K.V.S. RAMversusBANGALORE METROPOLITAN TRANSPORT CORPORATION

                         [2015] 2 S.C.R. 26


A                          K.V.S. RAM
                                v.
           BANGALORE METROPOLITAN TRANSPORT
                         CORPORATION
                (Civil Appeal No. 412 OF 2015)
B                      JANUARY 14, 2015
         [V. GOPALA GOWDA AND R. BANUMATHI, JJ.]
         Service Law - Misconduct - A/legation that appel/ant-
    workman secured appointment by producing false/bogus
C certificate - Disciplinary proceedings - Termination of
    appellant-workman - Justification - Held: Not justified,
    considering the delay in completing the enquiry and the age
    of appellant and the fact that similarly situated workmen were
    reinstated with lesser punishment - Appellant accordingly
D . ordered to be re-instated in service - Industrial Disputes Act.
    1947-s.11A.                    ,

        Allowing the appeal, the Court

E     HELD: 1.1. In the present case, as pointed out by the
  Labour Court, there was no plausible explanation for the
  inordinate delay in completing the enquiry. Having
  allowed the appellant-workman to work for fourteen
  years, by the time punishment of dismissal from service
F was imposed on the appellant, the appellant had reached
  the age of forty five years. As observed by the Labour
  Court, the appellant having crossed forty five years, he
  could not have sought for alternative employment.
  Further, similarly placed workmen were ordered to be
G reinstated with lesser punishment of stoppage of few
  increments. While so, there is no reason as to why for
  the similar misconduct the appellant should be imposed
  harsh punishment of dismissal from service. [Para 9]
  [30-H; 31-A-DJ
H                             26
      K.V.S. RAM v. BANGALORE METROPOLITAN                         27
              TRANSPORT CORPORATION

     1.2. On facts, considering the delay in completing             A
the enquiry and the age of the appellant and the fact that
similarly situated workmen were reinstated with lesser
punishment, the Labour Court ordered reinstatement, in
exercise of its discretion under Section 11A of the
Industrial Disputes Act. Once the Labour Court has                  B
exercised the discretion judicially, the High Court can
interfere with the award, only if it is satisfied that the award
of the Labour Court is vitiated by any fundamental flaws.
The award passed by the Labour Court does not suffer
from any such flaws. While interfering with the award of            C
the Labour Court, the High Court did not keep in view
the parameters laid down by this Court for exercise of
jurisdiction by the High Court under Articles 226 and/or
227 of the Constitution. The impugned judgment passed
by the High Court is set aside and the award passed by              D
the Labour Court is restored. [Paras 10, 15 and 16]
[31-E-F; 36-E-G]

    Syed Yakoob vs. K. S. Radhakrishnan AIR 1964 SC 477:
1964 SCR 64; lswarlal Mohan/a/ Thakkar vs. Paschim                  E
Gujarat Vij Company Ltd. & Anr (2004) 6 SCC 434; and
Harjinder Singh vs. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation
(2010) 3 SCC 192: 2010 (1) SCR 591 - relied on.

    Punjab Water Supply Sewerage Board & Anr. vs.
Ramsajivan &Anr 2007 (2) SCC (L&S) 668 = (2007) 9 SCC               F
86: 2007 (5) SCR 684 - referred to.

                    Case Law Reference

    2007 (5) SCR 684                 referred to   Para 11          G

    1964 SCR 64                      relied on     Para 12
    (2004) 6 sec 434                 relied on     Para 13
    2010 (1) SCR 591                 relied on     Para 14          H
28        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 2 S.C.R.



A        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 412
     of2015

          From the Judgment and Order dated 03.09.2012 of the
     High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in WritAppeal No. 390
B    of 2008.

         V. N. Raghupathy for the Appellant.
         S. N. Bhat for the Respondent.

         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c           I

         R. BANUMATHI, J. 1. Leave granted.
       2. This appeal by special leave arises out of the judgment
  dated 3.9.2012 passed by the High Court of Karnataka, in
D and by which, the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by
  the appellant-workman thereby, confirming the termination of
  the appellant.

