K.S. RANGANATHAversusVITTAL SHETTY

652                       [2021]
               SUPREME COURT     9 S.C.R. 652
                              REPORTS                       [2021] 9 S.C.R.


A                            K.S. RANGANATHA
                                        v.
                               VITTAL SHETTY
                       (Criminal Appeal No. 1860 of 2011)
B                              DECEMBER 08, 2021
                    [N. V. RAMANA, CJI, A. S. BOPANNA
                           AND HIMA KOHLI, JJ.]
             Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – s.138 – Dishonour of
      cheque – Appellant acquitted by trial court – Acquittal reversed by
C     High Court – On appeal, held: Respondent successfully discharged
      the initial burden cast on him – He established that the cheque signed
      by the appellant was issued in his favour towards discharge of a
      legally recoverable amount – Parties were known to each other –
      Appellant admitted about an earlier transaction where he had
D     borrowed the amount and repaid – This indicates that the parties
      had entered into financial transactions earlier as well and another
      transaction was probable between them – Respondent discharged
      the burden of proving that the transaction had actually taken place
      – To rebut the same, the defence put forth by the appellant that the
      documents and cheque in the present proceedings were obtained
E     by threatening him had already been considered in a separate
      proceeding and the respondent was acquitted therein – Acquittal of
      the appellant not justified – Impugned judgment not interfered with
      – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.2(d) r/w 200 – Penal Code,
      1860 – ss.365, 342, 323, 506.
F          Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – ss.118(a), 139 –
      Presumption under – Onus to rebut – Standard of proof – Discussed.
            Dismissing the appeal, the Court
            HELD: 1.1 The legal aspect relating to the presumption
      arising in law when a cheque is issued, is to be noted at the
G     threshold. The initial burden is placed on the complainant to
      discharge. When a cheque is drawn out and is relied upon by the
      drawee, it will raise a presumption that it is drawn towards a
      consideration which is a legally recoverable amount; such
      presumption of course, is rebuttable by proving to the contrary.
H     The onus is on the accused to raise a probable defence and the
                                    652
            K.S. RANGANATHA v. VITTAL SHETTY                           653


standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is                     A
on preponderance of probabilities. [Paras 8, 11][658-B-C;
662-G-H]
      K.Prakashan vs. P.K. Surendran (2008) 1 SCC 258 :
      [2007] 10 SCR 1010; Triyambak S. Hegde vs. Sripad
      in Criminal Appeal Nos. 849-850 of 2011 – relied on.             B
      Reverend Mother Marykutty vs. Reni C. Kottaram &
      Anr. (2013) 1 SCC 327 : [2012] 9 SCR 530; Kalamani
      Tex & Anr. vs. P. Balasubramanian (2021) 5 SCC 283 :
      2021 (2 ) JT 519 – referred to.
      1.2 It was the case of the respondent that the appellant had     C
borrowed the sum of Rs.3,75,000/- on 12.06.2003 which was
agreed to be repaid with interest in six months. Hence, cheque
No.062589 dated 12.12.2003 for Rs.4,00,000/- drawn on
Corporation Bank was issued. The respondent had relied on an
‘on demand promissory note’ and had stated that one Mr. ‘HM’           D
was also present. The said Mr. ‘HM’ who had also signed as
witness to the ‘on demand promissory note’ was not examined
as a witness due to which the trial Judge held the transaction as
not proved and in that context it was held that the respondent
has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. However,
the respondent had tendered evidence relating to the cheque            E
being issued and had discharged the initial burden. The entire
consideration by the Trial Judge to arrive at his conclusion was
predicated on the allegation levelled by the appellant that an
incident had occurred on 20.01.2004 when the respondent is
stated to have obtained the cheque and signatures on certain           F
blank papers by using force. Much is made about the respondent
having presented the cheque during February 2004 to assume
that he would not have waited that long if the cheque was really
dated 12.12.2003 and was issued earlier. Such an assumption
would not be justified when, in fact, the cheque is dated 12.12.2003
and was presented within its period of validity. To assume the         G
incident alleged by the appellant to have occurred on 20.01.2004
to be true, the cheque ought to have been dated on or after
20.01.2004. The date of presentation of the cheque is of no
consequence provided it is presented within its validity period.
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654           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2021] 9 S.C.R.


