Holding

Non‑mention of a ground for eviction in the notice does not preclude a landlord from obtaining eviction if the ground is proved bona‑fide and aligns with the statutory provisions, and the bona‑fide requirement must be assessed objectively on the evidence.

Summary

The landlord, K.S. Sundararaju Chettiar, evicted his tenant M.R. Ramachandra Naidu under the Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, first on the ground of his own business expansion and later also on the basis of a pawn‑broking partnership run by his wife and daughter‑in‑law. The eviction notice did not mention the partnership business, leading the High Court to remand the case on the ground of procedural irregularity. The appellate authority, however, held that the partnership business existed before the notice and that the landlord’s bona‑fide requirement was supported by documentary evidence, including income‑tax assessments. The Supreme Court affirmed that non‑mention of a ground in the notice does not bar eviction if the ground is proved bona‑fide and consistent with the Act, and that a cause of action for eviction can recur in subsequent proceedings. It also criticised the High Court for hyper‑technicality and upheld the order of remand, directing the appellate authority to consider the actual space requirement for the partnership business before deciding the eviction.

Issues considered

The omission of a bona‑fide requirement ground in the eviction notice bars the landlord from obtaining eviction?
Whether the landlord’s claim of bona‑fide requirement for a pawn‑broking partnership is valid despite not being mentioned in the notice.
Can a cause of action for eviction be pursued repeatedly in subsequent proceedings?
Whether the Rent Act is merely protective of tenants or also regulates landlord rights.

Legislation cited

Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960s. 10(3)(a)(iii), s. 14(1)(4), s. 14(1)(b)

Subjects

evictionbona fide requirementrent controlnotice deficiencylandlord‑tenant disputerecurring cause of actionhyper‑technicality

Judgment

A K.S. SUNDARARAJU CHEITIAR
(
v.
M.R. RAMACHANDRA NAIDU

FEBRUARY 18, 1994

B [K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY AND G.N. RAY, .1.T.]

Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960: Section
10(3)(a)(iii) and 14(1)(b).
r
-
c grou11dLandlord--Eviction-Notice-f'etition-Non-mentioning of evic,tio11
ill 11otice--But groulld mentiolled in petitioll-Whetlter disellft1Jes
lalldlord to claim relief

Evictio1t-Bona fide requirement-Factors relevant i11 determin-
illg-Failure of landlord to establislr-Effect on bo11a fide requircme11t ill
D subsequent proceedings.
Evictio1t-Cause of eviction-Wl1ether recurring i11 llature-Landlord's
failure to establish cause of action-Wlietller debars him from establishing
cause of action in subsequellt eviction proceedings.

E Re/II Act-Nature of-W/1ether a legi.slation for protection of tenant
0111y-W11ether regulates inter se rig/its of lalldlord and te11ant.

The appellant-landlord obtained an eviction order against his tenant
under section 14(1)(4) of the Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent
Control) Act, 1960. Thereafter, he let out the suit premises to the respon·
F dent but subsequently filed an eviction petition against him under section
10(3)(a)(iii) and 14(1)(b) of the Act i.e. on the grounds that (I) he required
more space not only for expansion of his own business but also for
expansion of pawn broking partnership business of bis wife and daughter-
in-law; (ii) the suit premises were old and in a dilapidated condition
requiring urgent demolition and construction. The Rent Controller al-
G
lowed the petition under section 10(3)(a)(iii) holding that the landlord
required the premises for own occupation but rejected his case that he
required the premises for demolition and construction under section ·~
14(l)(b) •. ~

.H On appeal the competent authority affirmed the li"dings of the Rent
20
CHETTIAR v. RAMACHANDRANAIDU 21

Con!;oller that the suit premises were bona fide required by the landlord A
for his own use and ocrupation.

The respondent-tenant filed a revision petition in the High Court
which held that (i) the landlord was not consistent with reference to I.be
location of the Company which was the pawn- broking business of partner-
ship; (ii) it was not clear as to what exactly was the area that was required B
by the respondent for the sailJ pawn broking business; and (iii) the
appellate authority had failed to consider not only the totality offacts and
circumstances of the case but also the bona fide on the part of the landlord
on account of alleged requirement of the partnership business. According·
ly the High Court by its order dated April 11, 1990 remanded the matter C
to the appellate authority to dispose of the case afresh In accordance with
law.

