Holding

The conviction under Sections 304B and 498A IPC is affirmed, but the term of imprisonment is reduced to eight years, which the appellant has already served, leading to his release.

Summary

Kailash was convicted under Sections 304B (dowry death) and 498A (dowry harassment) of the IPC for the death of his wife, whose body was found in a well, indicating death "otherwise than under normal circumstances." The trial court sentenced him to ten years for the 304B offence, with no separate sentence for 498A, and the High Court affirmed the conviction. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the meaning of "otherwise than under normal circumstances" and the requirement of a proximate link "soon before" the death, relying on precedents such as Kans Raj and Hira Lal. It held that the evidence of dowry demand, cruelty and harassment was sufficient and the presumption under Section 113B was applicable. While upholding the conviction, the Court reduced the custodial term to eight years, which the appellant had already served, and ordered his release. The appeal was therefore partly allowed on the question of sentence.

Issues considered

Whether the death of the woman occurred "otherwise than under normal circumstances" as required under Section 304B IPC.
Whether the prosecution proved the elements of cruelty or harassment "soon before" the death for a dowry death conviction.
Whether the presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act can be drawn against the accused in the absence of a resolved dispute.
Whether the ten‑year sentence imposed for the 304B offence is appropriate in view of time already served.

Legislation cited

Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 113B, s. 114
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 304B, s. 498A

Subjects

dowry deathSection 304B IPCSection 498A IPCotherwise than under normal circumstancessoon beforepresumption under Section 113Bsentence reductioncriminal appeal

Judgment

KAILASH A
v
STATE OF M.P.

OCTOBER 9, 2006

[ARIJ!T PASA YAT AND LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA, JJ.] B

Penal Code. 1860;

Section 304B-df!ath otherwise than under normal circumstances-
Held, it means death not being in the usual course but apparently under C
suspicious circumstances if not caused by burns or bodily injury as "normal
circumstances" apparently means natural death.

Evidence Act, 1872:

Section I J3B-Lapse of time between demand of dowry or the cruelty, D
harassment to the deceased-Held mere lapse of some time by itself would
not provide to an accused a defence, if the course of conduct relating to
cruelty or harassment in connection with the dowry demand is shown to have
existed earlier in time not too late and not too stale before the date of death
of the victim. E
The dead body of deceased, wife of the appellant, was found floating in a
well located in the house of the appellant. Thus her death of occurred otherwise
than under normal circumstances. The deceased was subjected to cruelty or
harassment by her husband and acquitted accused in connection with demand
for dowry. Appellant was tried for alleged commission of offences punishable F
under Section 498-A and 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 relatable to
the death of his wife. He was found guilty by the trial Court and was sentenced
to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years for the offence relatable to
Section 304-B IPC but no separate sentence was imposed for the offence
relatable to Section 498-A IPC though he was found guilty of the said offence. G
Placing reliance on their evidence, trial Court convicted the appellant. Matter
was carried in appeal before the High Court. The High Court did not accept
the plea and affirmed the conviction and sentence.