A     That the alleged offence had been committed by the respondent
      on 20.01.2004 itself, was considered in C.C. No.6318/2004. When
      a jurisdictional Court had gone into the very same allegation and
      had rendered its judgment on 06.12.2006, another court
      exercising co-ordinate jurisdiction could not have brushed it aside
      lightly. The sum and substance of the defence is that the
B
      documents and cheque had been obtained by the respondent on
      20.01.2004 by threatening the appellant. In that regard, the
      circumstances thereto were referred and it has been categorically
      stated that the appellant had filed a complaint, pursuant to which
      a case was registered against the respondent for the offence
C     punishable under Sections 365, 342, 323 and 506 of IPC. To arrive
      at the negative findings on the points raised, the Magistrate has
      assigned detailed reasons and has arrived at the conclusion that
      the evidence of the complainant in respect of the incident alleged
      to have taken place near the Taluk office, is not at all acceptable
      and therefore the prosecution has failed. Further, though an
D
      investigation was conducted in the said proceedings and the trial
      had proceeded, no material objects had been seized, which has
      been commented upon by the Magistrate. The same would
      indicate that the cheques and other documents relied upon in
      the present proceedings, were not found to be created by
E     threatening the appellant, as alleged. The Court had therefore
      arrived at the conclusion that the prosecution had miserably failed
      to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts against the accused
      for the alleged offences. The said finding and conclusion arrived
      at in the relevant proceedings would indicate that the incident
      alleged to have occurred on 20.01.2004, was not proved to have
F
      taken place. If that be the position, the defence sought to be put
      forth in the instant case and the witnesses examined in the instant
      proceedings are only by way of improvement in respect of the
      same cause of action. Therefore, the defence sought to be put
      forth relating to the cheque and other documents having been
G     obtained by force, cannot be accepted as a probable defence when
      the respondent successfully discharged the initial burden cast
      on him of establishing that the cheque signed by the appellant
      was issued in his favour toward discharge of a legally recoverable
      amount. The fact that the appellant has admitted about an earlier
      transaction where according to him, he had borrowed the amount
H
             K.S. RANGANATHA v. VITTAL SHETTY                              655


and repaid the same in the year 1995, would indicate that the              A
appellant and the respondent had entered into financial
transactions earlier as well and another transaction was probable
between the parties who were known to each other. The
respondent had discharged the burden of proving that the
transaction had actually taken place. To rebut the same, the very
                                                                           B
case put forth by the appellant cannot be accepted as probable
defence since the said aspect had already been considered in a
separate proceeding (C.C.No.6318/2004) and the respondent had
been acquitted in the said proceedings. The conclusion reached
by the Magistrate to acquit the appellant herein was not justified.
The Single Judge of the High Court was therefore justified in his          C
conclusion though detailed reasons have not been assigned. No
reason to interfere with the judgment passed by the High
Court impugned in this appeal. [Paras 12, 13, 15 - 18][663-A-G;
665-D-F; 666-E-H; 667-A-F]
                        Case Law Reference                                 D
[2007] 10 SCR 1010               relied on                Para 8
[2012] 9 SCR 530                 referred to              Para 8
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No.1860 of 2011.                                                           E
      From the Judgment and Order dated 18.08.2010 of the High Court
of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Appeal No.485 of 2008.
      S. N. Bhat, Ms. Parvati Bhat, Advs. for the Appellant.
      Ranji Thomas, Sr. Adv., V. N. Raghupathy, K. K. L. Gautam,
                                                                           F
Rahul Mohod, Advs. for the Respondent.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
      A. S. BOPANNA, J.
      1. The appellant is before this Court assailing the judgment dated
18.08.2010 passed by the High Court of Karnataka in Criminal Appeal        G
No. 485 of 2008. By the said judgment, the Learned Single Judge has
allowed the appeal filed by the respondent herein and set aside the
judgment of acquittal passed by the IIIrd Additional Civil Judge (Junior
Division) and JMFC, Udupi in favour of the appellant herein in Criminal
Case No. 3207 of 2004. Consequently, the appellant herein was convicted    H
656             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2021] 9 S.C.R.