After the order of remand, the appellate authority affirmed the order
of eviction passed by the Rent Controller against the tenant under Section D
10(3)(a)(iii) of the Rent Act holding that (I) the eviction grounds founded
ln the proceedings ~re not identical with grounds Indicated in the notice
for eviction inasmuch as the case of the bona fide requirement on account.
of expansion of partnership business had not been mentioned in the notice;
(ii) but in view of the tenant's admission that the landlord was running a
jewdlery shop and also a pawn broker's business run by his wife and E
daughter-in-law, the landlord was entitled to claim eviction of the tenant
bona fide on account of the said two business concerns; (iii) the documents
filed by the landlord clearly establish that partnership business had in fact
been run even though it was not mentioned in the eviction notice; (iv)
documents of accounts of the partnership filed after the first order of F
remand clearly establish that the partnership business had been slowly
progressing and it was assessed for income tax from the year 1985 onward;
and (v) in view of the admitted position that the said two business

.
•
establishment were being run, much importance was not required to be
attached as to the location of the pawn broking business .
G
Thereafter, the respondenMenan4 filed a Revision Petition and the
High Court held that the appellate authority had not decided the appeal
after remand in conformity with the order of remand dated April 11, 1990.
Accordingly the High Court by i!s order dated December 11, 1992
remanded the appeal for the second time to the appellate authority with a H
22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) 2 S.C.R.

A direction that the appeal should be disposed of in accordance with the
directions contained in the earlier order of remand dated April 11, 1990. (

The appellant-landlord filed an appeal in this Coiurt challenging the
second order of remand dated December 11, 1992 contending that (i)
omission in the Eviction Notice to mention about bona fide requirement
B on account of partnership business was of little significance because in
reality the said partnership business was in existence at the time of giving
the notice for eviction and the said business was being run even at the time
of disposal of the proceedings for .eviction; (ii) the High Court bas
proceeded on hypertechnicality and set aside the well-reasoned order of
c the appellate authority simply on the ground that the observation made in
the first order of remand had not be followed properly; (iii) assuming that
the appellate authority's findings were not strictly according to the obser-
vatioins made in the order of remand, if the ultimate finding of the
appellate authority was in conformity with the provisions of Section
10(3)(a)iii) of the Rent Act, there was no occasion for the High Court to
D set aside the said order and send the matter back for redeterminat!on of
the case; and (iv) in view of the appellate authority's finding that the
business activities had been steadily increasing. It was not at all necessary
to specifically refer In the dedsion which exhibit related to what document.

E Disposing ·the appeal, this Court

HELD : 1. Non-mention of a reasonable ground for eviction In the
notice for eviction on the basis of which a claim for eviction Is later on
founded usually raises a suspicion about the existence of such gound but
such non-mention by Itself cannot dlsentitle a landlord to claim eviction
F on such ground. If a claim for eviction founded on such ground in the
petition for eviction is proved to be wellfounded and the same Is consistent
with the grounds on which eviction is permissible In law, the landlord will
be entitled to a decree for eviction notwithstanding the fact that such ,
ground was not mentioned in the notice for evlction.[33·F·G)
G Z. The appellate authority had rightly indicated in the facts of this
~
case that the partnership business was in existence even prior to giving
notice for eviction by the landlord. Therefore, It cannot be reasonably held
that the claim of bona fide requirement on account of the said partnership ,..
business is per se ma/a fide and should not be taken Into consideration
H simply because the case for bona fide requirement on that account had not
CHETI'JAR v. RAMACHA.'IDRANAIDU 23

been mentioned in the notice for eviction. [33·G·34A·B] A
3. The High Court has acted with hyper-technicality in discarding
the finding of the appellate authority about the continuous expension of
the said partnership business. The appellate authority has referred to the
exhibits including the income-tax assessment orders for the purpose of
coming to the finding that the said business had been gradually expanding. B
Such finding, therefore, appears to be justified. In the aforesaid facts, it
was not proper to discard such finding of the appellate authority by
indicating that the exhibits had not been elaborated in detail.
(34-H, 35-A-C]
4. The requirement of spa« 1•• the s•id partnership business con· C
sistent with the nature rf l:>isiness and expanding activities had not been
gone into by the appellate authority and the relevant materials are also
not before this Court. Therefore, the order of remand is upheld to the
limited extent, namely, that the appellate authority on the basis of
materials already on record would consider the actual requirement of
space for the saiu vo.rlriershlp business consistent with the nature or D
business keeping in view, th;: expanding activities in such business. If on
such consideration, the appellate authority conies to the finding that the
landlord bona fide require, u1e disputed premises for running the said
business in a separate enclosure, the order of eviction under Section
10(3)(a)(iii) of the Rent Act should be passed by the appellate authority. E
(35-D·G]
Hameeda Hardware Stores v.B.Mohan Lal'Sowcar, A.I.R. (1988) S.C.
1060 and Krishnan Nair v. Ghouse Basha, A.l.R. (1987) S.C. 2199, referred
to.