In support of the appeal it was contended on behalf of the appellant, that

45 H
46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A the evidence of the witnesses who were examined to prove alleged dowry
demand, torture and harassment, is not sufficient to prove commission of
offence by the appellant being full of exaggerations and trial Court and the
High Court should not have placed reliance on them It was further contended
that the sentence, as imposed, is high. The accused has already undergone
B nearly eights years of the sentence.
Partly allowing the appeal, as regards quantum of sentence, the Court
HELD I.I. Witnesses have spoken about dowry demand, torture and
harassment and nothing substantially discrepant can be noticed. The
witnesses, though cross-examined at length, stated in clear terms about th1~
C dowry demand, the torture and the harassment. In that view of the matter the
trial Court and the High Court were justified in holding the accused guilty.
(48-E)
Kans Raj v. State of Punjab, (2000( 5 SCC 207, relied upon.
2.1. No presumption under Section ll3-B of the Evidence Act would be
D drawn against the accused if it is shown that after the alleged demand, cruelty
or harassment, the dispute stood resolved and there was no evidence of cruelty
or harassment thereafter. Mare lapse of some time by itself would not provide
to an accused a defence, if the course of conduct relating to cruelty or
harassment in connection with the dowry demand is shown to have existed
earlier in time not too late and not too stale before the date of death of the
E victim. The expression "soon before" would normally imply that the interval
should not be much between the cruelty or harassment concerned and the
death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live link.
(49-H; 50-A-B; C-D)
Hira Lal v. State (Govt. of NCT), Delhi, [2003) 8 SCC 80, referred to.
F 3.1. Th" expression "normal circumstances" apparently means natural
death. In other words the expression "otherwise than under normal
circumstances" means death not being in the usual course but apparently
under suspicious circumstances if not caused by burns or bodily injury.
(50-D-E)
G Shanti v. State ofHaryana, (1991 f I SCC 371 and Thakkan Jha v. State
of Bihar, (2004) 13 SCC 348, referred to.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. I027 of
2006.
From the Final Order and Judgment and dated 4.12.2003 of the High
H
KAILASH v. STATE OF M.P. [PASA YAT. J.] 47
)
Court of Judicature of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Crl. A. No. 1806/2000. A
Sudhir Kulsreshtra and Kedar Nath Yadav for the Appellant.

C.D. Singh, Munendra Kumar Singh, Merusagar Samantaray and
Minakshi Sharma for the Respondent.
B
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

ARIJIT PASA YAT, J. Leave granted.

.. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a learned single
Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur dismissing the appeal C
of the appellant and maintaining his conviction and sentence as recorded by
the trial Court.

Appellant faced trial for alleged commission of offences punishable
under Section 498-A and 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the
'!PC') relatable to the death of his wife Uma Devi (hereinafter referred to as D
the 'deceased'). He was found guilty by the trial Court and was sentenced
to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years for the offence relatable to
Section 304-B IPC but no separate sentence was imposed for the offence
relatable to Section 498-A IPC though he was found guilty of the said offence.
Smt. Shyam Bai who faced trial with the appellant was acquitted by the trial E
Court.

Prosecution case in a nutshell is as follows:

Appellant got married with the deceased on 4.5.1997. Acquitted accused
Smt. Shyam Bai is the aunt of appellant. In the wee hours of 18.3.1999 the F
dead body of deceased was found floating in a well located in the house of
the appellant. Thus, the death of Uma Devi occurred otherwise then under
normal circumstances. The deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment
by her husband and acquitted accused in connection with demand for dowry.

Inquest was conducted and the dead body of Uma Devi was sent for G

.. post mortem examination. The post mortem examination was conducted by Dr.
R.G. Kotia (PWI) who found an anti-mortem lacerated wound on occipital
region of the body and blood was oozing out from the wound. Dr. Kotia
opined that cause of death of Uma Devi was asphexia due to drowning. In
his opinion approximate time of death was within 12 to 24 hours of the post-
mortem examination. Ex.P-1 is the report of Dr. Kotia. During investigation a H
48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A rope and one steel gund were recovered from the spot. Jamuna Prasad
(PW-3), Mainda Bai (PW4), Desh Raj (PW5) Sheel Kumar (PW6), Parwati
(PW7), Mukundi (PW8) and Dashrath (PW9) were examined to prove the
dowry demand, harassment and torture. Placing reliance on their evidence,
trial Court convicted the appellant. Matter was carried in appeal before the
B High Court. Before the High Court, it was contended that the evidence was
not sufficient to prove the dowry demand, torture or harassment. The High
Court did not accept the plea and affirmed the conviction and sentence.

In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellant submitted
that the evidence of the witnesses who were examined to prove alleged dowry 1-
C demand, torture and harassment, is not sufficient to prove commission of
offence by the appellant. It is full of exaggerations and trial Court and the
High Court should not have placed reliance on them. It was submitted that
the sentence, as imposed, is high. With reference to the material on record
it is submitted that the accused has already undergone nearly eights years
of the sentence.
D
Learned counsel for the respondent-State on the other hand suppo1ted
the order.

