Supreme Court of India

K. PREMA S. RAO AND ANR.versusYADLA SRINIVASA RAO AND ORS.

Citation: 2002 INSC 443
Decided: 25 October 2002
Disposal: Disposed off
Bench: M B SHAH

Holding

A conviction for abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC is permissible even if the charge was not separately framed, provided the evidence establishes the offence, and the husband is liable under both Sections 498A and 306, while the in‑laws are acquitted and the dowry‑death charge is dismissed.

Summary

The husband forced his wife to relinquish land given as stridhana, concealed her family’s mail, and, together with his parents, drove her out of the matrimonial home, leading her to commit suicide. The trial court convicted the husband under Section 498A IPC for cruelty and acquitted all accused of dowry death (Section 304B). The High Court upheld the husband’s conviction under 498A, acquitted the in‑laws, and maintained the acquittal under 304B. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the omission of a specific charge under Section 306 IPC does not preclude conviction where the facts satisfy the offence, invoking Section 221 CrPC, and affirmed the husband’s conviction under 498A while also convicting him under 306 IPC. The court affirmed the acquittal of the in‑laws and dismissed the dowry‑death charge, increasing the sentence for the suicide abetment conviction.

Issues considered

The omission of a specific charge under Section 306 IPC – whether it bars conviction for abetment of suicide.
Whether the husband’s conduct constitutes dowry death under Section 304B IPC in the absence of a dowry demand.
Whether the in‑laws can be held liable under Sections 498A/304B for the wife’s suicide.
Effect of errors in framing charges under Sections 215 and 221 of the CrPC.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 215, s. 221
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961s. 2
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 113A
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 304B, s. 306, s. 498A

Subjects

dowry deathcrueltyabetment of suicideSection 306 IPCSection 498A IPCSection 304B IPCcharge framing errorSection 215 CrPCSection 221 CrPCstridhana

Judgment

K. PREMA S. RAO AND ANR. A
v.
YADLA SRINIV ASA RAO AND ORS.

OCTOBER 25, 2002

[M.B. SHAH, K.G. BALAKRJSHNAN AND B
D.M. DHARMADHIKARI, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860:

Sections 498A and 304B-Conviction under-Wife receiving land as C
stridhana at the time of marriage-After few months husband forcing her to
transfer the land in hi~ name-Wife refusing the same-Husband and in-laws
driving her out of the house-Wife committing suicide-Husband and in-laws
charged under section 498 A and 304 B-Trial Court convicting them for
offence under section 498 A and acquitting them under section 304 B-High D
Court upholding order of trial court with regard to husband and acquitting
the in-laws-Justification of-Held: High Court justified in acquitting in-laws
on appreciation of evidence and with regard to the husband trial Court and
High Court justified on evide.nce to hold him guilty of cruelty under section
498A-Since wife not subjected to cruelty and harassment in connection with
the dowry demand soon before her death, High Court justified in acquitting E
husband under section 304 B.

Section 306-Abetment to suicide-Conviction under Section 306 when
charge not framed under that section-Justification of-Wife committing suicide
on account ofcruel conduct of husband-Courts below on this evidence holding F
husband guilty under Section 498A-On appeal, held: Since such cruel
treatment driving the wife to commit suicide, offence of abeting suicide under
Section 306 /PC is made out read with Section I 13A of Evidence Act and
mere omission or defect in framing charge does not disable the criminal court
from convicting the accused for the offence which is found to have been
proved on the evidence on record-Provisions of Section 221 Cr.P.C. can be G
taken aid of in such a situation-Evidence Act 1872, Section 113A-Code of
Criminal Procedure 1973, Section 221.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Section 215-Ejfect of errors-
When omission to frame charge under a section does not result in any failure
339
H
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A ofjustice, there is no necessity to remit the matter to trial court for framing
charge under that section.