5. There is no manner of doubt that the bona fide requirement is F
required to be considered objectively with reference to the materials on
record and it is necessary to determine the real intention of the landlord
on the basis of evidences adduced in a case. If the materials on record
clearly justify a case of bona fide requirement, there will be no occasion
for the court to hold that the landlord did not require the premises bona G
fide simply because on a previous occasion the actj~n of the landlord for
bringing an eviction case was not bona fide. (34-B-C]

6. The cause for eviction is a recurring cause of action and even if
the existence of such cause of action had not been found in a previous
proceeding for eviction, the same cannot be discarded if such claim is H
24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] 2 S.C.R.

A established by cogent evidecnes adduced by the landlord in a subsequent
proceeding. The landlord may bring an ai:tion for eviction of the tenant on
subsequent cause of action justifying a case of bona fide requirement.
[34·D·E]
7. To say that the Rent Act is a legislation for protecting a tenant
will be over simplification of the legislative import of the Rent Act. It will
IB be more appropriate to .say that the Rent Act regulates the incidence of
tenancy and illter se rights and obli!lalions of the landlord and tenant.
(34-G]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 878 of
1994.
c From the Judgment and Order dated 11.12.92 of the Madras High
Court in C.R.P. No. 436 of 1991.

P. Chidambaram, V.K. Vijyaraghavan and S. Mur1idhar for the Ap-
pellant.

Siva Subramanian, V. Balachandran aad G. Nagarajan for the
Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

E G.N. RAY, J. Leave granted. Pursuant to the notice issued 011 the
special leave petition No. 1687 of 1993, the respondent has entered ap-
pearance through counsel and the counter affidavit has also been filed.

The appellant landlord is the owner of the suit premises being shop
No. 142. Gandhiji Raod, Mayiladuthurai, Tamil Nadu. On June 15, 1971,
F the appellant landlord leased out the premises in question to Sri G.
Vasanthan on a monthly rental of Rs. 400 with effect from June 15, 1971
and the appellant landlord sought eviction of the said tenant V&santhan
and filed a petition for eviction on April 22, 1975 under Section 14(1)(4)
of the Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960
(hereinafter referred to as the Rent Act) before the Rent Controller
G Mayiladuthurai. By an order dated December 12, 1975, the learned Rent
Cont(oller dismissed the said eviction proceeding being R.C.0.P. No. 9 of
1975. The appellant landlord preferred an appeal against the said order
of the Rent Controller before the appe11ate authority. By order dated
August 31, 1977, the appellate authority allowed the said appeal and
H directed the eviction of the said tenant Vasanthan. Thereafter, the appel-
CHETTIAR v. RAMACHANDRA NAIDU [G.N. RAY, J.] 25

lant landlord on August 29, 1978, let out the suit premises to the respon- A
dent M.R. Ramachandra Naidu for a period of three years from August 1,
1978 to August 31, 1981 on a rental of Rs. 750 per month. The period of
lease was extended further for another term of three years with effect from
September 1, 1981 to August 31, 1984. It is the case of the landlord that
he required the suit premises for expansion of his own business and also B
the pawn broking business under the partnership of his wife and daughter-
in-law. The appellant landlord served a notice dated November 5, 1984
upon the respondent tenant asking him to vacate the suit premises. The
respondent tenant refused to vacate the suit premises and on April 17,
1985, the appellant landlord filed an eviction petition under Section
10(3)(a)(iii) of the Rent Act for eviction of the •e.nant on the ground that C
the appellant landlord required more space for running the said pawn
broking shop as well as the business of his own. The appellant landlord
also urged that since the suit premises were old and in a dilapidated
condition the same required urgent demolition and construction and ac-
cordingly the tenant should also be evicted under Section 14(i)(b) of the D
Rent Act. By an order dated Oc•.ober 5, 1987, the learned Rent Controller
allowed the said R.C.O.P. No. 37 of 1985 on the ground that the appellant
landlord had made out a case under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the R~nt Act
and he required the suit premises Lona fide for his own occupation. The
Rent Controller, however, negatived the case of the appellant landlord that
he required the premises for demolition or construction under Section E
14(i)(b) of the Rent Act. The respondent tenant thereafter filed R.C.A.
No. 4 of 1988 dated April 26, 1989. The appellant landlord also filed Cross
Appeal being R.C.A. No. 9 of 1988 against the dismissal of the appellant
landlord's case for eviction under Section 14(i)(b) of the Rent Act. By a
judgment and order dated April 26, 1988, the appellate authority dismissed F
R.C.A. No. 4 of 1988 filed by the respondent tenant after endorsing the
finding of the learned Rent Controller that the suit premises was bona fide
required by the appellant landlord for his use and occupation. The learned
appellate authority, however, dismissed the landlord's Cross Appeal being
R.C.A. No. 9 of 1988 by the same judgment. The respondent tenant
thereafter filed Civil Revision Petition No. 1448 of 1989 in the High Court G
of Madras challenging the said eviction order under Section 10(3)(iii) of
the Rent Act. By an order dated April 11, 1990, the said Civil Revision
Petition No. 1448 of 1989 was allowed by the High Court of Madras and
the case was remanded to the appellate authority inter a/ia directing the
H
26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) 2 S.C.R.

