K.R. LAKSHMAN AND ORS.versusKARNATAKA ELECTRICITY BOARD AND ORS.

                                                                                          A
                        K.R. LAKSHMAN AND ORS.
                                   v.
                  KARNATAKA ELECTRICITY BOARD AND ORS.
-,
                                  DECEMBER 12, 2000
                                                                                          B
                    [G.B. PATTANAIK AND B.N. AGRA WAL, JJ.]
-
            Service Law

             Karnataka Electricity Board Recruitment and Promotion Regulations,           C
      1969 (as amended on 3.2.1982)--Constitution of India, 1950-Article 14-
      Promotion- To the post of Junior Engineer- Technically qualified direct
      recruits and non-technical promotees entitled to 35% quota for promotion -
      By amendment to the Regulation ratio of I: I provided between direct recruits
...   and the promotees in respect of 35% quota in order to remove stagnation             D
      Held, the amendment is not discriminatory, and hence not violative of Article
      14- When a provision is challenged as violative of Article 14, it is necessary
      in the first place to ascertain the policy underlying the statute and the object
      intended to be achieved by it.

             As Per the Karnataka Electricity Board Recruitment and Promotion E
      Regulations, 1969, 35% of the posts of Junior Engineers could be filled up
      by promotion from the common cadre of operator/Overseer/Meter Reader/
      Assistant Store Keeper. The Regulation was amended providing a ratio of I: l
      for promotion to the post of Junior Engineer (Electrical) in respect of the
      35% quota, between technically qualified (Direct Recruit) and technically not

-     qualified (Promotees). The appellants who were technically qualified direct F
      recruits to the post of Operator/Overseer/Meter Reader/Assistant Store
      Keeper, challenged the amendment by way of a writ petition on the ground
      that the same is discriminatory and arbitrary and that there was no rational
      basis for providing a ratio between technically qualified and technically
      unqualified people. Single Judge allowed the writ petition. Appeal against the Ci
      same before Division Bench, was allowed.

             In appeal to this Court, appellants contended that providing a ratio for
      promotion for the unqualified promotees would not tantamount to a
      classification based on qualification; that the regulation is liable to be struck
      down, being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, because the amendment      H
                                            535
    536                       SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A   to the regulation is an act of hostile discrimination against the qualified direct
    recruits inasmuch as there is no rationale behind providing such a ratio, which
    jeopardises the chances of qualified people; and that unqualified people who
    are not ordinarily entitled to promotion to the post of Junior Engineer, were
    being shown favouritism by providing a channel of promotion to them. The
    respondents contended that when a rule making authority provided for a ratio
B   for promotion to the post of Junior Engineer in order to remove stagnation
    taking into account the experience of the unqualified promotees, the same
    cannot be struck down as violative of Article 14, unless it is positively shown
    that either it is ma/a fide or it really works out any hostile discrimination
                                                                                         -
    between the two category of employees.
c         Dismissing the appeals, the Court

          HELD: I.I. By providing a ratio of I :1 in the matter of promotion to the


                                                                                         -
    post of Junior Engineer between directly recruited technically qualified people
    and promotee technically not qualified people, there has been no violation of
D   Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 1544-B, q

           1.2. It cannot be said that the direct recruit technically qualified
    personnel had been treated with hostile discrimination. Under the Regulation
    itself, both the technically qualified direct recruits and non-technical
    promotees were entitled to 35% quota in the cadre of Junior Engineer and
E   the amendment merely provided a ratio between them namely 1:1 and this
    amendment was brought about in the Regulation itself to ameliorate the
    stagnation of the unqualified promotees in the cadre. 1543-B, q