       3. Brief facts which led to the filing of this appeal are as
  under:- The appellant was appointed on the post of Driver in
E the Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation on 3.9.1985
  and was working on the same post since then. The appellant
  was served with article of charge dated 3.9.1990 alleging that
  he had secured appointment by producing a false transfer
  certificate. An enquiry was initiated on 15. 7 .1992 and the
F appellant·submitted his explanation to the aforesaid charges.
  The Enquiry Officer submitted his report on 13.3.2002 holding
  the appellant guilty for his misconduct. After affording
  opportunity to the appellant to show cause against the
G proposed punishment, the disciplinary authority passed the
  order imposing punishment of dismissal from service vide order
  dated 1.10.2004.

        4. Aggrieved by the order of dismissal, the appellant
  raised an industrial dispute bearing l.D.No.39/2005 before the
H 111 Additional Labour Court, Bangalore. The Labour Court vide
      K.V.S. RAM v. BANGALORE METROPOLITAN                          29
        TRANSPORT CORP. [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

award dated 14.2.2007 directed the management of the                 A
corporation to reinstate the appellant in his original post with
continuity of service but without backwages. The Labour Court
modified the punishment directing withholding of four annual
increments with cumulative effect. In the Labour Court, appellant
has produced notarized copies of orders passed by the                B
respondent-Corporation in respect of other workmen, who
have committed similar misconduct but were awarded lesser
punishments. Referring to Exs. W.5 to W.11 which are the
notarized copies of the orders passed in respect of other
workmen who have committed similar misconduct, Labour                C
Court held that those workmen were reinstated in service with
minor punishment of withholding of few annual increments,
whereas the appellant was imposed grave punishment of
dismissal from service and thus was discriminated. Referring
to another judgment of the High Court in W.P.No.17316/2005           D
(L/K) dated 8.8.2005, Labour Court observed that when
similarly situated workmen were imposed lesser punishment
and the appellant cannot be discriminated by imposing
punishment of dismissal from service and the Labour Court in
exercise of its discretion under Section 11A set aside the           E
punishment imposed on the appellant and directed
reinstatement of the appellant without backwages.

     5. Being aggrieved, respondent-corporation filed a writ
petition before the High Court. Vide order dated 31.1.2008, F
learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition
holding that the punishment of dismissal from service was
proportionate to the proved misconduct against the appellant.
Aggrieved by the same, the appellant-workman preferred
app~al before the Division Bench challenging the legality and G
correctness of the said order. The Division Bench dismissed
the appeal filed by the appellant on the ground that the charges
levelled against the appellant are serious in nature and that
the punishment of dismissal from service imposed by the
disciplinary authority was just and proper. In this appeal, the H
30         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 2 S.C.R.



A    appellant assails the correctness of the above judgment.

          6. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the
     High Court erroneously held that the long delay of twelve years
     in holding the enquiry is not fatal to the case, although it is
     clearly evident that no reasonable explanation is forthcoming
8
     for the inordinate delay of twelve years in concluding the
     disciplinary proceedings. It was further submitted that in the
     similar cases of other workmen who produced bogus
     certificate, they were reinstated in the service withholding of
c    few increments with cumulative effect and while so, the
     appellant alone cannot be discriminated by imposing harsh
     punishment of dismissal from service.

       7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-
  Corporation contended that the finding of guilt was based on
D appreciation of evidence on record and having regard to the
  gravity of the charges, the Labour Court was not justified in
  interfering with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary
  authority and the learned Single Judge as well as the Division
E Bench of the High Court rightly set aside the award passed by
  the Court.

         8. We have carefully considered the rival contentions and
     perused the impugned judgment and other materials on record.

