Holding

The detention order is unsustainable because the first two grounds are too remote and the authority failed to consider the detainee's representation, and therefore the order is quashed.

Summary

The petitioner, Kamlakar Prasad Chaturvedi, was detained under Section 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980 on seven grounds, two of which related to incidents that occurred in 1978 and 1980, more than five and two years respectively before the detention order dated 6 May 1983. The petitioner challenged the order on the grounds that the first two grounds were stale, vague and not proximate, and that his representation under Article 22(5) of the Constitution had not been considered within a reasonable time. The Supreme Court examined whether remote incidents can form a valid ground of preventive detention and held that the detaining authority cannot rely on such stale grounds, nor can it ignore the procedural requirement of considering the detainee's representation. Relying on precedents such as Shalini Soni v. Union of India and Mehdi Mohamed Joudi v. State of Maharashtra, the Court found the detention order unsustainable and ordered its quashment, directing the petitioner’s release.

Issues considered

Whether grounds of detention that are remote and stale, such as incidents occurring five years earlier, can be validly relied upon under Section 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980.
Whether the failure to consider the detainee's representation within a reasonable time under Article 22(5) of the Constitution vitiates the detention order.
Whether the provision in the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (Section 5A) is applicable to interpret the effect of multiple grounds in a preventive detention order.

Legislation cited

Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974s. 5A
Constitution of Indias. Article 19, s. Article 22(5), s. Article 32
National Security Act, 1980s. 3(1), s. 3(2)

Subjects

Preventive detentionNational Security ActStale groundsProximity testArticle 22(5) representationQuash of detention orderSupreme Court of India

Judgment

•

KAMLAKAR PRASAD CHATURVEDI
A
v.

STATE OF ·M. P. & ANR.
•
October 7, 1983

-
[D; A. DESAI, 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY AND A. ·VARADARAJAN, JJ.).

Naiiona/ Securi(y Act, 1980-Section 3(1) anti (l)-SciJpe of--Detention
order-Made on two or inore grounds-Not to be .deemed ro _have bee'h _made
seperately on each ground-Ground relating to five year old incident:-Too remote
ond slalt-:Detention order viti'('led.

The petitie:ner who was detained under sec. 3(2) of the National _Security
Act, 1980, was ~onveyed seven grounds of detention by the Detai~ing · ~utho--' ·
rity. The first tWo grounds related to the incidents -that occurred more than
S years and about 3 years respectively prior to the date of the order of
detention. The petitioner challenged the order of detention as vitiated on
account of the ~rounds of d~tention ,being vague and sta~e.•_:
..
D

A.itowing the writ petition ~y majo~ity,

HE~D : The order of detention is quashed.
+
(Per. Chinnappa Reddy and Varadarajan, JJ.)

. It is not open to the Detaining Authority to pick up an old and .stale
incident and hold it as "the basis of an order of detention under S.3(2) of the
Act. Nor it is cpen to the Detaining Authority to contend that it has been
mentioned only ·to show that the detenu has a tendency to create problems
resulting in disturbanCe to public order, for as ~ matter of fact it has been
0

mentioned as a ground of detention. [327 E-F]

Shalini Soni v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 431; Mehdi Mohamed Joudi
v. Staie of Maharqshtra, (1981) 2 S.C.C. 358;' Taramati Chan.du/al •· State of
Maharashtra AIR 1981 SC 871; and Shibban Lal Saksena v. The State of Uttar,
.-,r Pradesh. (1954) 4 S.C.R. 418 refetred to. . , .