A     and sentenced to pay compensation of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees four lakhs)
      within four months. In default thereto, the appellant was sentenced to
      simple imprisonment for a period of six months. The appellant was further
      ordered to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- to the State, in default, to undergo
      simple imprisonment for a period of 15 days. The appellant therefore is
      claiming to be aggrieved by the judgment impugned herein.
B
             2. The factual matrix, in brief, is that the appellant and the
      respondent are known to each other. Both of them hail from Udupi in
      Karnataka. The respondent filed a private complaint under Section 2(d)
      read with Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (‘Cr.PC’ for
      short) against the appellant seeking that he be punished for committing
C     the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments
      Act, 1881 (‘NI Act’ for short). The complaint was filed on 17.03.2004
      before the II Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division) and JMFC, Udupi
      in P.C. No. 213 of 2004 which was thereafter registered as CC No.
      3207 of 2004. It was the case of the respondent that the appellant carried
D     on the business of money lending and land brokerage for which he used
      to take loan from the respondent as and when required. In one such
      transaction, as per the case put forth by the respondent is that the appellant
      borrowed a sum of Rs. 3,75,000/- (Rupees three lakh seventy-five
      thousand) from the respondent on 12.06.2003 and executed an ‘on
      demand promissory note’ and a receipt in acknowledgment. The appellant
E     also issued a post-dated cheque bearing No. 062589 for Rs. 4,00,000/-
      (Rupees four lakhs) dated 12.12.2003, which included interest for six
      months. The said cheque was drawn on Corporation Bank, Ambalpady
      Branch, Udupi.
             3. As per the case of the respondent, when the cheque was
F     presented for realisation on 17.02.2004, the same was dishonoured by
      the bank for “insufficient funds” in the account of the appellant. Having
      got issued a legal notice dated 18.02.2004 and on the demand for payment
      of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees four lakhs) not being complied, the respondent
      filed the complaint in the jurisdictional court, the details of which is
G     referred to supra. The appellant however came out with the defence
      that though he had borrowed an amount of Rs.80,000/- from the
      respondent in the year 1995, the same was repaid with interest, amounting
      to Rs.3,20,000/- (Rupees three lakh twenty thousand) through various
      cheques and there was no further amount due and payable. The appellant
      therefore denied that he had taken any loan on 12.06.2003, as alleged. It
H
             K.S. RANGANATHA v. VITTAL SHETTY                                   657
                     [A. S. BOPANNA, J.]

was the further case of the appellant that the respondent had assaulted         A
and threatened him on 20.01.2004 and by force had obtained his signatures
on blank papers as also on some cheque leaves which were being misused.
The appellant had in that regard lodged a complaint on 02.02.2004, the
trial of which was held in the Court of Additional Civil Judge (Junior
Division) and JMFC, Udupi in CC No. 6318/2004. However, admittedly
                                                                                B
the respondent herein was acquitted in the said proceedings, through the
judgment dated 06.12.2006 which has attained finality.
       4. In order to contend that the complaint filed by the respondent
alleging dishonour of cheque was motivated, the appellant alleged that
as he had incurred debts, he decided to sell one of the properties belonging
to him, which was purchased in the year 1994, so as to clear the said           C
debts. The respondent evinced interest to purchase the same for
Rs.3,00,000/- (Rupees three lakh) but the appellant declined to sell it to
the respondent as according to him, the said property was worth more
than Rs.7,00,000/- (Rupees seven lakh). The appellant alleged that the
respondent had therefore filed the instant complaint, based on false            D
allegations.
        5. On the rival contentions, the learned trial Judge raised the point
for consideration, as to whether the respondent herein had proved that
the cheque dated 12.12.2003 for Rs. 4,00,000/ (Rupees four lakh) was
issued by the appellant to discharge the legal debt or liability and thereby    E
committed the offence punishable under Section 138 N.I Act. The learned
trial Judge having accepted the version put forth by the appellant passed
an order of acquittal. The learned Judge of the High Court, has on the
other hand, accepted the case of the respondent herein and taking into
account the presumption that had arisen on the cheque being issued and
such presumption not being rebutted for the reasons indicated by it, has        F
allowed the appeal and convicted the appellant which has resulted in this
appeal.
      6. We have heard Mr. S.N. Bhat, learned counsel for the appellant,
Mr. Ranji Thomas, learned senior counsel with Mr. V.N. Raghupathy,
learned counsel for the respondent and perused the appeal papers.               G
       7. From the rival contentions urged before us and the facts which
emerge from the records, it is clear that cheque bearing No.062589
dated 12.12.2003 drawn on Corporation Bank, Ambalpady Branch, Udupi
for the sum of Rs. 4,00,000/- (Rupees four lakh), which is the subject
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658             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 9 S.C.R.