F      9. The appellant joined the services of the corporation in
  the year 1985. In the year 1990, charges were framed against
  the appellant alleging that he had secured appointment by
  producing a false certificate and enquiry was initiated in the
  year 1992 and the Enquiry Officer submitted his report only in
G the year 2002, nearly twelve years after framing of charges.
  Even though the Enquiry Officer submitted his report on
  13.3.2002, order of dismissal from service was passed only
  on 1.10.2004. Enquiry report was thus submitted after a lapse
  of twelve years and there was a delay of twelve years in
H conducting and completing the enquiry. As pointed out by the
      K.V.S. RAM v. BANGALORE METROPOLITAN                     31
        TRANSPORT CORP. [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

Labour Court, there was no plausible explanation for such A
inordinate delay in completing the enquiry. The appellant
continued in service from 1990 to 2004. Having allowed the
appellant-workman to work for fourteen years, by the time
punishment of dismissal from service was imposed on the
appellant, the appellant had reached the age of forty five years. B
As observed by the Labour Court, the appellant having crossed
forty five years, he could not have sought for alternative
employment. Further, as seen from Exs. W.5 to W.11, similarly
placed workmen were ordered to be reinstated with lesser
punishment of stoppage of few increments. While so, there is C
no reason as to why for the similar misconduct the appellant
should be imposed harsh punishment of dismissal from
service.

     10. It is settled proposition of law that while considering o
the management's decision to dismiss or terminate the
services of a workman, the Labour Court can interfere with the
decision of the management only when it is satisfied that the
punishment imposed by the management is highly
disproportionate to the degree of guilt of the workman E
concerned. Considering the delay in completing the enquiry
and the age of the appellant and the fact that similarly situated
workmen were reinstated with lesser punishment, the Labour
Court ordered reinstatement, in exercise of its discretion under
Section 11Aofthe Industrial DisputesAct.                          F
     11. In the Writ Petition, while setting aside the award of
the Labour Court, learned Single Judge placed reliance upon
the judgment of this Court passed in the case of Punjab Water
Supply Sewerage Board & Anr. vs. Ramsajivan & Anr., G
reported in 2007 (2) SCC (L&S) 668 =(2007) 9 SCC 86 and
also another judgment of the High Court and observed that a
person who practices fraud for securing employment cannot
perpetuate on the ground of delay and the learned Single
Judge faulted the Labour Court for exercising discretion under H
32        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     (2015] 2 S.C.R.


A Section 11Aof the Industrial Disputes Act and interfering with
  the punishment of dismissal from service. In our considered
  view, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article
  227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court can interfere
  with the order of the Tribunal, only, when there has been a
B patent perversity in the orders of tribunal and courts
  subordinate to it or where there has been gross and manifest
  failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have
  been flouted. In our view, when the Labour Court has exercised
  its discretion keeping in view the facts of the case and the
C cases of similarly situated workmen, the High Court ought not
  to have interfered with the exercise of discretion by the Labour
  Court.
      12. In Syed Yakoob vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964
D SC 477, the Constitution Bench of this Court considered the
  scope of the High Court's jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari
  in cases involving challenge to the orders passed by the
  authorities entrusted with quasi-judicial functions under the
  Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Speaking for the majority of the
E Constitution Bench, Gajendragadkar, J. observed as under:
  (AIR pp. 479-80, Para 7)
         "7 .... A writ of certiorari can be issued for
         correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by
         inferior courts or tribunals; these are cases
F
         where orders are passed by inferior courts or
         tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of
         it, or as a result offailure to exercise jurisdiction.
         A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise
         of jurisdiction conferred on it, the court or
G
         tribunal acts illegally br improperly, as for
         instance, it decides a question without giving an
         opportunity to be heard to the party affected by
         the order, or where the procedure adopted in
         dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles
H
  K.V.S. RAM v. BANGALORE METROPOLITAN                    33
    TRANSPORT CORP. [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt            A
that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is
a supervisory jurisdiction and the court
exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate
court. This limitation necessarily means that
findings of fact reached by the inferior court or          B
tribunal as a result of the appreciation of
evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in
writ proceedings. An error of law which is
apparent on the face of the record can be
corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact,             C
however, grave it may appear to be. In regard to
a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ
of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in
recording the said finding, the Tribunal had
erroneously refused to admit admissible and                D
material evidence, or had erroneously admitted
inadmissible evidence which has influenced the
impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is
based on no evidence, that would be regarded
as an error of law which can be corrected by a             E
writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of
cases, however, we must always bear in mind
that a finding of fact recorded by the tribunal
cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ
of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and          F
material evidence adduced before the Tribunal
was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the
 impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency
 of evidence led on a point and the inference of
 fact to be drawn from the said finding are within         G
 the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the
 said points ca·nnot be agitated before a writ
 court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction
 conferred on the High Courts under Article 226
                                                           H
34       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 2 S.C.R.