In the instant case the first two incidents which are of 1978 and 1980
are mentioned as grounds of detention in the o~der dated 6-5-1983. There can
be no dotlbt that these .grounds especially grounds No.1 rClating ·to an incident·
or 1978 .,;, too remote and not proximate to ·the Order of detention. [327 D-E]

There is op provision in the National Security Act, 1!180 similar to s.SA
of the Conservation of Fofeign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling
Activities Act, 1974 which says t_hat where a person has been detained in,
·pursuance of an Order of detentjon un4~r syb-~ec ..(1) of .S,3 \\'hi~h has b~cn,
•

318 SUPIEMB COURT REPORTS (1984) 1 s.c.R..
made oii two or more grounds, such Order of detention shall be deemed to ..
have been rn·ade separately on each of such grounds and accordingly (a) such
Order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or
some of the g_rounds is or are vague, non-existent, non-reICvant, not connected
or not proximately connected with such persons or invalid for anY other
reason, and it is not therefore_ possible to hold that the Government or officer
inaking such order would have been satisfied as provided in .sub-sec. (1) of s.3
• with reference to the remaining groµnd· or grounds and inade \he order.of
B detention and (b) the Government or Officer making the order of detention
shall be deemed to have made the order of detention under the said sub-sec; (I)
after being satisfied as provided in that sub-section with reference to tha
remainin11 ground or grounds. (327 F-H; 328,AJ ,

In the present case, therefore, it cannot be postulated what view would
c have ·been taken by the Deta1Ding :AuthOrity ab6ut the need to-detain the
petitioner unde:r sec. 3(2) of the Act if .be had· hot ·taken into account the

..
stale and not proximate grounds 1 and 2 into consideration in arrivins at the
subjective satisfaction, , [328 A-BJ

(Per Desai J,) ' i.,:
- '> j
D When criminal actitit~ -of. _a perSon leads te such a drastic action as
detention without trial, ordinarily a single stray incident may not unless
contrary is shown be sufficient to inv~ke such drastic power of' preventive
detention .. In order to avoid the charge that a siray incident was seized upon
to invoke such drastic power of preventive detention the authority charged with •
a duiy to maintain public order of a"ssure security of the State. may keep a
E close watch on the activities oJ the miscre'ant for some time and repeated
indulgence into prejudicial activity may permit an inference that· unless pre..
ventive detention is ·resorted to, it would ·not be possible to wean away Such
person from such prejudicial activity. (319 G-H; 320 A-BJ

In the instant case therefore, when in 1983, an aCti9n was -propoaed to
be taken under sub..sec. (2) Of sec. 3, the Detaining Authority examined the ·

' .history of the criminal activity of the detenu and took int~ account a conti..
nuous course of conduct which may permit an inference that unless interdicted
by a detention order, such activity cannot. be put to an end the power under
. sub-sec. (2) of sec. 3 is exercised. [320 B-CJ
•
If there is a big: time lag between the last of the events leadina: to the
G detention order bein1 made and the remote""earlier event, the same cannot bC
treated as showing a coil.tinuity of criminal .activity. But if events in close
proximity with each other are taken into account for drawing a permissible
inference that these are not stray or spasinodic events but disclose a continuous
prejudicial activity, the reference to earlier events cannot be Styled as stale or·
remote which would vitiate the order of detention. (320 D-E]
H • ·,
Jn the instant case if each event is eXatnincd in cloSe proximity with each'
othtr, the events or 1978 and 1980 referred. to in grounds Nos. 1 and' 2- Cannot"
be rqectcd as a ·itray· or not pro:timato io.thc making· of the ·detention ·ordorc
ltAMLAKAR v. M.P. STATE (De1al, J.) 319
But they provide the genesis of the continuity of tho prejudicial activity of the
dctenu and they appear to have been relied upon for that limited purpose. A
. · [321 A-BJ

Gora v. ·State of West Bengal, [1975] 2 $.C.R .. 996; Smt, Rekhab<n
Virendro Kapadia v. State ojGujarot and Ora., [1979] 2 S.C.C. 566; and Firrat
Rozo Khan v. Stole 4 Uttor Pradesh and Ors., [1982] 2 S.C.C. 449, referred to.
,
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 584 of B
• 1983 . . .
-
(Under article 32 of the Constitution of India)

RK. Garg and D.K. Garg 'for the Petitioner.
.
Ravindra Bana. and A.K. Sanghi for the Respondent.
I .
'
c
The following Judgments were delivered,