A     matter of the complaint in CC No.3207 of 2004, has been brought on
      record. However, in the light of the defence that was raised, the point
      which arises for consideration is as to whether the said cheque was in
      fact issued by the appellant on 12.06.2003 by post-dating it to 12.12.2003
      and making it payable on or after that date, towards discharge of a legal
      debt.
B
              8. The legal aspect relating to the presumption arising in law when
      a cheque is issued, is to be noted at the threshold. No doubt, as noted by
      the trial court with reference to the decision of this Court in K. Prakashan
      vs. P.K. Surendran (2008) 1 SCC 258, the initial burden is placed on the
      complainant to discharge. Learned counsel for the appellant has further
C     relied on the decision of this Court in Reverend Mother Marykutty vs.
      Reni C. Kottaram & Anr. (2013) 1 SCC 327 with reference to para 13,
      which reads as hereunder;
            “13. That apart, having considered the conclusions of the learned
            trial Judge, we find that those conclusions were drawn by adducing
D           cogent and convincing reasoning and we do not find any fault in
            the said conclusions drawn by the learned trial Judge. In the
            circumstance, the principles set out in the decision relied upon by
            the learned counsel for the appellant in M.S. Narayana Menon as
            regards the presumption to be drawn and the preponderance of
E           probabilities to be inferred, as set out in paras 31 to 33, are fully
            satisfied. Those principles, set out in paras 31 to 33, can be usefully
            referred to which are as under:
            “31. A Division Bench of this Court in Bharat Barrel & Drum
            Mfg. Co. v. Amin Chand Payrelal albeit in a civil case laid down
F           the law in the following terms:
            (SCC PP.50-51 para 12)
            ‘12. Upon consideration of various judgments as noted
            hereinabove, the position of law which emerges is that once
            execution of the promissory note is admitted, the presumption
G           under Section 118(a) would arise that it is supported by a
            consideration. Such a presumption is rebuttable. The defendant
            can prove the non-existence of a consideration by raising a
            probable defence. If the defendant is proved to have discharged
            the initial onus of proof showing that the existence of consideration
            was improbable or doubtful or the same was illegal, the onus would
H
      K.S. RANGANATHA v. VITTAL SHETTY                                  659
              [A. S. BOPANNA, J.]

shift to the plaintiff who will be obliged to prove it as a matter of   A
fact and upon its failure to prove would disentitle him to the grant
of relief on the basis of the negotiable instrument. The burden
upon the defendant of proving the non-existence of the
consideration can be either direct or by bringing on record the
preponderance of probabilities by reference to the circumstances
                                                                        B
upon which he relies. In such an event, the plaintiff is entitled
under law to rely upon all the evidence led in the case including
that of the plaintiff as well. In case, where the defendant fails to
discharge the initial onus of proof by showing the non-existence
of the consideration, the plaintiff would invariably be held entitled
to the benefit of presumption arising under Section 118(a) in his       C
favour. The court may not insist upon the defendant to disprove
the existence of consideration by leading direct evidence as the
existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated
and even if led, is to be seen with a doubt.’
This Court, therefore, clearly opined that it is not necessary for      D
the defendant to disprove the existence of consideration by way
of direct evidence.
32. The standard of proof evidently is preponderance of
probabilities. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be
drawn not only from the materials on record but also by reference       E
to the circumstances upon which he relies.
33. Presumption drawn under a statute has only an evidentiary
value. Presumptions are raised in terms of the Evidence Act.
Presumption drawn in respect of one fact may be evidence even
for the purpose of drawing presumption under another.”                  F
Applying the abovesaid principles to the case on hand, we find
that the judgment of the trial court in having drawn the conclusions
to the effect that the appellant sufficiently rebutted the initial
presumption as regards the issuance of the cheque under Sections
138 and 139 of the Act, was perfectly justified. We also find that      G
the preponderance of probabilities also fully supports the stand of
the appellant as held by the learned trial Judge. The judgment of
the High Court in having interfered with the order of acquittal
passed by the learned trial Judge without proper reasoning is,
therefore, liable to be set aside and is accordingly set aside.
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660            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2021] 9 S.C.R.