A      to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately
       exercised."

                                     (Emphasis supplied)
      13. In the case of lswarlal Mohan/al Thakkar vs. Paschim
B Gujarat Vij Company Ltd. & Anr., (2004) 6 SCC 434, it was
  held as under:-
       "15. We find the judgment and award of the
       labour court well reasoned and based on facts
C      and evidence on record. The High Court has
       erred in its exercise of power under Article 227
       of the Constitution of India to annul the findings
       of the labour court in its award as it is well settled
       law that the .High Court cannot exercise its
D      power under Article 227 of the Constitution as
       an appellate court or reappreciate evidence and
       record its findings on the contentious points.
       Only if there is a serious error of law or the
       findings recorded suffer from error apparent on
E      record, can the High Court quash the order of a
       lower court. The Labour Court in the present
       case has satisfactorily exercised its original
       jurisdiction and properly appreciated the facts
       and legal evidence on record and given a well
F      reasoned order and answered the points of
       dispute in favour of the appellant. The High
       Court had no reason to interfere with the same
       as the award of the Labour Court was based on
       sound and cogent reasoning, which has served
G      the ends of justice.
        It is relevant to mention that in Shalini Shyam
       Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC
       329 with regard to the limitations of the High
H      Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Article
      K.V.S. RAM v. BANGALORE METROPOLITAN                   35
        TRANSPORT CORP. [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

    227, it was held in Para 49 that: (SCC p. 348)             A
    "49. (m) ... The power of interference under
    [Article 227] is to be kept to the minimum to
    ensure that the wheel of justice does not come
    to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure         B
    and unpolluted in order to maintain public
    confidence in the functioning of the tribunals
    and courts subordinate to the High Court."

    It was also held that: (SCC p. 347, Para 49)
                                                               c
    "49. (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat,
    in exercise of its power of superintendence
    under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere
    with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to
    it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a        D
    court of appeal over the orders of the court or
    tribunal subordinate to it."
     14. Emphasizing that while exercising jurisdiction under
Articles 226 and/or227 of the Constitution of India, Courts are E
to keep in view the goals set out in the Preamble and in Part
IV of the Constitution while construing social welfare
legislations, in Harjinder Singh vs. Punjab State Warehousing
Corporation, (2010) 3 SCC 192, this Court r.as held as under:

    "21. Before concluding, we consider it necessary           F
    to observe that while exercising jurisdiction
    under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution
    in matters like the present one, the High Courts
    are duty-bound to keep in mind that the
    Industrial Disputes Act and other similar                  G
    legislative instruments are social welfare
    legislations and the same are required to be
    interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in
    the Preamble of the Constitution and the
                                                               H
36         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 2 S.C.R.


A        provisions contained in Part IV thereof in general
         and Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and 43-A in
         particular, which mandate that the State should
         secure a social order for the promotion of welfare
         of the people, ensure equality between men and
B        women and equitable distribution of material
         resources of the community to subserve the
         common good and also ensure that the workers
         get their dues. More than 41 years ago,
         Gajendragadkar, J. opined that:
c
         "10 .... The concept of social and economic
         justice is a living concept of revolutionary
         import; it gives sustenance to the rule of law and
         meaning and significance to the ideal of welfare
o        State.
         (State of Mysore v. Workers of Gold Mines, AIR
         1958 SC 923 at page 928 para 1O)"
         15. Once the Labour Court has exercised the discretion
E judicially, the High Court can interfere with the award, only if it
  is satisfied that the award of the Labour Court is vitiated by
  any fundamental flaws. We do not find that the award passed
  by the Labour Court suffers from any such flaws. While
  interfering with the award of the Labour Court, the High Court
F did not keep in view the parameters laid down by this Court
  for exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Articles 226
  and/or 227 of the Constitution of India and the impugned
  judgment cannot be sustained.
G         16. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned
     judgment passed by the High Court is set aside and the award
     passed by the Labour Court is restored. In the facts and
     circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.

H Bibhuti Bhushan Bose                                 Appeal allowed