DESAI, J. I Iiave very carefully gone .through the opinion
prepared by my learned brother Varadarajan, J. · But I regret my
D
' inability to agree with ihe same.
. All the relevant facts and the grounds on Which the ·order of
3f- detention was made against the pettionet have· been succinctly set
out by my learned brother and therefore, it is not necessary to
+ recapitulate them here. However, the only ground examined by my

..
learned brother is that the order.of detention is vitiated on account
of taking into consideration grounds Nos. 1 and 2 which were stale
and not proximate to t)i.e time when detention order was made and
therefore, they .are irrelevant, .and would vitiate the · order of
detention. Grounds Nos. 1 and 2 relate to the events that occurred
on March 20, 1978 and August 9, 1980. The order of detention is F
made on May 6, 1983. In between there are four other incidents
involving the detenu dated July 13, 1982, ·July 26, .1982, September
8, 1982 and January 10, 1983 .. The·order of detention is erounded
on the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining AU:tliority that with
a view to preventing the detenu from acting in any manner prejudi-
cial to the security of Satna City, it was necessary to: detain tb,e
G
de'tenu. When criminal activity of a person leads to such a drastic
action as detention without trial, ordinarily a ·single stray incident
may not unless contrary is shown be sufficient to invoke such drastic
power of preventive detention. Onjinarily,· drastic power of
preventive detention without trial is invoked when the normal
B.
administration of criminal ji:istice would fail to prevent the person
so acting in a manner set out in sub-sec. (2) of Sec; 3 of the National
.' \ .
,· · llui>RBMB coiiai aiiPoaTs ;
. .
W>s4] i s.c.it
SilCurity Act, 1980.. In order to avoid the charge that a stray incident
A seized upon to invoke such drastic power ()f preventive· detention,
"the authority charged with a duty to maintain public order or assure.
. .
security of tlie State, may keep a close .watch on the activities
of the miscreant for some time and repeated indulgence into ).,

prejudicial activity may permit an inference that unless preventive )'
. detentionis resorted to, it would not be possible to wean away such '
B .-<
· person from such prejudicial activity. Therefore, when in · !~83, an
action was proposed to be taken under sub·sec. (2) of Sec. 3, the •
Detaining Authority examined the. history of the criminal activity of
the detenu and took into account a continuous course of conduct
. which may permit an inference that ·unless interdicted by a· detention
c 'order, such activity cannot be put to an end 'the power under sub-sec.
(2) of·St:c. 3 is exercised. Obviously, if there is a· big time la_g
between the last of the events leading to the detentio.n order being
made.and ·the remote earlier event, the same cannot be treated as .
. showing a continuity of criminal activity.· But if events in close·
D proximity with each other are taken into account for drawing a •
permissible inference thal these are ·not stray or spasmodic events
but disclose a continuous prejudicial activity, the reference to earlier'
events cannot be styled as stale or remote which would vitiate the
order of detention. In this connection, .one may refer to · Gora v.
State of West Bengal.(')· This Court after a review of· the earlier
E dec/sions observe4 that the test of proximity is not a rigid . oi,
mechanical test to be blindly applied by merely counting the number
of months between the ofiending acts and the order of detention.
The question is whether the.past activities of the detenu are such
that the detaining authority ·can reasonably came to the conclusi9n
F that the detenu is likely to continue iri his unlawful activities. ~This
view was affirmed in Smt. Rekhaben Virendra Kapadia v. State of
Gujarat and Others('). In a re'cent decision in Firrat Raza Khan v.
' State a/Uttar Pradesh and Ors.(') this Court held that when .both the
incidents are viewed in close proximity, the· propensity of the peti-
tioner to resort to prejudicial activity becomes manifest and the Court
"G therefore, rejected the contention that the earlier event was not proxi-
. mate in point of time and had no rational connection with ihe
conclusion that the detention was necessary for maintenance of pu)Jlic
·order.