Accused No.I married one of the daughters of PWI. After few
months of marriage accused No.I forced his wife to part with the land
which she received as 'stridhana' at the time of marriage but she refused.
B As a result, accused No.I who was Branch Post Master concealed the mail
sent to his wife by her father and her sister. His wife discovered the letters
and handed over to her father PWI. Accused No. I and his parents-accused
Nos.2-3 then drove her out from the matrimonial house. On account of
this extreme harassment she committed suicide. Accused were charged for
C offence under Section 3048 and 498A IPC. Trial Court convicted accused
for offences under Section 498A and acquitted them for offence under
Section 3048 IPC. Appellants-parents of the deceased filed revision against
the acquittal of accused under Section 3048 IPC. Accused filed appeal .
challenging their conviction and sentences. High Court dismissed the
revision and·allowed the appeal with regard to accused Nos.2-3 and upheld
D the order of trial court with regard to Accused No. I. Hence the present
cross appeals.

Accused contended that in the absence of a charge framed against , . /
the accused under Section 306 IPC, the accused cannot be convicted under/
the said Section.
E
Disposing of the appeals, the Court

HELD: I. High Court appreciated the evidence led against accused
Nos. 2-3 and found that the allegation against them of their participation
with accused No.I in driving out the deceased from their house was for
F the first time made by father of the deceased PWI only in his deposition
in Court. At no earlier point of time such allegation w~s made against
them. Apart from the oral testimony of PWI there is no other evidence
on record to prove that accused Nos.2-3 joined accused No.I in harassing
or cruelly treating the deceased. Thus the conclusion drawn by High Court
G in favour of accused No.2-3 is reasonable and does not justify interference
in their acquittal. Therefore, acquittal of accused No.2-3 is upheld.
1344-H; 345-A-C)

2. There is no evidence against accused No. I that at the time of
marriage there was any demand or settlement for giving dowry in cash
H or by way of transfer of property. There was no statement of PWI that
K. PREMA S. RAO v. YADLA SRINIVASA RAO 341
cash, ornaments and land were given at the time of marriage pursuant to A
any demand of dowry by parents of accused No 1. PW 1 merely stated
that according to the custom of the community declaration was made of
gift of five acres of land to the deceased as her 'Stridhana" and in the
ritual at the time of marriage land was transferred in her name. It was
only after 2-3 months of marriage, accused No 1 started harassing the wife
to force her to transfer the land to him and this harassment or cruel B
treatment cannot be said to be 'in connection with any alleged dowry
demand'. 'One of the main ingredients of the offence of "demand of
dowry" that "sbon before her death" she was subjected to cruelty and
harassment 'in connection with the demand for dowry' being absent, High
Court cannot be said to have committed any error in acquitting accused C
No.I for offence under Section 304B IPC. [345-E-G; 347-F]
3.1. The cruel conduct of accused No I-husband led the wife to
commit suicide and trial Court and High Court were justified on this
evidence to hold accused No.t guilty of the offence of 'cruelty' under
Section 498A. Thus offence of abetment of committing suicide punishable D
under Section 306, IPC is clearly made out against accused No. 1 and for
that purpose presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act can
be raised again~t him. Furthermore the word "cruelty" in the Explanation
to Section 113A of the Evidence Act has been given the same meaning as
contained in the Explanation to Section 498A IPC. Thus a case of
conviction and sentence of accused No. 1 under Section 306 IPC is made E
out. (348-E, F; 348-G; 347-G; 349-E]
Satvir Singh v. State of Punjab, [2001) 8 SCC 633, referred to.
3.2. Mere omission or defect in. framing charge does not disable the
criminal court from convicting the accused for the offence which is found
to have been proved on the evidence on record. From the statement of F
charge framed under Section 304B and in the alternative Section 498A
IPC it is clear that all facts and ingredients for framing charge for offence
under Section 306 IPC existed in the instant case. The mere omission on
the part of trial Judge to mention Section 306 IPC with 498A IPC does
not preclude the court from convicting accused for the said offence when G
found proved. In the alternate charge framed under Section 498A IPC, it
has been mentioned that the. accused subjected the deceased to such cruelty
and harassment as to drive her to commit suicide. The provisions of
Section 221 of Cr.P.C. take care of such a situation and safeguard the
powers of the criminal court to convict an accused for an offence with
which he is not charged although on facts found in evidence, he could have H
342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A been charged for such offence. Thus the provision of Section 221 (2) read
with sub-section (I) can be taken aid of in convicting and sentencing the
accused No.I of offence of abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC along
with or instead of Section 498A IPC. 1350-D-G; 351-B, Cl