           1.3. It cannot be said that there has been a complete fusion in the

F
    combined cadre inasmuch as the Regulation did provide for promotion at
    different percentage for in service personnel possessing diploma qualification,
    then diploma holders from amongst the combined cadre namely Operator,
    Meter Reader, Overseer and Assistant Store Keeper and 5% by promotion
                                                                                         -
    of Mechanics with five years of Service. Thus, 60% of the posts in the cadre
    of Junior Engineers were meant to be filled up by different ratio from amongst
G   the persons in the so-called combined cadre and 35% quota which was
    available for promotion for such common cadre people was further bifurcated
    between qualified direct recruits and technically unqualified promotees in the
    ratio 1:1. Such a classification cannotbe held to be discriminatory, ifthe object
    sought to be achieved is looked into. 1543-C-D, El

H         P. Murugesan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1993( 2 SCC 340, relied on.
          K.R. LAKSHMAN v. KARNATAKA ELECTRICITY BOARD                       537
     State of J&K v. Triloki Nath Khosa, (1974) 1 SCC 19; Shamkant A
Narayan Deshpande v. Maharashtra l.D. Corporation, (1993) Suppl. 2 SCC
194; Punjab State Electricity Board, Patiala & Am: v. Ravinder Kumar Sharma
and Ors., (198614 SCC 617; N. Abdul Basheer and Ors. v. K.K. Karunakaran
and Ors., (19891 Suppl. 2 SCC 344; Mohammad Shujat Ali and Ors. v. Union
ofIndia and Ors., [197513 SCC 76; Mervyn Coutindo v. Collector of customs, B
Bomba}~ (1966( 3 SCR 600; Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India, (1968( l
SCR 185 and G.M.S.C. Rly. v. AVR Siddanti, (1974( 4 SCC 335, referred to.

       2.1. The concept of equality before law means that among equals the
 law should be equal and should be equally administered and that the likes
should be treated alike. All that Article 14 guarantees is a similarity of           C
treatment and not identical treatment. The guarantee of equal protection of
law and equality before the law does not prohibit reasonable classification.
Equality before law does not mean that things which are different shall be
treated as though they were the same. The principle of equality does not
absolutely prevent the State from making differentiation between persons and
things. The State has always the power to have a classification on a basis of        D
rational distinctions relevant to the particular subject to be dealt with but such
permissible classification must satisfy the two conditions namely the
classification to be founded on intelligible differentia which distinguishes
persons or things that are grouped from others who are left out of tile group
and that the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to       E
be achieved by the legislation. There must be a nexus between the basis of
classification and the object of the legislation. So long as the classification is
based on rational basis and 80 long as all persons falling in the same class
are treated alike, there can be no question ofviolating the equality clause. If
there is equality and uniformity within each group, the law cannot be
condemned as discriminatory, though due to some fortuitious circumstances            F
arising out of a peculiar situation, some included in the class get an advantage
over others, so long as they are not singled out for special treatment.
                                                                 (541-A, B, C, DJ

      2.2. When a provision is challenged as violative of Article 14, it is          G
necessary in the first place to ascertain the policy underlying the statute and
the object intended to be achieved by it and having ascertained the policy and
object of the act, the Court has to apply a dual test namely whether the
classification is rational and based upon an intelligible differentia which
distinguished persons or things that are grouped together from the other that
are left out of the group and whether the basis of differentiation has any           H
     538                       SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A    rational nexus or relation with its avowed policy and object The power to make
     classification can be exercised not only by the legislature but also by the
     Administrative Bodies acting under an Act. J541-E, Fl

             CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 811-822 of
     1998.
B
           From the Judgment and Order dated 17.1.96 of the Kamataka High Court
     in W.A. Nos. 1417, 1420-21, 1424-25, 1428, 1430-31, 1436, 1438-39 and 1450 of
     1995.

C         M. Rama Jois, Sr. Adv., S.R. Bhat, Naveen R. Nath, Lalit Mohini Bhat
     and Ms. Hetu Arora for the Appellants.

             S.K. Kulkarni and Ms. Sangeeta Kumar for the Respondents.