H
(1) [!97Sj. 2 S.C.R. 996.
(2) [197912 s.c.c. 566.
(3) (1982] 2 s . c.c. 449.
IW!LAkAR ~.?.I.ti. STATE. (Yaradaiojan, I.) Ul
'
Turning to the facts of. this case, if each everit Is examined in
close proximity with each other, the events of 1978 and 1980 referred ', A
to in grounds Nos. 1 and 2 cannot be rejected as a stray or .not
proximate to the making of the detention order. Bui they provide the
genesis of tlle continuity of the prejudicial activity of the · detenu and
they appear to have been .relied upon.for that limited purpose.

I would therefore, find it difficult to quash the detention order
B
on the short ground that incidents set out in grounds Nos•• 1 and 2
are stale and ·wou1d be irreleven~ and therefore, the detention order is
vitiated. I would therefore uphold the detention order:

VARADARAJAN,1. This writ petition under Article 32 of the c
- Constitution is for quashing the Order of detention dated· 6.5.1983,
passed by.the·second resporldent District Magistrate, Satna as being
arbitrary aad unreasonable and for the issue of a .. writ. of habeas
corpus directing the immediate release of the petitioner Kamlakar
Prashed Chaturvedi. There is also another prayer in the petition, D
which cannot be granted in these proceedings, and that . is to direct
tlie first respondent State of Madhya Pradesh to pay compensation
to -the petitioner fcir the wrongful detention. ·

The second respondent passed the Order of detention ·dated
. 6.5.1983 against the petitioner under S. 3 (2) of the Natio~al Sec'iirity • E

-
Act, 1980, The grounds of detention were served on the petitioner
in jail and copy thereof was served on -the petitioner's brother on
· 6.5.1983. .The following are the grounds :-
•
(I} On 20.3.1978 petitioner unauthorisedly entered the
Nagar Mahapalika at Satna and beat the Revenue
Inspector Ram Biswas Tiwari in the presence of.
• other Government employees as a result of which
those employees ran away on account of fear and
a first information report has been lodged against
the petitioner· for offences under Ss. 323 and 35j G
I.P;C.;

(2) .On 9.8.19SO, petitioner and his ·associates Vijay
Shankar and three others formed themselves into an H
unlawfui assembly and unauthorisedly entered the .
Badri Hotel situate at Station Road and beat
Surender Kumar Srivastava with sticks and .rod as
•
.
· SVPIUiMs Coiitrt'!t~P6R'rs · '{1984] 1 s.c.lt.
a result of which the customers in the hotel and · ':>- ·
pa'ssen by. ran away in· panic; and a first information
report has been lodged against the petitioner and
.· others for offenc~s under Ss. 307, 147, 149 ancl 501
I.P.C.i •

(3) On 13.7.1983, petitioner and his associate Kamlesh
. • ,entered the Land Development !lank and beai Gaya
· Prasad Pandey in the presence of the • Manager of
the Bank arid threatened ro beat him with shoes at
the road crossings in Satna and on account of the
terror the staff of the Bank ran away and Gaya
c · . Prasad Pandey h.as not lodged any report;

(4) On 26.7.1982, petitioner unauthorisedly entered the
office of the Public Works Department and tried to
obtain by force approval of a wood contract from
D the Office Secretary R.P. Sharma and on his refusal.
to comply with his demand the petitioner took away
papers and intended to beat- the Office Secretary, and
the. office staff ran away due to the terror and a first
information report has been lodged against· the
petitioner for offences under Ss. 353 and 448 lP.C.;
' "'

