Holding

A civil judgment does not supersede or bind a criminal court; it is not conclusive proof in criminal proceedings, and the appeal is dismissed.

Summary

The appellant, K.G. Premshanker, sought to quash criminal prosecution on the ground that a civil suit for damages against him had been dismissed, and he argued that the civil judgment should prevail over the criminal case. The High Court rejected this plea and the matter reached the Supreme Court. The Court examined the relevance of prior judgments under Sections 40‑43 of the Evidence Act, 1872, and the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code relating to res judicata and autrefois acquit. It held that a civil judgment is not conclusive proof in a criminal proceeding except for limited purposes such as damages or sentencing, and that the view expressed in V.M. Shah’s case that civil findings supersede criminal findings is erroneous. Relying on the binding precedent of M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras, the Court affirmed that no hard rule mandates that civil decisions bind criminal courts. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the criminal proceedings were allowed to continue.

Issues considered

The civil judgment dismissing a suit for damages can be used to quash a concurrent criminal prosecution.
Whether judgments in civil proceedings are binding or conclusive in criminal trials under Sections 40‑43 of the Evidence Act.
The applicability of res judicata and autrefois acquit principles under the Criminal Procedure Code to parallel civil and criminal suits.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 197, s. 300, s. 468, s. 473, s. 482, s. 561
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 11, s. 40, s. 41, s. 42, s. 43
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 143, s. 166, s. 228, s. 323, s. 324, s. 341, s. 342, s. 357
Protection of Civil Rights Acts. 7

Subjects

Evidence ActRes JudicataCivil and Criminal ProceedingsPrior JudgmentsSection 40Section 41Section 42Section 43Criminal Procedure CodeSupersession of judgmentsConcurrent suits

Judgment

A K.G. PREMSHANKER
v.
INSPECTOR OF POLICE AND ANR.

SEPTEMBER 12, 2002

B [M.B. SHAH, BISHESHWAR PRASAD SINGH AND H.K. SEMA, JJ.]

Evidence Act, 1872-Sections 41, 42 and 43-Relevancy of previous
judgments-Suit decided against plaintiff who is complainant in criminal
C proceedings-Plea that criminal proceedings be dropped since decision
rendered in civil court will prevail-Dismissed by High Court-On appeal
held finding recorded by criminal court stands superseded by finding recorded
by civil court is not correct enunciation of law-Possibility of conflicting
decision in civil and criminal courts not a relevant consideration.

D One M filed suit for damages against appellant. Trial Court
dismissed the suit. M aJso filed criminal complaint against appellant.
Appellant filed application before High Court for quashing the prosecution
against him. Appellant contended that as the suit filed for damages against
him was dismissed, the decision of civil court would prevail and criminal
prosecution against him ought to have been dropped. High Court dismissed
E the application. Hence the present appeal.

On behalf of the respondents it was contended that the observation
in * V.M. Shah's case that "the finding recorded by the criminal court,
stands superseded by the finding recorded by the civil court and thereby
F the finding of the civil court gets precedence over the finding recor~ed by
the criminal court" is against the law laid down by this Court in various
decisions. It was further contended that under Evidence Act to what extent
judgments given in the previous proceedings are relevant is provided and,
therefore, it would be against the law if it is held that as soon as the
judgment and decree is passed in a civil suit the criminal proceedings are
G required to be dropped if the suit is decided against the plaintiff who is
the complainant in the criminal proceedings.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. The previous judgment which is final can be relied upon as
H provided under Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act; in civil suits between
350
,.
K.G. PREM SHANKER v. INSPECTOR OF POLICE 351
the same parties, principle of res-judicata _may apply; in a criminal case, Section A
a
300 Cr.P.C. makes provision that once person is convicted or acquitted, he
may not be tried again for the same offence if the conditions mentioned therein
are satisfied; if the criminal case and the civil proceedings are for the same
cause, judgment of the civil court would be relevant if conditions of any of
the Sections 40 to 43 are satisfied, but it cannot be said that the same would B
be conclusive except as provided in Se"ction 41. Section 41 provides which
judgment would be conclusive proof of what is stated therein. Further,
the judgment, order or decree passed in a previous civil proceeding, if
relevant, as provided under Sections 40 and 42 or other provisions of
Evidence Act then in each case, Court has to decide to what extent it is
binding or conclusive with regard to the matter decided therein. It may C
be relevant for a limited purpose, such as, motive or as a fact in issue.
This would depend upon facts of each case. 1361-E-G; 362-B]