On reading of the evidence of the witnesses who have spoken about
dowry demand, torture and harassment nothing substantially discrepant can
E be noticed. The witnesses, though cross-examined at length, stated in clear
terms about the dowry demand, the torture and the harassment. In that view
of the matter the trial Court and the High Court was justified in holding the
accused guilty.

In Kans Raj v. State of Punjab, [2000] 5 SCC 207 a three-Judge Bench
F of this Court dealt with the presumption available in terms of Section 113-B
of the Evidence Act, 1872 (in short "the Evidence Act") and its effect on
finding persons guilty in terms of Section 304-B IPC. It was noted as follows:
(SCC p. 217, para 9)

"9. The law as it exists now provides that where the death of a woman
G is caused by any bums or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than
under normal circumstances within 7 years of marriage and it is shown
that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment
by her husband or any relative for or in connection with any demand
.
H
of dowry such death shall be punishable under Section 304-B. In order
to seek a conviction against a person for the offence of dowry death,
...
KAILASHv. STATEOFM.P.[PASAYALI.] 49
the prosecution is obliged to prove that: A
(a) the death of a woman was caused by burns or bodily injury or had
occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances;

(b) such death should have occurred within 7 years of her marriage;

(c) the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her B
husband or by any relative of her husband;

(d) such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with the
demand of dowry; and

(e) to such cruelty or harassment the deceased should have been C
subjected soon before her death."

The law as it exists now provides that where the death of a woman is
caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal
circumstances within 7 years of marriage and it is shown that soon before her
death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any D
relative for or in connection with any demand of dowry such death shall be
)o
punishable under Section 304-B. In order to seek a Conviction against a
person for the offence of dowry death, the prosecution is obliged to prove
that:

(a) the death of a woman was caused by burns or bodily injury or had E
occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances;

(b) such death should have occurred within 7 years of her marriage;

(c) the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband
or by any relative of her husband; F
"
(d) such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with the
demand of dowry; and

(e) to such cruelty or harassment the deceased should have been
subjected soon before her death. G
No presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act would be
drawn against the accused if it is shown that after the alleged demand, cruelty
or harassment the dispute stood resolved and there was no evidence of
_,... cruelty or harassment thereafter. Mere lapse of some time by itself would not H
50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A provide to an accused a defence, if the course of conduct relating to cruelty
or harassment in connection with the dowry demand is shown to have existed
earlier in time not too late and not too stale before the date of death of the
victim. This is so because the expression used in the relevant provision is
"soon before". The expression is a relative term which is required to be
B considered under specific circumstances of each case and no straitjacket
formula can be laid down by fixing any time-limit. The expression is pregnant
with the idea of proximity test. It cannot be said that the term "soon before"
is synonymous with the term "immediately before''. This is because of what
is stated in Section 114 Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act. The detennination
of the period which can come within the term "soon before" is left to be
C determined by the courts, depending upon the facts and circumstances of
each case. Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression "soon before"
would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the
cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in question. There must be
existence of a proximate and live link [see Hira Lal v. State (Govt. of NCT),
Delhi [2003] 8 sec 80].
D
The factual position of the present case goes to show that the death
was not in normal circumstances. The expression "normal circumstances"
apparently means natural death. In other words the expression "otherwise
than under normal circumstances" means death not being in the usual course
E but apparently under suspicious circumstances if not caused by burns or
bodily injury. This position was noted before this Court in Shanti v. State of
Haryana, [1991] 1SCC371.

These aspects were highlighted in Thakkan Jha v. State of Bihar, [2004]
13 sec 348.
F The conviction as maintained by the High Court needs no interference.
Coming to the question of sentence, on considering the background facts, it '
would be appropriate to reduce the custodial sentence to eight years which
the appellant claims to have undergone including remissions. If the appellant
had already undergone custodial sentence including remission for eight years,
G he shall be immediately released from custody unless required to be in custody
in connection with any other case.

The appeal is partly allowed so far as it relates to quantum of sentence.

B.K. Appeal partly allowed.