A           Consequently, the conviction and sentence imposed in the
            impugned judgment [Criminal Appeal No. 1707 of 2007, order
            dated 17-3-2010 (Ker)] is also set aside.”
            9. The learned senior counsel for the respondent on the other
      hand, relied on the decision of this Court in Kalamani Tex & Anr. vs. P.
B     Balasubramanian (2021) 5 SCC 283 which is as hereunder: -
            “16. The appellants have banked upon the evidence of DW 1 to
            dispute the existence of any recoverable debt. However, his
            deposition merely highlights that the respondent had an over-
            extended credit facility with the bank and his failure to update his
C           account led to debt recovery proceedings. Such evidence does
            not disprove the appellants’ liability and has a little bearing on the
            merits of the respondent’s complaint. Similarly, the appellants’ mere
            bald denial regarding genuineness of the deed of undertaking dated
            7-11-2000, despite admitting the signatures of Appellant 2 thereupon,
            does not cast any doubt on the genuineness of the said document.
D
            17. Even if we take the arguments raised by the appellants at
            face value that only a blank cheque and signed blank stamp papers
            were given to the respondent, yet the statutory presumption cannot
            be obliterated. It is useful to cite Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar [Bir
            Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, where this Court held that: (SCC p. 209,
E           para 36)
            “36. Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed over
            by the accused, which is towards some payment, would attract
            presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
            in the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque
F           was not issued in discharge of a debt.”
            18. Considering the fact that there has been an admitted business
            relationship between the parties, we are of the opinion that the
            defence raised by the appellants does not inspire confidence or
            meet the standard of “preponderance of probability”. In the
G           absence of any other relevant material, it appears to us that the
            High Court did not err in discarding the appellants’ defence and
            upholding the onus imposed upon them in terms of Section 118
            and Section 139 of NIA.
            19. As regards the claim of compensation raised on behalf of the
H           respondent, we are conscious of the settled principles that the
            K.S. RANGANATHA v. VITTAL SHETTY                                    661
                    [A. S. BOPANNA, J.]

     object of Chapter XVII of NIA is not only punitive but also                A
     compensatory and restitutive. The provisions of NIA envision a
     single window for criminal liability for dishonour of cheque as
     well as civil liability for realisation of the cheque amount. It is also
     well settled that there needs to be a consistent approach towards
     awarding compensation and unless there exist special
                                                                                B
     circumstances, the courts should uniformly levy fine up to twice
     the cheque amount along with simple interest @ 9% p.a.
      10. It would also be apposite to take note of a decision in
Triyambak S. Hegde vs. Sripad in Criminal Appeal Nos.849-850 of
2011 dated 23.09.2021 wherein it was observed as hereunder:
                                                                                C
     “12. Insofar as the payment of the amount by the appellant in the
     context of the cheque having been signed by the respondent, the
     presumption for passing of the consideration would arise as
     provided under Section 118(a) of N.I. Act which reads as
     hereunder: -
                                                                                D
     “118. Presumptions as to negotiable instruments – Until
     the contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be made:-
        (a) of consideration – that every negotiable instrument was
        made or drawn for consideration, and that every such
        instrument, when it has been accepted, indorsed, negotiated or          E
        transferred, was accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred
        for consideration.”
     13. The above noted provisions are explicit to the effect that such
     presumption would remain, until the contrary is proved. The
     learned counsel for the appellant in that regard has relied on the         F
     decision of this court in K. Bhaskaran vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan
     Balan & Anr.(1999) 7 SCC 510 wherein it is held as hereunder:-
        “9. As the signature in the cheque is admitted to be that of the
        accused, the presumption envisaged in Section 118 of the Act
        can legally be inferred that the cheque was made or drawn for
                                                                                G
        consideration on the date which the cheque bears. Section
        139 of the Act enjoins on the Court to presume that the holder
        of the cheque received it for the discharge of any debt or liability.
        The burden was on the accused to rebut the aforesaid
        presumption. The Trial Court was not persuaded to rely on the
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662            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2021] 9 S.C.R.