2. In the instant case, the ratio in **M.S. Sherifrs case is binding,
wherein it has been specifically held that no hard and fast rule can be laid
down and that possibility of conflicting decision in civil and criminal D
Courts is not a relevant consideration. The law envisages "such an
eventuality when it expressly refrains from making the decision of one
Court binding on the other, or even relevant, except for limited purpose
such as sentence or damages". The observations made in * V.M. Shah's case
that the finding recorded by the criminal court stands superseded by the E
finding recorded by the civil court is not correct enunciation of law. Thus,
the civil proceedings as well as the criminal proceedings are required to
be decided on the evidence, which may be brought on record by the parties,
after remand by High Court. 1362-C-EI

**MS Sheriff and Anr. v. State of Madras and Ors., AIR (1954) SC F
397, followed.

* V.M. Shah v. State of Maharashlra and Anr., 11995] 5 SCC 767,
overruled.

Mis. Karam Chand Ganga Prasad and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., G
11970] 3 sec 694, distinguished.

Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, AIR (32) 1945 Privy Council 18;
B.N. Kashyap v. Emperor, AIR (1945) Lahore 23 and Kharkan and Ors. v.
The State of UP., 11964] 4 SCR 673, referred to. H
352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 2 S.CR

A CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
935 of 2002.

From the Judgment and Order dated 11.6.1998 of the High Court of
Kerala in Crl. M.C. No. 2209 of 1995.

B S.K. Dholakia, M.P. Vinod. Wills Mathews. Prachi Bajpai and M.K.
Michael, for the Appellant.

Atlaf Ahmed, P. Parmeswaran. T.A. Khan, K.N. Balgopal, A.P.
• Mukundan and C.N. Sreekumar, for the Respondent.

C The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SHAH, J. Leave granted.

The appellant and others who are accused in CC No. 513/95 filed
Criminal Miscellaneous Case Nos. 2209/95, 2361/95 and 784/96 before the
D High Court of Kerala for quashing the prosecution against them. Those
petitions were rejected by the High Court by judgment and order dated 11th
June, 1998. Hence, this appeal.

The prosecution was launched against the present appellant which arose
out of an incident which occurred because of a news item in the evening
E Daily "Sudinam" on 2nd February, 1988. The news item was printed and
published by one Madhavan at Kannur as per which one tribal girl Manja,
aged about 16 years was raped by one Rajan. Manja and her parents lodged
a complaint before the Superintendent of Police, who transferred the complaint
to the appellant herein, who was a Superintendent of Police Kannur for
investigation. On that complaint, a case was registered in Crime No. 50/88
F under Section 228A IPC and Section 7( I)( d) of the Protection of Civil Rights
Act. The case was entrusted to the Circle Inspector of Police who arrested
Madhavan and the printing press was also searched on 12th February, 1988.
It is contended that after the arrest at about 8.00 p.m., Madhavan was taken
in police jeep to the police station and on the way he was assaulted by the
G policemen in the jeep. At about 8.30 p.m., he was put in lock up and on 13th
February, 1988, he was produced before the Magistrate at Kannur. He
complained that he was assaulted by the police and thereby he sustained
injuries. After recording the aforesaid statement, the Magistrate enlarged him
on bail. For taking treatment for the injuries sustained hy him, he went to
hospital and got himself admitted there. From there, he lodged an FIR which
H was registered as Crime No.52 of 1988 under Sections 143, 323, 324 etc. of
K.G. PREMSHANKER. r. INSPECTOR OF !'OI iCI !::.HAH. J.] 353

