonment until disposal of the appeal, because refusal thereof would
render the very appeal otiose unless such appeal could be heard soon after
the filing of the appeal. But suspension of conviction of the offence under
Prevention of Corruption Act, de hors the sentence of imprisonment as a sequel
thereto, is a different matter. [230-F-G I
                                                                                     F
      5. When a public servant is found guilty of corruption after a judicial
adjudicatory process conducted by a court of law, judiciousness demands that
he should be treated as corrupt until he is exonerated by a superior court.
The mere fact that an appellate or revisional forum has decided to entertain
his challenge and to go into the issues and findings made against such public G
servants once again should not even temporarily absolve him from such
findings. If such a public servant becomes entitled to hold public office and
to continue to do official acts until he is judicially absolved from such findings •
by reason of suspension of the order of conviction it is public interest which
suffers and sometimes even irreparably. When a public servant who is
convicted of corruption is allowed to continue to hold public office it would H
    226                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A impair the morale of the other persons manning such office, and consequently
  that would a rode the already shrunk confidence of the people in such public
  institutions besides demoralising the other honest public servants who would
  either be the colleagues or subordinates of the convicted person. If honest
  public servants are compelled to take orders from proclaimed corrupt officers.
B on account of the suspension of the conviction the fall out would be one of
  shaking the system itself. Hence it is necessary that the court should not aid
  the public sen•ant who stands convicted for corruption charge to hold a public
  office until he is exonerated after conducting a judicial adjudication at the
  appellate or revisional level. f23l·A-El

C         Smt. Akhtar! Bi v. State of M.P., (2001) 4 SCC 355, explained and
    distincutshed.

          Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang and Ors., (1995) 2 SCC 513, referred
    to.

D        Deputy Director qfCollegiate Education v. S. Nagoor Meera, (1995) 3 SCC
    377 and State tJ/Tami/ Nadu v. A. Jaganathan, (1996) 5 SCC 329, relied on.

           6. Corruption by public servants has now reached a monstrous
    dimension in India. Its tentacles have started grappling even the institutions
E   created for the protection of the republic. Unless those tentacles are intercepted
    and Impeded from gripping the normal and orderly functioning of the public
    offices, through strong legislative, executive as well as judicial exercises the
    corrupt public servants could even paralyse the functioning of such institutions
    and thereby hinder the democratic policy Proliferation of corrupt public
    servants could garner momentum to cripple the social order if such men are
F   allowed to continue to manage and operate public institutions.
                                                                   (230-G-H; 231-A)

         CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
    770 of 2001.

G        From the Judgment and Order dated 7.2.2001 of the Punjab and Haryana
    High Court in Crl.M. No. 4262 of 2001

          Vikram Chaudhari and Mahabir Singh for the Appellant.

H         Altaf Ahmad, Additional Solicitor General, P. Parmeswaran and A.
                      K.C. SAREEN v. C.B.I. [THOMAS, J.]                   227
 Mariarputham for the Respondent.                                                  A
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

      THOMAS, J. Leave granted.

      The appeal of a public servant convicted and sentenced for corruption        B
cha:ges is pending in the High Court. The sentence has been suspended by
the High Court during the pendency of the appeal. The public servant wants
his conviction also to be suspended in order to avert the other fall out of the
conviction. But the High Court declined to oblige him though he moved the
High Court twice for the said purpose. This appeal by special leave is in
challenge of the order dated 7 .2.200 I passed by the single Judge, by which       C
the second petition to suspend the conviction was dismissed.

       Appellant was an officer of the Punjab National Bank. When he was
 posted at the Mewa Mandi (Amritsar) branch of the bank he was put in
charge of the current account. During the said period he got himself involved      D
 in a prosecution along with some of his co-employees of the same bank for
defrauding the bank to the tune of about Rs. 2 lakhs. The Central Bureau of
Investigation inquired into the matter. After completing the investigation a
charge-sheet was laid against the appellant and his other co-employees, for
offences under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for
short 'PC Act') and Sections 120, 201 and 420 of !PC. A Special Judge at           E
Patiala conducted the trial for such offences and at the end found the appellant
and some of the co-accused guilty for different counts of offences. For the
purpose of this appeal we need mention about the sentence of only one count.
He was sentenced to R. I. for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 500 for the
offence under Section 13(2) of the PC Act. It is against the said conviction
and sentence that he preferred the appeal before the High Court of Punjab          F
and Haryana. The High Court admitted the appeal and as mentioned earlier
suspended the sentence passed on him.

      After the judgment was pronounced by the trial court disciplinary
proceedings were initiated against the appellant and on the strength of the        G
conviction mentioned above the authorities of the bank dismissed him from
service. Appellant then moved the High Court to have the conviction also
suspended. That motion was dismissed by a single Judge of the High Court
on 1.8.2000, stating thus:

       After giving due consideration to the rival submissions of the learned H
    228                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001) SUPP. I S.C.R.