4. As provided in Section 215 omission to frame charge under Section
B 306 IPC has not resulted in any failure of justice. Thus there is no necessity
to remit the matter to trial court for framing charge under Section 306
IPC and direct a retrial for that charge. The accused cannot legitimately
complain of any want of opportunity to defend the charge under Section
306 IPC and a consequent failure of justice. 1351-FI

c 5. Conviction and sentence of accused No.I under Section 498A IPC
is maintained and he is also convicted under Section 306 IPC and sentenced
to five years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 20,000 to be paid
as compensation to the parents of the deceased. The sentences imposed
under Section 498A IPC and under Section 306 IPC shall run
D concurrently. 1352-FI

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
1457 oft 995. ·

From the Judgment and Order dated 24.8.94 of the Andhra Pradesh
E High Court in Crl. R.C. No. 564 of 1991.

WITH

Crl. A. Nos. 1458-1459 of 1995.

Mrs. Swarupa Reddy, S. Uday Kumar Sagar, B. Sridhar, K. Ram Kumar
F
and Guntur Prabhakar for the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DHARMADHIKARI, J. "Frailty thy name is woman", that is how in
G one his plays Shakespeare described one of the female characters in his play.
This description is more and more in evidence particularly in rural Indian
society where married women, who are unable to muster courage to fight
against cruelty and harassment meted out to them by their spouses and family ''
members, find no escape other than ending their own life.

H The deceased Krishna Kumari second daughter of PWI was married to
K. PREMA S. RAO v. YADLA SRINIVASA RAO [DHARMADH!KARI. J.]343

Yadla Srinivasa Rao (hereinafter referred to as accused No.I), on 26.6.1998. A
Accused No. I was employed as Branch Post Master in the village where the
spouses lived jointly with the parents of accused No. I.

At the time of marriage father of the deceased, who was a teacher, gave
a cash dowry of Rupees fifteen thousand and jewels worth fifteen thousand
besides gift of five acres of land and a house site in the course of marriage B
ritual described as "Pasupukumkuma". It is explained that this gift of land
was in the nature of 'Stridhana' given to the bride by the father for her
maintenance.

After three or four months of the marriage accused No. I, husband of
the deceased started demanding in from the deceased execution of a deed in C
his favour of the land and house site gifted to her. Refusal on the part of the
deceased to meet the demand was the cause of her continuous harassment.
Taking advantage of his position as the Post Master in the village, accused
No. I never delivered mail sent to the deceased by her father and her sister
Nagamani. Her younger sister after passing tenth class examination had to D
appear for Polytechnic Entrance Test. As a part of harassment of the deceased,
accused No. I did not deliver the Entrance Card received from Kakatiya
University addressed to the younger sister of the deceased which resulted in
the former losing the admission to the test.

The deceased somehow was able to lay her hands on the letters addressed · E
to her and which had been concealed by accused No. I. On finding those
letters, she handed over the same to her father. This incident led to extreme
point of harassment. A<;cused No. I and his parents, accused Nos. 2-3, drove
the deceased out from their house with stern warning to her to restore those
letters. This incidenfof.cruelty was so grave and unbearable that she committed F
suicide by consuming a poisonous insecticide Endo-Sulphan on 22.10.1989.
PW4, who had witnessed the incident of the deceased having been driven out
of the house the previous day, also saw accused No. I taking deceased to the
hospital at Madhira. PW4 informed about it to father (PW!) of the deceased
who rushed to the house of the accused to find Krishna Kumari, dead. The
father then lodged a First Information Report, Ex. PI within eight hours on G
the same day.

All the three accused were charged in Session Case No. 157 of 1999
,.. by the Court of Assistant Sessions judge, Nuzwid for offence of dowry death
under Section 3048, IPC and in the alternative under Section 498A, IPC for
cruelty and harassment of such ·magnitude as to drive the deceased to commit H
344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A suicide. The prosecution examined the parents of the deceased of PW 1-2.
PW3-4 were examined who had seen the deceased being driven out of the
house and taken back only on their persuasion.