             The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

D            PATTANAIK, J. The Judgment of the Division Bench ofKarnataka High
      Court, setting aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge is the subject
      matter of challenge in these appeals. The appellants are technically qualified
      direct recruits to the post of Operator/Overseer/Meter Reader/Assistant Store
      Keeper. The Karnataka Electricity Board Recruitment and Promotion
E     Regulations, 1969 were amended on 3.2.1982, providing a ratio of 1: I for
     promotion to the post of Junior Engineer (Electrical) between technically
     qualified (Direct Recruit) and technically not qualified (Promotees). The present
     appellants, assailed the aforesaid amendment by filing writ petitions. inter
     alia, on the grounJi that it is highly discriminatory and arbitrary and that there
     is no rational basis for providing a ratio between technically qualified and
F    technically unqualified people for promotion to the post of Junior Engineer.
     The learned Single Judge accepted the contention of the appellants and
     allowed the writ petitions by judgment dated '2th of January, 1994. In arriving
    at its conclusion that providing ratio for promotion is discriminatory, the
     learned Single Judge relied upon the decisi•ms of this Court in Mervyn
G   Coutindo, [ 1966] 3 SCC 600; Roshan Lal Tandon, [ 1968) I SCR 185; Punjab
    State Electricity Board, [1986) 4 SCC 617, Mohammed Shujat Ali, [1975) 5
    SCC 76, G.M.S.C. Rly v. AVR Siddanti, (19741 4 SCC 335, and N. Abdul
    Basheer, [ 1989] Supp. 2 SCC 344. The Board assailed the judgment of the
    learned Single Judge by preferring an appeal. The Division Bench of the
    Karnataka High Court, set aside the judgment of the Single Judge and allowed
H   the appeal. preferred by the Board. relying upon the decisions of this Court
  K.R LAKSHMAN v. KARNATAKA ELECTRICITY BOARD [PATTANAIK, J.] 539

in P. Murugeshan v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1993] 2 SCC 340 and S. N. Deshpande        A
v. Maharashtra I.D. Corporation, [1993] Supp. 2 SCC 194. It is this judgment
of the Division Bench, which is the subject matter of these appeals.

       Mr. M. Rama Jois, the learned senior counsel, appearing for the
appellants, contended that providing a ratio for promotion to the post of
Junior Engineer for the unqualified promotees, would not tantamount to a             B
classification based on qualification, as in the case of Murugeshan, and as
such the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court committed serious error
in interfering with the judgment of the learned Single Judge. According to
Mr. Rama Jois, the amendment to the regulation is nothing but an act of
hostile liiscrimination against the qualified direct recruits inasmuch as there      C
is no rationale behind providing such a ratio, which jeopardises the chances
of promotion of the qualified people and consequently, the regulation is liable
to be struck down, being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Mr. Rama
Jois, further urged that the unqualified people, who are not ordinarily entitled
to the promotion to the post of Junior Engineer, were being shown favouritism
by providing a channel of promotion to them. But without any rational basis          D
for providing a ratio and putting the unqualified people at more advantageous
position, must be held to be discriminatory and the Division Bench of the
High Court committed error in holding that it does not work out any
discrimination.
                                                                                     E
       The learned counsel, appearing for the respondents on the other hand
contended that stagnation in any public service, not being in the interest of
administration and taking into account the experience of the unqualified
 promotees, when the Rule making Authority, provided for a ratio for promotion
to the post of Junior Engineer, the same cannot be struck down, as being
violative of Article 14, unless it is positively shown that either it is ma/a fide   F
or that it really works out any hostile discrimination between the two category
of employees. According to the learned counsel, no doubt in the feeder
category, the appellants had entered by direct recruitment, while respondents
had entered by way of promotion, but the further promotion to the post of
Junior Engineer is the maximum rank to which the unqualified promotee could          G
ever aspire of, whereas qualified direct recruits can go still higher up in the
ladder and that being the provision to avoid harassment of stagnation, the
authorities having provided for a ratio between the qualified direct recruits
and unqualified promotees, on consideration of germane and relevant materials,
the same should not be interfered with by this Court. According to the
learned counsel for the respondents, the ratio of the judgment of this Court         H
    540                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A in Murugeshan, squarely applies and, therefore, the Division Bench of the
    Karnataka High Court was fully justified in interfering with the conclusion of
    the learned Single Judge.