A appellate authority to dispose of the case afresh in accordance with law
and in terms of the directions contained in the said order, Thereafter,
pursuant to the liberty granted by the lfigh Court to both the parties to
adduce further evidence before the appellate authority, fresh evidences
both oral or documentary were adduced before the appellate authority.
B The appellate authority by a judgment and order dated December 14, 1990,
dismissed the said R.C.A. No. 4 of 1988 filed by the respondent tenant and
confirmed the order of eviction passed by the learned Rent Controller. The
respondent tenant thereafter filed a Civil Revision Petition being Civil
Revision Petition No. 436 of 1991 in February, 1991.

C The said Civil Revision Petition was allowed by the High Court by
its order dated December 11, 1992 inter a/ia on the finding that the
appellate authority had not decided the appeal after remand in conformity
with the order of remand dated April 11, 1990 passed by the High Court.
The appeal was remanded for the second time by the High Court before
D the appellate authority by directing inter a/ia that the said appeal should
be disposed of by following the directions contained in the order of remand
dated April, 11, 1990. It is this second order of remand dated December
11, 1992 which has been challenged in the instant appeal by tht appellant
landlord.

E Since the impugned second order of remand has been passed by the
High Court inter a/ia on the finding that the appellate authority failed to
dispose of the appeal in accordance with the directions contained in the
earlier order of remand, it is necessary to advert to the observations made
in the first order of remand in order to appreciate as to whether or not the
F appellate authority has failed to dispose of the appeal properly in accord-
ance with the directions contained in the order of remand.

The High Court had noted in the first order of remand that in the
notice for eviction the landlord stated about the requirement of the dis-
puted premises on account of expanding his own business but in the
G eviction petition, the case for bona fide requirement of the landlord was
founded not only for the requirement for expansion of his own business
but also for the expansion the pawn broking business -Of the wife and
daughter-in- law of the landlord, and also for demolition and construction
of the suit premises. The High Court observed that the landlord was not
H consistent with referenre to the location of Govindammal and Company
CHETTIAR v. RAMACHANDRANAIDU[G.N.RAY,J.] 27

which was the pawn broking business in partnership of the wife. and A
daughter-in-law of the landlord. The High Court also observed that it was
net clear as to what exactly was the area that was required by the respon-
dent for the said pawn broking business in jewellery which was purely a
business of advancing money on the security of jewels. The High Court also
observed that the appellate authority came to the finding that the said B
partnership business had expanded by looking at Exts. A-10, A,11 and A-12
but the High Court was of the. view that in the absence of sufficient
materials right from the date of the commencement of the business, it was
not possible to make any finding about the improvement of the said
business. ·The High Court also observed that even if the business bad
improved, the very nature of the business that the pledged jewels bad to C
be secured either in the locker in the iron safe or in the bank, the
requirement of a very large area for such business might not be bona fide.

-
It was, therefore, necessary to determine whether the landlord required the
suit premises after keeping in mind the nature of the said partnership
business and the area already under the possession of the landlord. The D
High Court also observed that the trial court and the appellate authority
did not accept the case for eviction on the ground of demolition and
reconstruction. But even for the purpose of deciding bona fide requirement
of the landlord, the entire circumstances under which the landlord had
instituted the proceedings were required to be taken into account. Refer-
ring to a decision of this Court in Hameeda Hardware Stores v. B. Mohand E
Lal Sowcar, AIR 1988 SC 1060, the High Court observed that it was clear
from the said decision that when a landlord had sought eviction of a tenant
from the non-residential premises under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act,
the landlord was required to ~•tablish other ingredients, referred to in the
said Judgment. It was held by the High Court that as the appellate authority F
had failed to consider not only the totality and circumstances and the facts
of the case but also the bona fide on the part of the landlord in seeking
.. eviction from the demised premises on account of alleged requirement of
the said partnership business, the impugned order of the appellate
authority was vitiated. The High Court, therefore, held in the order of first
remand that : G

"It is in these circumstances, the order of the appellate authority
is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the ap!'ellate
authority to consider the totality of the facts and circumstances of
the case and the bona fide on the part of the respondent's require- H
28 SUPREMECOURTREPORTS [1994] 2 S.C.R.