IPC against the Sub-Inspector of Pofice, Ka1mur arJd also six or seven A
unidentified policemen. The ca;~ rcghtered againsr Madhavan was quashed
by the Hi!:;h Court. As there was no prog1 c:ss in th<' 'Tl R registered by
Madhavan, he moved the High Court for entrusting investigation to the CBI.
The High Court directed the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Northern
Range to investigate the case. Not being satisfied by the said order, Madhavan B
preferred a Special Leave Petition before this Court and by order dated 22nd
December, 1989, this court directed the Deputy Inspector General of Police,
Central Range, to investigate and file the report with in two months. As there
was no progress in the matter within the prescribed time, Madhavan again
moved this Court and by order dated 24th September, 1992, this Court
entrusted the investigation to CBI and also awarded compensation of Rs. C
I 0,000 to Madhavan. After investigation, CBI moved the State Government
for sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. and thereafter filed report before the
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ernakulam against 12 accused including the present
appellant on 27th April, 1995, for the offences punishable under Sections
324, 341, 342, 357, 219 and 166 !PC. The Chief Judicial Magistrate took
cognizance of the said report. D

Appellant and others filed separate applications for dropping· the
proceedings on the ground that a final report was filed by the CBI beyond
the period of limitation prescribed under Section 468 Cr.P.C. and that no
application for condoning delay was filed. Those applications were dismissed E
by the Chief Judicial Magistrate on 27.9.1995 and the delay in filing final
report by the CB I was condoned. The said order was challenged before the
Additional Sessions Judge, Ernakulam who directed the Magistrate to dispose
of the said applications afresh. That order was challenged by filing the
impugned miscellaneous applications before the High Court.
F
The High court after considering the various decisions cited, held that
learned Sessions Judge has only remitted the matter to the Chief Judicial
Magistrate to consider the petition to be filed by the CBI under Section 473
Cr.P.C. for condoning delay. The Court also.held that it was not a fit case for
exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
G
The appellant raised additional contention, before the High Court, that
the de facto complainant-Madhavan haCI filed a suit for the damages for the
alleged acts, before the Sub Court, Tellicherry against the appellant and other
accused and the trial court has dismissed the suit against which he had preferred
the appeal before the High Court. It was, therefore, contended that as the suit
was dismissed, the decision rendered by the Civil Court will prevail and H
354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A therefore the criminal prosecution pending against the appellant and others is
required to be dropped. The court rejected the said contention. Hence, this
appeal.

This Court on 9th November 1998, passed the following order :

B "Since we are of the view that the Judgment of this Court in V.M
Shah v. State of Maharashtra and Anr., [ 1995] 5 SCC 767 which has
been relied upon by Mr. Gopal Subramanium, learned senior counsel
appearing for the petitioner, requires reconsideration, we. refer this
petition to a larger Bench for disposal. Let the record be placed
before Hon. the Chief Justice for necessary orders."
c
Thereafter, on 12th October, 1999, it was pointed out to this Court that
the appeals filed against the dismissal of the suit are pending in the High
Court of Kerala and therefore the court directed that it would be appropriate
to await the judgment in those appeals before proceeding further with the
D case. The court adjourned the hearing of the matter and requested the High
court to dispose of the said appeals expeditiously.

At the time of hearing of these appeals, it is pointed out that the appeals
are allowed and the judgment and decree in OS Nos. 42/89 and 235/90
passed by the Subordinate Judge were set aside and the matters were remitted
E to the trial court to try the suit from the stage of framing of issues.

The net resµ It of the aforesaid decree passed by the High court is that
at present both criminal rrosecution for the offences as stated above and civil
suits for damages are pending at trial stage.

In the background of the aforesaid facts, we would refer to the
F observations made in VM Shah's case (Supra) which are as under:
"As seen that the civil court after full-dressed trial recorded the
finding that the appellant had not come into possession through the
Company but had independent tenancy rights from the principal
landlord and, therefore, the decree for eviction was negatived. Until
G that finding is duly considered by the appellate court after weighing
the evidence afresh and if it so warranted reversed, the findings bind
the parties. The findings, recorded by the criminal court, stand
superseded by the findings recorded by the civil court. Thereby, the
findings of the· civil court get precedence over the findings recorded
H by the trial court, in particular, in summary trial for offences like
K.G. PREMSl-IANKER v. INSPECTOR OF POLICE [Sl-IA!-1, J.] 355
Section 630. The mere pendency of the appeal does not have the A
effect of suspending the operation of the decree of the trial court and
neither the finding of the civil court gets nor the decree becomes
inoperative."