A               interested testimony of DW-1 to rebut the presumption. The
                said finding was upheld by the High Court. It is not now open
                to the accused to contend differently on that aspect.”
            14. The learned counsel for the respondent has however referred
            to the decision of this Court in Basalingappa vs. Mudibasappa
B           (2019) 5 SCC 418 wherein it is held as hereunder: -
                “25.We having noticed the ratio laid down by this Court in the
                above cases on Sections 118 (a) and 139, we now summarise
                the principles enumerated by this Court in following manner:

C               25.1. Once the execution of cheque is admitted Section 139 of
                the Act mandates a presumption that the cheque was for the
                discharge of any debt or other liability.
                25.2. The presumption under Section 139 is a rebuttable
                presumption and the onus is on the accused to raise the probable
                defence. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption
D
                is that of preponderance of probabilities.
                25.3. To rebut the presumption, it is open for the accused to
                rely on evidence led by him or the accused can also rely on the
                materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise a
                probable defence. Inference of preponderance of probabilities
E
                can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record by
                the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon
                which they rely.
                25.4. That it is not necessary for the accused to come in the
                witness box in support of his defence, Section 139 imposed an
F               evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden.
                25.5. It is not necessary for the accused to come in the witness
                box to support his defence.”
             11. The position of law as noted above makes it crystal clear that
G     when a cheque is drawn out and is relied upon by the drawee, it will
      raise a presumption that it is drawn towards a consideration which is a
      legally recoverable amount; such presumption of course, is rebuttable
      by proving to the contrary. The onus is on the accused to raise a probable


H
             K.S. RANGANATHA v. VITTAL SHETTY                                  663
                     [A. S. BOPANNA, J.]

defence and the standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is on          A
preponderance of probabilities.
       12. In the backdrop of the legal position being enunciated, the
facts herein are to be noted. It was the case of the respondent herein
that the appellant had borrowed the sum of Rs.3,75,000/- (Rupees three
lakh seventy-five thousand) on 12.06.2003 which was agreed to be repaid        B
with interest in six months. Hence, cheque No.062589 dated 12.12.2003
for Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees four lakh) drawn on Corporation Bank was
issued. It is true that the respondent had relied on an ‘on demand
promissory note’ and had stated that one Mr. Harish Moolya was also
present. The said Mr. Harish Moolya who had also signed as witness to
the ‘on demand promissory note’ was not examined as a witness due to           C
which the learned trial Judge held the transaction as not proved and in
that context it was held that the respondent has failed to prove the case
beyond reasonable doubt. However, it is to be noted that the respondent
had tendered evidence relating to the cheque being issued and had
discharged the initial burden.                                                 D
        13. The entire consideration by the learned Trial Judge to arrive
at his conclusion was predicated on the allegation levelled by the appellant
that an incident had occurred on 20.01.2004 when the respondent is
stated to have obtained the cheque and signatures on certain blank papers
by using force. Much is made about the respondent having presented             E
the cheque during February 2004 to assume that he would not have
waited that long if the cheque was really dated 12.12.2003 and was
issued earlier. Such an assumption would not be justified when, in fact,
the cheque is dated 12.12.2003 and was presented within its period of
validity. To assume the incident alleged by the appellant to have occurred
on 20.01.2004 to be true, the cheque ought to have been dated on or            F
after 20.01.2004. The date of presentation of the cheque is of no
consequence provided it is presented within its validity period. That the
alleged offence had been committed by the respondent on 20.01.2004
itself, was considered in C.C. No.6318/2004. When a jurisdictional Court
had gone into the very same allegation and had rendered its judgment on        G
06.12.2006, another court exercising co-ordinate jurisdiction could not
have brushed it aside lightly.
       14. The learned Judge of the High Court also referred to the
earlier proceedings only as a passing reference. In the instant case,
what needs to be noted is the defence that had been put forth before the       H
664            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 9 S.C.R.