A men! of the demised premises for the purpose of carrying on the
f
business of Govindammal and Company, by the members of the
family."

As aforesaid, the High Court directed that both the parties would be
at liberty to file fresh evidence both oral and documentary in support of
B their case.

After the said first order of remand, the appellate authority held, on
consideration of the materials on record including fresh evidences ad-
duced, that the grounds on which the eviction of the tenant was founded
C in the proceedings in question were not the identical grounds as indicated
in the notice for eviction given by the landlord to the tenant because the
case of the bona fide .(equirement on account of expansion of said partner-

-
ship business had not been mentioned. The appellate authority, however,
held that the tenant, both in the counter as well as in bis oral evidence,
D had admitted that the landlord was running a jewellery shop in the name
of Sunder Jewellery and also a pawn broker's business run by his wife and
daughter-in-law at door No. 141 in the name and style of S. Govindammal
and Company. The appellate authority held that in view of the aforesaid
admitted position and in view of the documents filed by the landlord which
clearly established that such partnership business had in fact been run in
E door No. 141, even though the landlord had not rrentioned in the notice
that the landlord required the suit premises also for the said partnership
business run by his wife and daughter-in- law, the landlord was entitled to
seek eviction on account of requirement of the said premises for the said
business. The appellate authority also held that it was not the case that the
F said business in the name and style of Govindammal and Company had not
been run at door No. 141 prior to the giving o'f' notice for eviction and such
business was introduced only for the purpose of making a case for eviction.
Accordingly, it could not be contended that claim for eviction on account
of the said partnership business was not made with any good intention. The
G appellate authority also held that on perusal of Ext. No. 13 filed by the
landlord it could be noted that the partnership agreement had been
entered or August 25, 1988 and from Ext. 7 it transpired that the licence
for the said business had been issued on August 28, 1982 by the Tensildar
at Myiladuthurai and from Ext. 8 and 9 it transpired that the said partner-
ship firm had been registered on May 24, 1983 and from Ext. 10 it
H transpired that the said partnership firm was assessed for income tax and
CHETI1AR v. RAMACHANDRANAIDU [G.N. RAY, J.] 29

from Exts. 11 and 12 it appeared that the income tax had been assessed A
from the year 1985 onward. The appellate authority, therefore, held that
the running of the said partnership business in the said door No. 141 was
amply proved. The appellate authority also found that the jeweliery shop
of the landlord known as Sunder Jewellery was also being run in the said
door No. 141. The appellate authority, therefore, held that the landlord was
entitled to claim eviction of the tenant bona fide on account of the said two
B
business concerns. The appellate authority also held that on perusal of the
landlord's Ext: 30 to 37 and 43 to 50 pertaining to the accounts of the said
"'
Govindammal and Company which were filed after the said first order of
remand, it was clearly established that the said parternship business namely
Govindammal and Company had been slowly progressing from year 1983. c
Coming to the question of the location of the said business in pawn broking
and also the business of the landlord known as Sunder jewellary, the
appellate authority held that much importance was not required to be
attached as to the location of the pawn broking business in view of the fact
,.
the it was an admitted position that at door No. 141 both the said two
D
~
businesses est&blishments were being run. The appellate authority then
took into consideration as to whether the landlord had other premises in
his occupation in which requirement for running the said business concerns
could be carried out. The appellate authority came to the finding that the
tenant in his evidence had admitted that the newly constructed building of
the landlord had not been fully completed and no shop was being run in E
the aforesaid building. The appellate authority, therefore, came to the
finding that the landlord did not own any vacant building. Referring to a
decision of this Court made in Krishanan Nair v. Ghouse Basna, AIR(1987)
SC 2199, the appellate authority inter a/ia came to the fmding that a petition
under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Rent Act on account of requirement of
F
a partnership business in which the members of the family of the landlord
were partners with strangers, was admissible and.the landlord was entitled
to claim eviction of the tenant for running such partnership business with
strangers. The appellate authority also took into consideration the case of
bona fide requirement of the landlord in the context of not mentioning the
requirement of the landlord on account of the said pawn broking business G
in the notice. The appellate authority, however, hold that since admittedly
• both the said two businesses had been run in the said door No. 141 and
~. the said partnership business had existed even prior to giving notice for
eviction to the tenant, it was established that the landlord's claim of
H
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] 2 S.C.R.