Further, the learned senior counsel- Shri Dholakia appearing for the
appellant submitted that apart from the aforesaid judgment, this Court (three B
Judge Bench) in Mis. Karam Chand Ganga Prasad and Anr. v. Union of
India and Ors., [1970] 3 SCC 694 held thus:

"If the appellants are able to establish their case that the ban on
export of maize from thd;tate of Haryana had been validly lifted all
the proceedings taken against those who exported the Maize C
automatically fall to the ground. Their maintainability depends on the
assumption that the exports were made without the authority of law.
It is a well-established principle of law that the decisions of the civil
courts are binding on the criminal courts. The converse is not true .."

The aforesaid observations are to be read in context of the facts that D
Delhi High Court after elaborately hearing the arguments rejected the writ
petitions on the sole ground that in view of the pendency of the criminal
proceedings before some Courts in the State of West Bengal, it was
inappropriate for the High Court to pronounce on the questions arising for
decision in the writ petitions. The Court observed that the High Court after E
entertaining the writ petitions and hearing arguments on merits of the case
should not have dismissed the petitions merely because certain consequential
proceedings had been taken on the basis that the exports in question were
illegal. If appellants 'Were able to establish their case that the ban on export
of maize from the State of Haryana had been validly lifted all the proceedings F
taken against those who exported the maize automatically fall to the ground.
Their maintainability depends on the assumption that the exports were made
without the authority of law. In context of those facts, the Court observed
that the decisions of the civil courts are binding on criminal courts but the
converse is not true.
G
It is the submission of learned senior counsel Mr. Dholakia that in view
of the well-settled principle, the High court ought to have dropped the
prosecution against the appellant as civil court has dismissed the suit for
damages filed against appellant.

Learned Additional Solicitor General Shri Altaf Ahmed appearing for H
356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A the respondents submitted that the observation made by this Court in V.M.
Shah's case that "the finding recorded by the criminal Court, stands superseded
by the finding recorded by the civil Court and thereby the finding of the civil
Court gets precedence over the finding recorded by the criminal Court" is
against the law laid down by this Court in various decisions. For this, he
B rightly referred to the provisions of Sections 41, 42 and 43 of the Evidence
Act and submitted that under the Evidence Act to what extent judgments
given in the previous proceed.ings are relevant is provided and therefore it
would be against the law if it is held that as soon as the judgment and decree
is passed in a civil suit the criminal proceedings are required to be dropped
if the suit is decided against the plaintiff who is the complainant in the
C criminal proceedings.

In our view, the submission of learned Addi. Solicitor General requires
to be accepted. Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act provide which judgments
of Courts of justice are relevant and to what extent. Section 40 provides for
previous judgment, order or a decree which by law prevents in a court while
D taking cognizance of a suit or holding a trial, to be relevant fact when the
question is whether such court ought to take cognizance of such suit or to
hold such trial. Section 40 is as under:

"40. Previous judgments relevant to bar a second suit or trial. The
existence of any judgment, order or decree which by law prevents
E any Courts from taking cognizance of a suit or holding a trial is a
relevant fact when the question is whether such Court ought to take
cognizance of such suit or to hold such trial."

Section· 41 provides for relevancy of certain judgments in probate,
F matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction and makes it relevant or
conclusive as provided therein.