            The Recruitment and other service conditions including promotion in
    the Karnataka Elect<icity Board is governed by a set of regulations called the
B    Karnataka Electricity Board Recruitment and Promotion Regulations (hereinafter
     referred to as 'the Recruitment Regulations). The Recruitment to the post of
    Operator, Meter Reader and Assistant Store Keeper, which constitute a
     combined cadre, is made both by direct recruitment as well as by promotion,
    on the basis of seniority-cum-merit. The Regulation provides that 50% of the
C   combined cadre would be filled up by direct recruitment and 40% of the cadre
     by promotion on the basis of seniority-cum-merit and equivalent post and
     10% by direct recruitment from among the in-service personnel. The minimum
    qualification for direct recruitment is LT.I. certificate in Electrical or
    Telecommunication or Electronic trade or certificate in Lineman trade of
     Karnataka Electricity Board Training Institute, after passing of the 10th
D   standard, whereas for promotees, from the Mechanic Grade II, the minimum
    educational qualification is up-to 10th standard. The next higher rank is the
    Junior Engineer (Electrical) and the cadre of Junior Engineer is required to be
    filled up, by direct recruitment of persons possessing diploma in Electrical or
    Computer Engineering to the extent of 40%. Against this 40% quota,
E   appointment could be made by transfer of in service personnel, possessing
    Engineering Degree qualification. 10% of the cadre of Junior Engineer could
    be filled up by direct recruitment of in service personnel possessing diploma
    qualification. 10% of the post could be filled up by promotion of Operators,
    Meter Readers, Overseers, Assistant Store Keepers, having diploma
    qualification. 35% of the post of Junior Engineer could be filled up by
F   promotion from the common cadre of Operator, Overseers, Meter Readers and
    Asst!. Store Keepers and 5% by promotion of Mechanics with five years of
    service. By the amendment of the Regulation in February, 1982, a ratio was
    provided in respect of the 35% quota, which was to be filled up by promotion
    for the common cadre, the same ratio as 1: 1 between the technically qualified
G   direct recruits and technically unqualified promotees. It is this amendment
    which had been assailed by the present appellants by filing writ petitions in
    Karnataka High Court. The question for consideration, therefore is whether
    the amended Regulation, providing a ratio of 1: 1 between the technically
    qualified direct recruits and technically unqualified promotees, as against 35%
    quota available to them in the cadre of Junior Engineer, could be held to be
H   violative of Article 14 or such a classification is permissible in law and the
  K.R. LAKSHMAN v. KARNATAKA ELECTRICITY BOARD [PATTANAIK. J.] 541

  Rule making Authority had considered all relevant and germane materials in          A
 providing for the aforesaid ratio? The concept of equality before law means
 that among equals the law should be equal and should be equally administered
 and that the likes should be treated alike. All that Article 14 guarantees is a
 similarity of treatment and not identical treatment. The guarantee of equal
 protection of law and equality before the law does not prohibit reasonable
 classification. Equality before law does not mean that things which are different    B
 shall be treated as though they were the same. The principle of equality does
 not absolutely prevent the State from making differentiation between the
 persons and things. The State has always the power to have a classification
 on a basis of rational distinctions relevant to the particular subject to be dealt
 with but such permissible classification must satisfy the two conditions             C
 namely the classification to be founded on intelligible differentia which
 distinguishes persons or things that are grouped from others who are left out
of the group and that the differentia must have a rational relation to the object
sought to be achieved by the legislation. In other words, there must be a
 nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the legislation. So
 long as the classification is based on rational basis and so long as all persons     D
 falling in the same class are treated alike, there can be no question of violating
 the equality clause. If there is equality and uniformity within each group, the
 law cannot be condemned as discriminatory, though due to some fortuitous
 circumstances arising out of a peculiar situation, some includc:d in the class
get an advantage over others, so long as they are not singled out for special         E
treatment. When a provision is challenged as violative of Article 14, it is
necessary in the first place to ascertain the policy underlying the statute and
the object intended to be achieved by it and having ascertained the policy
and object of the Act, the Court has to apply a dual test namely whether the
classification is rational and based upon an intelligible differentia which
distinguished persons or things that are grouped together from others that            F
are left out of the group and whether the basis of differentiation has any
rational nexus or relation with its avowed policy and objects. The power to
make classification can be exercised not only by the legislature but also by
the Administrative Bodies acting under an Act.