F
(5) On 8.9.1982, petitioner unauthorisedly entered the
office of the Lilnd Development Bank at Satna and
threatened to beat the Chairman Ram Asray Prasad~
. M.L.A. and he again threatened to beat that person
on 1.10.1982 at the Guest House at Bhopal in the
presence of one Gulshar Ahmed;
-
(6) On 1.1,.1983, petitioner with his associates entered
the ,Land Development Bank, Satna and threatened
the Gµard and broke the telephone and beat ·one
Tara Chand Jain at the Dharamshala later, and a
first information report was lodged at the ·Police
Station about that incident, and on 15.1.1983 Ram
Asray Prasad, M.L.A. has reported.to the police at
H Jahangirabad, Bhopal that at the Tara .Chand Jain
Guest House the petitioner threatened . to break his
arm as a result of which Harijans employed . in the
Land Development Bank were feeling insecure and a
. ,
•
. kAMLAKAR v. M.P. STATE (l!aradara}an, J.)

first information report has been lodged against him
on 6.1.1983;

(7) On 25.3.1983 at night, petitioner with his associates
threatened Bijju Prasad Misra and Shanti Prasad
Misra near Dashrath Singh garage saying that he
• would kill them.if they gave evidence against Anup
Singh and Ram Charan and a case has. been B
·registered against him on 26.3.1983 under Ss. 107

- 'and 117 I.P.C. and a ·notice calling upon him to
appear in the Court on 2.4.1983 had been served on
him and he left the Court without signing the order
sheet. c
The petitioner's case is that the .detention Order is politically
.motivated and bas been passed at the instance of the Congress (I)
M.L.A. Ram Asray Prasad as the petitioner is a social· worker who
had always raised bis voice against goondas who are protected by
the Congress (I) Party h1. Madhya Pradesh and had organised a D
nuinber of rallies against the unscrupulous and uncivilized behaviour
of the Block Developmen·t Officers with illiterate and · poor farmers
of the Ltate. The second respondent has passed the Order of
detention mechanically without applying bis mind' to the facts and
·+ circumstances of the case on the basis of the first information, reports
lodged against the petitioner. The grounds of detention must be
precise, pertinent, proximate and relevant. Vaguness and staleness
• would vitiate the ground of detention as held in Shiv Prasad
Bhatnagar v. State of Madhya Pradesh.(') . All the seven grounds do
not fall within the realm of public order but relate oqly to law and
" order. Grounds· 1 to 4 suffer from want of proximity to the order
of detention. Grounds 5 and 6. are vague. Ground 7 is irrelevant.
The State Government has not considered the petitioner's represen·
tation dated 25.5.1983 expeditiously. · The Order of detention
'eontravenes Article 22 (5) of the Constitution and is consequently
liable to be quashed.

The pettion is opposed. The District Magistrate, Satna bas
contended in·his counter affidavit that the petitioner's detention has
been orderded because his recent activities coupled with the past
incidents are. prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The B
·Order .of detention. was considered necessary to prevent him from

(l) A.I.R 1981 S:C. 870.
StJi>RllMB cOtiaT REPoR1S (1984] 1 s.c.ti..

repeating the offences because the petitioner has a tendency to go on
violating the laws. The grounds of attack made in the petition
have been denied in the counter .affidavit· and it is stated that the
State Government had considered the petitioner's representation·
and rejected it on 4.6.1983 and even the Advisory Board has rejected
his representation. · ·
B
In addition to the above grounds of. attack on the Order of
detention the petitoner has stated in para 13 of the Writ Petition

c
that.the Detaining Authority hl!s 'not "suggested the relevant docu·
ments on the basis of which the satisfaction of passing the -Oetention .. ·
Order has .been framed". Perhaps, what is meant to be. conveyed
by that allegati"n of the petitioner is that relevant documents on .1.
the basis of which the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining
-
Autdority had been reached have not ·been supplied to the
petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted in the
·course of his arguments befor~ us that the copies of the ·first infor·
D mation reports referred to· in the grounds of detention bad not been
supplied to the petitioner alongwith grounds Of detention. The said
allegation in para 13 of the Writ Petition does not naturally appear
fo have been understood. by the second respondent who has not .
stated anything about it in his para wise .reply in the . counter
. affidavit.
• E
\
It is not necessary to consider all the other objections raised
· · by .the petitioner in his Writ Petition as we propose to dispose bf
• the petition on the ground of want of proximity. of grounds 1 and 2,
particularly. ground 1 fo the order of detention dated 6.5.1983.
F Those grounds relate to alleged incidents of 20.3.1978 and 9.8:1980 •
which are more than 5 years and about 2 years respectively prior to ·
.'
the date of the Order of detention. This Court has taken· a strict