The trial court by judgment dated 19.8.1991 accepted the evidence led
by the prosecution of alleged cruel treatment and harassment of the deceased
B which drove her to commit suicide. It, however, held that on the evidence
only offence under Section 498A, IPC is made out. It acquitted them of the
offence"under Section 3048, IPC. The three accused on their conviction for
offence under Section 498A were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for
two years and a fine of Rs. 500 each. In default of payment of fine, they were
C sentenced to two months simple imprisonment each.
The appellants i.e. parents of the deceased filed Criminal Revision No.
564/91 in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh against the acquittal of the
accused under Section 3048, !PC. The accused preferred Criminal Appeal
No. 1291 /99 before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh assailing their
D conviction and sentences.

The learned Single Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh decided
,,
the revision preferred by the parents of the deceased and the appeal preferred
by the accused by a common Judgment dated 24.8.1994 which is the subject
matter of these two separate criminal appeals preferred by the parents of the
E deceased and the State of Andhra Pradesh.

The learned Single Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh dismissed
the Criminal Revision filed by the parents of the deceased and confirmed the
verdict of ~he trial court that the accused are liable to conviction and sentences
only under Section 498, IPC and not under Section 3048. IPC.
F
By the same common judgment the High Court allowed the appeal
preferred by accused Nos. 2-3 (Parents of accused No. I) and acquitted them
of the aileged offences.

Against the common judgment of the High Court, State of Anclhra
G Pradesh has preferred Criminal Appeal Nos. 1458-59of1995 challenging the
acquittal of accused Nos. 2-3 and the parents of the deceased have preferred
connected Criminal Appeal No. 1457 of 1995 seeking conviction of all the
accused under Section 3048 of the IPC.

The High Court in its common judgment passed in Criminal Appeal
H and Criminal Revision before it after appreciating the evidence led against
K. PREMA S. RAO v. YADLA SRINIVASA RAO [DHARMADHIKARI, J.] 345

accused Nos. 2-3, has found that the allegation against them of their A
participation with accused No. I in driving out the deceased from their house
was for the first time made by PW-I father of the deceased only in his
deposition in the Court. At no earlier point of time either in the first information
report Ex.Pl or in the statements made under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. to the
police, such allegation was made against accused No.2 and accused No.3. B
Apart from the oral testimony of PW I (the father of the deceased) there is
no other evidence on record to prove that the two accused Nos. 2-3 joined
accused No. I in harassing or cruelly treating the deceased. On appreciation
of the evidence the conclusion drawn by the High Court in favour of accused
No.2 and accused No.3 is reasonable and does not justify interference by us
in their acquittal. Consequently, we uphold the acquittal of accused Nos. 2- C
3 and dismiss the two appeals preferred by the State of Andhra Pradesh
which are filed to seek their conviction.

We now take up for consideration Criminal Appeal No. 1457of1995,
preferred by the parents of the deceased seeking conviction of accused No. I
for offence under section 3048 of the Indian Penal Code. In its common D
Judgment after appreciating the evidence on record, the conclusion reached
by the High Court that the accused No. I cannot be convicted under section
3048, IPC appears to be legally sound. There is no evidence against accused
No. I that at the time of marriage there was any demand or settlement for
giving dowry in cash or by way of transfer of property. The father of the E
deceased PW! has not stated that cash, ornaments and the land were given
at the time of marriage pursuant to any demand of dowry by the parents of
the husband. He merely states that according to the custom of the community
declaration was made of gift of five acres of land to the deceased as her
"Stridhana" called in the community as pasunukumkuma. As promised and
declared in the ritual at 1he time of marriage the land was transferred in the F
name of the wife. The couple lived happily thereafter. It is only 2-3 months
thereafter that the husband started harassing the wife to force her to transfer
the land to him. This harassment of cruel treatment to pressurize her to
transfer the land cannot be said to be 'in connection with any alleged dowry
demand.' For the purpose of Section 3048, IPC the legislature has borrowed G
the definition of 'dowry' from Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act of
1961. The relevant provisions of the Penal Code, Dowry Prohibition Act and
Evidence Act are quoted hereunder:

304-B. Dowry death-(!) Where the death of a woman is caused by
any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal H
346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that
soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by
her husband or any relative of her husband, for, or in connection
with, any demand for c(owry, such death shall be called "dowry death,"
and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her
deaih.
B
·*Explanation - For the purposes of this sub-section "dowry" shall
have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act,
1961.

