Holding

The Assistant Charity Commissioner is a court within the meaning of Sections 2 and 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

Summary

The appellants, editors of a newspaper, were prosecuted for contempt after publishing material alleged to scandalise the administration of justice. The contempt petition was filed by the Assistant Charity Commissioner, who was a serving civil judge appointed under Section 5 of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950. The appellants challenged the jurisdiction of the Commissioner, arguing that he was not a "court" within the meaning of Sections 2 and 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The Supreme Court examined the statutory scheme, the powers conferred on the Commissioner—including the authority to conduct inquiries, summon witnesses, and render final judgments with appellate review—and held that these attributes satisfy the definition of a court. Consequently, the Court affirmed that contempt proceedings could be instituted and dismissed the appeal.

Issues considered

Whether the Assistant Charity Commissioner appointed under the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 is a "court" for the purposes of Sections 2 and 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
Whether contempt proceedings can be initiated against the newspaper editors by the Assistant Charity Commissioner

Legislation cited

Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950s. 18, s. 19, s. 5, s. 70, s. 72, s. 73, s. 74, s. 76, s. 79, s. 80
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971s. 2, s. 3
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 193, s. 219, s. 228

Subjects

Contempt of Courts ActBombay Public Trust ActAssistant Charity CommissionerCourt definitionJurisdictionJudicial officerPublic trustAdjudicatory powers

Judgment

K. SHAMRAO AND ORS. A
V.

ASSISTANT CHARITY COMMISSIONER

MARCH 4, 2003

. [Y.K. SABHARWAL' AND H.K. SEMA, JJ.]
B

Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950-Section 5-Assistant Charity
Commissioner appointed thereunder-Whether 'Court' for the purposes of
Sections 2 and 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 197 I-Held, yes since it C
possesses all the attributes of a Court-Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, Sections
2 and 3.

Respondent-Assistant Charity Commissioner was a serving judicial
officer of State Judicial Services whose services had been placed at the
disposal of the Government to be appointed as an Assistant Charity D
Commissioner under the provisions of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1951.

Appellants published certain items in their newspaper whicn were
said to be scandalous and intended to interfere with the administration of
justice. Contempt proceedings were initiated against them on reference E
made by the Assistant Charity Commissioner. Appellants took a
preliminary objection that the Assistant Charity Commissioner is not a
"court" thus, contempt action could not be initiated against them. High
Court overruled ttie objection and held that the Assistant Charity
Commissioner under the Act is a "court" within the meaning of Sections
2 and 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Hence the present appeal. F
Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1 The scheme of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950, the
powers conferred on the Assistant Charity Commissioner and the
provisions of the Act clearly show that the Assistant Charity Commissioner G
has to be a judicial officer or an officer with a legal background; has to
hear parties wherever dispute is raised with regard to existence of a public
trust or with regard to a property being trust property or otherwise and
then give a definitive judgment after taking evidence having regard to the
facts of the case and by application of law. The judgment is final unless H
523
524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 2 S.C.R.

A interfered with in appeal or thereafter tested in appeal before the-High
Court. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court has been barred in the matters
inquired into and decided by the Assistant Charity Commissioner.
(5:!8-B-q ..
,

1.2. The provisions make it clear that the Assistant Charity
B Commissioner has not only the trapping of a judicial tribunal but also has
power to give a decision or a definitive judgment which has finality and
authoritativeness which are essential tests of a judicial pronouncement.
The Assistant Charity Commissioner, therefore, possesses all the attributes
of a court. The fact that the Assistant Charity Commissioner has also to
C perform some administrative functions is not of any relevance for coming
to the conclusion that he is not a court, having regard to the provisions of
the Act which substantially confer on him the power to give a definite
judgment subject to finality in appeal, after hearing all concerned.
Functions of the Assistant Charity Commissioner are predominantly
adjudicatilry. The Assistant Charity Commissioner has almost all the
D powers which an ordinary civil court has including power of summoning
witnesses, compelling production of documents, examining witnesses on
oath and coming to a definite conclusion on the evidence adduced and
arguments submitted. Thus the Assistant Charity Commissioner is 11 Court
for the purposes of Sections 2 and 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
E [529-D-E-F)

The Bharat Bank Ltd., New Delhi v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd,
Delhi and Anr., [.1950) SCR 459; Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain, [1955)
2 SCR 955; Shri Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v The State of Punjab, (1955) 2
SCR 1013 and Thakur Juga/ Kishore Sinha v. Sitamarhi Central Co-operative
F Bank Ltd and Anr., (1967) 3 SCR 163, referred to.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
1534 of 1995.

From the Judgment and Order dated 9.10.1992 of the Karnataka High
G Court in Contempt of Court Case (Crl.) No. 4 of 1992.

Sanjiv Sen, R.N. Karanjawala, Mrs. Nandini Gore and Mrs. Manik
Karanjawala, for the Appellants.