-,
view of the law of preventive detention which deprives the citizen
of his freedom without a trial and full fledged opportunity for him to
prove his innocence. ·In Sha/ini Soni v. Union of India(') to which '
G one of us was a parfy, ,it is observed :- ·

"Quite obvi9usly, the obligation imposed on ihe ·
detaining authority, by Art. 22 (5) of the Constit1:1tiori, to
H iiffor<! to the detenu the ~arliest opportunity of making a
representation, carries with it the imperative implication:

(I) A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 431.
•

IW.!LAKAR v: M.P. STATE ('P'arlidarajan, J.) '.!25

that the representation shall be consinered at the earliest
opportunity. Since all .the constitutional protection that
a detenu can claim is the ·-little that is afforded by the
. procedural safeguards prescribed by Art. 22 (5) read with
Art. 19, the Courts have a duty to rigidly insist that
•
,
>-
preventive detention proc~dures be fair and· strictly
observed. A breach of the procedural imperative. must
lead to the release of the detenu. The representation
8
dated July 27, 19SO was admittedly not considered and
on that ground alone the detenu was.entitled·to be set at
liberty'. .

In the view that we h!lie taken on the question of c
· the failure of t!)e detainiil? authority to consider the
representation of the detenu it is really unnecessary· to
·consider the second question raised on behalf of detenu
· in Criminal Writ Petition No; 4344 of. 1980. However,
this question has been squarely and directly ra£sed and,
indeed, it was the only question raised in the other two
Criminal Writ Petition.sand we have, therefore, to deal
with it.~,
. .,
. In Mehdi Mohamed Joudi v. State of Maharashtra(I) to which
one of us was a party the Order of detention was set aside on the .E
ground that the materials and documents were not supplied pari passu
... the grounds pf detention and that there was delay of more than a .
month in disposing of the representation of the detenu.. In Taramati
Chandu/a/ v. State of Maharashtra(') to wl).ich one of us ,was a party
the Order of detention was set aside on .the ground that the .docu-
ments relied upon in the Order of detention were not supplied as part
of the grounds alongwith the grounds of dctention. In Shibban
Lal Saksena v. The State of'Uttar Pradesh,(') it is observed :

"The petitioner was arrested on the 5th of January, G
. I 953, under an order, signed by. the District Magistrate
of Gorakhpur, and the order expressly directed the deten-
tion of the petitioner in the custody ·of the Superintendent,

(!) U98!J 2 s.c.c. 358.
(2) A.I.R. 1981 SC 871·
(3) [1954) 4 S.C.R, 418.
•

326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS !1984) 1 s.c.R.

District Jail, Gorakhpur, under sub-clauses. (ii)· and (iii)
A of clause (a) of section 3(1) of the ·Preventive Detention
Act, 1950, as amended by later Acts. On the 7th of
January following, the grounds of detention were com-
..,..
municated to the detenu in accordance with the provisions
of section 7 of the Preventive . Detention Act and the
B grounds, it appears, were of a two-fold character, falling
respectively under the two categories contemplated by
sub-clause (ii) and sub·clause (iii) of section 3(1) (a) of
the Act. Iri the first paragraph of the communication it
is stated that the. detenu in course of speeches dOlivered
Ghugli on certain dates exhorted and enjoined upon
c the cane-growers of that ·area not to supply sugar
cane to the sugar mills or even to withhold supplies
from them and thereby interfered with the ·main·
tenance of supply of sugar cane essential to the com·
munity. The other ground specified in paragraph 2 is to
D the .effect that by using expressions, some of which were
quoted under·neath the paragraph, the petitioner incited ·
the cane-growers and the public to violen~e against
established author!ty and to defiance of lawful orders
and directions issued by Government officers and
thereby seriously prejudiced the maintenarice of public
E order-------- +
· . "The sufficiency of the grounds upon which such.
satisfaction. purports to be based, provided they have a
rational probative value and are not extraneous to the
F . scope of purpose of the legislative provision, cannot be
chailenged in a court of law except on the ground of mala
fides. A court of law is not even competent to enquire
into the truth or otherwise of the facts which are mentioned
as grounds of detention in the communication to the
detenu under section 7 of the Act. What was happened,
G however, in this case is some what peculiar. The Govern· .
ment itself, in its communication dated the 13th of
March, 1953, has plainly admitted that one of grounds
upon which the original order of detention was passed '
H is uusubstantial or non existent and cannot , be
made a ground of detention. The . question is, whether ·
in such circumstances the original order made ·.u'nder'
section 3(1) (a) of the Act .can he allowed· t.; siana •.
•