       When the validity of the amended Regulation, providing ratio for
                                                                                      G
promotion between the technically qualified and technically unqualified persons
in I: I is examined from the aforesaid stand point, we are unable to hold that
the direct recruit technically qualified personnel had been treated with hostile
discrimination. The feeder category for promotion to the post of Junior Engineer
is the combined cadre of Operator-Overseer-Meter Reader-Assistant Store               H
    542                        SUPREME COURT REPORTS 12000] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A    Keeper. To the aforesaid combined cadre, a direct recruitment is possible and
     those with IT! Certificate in Electrical or Telecommunication or electronic
     Trade , after passing of 10th standard could be recruited. Wheceas in case
     of promotees, the qualification required is only study upto I 0th standard and
     for them the entry point is Mechanic Grade II, from where they get promoted
B    to the combined cadre, as noted above. For the technical post of Junior
     Engineer, which is the next higher post, the Regulation itself provided that
     35% of the said posts could be filled up by promotion from the common cadre
     and the aforesaid provision for promotion from the common cadre had been
     made, after prescribing different quotas for direct recruitment of in service
     personnel having diploma qualification, promotion from the combined cadre
C    who have diploma qualification and promotion of Mechanics with five years
     service. According to the Board, though the Regulation, initially provided for
     promotion to the extent of 35% in the cadre of Junior Engineer from the
     common cadre but it used to work out gross injustice to the technically
     unqualified riromotees inasmuch as such technically unqualified operators
D    could be considered for promotion to the post of Junior Engineer only after
    they have rendered more than 15 years of service. That apart the only
     promotional avenue available to such technically unqualified promotees is the
     35% quota in the cadre of Junior Engineer and they could not aspire of any
     further promotion, whereas the qualified direct recruits could be promoted still
     further higher ups. The Board claimed that while t'ixing the ratio as I: I, it took
E    into account the qualification, the experience and the smooth functioning of
    the Board and for striking a balance between the qualification on the one
    hand and the experience on the other. In Trilokinath, this court has affirmed
    the principle of classification but has held that it should be founded on a
    reasonable differentia which distinguishes the persons grouped together from
    those who are left out of the group and in that case the classification was
F   between the Degree holder Assistant Engineers and Diploma holder Assistant
    Engineers. The Court upheld such classification as it was intended to achieve
    administrative experience in the Engineering Service. In Murugesan, a three
    judge Bench of this Court upheld the ratio of}: I between graduate Assistant
    Engineers and Diploma holder Junior Engineers for promotion to the post of
G   Assistant Executive Engineer, as such a distinction had been maintained
    throughout between the two categories. It is •10 doubt true that in that case,
    it is the diploma holders who had approa~hed the Court. challenging the
    introduction of ratio of 3: I between such diploma holders and graduate
    Assistant Engineers and the Court upheld the provisions, whereas in the case
    in hand, it is the qualified direct recruits, who have approached the Court. But
H   in deciding the question whether such a provision can be held to be violative
  K.R. LAKSHMAN v KARNATAKA ELECTRICITY BOARD [PATTANAIK. JI 543

