Holding

The Supreme Court held that the High Court was justified in exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the proceedings as the complaint did not disclose a prima facie case of abetment of suicide.

Summary

The case concerned the alleged abetment of suicide by Kailashi Bai, the wife of a deceased civil judge, under Sections 306 and 107 of the IPC. The prosecution alleged that she harassed her husband because of caste differences, leading to his suicide, and filed a charge sheet. Kailashi Bai filed a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC seeking quashal of the proceedings, which the Madhya Pradesh High Court granted, holding that the complaint did not disclose a prima facie offence. The State appealed, contending that the High Court misapplied its inherent jurisdiction and that the matter warranted a trial. The Supreme Court examined the scope of Section 482, the categories of cases where it may be invoked, and the need for a prima facie case before quashing. It concluded that the allegations failed to establish the ingredients of abetment of suicide and that the High Court was correct to exercise its inherent power to quash the case. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The propriety of exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash criminal proceedings for alleged abetment of suicide.
Whether the allegations in the FIR/complaint disclose a cognizable offence under Sections 306 and 107 IPC.
Whether the High Court erred in concluding that no prima facie case existed and thus could quash the proceedings.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 482
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 107, s. 306

Subjects

Section 482inherent jurisdictionquashing of criminal proceedingsabetment of suicideIPC 306IPC 107cognizable offenceabuse of processSupreme CourtMadhya Pradesh High Court

Judgment

[2009] 7 S.C.R. 312

A KAILASHI BAI
....
v.
AARTI ARYA & ANR.
Criminal Appeal No. 861 of 2009

APRIL 27, 2009
B
(DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND ASOK KUMAR
GANGULY, JJ.)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:

c s. 482 - Quashing of criminal proceedings - Abetment
of suicide and abetment of a thing - Material collected during
the investigation and evidence led in Court would decide the
fate of the accused person -A/legations of ma/a tides against
the informant are of no consequence and cannot by
~
themselv($S be the basis for quashing the proceedings -
D
Exercise of jurisdiction under s. 482 Cr.PC. only in exceptional
cases and where there is prim a facie trial to be held - However,
""
in the peculiar facts of the case no need for interference -
Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 306, 107.

E Dhana/akshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar 1990 Supp SCC
686; State of Bihar v. P P Sharma AIR 1996 SC 309; Rupan
Deal Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill 1995 (6) SCC 194; State
of Kera/av. 0. C. Kuttan AIR 1999 SC 1044; State of U.P. v. 0. ):'

P. Sharma 1996 (7) SCC 705; Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh
F Kumar Bhada 1997 (2) SCC 397; Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt.
of NCT of Delhi) AIR 1996 SC 2983; and Rajesh Bajaj v. State
NCT of Delhi 1999 (3) SCC 259 and State of Karnataka M.
Devendrappa and Another 2002 (3) SCC 89 - relied on.
Case Law Reference
G
1990 Supp sec 686 relied on para 7 ~(

AIR 1996 SC 309 relied on para 7
1995 (6) sec 194 relied on para 7

H 312
KAILASHI BAI V. AARTI ARYA & ANR. 313

,...
AIR 1999 SC 1044 relied on para 7 A
., 1996 (7) sec 105 relied on para 7
1997 (2) sec 397 relied on para 7
AIR 1996 SC 2983 relied on para 7
B
1999 (3) sec 259 relied on para 7
'( 2002 (3) sec 89 relied on para 7
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 861 of 2009 c
From the Judgement and Order dated 06.09.2007 of the
Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Misc.
Criminal Case No. 5778 of 2007.
).
Vikas Upadhyay, B.K. Satija, for the Appellant.
71 D
Fakhruddin, Mushtaq Ahmad, Raj Kishore Chaudhary,
Munwar Sultana Alam, Abdul Karim Ansari, Gulteshan Javed,
Aftab Ali Khan, Vibha Datta Makhija, with him for the
Respondent.
-1 E
The Judgement of the Court was delivered by
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
---.
Leave granted.
Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by the F
learned Single Judge of Madhya Pradesh High Court allowing
the petition filed in terms of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (in short 'the Code').
Background facts, in nutshell, are as follows:
G
.r!'> The present respondent No.1 was married to Mukesh Arya
(hereinafter referred to as 'deceased') in the year 2003.
According to the prosecution, the deceased was working as
Civil Judge and was posted at the relevant time at ltarsi.
Respondent No.1 's in laws did not approve of the marriage as
H
314' SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 7 S_C_R

A the respondent No_ 1 belonged to an upper caste while the
deceased belonged to_ the Scheduled Caste_ A child was born
to them_ The deceased conStJmed some poisonous substance
and lost his life on 18/3/2007_

It was· the case of the prosecution that during enquiry it
B surfaced that the respondent No.1 accused used to harass the
deceased and subject to mental cruelty as she belonged to
higher caste and she did not like association of deceased with ~-

his parents and relatives. This was stated to be the ground of
suicide and the accused abetted the suicide. Charge sheet was
c filed in Court of Magistrate_ An application under Section 482
of the Code was filed questioning the order passed by learned
Magistrate.

The High Court took note of the fact that the present
appellant's statement on a fair reading did not disclose any
•
D
offence. The High Court noted even at the time of marriage, the "
parties knew caste of the deceased and the accused and
therefore the question of that being a factor for harassing the
deceased. Leading to his suicide cannot be believed. It was
also found that there was no material to show that the accused
E wanted the deceased to stay separately from his parents.
Accordingly, the proceedings were quashed.