Section 41 reads thus:

"41. Relevancy ofcer/ain judgments in probate, etc., jurisdiction--
A final judgment, order or decree of a competent Court, in the exercise
G of probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction which
confers upon or takes away from any person any legal character, or
which declares ai1y person to be entitled to any such character, or to
be entitled to any specific thing, not as against any specified person
but absolutely, is relevant when the existence of any such legal
H character, or the title of any such person to any such thing, is relevant.
K.G. PREMSHANKER v. INSPECTOR OF POLICE [SHAH, J.] 357
Such judgment, order or decr;;:e is conclusive proof- A
that any legal character which it confers accrued at the time when
such judgment, order or decree came into operation;

that any legal character, to which it declares any such person to be
entitled, accrued, to that person at the time when such judgment, B
order or decree declares it to have accrued to that person;

- .. that any legal character which it takes away from any such person
ceased at the time from which such judgment, order or decree declared
that it had ceased or should ease;

and that anything to which it declares any person to be so entitled C
was the property of that person at the time from which such judgment,
order or decree declares that it had been or should be his property.

Section 42 with illustration reads thus :

"42. Relevancy and effect ofjudgments, orders or decrees, other than D
those mentioned in section 4/-Judgments, orders or decrees other
than those mentioned in section 41, are relevant if they relate to
matters of a public nature relevant to the enquiry, but such judgments,
orders or decrees are not conclusive proof of that which they state.

Illustration: E
A sues B for trespass on his land. B alleges the existence of a
public right of way over the land, which A denies.

The existence of a decree in favour of the defendant, in a suit by
A against C for a trespass on the same land in which C alleged the F
existence of the same right of way, is relevant; but it is not conclusive
proof that the right of way exists.

Thereafter, Section 43 in terms provides that judgments, orders or
decrees, other ~han those mentioned in Sections 40, 41, 42 are irrelevant
unless the existence of such judgment, order or decree, is a fact in issue, or G
is relevant under some provisions of the Act.

The final judgment, order or decree of a competent Court, in exercise
of probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction would be relevant
if it confers upon or takes away from any person any legal character or it
declares any person to be entitled to any such character or to be entitled to H
358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A any specific thing, not as against any specified person but absolutely. It
further specifically provides that such judgment ,or decree is conclusive proof
of what is provided therein such as legal character etc. As against this under
Section 42, the relevancy of the judgments, orders and the decrees in previous
proceedings is limited if they relate to matters of public nature relevant to the
enquiry and such judgments, orders or decrees are not conclusive proof of
B that which they state. Illustration to Section 42 makes the position clear.

In the facts of the present case, Section 42 would have some bearing
and the judgment and decree passed in civil Court would be relevant if it
relates to matter of public nature relevant to the enquiry but such judgment
..
C and decree is not a conclusive proof of that which it states.

In this regard, we would first refer to the decision rendered by the Privy
Council in Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, AIR (32) 1945 Privy Council
18]. The Privy Council considered whether the High Court had power under
Section 561 Cr.P.C. to quash all proceedings taken in pursuance of FIR for
D the offence punishable under Section 420 and prohibit the investigation on
the ground that similar charges were levelled against the respondent four
years earlier. Some of the charges were actively disproved and the rest held
to be unfounded in an enquiry held as a consequence of application to remove
the respondent from his post of Receiver of the property. After considering
the evidence which was recorded in the enquiry, the High Court quashed the
E proceedings and in that context the Privy Council observed that all this may
be good ground for rejection of acquisition and dismissal of any prosecution
launched upon if such a prosecution ultimately takes place and if the courts
are then satisfied that no crime has been established and thereafter court
observed thus:

F "It is conceded that the findings in a civil proceeding are not binding
in a subsequent prosecution founded upon the same or similar
allegations. Moreover, the police investigation was stopped and it ....
cannot be said with certainty that no more information could be
obtained. But even if it were not it is the duty of a criminal Court
when a prosecution for a crime takes place before it to form its own
G view and not to reach its conclusion by reference lo any previous
decision which is not binding upon it. "
Further, in M.S. Sheriff and Anr. v. Stale of Madras and Ors., AIR
(1954) SC 397 the Constitution Bench of this Court dealt with exactly similar
situation, where two sets of proceedings arising out of the same facts were
H pending, namely, two civil suits for damages for wrongful confinement and
K.G. PREMSHANKER v. INSPECTOR OF POLICE [SHAH, J.) 359
another two criminal prosecutions under Section 344 IPC for wrongful A
confinement. In that context, it was contended that simultaneous prosecution
of these matters will embarrass the accused and the Court considered the
question whether criminal.prosecution should be stayed. In that context, it
was held thus:

"As between the civil and the criminal proceedings we are of the B
opinion that the criminal matters should be given precedence. There

- is some difference of opinion in the High Courts of India on this
point. No hard and fast rule can be laid down but we do not consider
that the possibility of conflicting decisions in the civil and criminal
Courts is a relevant consideration. The law envisages such an C
eventuality when it expressly refrains from making the decision of
one Court binding on the other, or even relevant, except for certain
limited purposes, such as sentence or damages. The only relevant
consideration here is the likelihood of embarrassment."

Shri Altaf Ahmed, learned Additional Solicitor General, further referred D
to the full bench decision of Lahore High Court in B.N. Kashyap v. Emperor,
AIR (1945) Lahore 23 wherein the Full Bench considered the following
question:

"When there are concurrent proceedings covering the same ground
before a criminal Court and a civil Court, the parties being substantially E
the same, would the judgment of the civil Court, if obtained first, be
admissible in evidence before the criminal Court in proof or disproof
of the fact on which. the prosecution _is based?"

In that context while deciding the said question the court observed thus:-

"ln other words, the short point to decide is whether the finding F
on certain facts by a civil Court is relevant before the criminal Court
when it is called upon to give a finding on the same facts or vice
versa? The Evidence Act being exhaustive, the answer to this question
depends upon the correct interpretation of the relevant provisions
contained in that Act regardless of the fact whether the conclusion at G
which one ultimately arrives is in accordance with what was
characterized before us during the arguments at the Bar to a common
sense view of things or not. In construing a statute like the Evidence
Act, where any fact intended to be established has to be in accordance
with the scheme of the Act, found to be relevant under a provision
contained in the Act before it can be allowed to be proved, any H
360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A argument based on plausibility can have no effect. I must therefore
ignore any other consideration and confine myself strictly to the
provisions of the Act."

Thereafter, the Court referred to Sections 42 and 43 of the Evidence
Act. After considering the said questions, the Court observed as under: -
B
"Under S.40 of the Act, previous judgments are admissible in
support of a plea of res judicata in civil cases or of autre fois acquit
....
or autre fois convict in criminal cases. Judgments such as those whose
relevancy we have been called upon to determine do not fall under
c this category. Nor can they fall under S.41 of the Act which only
makes a final judgment of a competent Court, in the exercise of
probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction, conferring
upon, taking away from or declaring any person to be entitled to any
legal character or to be entitled to any specific thing absolutely, relevant
when the existence of any such legal character or the title to any such
D thirig is relevant. They do not also fall within the purview of S.42 of
the Act as they do not relate to matters of a pub Iic nature. Section 43
of the Act positively declares judgments other than those mentioned
in Ss. 40, 41 and 42 to be irrelevant unless their existence is a fact
in issue or is relevant under some other provision of the Act. It is
quite cle<1r that the mere existence of a judgment in the present case
E
is not relevant. Learned counsel for the petitioner saw this difficulty
and wishes to rely on S.11 of the Act. But I cannot see how could
that section have any application when the existence ofthatjudgment
as apart from any finding contained therein or even the finding itself
could neither be inconsistent with any fact in issue or a relevant fact.
F Nor could such judgments either by themselves or in connection with
other facts make the existence or non-existence of any fact in issue
or relevant fact in any subsequent proceedings highly probable or
improbable. This section only refers to certain facts which are either
themselves inconsistent with, or make the existence or non-existence
of, the fact in issue or a relevant fact highly probable or improbable
G and has no reference to opinions of certain persons in regard to those
facts. It does not make such opinions to be relevant and judgments
after all of whatever authority are nothing but opinions as to the
existence or non-existence of certain facts. These opinions cannot be
regarded to be such facts as would fall within the meaning of S.11 of
H the Act unless the existence of these opinions is a fact in issue or a
K.G. PREMSHANKER v. INSPECTOR OF POLICE [SHAH. J.] 361
relevant fact which is of course a different matter." A
Finally, after considering the various decisions, the Court held thus:

"There is no reason in my judgment as to why the decision of the
civil Court particularly in an action in_personam should be allowed
to have that sanctity. There appears to be no sound reason for that B
view. To hold that when a party has been able to satisfy a civil Cou1t
as to the justice of his claim and has in the result succeeded in
obtaining a decree which is final and binding upon the parties, it
would not be open to criminal Courts to go behind the findings of the
civil court is to place the latter without any valid reason in a much
higher position than what it actually occupies in the system of C
administration in this country and to make it master not only of cases
which it is called upon to adjudicate but also of cases which it is not
called upon to determine and over which it has really no control. The
fact is that the issues in the two cases although based on the same
facts (and strictly speaking even parties in the two proceedings) are D
not identical and there appears to be no sufficient reason for delaying
the proceedings in the criminal Court, which, unhampered by the
civil Court, is fully competent to decide the questions that arise before
it for its decision and where in the nature of things there must be a
speedy disposal."
E
In Kharkan and Ors. v. The State of U.P., [1964] 4 SCR 673, the Court
observed thus:

"the earlier judgment can only be relevant if it fulfils the conditions
laid down by the Indian Evidence Act in Sections 40 to 43. The
earlier judgment is no doubt admissible to show the parties and the F
decision but it is not admissible for the purpose of relying upon the
appreciation of evidence"

What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is-( I) the previous
judgment which is final can be relied upon as provided under Sections 40 to
43 of the Evidence Act; (2) in civil suits between the same parties, principle G
of res-judicata may apply; (3) in a criminal case, Section 300 Cr.P.C. makes
provision that once a person is convicted or acquitted, he may not be tried
again for the same offence if the conditions mentioned therein are satisfied;
(4) if the criminal case and the civil proceedings are for the same cause,
judgment of the civil Court would be relevant if conditions of any of the H
Sections 40 to 43 are satisfied. but it cannot be said that the same would be
362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A conclusive except as provided in Section 41. Section 41 provides which
judgment would be conclusive proof of what is stated therein.

Further, the judgment, order or decree passed in a previous civil
proceeding, if relevant, as provided under Sections 40 and 42 or other
provisions of the Evidence Act then in each case, Court has to decide to what
B extent it is binding or conclusive with regard to the matter(s) decided therein.
Take for illustration, in a case of alleged trespass by 'A' on 'B's property,
'B' filed a suit for declaration of its title and to recover possession from 'A'
and suit is decreed. Thereafter, in a criminal prosecution by 'B' against 'A'
for trespass, judgment passed between the parties in civil proceedings would
C be relevant and Court may hold that it conclusively establishes the title as
well as possession of' B' over the property. In such case, 'A' may be convicted
for trespass. The illustration to Section 42 which is quoted above makes the
position clear. Hence, in each and every case, first question which would
require consideration is whether judgment, order or decree is relevant?, if
relevant-its effect. It may be relevant for a limited purpose, such as, motive
D or as a fact in issue. This would depend upon facts of each case.

In the present case, the decision rendered by the Constitution Bench in
M.S. Sheriffs case (supra) would be binding, wherein it has been specifically
held that no hard and fast rule can be laid down and that possibility of
conflicting decision in civil and crimina! Courts is not a relevant consideration.
E The law envisages "such an eventuality when it expressly refrains from making
the decision of one Court binding on the other, or even relevant, except for
limited purpose such as sentence or damages."

Hence, the observation made by this Court in V M. Shah's case (Supra)
that the finding recorded by the criminal Court stands superseded by the
F finding recorded by the civil Court is not correct enunciation of law. Further,
the general observations made in Karam Chand's case are in context of the
facts of the case stated above. The Court was not required to consider the
earlier decision of the Constitution Bench in M.S. Sheriff's case as well as
Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act.
G In the present case, after remand by the High Court, civil proceedings
as well as criminal proceedings are required to be decided on the evidence,
which may be brought on record by the parties.

In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
H N.J. Appeal dismissed.