A           counsel for the parties, I am of the view that the relief prayed for
            cannot be allowed in this case. No doubt, the court has powers to stay
            the operation of conviction under Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. in view of
            the facts and the circumstances of the case. But in the instant case,
            it has come on record that the applicant-appellants are already out of
            service. In case, they are ultimately acquitted, the damage, if any,
B           caused to them with regard to their service or other retiral benefits
            can well be revived and made good to them. Keeping in view all the
            facts and the circumstances of the case, I do not consider it a fit case
            so as to invoke the powers under Section 389(1) Cr~P.C. to stay the
            operation of the impugned order of conviction during the pendency
c           of this appeal. Consequently, this Crl. Misc. is dismissed."
                              '
           Undeterred by the said order the appellant once again moved the High
    Court for the same purpose, at a later stage, by supplying certain additional
    facts to the High Court for fresh consideration of his plea for suspending the
    conviction. One of the causes spearheaded by him before the High Court was
                                                                                         -
D   the order of dismissal passed by the bank authorities against him on the
    premise of the conviction. Another ground highlighted by him was that his
    appeal in the High Court was not likely to be boarded for hearing without the
    lapse of I 0 years and that itself would defeat the ends of justice. Alternatively
    he made a bid to show that the conviction was based on very slender reasoning
E   and hence he has "a fair chance of getting acquitted in appeal".

          Learned single Judge of the High Court who dealt with the aforesaid .
    second petition dismissed the same by observing that "after perusing the
    record no ground is seen made out for suspending the order of conviction
    passed against the appellant".
F
          Shri Vikram Chaudhary, learned counsel for the appellant repeated
    before us those grounds and further submitted that as a trial can logically
    reach its final end only when the appellate court decides the matter the
    conviction passed by the trial court cannot be treated as having become
    absolute. He made an endeavour to draw support for the said proposition
G   from the following observations made by this Court in Smt. Akhtari Bi v.
    State of MP., [2001] 4 SCC 355:

           "Appeal being a statutory right, the trial court's verdict does not
           attain finality during pendency of the appeal and for that purpose hi~
           trial is deemed to. be continuing despite. conviction."
H
                      K.C. SAREEN v. C.B.I. [THOMAS, J.]                    229
      By the said observation this Court did not mean that the conviction and      A
sentence passed by the trial court would remain in limbo automatically when
they are challenged in appeal. The said observation was made in a different
context altogether when notice of the executive government was drawn to the
need to appoint requisite number of judges to cope up with the increased
pressure on the existing judicial apparatus, a_nd for highlighting the
consequences of non-filling existing vacancies of judges in the High Courts.       B
We are unable to appreCiate how the said observation can be culled out of
the said context for the purpose of using it in a different context altogether
such as this where the convicted .accused is seeking to have an order of
conviction suspended during the pendency of the appeal.

       Section 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the Code)
                                                                                   c
deals with the.powers of the appellate cot.rt regarding suspension of execution
of the 'sentence or order appealed against' during the pendency of the appeal.
It must be remembered that the same powers are invokable by the revisional
court also during the pendency of the revision, (vide Section 401 of the
Code). That is obviously not a reason for holding that the trial of the case       D
could reach its culmination only when the revisional proceedings end.

      A three Judge Bench of this Court have elaborately considered the
scope and ambit of the powers of the appellate court envisaged in Section
389 of the Code. Vide Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang and Ors., [1995] 2
sec 513. Ahmadi, CJ, who authored the judgment for the Bench said that             E
what can be suspended under Section 3 89(1) of the Code is the execution of
the sentence or execution of the order and obviously the 'order' referred to
in the sub-section must be an order which is capable of execution. Learned
Chief Justice then observed thus:

        "An order of conviction by itself is not capable of execution under
                                                                                   F
        the Code. It is the order of sentence or an order awarding compensation
        or imposing fine or release on probation which are capable of execution
        and which, if not suspended, would be required to be executed by the
        authorities. Since the order of conviction does not on the mere filing
        of an appeal disappear it is difficult to accept the submission that       G
        Section 267 of the Companies Act must be read to apply only to a
        'final' order of conviction. Such an interpretation may defeat the very
        object and purpose. for which it came to be enacted."

Nevertheless, the three Judge bench further stated that in certain situation the
order of conviction can be executable and in such a case the power under           H
     230                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A    Section 389(1) of the Code could be invoked. The ratio of the judgment can
     be traced out in the said paragraph which is extracted below:

             "In certain situations the order of conviction can be executable, in the
             sense it may incur a disqualification as in the instant case. In such a
             case the power under Section 389(1) of the Code could be invoked.
B            In such situations the attention of the appellate court must be
             specifically invited to the consequences which are likely to fall to
             enable it to apply its mind to the issue since under Section 389(1) it
             is under an obligation to support its order 'for reasons to be recorded
             by it in writing'. If the attention of the Court is not invited to this
c            specific consequence which is likely to fall upon conviction how can
             it be expected to assign reasons relevant thereto? No one can be
             allowed to play hide and seek with the Court; he cannot suppress the
             precise purpose for which he seeks suspension of the conviction and
             obtain a general order of stay and then contend that the disqualification
             has ceased to operate."
D
           The legal position, therefore, is this: Though the power to suspend an _
    order of conviction, apart from the order of sentence, is not alien to Section
    389( I) of the Code, its exercise should be limited to very exceptional cases.
    Merely because the convicted person files an appeal in challenge of the
    conviction the court should not suspend the operation of the order of
E   conviction. The court has a duty to look at all aspects including the
    ramifications of keeping such conviction in abeyance. It is in the light of the
    above legal position that we have to examine the question as to what should
    be the position when a public servant is convicted of an offence under the PC
    Act. No doubt when the appellate court admits the appeal filed in challenge
p   of the conviction and sentence for the offence under the PC Act, the superior
    court should normally suspend the sentence of imprisonment until disposal of
    the appeal, because refusal thereof would render the very appeal otiose unless
    such appeal could be heard soon after the filing of the appeal. But suspension
    of conviction of the offence under the PC Act, de hors the sentence of
    imprisonment as a sequel thereto, is a different matter.
G
           Corruption by public servants has now reached a monstrous dimension
    in ll)dia. Its tentacles have st(lrted grappling even the institutions created for
    the protection of the republic. Unless those tentacles are intercepted and
    impeded from gripping the normal and orderly functioning of the public
H   offices, through strong legislative, executive as well as judicial exercises the
                          K.C. SAREEN v. C.B.l. [THOMAS, J.]                      231
    corrupt public servants could even paralyse the functioning of such institutions      A

-   and thereby hinder the democratic policy. Proliferation of corrupt public
    servants could garner momentum to cripple the social order if such men are
    allowed to continue to manage and operate public institutions. When a public
    servant was found guilty of corruption after a judicial adjudicatory process
    cond11cted by a court of law, judiciousness demands that he should be treated         B
    as corrupt until he is exonerated by a superior court. The mere fact that an
    appellate or revisional forum has decided to entertain his challenge and to go
    into the issues and findings made against such public servants once again
    should not even temporarily absolve him from such findings. If such a public
    servant becomes entitled to hold public office and to continue to do official
    acts until he is judicially absolved from such findings by reason of suspension       C
    of the order of conviction it is public interest which suffers and sometimes
    even irreparably. When a public servant who is convicted of corruption is
    allowed to continue to hold public office it would impair the morale of the
    other persons manning such office, and consequently that would erode the
    already shrunk confidence of the people in such public institutions besides
    demoralising the other honest public servants who would either be the                 D
    colleagues or subordinates of the convicted person. If honest public servants
    are compelled to take orders from proclaimed corrupt officers on account of
    the suspension of the conviction the fall out would be one of shaking the
    system itself. Hence it is necessary that the court should not aid the public
    servant who stands convicted for corruption charges to hold only public               E
    office until he is exonerated after conducting a judicial adjudication at the
    appellate or revisional level. It is a different matter if a corrupt public officer
    could continue to hold such public office even without the help of a court
    order suspending the conviction.

          The above policy can be acknowledged as necessary for the efficacy              F
    and proper functioning of public offices. If so, the legal position can be laid
    down that when conviction is on a corruption charge against a public servant
    the appellate court or the revisional court should not suspend the order of
    conviction during the pendency of the appeal even if the sentence of
    imprisonment is suspended. It would be a sublime public policy that the               G
    convicted public servant is kept under disability of the conviction in spite of
    keeping the sentence of imprisonment in abeyance till the disposal of the
    appeal or revision. -

         We are fortified.in holding so by two other decisions of this Court. One
    is Deputy Director of Collegiate Education v. S Nagoor Meera, [ ! 995] 3              H
    232                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A sec 377. The following observations of this Court are apposite now:
            "The more appropriate course in all such cases is to take action under
            clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) once a government
            servant is convicted of a criminal charge and not to wait for the
                                                                                     -
            appeal 9r revision, as the case may be. If, however, the government
B           servant-accused is acquitted on appeal or other proceeding, tlie order
            can always be revised and if the government servant is reinstated, he
            will be entitled to all the benefits to which he would have been
            entitled to, had he continued in service. The other course suggested,
            viz., to wait till the appeal, revision and other remedies are over,

c           would not be advisable since it would mean continuing in service a
            person who has been convicted of a serious offence by a criminal
            court."

           The other decision is State of Tamil Nadu v. A Jaganathan, [ 1996] 5
    SCC 329 which deals with the case of some public servants who were
D   convicted, inter alia, of corruption charges. When the appeal, filed by such
    public servants, was dismissed the High Court entertained a revision and
    ordered suspension of the sentence as well as the order of conviction, in
    exercise of the powers under Section 389(1) of the Code, taking que from the
    ratio laid down in Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang (supra). But when the
    State moved this Court against the order of suspension of conviction a two
E   Judge Bench of this Court interfered with it and set aside the order by
    remarking that in such cases the discretionary power to order suspension of
    conviction either under Section 389( 1) or even under Section 482 of the
    Code should not have been exercised.

F         We therefore dismiss this appeal. However, we wish to state that it is
    open to the appellant to move the High Court for early hearing. If the High
    Court is satisfied that the appellant has a reasonably good prospect of being
    exonerated or that there is any other special reason we hope that the High
    Court would board the appeal for hearing on an early date.

G T.N.A.                                                      Appeal dismissed.