' KAMLAKAR v. M.P. STATE (Vtiradatajan, J.) 321
-:
The answer, in our opinion, can only be in the' negative: ·
The detaining autho~ity gave here two grounds for detain-
ing the petitioner. We can neither decide whether these
grounds are good or bad, nqr can we attempt to .assess
in what manner and to what. extent each of these .groun<ls
f
operated on the mind of. appropriate · authority and
contributed to the creation of the satisfaction on .the basis B
of which the detention order was made .. · To say that the
other ground, which still remains is quite suf!icient io
sustain, the order, · would be to substitute an objective
judicial test for the subjective decision of the· executive
authority which is aaain the legislative policy underlying.
the staiute. In such cases, we. think, the position \¥ould · c
be the same as if one of these two grounds was irrelevant
for the purpose of the Act or was wl16lly illusory and this
would vitiate the detention ·or~r as a whole."

• The first two incidents which are of 1978 and 1980 are D
mentioned as grounds of detention in the order dated 6.5.1983.
There can be no doubt these grounds especially ground No. 1 relating
to an incident of'l 978 are too remote and not proximate to the
Order of detention. It is not open to the Detaining Authority to
pick up an old and stale incident and hold it as the basis of an
Order of detention under S. 3(2) of the Act. Nor it is open to the
Detaining Authority to .contend that it has been mentioned only to
show that the detenu has a tendency to create problems resulting in
disturbance to public order, for as a matter of fact it has been
mentioned as a ground of detention. Now there is no provision. in
the National Security Act, 1980 similar to S. SA of the Conservation F
of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act,
• 1974 which says that where a person has been detained in pursuance
of an Order of detention under sub-se~on l of S. 3 which has been •
made on two or more grounds, such Order of detention shall b.e
deemeq to have been made separately on each of such grounds and
G
accordingly (a) such 'Order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inope-
rative merely because one or some of the grom;1ds is. or are vague, non-
existent, non-relevant, not connected or not proxin;Jately connected
with such persons or invalid for any other reason, and. it is not
therefore possible to hold that the Government or offier making H
such order would have been satisfied as provided in sub-section I of
S. 3 with reference to the remaining ground or grounds and made
the order of detention and (b) the Government or. officer• making
•
928 SUPREME COURT IU!POB.TS (198411 s.c.tt.

the order, of detention shall be deemed to. have·· made the order of
detention under the said sub-section I after being fatisfied as provided
in that sub-section ·with reference to the remaining ground or grounds ..
Therefore in the· present case it cannot be postulated what view
would have been taken by t!\e Detainirig Authority about the need to
' detain the petitioner under section 3(2) of the Act if. he had not taken
into account the. $tale and not proximate grounds I and 2 into consi-
,deration in arriving· at the subjective satisfaction .. We are, therefore,
of the opinion that the petitioner's detention is unsustainable in law.
·Accordingly, ~e quash the order of detention and direct that the
petitioner be set at liberty forthwith. ·

u.s.K..
.
Petition. allowed•

•
•

•

.,
.
\

I
~-
. .)" , I '

'