A requirement of the suit premises for expanding the said partnership busi- (
ness was based on bona fide intention. The appellate authority, however,
held that the case of requirement of the disputed premises on account of
expansion of the landlord's said business in the name and style of Sunder
Jewellery was not acceptable but it was necessary to separate the said
business in pawn broking in the name and style of Govindammal and
B Company from the other business of the landloard known as Sunder
Jewellery. The appellate authority.dismissed the claim of the landlord for
~
eviction on the ground of re-building after considering the relevant
evidence about the condition of the building. Accordingly, the appellate
authority affirmed the order of eviction passed by the learned Rent Con-
c troller against the tenant under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Rent Act.

As aforesaid, the said decision of :he appellate authority after
remand has been set aside by the High Cot rt in revision inter aiia on the
finding that the appellate authority had not applied its mind about the exact
location where the pawn broker's shop m.s situated and the appellate
D
authority had also not taken into consideralion the question of bona fuie ~

reqqirement of the landlord for the purpose of carrying on the said
business in pawn broking having regard to the area under occupation of
the tenant and the actual requirement for the said business in pawn
broking. The High Court was of the view th.it the appellate authority was
E expected to go into the question whether the entire area under the occupa-
tion of the tenant was required or not. The High Court also observed that
although the appellate authority referred to Eirts. 30 to 37 and 43 to 50 and
came to the fmding that the said partnership business had been steadily
improving from 1983, the appellate authorit} failed to indicate what were
,•
the documents under the said exhibits and how the said docvments were
F
relevant. The High Court set aside the order of the appellate authority on
the finding that the decision of the appellate authority was not only
unsatisfactory but the same was also not in conformity with the earlier I

order of remand passed by the High Court l he High Court also held that
the requirement of the building for demolitiM and reconstruction had not
G been seriously pressed before it and such question was, therefore, not
required to be considered,

r
Mr. Chidambaram, the learned senior counsel appearing for the
landlord-appellant, has very strongly contended that the High Court passed
H the impugned order of remand for the second time without properly
CHETIIAR v. RAMACHANDRA NAIDU [G.N. RAY, J.] 31

appreciating the facts and circumstances of the case and the materials on A
record and the import of the finding made by the appellate authority after
first order of remand. He has submitted that the High Court bas proceeded
on hyper-technicality and set aside the well-reasoned order of the appellate
authority simply on the ground that the observation made in the first order
of remand had not been followed properly. He has submitted that even if
it is assumed that the appellate authority had not made the finding strictly
B
according to the observatiom made in the order of remand, if the ultimate
finding of the appellate auth Jrity on the basis of the materials on record
"' and the evidence adduced after the first order of remand is in conformity
with the provisions of Section 10 (3)(a)(iii) of the Rent Act, there was no
occasion for the High Court to set aside the said order and send the matter c
back for redetermination of the case. The anxiety of the Court should be
not to prolong the course of litigation but to achieve its finality as early as
possible. He has submitted that the appellate authority ha' rightly held that
the exact location of the said partnership business was not required to be
determined because of the admitted postion that both the said two business
' D
concerns namely Sunder Jewellery and Govindammal and Company had
' _, been run in door No. 141. The real question required to be considered for
the purpose of deciding the claim for eviction is whether there was neces-
sity for expanding of the said two businesses and whether or not the
landlord and any alternative suitable accommodation for carrying out the
said two businesses consistent with the requirement of the same. Mr. E
Chidambaram has also contended that the appellate authority has referred
to the assessment orders passed by the income tax authority from 1985
onward in respect of the said partnership business and with reference to
such assessment orders, the appellate authority came to the fmding that
the business activities had been steadily increasing. It was, therefore, not F
at all necessary to specifically refcd in the decision which exhibit related
to what document. In a.'ly event, the materials were before the High Court
and the High Court could look into the same and could appreciate as to
whether or not the finding of the appellate authority about the steady
expansion of the said business was justified or not. Mr. Chidambaram has
also submitted that in the notice for eviction the bona fide requiremnt of G
the suit premises also on account of the accommodation of the said
partnership business was not mentioned. But such omission to mention the
~
said fact was of little significance because in reality the said partnership
business was in existence at the time of giving the notice for eviction and
H
32 SUPRFME COURT REPORTS [1994] 2 S.C.R.