Siddharth Dave, Satya Mitra and Sanjay R. Hegde, for the Respondent.
H The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
K. SHAMRAO v. ASSISTANT CHARITY COMMISSIONER [Y.K. SABHARWAL] 525
Y.K. SABHARWAL, J. Whether Assistant Charity Commissioner A
appointed under Section 5 of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 (for short;
the Act') as applicable to Karnataka is a 'court' for the purposes of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is the question involved in this appeal.

The contempt proceedings have been initiated against the appellants in
the i-1 igh Court on reference made by the Assistant Charity Commissioner, B
Belgaum for taking contempt action as a result of publications in a daily
newspaper. The three original appellants were the Managing Editor, Editor,
Printer and Publisher respectively of the said publication. The first appellant
died during the pendency of the appeal and, therefore, the appeal in so far
as the said appellant is concerned stands abated. The items published in the C
said newspaper on three dates were said to be scandalous and intended to
interfere with the administration of justice. It is not necessary to go into the
factual matrix since the present appeal has been filed against the judgment of
the High Court deciding a preliminary objection raised by the appellants
before the High Court. The objection was that the Assistant Charity
Commissioner is not a Court and, therefore, contempt action cannot be initiated D
against them. The High Court, overruling that objection, has held that the
Assistant Charity Commissioner under the Act is a court within the meaning
of Sections 2 and 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The decision of the
High Court on the preliminary objection is under challenge in the present
appeal. E
The Assistant Charity Commissioner was a Civil Judge working in the
judicial department of t!1e State. His services were placed at the disposal of
the Government for being appointed as Assistant Charity Commissioner under
the provisions of the Act. To determine whether the Assistant Charity
Commissioner is a court, it would be necessary to find out, having regard to p
the provisions of the Act, whether the Assistant Charity Commissioner
possesses the attributes of a court.

The expression 'court' is not defined in the Contempt Act. The definition
of the said expression in Section 2(4) of the Act is of no assistance or
relevance for determining the question in issue. G
Before we examine the provisions of the Act for the purposes aforesaid,
certain decisions of this Court wherein similar question was considered albeit
in different context, may be noticed.

In The Bharat Bank Ltd., New Delhi v. Employees of the Bharat Bank H
526 SUPREME COoJRT REPORTS (2003] 2 S.C.R.

A Ltd, Delhi and Anr., [1950] SCR 459, while dealing with the question whether
industrial tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was a
Court for the purpose of Article 136 of the Constitution of India, it was
observed by Fazal Ali, J. that the Tribunal has all the trappings of a Court.

In Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain, [1955] 2 SCR 955 considering
B the question whether a Commissioner appointed under the Public Servants
(Inquiries) AC!, 1850 was a Court within the meaning of Contempt of Courts
Act, 1952, reference was made to the decision in Bharat Bank's case (supra)
and various other decisions and it was held by this Court that in order to
constitute a court in the strict sense of the term, an essential condition is that
C the court should have, apart from having some of the trappings of a judicial
tribunal, power to give a decision or a definitive judgment which has finality
and authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement.

In Shri Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. The State of Punjab, [1955] 2
SCR 1013] it was laid down by this Court that what distinguishes a court
D from a quasi-judicial tribunal is that it is charged with a duty to decide
disputes in a judicial manner and declare the rights of parties in a definitive
judgment. To decide in a judicial manner involves that the parties are entitled
as a matter of right to be heard in support of their claim and to adduce
evidence in proof of it. And it also imports an obligation on the part of the
authority to decide the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and
E in accordance with law. When a question, therefore, arises as to whether an
authority created by an Act is a court as distinguished from a quasi-judicial
tribunal, what has to be decided is whether having regard to the provisions
of the Act it possesses all the attributes of a court.

F The aforesaid decisions were cited with approval in Thakur Juga/
Kishore Sinha v. Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank Ltd and Anr., [( 1967)
3 SCR 163], where the question was whether the Assistant Registrar of Co-
operative Societies, an authority under the Bihar and Orissa Co-operative
Societies Act, 1935 could be regarded as a Court for the purposes of Contempt
of Courts Act, 1952. It was held that to determine whether a statutory authority
G was functioning as a court, the provisions of the concerned statute have to be
looked into. Af'er examining the provisions of the Act and the powers, duties
.and functions of the Assistant Registrar thereunder, this Court held that the
Assistant Registrar performed judicial functions. The Assistant Registrar was
regarded as a Court for the purpose of Contempt of Courts Act, 1952.

.H To determine the question in issue, let u~ now examine the provisions
K. SHAMRAO v. ASSIS.TANT CHARITY COMMISSIONER [Y.K. SABHARWAL] 527

of the Act. The Act is intended to regulate and make better provision for the A
administration of public and charitable trusts in the State. Chapter IV of the
Act deals with registration of public trust after due inquiry. An application
for registration of a trust as a public trust is required to be made under
Section 18 of the Act, Section 19 stipulates an inquiry for registration. The
inquiry shall be held on an application made by any person having interest
in the public trust or on his own motion by the Assistant Charity Commissioner B
to ascertain :

(i) whether a trust exists and whether such trust is a public trust,

(ii) whether any property is the property of such trust,

(iii) whether the whole or any substantial portion of the subject-matter c
of the trust is situate within his jurisdiction,

(iv) the names and addresses of the trustees and manager of such
trust,
(v) the mode of succession to the office ·of the trustee of such trust, D
(vi) the origin, nature and object of such trust,
(vii) the amount of gross average annual income and expenditure of
such trust, and
(viii)any other particulars as may be prescribed under sub-section (5) E
of section 18.