A     learned Magistrate to defeat the case of the respondent herein, so as to
      consider whether such contention of the appellant can still be considered
      as a probable defence. The defence put forth by the appellant in the
      instant case i.e., Section 138 NI Act proceedings in C.C. No.3207 of
      2004 as referred to by the learned Magistrate in the course of the
      judgment, reads as hereunder: -
B
            “It is further alleged that during the year 2003, in order to clear
            off the dues to some others, the accused has decided to sell the
            above referred property and the accused expressed his desire to
            sell his property before the complainant. At that time, the
            complainant proposed to purchase the said property from the
C           accused for Rs.3,00,000/, but the accused has refused to sell the
            said property to the complainant for the above said amount of
            Rs.3,00,000/- since, the property is worth Rs. 7 lakh. In view of
            the proposal made by the complainant for small amount, the
            accused is declined to sell his property to him. Thereafter, the
D           accused himself began to search the customers for purchasing
            the said property at that time the complainant mislead the proposed
            purchasers who are ready to purchase the said property
            representing that the said property was pledged by the accused
            for the purpose of loan which was obtained by the accused from
            the finance of the complainant and accordingly, the purchasers
E           who are come forward to purchase the same refused to purchase
            the said property thereby, the accused transferred some of the
            portion of the said property to his creditors and some of the portion
            was transferred in the name of his wife. When facts stood thus,
            on 20.1.04, when the accused went to taluk office at Udupi with
F           his bike, the complainant chased the accused in his Maruthi Omni
            Van and thereafter, kidnapped the accused and took him to his
            office which was situated at Sri. Rama Building at Udupi, wherein
            the complainant wrongfully restrained the accused and assaulted
            him with hands and also with iron rods and forcibly obtained various
            signatures on some blank papers and also on some cheque leaves
G           only with an intention to knock off the property of the accused. It
            is further alleged that at that time the complainant warned the
            accused to get some papers from the wife of the accused since
            the property was stands in the name of the wife of the accused.
            At that time the complainant further threatened that he will finish
H           the life of the accused as well as wife and children of the accused,
             K.S. RANGANATHA v. VITTAL SHETTY                                 665
                     [A. S. BOPANNA, J.]

      if the said alleged act is intimated by the accused to the police.      A
      Thereafter the said incident, the complainant appointed the paid
      goondas to watch the activities of the accused and the said goonda
      people also always watched the activities of the accused nearby
      the compound of the accused, thereby, there was delay in lodging
      the complaint and accordingly, the accused herein lodged the
                                                                              B
      complaint against the complainant on 2.2.04 nearly after lapse of
      12 days from the date of incident. It is further alleged that the
      complainant is having criminal mind and he has got every criminal
      background and also faced various criminal charges like offences
      punishable u/s. 302 and 326 of IPC and also engaged in Criminal
      activities amongst those, this incident is also one of the charge       C
      faced by the accused. It is further alleged that the accused never
      issued the cheque in question voluntary and the same was obtained
      by the complainant by force and accordingly, the case was
      registered against the complainant for the offences punishable u/
      s. 365, 342, 323 and 506 of IPC and accordingly, the cheque in
                                                                              D
      question and some other documents also misused by the
      complainant against the accused. In the light of the above said
      defence, the accused humbly prayed for acquittal.”
       15. A close perusal of the above indicates that the sum and
substance of the defence is that the documents and cheque had been
obtained by the respondent on 20.01.2004 by threatening the appellant.        E
In that regard, the circumstances thereto were referred and it has been
categorically stated that the appellant had filed a complaint, pursuant to
which a case was registered against the respondent for the offence
punishable under Sections 365, 342, 323 and 506 of IPC. This makes it
relevant for us to take note of the aspect that was considered in the         F
above noted criminal complaint filed by the appellant. The said case was
registered as C.C. No.6318 of 2004. In that case, the learned Magistrate,
on taking note of the allegation made by the appellant, had raised the
points for consideration and the findings were summarised. They are as
follows: -
                                                                              G
      “5. Heard both sides and perused the record. Now, the points that
      arise for the due consideration of this Court are as follows: -
          (1) Whether the prosecution proves beyond all reasonable
          doubts that on 20.1.2004 at about 11 p.m. within the jurisdiction
          of Udupi Town PS at Shivalli Village in Sriram Building at Room     H
666            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 9 S.C.R.