A the said business was being run even at the time of disposal of the
(
proceedings for eviction. He has, therefore, submitted that the appellate
authority was justified in holding that there was no lack of bona fide on the
part of the landlord in basing a claim for eviction also on account of said
partnership business although such case was not mentioned in the notice
because the said business was not brought into existence after institution
B of the said eviction suit but the same was there from before. The landlord,
according to Mr. Chidambaram, has led evidence to establish that for the
said expanding business more space was necessary and as the landlord did
not have any other suitable acommodation for the said business, he bona
fide required the suit premises. He has, therefore, submitted that the
c impugned order has resulted in gross failure of justice to the landlord
appellant and the same should be set aside and the order of eviction on
concurrent finding of bona fide requirement of the landlord by the learned
Rent Controller and the appellate authority should be upheld by this Court
and the order of eviction passed by the appellate authority should be
D maintained.

The learned counsel for the tenant respondent has, however, dis-
puted the said submissions of Mr. Chidambaram. It has been contended
by the learned counsel for the tenant respondent that for the purpose of
coming to a findfog as to whether or not the landlord has a bona fide
E requirement in pasing a claim for eviction of the tenant under the Rent
Act, the Court is required to look into all the facts and circumstances of
the case. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the tenant that
the previous tenant was evicted on the ground of building and reconstruc-
tion of the suit premises but the landlord deliberately failed to reconstruct
F the same and having obtained the possession, he inducted a new tenant. It
is only for the purpose of evicting the tenant respondent for getting higher
rent the claim for eviction on the ground of building and reconstruction
has been made by the landlord but such claim has not been upheld. The
learned counsel for the tenant has also submitted that the landlord did not
bona fide require the suit premises is evident from the fact that there was
G no mention of requiremnt for the expansion of the said partnership busi-
ness in the notice for eviction. Had there been any such requirement, the
said fact should have been mentioned in the notice for eviction. Although
the landlord really did not require the suit premises for the alleged purpose
of expansion of the said business, the same was alleged ma/a fide in the
H petition for eviction. The omission to mention the said ground should be
CHETTIAR v. RAMACHANDRANAIDU[G.N.RAY,J.] 33

considered for the purpose of determining whether there was a real need A
for expansion of said business. it is precisely for the said reasons, all the
antecedent facts and circumstances are required to be taken note of for
the purpose of deciding the bona fide requirement of the landlord. The
learned counsel has submitted that the Rent Act is essentially a beneficial
legislation for protection of the tenant against the caprices and whims of B
the landloard. The avowed purpose of the legislation to give such protec-
tion will be frustrated if propet consideration as to the bona fide require-
ment of the landlord .s not taken into consideration. The learned counsel
for the tenant has also submitted that even if it is assumed that the said
partnership business is expanding, it is necessary to determine the exact
nature of business and the space required for carrying out such business C
consistent with the expansion of such business. The necessity for such
determination of the requirement of space had been indicated in the first
order of remand by the High Court but despite the same, the appellate
authority failed and neglected to determine the same and simply on a
finding that the business was improving and it required expansion, the D
decree for eviction had been passed against the tenant. In the aforesaid
facts, the High Court was justified in setting aside the decree for eviction
and sending the appeal to the appellate authority on remand for redeter-
mination in accordance with the observation made in the first order of
remand. No interference is, therefore, called for in this appeal and the
same should be dismissed with exemplary cost. E

After giving our careful consideration to the facts and circumstances
of the case, it appears to us that non-mention of a reasonable ground for
eviction in the notice for eviction on the basis of which a claim for eviction
is later on founded usually raises a suspicion about the existence of such F
ground but such non-mention by itself cannot disentitle a landlord to claim
eviction on such ground. If a claim for eviction founded on such ground in
the petition for eviction is proved to be well-founded and the same is
'·
consistent with the grounds on which eviction is permissible in law, the
landlord will be entitled to a decree for eviction notwithstanding the fact
that such ground was noi mentioned in the notice for eviction, In our view, G
the appellate authority has rightly indicated in the facts of this ease, that
the partnership business under the name and style of Govi11dammal and
Company was in existence even prior to giving notice for eviction by the
landlord. Such partnership business was registered and the licence for the
business was obtained and the business had been subjected to assessments H
34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] 2 S.C.R.