 of Article 14, the principle in Murugesan would apply with full force to the       A
case in hand. It may be noticed that the learned Single Judge relied upon the
two earlier decisions of this Court in Roshan Lal Tandon and Mervyn Coutindo
and both the decisions have been noticed and distinguished in Murugesan
and the other decision on which the learned Single Judge has relied upon
namely Shujat Ali, has also been explained away in the aforesaid three Judge        B
Judgment in Murugesan. It is no doubt true that in Trilokinath, Chandrachud,
J. had observed that the classification should not be carried too far lest it may
subvert, perhaps submerge the precious guarantee of equality, but such word
of caution will have no application to the facts of the present case, where
under the Regulation itself, both the technically qualified direct recruits and
non-technical promotees were entitled to 35% quota in the cadre of Junior           C
Engineer and the amendment of the year 1982 merely provided a ratio between
them namely I: I and this amendment was brought about in the Regulation
 itself to ameliorate the stagnation of the unqualified promotees in the cadre.
That apart, it is not correct to hold that there has been a complete fusion in
the combined cadre inasmuch as the Regulation did provide for promotion at
different percentage for in service personnel, possessing diploma qualification,    D
then diploma holders from amongst the combined cadre namely Operator,
 Meter Reader, Overseers and Assistant Store Keepers and 5% by promotion
of Mechanics with five years service. Thus, 60% of the posts in the cadre
of Junior Engineers were meant to be filled up by different ratio from amongst
the persons in the so-called combined cadre and 35% quota, which was                E
available for promotion for such common cadre people was further bifurcated
between qualified direct recruits, who are the appellants and technically
unqm.lified promotees, who are the private respondents in the ratio I: I. Such
a classification, in our considered opinion, cannot be held to be discriminatory,
if the object sought to be achieved, as indicated by the Board in its counter
affidavit is looked into. The decision of this Court in the case of Punjab State    F
Electricity Board, Patia/a and Anr. v. Ravinder Kumar ~harma and Ors.,
[ 1986] 4 SCC 617. on which the learned Single Judge had relied upon and
Mr. Rama Jois, appearing for the appellants had strongly relied upon was
over-ruled by the three Judge Bench Judgment in P. Murugesan and Ors. v.
State of Tamil Nadu and Ors, [ 1993] 2 SCC 340. The decision of this Court          G
in N. Abdul Basheer and Ors. v. K.K. Karunakaran and Ors., [1989] Supp.
2 SCC 344, on which also. th~ learned Single Judge had relied upon and Mr.
Rama Jois, also strongly relied upon, has been distinguished in the aforesaid
case of Murugesan. The decision of this Court in Mohammad Shujat Ali and
Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., [ 1975] 3 SCC 76, which was followed in the
Punjab State Electricity Board case, has been explained in the aforesaid three      H
    544                       SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A   Judge Bench Judgment. The decision of Mervyn Coutindo, [1966] 3 SCC 600,
    as well as Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India, [ 1968) 1 SCR 185, has also
    been noticed in Murugesan, and not followed, but in the later case of Shamkant
    Narayan Deshpande v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corpn. & Anr.,
    [ 1993) Supp. 2 SCC 194, both these decisions have been distinguished, in
    view of the law laid down in Triloki Nath Khosa 's case, (1974) 1 SCC 19. In
8   the aforesaid premises and in view of the judgment of this Court in Triloki
    Nuth Khosa, in P. Murugesun and in Shamkant Narayan Deshpande, the
    Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court was fully justified in setting
    aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge and in coming to the conclusion
    that by providing a ratio of I: I in the matter of promotion to the post of Junior
C   Engineer between directly recruited technically qualified people and promotee
    technically not qualified people, there has been no violation of Article 14 of
    the Constitution and we see no infirmity with the aforesaid conclusion of the
    Division Bench of Karnataka High Court. Accordingly, these appeals fail and
    are dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs.

    K.K.T.                                                        Appeal dismissed.