· (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with
C imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than geven years but
which may extend to imprisonment for life."

Section 2· of the f?owry Prohibition Act, 1961 defines "dowry" as
under :

D 2. Definition of "dowry"-In this Act, "dowry" means any property
or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or
indirectly -

(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage, or

(b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other
E person, to either party to the marriage or to an other person.

At or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the
marriage of said parties, but does not include Dower or Mahr in the
·case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat). applies.

F Explanation I-For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that
any presents made at the time of a marriage to either party to the
marriage in the form of cash, ornaments, clothes or other articles,
shall not be deemed to be dowry within the meaning of this section,
unless they are made as consideration for the marriage of the said
G parties.
Explanation II- The expression 'valuable security' has the same
meaning as in section 30 of the Indian Penal Code.

Section I I 3B of Evidence Act raises a presumption against the accused
and reads:
H
K. PREMA S. RAO v. YADLA SRINIVASA RAO [DHARMADHIKARI, J.]34 7

113-8 Presumption as to dowry death - When the question is whether A
a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown
that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such
person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand
for dowry, the court shall presume that such a person had caused the
dowry death.
B
Explanation - For the purpose of this section, "dowry death" shall
have the same meaning as in Section 304-8 of the Indian Penal
Code."

The legal position firmly established is that 'suicidal death' ofa married
woman within seven years of her marriage is covered by ·the expression c
"death of a woman is caused .............. or occurs otherwise than under normal
circumstances" as used in Section 3048 of the Indian Penal Code. See Satvir
Singh v. State of Punjab, [2000) 8 SCC 663.

The evidence which has been found acceptable by the courts below D
against accused No. I is that the cruel treatment and harassment of the deceased
by him led her to commit suicide which was a death "otherwise than under
normal circumstances". To attract the provisions of Section 3048 lPC, one
of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is
that "soon before her death" she was subjected to cruelty and h'arassment 'in
connection with the demand for dowry'. There is no evidence; op record to E
show that the land was demanded as dowry. It was given by the father to the
deceased in marriage ritual as pasupukumuma. The harassment or cruelty
meted out to the deceased by the husband after the marriage to force her to
transfer the land in his name was 'not iil connection with any demand for
dowry.' One of the main ingredients of the offence of "demand of dowry" F
being absent in this case, the High Court cannot be said to have committed
any error in acquitting accused No. I for offence under Section 3048, !PC.

We however, find that the same evidence on record which was held
reliable to convict accused No. I for offence .of'cruelty' under section 498A,
!PC, clearly makes out a case for his conviction for offence of abeting suicide G
under Section 306, !PC read with section 113 A of the Evidence Act. Section
498A makes cruelty by husband to wife as a punishable offence. The word
"cruelty" is defined in the Explanation appended to the said Section. Section
. 498A with Explanation thereunder reads thus:

Section 498A: "'Husband or relative of husband ofa woman subjecting H
348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A her to cruelty-Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the
husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished
with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and
shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation - For the purpose of this section, "cruelty" means-
B
(a) Any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive
the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to
life, limb or health (whether mental. or physical) of the woman, or

(b) Harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view
C to coercing her or any person related "to her to meet any unlawful
. demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of
failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand."
[undedining for emphasis]

D Clause (a) of the Explanation under Section 498A, !PC defines cruelty
to mean a 'wilful conduct of the husband of such nature as is likely to drive
the woman to commit suicide.' In the instant case, the accused pressurised
and lfarassed the deceased to part with the land received by her from her
father as "Stridhana." As a method adopted for harassment the Postal Mail
of her relatives sent to her was suppressed by the husband who was in a
E position to do so being a Branch Post Master in the village. When the letters
were discovered by the wife and she handed them over to her father (PW!)
she was driven out of the house. This cruel conduct of the husband led the
wife to commit suicide. The trial court and the High Court were, therefore,
perfectly justified on this evidence to hold accused No. I guilty of the offence
F of' cruelty' under Section 498A. As a result of such cruel treatment the wife
was driven to commit suicide.