Under Section 73, in holding inquiries under the Act, the officer holding
the same shall have the same powers as are vested in courts in respect of the
following matters under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in trying a suit:

"(a) proof of facts by affidavits, F
(b) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and
-··· examining him on oath,
(c) ordering discovery and inspection, and compelling the production
of documents, G
(d) issuing of commissions."

Section 74 provides that all inquiries and appeals under the Act shall
be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193,
219 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 76 provides that save in so
far as they may be inconsistent with anything contained in the Act, the H
528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) 2 S.C.R.

A before the court under the Act.

Sections 79 and 80 are of significant importance to determine the point
in issue. Section 79 provides that any question, whether or not a trust exists
and such trust is a public trust or particular property is the property of such
trust, shall be decided by the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner or
B the Charity Commissioner in appeal as provided by this Act. The decision of
the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner or the Charity Commissioner
in appeal, as the case may be, shall, unless set aside by the decision of the
court on application or of the High Court in appeal be final and conclusive.
Section 80 bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. It provides that save as
C expressly provided in the Act, no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to decide
or deal with any question which is by or under this Act to be decided or dealt
:with by any officer or authority under this Act, and in respect of which the
decision or order of such officer or authority has been made final and
conclusive.

D Chapter XI dealing with functions of Charity Commissioner, procedure,
jurisdiction and appeals, provides for appeal against the finding or order of
the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner to the Charity Commissioner
under Section 70 in following cases :

"(a) the finding and order, if any, under Section 20;
E
(b) the finding under section 22; (b-1) the findings under Section
,22A;

(c) the findings under section 28;

F
(d) the order under sub-section (3) of section 54;"

Under Section 72, any person aggrieved by the decision of the Charity
r
Commissioner under various provisions mentioned therein or on the question
whether a trust exists and whether such trust is a public trust or whether any
property is the property of such trust may, within sixty days from the date
.
,.._

G of the decision, apply to the court to set aside the said decision. It also, inter
a/ia, provides that an appeal shall lie to the High Court, against the decision
of the Court under sub -section (2) as if such decision was a decree from
which an appeal ordinarily lies. The matters relating to the public trust in
respect whereof the jurisdiction is conferred on the officers appointed under
the Act, but for the bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court, would be triable by the
H Civil Court as provided in Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A
K. SHAMRAO v. ASSISTANT CHARITY COMMISSIONER [Y.K. SABHARWAL] 529
•. person to be appointed as a Deputy Charity Commissioner and or the Assistant A
Charity Commissioner, as provided in Section 5(2) of the Act, shall be either
a judicial officer or a member of the bar. The officer is, therefore, required
to have a legal background. As already noticed, the Assistant Charity
Commissioner, in the present case, was a serving judicial officer of State
Judicial Services whose services had been placed at the disposal of the B
Government to be appointed as an Assistant Charity Commissioner.
The scheme of the Act, the powers conferred on the Assistant Charity
Commissioner and the perusal of the aforesaid provisions of the Act clearly
show that the Assistant Charity Commissioner has to be a judicial officer or
an officer with a legal background; has to hear parties wherever dispute is C
raised with regard to existence of a public trust or with regard to a property
being trust property or otherwise and then give a definitive judgment after
taking evidence having regard to the facts of the case and by application of
law. The judgment is final unless interfered with in appeal or thereafter tested
in appeal before the High Court. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court has been
barred in the matters inquired into and decided by the Assistant Charity D
Commissioner.
The aforesaid provisions make it clear that the Assistant Charity
Commissioner has not or.ly the trapping of a judicial tribunal but also has
power to give a decision or a definitive judgment which has finality and
authoritativeness which are essential tests of a judicial pronouncement. The E
Assistant Charity Commissioner, therefore, possesses all the attributes of a
court. The fact that the Assistant Charity Commissioner has also to perform
some administrative functions is not of any relevance for coming to the
conclusion that he is not a court, having regard to the provisions of the Act
which substantially confer on him the power to give a definite judgment p
subject to finality in appeal, after hearing all concerned. Functions of the
Assistant Charity Commissioner are predominantly adjudicatory. The Assistant
Charity Commissioner has almost all the powers which an ordinary Civil
Court has including power of summoning witnesses, compelling production
of documents, examining witnesses on oath and coming to a definite conclusion
on the evidence adduced and arguments submitted. G

-
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Assistant Charity
Commissioner is a Court for the purposes of Sections 2 and 3 of the Contempt
of Courts Act, 1971. The appeal is accordingly dismissed leaving the parties
to bear their own costs.
H
N.J. Appeal dismissed.