A               No. 11 i.e. inside Svitha Finance, having old hatred, the accused
                locked up CW1 K.S. Rangnathan inside the said finance,
                thereby wrongfully confined CW1 committed the offence
                punishable U/s. 342 of IPC?
                (2) Whether the prosecution further proves beyond all
B               reasonable doubts that on the same date, place and time, the
                accused in continuation voluntarily assaulted with his hands on
                the face, neck and other parts of the body of CWl and thereby
                committed the offence punishable U/s. 323 of IPC?
                (3) Whether the prosecution further proves beyond all
C               reasonable doubts that on the same date, place and time, the
                accused in continuation threatened the life of CWl, his wife
                and children if CWl will not return the loan amount within the
                prescribed time and thereby committed the offence punishable
                U/s. Part II of 506 of IPC.
D               (4) What order?
            6. Now the findings of this Court on the above said points that
            arisen for due consideration are answered as follows:-
                Point No. 1 : In the Negative
E               Point No. 2: In the Negative
                Point No. 3: In the Negative
                Point No. 4: As per final order for the following:”
             16. To arrive at the negative findings on the points raised, the
F     learned Magistrate has assigned detailed reasons and has arrived at the
      conclusion that the evidence of the complainant in respect of the incident
      alleged to have taken place near the Taluk office, is not at all acceptable
      and therefore the prosecution has failed. Further, though an investigation
      was conducted in the said proceedings and the trial had proceeded, no
      material objects had been seized, which has been commented upon by
G     the learned Magistrate. The same would indicate that the cheques and
      other documents relied upon in the present proceedings, were not found
      to be created by threatening the appellant, as alleged. The Court had
      therefore arrived at the conclusion that the prosecution had miserably
      failed to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts against the accused
H     for the alleged offences. The said finding and conclusion arrived at in
               K.S. RANGANATHA v. VITTAL SHETTY                                   667
                       [A. S. BOPANNA, J.]

the relevant proceedings would indicate that the incident alleged to have         A
occurred on 20.01.2004, was not proved to have taken place.
        17. If that be the position, the defence sought to be put forth in the
instant case and the witnesses examined in the instant proceedings are
only by way of improvement in respect of the same cause of action.
Therefore, the defence sought to be put forth relating to the cheque and          B
other documents having been obtained by force, cannot be accepted as
a probable defence when the respondent successfully discharged the
initial burden cast on him of establishing that the cheque signed by the
appellant was issued in his favour toward discharge of a legally
recoverable amount. The fact that the appellant has admitted about an
earlier transaction where according to him, he had borrowed the amount            C
and repaid the same in the year 1995, would indicate that the appellant
and the respondent had entered into financial transactions earlier as well
and another transaction was probable between the parties who were
known to each other. In the light of the other circumstances established
by the respondent, it would indicate that the respondent had discharged           D
the burden of proving that the transaction had actually taken place. To
rebut the same, the very case put forth by the appellant cannot be accepted
as probable defence since the said aspect had already been considered
in a separate proceeding (C.C.No.6318/2004) and the respondent had
been acquitted in the said proceedings.
                                                                                  E
      18. Hence, the conclusion reached by the learned Magistrate in
C.C. No.3207/2004 to acquit the appellant herein, was not justified. The
learned Single Judge of the High Court was therefore justified in his
conclusion though detailed reasons have not been assigned. In that view,
we see no reason to interfere with the judgment dated 18.08.2010, passed
by the High Court in Criminal Appeal No.485/2008, impugned in this                F
appeal.
      19. Accordingly, the appeal being devoid of merit stands dismissed.
The parties shall bear their own costs.
       20. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.                 G
Divya Pandey                                                  Appeal dismissed.




                                                                                  H