Thus offe~ce of abetment of committing suicide punishable under Section
306, !PC is clearly made out against accused No. I and for that purpose
presumptioJ:! under Section l 13A of the Evidence Act can be raised against
G him. Section 306, !PC reads thus:

"306. Abetment of suicide -If any person commits suicide, whoever
abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
H
l 13A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman -
K. PREMA S. RAO v. YADLA SRINIVASA RAO [DHARMADHIKARI, J.]349

When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman A
had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and
it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven
years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such
relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may
presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that B
such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative or
her husband.

Explanation - For the purposes of this section, "cruelty; shall have
the same meaning as in section 498A of the Indian Penal Code."

[emphasis applied) C

Both the Courts below have found the husband guilty of cruel treatment
of his wife and as a result the wife committed suicide within seven years of
their marriage. On such evidence the presumption which arises under Section
l 13A of the Evidence Act is that the husband abetted suicide. The word D
"cruelty" as mentioned in the Explanation below Section l 13A of the Evidence
Act has been given the same meaning as contained in the Explanation below
Section 498A !PC. On the facts found, 'the wilful' conduct of the husband
in forcing the deceased to part with her land which she had received in
marriage as "stridhana" and for that purpose concealing her postal mail was
so cruel that she was driven to commit suicide. A case of conviction and E
sentence of accused No. I under Section 306, !PC has thus clearly been made
out even though his acquittal for commission of the offence of 'dowry death'
punishable under Section 3048, !PC is not found liable to be disturbed.

The learned counsel for the accused has argued that in the absence of F
a charge framed against the accused under Section 306 !PC, the accused
cannot be convicted under the said Section.

From the record we find that although a charge specifically under Section.
306 !PC was not framed but all facts and ingredients constituting that offence
were mentioned in the Statement of Charges framed under section 498A and G
Section 3048 of !PC. The statement of charge framed by the trial courts
reads thus:

"That on or about the 22nd day of October, 1989, at your house at
Tunikipadu of Gampalagudem Manda! Yedla Krishna Kumari, wife
of A-1 of you and daughter-in-law of A2 and A-3 among you, H
350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A ~ommitted suicide by consuming poison, and that you all subjected
her to such cruelty and harassment as did drive her to commit suicide,
with the object of extracting Ac. 5-00 of land as dowry to A-I and
thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 304-B of the
_Indian Penal Code and within the cognizance of this Court.

B OR ALTERNATIVELY

That, prior to the 22nd day of October, 1989; at your house' at
Tunikipadu, you subjected Yedla Krishna Kumari, wife of A-I among
you and daughter-in-law of A-2 and A-3 among you, to such cruelty
and harassment as did drive the said Krishna Kumari to commit
c s_uicide, and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section
498-A of the Indian Penal Code and within the cognizance of this·
,Court."

[emphasis applied]
D Mere omission or defect in framing charge does not disable the Criminal
Court from convicting the accused for the offence which is found to have
been proved on the evidence on record. The Code of Criminal procedure has
ample provisions to meet a situation like _the one before us. From the Statement
of Charge framed under· Section 3048 and in the alternative Section 498A,
E IPC (as quoted above) it is clear that all facts and ingredients for framing
charge for offence under Section 306, IPC existed in the case. The mere
omission on the part of the trial Judge to mention of Section 306, IPC with
498A, JPC does not preclude the Court from convicting the accused for the
said offence when found proved. Jn the alternate charge framed under Section
498A of !PC, it has been clearly mentioned that the accused subjected the
F deceased to such cruelty and harassment as to drive her to commit suicide.
The provisions of Section 221 of Cr.P.C .. take care of such a situation and
safeguard the powers of the criminal court to convict an accused for an
offence with which he is not charged although on facts found in evidence, he
could have been charged for such offence. Section 221 of Cr. P.C. needs
G reproduction:-

"221. Where it is doubtful what offence has been committed-(!)
If a single act or series of acts is of such a nature that it is doubtful
which of several offences the facts which can be proved will constitute,
the accused may be charged with having committed all or any of such
H offences, and any number of such charges may be tried at once; or
K. PREMA S. RAO v. YADLA SRINIVASA RAO (DHARMADHIKARL .l.D 5I

he may be charged. In the alternative with having committed some A
one of the said offences.