It was held that ingredients of Section 306 were not ¥'
established. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that
F the parameters of exercise of power under Sec.482 of the Code
was not kept in mind by the High Court. In any event, it was not
a matter which was to be dealt with in trial. Learned counsel for
the respondent No.1 supported the judgment.
Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a
G case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The Section
-l'!\,
does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves
the inherent. power which the Court possessed before the
enactment of the Code.It envisages three circumstances under
which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to
H give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of
'. '
~
I
';
(
,
KAI LASH I BAI V. AARTI ARYA & ANR. . 315
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J]
_,,..
the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of A
justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any
-t inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent
jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can
provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore,
have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which B
are necessary for proper .discharge of functions and duties
imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds
f expression in the section which merely recogrrrzes and preserves
inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or
criminal possess; in the absence of any express provision, as c
inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary
to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration
of justice on the principle "quando lex aliquid alicui concedit,
concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest"
J (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without
D
'ti which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section,
the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision.
·Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be
exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when
such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in
the section itself. It is to be, exercised ex debito justitiae to do E
real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone
courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of
---,.; justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as
to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abus~. It
would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action F
which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice.
In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any
proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to
abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings
would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is G
,JO•. disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question
of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is
permissible to look into the materials to assess what the
complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out
even if the allegations are accepted in toto. H
316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 7 S.C.R.
..
A In R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab (AIR 1960 SC 866) this
Court summarized some categories of cases where inherent
power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings:

(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar.
against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction;
B
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or
complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their
entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where ....
the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal
c evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or
manifestly fails to prove the charge. .;-.;>

In dealing with the last case, it is important to bear in mind
the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence
or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the
~
D accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence
which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations.
When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code,
"'
the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry
whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether
E on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be
sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process
should not be an instrument of oppression,. or, needless
harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in
x-
exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and
F circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest
it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant
to .unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the
same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an
accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden
death.
G
The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 of the ......
Code and the categories of cases where the, High Court may
exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to
prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure
H the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this Court in
KAILASHI BAI V. AARTI ARYA & ANR. 317
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J]

State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) 335). A note of A
caution was, however, added that the power should be
exercised sparingly and that too in rarest of rare cases. The
illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as follows:
"102. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face B
value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the
accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the.first information report c
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(·1) of the Code except
under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section
155(2) of the Code. · ·
D
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR
or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the
same do not disclose the commission of any offence and
make out a case _against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not com;titute a E
cognizable offence but constitute only a no~Fcognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate ~s contemplated under. --
Section 155(2) of the Code. -
F
5 Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion
that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
G
6 Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under ·
· which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution .
a net continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is
a specific provision· in the Code or Act conc~rned, H
318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R.

..#-

-
A providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the )-
aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended ' '
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
B on the·accused and with a view to spite him due to private
and personal grudge."
·'
As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court y

under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very
c plenitude of the power requires great caution in its
exercise. Court must be careful to. see that its decision in
.. exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The
inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate
prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a 4-

State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie ~
D
decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete ~

and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been
collected and produced before the Court and the issues
involved.. whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and
cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient
E material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down
in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its
extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at
~
any stage. (See: Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary (1992 (4)
SCC 305), and Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar (AIR
F 1964 SC 1). It would not be proper for the High Court to
analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all
probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction
would be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a
conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would
G be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude

H
that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In a
proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent
powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a
case where the complaint does not disclose any offence
or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations
......
-
•
KAILASHI BAI V. AARTI ARYA & ANR. 319
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J]

set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of A
which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is
open fo the High Court to quash the same in exercise of
the inherent pow_ers under Section 482 of the Code. It is ·
not, however, necessary that there should be meticuloys
analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the B
case would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint.
has to be r_ead as a whole. If it appears that on
consideration of the allegations in the ligh\ofthe statement
made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of
.the offence or offences are disclosed ·and there is no c
<
' materiaLto show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous
· or ~exatious, in that event there would be no justification

- for interference by the High Court. When an information is
lodged at the police station and an offence is registered,
then the mala tides of the informant would be of secondary -0
importance. It is the material collected during' the
· investigation and evidence led in court which decides the
fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides
against the informant are of no consequence and cannot
by themselves be the basis for quashing the proceedings.
(See: Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar (1990 Supp E
SCC 686), State of Bihar v. P.·P. Sharma (AIR 1996 SC
309), Rupan Deal Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill (1995 (6)
SCC 194), State of Kerala v. 0. C. Kuttan (AIR 1999 SC .
1044), State of U.P. v. 0. P. Sharma (1996 (7) SCC 705),
Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada (1997 (2) SCC :·F
397), Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (AIR
1996 SC 2983) and Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi
(1999 (3)sec 259 .
• The above position was recently highlighted in State qf G
Karnataka M. Devendrappa and Another (2002 (3) SCC 89).

Section 306 deals with abetment of suicide and Section
107 deals with abetment of a thing. They read as follows:

"306. Abetment of suicide- If any person commits suicide, H.
320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R.

A whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be ..;
punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to ten years and shall also be
liable to fine.
107. Abetment of a thing- A person abets the doing of a
B thing, who:-
First- Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly-
Engages with one or more other person or persons in any
conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission
c takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the
;.-
doing of that thing; or
Thirdly- Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission
the doing of that thing.
Explanation 1-A person who, by willful misrepresentation
D
or by willful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to "
disclose voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or
procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that
thing.
E Explanation 2:- Whoever, either prior to or at the time of
the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate
the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the
commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act." )C

There is no doubt that exercise of jurisdiction under Section
F 482 of the Code has to be done only in exceptional cases and
where there is prima facie material trial was to be held. But on
the peculiar facts of the case highlighted above, we are of the
view that the High Court was right in exercising its jurisdiction
under Sec.482 of the Code. Therefore, no interference is called
G for in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.
..i...,,

G.N. Appeal dismissed. .'