A made by the income tax authorities. Hence, such business was not brought
into existence only for the purpose of making a foundation for eviction of r
the tenant with maid fide intention. Hence, in the facts and circumstances
of the case, it cannot be reasonably held that the claim of bona fide
requirement on a<:eount of the said partnership business is per se ma/a fide
B and should not be taken into consideration simply because the case for
bona fide requirement on that account had not been mentioned in the
notice for eviction. There is no manner of doubt that the bona fide
requirement is required to be considered objectively 1vith reference to the
materials on record and it is necessary to determine the real intention of
the landlord on the basis of evidences adduced in a case. If the materials
C on record clearly justify a case of bona fide requirement, there will be no
occasion for the court to hold that the landlord did not require the
premises bona fide simply because on a previous occasion the action of the
landlord for bringing an eviction case was not bona fide. It should be borne
in mind that cause for eviction is a recurring cause of action and even if
D the existence of such cause of action had not been found in a previous
proceeding for eviction, the same cannot be discarded if such claim is
established by cogent evidences adduced by the landlord in a subsequent
proceeding. It will not be correct to hold that only because after a tenant
was evicted by the landlord on the ground of reasonable requirement for
building and reconstruction, the landlord did not make the alleged
E reconstruction but let out the premises to another tenant after obtaining
possession, any subsequent eviction case for the said premises deserves to
be dismissed in limine. The landlord, in our view, may bring an action for
eviction of the tenant on subsequent cause of action justifying a case of
bona fide reqnirement. Similarly, rejection of a case for building and
F reconstruction by itself will not disentitle the landlord to get an order of c•
evictio.n if the eviction on such ground can be founded in a changed
circumstance. We may also indicate here that the contention that the Rent
Act is a legislation for protecting a tenant will be over simplification of the
legislative import of the Rent Act. In our view, it will be more appropriate
to hold that the Rent Act regulates the incidence of tenancy and inter se
G rights and obligations of the landlord and tenant.

In our view, M:r. Chidambaram is justified in his submission that the
High Court has acted with hyper-technicality in discarding the finding of
the appellate authority about the continuous expansion of the said partner-
H ship business. The appellate authority has referred to the exhibits including
CHETTIAR v. RAMACHANDRANAIDU [G.N. RAY, J.] 35

the i icome-tax assessment orders for the purpose of coming to the finding A
that the said business had been gradually expanding. In the aforesaid facts,
it was not proper to discard such finding of the appellate authority by
indicating that the exhibits had not been elaborated in detail. In any event,
such exhibits were before the High Court for its consideration and in the
anxiety to dispose of a !is as early as practicable, the High Court should B
have looked into the records and considered the justification of the finding
made by the appellate authority. It appears to us that the appellate
authority has referred to the assessment orders from 1985 and has come
to the finding that the said assessment orders indicated that the business
was expanding. It is nobody's case that the documents did not indicate such
expansion in business activities. Such finding, therefore, appears to be C
justified.

Since the eviction proceeding is pending for long, it would have been
only desirable if the same could have been concluded before this Court.
But the requirement of space for the said partnership businesses consistent D
with the nature of business and expanding activities had not been gone into
by the appellate authority and the relevant materials are also not before
us. We may also indicate here that the appellate authority has specifically
held ihat for the expansion of the business of the landlord styled as Sunder
Jewellery no further space was required but the partnership business in
pawn broking was required to be separated. Such finding has not been E
challenged before the High Court and also before us. It therefore appears
to us that the said pawn broking business requires to be run separately.
Hence, we upheld the order or remand to the limited extent, namely, that
the appellate authority on the basis of materials already on record would
consider the actual requirement of space for the said partnership business F
consistent with the nature of business styled as Govindarnmal and Com-
pany after keeping in view, the expanding activities in such business. If on
such consideration, the appellate authority comes to the findi11g that the
landlord bona fide requires the disputed premises for runing the said
business in a separate enclosure, the order of eviction under Section 10
(3)(a)(iii) of the Rent Act should be passed by the appellate authority. G
Since parties have already led evidence pursuant to the liberty given by the
High Court in the first order of remand, no further evidence should be
allowed to be led by either of the parties. This order will, however, not
preclude the tenant respondent to give additional evidence. If any, in
support of the contention that there had been change in the circumstances H
36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] 2 S.C.R.

A after the impugned decision of the High Court under which the landlord
has already got in his possession suitable alternative accommodation which
r
will satisfy the requirement of the landlord for running the aforesaid busi-
ness concerns. As the matter is pending for long, we direct the appellate
authority to dispose of this matter within three months from the date of
the receipt of this order. Jn the facts and circumstances of the case, there
B will be no order as to costs.

G.N. Appeals disposed of.

r

r.