(2) If in such a case the accused is charged with one offence, and it
appears in evidence that he committed a different offence for which
he might have been charged under the provisions of sub-section ( 12),
he may be convicted of the offence which he. is shown to have B
committed, although he was not charged with it.

The provision of sub-section (2) of Section 221 read with sub-section
( 1) of the said Section can be taken aid of in convicting and sentencing the
accused No. I of offence of abetment of suicide under Section 306 of !PC
along with or ·instead of Section 498A of !PC. C
Section 2 I 5 allows criminal court to ignore any error in stating either
the offence or the particulars required to be stated in the charge, if the
accused was not, in fact, misled by such error or omission in framing th~
charge and it has not occasioned a failure of justice. See Section 215 of Cr. D
P.C. which reads:-

"215. Effect of errors - No error in stating either the offence or the
particulars required to pe stated in the charge, and no commission to
state the offence or those particulars, shall be regarded any stage of
the case as material, unless the accused was in fact misled by such· E
error or omission, and it has occasioned a failure of justice.

As provided in Section 215 of Cr.P.C. commission to frame charge
under Section 306 !PC has not resulted in any failure of justice. We find no
necessity to remit the matter to the trial court for framing charge under
Section 306 !PC and direct a retrial for that charge. The accused cannot p
legitimately complain of any want of opportunity to defend the charge under
Section 306, !PC and a consequent failure of justice. The same facts found
in evidence, which justify conviction of the appellant under Section 498A for
cruel treatment of his wife, make out a case against him utlder Section 306
!PC of having abetted commission of suicide by the wife. The appellant was
charged for an offence of higher degree causing "dowry death" under Section U
3048 which is punishable with minimum sentence of seven years rigorous
imprisonment and maximum for life. Presumption under Section 113A of the
Evidence Act could also be raised against him on same facts constituting
offence of cruelty under Section 498A, IPC. No further opportunity of defence
is required to be granted ,to the appellant when he had ample opportunity to H
352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A meet the charge under Section 498A, !PC.
It may be mentioned that against confirmation of this conviction by the
High Court ~nder section 498A, !PC, the accused No. I has not preferred any
special leave to appeal to this Court. The facts found proved for his conviction
' . .- '• \·, ..t.
and sentence under Section 498A', !PC, cannot now be questioned by the
B accused. Our conclusion, therefore, is that same facts and evidence on winch
accused No. I was charged under Section 498A and Section 3048, the accused
can be convicted and sentenced under Section 306 !PC. We find no legal or
procedural impediment in doing so.

The legislature has by amending the Penal Code and Evidence Act
C made Penal Law more strident for dealing with and punishing offences against
married women. Such strident laws would have a deterrent effect on the
offenders only if they are so stringently implemented by the law courts to
achieve the legislative intent. On the facts found and the offence proved to
have been committed leading to suicidal death of the wife, imprisonment of
D two years with fine of Rs. 500 is too light a sentence. For offence under
Section 306 !PC the sentence may extend to ten years. In this case the
husband is found to have harassc ·' his wife to such an extent as to drive her
to commit suicide. Sentence of ti ve years would, in our opinion, be a proper
sentence for the crime with the amount of fine increased to Rs. 20,000 to be
paid as compensation to the parents of the deceased. On non-payment of fine
E the accused No. I shall suffer further sentence of one year.
We, thus, allow Criminal Appeal No. 1457 of 1995 preferred by the
parents of the deceased. We maintain the conviction and sentence of accused
No. I under Section 498A, !PC. The accused No. I is also convicted under
F Section 306, !PC and sentenced to five years rigorous imprisonment with a
fine of Rs. 20,000 to be paid as compensation to the parents of the deceased.
In the event of non-payment of fine, accused No. I shall suffer imprisonment '
for a further period of one year. The sentences imposed under Section 498A,
!PC and under Section 306, !PC shall run concurrently.

G Connected Criminal Appeal Nos. 1458-59 of 1985 preferred by the
State against acquittal of accused Nos. 2 & 3 are dismissed.

NJ. Appeals disposed of.

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